In preparation for the conference

“Contested Legacies:
The German-Speaking Intellectual and Cultural Emigration
to the United States and United Kingdom, 1933–45”

Bard College, August 13–15, 2002

Essays from the “No Happy End” Workshop
Bard College, February 13–15, 2001
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1. INTRODUCTION

The "No Happy End" Workshop at Bard

The articles in this booklet are the products of the "No Happy End" workshop on the intellectual and cultural effects of exile, reconsidering the case of the emigration brought about by National Socialist rule in Germany. The project initiated by the workshop focuses, first, on the ways in which the exiles variously reinvented their roles and their pasts, and, second, on the diverse readings of the exiles' lives and works by succeeding generations. A primary concern is the present-day evaluation of their life-works, with special attention to discontinuities in their intellectual and cultural projects because of their forced emigration. Historical and cultural-sociological studies, valuable in themselves, are enlisted in the service of reflexive interpretation and critique.

"Happy end" was, of course, the hallmark of Hollywood movies of the 1920s and '30s, and the expression, in English, was a standard trope in Weimar discussions of America. In the last years of the Republic, it became the music for a play with this name. To title the workshop "No Happy End" was not to prejudice the highly differentiated historical record; it seems safe to say, however, that no exile was accorded the happy end that some may have expected out of their own lives. Among the most interesting, unresolved arguments regarding the effects of exile on the emigrants is whether the effects of exile imposed on them, their ouster appears not only unjust but also stupid and self-defeating. Like Oedipus at Colonus, then, the exiles are viewed not merely as victims, but as both benefactors and beneficiaries.

To what extent is such a reading of the intellectual and cultural emigration a benign myth that obscures important knowledge? The first two elements of the consensus may be put aside, although there are interesting, unresolved arguments regarding both. The effects of exile on the emigrants' work is the more urgent issue. One challenge here is to find impartial ways of comparing the merits of work done in two phases of an individual life, allowing for the usual effects of maturation and aging. At issue are questions of breadth, scope, openness, innovation, responsiveness, as well as rigor, clarity, and communicability. Primarily, one would expect damage when people are born not only from their immediate universe of discourse but also from the networks that comprise their partners in conversation and competition. These effects would differ with generational location, as well as vocation. A conductor or film director would be more likely to have been operating on new premises than an emigrant writer. The effects would also be compensated, of course, in different measures and different forms by new learning and networks. Recent developments in the microsociology of culture encourage a more systematic examination of such factors in the structure of exile than was possible before.

Much work on the emigration from Hitler's Germany has also been contaminated by a melodramatic conception of Weimar culture as bankrupt in the sciences and the arts by 1930. This picture was first drawn by some emigrés, for a variety of reasons, and it was heightened by some German writers in the immediate postwar years, which helped to justify the "year zero" conception that allowed them to wipe out the past, including, in many cases, their own dubious records. A reevaluation of the emigration entails a reevaluation of Weimar as a time that was by no means predestined to yield to Hitler. In this connection, then, a major theme of the project is a reassessment of the political dimensions of the emigrants' productive activities, both before and after emigration. Present-day conceptions of politics are more expensive than the narrow definition generally applied to distinguish "political" emigrations from other types. It has been suggested, for example, that in the wider context of the Holocaust everyone associated with this emigration or speaking about it must be understood to be making political statements, even by their silence (Brinkmann 1999). More narrowly, it is important to look behind the emigrants' common self-reproaches about their lack of political understanding or responsibility during the later Weimar years and their widespread self-characterizations as mandarins, aesthetes, or appeasers. In their own writings, as well as in the writings about them, this judgment often depends on a definition of politics strongly conditioned by "popular front" conceptions that only speech and action directed towards rapprochement with the Communists could count as political in the full sense. The Social Democrats are consequently excoriated on all sides, as is the production of intellectuals and artists who are oriented to them, if only to the extent of presupposing the continued power and influence of reform. Perhaps it is time to look again, without "critical" juxtaposition against the conventional leftist counterfactual, at the work of the republican intelligentsia and artists during the period 1930-33. Insofar as this generation of exiles is understood to have been engaged in activities that were significantly political, to what extent should their exile be understood as a "political emigration" of a special sort, with important consequences for our understanding of their reinvention by themselves and others?

In the context of contemporary exile studies, the project also addresses aspects of "acculturation," the mutual changes in knowledge, belief, and identities consequent on continuous culture contacts between unlike groups (Krohn et al. 1998). The recent introduction of the acculturation concept helps to counter the undue political narrowing of past emphases, where all too often only individuals with a certain political character cued as emigrés (Jay 1997). Yet the approach must be refined, in turn, by adequate recognition of the extent to which the intellectual and cultural emigration necessarily ceased to form, in Karl Mannheim's sense, a generational unit. Despite differences in age, the members of this cohort remained interactively bound by their common activities and experiences in the Weimar years, notably in the crisis years of 1930-33. Through their recollections in exile they were confronted by political questions that they could individually neglect or reject, but that they would not let each other forget. It has been well said that the exiles should be understood as living "double" lives (Gross 1996); this generational moment itself subject to myriad reinterpretations, may well be considered one of the alternative personalities that the emigrants enacted.

Similarly, it is necessary to balance the new reformulating insights produced by allowing the study of social scientists to be influenced by findings in the social history of physical sciences (Ash and Söllner 1996), thus giving proper weight to the contributions they made to the cumulative body of knowledge in professional disciplines. Yet many of them, even among the physical scientists, were also importantly attached to their participation in the public intellectual discourses in the Weimar years, meeting in conversations and hauptschrift. As a result, the project is a historically specific attempt to assess a constituency of the cultivated and cut across the boundaries between the "two cultures," as well as between arts and letters. However flawed his social analysis, this is the group that Karl Mannheim correctly identified as "the intellectuals," this understanding of the political entities in their exchanges was controversial but widely acknowledged, especially by the cohort that eventually emigrated. In some extended sense, these intellectuals were political; it is
Sovereignty is at loggerheads with freedom, either
judgment, or “free thought,” a misnomer because the faculty for command that follows the exercise of the faculty of thinking typically assigns actions a cause in the light of the differences among perspectives in Germany, Austria, Canada, South Africa, and the United States. The workshop, preparatory to a larger, public interdisciplinary conference to be held at Bard College in August 2002, led to a reconceptualization of the central theme as “Contested Legacies,” a change that is discussed in the conclusion.
— David Ketterle, Bard College

II. WORKSHOP ESSAYS

Freedom, Politics, and Social Science: Hannah Arendt in America
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Hannah Arendt’s concept of freedom is, appropriately, one of the most difficult of her ideas to pin down, but perhaps the best way to proceed is by stating initially what she did not mean by it. To begin with, freedom is not to be equated with the notions of “free will,” a contradiction in terms, since the will is the faculty of command that follows the exercise of judgment, or “free thought,” a misnomer because the very act of thinking typically assigns actions a cause (WF, 44–45). Nor is freedom tantamount to individual sovereignty, if by sovereignty is meant “self-sufficiency and mastery” (HC, 234). Such a godly status is profoundly alien to the human condition. Human beings inhabit an earth whose chief characteristic is its plurality. A life on earth means accepting that the earth is something to be shared not monopolized. The concept of sovereignty, however, suggests a condition quite different, modeled on the idea of the human will, sovereignty is incapable of being divided; this is what commended the concept to Rousseau in his attempt to promote a state devoid of factions. Sovereignty is at loggerheads with freedom, either because it seems to deny it outright—by definition not every person can be sovereign and live in a human world—or because it restricts freedom to those few who are able to exercise sovereignty—in which case freedom becomes not a property of plural individuals but of supernmen (WF, 164–165).

In the place of equations she believed false and pernicious, Arendt offered her own three-dimensional alternative. First, freedom is a “faculty” (WF, 169) of human beings that enables them to make new beginnings; indeed the very existence of “naturality” or birth brings into the world something new, a creature with the faculty for making a new beginning, for interrupting the routines of everyday life, for breaking down ossified structures, for thus bringing unpredictability and uncertainty into the world.

Second, freedom, the capacity to begin, is something that is experienced, not in the will nor in thought, but in the field of “action.” While all action has motives and aims, and to that degree is determined by “causes,” action is only “free to the extent that it is able to transcend [cause]” (WF, 151). Such transcendence is possible wherever action is inspired by a “principle” that, unlike motives, springs, “as if we were, without.” Principles “are much too general to prescribe particular goals, although every particular aim can be judged in the light of its principle once the heart has been started”; they include honor, glory, virtue, distinction, excellence, courage, and self-control—but also fear, distrust, and hatred (WF, 152, 156, 159). “In distinction from its goal, the principle of an action can be repeated time and again, it is inexhaustible, and in distinction from its motive, the validity of a principle is universal, is not bound to any particular person or to any particular group. However, the manifestation of principles comes about only through action; they are manifest in the world as long as the action lasts, but no longer. . . . Freedom or its opposite appears in the world wherever . . . principles are actualized; the appearance of freedom, like the manifestation of principles, coincides with the performing action. Men are free—as distinguished from their possessing the gift of freedom—as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same” (WF, 152; cf. 165: “freedom experienced in the process of acting and nothing else”). Third, the space or region in which people act freely is the one in which their performance will be most visible, and that space is the polis. Indeed, Arendt argues that without “a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance” (WF, 149). She admitted that such an equation seems odd in the aftermath of totalitarian regimes whose elimination of civil rights and intrusion into private life has led to the modern belief that freedom is the antithesis of politics or at least that freedom is about the option of pursuing activities outside the political realm; or, since Hobbes, is about personal “security” (WF, 149–150). But for Arendt this view is doubly mistaken: first, because totalitarian regimes were decedently anti-political formations, guaranteeing nothing, least of all the ability of citizens to engage freely in political life; second, because the polis is the sphere in which freedom can emerge from the obscurity of the human heart (WF, 149), show its virtuosity, and become “a worldly reality, tangible in words which can be heard, in deeds which can be seen, and in events which are talked about, remembered, and turned into stories before they are finally incorporated into the great storybook of human history” (WF, 154–155).

Arendt’s most extended analysis of freedom as beginning is, of course, to be found in her celebration of the American founding generation, On Revolution (1963). Here America stands as the template of what new beginnings can achieve, much more so than the council experiments that she also praises but that left no lasting tradition. Yet Arendt’s appeal to the American founders was accompanied by a highly critical account of what has become of their legacy. The simultaneous rise of the welfare state and party oligarchy is a story of political decline. There is no happy end to the founders’ accomplishment. Indeed the evocation of the American republic witnesses the emergence of a very different, vapid, and denuded concept of happiness, private and essentially hedonistic. The modern preoccupation with happiness, Arendt declares in The Human Condition (1958), is synonymous with sensual pleasure, and mood; it represents the utilitarian victory of the “animal laborans” over the political actor. In contrast, the genius of the American founding enterprise was to recaptivate the classical republican sense of happiness: the public happiness animated by participation in government with the express desire to energize and increase the space of deliberation. That happiness, she avers, is among the “lost treasure” of the revolutionary tradition. In the American Revolution, public happiness and the passion for public freedom were two sides of the same coin (OR, 126). Now, Arendt asserted, both happiness (WF) freedom have become largely fugitive, private affairs. Writing to Blücher from Berkeley in 1955, Arendt reports that her students are under the misguided impression that nothing matters and that they should try to be happy (A/B, 226); these are the same “very innocent students for whom the collapse of our world is completely unknown”; unfortunately, psychologically “nonsensical” is their eratia for real understanding. To be sure, Arendt believed that the student movement of the 1960s had in some sense rediscovered the old impulse for public happiness and the joy in action (COR, 166). But unfortunately the students operated with an incoherent and destructive notion of freedom. Not only did they plainly fail to understand the true meaning of plurality—otherwise they would have rejected as absurd the homogenizing misnomer the “Third World.” Worse, student freedom to politicize the university—a development that had been preceded by the authorities— to
reduce truth to power and intellectual standards to imperatives of social equality—was both a mockery of politics and a self-defeating strategy. In particular, a marriage of the student movement with Black Power would encourage violence, not politics. The perverse result, Arendt feared, would be the destruction of the university itself, the only real institutional base that students possessed for their rebellion against society (COR, 96, 170).

While Arendt's favorable first impressions of the American republic became more qualified and discomfited over the years, she never seriously entertained a permanent return to Germany. If there was no happy end, this was nonetheless as believing that America was a hopeless case. Arendt took heart from the "generosity of spirit in this country," which she considered astonishing (A/J, 297); remarked on the fairness and decency she observed in the American jury system; refused to equate the "masses" with an "attitude that does not take appearances" seriously, indeed renders them epiphenomenal; for occluding the space of human beginnings through of a theory of action that focuses on causes and motives (inner causes) and thus not real action in her sense; for refusing to learn from elementary facts; for a lack of common sense; and for discouraging a belief in individual responsibility, again because of sociology's deterministic stance. On the first page of On Revolution, Arendt makes explicit the incompatibility of modern sociology and psychology with a comprehension, let alone defense, of freedom, accusing both sciences elsewhere in the book of fostering resentment and a pseudopolitics of suspicion. Arendt even goes so far to imply that there is a disturbing parallel between sciences that wish to "deUNK" appearances and states trials that seek to make the innocent seem guilty. And even the intellectuals—a throwback to her Weimar critique of the sociology of knowledge—provide with the opportunity to deny their standing as a potentially disinterested group and to contrast them invidiously with 18th-century hommes de lettres (OR, 11, 19, 96, 220). The contrast with Mannheim's "sentences of an otherwise pitch-black night" capable of a total orientation and "synthesis" (IU, 160-161), could not be sharper. I conclude with the larger point that it is extremely difficult to untangle what Arendt owed to America, what she owed to Germany, and what to the collision between them. One way forward is to distinguish Arendt on America (her changing views of the republic); Arendt in America (the degree to which her views were shaped by the American experience); Arendt as perceived by America (the critical reception of her work by Americans); and Arendt in spite of America (what she tenaciously retained of her continental formation: Bildung, Kultur, and, at their center, Muttersprache).

References

Sites of Nachträglichkeit

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Most of the contributors to this project are scholars of the exiles and of the Weimar period. Some few of the participants have precise, direct links to these figures and to the period. While all the contributors have been affected by the thought and work of those who were fortunate to have been able to choose exile, for some the exile experience has become part of their work and outlook without it having an intimate provenance or becoming the object of an expertise. Yet this thought has entered into contemporary thought, even when it is not a specialized object of scholarly study. It is a legacy. It is, to use a German word for which there is no single English equivalent, “Nachträglich.” It is a debt, an after-effect, a burden, a grudge, a supplement, a gift—a stuff of spirit and matter that continues to have a permanent dwelling in contemporary culture, consciousness, and discourse.

Take as an example Alan Cohen’s photographs of the battlefields on the Western Front of World War I, the Nazi death camps, and the reading vestiges of the Berlin Wall—they exhibit contemporaneity while bearing a profound sense of responsibility to bring that epoch into the present and make it contemporary. His photographs are steeped in Nachträglichkeit. His photographic study is an eerie carrier of the atmosphere of that time, even though it is now and not from that time. That which is carried after is a Nachtrag—a remittance, something that reaches its destination too late or uninvited. This photographic project, recently brought together in an exhibition called Now and a book entitled On European Ground sets historical markers for the exile experience while forcing a reflec-

tion on the temporalities that are carried in such a project of cultural reflection, contemplation, and recovery, challenging the predominantly epistemologi-

cal matrix of the enterprise. These are photographs that have taken and absorbed a blow, transforming a blow into a contemporary act of visualization, making visualization a contemporary act of self-reflexive remembering—I offer this brief discourse about these photographs because they demonstrate the need for us to reflect upon the fragile legacy that we carry and the burdens of carrying it, as something that underwrites, motivates, and is thus more and less than an exclu-

sively epistemological practice. This taking stock is no less urgent because it might be belated.

