REMEMBRANCES OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER IN MARBURG

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According to Heidegger's own words the years of his teaching career he enjoyed most were those in Marburg from 1923-1928. These were also the best years of the Weimar Republic. The German mark was stabilized, the economy greatly improved and the cultural life reached a high point. Dance, music, theater, the visual arts and poetry flourished as never before and created an atmosphere of excitement among young people. And the immensely productive intellectual and artistic activity did not fail to have an impact on the academic community. The French writer Paul Duhamel was greatly impressed by the German universities. In a lecture he delivered at Marburg University he remarked: "There are said to be seven world wonders but the German universities must be added as the eighth."

Marburg's rural setting pleased Heidegger. The town is situated at the river Lahn and is surrounded by the Lahn mountains. With its winding narrow streets, the old fountains, half-timbered houses and the castle on a hill, Marburg exuded a romantic atmosphere. In addition, in a few minutes one was deep in nature and so Heidegger could enjoy his customary afternoon walks. If one was lucky to meet him, he would always stop for a short talk.

Today Marburg has 15,000 students and half of them are Communists. But when Heidegger was there, Marburg had only 3,000 students; their contact with the professors was close. Marburg was rather notorious for her many dueling fraternities; the students belonging to them were mostly conservatives in politics. In opposition to them the liberal students founded the academic association; if my memory is correct, Heidegger attended some of its meetings.

At the time Marburg University had a nation-wide reputation for its Neokantian school and the department of religion which counted among its professors several noted theologians. In the light of Heidegger's interests in
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the twenties, his appointment as a professor at the University was an important period in his career. It was Paul Natorp, the famous representative of the Neokantian school, who was instrumental in bringing Heidegger to Marburg. It is sometimes said that after the first World War students were bored with the way philosophy was taught at the universities and that Husserl and Phenomenology provided the answer to what many students were looking for. On the other hand, the Neokantian school, dependent on its representative, had much inspiration to offer. Paul Natorp, for instance, had the temperament of a true philosopher and attracted many students. I am not surprised that he and Heidegger were in close contact.

At a progressive Gymnasium in Berlin I had a professor in philosophy who had studied with Natorp. He imbued us with an enthusiasm for philosophy which he had experienced as a student with Natorp. At a relatively young age I had become a great admirer of Kant. Since phenomenology in Freiburg where I spent my first semester had somewhat disappointed me, I decided to spend the summer semester 1925 at Marburg. Unfortunately, Natorp had already died the year before and Nicolai Hartmann now represented the Neokantian school. I took a course in Epistemology and a seminar on Kant with him. When I registered for the seminar Hartmann asked what I had done during the winter semester in Berlin. I told him that I had taken Eduard Spranger's seminar for beginners where we read Kant's two Critiques. He looked at me with a good deal of doubt and remarked rather ironically: “And you think you will hear the same here?” Spranger was a noted psychologist and thus Hartman objected to his intrusion into philosophy. It is of some importance to note that Heidegger, although he agreed with Hartmann on the strict separation of psychology and philosophy, quoted Spranger in Sein und Zeit in support of his view as to the “constitution of historical understanding”.

It is characteristic of Heidegger then and later that criticism did not make him blind to an author's achievement in other respects. I remember that Heidegger was quite unhappy about the misunderstanding his “destruction of metaphysics” created among his colleagues. During a conversation he remarked that “critique is always also admiration” (Kritik schliesst immer Verehrung ein). On the occasion of a seminar Heidegger conducted at Zollikon he elucidated his view of critique: “Criticism” he stated “is derived from the Greek word krinein that is to differentiate, to contrast with. Genuine criticism is different from criticizing in the sense of finding fault with, of disapproving and carping. Criticism (as an act) of differentiating means to show the different as such in its differentiation. What is different is this only in as far as it is different in one respect. Consequently, we see first the same: the latter and that which is differentiated from it belong together. Any investigation must direct the eye to the same. In other words, genuine criticism as this kind of showing is eminently positive. And genuine criticism is rare.”

A case in point is Ernst Cassirer, a product of the Marburg school who had studied with Paul Natorp. In his review of Cassirer’s Mythical Thought Heidegger is quite critical of Cassirer’s failures to relate myth to Dasein. He nevertheless recognized Cassirer’s “first attempt since Schelling to place myth as a systematic problem within the range of philosophy.”

