THE INDISPENSABLE NATION

Edited by Vicki Chan

On 9 December 2004, friends of James Chace gathered at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs for a discussion inspired by Chace's thoughts and words. The event was organized by Joel Rosenthal, President of the Carnegie Council, and Ian Bremmer, President of Eurasia Group. Following are excerpts from the night.

SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL

"Realism, Idealism, and American Politics"

From the moment James left Massachusetts on graduating Harvard, he was immersed in the cultures and histories of other nations. John Locke said, "In the beginning, all the world was America." And for James, for a while, all the world was Massachusetts. But then he went elsewhere.

He began in France, edited a journal on Eastern Europe, reported from Central America, traveled extensively in Asia, including China, where he wandered through Tiananmen Square, filled with students demonstrating for democracy before the massacre.

He constantly thought and wrote about the relationship of the rest of the world to the United States. But in a sense for him, the United States was "a world elsewhere," the title of his first book on foreign affairs. It was his touchstone, to be sure, but domestic politics was not to become his major focus for a long time.

James operated from concepts of balances of power, spheres of influence,

ententes and detentes, alliances cordial and otherwise. The Congress of Vienna was as pertinent as the Congress of the United States. In short, he counted himself a realist. And yet, as an American, he never dismissed the moral element, especially in its exemplary form.

After he finished *Solvency* in 1998, in the twilight of Reaganism and the early building of a Star Wars antimissile defense, James teamed up with Caleb Carr, a protégé who, perhaps unsurprisingly, became a novelist of historical fiction, to produce a book called *America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars*. Here James delved into the psychology of American history, beginning with the burning of Washington by the British, to illustrate episodes of the quixotic search for perfect security.

This impulse had what economists would call a crowding-out effect, contributing to a brand of unilateralism that supplanted diplomacy and politics—invaluable tools for creating balances of power and international order in which national interests could be advanced.

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America Invulnerable addressed the terror of the nuclear threat but not modern terrorism. Yet the conclusion was a call for national maturity, an admonition to live with the notion of relative security, however unsettling, precisely to bring about the safe measures of power, as Jefferson put it.

Soon after the publication of *America Invulnerable*, the cold war that had seemed frozen in ice melted away with the internal disintegration of the Soviet empire, and James took the title of his next book from John Maynard Keynes' *The Consequences of the Peace*. But where Keynes had written an acidic analysis of the failures of the Versailles peace treaty, James pointed to avenues of hope and possibility for a new era.

All of his usual themes were present, from solvency to realism, and his insights, gained through extensive experience, were apparent in this *tour d'raison* from Germany to Japan, Mexico to China. But it was in his typology of the emerging political debate over the future of US foreign policy that he was most prescient.

He outlined three schools of thought in post-cold war America:

-One was neoisolationist, combining strands of protectionism and non-interventionism;
-The second, James called triumphalism, or what we would call neoconservatism. James observed a striking absence of a concern with ends and means in their analysis .

-The third school was that of then-President George H.W. Bush's new world order, neither isolationist nor triumphalist. The elder Bush's approach, according to James, did not truly acknowledge the fundamental change in world affairs brought about by the end of the cold war, but it was an effort to preserve the US position in the status quo that could not be sustained.

James called for a new internationalism, a rethinking of the realist vision, a recasting of Franklin Roosevelt's pragmatism that forged the economic and political institutions of international order underpinning global stability. After the cold war, the world would not necessarily become more peaceful, immune to new threats, but the new approach, James suggested, would require the United States to abandon any pretense to being the only superpower. Yet it would preclude a withdrawal into ourselves. It would require us to use all our efforts to sustain the global balance, taking nothing for granted in our ability to remain economically and militarily vigorous. That was the idea behind the phrase "indispensable nation."

Now, fully engaged with the future, James immediately turned to the past. He felt compelled to write his biography of Dean Acheson from a variety of motives. Acheson was, as James wrote, "the quintessential American realist, who most fully understood and mastered the exercise of American power in the American era."

In the writing of their popular book, *The Wise Men*, Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas had called upon James for advice. James admired their book but believed it put too much emphasis on the supposedly common social and class backgrounds of

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those leading foreign policy figures of the postwar period to explain the development of their views and the coherence of their interrelationships. In part James saw his biography of Acheson as a corrective to these misconceptions.