We gaze at Alan Cohen’s photographs as if we, the viewers, were the last witnesses to the final scene, the disappearance from sight and memory of these cata-

crophic sites, as if Cohen’s camera has captured the last glimpse of a collective trauma sliding utterly, inter-

orally, and finally into oblivion. These photographs
offer themselves as the vicarious bearers of traumatic traces, and merely by looking at them, we might consider ourselves to be memory bearers.

Is trauma so vicariously contagious? The exhibition titles are toponyms: “The Somme,” “Verdun,” “Dachau,” “Bergen-Belsen,” “Auschwitz,” “Auschwitz-Birkenau,” and so on. They have as their referents minutesquare sections, photographic tiles, that without the toponymous descriptors would be unrecognizable (with few exceptions) as sites of historical calamity. Here is rolling serpentine countryside and curvilinear mounds, there is the vertical of a well-trodden path—like a flag of textures, the rough between the smooth, a textured version of an abstract expressionist painting.

In the “Auschwitz” Photographs, I Discern a Path, Calling to Mind a Dense Palimpsest of Footsteps

How does one date a path? What is more immemorial than a path as a sign-bearer or carrier of human presence?

Who, without the help of the toponym-title, would conjure up tens of thousands of victims force-marched to their deaths along this path? Who would recognize that these photographic records, tiles in view of their formal composition, capsules in view of the evidence they hold, are like atolls in an ocean of mass murder? By what scale do we measure that tile as passing from East to West across the ruin of the wall—a visual sign of the epochal and still because they are wordless. We are forced to pass from a signifying surface that empties meaning to the visual minimum to a toponymic frame that imbues the whole to the maximum of verbal suggestion. Anselm Kiefer, another abstract expressionist successor-transgressor, fabricates a visual surface as visualizing ground. Unlike Cohen, not trusting the ground—including the word “ground” itself—Kiefer has to fabricate his own ground as the surface for his inscriptions. He does this to make his point about how besetted the ground itself is, beset by Blut und Boden, beset by the philosopher of the ground, Martin Heidegger. Kiefer seeks to disempower the ground by making it a surface; thus he maximizes the inscriptive capacity of the surface to ingest the nightmare of German history and culture—artifacts, material detritus, hagiography, allegory, and Hitler’s dentures (if he could get hold of them). Where Kiefer loads his surface semiotically, driven to pump it up and halo it symbolically, Cohen is almost a Flemish minimalist in his vigilant attempts to keep the surface inward, contained, and meditative—he is the groundskeeper of his surface. Words are like leaves in the fall, except they have to be kept to one side. There is only one photograph in the show that has a word in it. Language shatters the stillness of the photographic image. For Alan Cohen, the intervention of history is verbal and noisy.

The psychoanalyst Nicholas Abraham wrote that “what haunts are not the dead but the gaps left within us by the secrets of others.” Alan Cohen’s photographs reveal and navigate these gaps. They induce the feeling of the presence of phantoms. The spectator is witness to secrets, no less secret for having been revealed, documented, enshrined, commemorated, and archived. Once again, Nicholas Abraham: “The phantom which returns to haunt bears witness to the existence of the dead buried within the other.”

The “Berlin Wall” series offers a purchase on and a culmination for Alan Cohen’s highly schooled and aesthetically tuned photographic art. His photographs are marked by an approach that arises from abstract expressionist painting and its successor, minimalism. Cohen’s approach can be seen at work by considering the lower vertical boundary of the wall where it once rose from the ground. This contiguity between where the wall once stood and the ground that is all that remains is the point of entry, the touch for Cohen’s visual problematics. The wall has returned to ground; a demolished vertical yields a horizontal as a signifying surface. It signals an absent vertical: not the wall but the absence of the wall is the trace. The subject then, returning to Nicholas Abraham, is not the wall but the phantom of the wall. Alan Cohen’s postminimalism induces a double phantom, the phantom of the Berlin Wall and the phantom of an abstract expressionist legacy that would constitute the wall as inscriptive surface. The sites of calamity are thus visited through
an approach that eschews the phantom in its method of emptying. The toponym summons the phantom.

Alan Cohen's photographs shuttle between two registers—an aesthetic of visual delineation that pursues visual meaning through the elimination or emptying of all that is deemed visually extraneous, leaving the deposit of a race, and an ethical calling that witnesses and archives the visual residue as evidential traces of calvary. When does looking count as testimony? When does the act of looking recall—after looking?

Roland Barthes's Camera Lucida is a text filled with the fabulous and spooky metaphysical allegation of the photograph as a phantom. He enunciates this allegation not only in terms of the death that is the tense of the photograph but in terms of the death that is able to return and the death that takes place as a scission between the subject and his eidolon, his image captured by the camera—the photograph as body of human beings, diminished and encapsulated, but real for a self's grasp. It is from this phantomic property of the photograph that the real presence is not offered—instead, it is a carrier of real presence, only the real presence that it carries is regrettably dead. The photograph testifies to that which is no longer, but wraiths carried on the photographic medium eluding the same reason that they semiotically fail.

Thus Cohen's photographs stake a claim as custodians of the traces, sharing a favored role in contemporary art as custodial witness. Initially one might compare the photographs in terms of their testamentary claim to the work of Christian Boltanski who reenacts visually asphotographic gestures so many topics on the Barthesian agenda, especially in the earlier Lessons in Darkness. Boltanski in his construction of hagiographic situations compels photographs to demonstrate their testamentary powers. The photograph in part owes its power to its diminished semiotic status in Barthes's analysis ("Boltanski subverts the photographic role to witness presence by explicating it semiotically and by doing so casts suspicion on its power to witness.") which, I believe, Boltanski introduces such garish hagiographic supplements.

Not being portraits, Alan Cohen's photographs are documents of the ground itself. Their ontic matter of factness as tiles supports the sense one has of their testamentary fidelity. Real presence is not offered—instituting the ground of the surface holds its secrecy real presence—that there were very real human beings occupying these places recalls for me the exquisitely simple and eloquent lines from the poem by John McCrae that every child in the British Commonwealth memorizes to recite on Armistice Day and that I too learned.

We are the Dead. Short days ago We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow Loved and were loved, and now we lie In Flanders fields.

Alan Cohen's photographs are of the location where they last were—if not there, then at least somewhere near there, in the vicinity. His photographs of the battlefields and death camps rest in the imminent expectation of the last judgment and bring to mind Rogan van der Weyden's polyptych altarpiece Last Judgment.

These photographs seem to occupy a topos just the moment before and so recall Walter Benjamin's writing on Kierkegaard's Novus: "The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead and make whole what has been smashed."

Alan Cohen's photographs are contributions to the unfinished work of that angel. He is keeping good company.

Max Weber among the Exiles: The Weber-Mannheim Problem and the Launching of a Dynamic Political Science

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To demonstrate that many of the German and Austrian intellectuals who fled in the World War II era to England and the United States carried an understanding of Max Weber with them into their new setting would hardly be worth a paper. The fact is too obvious. It is less obvious that there are several elements of Weber that the emigres took with them which they were unable to translate completely into the social-scientific vocabulary of their new setting. This essay focuses on a version of Weber's work of great significance to the study of politics his much ignored project of using his ideal-typical political sociology to provide a kind of prudential clarification for political actors of all partisan persuasions as to the meaning and significance of their political commitments.

The Weber-Mannheim Problem

Using his ideal-typical sociology, Weber constructs a model for the political clarification of partisan standpoints. He famously argues that social science can provide all serious partisan individuals with an account of what their position looks like if consistently held, the means necessary for the realization of this position once power is used to achieve it, and finally an account of the probable consequences that may follow once one chooses to apply these means within the confines of the state and economy (Weber 1982, 607, 150, 510, 539). Weber claims that a sociology based on ideal types can provide such an impartial clarification to actors; at the same time, he also admits ideal types are themselves constructed from a vantage point of cultural values.

Notes
1. An extended version of this text was given as a public lecture to open the exhibition of Alan Cohen's photographs entitled Now at the Mary and Leigh Block Museum of Art Northwestern University, May 6–June 15, 2001; portion of that lecture was published in an essay entitled "Phantoms" that accompanied Alan Cohen, On European Ground. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. The author wishes to acknowledge University of Chicago Press for permission to publish a fragment of that essay. The author would like to thank Alan Cohen for providing the image.
5. McCrae, John. 1919. "In Flanders Fields." In Flanders Fields and Other Poems.

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which in turn are chosen from the standpoint of one’s ultimate “practical values,” that is, one’s partisan standpoint. Although acknowledging that, given this circumscription, his sociological accounts merely provide one perspective on the meanings and consequences of some social constellation, he insists that transparency in the construction of typologies ensures impartiality in the testing of partisan positions (Weber 1922, 333).

In Ideology and Utopia Mannheim radicalizes Weber to produce a science of politics in which sociology of knowledge aids in constructing political conjunctures of competing ideological positions, each of which sees some aspect of the possibility, or the limits to political possibility, that the other fails to see. While each ideology is blind to some aspect of the dynamics that retard or enable the realization of its goals, each ideology also provides insight into the political reality out of which it arises and in which it seeks to intervene. Insisting that all political sociologies are located in the field of political conflict, Mannheim argues that there is no one style of thought, vocabulary, or even logic to judge all conflicting partisan positions (Mannheim 1936, 116–117; Mannheim 1985, 101).

In light of this problem, Mannheim proposes a new political science that synthesizes the differing assessments of political reality and possibility into an overview of the “political field” in any one historical moment. In doing so, he offers a political science that studies “political issues as political” (Mannheim 1936, 117–146; Mannheim 1985, 102–132). A political science that draws out of each of the contesting parties their various assessments for the exercise of political will and the dynamics that further or inhibit it provides account of political possibility in terms of the exercise of traditional prerogative, procedure for negotiating among competing interests, the collective running of the means of production—than any one of the parties can provide (Mannheim 1936, 150; Mannheim 1985, 130). And this comprehensive view could ostensibly alter the understanding of the political conjuncture by all the parties, convincing them to face dynamic realities they had overlooked (Kettler and Meja 1995, 83). For Mannheim the very process of political-sociological clarification arises out of the contestation of political ideologies, as compared with Weber’s claim that once ideal types regarding the business demands of politics are constructed it is possible to impartially test competing positions according to their ability to respond to these demands. In effect, Mannheim pushes the self-reflexivity implicit in Weber’s method to the surface, destabilizing Weber’s sociologically constructed reality as merely one perspective on a political conjuncture whose meaning is constantly contested. It would seem that the next step would be to explore the boundaries of this tension between conflicting political ideologies and the instability of political “reality.”

With wartime exigue, the project stalls. Instead of forging a political science that uses the sociology of knowledge to test the claims to political possibility of competing ideologies and utopias, Mannheim embraces economic planning, the very danger that he warned of at the end of Ideology and Utopia (Mannheim 1936, 262–263; Mannheim 1985, 224–225). This reduction of political clarification to merely reconciling individual freedom with planning exemplifies what I call the Weber-Mannheim problem: How does one carry on this attempt to launch a self-reflexive political science that clarifies for political actors the meaning of their ideological positions when the ground for intelligibility of such a project seems to have slipped away?

How did other emigres influenced by the Mannheim-Weber program for a new political science avoid having their political projects stall when the setting in which that project seemed meaningful disappeared? There developed three conflicting ways in which the Weber-Mannheim project of constructing a sociologically informed political science was translated into the American setting.

The Translation of the Weber-Mannheim Problem into the American Setting

One attempt to sustain the Weber-Mannheim project was developed by Arnold Brecht and summed up in his book Political Theory (Brecht 1959). Brecht tried to forge a political science based on a “normative” adherence to Weber’s “value” distinction. For Brecht, the problem of value relativism bulked large, but he claimed Weber’s attempt to use sociology to evaluate political possibility might serve a normative purpose in its recognition that political theory cannot tell how one should act, only how one can act. Brecht thus devote a portion toward the end of his massive book to showing how sociological, broadly conceived, can furnish advice of great significance to value commitments by demonstrating the various goals that are “impossible” or whose byproducts will not be accepted high risks or render the goal self-defeating (Brecht 1959, 423–425, 431–432). The problem is not in the strength of his arguments, but that his argument is aimed more at demonstrating that values can be “scientifically” tested than at seeking to enter any particular political conjuncture. Further, in the place of Weber’s and Mannheim’s distinctive self-reflexivity in trying to understand the context for testing political positions, Brecht selects various claims from throughout social science—some good, some questionable.

A second approach to the Weber-Mannheim problem is posed in the famous concept of “realism” developed by Hans Morgenthau. Where Brecht argued for the normative worth of Weberian “scientific” clarification of political possibility, Morgenthau continued the process of clarification to specific relations of power in international relations: echoing Weber, Morgenthau claims, “I have the scholar can do, then, is to trace the different tendencies which, as potentialities, are inherent in a certain international situation. He can point out the different conditions which make it more likely for one tendency to prevail than for another and finally assess the possibilities for the different conditions and tendencies to prevail in actuality” (Morgenthau 1948, 7). At the center of this notion of scientific clarification are Weber’s emphasis on the power interests of the state and nation and his definition of politics as a struggle for power in the midst of competing values. Thus, Morgenthau criticizes liberal ideology for its belief in science, law, and planning for the interests at stake in international conflicts, as opposed both to withdrawal from all conflict or a belief that all politics is a form of war. Thus, Morgenthau flatly rejects Weber’s and Mannheim’s sociologically informed clarification of partisan positions in the name of a “realism” that focuses largely on national interest—though admittedly in the service of peace and cooperation (Walker 1999, 3).

The third and perhaps the most significant approach is the attempt to forge a political sociology combining an analysis of the economy, politics, constitutional structure, and ideologies in a way that reveals the objective possibilities of historical-political conjunctures. Among the emigres, the best representation of this direction is in Franz Neumann’s Behemoth (Neumann 1966). In a style at once combining Weber
and Mannheim, Neumann first analyzes the Weimar conjuncture to determine the long-range structural basis for the breakdown and then looks at alternative courses of action that could have broken the Weimar political paralysis. Neumann sees the general causes of the breakdown of the Weimar Constitution as rooted both in the stalemate of powers produced by a constitution based on plural interest groups and parties (Neumann 1966, 10-12) and in a concept of political democracy that fails to direct the industrial economy to abolish unemployment and improve living standards (Neumann 1966,34). The Weimar Constitution, forged by the dominant powerful interests, suffered from both of these defects.

Turning then to the political conjuncture of competing forces in Weimar, Neumann suggests no less than five opportunities in which the left could have taking advantage of the situation. Neumann sees the general causes of the breakdown of the Weimar Constitution as rooted both in the stalemate of powers produced by a constitution based on plural interest groups and parties (Neumann 1966, 10-12) and in a concept of political democracy that fails to direct the industrial economy to abolish unemployment and improve living standards (Neumann 1966,34). The Weimar Constitution, forged by the dominant powerful interests, suffered from both of these defects.

Opportunity Structures for Migrating Scholars

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Most narratives about the emigre scholars are shot through with myth. The aim of the following short remarks is to demystify them.