In the recently published second edition of Karl Jaspers’ Autobiographie
nineteen pages of references to Heidegger previously left out are now included. Jaspers tells of a conversation with Heidegger in the course of which he expressed his surprise that "The dedication of Heidegger's first book to Rickert, of his second to Husserl, emphasizes a connection with people of whom he had spoken to me with contempt." "He pretended" Jaspers continued "to belong to a tractional world from which we had set ourselves apart." The use of the word contempt may well be a misnomer; it is quite possible, however, that Heidegger made some derogatory remarks in regard to certain aspects of their respective philosophies with which he disagreed. In addition, it is not justified to refer, as Jaspers did, to Rickert and Husserl in one breath. The dedication of Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus to Rickert is of 1916, the one of Sein und Zeit of 1927. Much had happened between 1916 and 1927. Heidegger could have countered Jaspers' reproach with calling his attention to the fact that what was true in 1916 was not necessarily true in 1927 and later. I remember quite vividly that during my years at Marburg Heidegger was quite outspoken in his opposition to any value philosophy be it Rickert's or Hartmann's. Phenomenology, on the other hand, remained an important influence throughout Heidegger's career. Furthermore Heidegger may have avoided the issue Jaspers had raised because of a strong dislike to give an account of his intellectual background and his personal or professional relationships. (It was for this reason Heidegger told me that he declined Professor Schilpp's suggestion to publish a volume dealing with his philosophy in The Library of Living Philosophers.) Instead of defending himself against Jaspers' reproach Heidegger answered in kind telling him: "You are instead traditional in your factional philosophy."

During the ten years he worked on Sein und Zeit Heidegger felt quite close to Max Scheler. They shared a criticism of the Neokantian school because in the words of Scheler, "it is a thinking that creates objects in accord with the inner rules of the mind." Like Heidegger Scheler differentiates between the task of philosophy and the task of the sciences: The former raises the question of the fundament (Grund) of all that is, the latter explains nature and events with the help of laws. More important still Heidegger's concept of Dasein-being-in-the-world and with other human beings corresponds in Scheler's philosophy to the notion of a person, that is the whole concrete man as a feeling, acting, loving and thinking being in his relation to "world" and other people. In Sein und Zeit Heidegger quotes Scheler in support of his view that a person's acts are not the object of a science (psychology); they have to be seen in the context of a whole person's being.

Although Heidegger had doubts about the possibility of a philosophical anthropology which according to him had been Scheler's goal for years, he recognized the great contributions Scheler had made to philosophy. When Max Scheler died in 1928 Heidegger gave a short speech remembering his great colleague before he started his lecture course. The final words which said so much in their utter simplicity are still alive in my memory: Ein Licht ist ausgegangen. (A light has gone out.)

In contrast to his relationship with Scheler, Heidegger had less in common with Nicolai Hartmann. The latter had somewhat loosened the scientifically oriented Neokantian position in that
he admitted the importance of "emotional" transcendental acts and distinguished between layers of entities from matter to spirit to which various categories applied. But for all that he did not overcome the subject-object dichotomy. In Foundation of Ontology (Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie) we read: "... Here the question is the basic phenomenon of all knowledge: the being in itself of the object has its cause not only in the essence of what knowledge as relation means, rather all knowledge, the most naive included, already knows the being-in-itself of the object and understands it from the beginning as an entity independent of it." Hartmann also taught that not all entities need to become objects; on this basis he rejected the notion of "phenomenon since "it presupposes that it belongs to (the character of) all entities that they show themselves." A similar misunderstanding prevails in Hartmann's interpretation of Heidegger's concept of an entity being ready-at-hand. "It could appear" he claimed "that the entity is an object with which we have dealings (Umgangsgegenstand), ready-at-hand ... Moreover, the disadvantage of the relation as ready-at-hand over against the relation as knowledge is manifest; not everything that 'is' can become an object for our use; but everything that 'is' can ... at least in principle ... become an object of knowledge."