James was drawn to Acheson as a subject—no doubt as a fellow New English Yankee—who was not, as James reminded us, a patrician or born to great wealth. But just as he wished to clarify naïve and sentimental notions of *The Wise Men*, he wanted to present the actual career and thought of the man who was present at the creation as once again, at the end of the cold war, we were present at another creation.

Acheson, the Secretary of State Who Created the American World, is an enduring, brilliantly crafted, and elegantly written work of history. It is a perfect illumination of the relationship of character and politics, personality and policy, a man and his times.

Often James read aloud the beginning of his book to me, and I'm sure to others, the story of President Truman's arrival at Union Station in Washington after the disastrous 1946 midterm elections—Democrats are used to disasters—greeted by a lone figure, his Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in a gallant act of loyalty.

Acheson recounts on almost every page lessons of US foreign policy from FDR through Nixon. It details Acheson's battles with those he called "the primitives" and their crusades and the price that Acheson paid politically for his devotion to the national interest in the face of these pressures and personally in assaults on his character and integrity.

Through these anguished incidents, James began to explore the roots of foreign policy and domestic politics. Perhaps because of his understanding of Acheson's political milieu and spending stretches of time in Washington during the Clinton presidency, James was pulled even farther into the past and yet closer to American politics.

As he wrote *1912: Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft and Debs, the Election that Changed the Country*, his natural sympathies for the contending candidates of the ultimate presidential campaign of the progressive era became more pronounced. The more he learned of Theodore Roosevelt, the more he loved him. TR the bull moose standing at Armageddon with programs for the industrial age of reform became for James another

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incarnation of the practical idealist. James felt twinges of sympathy for forewarned William Howard Taft, who never wanted to be President, pushed by his ambitious wife, his conservatism an aspect of his self-confounding passivity and political ineptitude.

Before James started his research, he knew little of Eugene Debs, the labor movement, or American socialism before World War I. Debs emerges as the surprise of the book. Debs, of Alsatian parentage from Indiana, self-educated, not an intellectual, a politician, or policymaker, with no interest whatsoever in foreign policy, was driven more by the moral emotion and feeling of Christianity than the dogma of socialism.

"The vision of Eugene Debs," James wrote, "was not unlike that of Governor John Winthrop of Massachusetts, who in 1630 declared that America should be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people upon it," the phrase that's often forgot, but not by James.

James tried to keep an open mind on Woodrow Wilson, but not even Wilson's adulterous affair with Mary Peck, his hidden human side, could warm James to him. Wilson's moralizing rigidity repelled him. Still he gave Wilson his due for his progressive advances, though he called the chapter on him "The Moralist," which in James' lexicon was not a compliment.

James entitled the final section of *1912* "The Consequences of Victory." He cited one of his favorite quotations, certainly his favorite of Wilson's: "It would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs, for all my preparation has been in domestic matters," James pointed out. That, however, was precisely the irony fate had in store for the century's first Democratic President.

In his conclusion James located the traditions of TR and Wilson flowing into the synthesis of FDR: "The right balance of idealism and power," as James said. But it was also something of an irony of fate that James, the foreign policy analyst, found himself dealing with domestic matters. For James, realism was not lodged in foreign affairs and idealism in domestic. He discovered that the proper combination of realism and idealism had been in the 20th century, and must be in the 21st, reflected in both spheres.

In one of his last essays, James dealt with the legacy of *The Wise Men* as applied to the George W. Bush presidency. In "Wise After All," an essay published in *The American Prospect* this July, James wrote that Bush has wholly abandoned the precepts that guided the postwar generation. Instead of messianic efforts, James called for strategic realism in the Roosevelt and Acheson tradition.

He ended on a prophetic note. "Without a return to a realistic understanding that military power does not bless us with moral superiority over others, we are likely to find ourselves viewed by much of the world as a pariah nation to be feared, to be isolated, and finally, to be contained."

While James was writing *Acheson*, I offered to take him to see Acheson. James had never before been to the Oak Hill Cemetery in Georgetown, and I guided him to the modest grave in the shadow of the small church. "There he is," I said. "So he is," James replied.