Conventional wisdom holds that all the emigre scholars who were forced out of the Third Reich by the Nazis went through disappointing experiences after their arrival in the safe refuge of the United States. Landing at New York’s still-bustling piers with just the proverbial dollar bill, washing dishes, toiling at menial factory labor, or being dependent on more adaptable wives who sold the skills that they had earlier exercised only at home as needwomen, typists, and secretaries—these are the essentials in stories and histories about intellectual refugees. I do not want to question the accuracy of such reports in every case; I do want to emphasize the exceptional status of those experiences, and above all, their transitoriness. If someone was forced to work below his or her level of competence, it was in fact only for a short time. Nevertheless these extraordinary experiences are engraved in the collective memory. Histories provided by admirers and disciples accentuate unlucky episodes and make it appear that these glimpses are sufficient to show the whole picture. Yet, for every case of an eminent scholar turned unknown immigrant and traditionally employed in an alien field, one could easily name onetransiting cases of instant success, at least in the early 1930s. How was this success possible? About two thirds of the intellectuals who went into exile from the Third Reich ended up in the United States. From the American point of view, this was the first immigration wave made up of highly educated people with upper-middle-class social backgrounds. Previous immigrants were mostly
unskilled or skilled workers and craftsmen from lower-class social backgrounds. Therefore, the masses landing on the American shores after 1880 did not pose competition for Americans middle and upper-middle class. Moreover, after their arrival, earlier immigrants behaved according to the tacit rules for immigrants. They accepted jobs below their level of competence. They were trying to make their way up the social ladder, however, and in the event that they failed, they nevertheless hoped that their children would be successful and satisfy their aspirations to upward mobility. Thus, they contributed to the American creed.

The picture changed completely when the well-educated emigrant scholars arrived in the United States. The situation was different in two respects: on the one hand, the economic devastation of the Great Depression had destroyed jobs for college professors and other professionals. Newcomers in the academic market were not always welcomed as warm-hearted as the immigrant labor force had been earlier welcomed by industry and tolerated by the laboring classes. On the other hand, the number of these well-educated immigrants was small compared with the masses of former decades. Never before or afterward were the numbers of legal immigrants to the United States as low as during the 1930s. As a consequence, one might expect that the integration of this small population would proceed smoothly.

In contrast to the myth, then, only a few of these educated German-speaking immigrants, especially among the early arrivals, had to take the traditional way of “understratification,” a sociological concept applied when someone accepts a job below their former level of employment. Due to the generosity of some internationally inclined American academics and thanks to the financial aid provided by Jewish philanthropists of German origin, most of the displaced scholars could resume academic work nearly immediately. When, later in the 1930s, larger numbers of intellectual refugees landed in the United States—a development due to the help of foundations, philanthropists, and politically active and influential American intellectuals—they were confronted with the first signs of a changing landscape for academic job-seekers. At the beginning of World War II in Europe, however, American economics was on its way to recovery, college and university enrollments were rising again, and some American professors were replacing British colleagues called to service.

What appears to be a disadvantage at first sight, coming late to the United States proved in fact to be an advantage. If they were able to make their way across the Atlantic, which was the more complicated thing, Austrian intellectuals fleeing their country due to the Nazi takeover and German Jews who fled after the pogroms of November 1938 arrived when American supporters of refugees had gained invaluable experience. They were free of the anxieties they had expressed after 1933 with regard to the competition for the newcomers who would create employment for young Americans who lost their jobs in the Depression. Moreover, the cosmopolitans among the American intellectuals had also learned how to handle the everyday business of helping refugees. It is also true that Austrian emigrants among the latecomers were younger than their German counterparts of the first wave, that they had left less-prestigious positions, and that they were not so heavily bonded to their national heritage. In short, they were more adaptable to America. After a relatively short transition period the late-arriving Austrians and Germans took over the jobs of Americans who were serving the war effort.

What is true for the academic immigrants in America is true for the other European refugees of that era. According to a study conducted as early as the middle of the 1940s, the overwhelming majority of the male refugee population had found jobs very similar to those they had left in Germany and Austria: at least 67 percent of former German or Austrian male professional workers and 52 percent of the qualified women earned their living in the United States as professional workers (Davie 1947, 128). Asked whether they had experienced upward or downward mobility or no change at all, 36 percent reported upward mobility, whereas only 0.8 percent indicated a downward move. Even if the respondents overestimated their success due to social pressure, their claims of success often paved the way for real success.

During the years when refugees fled to the United States another, much smaller group of immigrants arrived too. They can be described as ordinary academic brain drainers. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, continued its fellowship program for Europeans, established in the 1920s, until the very beginning of World War II. This program was designed to bring foreigners on a visiting basis to United States universities. Fellowship holders had to promise to return home at the end of their visits because of immigration and naturalization regulations and also to meet the objectives of the program. Yet young scholars from different countries reacted differently to this obligation. Most of the British, Dutch, French, Italian, and Scandinavian scholars returned as they had promised. But even among the scholars not directly endangered by the takeover of Europe by the Nazis, a remarkable minority decided to stay in the United States after the expiration of their fellowship terms. Three out of ten remained: four out of ten Germans, every second Austrian, and all Polish fellowship holders. Bear in mind that the Rockefeller Foundation did not positively discriminate in favor of later victims of the Nazi purge. It would be erroneous to think that the scholars remained for political reasons or out of fear. Most of them were ordinary job-seekers. The majority of people who came to the United States during the 1930s and early 1940s were involuntarily exiled, but a not insignificant minority voluntarily chose the expanding American academic marketplace.

An inner contradiction in the accepted myth is that many of those who repeated tales of hardship and exclusion also made exaggerated claims for the intellectual refugee. Impact on American intellectual, society. Remarkably enough, the names cited are mostly those who are voguish when an author is writing. Quite different people were named as influential in the 1950s than in the 1990s. Psychologists like Karen Horney, Jacob Moreno, and Kurt Lewin were the heroes of the 1950s, whereas political theorists like Hannah Arendt and Herbert Marcuse became prominent in the 1960s. A decade ago, so-called neoliberal economists like Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek took center stage. Most recently, the immigrants from the Nazi period have become less voguish. Disciples of former refugee intellectuals and authors with a “family likeness” to some of them took over their positions.

Looking more carefully at the measurable impact of academic immigrants reveals a two-fold picture. Authors who received acclaim from wider audiences were not the same as those who had residence inside the more narrowly defined academic discourses. In an investigation patterned on citation analysis I compared some three hundred German-speaking social scientists with regard to two indicators. Using the full-text database JSTOR, widely used in United States universities and libraries, containing some 60 leading academic journals, I have been able to develop some hard indicators of intradisciplinary influence. In addition, I found surprising and striking evidence of differences between Austrian and German immigrants. Using the search options of JSTOR, it is possible to count how many articles were published by individual authors. I labeled this variable “productivity.” And one can also count how often the name of someone appears in articles written by others. I call this variable “recognition.”

The 10 most productive authors were:
1. Christopher Tietze (b. 1908, Vienna, Austria)
2. Jacob L. Moreno (b. 1889, Bucharest, Hungary)
3. Joseph L. Kunz (b. 1890, Vienna, Austria)
4. Fritz Machlup (b. 1902, near Vienna, Austria)
5. Gottfried Haberler (b. 1900, near Vienna, Austria)
6. Gerhard Tintner (b. 1907, Nurnberg, Germany)
7. Leo Gross (b. 1903, Groso, Galicia)
8. Gustav Bergmann (b. 1906, Vienna, Austria)
9. Peter M. Blau (b. 1918, Vienna, Austria)
10. Hans Kohn (b. 1891, Prague, Czech Republic)

And the 11 most cited authors were:
1. Paul F. Lazarsfeld (b. 1903, Vienna, Austria)
2. Sigmund Freud (b. 1856, Freiberg, Moravia)
3. F. A. Hayek (b. 1899, Vienna, Austria)
4. Fritz Machlup (b. 1902, near Vienna, Austria)
5. Peter M. Blau (b. 1918, Vienna, Austria)
6. Gottfried Haberler (b. 1900, near Vienna, Austria)
7. Oskar Morgenstern (b. 1902, Götting, Germany)
8. Joseph A. Schumpeter (b. 1883, Triesich, Moravia)
9. Christopher Tietze (b. 1908, Vienna, Austria)
10. Alexander Gerschenkron (b. 1909, Odessa, Russia)
11. Theodor W. Adorno (b. 1903, Frankfurt am Main, Germany)

No woman reached the top 40 rankings in productivity, whereas three women show up in the corresponding recognition rankings: social psychologist Marie Jahoda (17), psychoanalyst Anna Freud (21), and political theorist and public intellectual Hannah Arendt (29).
The names on the productivity list are less familiar than those on the recognition list. The explanation is relatively easy to find. The demographer Tietze, the inventor of sociometry Moreno, and the international law experts Kunz and Gross were prolific writers in fields characterized by frequent publication. Only Moreno obtained a hearing outside his specialized field, and then only during a comparably brief period in the 1940s and early 1950s. The is another lesson to learn from this list: economists rank high because they were the first social scientists publishing primarily in journals, whereas the majority of the other social scientists divided their publication activities between books and journals. JSTOR does. (books.)

Recognition is not restricted to articles, however. There are some authors on the list, Freud in particular, whose works took the form of books. I do not want to exaggerate the meaningfulness of this analysis, however, the strong impact achieved by Austrian emigres is striking compared to the relative success of German emigres. It leads to the thesis that the Austrians were more adaptable to their new environment, where they became recognized more by their scientific peers than by the audience at large. Kenneth Spaulding, an American writing on these Austrians gave his study the title “The Quiet Invaders.”

Those examining the experiences of refugee scholars should bear in mind that not everything emphasized in narratives about the emigre scholars has historical significance or accuracy. There is ample room for telling more inclusive and precise stories about them.

Reference


Erik Erikson, Emigration, and Identity

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In postwar America Erik Homburger Erikson was perhaps the most influential immigrant psychoanalyst from German-speaking Europe. His concept of an adolescent identity crisis anchoring a five-stage life cycle became commonplace in American intellectual and popular discourse. By the mid 1960s, his book Childhood and Society (1950) was basic to the American undergraduate psychology curriculum. The identity concept embedded in the book regulated a sense of marginality and the absence of firm boundaries—linguistic, geographic, familial, and occupational—that is often ascribed to intellectual emigrés of Erikson’s generation. At the same time, his identity construct resonated with and clarified a pervasive post-Freudian sense that midcentury United States culture was an invigorating and confusing bundle of diverse “identities.” Erikson became a cult hero as he brought his identity concerns to this “nation of immigrants.” As such, he has been long regarded as one of the most illustrious and creative psychoanalytic emigrés of the period. But does the label “emigré” obscure more about Erikson than it reveals? I think so.

The matter goes back to his childhood. By his own late-life admission, Erikson’s problems growing up in early-20th-century Karlsruhe might be classified as borderline. Told that Jewish pediatrician Theodor Homburger, his Danish Jewish mother’s second husband, was his father, he knew otherwise and longed to discover the identity of his blood father. Characterized as a boy in his parents’ synagogue, the blonde, blue-eyed young man was considered a Jew in gentile Karlsruhe. In his early twenties, Erikson took a long Wunderschau into the south of Germany and then Italy to discover who he was and what he was to become. He loved art and was talented with woodcuts, but not good enough to make a vocation of it. So he returned to Karlsruhe.

Erikson thought it best to migrate to Copenhagen where he could practice analysis. A more compelling motive was that he might make some headway in finding the identity of his father, who he assumed was a Danish gentile of plentiful means and strong artistic talents. To find his missing father was to find his own identity and move into a life of his own making.

In later life, Erikson and his wife fashioned a story of how they heroically escaped Hitler’s clutches: they left Vienna before the Nazi invasion, avoided German territory entirely, traversed the Polish Corridor to a ship that took them to Copenhagen, and then found safety in America. This compelling tale would qualify them as “refugees.” Yet the evidence is more subtle, more tenuous, less automatic. Erikson thought it best to migrate to Copenhagen where he could practice analysis. A more compelling motive was that he might make some headway in finding the identity of his father, who he assumed was a Danish gentile of plentiful means and strong artistic talents. To find his missing father was to find his own identity and move into a life of his own making.

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economic consequence to leave Austria, despite the fact that through his mother, he was most definitely Jewish. Residency in Denmark, so close to Germany, could not be viewed as escape from the emerging Nazi danger. The lesson to students of the intellectual emigration is obvious—that forced emigration can be a fictional construct for some and a pressing reality for others.

II

The Eriksons spent several months in Copenhagen, where they found some support from his mother’s well-established and prosperous family. However, psychoanalysis was not in good repute in Denmark, and Erik could not garner a work permit to practice his profession, nor was he able to learn much about his father, save for family rumors that the man was a photographer and may have left Copenhagen for America. There were some old-timers in the Danish Abrahamson family who knew more, but they volunteered little and Erik did not seem to press very hard. Later, he claimed that he did not want to confront or embarrass his father. Without the capacity to work in psychoanalysis, Joan’s plea to emigrate to America was more compelling. Indeed, several psychoanalytic colleagues in New York and Boston had assured him of employment. Anna Freud urged him to return to Vienna where child practice was growing, but once again, he rejected that request.

But obtained consultancy just before setting sail for New York, Erikson began a lengthy correspondence with another Vienna psychoanalyst, August Aichhorn. A gentle, Aichhorn had pioneered work with juveniles in poorer sections of Vienna and had shown this seamy side of the city to Erikson. He now wrote to Aichhorn that he would probably still be in Vienna, joining Aichhorn in his work, if he had taken Aichhorn and not Anna Freud as his analyst. He asserted that, by allowing Freud and her largely female circle of child analysts to become the center of his professional existence, he had psychologically remained locked in his early childhood. Freud’s “Vienna aunt ensemble” was hardly more than a creation. Erik explained, of a circle of his own aunts who had joined his mother near Frankfurt when he was born. He might have made the break from his mother’s “aunt ensemble” by selecting Aichhorn as his analyst and mentor, he wrote, but it was “unconscious knowledge of the betrayed father which made me withdraw from you.” He had mistakenly regarded Aichhorn emotionally as the gentle “father” who had abandoned his mother. Erikson’s letter did not flatter Aichhorn. He wrote back that Erikson should be attentive to his “narcissistic tendencies” of self-absorption, self-promotion, fantasy, and deficient concern for others, that Erikson lacked confidence in himself—indeed, that he lacked a fully developed self that could engage much reciprocity from others. In brief, Aichhorn told him to come out of himself and see the world for what it was before he set sail for America. Erikson was shocked and hurt and lashed back at Aichhorn. But the point had been made. He had been made to see the world for what it was before he set sail for America. Erikson was shocked and hurt and lashed back at Aichhorn. But the point had been made. He had been made to see the world for what it was before he set sail for America.

III

In the United States the flight continued. Arriving in New York, Erikson found employment in Boston as one of the area’s first child analysts. He also found work with Henry Murray’s Harvard Psychological Clinic and had found more lucrative employment at Yale and, in 1939, on Jean Walker McDarian’s research team at the University of California, Berkeley. His early experience in America was privileged and protected within academia, despite his lack of even an undergraduate degree. As Hitler’s sway over Europe extended and Nazi brutalities increased, Erikson embellished the story of his emigrated experience and presented himself as a student of Sigmund Freud. He also became a consultant to the American intelligence effort, fashioning the psychological foundations of Hitler’s appeal to German youth. He was very well received in the psychoanalytic profession, with purportedly “impeccable” Vienna credentials, and by 1950 he was elected president of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society. In time, as determined by his created history, he became part of the historical record as a Holocaust emigré who fashioned striking success in America.

On Music, Humor, and Exile in Wittgenstein and Adorno

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Does any singing go on in dark times? Yes! One sings of the dark times, one sings of the dark times, one sings of the dark times.