Already in Sein und Zeit Heidegger took exception to Hartmann's (and Scheler's) "ontologically oriented theory of knowledge." He claimed "that 'ontology' in its traditional fundamental orientation fails over against Dasein." In the second edition (not the first!) of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1951) he reproaches Hartmann with interpreting Kant in terms of a "theory of experience" that is based "on the positive sciences." In Der Satz vom Grund (1957) Heidegger refers to Hartmann's and others misunderstanding of the basic stance taken in Sein und Zeit. "Understanding of Being means here," he asserts, "that man as a subject never possesses a subjective perception of Being and that Being is a mere perception. With this Nicolai Hartmann and many contemporaries have tried to make the starting point of Sein und Zeit understandable to themselves." Furthermore, Heidegger could not accept Hartmann's definition of values which he claimed "subsist independently of consciousness of them" ... "Hence, concerning the characteristics which values have, the proposition holds good that they have self-existence."

Nicolai Hartmann left Marburg in the Fall of 1925. For the following semester Heidegger announced a lecture course with the title: Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It was clear that Heidegger wanted to distinguish his Kant interpretation from the Neo-kantians. Heidegger repeated the course in 1927-28 when I took it. Despite my completely different background, the way Heidegger dealt with the Critique fascinated me. What was the reason? Compared to Nicolai Hartmann, Heidegger was not what you would call an accomplished lecturer. Whereas Hartmann was fully aware of the impact he made on his audience, Heidegger's contact with the students rested on more subtle means.

Unassuming as Heidegger's physical presence was, the power of his intellect impressed the students immediately. Heidegger developed his theme clearly — although not without detours; an intensity in his voice betrayed an inner passion that called for full
attention. Nicolai Hartmann was an interesting lecturer too, but Heidegger's method had the greater appeal. He allowed us as it were insight into the philosopher's work-shop. We were completely captured by his step by step interpretation of the Critique. It made us participate in Kant's thinking-process, a procedure we had not known before. Furthermore, Heidegger presented the Critique not in abstract terms as a question of knowledge of objects but as a concrete problem of man's relation to the world. It made sense that a finite being, existing in a world not of his making, must receive phenomena through the intuitions of space and time. It was also the ground on which Kant defined reason as transcendental, that is the activity of the mind is a response to given entities. In the last analysis, according to Heidegger, both intuition and thinking spring from the transcendental imagination which has the character of both spontaneity and receptivity. In several important writings Heidegger later revised this Kant interpretation. But this is not the issue here. For those young students who had an affinity with his thinking — this must of course be presupposed — he was entirely convincing.

After Heidegger had accepted a chair at Freiburg University, Erich Franck, a Neokantian philosopher, was called to Marburg. For the State examination, which entitled one to become a professor at the Gymnasium, I was examined by Franck. (For my oral doctoral examination Heidegger had discussed with me Kant's concept of imagination.) Franck asked a question about Kant and when I answered according to what I had learned from Heidegger, he corrected me. But I summoned the courage to say that the opinion was nonetheless held.

I took several seminars with Heidegger which were equally exciting although by no means easy. We would read a text and discuss it sentence by sentence. Heidegger's most valued quality was that he would listen to the student with patience and interest. He thus practiced what he said in Sein und Zeit, that one must listen before he speaks. It was a characteristic of Heidegger not only as a teacher but in conversations outside the classroom. My later experiences when I visited Heidegger quite often in his home in Freiburg confirm this. Heidegger was certainly not a conversationalist who would overwhelm you with an easy flow of words. In serious discussions he carefully weighed his words; even in lighter moments of conversations the dialogue proceeded leisurely. It is interesting to note that Jaspers in his Autobiographie mentions the same fact. "In our dialogues it was I who mostly talked. Heidegger's personality — inclined to silence — induced me occasionally to speak too much . . ." Heidegger had a genuine interest in young people and nodded approval if an answer was to the point. As I recall, his criticism was never devastating.

When I took my first seminar with Heidegger in 1926 we read J. H. Droysen's Historik. Droysen was a predecessor of Dilthey in elaborating the hermeneutic method. Heidegger quotes him in the essay Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft (The Concept of Time in History as a Science): "Perhaps the greatest merit of the critical school in the historical sciences," Droysen asserted, "at least the most significant in regard to methods, is to have finally made it clear that the foundation of our studies is the examination of sources from which we learn. There with the relation of history to the past has reached the point which is scientifi-
cally important." Droysen was also of interest to Heidegger because he had published a biography of Yorck von Wartenburg, whose correspondence with Dilthey Heidegger discussed in Sein und Zeit.