At the end of *Acheson*, James quotes the description given by his friend and confidante, Oliver Franks. "Acheson," Franks said, "was a pure American type of a rather rare species."

And so was James. As he taught us the value of the American example in the world, he served as a wise man and an exemplary American himself.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.

"Concepts of Empire"

James Chace always seemed to me a Yankee. He was a Yankee in his lucidity of mind. He was a Yankee in his chronic skepticism. He was a Yankee in his curiosity. He was a venturesome intellect and he became infected by history.

We had a discussion, conversation, over the years whether there was an American empire or not. Now, the extremists of the right and the left believe in the American empire. Noam Chomsky, for example, thinks there is an American empire and that it's evil. Neocons believe that there is an American empire and it's good. The neocons vision is that the United States as a supreme military superpower is bound to work its will on the rest of the world.

Comparisons are often made to the Roman Empire and to the 19th century

British and French Empires. Is the so-called American Empire a fitting successor? The neocons expect it will be.

But Americans, unlike the Romans, the British, and the French, are not colonizers of remote and exotic places. We peopled North America's vacant spaces, as the white invaders deemed them, from sea to shining sea, but we did not send away our youngest sons to man the outposts of empire.

Britain created a British world in India and Africa as the French did in Algeria and Indo-China. But Americans, as James Bryce wrote in 1888, have none of the Earth hunger which burns in the great nations of Europe.

Some of our political leaders did indeed have that Earth hunger. Jefferson said about Cuba, "The most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states," and told John C. Calhoun in 1820 that the United States "ought, at the first possible opportunity, to take Cuba."

John Quincy Adams agreed, considering the annexation of Cuba, as he said, "indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself," and supposing Cuba would inexorably fall to the United States by the law of political gravitation.

As for Canada, J.Q. Adams held our proper domain to be the continent of North America. Henry Adams, J.Q.'s grandson, wrote in 1869, "That the whole continent of North America and all its adjacent islands must at last fall under the control of

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the United States is a conviction absolutely ingrained in our people."

As late as 1895, Henry Cabot Lodge declared, "From the Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean, there would be but one flag and one country."

These things so authoritatively predicted never came to pass. The American people were not much interested in an empire. The United States has not annexed Cuba or Canada. There is no likelihood that we ever will.

There was a question of control. The term "empire" is, according to the common understanding, the thirst for the political control by the dominant country of the domestic and foreign policy of weaker countries.

Rome, London and Paris, despite slow and awkward lines of communication, really ruled their empires. Today communication is instantaneous, yet despite the speed of contact Washington, far from ruling an empire in the old sense, has become the prisoner, the virtual captive, of its current space. This was the case notably with South Vietnam in the 1960s, and it has been the case ever since with Israel. Governments in Saigon 40 years ago and in Tel Aviv today have been sure that the United States, for internal political reasons, would not apply the ultimate sanction by

withdrawing support. They therefore defied American commands and demands with relative impunity.

Pakistan, Taiwan, Egypt, South Korea, and the Philippines are similarly unimpressed, evasive, or defiant. For all our vast military strength, we cannot get our Latin American neighbors or even these tiny Caribbean islands to do our bidding. Americans are simply not competent imperialists, as we are demonstrating in Iraq momentarily.

The so-called American empire seems to me in fact a feeble imitation of the Roman, British, and French empires. I discussed this matter with James Chace, but I looked forward to more discussions with him, and alas, this serene, lucid, ironical, charming man is no longer with us.

CHARLES KUPCHAN

"The New American Internationalism"

The question that I asked in preparing my remarks tonight was who is this guy intellectually? Where does he fall on some type of intellectual spectrum? And that's not an easy question to answer, because he isn't someone who really believed in "isms." He isn't someone who was out there saying one must be a realist, one must be a liberal; he was someone who was much more concerned about the real world, the management

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of international politics, and then crafted his theoretical or conceptual perspective accordingly.

I think that at the end of the day, James is more of a realist than anything else, and he kept more pride in his realism than anything else. That I took partly from his writings but also from the gleam in his eye that I would see when he would recount teaching his class Morgenthau and Waltz. And perhaps it was precisely because he was at Bard, a liberal arts college, that James took a special pride in that. But he did, I think, believe in the operation of the balance of power. The world is a dangerous place; national interest is a core concept to be anything other than a realist at the end of the day.