— Bertolt Brecht and Hanns Eisler, Hollywood Songbook

“When I came home I expected a surprise and there was no surprise for me, of course I was surprised.” So wrote Wittgenstein circa 1951 and Adorno wrote of home three years later: “Novais’s definition, according to which all philosophy is homesickness, holds true only if this longing is not dissolved into the phantom of a lost remote antiquity, but represents, rather, the homeland, nature itself, as wrested from myth. Homeland is the state of having escaped. The title of this paper might have been ‘on what it means for philosophical exiles to go home’ because its theme, first, is about the process by which philosophers think philosophically about going home, and second, about the character of their arrival. In broader terms, the theme is about doing philosophy and the way thoughts of exile, estrangement, and distance affect it.

Conceiving philosophy as an activity, this paper compares philosophy to two other activities with dynamic properties: humor and music. The comparison has a long history: these themes are juxtaposed primarily in the work of Wittgenstein and Adorno, focusing less on independent thoughts about humor, music, or even exilic than on how each philosopher contributes to modernist understandings of the dynamic form of doing philosophy. My interest is in the formalism intrinsic to the temporal condition of music, humor, and exile and how that condition teaches something about the noncognitive or nonconceptual movement of philosophical learning.

Taking time for learning is a process of coming to understand a piece of music will, as philosophers think, listen differently, play differently, talk differently.” Adorno could have written the same words, and in neither case would the “difference” to which they refer have been a platitude. Adorno wrote this instead: “The wretched fate here [of memory and individuality] is like that which befalls the joke specifically committed to paper so that we can remember it.” Writing down a joke fixes meaning and renders performance, like thinking, redundant. And that is also why no jokes are reproduced here.

Consider the idea of exile seen from contrasting perspectives. First, literally, in terms of two philosophers living abroad, away from home, by choice, or by the dire political necessity of a world with two World Wars. And then think of exile metaphorically or metaphorically as a condition of estrangement, unfamiliarity, and foreignness. Wittgenstein and Adorno each thought about both sorts of exile, though Adorno much more explicitly. What I find intriguing is how they both internalized their thoughts about exile or foreignness into the form of their philosophical argument and how both used musical models to do so: content became form, form became content. Both thought deeply also about humor. Much in their philosophical arguments depends on triggering a change of attitude, yet they did not simply reject a false
power of same essence: in Wittgenstein's case, metaphysical illusions of deep or core essences; in Adorno's case, ideological distortions of conformity and identity. Concerned with philosophy, Wittgenstein spoke of "philosophical injustices", concerned also with the world, Adorno spoke of a "damaged life." Wittgenstein once wrote, "Humor is not a mood [keine Stimmung] but a way of looking at the world [Weltenansahung]." So if it is correct to say that humor was stamped out in Nazi Germany, that does not mean that people were not in good spirits, or anything of that sort, but something much deeper and more important.

Both philosophers use their work to challenge the comforts of home, to throw into doubt what seems most familiar and self-evident. Both aim to demonstrate the distinction between truth and deception, to demarcate a false feeling of familiarity with a true one, to replace, they say, a false sense of home with a true sense. Yet, for all this similarity, they end up with different conceptions of home. In part this is why I contrast them; they show a difference amongst modernists. Wittgenstein's philosophy led him to a conservative and harmonious home, Adorno's to a critical and dissolvent home. Wittgenstein thought about happy endings; Adorno rejected them. Paradoxically for both, Wittgenstein thought about strategies of defamiliarization as removing oneself from the living room of one's home. The farthest he thinks a philosopher has to go is to see the strangeness of how we see the world is one's own "back garden." Appreciating the "deprovincializing" effect of exile in America, Adorno thought on his return to Germany that the "untruth" or "deceptions" of home always demand that one keep one's thinking in a state of exile, and, in the context of a "damaged life," in a philosophical condition of subjective misery.

The difficult question I pose is whether or not the different endings these philosophers propose could have been determined by philosophical form alone. I argue that they could not. If this paper is about their formalism, then it also about how far form can take one. "The way things are" wrote the unhappy Adorno, "should not be the final word." In regard to philosophy, even the happier Wittgenstein would have agreed: "It is as though I had lost my way and asked someone the way home. He says he will show me and walks along a nice smooth path. This suddenly comes to an end. And now my friend says: 'All you have to do now is find the rest of the way home from here.'" For both philosophers, "all the way home" is just where all the difficulty of philosophy resides, and, if this is correct, then it is so independent of whether or not "the way things are" makes for happy or unhappy endings.

The Doublesent of Settler Exile at the Periphery

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I want to extend the concept of exile to certain persons born in the new land. It may seem illogical to speak of such persons as exiles. They are not emigrants, persons who have had to leave the old land because of coercion or threat, dissatisfaction, or refusal to cooperate. And yet those born in the new country may be wedded to the old to the point where they feel as if in exile—especially if the new land is defined for them by a colonial settler formation. Feeling an exile is not the same as being one, and yet the social formations betrayed by such feelings might profitably be understood as situations for which it is reasonable to say: here also are cases of exile.

I am concerned with colonial settler formations in particular and interested to understand how they might foster a sense of exile in certain persons. The person I take as an example is Irma Stern, the great South African painter of the 1920s and '30s. Stern paints and writes her own story of exile and paradise in a journal called Paradise. It is the record of an artist active in the German avant-garde and exhibited with the Die Brücke artists until the outbreak of World War I.

For Stern, born in the South African Transvaal, the native country was a provincial prison with few galleries, little interest in new forms of representation and little space for a creative woman to be herself. And yet Paradise harps on the fact that she spent her years in Germany thinking only of her native South Africa, for which she "burned." Returning to South Africa at the onset of World War I, feeling the "burning fires of Europe" (apocalyptic fire appears throughout this biblical story), she became increasingly estranged and reduced. Indeed she disappeared into her exoticizations of "the native" when not cradled in the privacy of her home. Her home she converted into a room of her own, a refuge and creative womb, filled with her work and a marvell of Zanzibar door jams, African sculptures, huge rough-hewn tables, and fetish items.

Now it is settlers and their descendants who feel in exile in the South African colony. Later, Zulus, Twana, Xhosa will feel in exile only outside of it (or in internal exile, working far from families in the mines).

It is the settler families who simultaneously treat the colony as a utopian paradise and a provincial prison. "Exile in paradise" is a settler construction.

Stern has imbued the history of painterly exoticism and is instinctively attuned to the German expressionist desire to find utopia in the vibrant and unbridled colors of the "primitive." Her is a line extending back from Max Pechstein, her mentor and friend, to Paul Gauguin. Paradise is the record of this exotization of home. Her work, being that of a "settler," also evinces more than mere exotic phosphorescence. What she paints is familiar because she has grown up on African soil among African people. So (especially when painting urban, mixed populations of Cape Town) she paints people as locals, not mere fantasy items. She lends them a degree of subjectivity, foregrounds them, giving their faces room for expression. They do not float in the background of her pictures (as they do in Pechstein’s), merged into the flora and fauna.

She shows an ambivalence about being at home in the colony: the colony is both exotic paradise and familiar locale. This double way of being at home and in a foreign place is related to her sense of being always also European, genuinely connected to Germany as place, comprising the distinctive German sense of Lebenswert (value of life) and Kultur.

Upon her return, Stern takes up habitation in Cape Town, where she is briefly and unhappily married and where she lives for the remainder of her life. There she is a cosmopolitan condemned to the province, a creative artist forced into the position of dependency on art worlds that exist elsewhere and from which she gradually loses touch. I am convinced that, given the adulation of her by artists and the public up to 1915, had she stayed in Germany, she would have been regarded as an avant-garde painter of importance. (Being Jewish, she also would have ended up dead, but that is another story). In the provinces she is out of circulation. Not just German circulation, but circulation in general, for in South Africa there was little infrastructure through which art could circulate (this
remains all too true today. By “circulation” I mean the ability to participate in markets of supply and demand occasioned through the infrastructure of galleries, exhibitions, inclusion in movements, objectification and adulation by critical pronouncements, validation through commodification in collections, eternalization by museums—the way modernity occasions modern art in Europe and, later, America.

Fundamentally therefore to the idea of a “settler in exile” is the condition of someone who lives away from centers of circulation—on the “periphery.” Stern’s exile is also that of a woman of talent in an archaic, patriarchal world. Were she a man, she probably would have taken more paternalist interest in the nation-building exercises of the South African colony, and she would have had more access, with less stereotyping, to whatever there was by way of circulation in South Africa.

And yet in spite of all this, there is the sense that even while she was in Europe she pined for South Africa as her home. Here is therefore a two-sided experience of exile; she is at home in neither place. This is almost a definition of the cultured, creative “settler.” In Africa, German remains her language. She writes her special friends in German, which remains a secret, adored language. Paradise is composed in German. She is homesick while in the land of her birth. The result of this double exile is a retreat into privacy from public social life.

Stern never devalues Europe, she only mourns it. It remains the idealized “other,” even as it burns in apocalyptic rage. Her gaze upon Europe remains that of the displaced pining for a lost piece of herself, one crucial of music and its reputedly salvational values. By contrast Stern never rethinks Europe in the light of her experience of exile; she is at home in neither place. This is the most important difference between the settler and the exile.

I propose in this paper that the attitude of analytical distance, reflexivity, and maybe also irony associated with the German project of sociology of culture was not compatible with the intellectual and cultural traditions of the Anglo-Saxon world the emigrants tried to adjust to. This attitude was only revived after 1968 through the reception of the writings of Michel Foucault, the new interest in science studies, and a new awareness of the cultural dimension in all social sciences and in historiography. I will try to illustrate my thesis about the fundamental misunderstandings involved in the Anglo-Saxon reception of studies in sociology of culture by taking the example of Karl Mannheim and of one of his pupils in London, the emigrant Viola Klein.

The creation of German cultural sociology corresponds from its beginnings with a diagnosis of crisis. The interest in culture was associated with the conviction that the old contents of culture had become obsolete and lifeless. The cultural-sociological analytical perspective was supposed to contribute to an overcoming of the cultural pessimism that began spreading in 1900 and ever more strongly during and after World War I. The theme that Freud captures in 1930 as “the discontent in culture” is first sounded by Simmel.

I pose the topic of exile in relation to the concepts of center, periphery, and dependency, which is to say in terms of cultural economy. The topic extends to emigration, leading to broader terms for comparing kinds of exile. It is crucial that author Stefan Zweig ended up in a South African colony, and she would have at least found a fairly robust world there, with many compatriots and familiar cultural forms. In Petropolis he found loneliness, exile from Europe, and a sense of being a stranger in a form of life that must have, to him, remained opaque, impenetrable, other. Whether he would have killed himself in New York we can never know. Still, there is a difference of the categorization to a center and to a “colonial province.”

But then there is the case of my student from Congo, a former jesuit priest, a philosopher who began a lecture by saying, “We from Kinshasa have experienced two homes, Kinshasa and Paris.” His experience is of a double possession of homes. His position is ironic: he is really in exile-unable to return to his country. And Paris is to him unaffordable.

References


The Disappearance of the Sociology of Knowledge and Kultursociologier, 1933

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I propose in this paper that the attitude of analytical distance, reflexivity, and maybe also irony associated with the German project of sociology of culture was not compatible with the intellectual and cultural traditions of the Anglo-Saxon world the emigrants tried to adjust to. This attitude was only revived after 1968 through the reception of the writings of Michel Foucault, the new interest in science studies, and a new awareness of the cultural dimension in all social sciences and in historiography. I will try to illustrate my thesis about the fundamental misunderstandings involved in the Anglo-Saxon reception of studies in sociology of culture by taking the example of Karl Mannheim and of one of his pupils in London, the emigrant Viola Klein.

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I pose the topic of exile in relation to the concepts of center, periphery, and dependency, which is to say in terms of cultural economy. The topic extends to emigration, leading to broader terms for comparing kinds of exile. It is crucial that author Stefan Zweig ended up in Petropolis rather than New York. Were he in New York, he would have at least found a fairly robust world there, with many compatriots and familiar cultural forms. In Petropolis he found loneliness, exile from Europe, and a sense of being a stranger in a form of life that must have, to him, remained opaque, impenetrable, other. Whether he would have killed himself in New York we can never know. Still, there is a difference of the categorization to a center and to a “colonial province.”

But then there is the case of my student from Congo, a former jesuit priest, a philosopher who began a lecture by saying, “We from Kinshasa have two homes, Kinshasa and Paris.” His experience is of a double possession of homes. His position is ironic: he is really in exile, unable to return to his country. And Paris is to him unaffordable.
Mediation between objective and subjective culture appeared to be necessary, but it was also deemed to be possible. Karl Mannheim lays out this program in 1918, in a lecture on “Soul and Culture” to the so-called Free School for Humanistic Studies in Budapest. He asserts that, since the distance between the isolated individual and objectified culture has become ever greater, cultural estrangement must be counteracted by a deeper cultural analysis: “by objective culture we mean the aggregate of objectifications of the spirit, which have in their development become a human endowment.” Instead of despairing, the attempt should be made “to use the opportunity given by the historical situation and to illuminate the framework of the decontextualized cultural domains and to turn them to account” (Mannheim [1917] 1964, 77). This yields the necessity of the “structural analysis of individual cultural sectors” that he set out as the mission of the generation assembled before him in the Free School for Humanistic Studies. Georg Lukács was to have advanced aesthetic, or perhaps sociology of literature; Béla Balács was to have explained the “development of lyrical sensitivity”; Arnold Hauser was to have investigated “dilettantism in art”; and Béla Bartók was to have compared folk music and modern music. For himself, Mannheim reserves the structural analysis of epistemological systems—a program from which his form of sociology of knowledge was to later develop—(Kardel and Verbr 1985).

Mannheim’s work reflects the general mood of the 1920s, after he had been compelled to leave Hungary and had studied in Heidelberg with the cultural sociologist Alfred Weber, among others, Mannheim draws a closer circle around the question of just why and how culture has to be analyzed. He emphasizes that the emergence of cultural sociology was tied to a crisis of culture: “The problem of culture did not arise because of someone’s idiot rationalization, but because culture itself became problematic” (Mannheim [1924] 1982, 278–279). This required a new attitude, which Mannheim calls the historical-social genetic perspective. Especially important is the insight into the fact that “cultural sciences are themselves part of the process they are describing, and that, accordingly, in this case the subject and object of science, in effect, coincide.” Consequently, “the subject of cultural-scientific knowledge is not the mere epistemological subject, but the ‘whole man.’” What this means is “that one may not apprehend spiritual realities as if they were things and that one may not, in methodological reflection, falsify the knowledge relating to them by analogies drawn from the natural sciences (which more or less expressly dominate our reflections);” (Mannheim [1922] 1982, 50). It is rather up to cultural sociology to recognize the phenomenon of what is called prescientific learning from experience as a rudimentary form of knowledge that has not yet become science. The sociogenetic view of cultural creations is actually nothing but an extension of “everyday learning from experience” or “general experience of the world” (both expressions of Wilhelm Dilthey), and this basis cannot and must not be abandoned. This pretheoretical origin of sociogenetic knowledge is by no means a condemnation to imprecision. What follows, rather, is “that not only law, morals, forms of life, art, religion, etc. can be examined in their sociogenetic functionality, but that the process of thinking and knowing, as well as the structure of intellectual creations and concrete intellectual contents of an age can be understood in terms of their sociogenetic functional relations.” This functionality can be investigated in several ways, “on the one hand as a function of more inclusive psychic constellations, as a function of the worldview of the given individual, or, on the other hand, as a function of the pursuit of economic and social power by groups” (Mannheim [1922] 1982, 62).