From some marginal notes to the text, which is still in my possession, I can recall some of Heidegger's comments. Droysen defined history as the constant increase of the ethical world, an assumption Heidegger did not share and which, in his view, lacked any proof. The historic fact, Droysen maintained, is that which remains from the past and its happenings. Heidegger gave us his own formulation to the effect that the given, the mere "material," is mediated by the intention.

Droysen further stated that the single expression must be seen as an expression of the inner man; it is a conclusion a posteriori from this inner center. Heidegger challenged this psychological interpretation of a statement claiming that any utterance is evident in itself. For similar reasons Heidegger rejected Droysen's distinction between the "logical mechanism of understanding and the act of understanding" asserting that such a distinction is concretely not possible. Droysen was aware of the fact that the historian, as the observer of the past, is present in the field of the observed but, as a Kantian, the primary source of any understanding and knowledge is for him the subject. "The one who understands," Droysen wrote, "because he is an ego, a totality in himself, like the one he has to understand, completes the totality of the latter from the single utterance and the single utterance from his totality. The understanding is both synthetic and analytical as well as inductive and deductive." The human mind and will are in Droysen's judgment the sources of both the historic past and its interpretation.

Although Heidegger made sure that we understood the author, Droysen also served as a springboard to introduce us to some of his own philosophical views. We had for example a lively discussion of historic truth, Heidegger leading us to see it as a problem in hermeneutics and stressing the correlation between truth and meaning. Like the lecture course on Kant the seminar on Droysen prepared us for Sein und Zeit.

I was fortunate to have been included in a group of students whom Heidegger invited to his house to discuss phenomenology every other Sunday during a semester. I recall that Frau Heidegger would always start the session with the reading of some poetry. Rilke whom I admired very much is still alive in my memory as one of the poets we listened to. The purpose of the discussions however was not Husserl's phenomenology but rather Heidegger's development of phenomenology in Sein und Zeit. The human condition presented in Sein und Zeit as Da-sein-being-in-the-world opened a new dimension to philosophy. Academic philosophy received a new look with the introduction of such concepts as dread, death and conscience, which only few philosophers — among them Scheler — would allow in philosophy. One cannot measure the influence any writing of importance has on the mind. One thing is certain: those of us who had read Sein und Zeit with great enthusiasm were saved from falling into the trap of both analytical thinking and formal logic which are abstract and unhistorical.

I can gather the impact Sein und Zeit had on me from a book review I wrote in 1935. It concerned the third volume of Dunin Borkowski's Spinoza which had just been published. After
reference to Dilthey and Meinecke I said of Heidegger: "The philosophical thinking of the present time presupposes the historicity (temporality) of human existence. It is the great merit of Martin Heidegger to have raised the philosophical question of how all human existence is intimately bound up with the course of "historical" events. ... From this follows, also for the past-oriented historian, that he must conceive the past in its temporal setting, a process that includes the future." I still consider the temporality and historicity of Dasein-being-in-the-world as the climax of Sein und Zeit. It leads, moreover, directly to Heidegger's later work. Of course, the focus of Sein und Zeit is Being, the Being of a special being: Dasein. Although the ontological difference is not mentioned in Sein und Zeit, in the recently published notes to it in the Gesamtausgabe Heidegger mentions it twice. A third note is still of more interest here. It occurs in connection with the division into sections of the two parts of Sein und Zeit. One section of the first part is called Zeit und Sein; in a note Heidegger refers to "Die transcendenzhafte Differenz". (Difference combined with transcendence.) It seems to me that the ontological and "transcendenzhafte" Differenz must be seen together in order to give the former a concrete meaning. It is quite clear from his later writings that Heidegger was aware of the difficulty involved here. In Holzwege he states: "The clearing (Lichtung) of the difference cannot mean that the difference appears as the difference. However, it is quite possible," Heidegger continues, "that the presence as such (that is, what unconceals the present: Being), the relation to what is present, may manifest itself in such a way that the presence becomes articulate as this relation." When I talked with Heidegger about the meaning of Being he would sometimes look toward the Zähringer Hills from the large window of his study. The gesture said much: Beholding things "present", Being speaks to us. This also explains why Heidegger calls thinking a thanking for what Being brings into the open. In the same note to the section Zeit und Sein Heidegger further states: "Die Uberwindung des Horizontes als solchem" (The overcoming of the horizon as such), "Die Umkehr in die Herkunft" (the reversal to the Origin); "Das Anwesen aus dieser Herkunft" (The presence from this origin). In a note for an earlier page Heidegger remarks: Sein des Seienden, Sinn der Differenz" (Being of being; meaning of the difference). Being as presence and Being as time appear together in the e-vent (Ereignis). This means Being manifests beings in epochal e-vents. If the concept of e-vent plays a considerable role in the later Heidegger it is clearly related to the last part of Sein und Zeit. I do not know how thoroughly Heidegger was acquainted with the philosophy of Whitehead but he thought that Whitehead's philosophy of process which involves ever new creations or "occasions" had an affinity to his own thinking.