At the same time, you can't put down James' books or his Codas in the *World Policy Journal* and not see a profound, strange liberalism. And I don't mean liberalism in the American political context, but classical liberalism—a belief in the ability of law of reason, of institutions, contained in our national politics, to prevent the unfettered balance of power from leading to outcomes that we all hope to avoid.

In a sense, I think the best phrase to capture who James was intellectually is that he was a liberal realist. He was a realist at the end of the day, obsessed in many respects with hegemony, as you put it, and the operation of the balance of power. But

he also thought that we could do better, that we could tame the balance of power and craft it in ways that I think would lead to not just the betterment of the United States from a national security perspective but others as well.

In that respect I think James is a kind of representative of what I take to be the best of American political position when it comes to foreign policy, the liberal internationalist tradition that was essentially entrained from Roosevelt through Bill Clinton, which seems today to be in very dire shape. But I think James personally, and through his writings, was a representative of that core political foundation for liberal internationalism.

Let me identify the tension between realism and liberalism in a couple of specific areas.

First, on the question of balance of power versus concert of power, I think James essentially tried to find a balance between someone who believed that the balance of power would operate in an unfettered fashion, that a concentration of power here would lead to a concentration of power there, with an idea that one could regu-

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late form, fashion, concerts among major concentrations of power.

He wrote, "To urge the United States to play a central role in seeking a balance of power among nations is simply to recognize that the international system has never given way to an effective world government, as Woodrow Wilson held more to an enduring imperium, as August Caesar might have imagined." And I think he essentially treated, almost with disdain, the idea that the democratic revolution or the commercial revolution was making war obsolete.

At the same time, I think James brought to his work two important caveats about the nature of power. One had to do with the nature of American power, and here I think there was a little bit of an American exceptionalism, because James did think about American power as benign. He did believe that the United States knew that if it didn't rein in its power, if it attempted to be an empire rather than a hegemon, that it would invite others to rally against it.

And second, if there was a historical model out there that James repeatedly went back to to inform his work, it was the Concert of Europe. In his writings he constantly quotes Palmerston and Clausewitz, quotes Nicholson, the historian of the Concert of Europe. He wrote, quoting Nicholson, "It is a mistake to regard the balance of power as some iniquitous plotting force. It was rather an achievement of such a distribution in strength that would render aggression by any single country a policy of the greatest uncertainty and danger."

He called for the United States to promote global and regional balances of

power, creating what he called “a kind of central steering group” to oversee the management of international affairs, very much in the tradition of the Concert in the 19th century.

The second issue I want to touch on briefly is morality and ethics in international politics. And here I think James was someone who struggled with this a great deal. You can on the one hand sense that he felt that there wasn't much room for moral considerations in the world in which the balance of power operates. But you could also sense his deep personal discomfort with chucking it out the window, and that's why I think, in addition to having a gleam in his eye when he would talk about Morgenthau, he wouldn't be happy unless he also brought in his progressive, more idealistic strain.

As I mentioned, I think James did believe in American exceptionalism to a certain degree, but only so far. Where he, I think, departs from the idea of American exceptionalism is in the idea that the United States was a city on the hill. In that sense he very much was against some notion of a self-righteous crusading moralism in American foreign policy, in part because we would get it wrong but in part because I don't think he believed that we as scholars or Americans, as practitioners, would be able to make the moral judgments with sufficient clarity to embrace a strong moral element in our foreign policy.

I want to read a paragraph here from his classic *New York Times* essay in 1978:

> Life and literature have taught that this vision of an uncharted continent where everything is possible is simply simplistic. In this world everything is impure, even ourselves, and everything is limited, even our possibilities. We do not always know what is good. When we know it, we do not always try to achieve it. When we try, we do not always succeed. In trying to penetrate the basic attitudes that are formed by foreign policy, we would do well to turn back to the mainstream of American literature. After all, we continue to read the great novels and tales not because they are imposed upon us but by choice. They reflect a moral, complex vision of ourselves. They warn us against being too sure that we understand our situation or our possibilities. Political pronouncements, in contrast, too often remain mere rhetoric, misleading and distorting.