In his later work from the 1930s, Mannheim’s sociogenetic knowledge requires a double attitude towards the contents to be analyzed. Sociology emphasizes the functional aspect of thinking, subjects it to an external, nonimmanent scrutiny. But it is also possible to direct one’s attention to the theoretical realm in its immanence. This double attitude towards cultural creations in general constitutes the cultural-sociological paradox, which must be tolerated rather than transcended. The task of cultural sociology is not an immanent examination of cultural objects, but the analysis of the social contents of experience that lie behind them. The prototype of this kind of cultural-sociological analysis is The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Max Weber:

The theoretical achievement of the sociologist thus consists in his attempt to penetrate this sphere of experiential contexts, that at first appears wholly resistant to theorization, in search of its structure. Cultural-sociological analysis is accordingly not the analysis of cultural creations or social formations, but rather the analysis of the structure of the various world views, in search of the experiential contexts that may coherently make a conjoint appearance within them. (Mannheim [1922] 1982, 94)

The “constellation” thus becomes a basic category in the sociogenetic observation of cultural creations, but it is not to be grasped simply as social location. In order to arrive at the structure of experiential contexts, it is necessary to reconstruct the entire framework of cultural creations in its interactions. According to the times, social location, generational placement, religious tradition, gender specific biographical patterns, but also according to typical occupational experiences, the appropriation of concrete cultural creations (art works, “ideologies”) theories will assume quite different meanings. “Constellation” can only be comprehended as a relatively unified “life system.” Cultural sociology aims beyond this to refer the world/totalities to the social existence lying behind them, and thereby to the sociological-conceptual level. Neither a sociology of variables nor pure intellectual history can achieve this. Mannheim tried such a “sociological interpretation of meaning” in his investigation of German conservatism, where he traced the general theoretical attitude thought as a “counterlogic” to the “Jacobin natural-law way of thinking,” he pointed to social locations and generations as well as the invention of tradition and the competition of political ideas (Mannheim [1925] 1984).

The publication of Ideology and Utopia in 1929 leads to a vigorous dispute over the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim’s proposal to develop a synthetic consciousness after a phase of atomized competition among different interpretations of the world runs into equally fierce opposition from conservatives, “genuine” humanists, and Marxists, while positivism hardly figures as yet in the German debate. After his call to Frankfurt, he steadfastly pursued an empirical sociology of culture and knowledge in both instruction and research (Mannheim 2001; Loader and Kettler 2001). This expressed itself as well in interdisciplinary seminars, like the Liberal Seminars conducted jointly with Adolf Löwe and Paul Tillich, as in the dissertations supervised by him or his assistant, Norbert Elias. These are devoted to various topics, such as the press, the male and the female intelligentsias around 1800, the emigration after the French Revolution (Rubinstein [1933] 2000), women’s social work, the sociology of housework, theatrical association, or the history of photography in the 19th century (Frenzel 1936). This work by the latter famous Girola Freund was the only one with a happy end, because it could be completed at the Sorbonne after Mannheim lost his chair in 1933 and emigrated to London (Honnegger 1993).

Deprived of his language and culture for the second time, Mannheim nevertheless manages to uphold his Enlightenment cultural-sociological program. Despite his precarious position (it was not until 1946, a year after his death, that he received a full professorship for educational sociology in the Institute of Education at the University of London), and despite linguistic difficulties, he continues to publish. In England, there is next to no sociology, no Marxism, but primarily natural science and literary criticism (as well as economics and theology). It seems almost hopeless to try to transmit the intellectual adventure of his sociology of knowledge to this strange public. Nevertheless he prepares, with the help of Louis Wirth from the University of Chicago, an English edition of Ideology and Utopia, to which the latter contributes the foreword. This preface ends with the following optimistic passage concerning the possible reception of Mannheim in the United Kingdom and United States:

In Ideology and Utopia, Professor Mannheim presents not merely the outlines of a new discipline which promises to give a new and more profound understanding of social life, but also offers a much-needed clarification of some of the major moral issues of today. It is in the hope that it will make some contribution to the solution of the problems which intelligent people in the English-speaking world are facing that the present volume has been translated. (Wirth 1936, xxxv)

Mannheim himself added an explanatory first chapter to the English edition, written as if he anticipated a hostile reception from a cultivated English public. In a
letter to Louis Wirth in 1936, he writes about the situation in England and about his attempt to bring the sociology of knowledge closer to the Anglo-Saxon world:

The great security that reigns in this country has not opened even the clearest heads among the local intelligentsia to the problem of the sociological background of consciousness. For most, the old book would appear simply as a document of a world closed to them. I attempted to make these difficulties more manageable through my historical analogies with the Sophists and Socrates.

(Laube 2000, 268)

It is more than doubtful that he actually enhanced his approachability with this. While the history of his reception in the United States is fairly intricate (Merton 1968, 543–562; Longhurst 1989; Ketterl and Meja 1994), in England, he was either ignored as a German sophist or denounced as a positivist elitist theorist. Mannheim did not, it should be said, let up in his efforts to transmit the sociology of knowledge. He published several more books in English, taught at the London School of Economics as well as at the Institute of the University of London, and served as editor of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction. In this series appeared many works by German emigrants and classics of sociology, but also several dissertations.

The reception of the work of Viola Klein, an emigrant from Austria who wrote a dissertation in sociology of knowledge in English, was not understood. The reception was rather a single vast misunderstanding. The author summarizes in retrospect:

"Approaches to the Problem of Personality", published in 1946 with a foreword by Karl Mannheim, was not prepared to take her word for it that the book was concerned with an analysis of existing theories about feminine psychology rather than being itself a psychological study of women. The misunderstanding of the author's intentions went so far that some critics... accused her of using "secondary sources" instead of doing "original research," when in fact the investigation of those sources was the very object of the exercise. (Klein 1989, xiii)

Recent changes in the position of women, their increasing participation in public life and their manifestation of hitherto unexpected psychological qualities have challenged our views concerning the so-called eternal traits of the feminine character... For centuries these have been taken for granted and considered as facts until a sudden change has revealed their irrational or ideological nature.

In the preface to the second edition (1971), Viola Klein stated her own views about the book, its intentions, and reception:

Originally, the book was conceived as the application of the principles of the sociology of knowledge to the study of a specific, clearly delimited and topical issue. In other words, its main purpose was to demonstrate that scholars—no matter how honestly they endeavour to preserve the truth and nothing but the truth, pure and objective—are intellectually dependent on the social, cultural and historical climate of their time.

But this was just how the book was not understood. The reception was rather a single vast misunderstanding. The author summarizes in retrospect:

It seems, however, that the reading public, by and large was not prepared to take her word for it that the book was concerned with an analysis of existing theories about feminine psychology rather than being itself a psychological study of women. The misunderstanding of the author's intentions went so far that some critics... accused her of using "secondary sources" instead of doing "original research," when in fact the investigation of those sources was the very object of the exercise. (Klein 1989, xiii)

When Mannheim dies in 1947 in London, he is considered on the left to be an archibear, positivist, and anti-Marxist, while others represent him as the archenemy of an open society. Sociology of culture is disappearing behind a positivistic dissection of culture in the Parsonsian era of the social sciences, behind a traditional form of the history of ideas in historiography and behind a conservative notion of culture within the humanities. Ironically enough the last one took shape in a fictional posthumous continuation of the most “dialogue” between T. S. Eliot and Karl Mannheim in Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, a book that appeared in 1948. Until recently the tradition of the German Kultursoziologie was almost forgotten in the Anglo-Saxon world.

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French and German Intellectual Migration to the United States, 1940–47: Elements for a Political Sociology of Intellectual Practices

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This paper attempts to draw some conclusions about the study of intellectuals in exile, making use of the particular case of French intellectuals who fled to the United States after 1940. The creativity of intellectuals who found themselves in exile should not be reduced to the strategies of outsiders who want to become established, of refugee intellectuals in need of legitimation. In order to deal with cultural production of refugee intellectuals, as well as with their political behaviors during the war, I employ the notion of “critique” as developed by Michael Walzer in The Company of Critics.

“Critique” here is understood as the general faculty to contest a political order by denouncing the social values on which it rests. As individual complaints, critiques gain power as they begin to be perceived as more general than specific. Historically, intellectuals—artists, writers, scholars—have defined themselves as critique specialists. Not only have they considered themselves bearers of “critical conscience,” they have also developed skills and organizations to do the work of universalization, which gives force to any complaint. To the European exile in the United States, critique must be articulated to principles that support it. Critique, as a moment in the course of social interactions, justifies itself by values and rules that can produce an alternative evaluation of the world. It displays the implicit ethos of any symbolic production or political commitment: higher moral principles around which to gather, creating an “imagined community” no less real than any community. So the practice of critique is essentially pluralist. It applies various conventions of evaluation. Speaking in the name of justice, truth, and human rights, as intellectuals like to do, can be done in many specific ways, according to various modes of perception and categorization of the social world.

The fate of intellectuals in exile raises the problem of maintaining critique despite distance. The life of intellectuals in exile is “damaged” in so far as it is deprived of the cultural tradition and moral content that supported their critique. The situation of exile challenges the routine of the compromises upon which critique was usually built and urges intellectuals to reinvent their practice of critique.

Pragmatic constraints bearing on the practices of intellectuals are different in situations of exile. The imperative of justification of any critique is reinforced by the marginalized position of refugee intellectuals—within the context of arrival, and also in relation to their country of departure. German-speaking and French exiles in the United States had to translate the—sometimes hypothesized, sometimes fantasized—complaints of those who stayed in Europe into the idiom of America and vice versa. Their double isolation posed more obstacles to making their critique general and acceptable. They had to formulate more explicit principles of agreement for an alternative social and political order. But critique is not only a question of content. Intellectuals in exile also had to find new sites, new allies, new means of intervention. The questions I am raising in my work are thus the followings: How did intellectuals remain critical while being exiled? How did the content and the forms of their critique change with migration? According to which repertoires of critique did intellectuals in exile express their viewpoints on the historical moment they were living?

I focus on the study of the two most important and debated developments of the French intellectuals in exile: the École Libre des Hautes Études at the New School for Social Research and the journals and galleries close to the circle of surrealists in exile. The École Libre played an ambiguous role among French scholars in exile. On one hand, it favored isolation and politicization. On the other hand, it contributed indirectly to modernize French scholarship after the war. French scholars in exile remained critical intellectuals in the traditional vein as inaugurated with the Dreyfus affair. Yet scientists among them also learned to combine legitimations of their role, focusing on efficiency and utility. Anticipations of utility or expected efficient results was the best way for a critique to gain support, be accepted as nonpartisan, and to strengthen itself.

The exile of surrealism demonstrated the limits of the prophetic posture in the coming context of intellectual life. The surrealist circle in exile was far less isolated socially than were the French scholars. Yet their critique remained much more distanced. The critique they were addressing toward the role rationality and science played in modernity excluded them from European intellectual circles. The failure of the surrealists to come into a wider circulation of ideas and to engage in a mutual critique is another result of the prophetic role of critique.

This situation on reveals the tensions between the different orders of perception and evaluation that are combined by intellectuals to produce works and courses and inform their political orientations. Maintaining a critical position while being an exile is a work of bridging of various repertoires of justification. Although pressures for social integration or cultural assimilation were strong for intellectuals in exile, their ability to build a critique did not disappear. The situation of intellectuals in exile did not condemn them to a simple normative alternative, that is, becoming integrated and uncritical on one hand or remaining critical and isolated on the other. The European exile in the United States during World War II, more than other situations of exile, placed the refugees in a strong temporal contradiction. The German-speaking and French intellectuals in exile positioned themselves in continuity with the past: they found support in the memory of Weimar or, of the Third Republic to criticize the present. But they were also constantly mobilized in the United States to anticipate the future and imagine the ruptures of the social and political order of the postwar era. On one side, their experience of the past was mostly qualitative, subjective, damaged; yet on the other, their experience of the future were to be quantitative, objective, precise. Intellectuals who could hold this contradiction together became critical modernizers or reformers in the United States or in their country of origin when they returned. Others, whether relying only on inspiration or on utility and efficiency, often lost their critical strength with exile. Remaining critical in exile may well have more to do with a temporal adjustment than with a cultural or geographical one.

Exile Goes to College: Franz L. Neumann and the “Cultural Emigration”

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Even more than the financial assistance, however, was the willingness of the colleges and universities to take the risk of employing us, the friendliness with which we were received, and the almost total absence of resentment. It is these psychological elements that have succeeded in transforming a tragic problem into a happy solution.

—Franz L. Neumann (1953)

The Nazi regime lasted 12 years. That was a horribly long time, of course, but it is not long in a lifetime, at least for the survivors. Even middle-aged emigrants of the first hour, not to speak of the distinctive generation born around the beginning of the century, were faced with the problem of explaining themselves, not only to each other and to the public in their places of refuge but also to postwar German audiences that included many of their old friends and enemies and many more by whom they were known. A revealing and representative stock-taking took place in the early 1950s, when Franz L. Neumann contributed the opening chapter for a pioneering collection on German emigrants in several academic fields, an analysis that was largely presupposed in the first substantial German study of the same phenomenon by the fledgling sociologist Hege.
Three things stand out in these writings. First is the elision of the difference between intellectuals and academics (in the American sense of that word). Second is the neglect of the conflicts and compromises attending the attempts by intellectuals to colonize the universities, both in Weimar Germany and in Anglo-American exile. Third, then, is Neumann’s overstatement of the case for a complete break between the lives before and after the forced emigration from Germany. He underplays the pains of his generation with business that could never be finished.

Neumann introduces the term “intellectual” at the very outset of his discussion of the “cultural emigration” in the “social sciences.” In terms reminiscent of the softer teachings of the Institut für Sozialforschung—notably the writings of his friend Karl Mannheim—he announces that “the intellectual is, or ought to be, the critical conscience of society” and a “metacritic” that must resist full social integration. He frames his discussion in a typology of relations between intellectuals and political systems. The liberal state was the golden age of the intellectual, Neumann contends, although even in that era the intellectual was occasionally compelled to flee into inner or outer emigration because the liberal state labored under a profound ambivalence between its disengagement from matters in the private realm and its categorical commitment to its sovereignty against anything it perceived as a threat. In the bureaucratized nation states of the next phase, the intellectuals were ever more susceptible to Julien Bendel’s “treason of the clerks” concept that Neumann rather freely translates into their reduction to the role of functionaries, a process that culminates in the totalitarian regime, where not even inner emigration remains as an alternative to the total subjugation of the mind.

When he turns to the emigrants, however, Neumann makes it clear that the phase of the nation state also importantly shaped the destinies of intellectuals who resisted bureaucratization. He stresses how closely tied the intellectual was to his nation in the modern era and how profoundly bereft the intellectual compelled to emigrate from Nazi Germany was left by his losses. The emigrant intellectual, he writes, must separate himself from his historical tradition and collective experience. He must learn new language, accumulate new experiences, begin a new life. He suffers not just the loss of possessions and status, but must assume the burden of new national culture. Hatred of National Socialism and liberation from an impossible situation do not assuage difficulties, especially not for “political scholars” in an inclusive sense of that term. They had to confront the brutal facts of politics. They had fought—or should have fought—for a better political system. They are triplic bereft: as individuals, with family, as scientists and as political beings. This is the scope of the “tragic problem” to which American universities, according to Neumann’s concluding words, offered a “happy solution.”