Another question that was recently raised regarding Sein und Zeit is whether it had any political implications. Did Heidegger put so much stress on the individual in order to make the point that in times of decline the person must fall back on himself? When we read Sein und Zeit at the time of its publication in 1927 we never saw in it any political references. And this fits with the Spiegel interview where Heidegger asserted that he was never politically active before 1933. The latter statement, moreover, is borne out by the fact that in 1930 Adolf Grimme who
was a religious socialist and Kultusminister (secretary of education) of Prussia, made several attempts to bring Heidegger to Berlin as Professor at the university. He would not have written to him in most flattering words had he thought of him as a critic of the Weimar Republic. In addition, the decay of the Republic and the disunity evidenced by the many parties was not yet visible in 1927 but only in 1930.

That Heidegger had such a positive memory of Marburg is in part due to his close contact with the department of religion. Next to the Neokantian school, the latter enjoyed a nationwide reputation. Among the theologians were Hermelink, a church historian, Hölscher an Old Testament scholar, Rade an expert on Luther, and Rudolf Otto who was famous for a widely read book entitled *The Holy*. It is of course well-known that Heidegger had the closest relationship with Rudolf Bultmann, the Protestant theologian.

Heidegger had a strong religious background which included several semesters devoted to the study of theology. Even if he had not said so himself for readers of *Sein und Zeit* and his later work, it is quite obvious "that without my theological background I would not have taken the path in philosophy I did." Despite his Catholic upbringing, Heidegger's religious interests soon focused beyond Augustine and Eckhart on Luther and Kierkegaard. The latter two theologians attracted Heidegger because they started their reflection with a religious experience: faith. And along this line Heidegger elsewhere remarked that he was religious without being interested in proofs of the existence of God, that is, in metaphysical speculation. His acquaintance with Protestant theology included Calvin and Zwingli.

I suspect, although it is hard to judge, that for Bultmann his relationship with Heidegger was more consequential than vice versa. It is well known that Bultmann applied the analysis of *Dasein* in *Sein und Zeit* to theology, especially the central concepts of hermeneutics and historicity. The Biblical Word was for Bultmann, "a possible way to understand my own existence." Against his critics he explained his position, claiming that the Biblical hermeneutic like the interpretation of any other text is rooted in a particular situation or dependent on a philosophical foundation. As a theologian Bultmann could assert that the believer discovered his authentic *Dasein* through faith in the Word. Faith is a rebirth like *Dasein*'s "conversion" to authenticity with the important difference that the latter in contrast to faith in revelation is an autonomous resolve of the person.

In his dialogue with Bultmann, Heidegger's main concern seems to have been the relation between theology and philosophy and not primarily theology as such; this is indicated by the essay, "Phenomenology and Theology" of 1927. One important focus of this essay is to show that whereas *Dasein*'s existential of guilt is the "existential" ground for faith, the revealed God of Christianity can never be the subject of philosophy. Heidegger expressed this thought thus: "Philosophy is the possible ontological corrective which can formally point out the ontic and, in particular, the pre-Christian content of basic theological concepts. But philosophy can be what it is without functioning factually as this corrective."