Let me end by going back to where I began, and that is to locate James as a founding member, a card-carrying member, a supporter, a proselytizer, if you will, of liberal internationalism. I think James' legacy is more important today than perhaps at any moment since World War II, and that's because the liberal internationalist coalition in this country is coming apart at the seams.

I think we need to turn to James—his writings, his lessons, and his messages—to see this as perhaps the greatest challenge before us today: to cobble together that bipartisan, centrist coalition behind liberal internationalism. It served the country

so well for the last 50 years, and we seem to be much the unsafer for having lost it.

DAVID FROMKIN

"Alexander Dumas and the Nature of Politics"

It's often said that the books that influence you most were the ones that you read when you're very young. James often said that. But James also made an opposite point. He argued that it was precisely because you have that particular outlook that you chose to read the books that you did.

In his last published writing, a piece for the *Washington Post*, James put it this way: "If a person looks at his professional life long enough, he begins to see a pattern that was there long before. I think now that I have always seen politics in action through fiction, not only in great political novels like Stendahl's *The Charterhouse of Parma* and Dostoevsky's *The Possessed*, but also in novels that I had read as a boy. The writer who most confirmed what was in my young mind already was Alexander Dumas. All of his novels are at bottom political novels. Six volumes describe the adventures of D'Artagnan, Athos, Aramis, and Porthos, from *The Three Musketeers* to *The Man in the Iron Mask*, played out against the political machinations of Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin and Louis XIV, as well as the love affairs of Anne of Austria and Louise De La Valliere. They are stories that show that political action is determined not by historical inevitability, but rather by the roads not taken, the distractions, the near misses, the destructive if alluring love affairs, all the contingencies and what-if's of history."

"All for one and one for all," a great slogan, which was for James not so much a literary quotation as a way of life. He believed in it, and he practiced it.

Alexander Dumas, Dumas Père, born in the first part of the 19th century was a writer of historical fiction. It was his aim, he once said, to write the whole history of France in novel form, and he came close to doing that. His books began in the early part of the 16th century and go up to the French Revolution. Dumas once told Napoleon III, who was a friend of his, that he had written 1,200 volumes, and this was at a time when he was still writing.

Many years ago I read that George Bernard Shaw learned his French history from reading Dumas' novels. I did, too. And so did James. He was a bond between us.

What especially drew James to it might well have been the focus in [*The Three Musketeers*] on what today is called male bonding: "All for one and one for all," a great slogan, which was for James not so much a literary quotation as a way of life. He believed in it, and he practiced it.

I wonder, if it's not too far-fetched, whether James was not attracted to the policy of alliances from his reading of Dumas. Such alliances are endemic throughout

the Dumas novels, not merely between political factions and between countries but even between husband and wife, as in the quote "offensive defensive alliance" between Queen Margot and the young King Henry IV, whom she had been forced to marry, in the opening chapters of *La Reine Margot*. The two decide that their mutual interest is going to come first before anything.

James was a romantic, a believer in the individual. He always was conscious of the human factor in politics and of the accidental, of the misunderstanding, and of the mistake. He recognized the dark power of the irrational but also the redemptive power of human genius. All of these were dispositions that when James encountered them in Dumas resulted in love at first sight.

Viewing politics as James did, through a novelist's eyes, he wanted politics to be fun, and he wanted them to be interesting and dramatic—"lights, action, camera!" That was the appeal for him.

MARK DANNER

"The Deceitful Dream of American Exceptionalism"

I'm supposed to speak about American exceptionalism, but of course, James, for all the poignancy and the power of that phrase, didn't really believe in American exceptionalism. In fact, he thought it had done much more damage than good.

You see it as the formation of James Chace, as taking the young man who had become interested in literature and art and found that he could find aesthetics in politics, and that determined very much his life.

When he was in his early twenties, he was in Paris. If you want to find the formation of where James Chace's thinking came from and how he transformed himself from a novelist into a novelist as foreign affairs thinker, you have to look back to what young James found in Paris and what he became.

He describes himself in *Solvency*: "But politics in the beginning was far from my mind. I had come to Paris to study Delacroix and Beaudelaire, the relationship between art and literature, not between the state and society of nations."