Neumann draws on Hans Speier’s theoretical formulation of sociological conditions for the easy integration of intellectuals. In the end, the transmuting of emigrant intellectuals into American academics remains a puzzle, since Speier posits above all a parallelism in structure and the German universities, on Neumann’s summary showing, are dramatically different from American institutions of higher learning. There are supporting elements, as in the unexpected vitality of Humboldt’s humanistic cultivation ideal in American colleges, when it remains only as an idealized aspiration in German universities, but Neumann’s principal explanations are, first, the unexplained “friendliness” of American academic circles and, second, the categorical decision by the intellectuals to make a “total break” and a “new beginning.” Neumann illustrates this himself by his own actions in leaving England, where he had remained active in emigrant politics, and taking his newly acquired doctorate in political theory to the United States for a new life after he had concluded that Hitler had changed Germany as well as the regime and that there would be no internal revolt.

Leaving aside Neumann’s surprising move beyond structural sociological explanations, there are several revealing discrepancies in this story. First, there is the uncomfortable detail that Neumann after all left England for an administrative position with the Institute of Social Research, whose codirectors are very much interested in the United States and returned to Germany at the first opportunity. Second, there is the fact that Neumann pondered and pondered the events of 1930-33, not only as a problem in political analysis but also as an unsolvable personal pain. Third, and most important, there is the fact that Neumann displays a rather faulty memory about the place and projects of intellectuals in the universities of Weimar precisely during the last years of the Republic. After the time that Neumann curiously refers to as the “Indian summer” of 1924 to 1930, Neumann’s forceful characterization of the unformed German universities of the Weimar years, like his glowing account of Max Weber as the heroic exception to the reactionary propagandists, narrow specialists, and opportunistic time-servers that occupied their lecture and institutes, has a measure of truth, but also a ring of familiarity. It conforms very closely to the position advanced by two major intellectual sources in the Weimar years, during Neumann’s distinguished service as brilliant young labor lawyer in Frankfurt and Berlin—and as instructor, first, in the Frankfurt Academy of Labor under his mentor, Hugo Sinzheimer, and, second, in the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin, Common to Frankfurt and Berlin, and to the Prussian ministers who promoted the social sciences there against the wishes of the academic establishment, was a political project of an education for democracy. The best-known spokesman for this program was Karl Mannheim, with whom Neumann had studied in London while taking his degree under Laski, and it was Mannheim, of course, who envisioned the transmutation of the intellectual into a sociological teacher for a mass democratic consciousness. My aim is not simply to set the stage for this inquiry into the sincerity of Neumann’s polemical rejection of Mannheim’s theories during his New York years (although there are marked fluctuations, as there were fluctuations in his respect for Speier, used as authority in the 1936 piece but excoriated earlier). I am not interested in “influences” Albert Salomon at the New School was perhaps even a more effective spokesman for the Weimar political education project than Mannheim. I am interested, rather, in exploring the question of tribunal and uncertain continuities between Neumann’s actual political commitments in Weimar and his definition of the situation of intellectuals in emigration. Mannheim enters into the discussion because he knew something about intellectuals and their politics, about the links between being an intellectual and participating in the activity that Germans call Bildung in a new mode. I am perhaps talking about the constitutive experience of a generation—to use another concept that Mannheim knew something about—that was forced into emigration and became ever less able to articulate or develop a central conception that nevertheless held them in thrall.

If Neumann is representative of intellectuals who are not completely clear about the extent to which and the ways in which they form a “political emigration,” it is tempting to experiment with some theses developed by another Mannheim student, Nina Rubinstein, about the constitution and characteristic limitations of a “political emigration.” In language strikingly reminiscent of Neumann’s talk of a “complete break,” Rubinstein contends that just such a break—an Umbruch—to use a term derived originally from Heidegger—actually initiates a political emigration as a social formation, an association of stranded strangers who can never in their own lifetimes break through their estrangement from their host communities, whatever their economic social roles, and who are also precluded from understanding their histories or the realities of change in the world they left behind.

I am overdramatizing Rubinstein’s already dramatic argument, and I am obviously not pretending to do full justice to Neumann’s monumental study of Hitler’s Germany or to his writings on law and politics. I am fixed, however, by a certain lack of self-knowledge in my esteemed teacher and by the deep unhappiness expressed in the following letter to H. Ege Pros, written shortly before his premature death:

How often have I asked myself since 1933 where my own responsibility for National Socialism lies. Because I do believe in collective guilt—and then I cannot exempt myself. All of us in the opposition to reaction were too cowardly. We all made compromises. How lying the SPD was in the months between July 1932 and May 1933 (and not only then), I could see with my own eyes—but I said nothing. How cowardly the union bosses were—and I continued to serve them. How lying the intellectuals were—and I remained silent. Naturally I can rationally justify this by the united front against National Socialism, but ultimately the fear of isolation played a part. And yet I had great models: Karl Kraus, Kurt Tucholsky. And in my theory I have always agreed with the Socratic standpoint that the genuine intellectual...
must always and in the face of every political sys-
tem be a metric, an alien. So I also played a part in
the sell-out of the ideas of the so-called German
Left. No doubt, my contribution is small, and the
politician will view my attitude with irony. But is
it possible to view the fall of the SPD and the rise
of the National Socialists as only a political prob-
lem? Were there no moral decisions to be made?
I made those too late and still not radical enough.

Notes
1. Franz L. Neumann, “The Social Sciences,” The Cul-
tural Migration: The European Scholar in America. 1953.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hedge
Press, Die deutsche akademische Emigration nach den
Verenigten Staaten 1933–1941. 1953. Berlin: Duncker
& Humblot. Introduction by Franz L. Neumann. An insight
into the context in which Neumann and Press address
questions of the intellectual emigration is provided by
Donald Peterson Kent, The Refugee Intellectual: The
Americanization of the Immigrants of 1933–1941, pub-
lished by the Columbia University Press only a year before
Neumann’s published lecture. Notwithstanding the appa-
ratus of disinterested sociological methodology, the study is
clear in its judgment of intellectuals who lacked the “wil-
ingness to become adjusted,” which was found to be a pre-
condition for the assimilation it takes as the measure of “success.” For a recent reappraisal of Neumann’s essay
from a different point of view, see Karen J. Greenberg,
“The Refugee Scholar in America: The Case of Paul
Tillich,” in Michael G. Ash and Alfons Söllner, eds., Forced
Migration and Scientific Change. 1996. Washington: Ger-
man Historical Institute [Cambridge University Press].
2. Nina Rubinstein, Die französische Emigration nach 1789:
Edited with an Introduction by Dirk Rath, with contribu-
tions by Hanna Papanek and David Kettler. Vienna: Naunzer
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The Scientific Emigration to the United States—A Success Story?
CLAUS-DIETER KROHN
History, University of Lueneburg, Germany

Generally speaking, my topic is “Westernization.” I will
not restrict my view only to the years between 1933
and 1945, but will also include the 1920s and the
decades after 1945. This discussion may shed some
light on the trans-Atlantic brain drain in both direc-
tions. In short, “Westernization” not only means the
intellectual transfer by German or European emi-
grants to the United States in the 1930s, but also the
mutual acculturation process of different ideas and the
reflux of ideas from the United States to postwar
Germany and Europe, resulting from that intellectual
symbiosis some years before. Those ideas may be
labeled as “New Dealism” or consensus liberalism,
which formed the theoretical understanding in large
parts of the intellectual community both in the United
States and in Germany.

A complete culture was expelled from Germany
after 1933 and from Austria in 1938. In the scholarly
domain, this corresponded to the modern social sci-
ences—sociology, political sciences, and economics,
that is, disciplines just on the way to their academic
professionalization or to new paradigms. (The same
can be found in different subdisciplines of the natural
sciences like biotechnology or nuclear physics.) Elements of that “Weimar culture”—a term created by
the former refugee and historian Peter Gay—could be
reused in the United States, to which the large
majority of its representatives had fled by 1943. The
New Deal, the economic program of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, created unique preconditions for the flight
of that intellectual segment of emigrants. Much more
than an economic crisis program, it was a reform pro-
gram for the whole society, in line with many of the
former goals and experimental attitudes of the refugee
intellectuals, many of whom understood their schol-
arily work in 1920s Germany as an active democratic
contribution to the permanently crisis-ridden Weimar
Republic. The American New Dealers, as well as most
of the German refugee scholars, were convinced of the
necessity of macroeconomic planning. This belief in
interventionist measures to stabilize modern societies
characterized most of the younger scholars in the
western industrial countries and also found its expres-
sion in the Keynesian revolution in Great Britain dur-
ing the 1930s. Beside this, the refugees brought with
them a specific knowledge of international relations,
which not only was hailed by their American colleagues
in a public atmosphere of isolationism and xenopho-
bia, but which proved to be of enormous value later
when the United States entered the war.

Thus, the emigrants came to the United States at
the right time, to the right place, and with the right
messages. This contributed to a smooth integration
and acculturation of the large majority of the refugees.
The foundation of the University in Exile at the New
School for Social Research in New York by its director
Alvin Johnson, a dedicated New Dealer, or the shelter
which the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research found
at the Columbia University are only individual exam-
ple of that process. There are also the new Bauhaus
in Chicago for the architects from Dessau, Black
Mountain College for artists and art historians, and
the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, as well
as the many war agencies where hundreds of refugees
found new fields of politically motivated activities
after 1941.

Against the background of Americans’ esteem for
German scientific culture, the refugees brought with
them theoretical approaches that stimulated discus-
sion in different disciplines. The “totalitarianism” the-
ory is such an example based on expertise of the
refugees, a theory as important as other emigres’
research, for example, on stable and “militant” de moc-
racies, on the mass society, cultural industry, and
financial and growth theory, to name a few areas. The
same is true in the humanities, where the iconology of
the refugee art historian Erwin Panofsky during the
1930s became the worldwide style of art interpreta-
tion. There is also the introduction of the archival sci-
cences by Ernst Posner.

In general, the New Dealers, along with their
 comrades-in-arms from Europe, seem to have
changed the American intellectual climate during the
1930s. Symptomatic of the new spirit to form a new
society with scientific means, Harvard University
changed its emblem in 1936: until then, its motto had
been “Christo et Ecclesiae,” which was replaced by the
word “Veritas” written in three open books. The cultural
innovations brought by the emigres con-
tributed to a dismantling of the traditional anti-
Semitism; on the other hand, the refugees gained
much in this process of integration. While the eco-
nomic depression in Germany contributed to the
destruction of the political system, the refugees in
the United States learned firsthand what reform capacities
were inherent in the capitalist system and what dem-
ocritic impulses grew out of the economic crisis. The
philanthropy of emergency committees, as well as the
willingness of numerous universities to hire emigres
were further factors in social, mental, and emotional
integration. In the mid 1930s the refugees first wrote
on the chance they had found in America. To this
period belongs the process of “EntenteForResource
(H. Stuart Hughes), which means among other things to
renounce an adherence to the great closed-theory sys-
tems in the Hegelian tradition for more empirical-or-
ienteled analyses.

From time to time American nativists a vivid
discussion on the significance of the emigre
intellectuals fares up. This debate found its climax
years ago in Allan Bloom’s best-selling book The
Closing of the American Mind. Oddly enough, Bloom
himself was a student of the emigrated conservative
philosopher Leo Strauss. In this book the author dis-
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hint that, at least in the United States, the flight has led to a happy end. In fact, many emigrés in the decades following the 1940s belonged to the new type of intellectual class—consensus liberals—who had been formed by the New Deal and the fight against fascism and who now looked for answers to fight Stalinist totalitarianism, as well as the isolationism of Senator Joe McCarthy. Working for the United States government, many of the emigrants also were “bridge builders” and transmitters for the integration of postwar Germany into the newly established “Atlantic community.” Along with this process of Westernization, elements of the Weimar culture, reformulated in the United States, returned to Germany, where their antecedents had been completely destroyed by the Nazis.

In the Hide of the Stalked Prey: Exilic Experience and Philosophical Camouflage in Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment

JOHN MCCORMICK
Political Science, Yale University

My contribution to this conference explores the relationship between the exile status of T. W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer and the expositional form of their Dialectic of Enlightenment (DE), composed in California in 1944. In this work, which became the somewhat ambiguous founding document of the postwar German and eventually North American Left, these German Jewish social theorists who had fled Nazism interrogate the pathologies of Western rationalism as sources of abstract liberal-capitalist domination and concrete fascist repression. Curiously, they do so in a way that apparently adopts an existential or Lebensphilosophical approach to modern rationality associated with Nietzsche and the young Heidegger—the very turn in German thought that had provided indirect and direct assistance to fascism. Moreover, they compose the work in German rather than English, the language of the adopted home, and publish it in the Netherlands. On all these counts I ask, why?

As a result of the authors’ mode of presentation, DE is most often read in quasi-Heideggerian terms, even by interpreters whose philosophy and politics are steeped in the German philosophical tradition and who are fluent in German or not. The form of esotericism that was once hoped to overcome violence altogether. I suspect that, on the contrary, in DE Adorno and Horkheimer undertake a less-than-obvious interpretive strategy in the hope of making clear to everyone the coercive consequences of technologically administered mass society. By just how they think such a disorienting work could achieve universal enlightenment is a disconcerting question. Nevertheless, their dialectics are philosophically functional, not “political,” in the sense that the authors are not, like Leo Strauss and his school, intellectual elites seeking to conceal some truth or advantage in a cynical project of self-satisfaction and self-defense (couching always in noblelie oblige terms of protecting the vulgar from themselves).

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Rather, their method holds out the expectation of the possible genuine enlightenment of all, even at the moment when humanity faces the greatest danger of mass deception. Adorno and Horkheimer seek to further the project of emancipating humanity from the very elite-privileging organization of the masses that would fully condition the esoterism that emigrated to the United States, and then they had the chutzpah to denounce and decry the threat to philosophical conservation posed by mass politics. In precisely this sense, the success of this agenda’s self-promotion has become the American-intellectual version of the Reichstag fire. But the story of Leo Strauss’s emigration is another story. The ubiquity and dissimilarity of different philosophical agendas is not the subject of this paper. But the invocation of Strauss raises the issue of reading DE in terms of alternative forms of “writing” and not so much in terms of the rational sustainability of its critique of rationality. Even the most sympaetic commentators have shown definitively that the work is a dead-end on the latter grounds. But I want to explore the relationship of the author’s exilic experience with the following questions: does an alternative form of writing harbor the semblance of a new perspective in this group? or a perspective supposedly less sensitive to continental thought—is actually the most nuanced and unpurged interpreter of the texts and their concerns. An excellent recent reading of the book is Anson Rabinbach’s "The Cunning of Unreason: Mimesis and the Construction of Anti-Semitism in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment," in The Shadow of Catastrophe. 1997. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 166–198. This essay is not an attempt to impose the kind of coherence or unity on Dialectic of Enlightenment that Rabin Bach rightly argues is inappropriate. As I demonstrate, it does, however, assume the possibility of a fractured coherence for the work.


Notes
2. For instances respectively, Bernard Yack, The Fetishism of Modernities: Epistemic Self-Consciousness in Contemporary Social and Political Thought. 1998. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press; Christopher Rocco, "Between Modernity and Postmodernity: Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment against the Grain," Political Theory 22, no. 1 (February 1994) pp. 71–97; and Jürgen Habermas, "The Entwinedness of Myth and Rationality: Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno," in The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence. 1987. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. pp. 106–130. Rocco talks to read Dialectic of Enlightenment "against the grain" that is, between the two modes of thought mentioned in his title, but actually winds up dissolving the work into poststructuralist categories. For whatever reasons—intellectual, professional, or Oedipal—Habermas consigns the work of his former mentors to the tradition of Nietzsche and Heidegger rather than that of Hegel and Marx. Yack, the representative of the liberal perspective in this grouping, a perspective supposedly less sensitive to continental thought—is actually the most nuanced and unpurged interpreter of the texts and their concerns. An excellent recent reading of the book is Anson Rabinbach’s “The Cunning of Unreason: Mimesis and the Construction of Anti-Semitism in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment,” in The Shadow of Catastrophe. 1997. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 166–198. This essay is not an attempt to impose the kind of coherence or unity on Dialectic of Enlightenment that Rabin Bach rightly argues is inappropriate. As I demonstrate, it does, however, assume the possibility of a fractured coherence for the work.