It is quite obvious that a student's ability to enter into Heidegger's thinking has its limitations but for all that my enthusiasm for his philosophy was unlimited. I had many lively discus-
tions with fellow-students when we tried to clear our own understanding in challenging the other's interpretation. Even my history professor became the victim of my fervor and I often spoke to him about Heidegger. One day he jokingly said to me: "You should go to America and open a seminar on Heidegger." (At that time I did not dream that I would ever land on the shores of the United States.)

From my days at the Gymnasium in Berlin I had developed a profound interest in all aspects of cultural activity. Heidegger's dedication to the arts found an echo in many students. A friend of mine, Paul Oskar Kristeller of Columbia University, who was in Marburg in 1926, often played the piano for Heidegger in his home. Private discussion-groups were always preceded, as I mentioned, by poetry readings. Marburg had a famous art department with a rich collection of photographs of paintings which should have been of interest to Heidegger. When I visited Heidegger in his study in Freiburg there were always some art-pieces around. But what caught not only Heidegger's eyes as often as he looked up, but the visitor's as well, was a small painting of delicately blue blossoms by Braque, the French painter. Heidegger was fond of Braque as a friend and artist and admired among other works his non-abstract paintings of large birds that seem to roam the universe. Heidegger enjoyed the beautiful colors and the many imaginative paintings of Braque, Paul Klee, and others. But he freely admitted that abstract artists had less appeal to him. Perhaps it is not as surprising as it sounds. Heidegger was fully immersed in a world comprising both man and things in a mutual relationship. From such a basis one could hardly expect him to appreciate an art-expression for which the world existed in the image created by the artist.

I would like to close my reminiscences with some lines Heidegger contributed to a volume by René Char in memory of Georges Braque. "Die Verwandlung des Mannigfaltigen in die Einfalt ist jenes Abwesenlassen, wo­durch das Einfältige anwest,
Abwesen entbringt Anwesen,
Tod erbringt Nähe."

The change of the manifold into the simple is to let be absent that which allows the simple to be present.

Absence reveals presence,
Death brings nearness.41

REFERENCES

1. This is reported by Walter Biemel, Heidegger, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch 1973, p. 33.
2. P. 394 note
5. P. 100. Professor Pöggeler has kindly made available to me a xerox-copy of the pages referring to Heidegger.
6. Ibid.
7. See below, note 11.
9. Ibid., p. 44. On Scheler see Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965.
10. P. 47.
13. Ibid., p. 72.
14. Ibid., p. 73.
15. P. 208, note.
17. P. 146.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 10.
25. Note a to p. 127 and note a to p. 304.
26. Note a to p. 53.
29. See note 26.
30. Note a to p. 50.
31. Note a to p. 312.
33. See the interesting study by Vincenzo Vitiello, Heidegger: il nulla e la fondazione della storicità. Dalla Überwindung der Metaphysik alla Daseinanalyse. (Urbino: Argalia Editore 1967.) In our context it is noteworthy that Vitiello connects the ontological difference with temporality and historicity and considers the last part of Sein und Zeit the focal point of Heidegger's whole philosophy.
34. See Otto Pöggeler, Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1972, p. 16.
35. See the translation of the interview in Philosophy Today, Winter 1976, p. 268 and p. 270: "At that time (in 1930) I was completely taken up with the questions that are developed in Being and Time (1927) and in the writings and lectures of the following years."
36. See Adolf Grümme (Brieftes), letter of May 14, 1930, p. 37. Grümme says he intends to send Dr. Richter to Freiburg to discuss once more with Heidegger the possibility of his coming to Berlin. "Welches Ergebnis die Unterhaltung auch haben mag" Grümme continued "Sie wissen, sehr verehrter Herr Professor, dass ich Ihre Entscheidungs-gründe vollauf würdigen werde. So schmerzlich mir eine endgültige Absage auch sein würde, ich hätte wenigstens das Gefühl, nichts unversucht gelassen zu haben, um diejenige philosophische Persönlichkeit für Berlin zu gewinnen, von der ich überzeugt bin, dass ihre hiesige Wirksamkeit von dem allergrössten Einfluss auf das gesamte deutsche Geistesleben werden würde."
37. In Autobiographie, p. 96, Jaspers comments on the fact that through Heidegger the Catholic tradition became alive to him. He also remembered Heidegger talking about Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and Luther.
39. See the translation by Hart of this essay in The Piety of Thinking, pp. 5-21.
40. Ibid., p. 20.