And then events intrude: "But soon it became impossible for me to remain indifferent to politics, as impossible as it would have been for a foreign student coming to America in 1968. Whether or not to go on fighting the seven-year war in Indochina divided neighbor from neighbor, while the government, uncertain of its goals, refused to negotiate with the Communists."

Now he goes through his own political transformation: "By winter, things fell apart. There were riots to protest the Indochina war. My fellow students and I first gathered in the courtyard of the university, then, bursting forth, were pursued by the cape-swinging gendarmes along the Boulevard St. Germain toward the National Assembly."

It is a very romantic view of politics, politics as drama, politics as sweeping one up in the street and throwing one into a political struggle. And you see it as the formation of James Chace, as taking the young man who had become interested in literature and art and found, as Ron Steel recently wrote, that there could be an "aesthetics of political action," that he could find aesthetics in politics, and that determined very much his life.

Let me speak a minute about the beginnings of American exceptionalism. People now, of course, think about exceptionalism with respect to John Winthrop, "the city on the hill."

James had a particular attitude about this, which I think derived from his own family, that is a family that had been New England gentry, had had power, wealth, and had lost it all. It gave him throughout his life a sensitivity to contingency, the notion that people of power had that they were endowed with wealth and power because of their own virtue rather than the contingency of history and the virtues of their ancestors. It gave him the sensitivity to what could be lost.

This is the heart of James' thinking: you need to have a practical view of the world and to separate primary from secondary interests, and one of the great damages that American exceptionalism has done in American history, particularly in Vietnam but I think at present also in our involvement in Iraq, was to cause statesmen to forget

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what [Walter] Lippmann, in a line he quoted frequently, called "the bringing into balance with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve a nation's commitments, economic, political, military, and a nation's power." That to James was statesmanship, and it could not coexist with American exceptionalism.

His central insight really was that the illusions of statesmen, particularly the illusions of American statesmen, which are built on a notion of America as all powerful, benefiting from enormous resources that can never be depleted, and from a faith that essentially derives from its status as a chosen nation of God, will lead to a kind of delusion that will undermine American power. He saw this in Vietnam very clearly and he saw it today in what's happening in Iraq.

JAMES HOGE JR.

"Solvency"

Before, during, and after his time at *Foreign Affairs*, James wrote extensively about the principal dilemmas and challenges of conducting a democratic foreign policy. A core dilemma of statesmanship with which he wrestled throughout his career was how to balance interests and resources in the pursuit of effective foreign policy objectives.

For James, the problem was particularly consequential when a great power like the United States was weighing the costs and the benefits of possibly using force. He felt that a right balance was critical to playing a successful leadership role but that it couldn't be found in an easy formulaic answer. There were not even easy definitions. For example, interests were not just concrete things like trade and energy; they included moral purposes that James thought essential to the right conduct of a democratic foreign policy. But the wrong understanding of moral values could also give you a problem and could prove counterproductive, even tragic, since they were invariably in dispute both at home and abroad, and he warned more than once about this problem with over-moralizing politics.

Neither is there a cut-and-dried definition of the second part of the equation, resources. One cannot be satisfied with a head count of troops, weapons, and funds. Political will and public support are intangible but vital resources for democracies venturing into troubled waters.

In a *Foreign Affairs* article published in 1988, he applied his concern for getting the right balance of interests and resources to the conflicts then raging in Central America. He had no automatic objection to these, but he found them to be inescapable engagements that if left unattended could engulf an American administration.

What he faulted about the Reagan interventions in Panama, Nicaragua, and El Salvador was that they were unbalanced in his view. Three times as much US funding went for waging wars in these countries than for development and reform. It was the latter resources, James pointed out, that would put these countries on a sustained progressive path, a refrain we hear today regarding a different country, Iraq.

The problem of achieving right balances has persisted in American foreign policy, unfortunately, and thus until his death James continued to raise questions about balance—between interests and resources, between innocence and experience, and the moral and the practical. Although he advocated a place, as I have said, for moral values in foreign policy, he was particularly alarmed in his latter days by contemporary moral crusaders and by reductionists who cast issues in terms of good vs. evil.

Chace's voice should be a constant reminder of the critical responsibility of statesmen. They must balance interests and resources, broadly defined, and commit the nation abroad only with careful selectivity.

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