In 1991 I became the owner of a ten-volume 1841 edition of the works of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, the great poet of the German Enlightenment. The previous owner was an 89-year-old woman from Chicago, whose sight had grown so poor that she could no longer read. She was afraid the books might be lost after her death, and since the edition meant a great deal to her, she asked distant German relatives to find a professor of German literature who would appreciate it and honor it. Thus I was given the Lessing edition, and it now sits proudly in my library. The name of its previous owner is Lisa Fitko. Given Gisèle Freund’s death last year, I think Fitko is the last living emigre who knew Walter Benjamin. Fitko guided Benjamin on his flight through the Pyrenees to Port Bou, Spain. He arrived on the 26th of September, 1940, and took his life the following night. She records the story in her book Escape through the Pyrenees (2000).

Lisa Fitko didn’t escape until 1941. She went first to Cuba. There she bought the Lessing edition with the little remaining money she had. She bought it in an antiquariat in the port, to preserve a little of the culture and land into which she was born—and which had finally exiled her. Lessing’s Enlightenment writings represented part of the cultural identity the Nazis tried to take from her. Simultaneously, they represented a German culture that strongly opposed the barbarism of National Socialism. When Fitko bought her Lessing, she was living in Cuba. The book, her only remaining property, had been stolen from the stage in Germany. Lessing in Cuba was a piece of German culture taken back because Lessing must have seemed to be like Fitko herself, an emigre.

Ever since Fitko’s Lessing edition came to Berlin, I have been thinking about what the German classics meant to the emigres at the time of National Socialism. In the emigre documents, one repeatedly encounters the question: If Lessing and Holderlin, Schiller and Goethe were still among the living, would they also have fled Nazi Germany? Invariably, the answer was yes. The question itself expresses a desperate effort to distinguish Germany from National Socialism, German culture from German barbarism, thus differentiating a true Germany from a false one, which, in contrast to the ideal Germany, was condemned to imminent ruin. Today it is widely acknowledged that such distinctions are misleading. Nonetheless, for many emigres the veneration of the German classics meant not only protection against the loss of identity in exile, but also a medium of political opposition to a Germany that had betrayed its cultural traditions.

Goethe played a prominent role in the cultural self-definition of these emigres, be they writers, musicians, scientists, or visual artists. The only exception consists of a few representatives of the literary avant-garde who staunchly maintained their opposition to Goethe. Brecht was one, but even he read Goethe in a new way in exile— with a decidedly decadent admiration. Goethe was the epilogue of a classical representative of German culture. Anyone wishing to distinguish German culture from Nazism would put Goethe on the side of the emigres, beyond all partisan boundaries, determined the strategy of the emigres. Thus, Heinrich Mann greeted his brother Thomas after his expatriation on December 2, 1936, with these words: "A German about to be expatriated, in opposition with another German, Goethe, who would not at this time be sitting in Weimar; rather, he would have deprived of home and possessions and would have shared his exile with all of us." Thomas Mann contributed more than any other to making Goethe into an author of exile. His novel Lotte in Weimar, conceived in Switzerland in 1936, was the first to be begun, completed (1939) and published in exile. Blacklisted in Germany, the historico-cultural novel dealing with the 67-year-old Goethe enabled Mann to comment on contemporary problems—the consequences of war, nationalism, and anti-Semitism—from the perspective of the German national poet. His work was so successful that Sir Hartley W. Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials, was led to make a curious mistake in his closing speech of 1946: Shawcross said, “Many years ago, Goethe said of the German people...
that their fate would one day catch up with them: "Fate will overcome them, because they betrayed themselves and did not want to be what they are. It is deplorable that they naively submit to every exotic rogue who calls on their lowest instincts, confirming them in their vices, and teaching them to understand nationality as exalted isolation." The sentences Shawcross thought Goethes were actually the fictional Goethes from Mann's Lotte in Weimar. In exile, Thomas Mann's identification with Goethe was found. The man who said of himself in exile, "Wherever I am, there is German culture" might well have said, "Wherever I am, there is Goethe."

One precondition for Goethe's effectivesness as a figure of identification for the expatriates was the great ideological difficulty the poet caused for the Nazi regime. Goethe's organism may have seemed easily adaptable to the Nazi Biologismus, but generally Goethe posed insurmountable difficulties to every attempt at ideological appropriation under National Socialism. His cosmopolitanism, antinationalism, admiration for Napoleon; his rejection of the romantic worship of things German, his humanism and universality with its basis in the adulthood of the Greeks; his concept of artistic autonomy; his relationship to history and religion—none of this could be politically integrated and assimilated. The National Socialist theorists of literature therefore saw the critique of the humanism characteristic in German classicism as one of their central tasks.

But it was precisely this humanist ideal that had taken on particular significance from the perspective of the emigre. Hardly any other author was more often cited in expatriate publications against Hitler's Germany than Goethe. Indeed, Goethe became the opponent of the Third Reich, and thus also the prophet of its decline. There was a tendency, for example, to refer to the following verses from "Des Epimenides Erwachen" to Hitler:

Doch war dem Abgrund kühn entstiegen
Kann durch ein ehernes Geschick
Zum Abgrund muss es doch zurück.

(Though he who has boldly risen from the abyss
Through an iron will and cunning
May conquer half the world,
Yet to the abyss he must return.)

Beyond such political functionalization, Goethe was cited numerous times by the emigres to invoke their unity under the sign of Goethe's humanism; for example, the poet Richard Beer-Hoffmann wrote from New York to Emil Ludwig in California on October 28, 1941: "Here, a quaint little picture of Goethe's house. Place it in a volume of Goethe, like the pious who put a picture of a pilgrimage church in their prayer-book." Here Goethe is cited as a common figure of orientation to overcome the isolation of exile.

Yet he is also evoked to express the isolation and anxiety of exile. Benjamin, in whose works Goethe occupies a central place, quotes Goethe's maxim in a letter to Gersthofen, January 18, 1934: "A burned child avoids the fire, an oft-scorched old man avoids warming himself." And Benjamin continues: "It is to this [maxim] I allude, in order to say with few words what the moods are against which I have to fight—often for weeks—in order to arrive at an initiative aimed at the placement of my writings." It is precisely Goethe's opposition to his time and the loneliness that resulted from that opposition that enabled the emigré to see himself mirrored in a literary figure who could not be assimilated by the Nazi regime.

It is worth noting the central role played by Jews in the Goethe generation was a way to restore a supposed continuity of humanity and the desperate persistence in seeing Goethe as the guarantor of the human core of Germaneness. "It was a great stroke of luck in Rahel's life that she found someone to trust," wrote Arendt regarding Varnhagen's veneration. One might say Goethe was the German whom Jews trusted. Hence many Jews literally carried Goethe's books with them into exile—witness the Goethe collection of the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem.

The German Jewish veneration of Goethe left a clear mark on the intellectuals in exile. Example of this in psychoanalysis can be seen in the works of Sigmund Freud, Theodor Reik, and Kurt R. Eissler. Freud, recipient of the Frankfurt Goethe Prize, passed on his veneration to many students. Two, Reik and Eissler emigrated in 1938 to New York: in 1949 Reik published his autobiography, Fragment of a Confession. In this self-analysis, the title of which is a Goethe quote, he interprets his Goethe mania as a compulsive neurosis developed after his father's death: Goethe as a father substitute. In 1963, Kurt Eissler published his monumental monograph Goethe: A Psychoanalytical Study, 1775-1868, in which he analyzes the poet whom his "father" Freud had approached with such admiration.

Aby Warburg, authority on and great admirer of Goethe, provides an example from art history. He held Friedrich Gundolf, whose great Goethe monograph he had studied, in particularly high esteem. In 1933 Raymond Klubansky oversaw the move of Gundolf's library and estate to London on the same ship from Hamburg that carried Warburg's library. Goethe's influence on the Warburg circle has not yet been explored, but just think of Dora and Erwin Panofsky's Pandora's Box (1966), no less than in Edgar Wind's Art and Anarchy (1963), and the studies William Heisler devoted to Goethe. Goethe and the Warburg school in exile is a research topic in its own right.

Ernst Cassirer, an example from philosophy: the philosopher-in-residence at the Bibliothek Warburg wrote and lectured prodigiously on Goethe. At his death in 1945, he was planning an extensive monograph on Goethe. His wife, Toni, records how deeply moved Cassirer was when he lectured on the young Goethe at the University of Göttingen in the mid-1930s: "He was deeply troubled by the realization that the same people that had brought forth this unique and wondrous work had shown itself to be so unworthy of it. Every quote from Goethe that he chose quite unintentionally seemed in the moment of its utterance to be bemirched and trampled in the dust. He felt ashamed of the current state of Germany, and wanted to conjure forth the true German, Goethe's Germany, before his listeners." Goethe's veneration was a way to restore a supposedly—but now destroyed—true Germany.

"That I would maintain this intellectual continuity seemed self-evident to me. I fully realized quickly that one who is capable of speaking gives her an asylum in the world teaches her to get along with people, to trust what she hears. She owes her voice to Goethe." Here you have it: Goethe as asylum. Michael Bernays founded the tradition of Goethe philology in 1866; Ludwig Geiger founded the Goethe Yearbook in 1880, which he published until 1913; Eduard Simson became the first president of the Goethe Society in 1885. From Albert Bielschowsky and Ludwig Geiger to Georg Simmel and Friedrich Gundolf, the most popular and influential German-language biographies and monographs of Goethe prior to 1933 were all written by German Jews. The rationale for this Jewish veneration of Goethe is complex, informed by among other things the conviction that Goethe is the representative...
In Search of Exile: Mirror and Shadowplay
HANNA PAPANEK
Anthropology, Independent Scholar

Political exiles face persecution because of their beliefs and actions; their choices within specific historical contexts (primarily opposition to a regime) drive them and their families away from home. At least at first, political exiles hope to return to their home countries.

In both respects, they differ from "enigmes" and "refugees" who leave home because they are persecuted for many other reasons—usually because of who they are (race, nationality, status, religion, ethnicity) and not necessarily for what they believe or do. Although in mid-20th-century Europe the life trajectories of these groups have been quite similar and there is much overlap between them, the experience of political exile has often been different from that of other displaced persons. In my work-in-progress, In Search of Exile: The Participatory History of a Political Family, 1880-2000, I try to understand the experience of political exile in the 20th century from the viewpoint of individual exiles, using their own words, in the context of events within which they committed themselves to political choices. My book manuscript is nearing completion. I have published or presented papers based on my research to several audiences, mainly in Europe. Here I highlight some aspects relevant to our discussions.

Methods: Mirror and Shadowplay

Although I knew from the beginning that I wanted to combine the inner experiences of persons I knew—as well as my own memories and my feelings during the search—with the context of external events, the format evolved only as I began to write. The interweave of individual memory and documented historical events is expressed in the guiding metaphor I chose for the reconstruction of the lives of members of my own extended family as neither memoir nor historical fiction. Nor is it conventional history.

In the metaphor of the javanese shadowplay, I see events as represented by concrete figures on one side of the linen screen and my memories as reflected shadows on the other. As I write the narrative, I move from one side of the metaphorical screen to the other, allowing unconscious memories to emerge from the dimulus of concrete documents and photographs and letting memory illuminate events described by others. The choice of an Asian metaphor is no accident but reflects a later phase of "chosen" rather than "forced" exiles in my own life trajectory.

Although I did not fully understand this when I began—or did I recognize the depth of my obsession with the narrative—I came to realize that the choice of my own extended family as the prism or mirror for understanding the forced exiles I experienced in childhood and youth was determined by several aspects of my method. One is the ready availability of archival materials. Since political exiles often cling to their personal documents as vital to their survival, I have unexpectedly found myself in possession of a treasure trove of primary sources that I feel compelled to exploit. I have systematically expanded these collections by targeted searches of public archives in many locations in Europe and the United States, restricting myself to materials by and about individuals whom I knew personally.

Gradually, I have also understood another aspect of my method, which is a central feature of my way of understanding the world: empathy with the experience of others. It is easier to try to understand others if I also knew them personally, can visualize their faces and bodies, imagine their emotions. I am of course aware that my use of empathy skews the story—what child can see her parents without bias? But since I am also convinced that there is no such thing as an "objective" observer of human behavior, I acknowledge this bias from the outset and miss no chance to make the story highly personal.

In short, I work, like many ethnographers, from the ground up, doing "my work" among primary sources. As I write, I use secondary sources to expand my understanding of the context of events. I make no claim for generalizations from this story—only for a deeper understanding of the many meanings of exile.

Political Solidarity and Its Consequences in Exile

My focus on political exiles indicates the positive and negative consequences of individual choice, as reflected in beliefs, actions, and risk-taking. Among the positive consequences, I count the experience of solidarity that I learned at first hand at age 12 in the youth group Rote Falken, organized in Paris by Austrian Social Democrats, in which I was the only German. The solidarity among youthful Genosen (comrades) decisively shaped my experience of exile, indeed my entire worldview. In this socialist youth group, I became preoccupied with Politics—as seen by our Austro-Marxist counselors—as a way to understand events around us in terms of conflicting ideologies, conflicting class interests, and "historical inevitability." These ideas reinforced what I had learned from my parents in the Social Democratic milieu before and during exile.

The significance of political solidarity based on shared beliefs, even among adolescents, was vividly brought home to all members of my Gruppe when, a year later, we lived together with nonpolitical Jewish refugee children in the children's homes of L'Observatoire Secours aux Enfants (O.S.E.) in France. Most of them lacked the coherent explanation for their exile that our political socialization had given us and saw their flight from home as a series of terrible, unpredictable events that had targeted them and their families. Some of them acted like "children of divorce," wondering if my fault that I had to leave home? We others, by contrast, arrogantly displayed our political education and our assurance that "we" would win in the end.

As a newcomer to the United States at age 13, I looked for a replica of my Paris youth group, but never found a satisfactory substitute. Should I count this as a negative consequence of having experienced such strong solidarity in an earlier exile? My failure to find a similar group was one of the reasons for deep disappointment with the country that is now my primary residence and clearly part of my "identity" as perceived by myself and ascribed to me by others. It remains a limited and conflicted identity.

Adjustment and Identity

Conventional research on exile from Hitler's Germany tends to be preoccupied with the question of "identity" and problems of "adjustment" or "assimilation" to the country that has provided one asylum. Leaving aside for now the important matter of language acquisition, my own experience leads me to ask a different question: What are the pressures for and against "assimilation" by political exiles?

Unlike the terms "refugee" and "immigrant," the term "exile" connotes an expectation of permanence. Many adult political exiles did not give up their preoccupations with political events in their home countries, but their detailed knowledge was of little or no interest among the United States public or even in government agencies. Their concerns over the postwar fate of their home countries faced hostile incomprehension in the United States. Differences on this point among political exiles led to serious splits within their organizations.

What are the preconditions for wishing to blend in, to conform to the norms of the receiving community? What are the consequences for those who fail to perceive the cues for conformity—as I so often failed to do—and who always remain to some extent alienated from aspects of their country of asylum? My experiences and that of some of my youthful comrades suggest that in our political socialization we learned all too well the idea of principled opposition to the majority, even though the United States did not provide us with the political means of expressing it. In the 1940s, the "days of rage" of the 1960s were still far in the future. How much harder it must have been for most of the adults in our milieu!

Victimhood and Choice

In writing this "participatory history," I face several difficult moral problems. In reconstructing the story of a close childhood friend and her parents, who had fled to France in 1939 as political exiles but were deported in 1942 as Jews and murdered in Auschwitz, I concluded from detailed archival evidence that the family had acted in ways that seemed irrational—both in retrospect and in the judgments of their contemporaries. They had decided never to separate nor to allow their daughter to be hidden alone. Am I entitled to be critical of the decisions that led to their deaths? Historians often make judgments in retrospect, but in this case I had to find evidence that others in the same situation at that time acted differently and survived. I also felt that I owed it to my friends to report their
choices on the basis of what they thought was best for themselves. To foecilovery criticism would have been false tact in the face of dreadful death.

In writing about this family’s decisions, made at a time when they still had a limited freedom of choice, I also had to confront the widespread notion that all Jews were powerless victims from the beginning of Nazi persecution. Instead, I have chosen to emphasize the stories of Jewish relatives and friends who took huge risks by acts of resistance, illegal escapes, going into hiding. But I also include the story of my non-Jewish aunt in Berlin, to trace the genesis of her independent decision to hide a Jewish friend for three years as a deliberate act of political resistance.

Women in Exile

My narrative has as its most powerful subject the lives of my mother and other female relatives; they shaped my experience of exile. Today, some among the Exilforscher are explicitly concerned with “women in exile” but even in the Arbeitsgruppe Frauen im Exil (now my most important reference group), much of the work focuses on the “forgotten” women in literature, art, pedagogy and the social sciences. Yet the everyday life of women in exile—political or otherwise—is either neglected by conventional Exilsforschung or pushed aside, because it is largely unrecorded. Except for the stories of gifted writers—and personal letters not widely publicized—little is known of women’s experiences of exile. Their stories are usually subsumed by stereotypes, such as “the woman at the great man’s side.”

Social stereotypes can be useful; I am sure that the women in my exile milieu played such a crucial role in helping their families survive precisely because of gender discrimination in the labor market. As is true for migrants in many other societies, women in political exile were offered menial jobs (Frauenarbeit) at minimum wages that highly educated men would not have been offered and usually could not have filled. Other women did unpaid work as secretaries for their politically active husbands or fathers—and that is how they show up on Gestapo Surveillance Lists for France in 1940. But working for a living left little time for developing careers later to be classified as “success stories,” one reason why there are so few. Displaced women also tend to be more flexible in adjusting to difficult living conditions, especially if they must care for children. But I also saw how their political actions took advantage of their social “invisibility”—they acted as couriers in the French Resistance, guides across the Spanish frontier, and as guides and rescuers of persecuted Jews in many countries.

Even more important, women in my experience of exile sustained the largely invisible fabric of social solidarity through personal friendships, gestures of mutual support, shared senses of humor. Although the exile groups I knew were often torn by political quarrels among men—derisively called Emigrantenquetsch—the relationships among women tended to be more stable.

Finally, as I see from my mother’s carefully preserved postwar correspondence, women in exile helped to rekindle the bonds between “exile” and “home.” If there was anyone left at home, the letters between New York and Berlin brought us the first news of losses as well as of acts of resistance. In a United States environment justifiably full of hatred against all things “German,” I could be proud of my Berlin family. Their stories taught me early on to distinguish between perpetrators, resisters, and passive observers and to confirm my admiration for high-risk choices.

Hannah Arendt Reconsidered

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In an era of identity politics Hannah Arendt’s relationship to her Jewishness has become a major interest; much contemporary scholarship is devoted to analyzing whether and how her Jewish identity has influenced all her intellectual work. What is the meaning of her Jewish identity to her, how ambiguous is it, how does she reconcile it with her German one?

Not only is Hannah Arendt Jewish, she is also a woman. Today it matters little that she had no sympathy for high-risk choices. What arises mainly from Jewishness is a feminist movement and thought and the “woman question” inappropriate. Feminists are engaging with her insights, many are finding something in her thought on which feminism can build or from which it can learn. Simply put, the issue is, how does reading Arendt modify and develop feminist theory?

In this connection, and related to the question of Jewish identity, contemporary attention has been given to her early biography of Rahel Varnhagen, written before her exile but first published after the United States entered the war. This work is Arendt’s first analysis of the negative Jewish experience of assimilation and anti-Semitism, through the story of a highly educated woman whom Arendt at the same time both keenly understands and is critical of, as Rahel vacillates between pariah and parvenu. To Büchner in 1936 Arendt writes that Rahel is truly her best friend.

From a different point of view, the question has been raised whether her gender has affected in particular the vehement, even vituperative, reception of her book on Eichmann. Exactly forty years ago the trial of Eichmann opened in Jerusalem, and Arendt reported on it in The New Yorker. Her articles, published as a book two years later, became a cause célèbre. They were greeted with a raging vehemence that attacked her intentions, her interpretations, her judgments, her style, and her tone. The controversy hinged around three major issues: first, the legal validity of the trial; second, the description of Eichmann’s character as that of an “ordinary man,” a thoughtless man who does not even hate those whom he kills and who represents the banality of evil in a totalitarian system; third, the assessment of the role of the Jewish community leadership in Europe as one of appeasement and collaboration.

While I could discuss at length, the details of these attacks, some not at all quite cogently, I would rather like to ask the questions to what extent is the book still of interest today, and what influence may it have had? First of all, it seems that the accusation that Arendt leveled at the Jewish Councils on the basis of Nazi archival data that she took from Hilberg and much serious research on Jewish responses to persecutions in general and on Jewish Councils in particular. It also encourages survivors’ reflections on behavior in extreme circumstances. There is no doubt that Arendt’s report raised on one-sided data and that she did not draw on the victims’ perspectives. In particular, the exhaustive and massive work of Isaiah Trunk, Judenrat (1972), which showed the complexities of the situations at various stages in the extermination process, is a serious corrective to what must be called Arendt’s shallow treatment of the Jewish leadership. Perhaps Lawrence Langer says it best when he articulates his concept of “choiceless choices,” What arises mainly from Jewish sources is the diversity of responses.

The former unacknowledged bias in Holocaust research towards martyrology, in contrast to Arendt, and denial of human corruptibility, has also been corrected in contemporary research. In this connection, however, in Israel the Holocaust is commemorated also as a day of heroism, being called Yom HaShoah and Yom Hagurah, a narrative of destruction and redemption, as James Young has shown so well. Perhaps at this point we should ask why Arendt deals at all with the Judenrat. After the angry responses to her allegations, she argues that these pages have been unjustly emphasized and constitute but a minor part of the work. Yet these passages are essential because they are emblematic for her of the totality of moral collapse under totalitarianism. The question of moral responsibility is crucial for Arendt, a major thread that runs through much of her work.

We have recently been treated to another cause célèbre book, Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners.
Contrasting the two authors may be instructive. Arendt was strongly opposed to any theory of national character; she also did not emphasize the distinctly German sources of Nazism, that is, modernization accounts for totalitarianism. Goldhagen has no hesitation about national character. Goldhagen privileges a cultural explanation, a mistaken totalizing one. On the other hand, what accounts for Arendt’s reluctance to acknowledge the German sources of Nazism? In his angry and deeply felt response to Eichmann in Jerusalem Gershon Scholem accuses Arendt of seeing only the weaknesses of the Jewish position, of having no love for the Jewish people, no “tact of the heart,” of making a mockery of Zionism. Arendt’s response has often been commented upon as an indication of what her Jewishness means to her. Her Jewish identity is for her a simple, unquestionable, fixed fact of life, given once and for all, and never to be relinquished. However, it is totally uncommitted to any love for the Jewish people. Love is to be shed on persons, not on collectivities. She belongs to the Jewish people: she does not love it. She finds Jewish wrongdoing more distressing than that of other people, a distress that should be concealed, for the public realm is not for emotional display. To understand her, she transcends her own Jewishness. This freedom through distancing is of great importance to her. From another perspective, Jews do not constitute her whole identity; it constitutes only a fragment of who she is. Yet she does not deconstruct what Scholem means by Jewishness, nor does she respond that Jewishness is not necessarily univocal. Arendt never problematized her identification as a Jew; the ambiguity for her was how to translate it into an identity. She never answered the question what it means to be a secular Jew.

Finally, let me address the problem of evil in Arendt’s work, her central concern. In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt develops her concept of radical evil, the distinguishing mark of this new political system. It is a system in which human beings are superfluous; it has a demonic and quasi-supernatural quality. Evil is intrinsic to the system, as such it is political, and eliminating the individual becomes a distinct possibility. As a system totalitarianism is the most effective in accomplishing evil goals. In Eichmann in Jerusalem Arendt modifies her concept of evil: it becomes banal (I think a rather misused term) loses its demonic quality, and is secularized, I would even say that it is routinized. It is not that Eichmann is guiltless—he metes out his sentence in no uncertain terms—but what really intrigues her is the virtual atrophy of his conscience. He is unable to understand the enormity of what he has done and has been provided with stocks of clichés, euphemistic language rules, “winged words” destined to protect him from any other responsibility. Is there any continuity from radical to banal evil, or does a confrontation with Eichmann in the flesh bring about a rethinking? In radical evil, human beings are rendered superfluous, in banal evil, human beings do not think. Can the capacity to think prevent the occurrence of evil? And in what sense was Eichmann responsible for what he had done? Can thinking prevent evil? Awareness of others may support evil-doing.

Christopher Browning confirms the ordinariness of the Nazi criminal in his recent study Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (1992). But neither he nor Arendt nor Goldhagen have satisfactorily explained why some people, too few, resisted the terrible conformity of totalitarianism.

The Two-Stage Emigration Pattern: Hungarian Emigrants to Germany Flee Hitler

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My contribution attempts to present the characteristic two-stage pattern of those Hungarian leftist exiles who had emigrated from Hungary in 1919, settled in Germany, and then found themselves forced by Hitler’s rise to power to move again either to an Anglo-Saxon country or to the Soviet Union. I want to put artist László Moholy-Nagy in the focus and to use the parallel case of sociologist Károly Mannheim for additional information as well as for comparison.

Both Moholy-Nagy and Mannheim fled to Vienna after the fall of the republic of councils in Hungary and then went on to Germany in 1920. There they mastered the cultural difficulties and overcame the institutional obstacles that impeded the admittance of foreigners to prestigious positions. With hard work, perseverance, and good luck they became major figures in their respective fields in less than a decade. Thus, for colleagues in other countries, they came to represent German cultural achievement. This is how they were received when they embarked on the second stage of their emigration, this time to Britain. Mannheim stayed in England, while Moholy-Nagy moved on to Chicago.

The First Emigration
Born in 1893 and 1895, respectively, Mannheim and Moholy-Nagy were young and at the very beginning of their careers at the time of their first emigration. Mannheim had published a few articles, and Moholy-Nagy had a small exhibition of his first paintings and drawings in the town of Szeged. Both associated with radical circles and were accordingly recognized as promising talents by the cultural policy of the short-lived revolutionary regime that appointed Mannheim a university lecturer and bought three drawings by Moholy-Nagy. Although practically of the same age and social background, they were, strictly speaking not of the same generation-unit in the sense Mannheim used this concept. The crucial formative experiences of their lives, although undergone at the same time, sharply differed. For Mannheim it was membership in an intellectually and emotionally highly charged, vibrant group of scholars and artists—the so-called Sunday Circle. For Moholy-Nagy, a law student drafted into the army, it was the war.

The flight from Hungary was, on the other hand, a shared experience. The first station of almost all refugees was Vienna. Here they struggled for survival and wished for a miracle that would somehow put an end to political terror in Hungary. Their common plight did not bring them closer; they reconstituted their respective political and social circles and disregarded or despised the rest. Both Mannheim and Moholy-Nagy found this depressing and left Vienna for Germany as soon as they could. As Mannheim observed in his “Letters from the Emigration” that he published in a Hungarian journal in Vienna in 1924: The emigration is a theoretical concept to which nothing corresponds in organisational terms. And nothing can correspond to it, not even in Vienna, where most of the emigrants live, for the various organizations of the emigration stand isolated and very far from one another.

The Sunday Circle was more or less regularly meeting in Vienna up until 1926, although it latterly lacked its key members. The group of Hungarian avant-garde artists that the poet, writer, and editor Lajos Kasák had attracted in Hungary to his outstanding art journal, MA, also gathered again in Vienna. They organized lectures and performances and planned to relaunch the journal. This was the circle Moholy-Nagy belonged to. In his formative years it was the regular exhibitions and intellectual atmosphere of MA that had given orientation and set the standard for his work until 1930.1 But in Vienna he felt uneasy among them, perhaps even he feared the crushing effects of Kasák’s dominating personality on his own development.

In Berlin, Moholy-Nagy immediately immersed himself in the art world of the city. None of the avail-
able documents indicate that he ever considered himself a painter in exile. On this point, Mannheim’s “Letters from the Emigration” are more outspoken. He tells of what emigration meant to leftist intellectuals and how they estimated their chances of return to Hungary. First of all, Mannheim distinguishes between “real” and “accidental” emigrants:

All emigrants were huddled out of the country by the revolution, but not all of them were revolutionaries. ... Emigration is a hard lot, indeed, the school of shattering teeth and rumbling stomachs. Those who feel sorry [for their roles in the revolution] do not belong among us, that is, they are not real emigrants.

Who is a real emigrant, then? The persons who feel that the opposition between their worldviews and the regime is unbridgeable. Among them there are such who were not persecuted and could have stayed at home just as well, yet they could not remain precisely because of their sense of that opposition. Their emigration was voluntary but they have more in common with the forced emigrant revolutionaries than those who are now longing to return even if they were forced to emigrate.

Mannheim proceeds to discuss the political function of the emigrant community in an international political context in which all hopes concerning an interference of the European democracies “against the reactionary nest in the Hungarian Plain” had been disappointed. He also adds what every political emigrants tends to secretly dream about even if they rarely admit to indulging in this form of emotional self-gratification:

When the reign of common sense and insight returns, Hungarian public opinion will adore the emigration with the wreath of patriotism.

Acculturation and Advancement Strategies in Germany
For the emigrants to Germany it was of vital importance to extend and activate personal networks that could secure them admittance to the circles distributing social recognition in their professions. Through recommendations, Mannheim was invited to Marianne Weber’s salon that he was careful enough to attend regularly. Social acceptance by Max Weber’s widow amounted to a certificate of one’s intellectual existence and eventual value as a sociologist.

The art world of Berlin after the war was dynamic and cosmopolitan, eager for every new idea. The wartime contacts between the journal MA and Herwarth Walden’s journal Der Sturm, and the presence of numerous Hungarian artists in Berlin, allowed Moholy-Nagy to see everything, meet everybody, absorb and experiment with every novel idea and technique. He assimilated all that he had seen and learned into attempts to solve what he came to define as the problem of painting. How to capture and activate light? This wonderful medium that by virtue of its power to create space through movement, reflection, and cast shadows could unite the constructivity of architecture, the flexibility of dance, and the visual harmony of balanced forms on the painted surface? How to make light work in other media—metal surfaces, photos, or film?

Interestingly, but understandably enough, the Hungarian articles Moholy-Nagy published or co-authored are much more political than anything he wrote for a German or international audience. They represent the form of politics open to the immigrant who happens to be no citizen of any polity: a purely radical vision that flows smoothly over into reference to the vaguely outlined image of a desirable future society.

In 1922 Moholy-Nagy joined the faculty of the Bauhaus in Weimar as its youngest professor. Invited by Gropius to lead the metal workshop, he also taught the preliminary course after Itten’s resignation, edited the Bauhaus Bücher, and continued working in the old media and experimenting with new ones in order to find the appropriate forms for his transparent architecture of a relationally defined world. When he left the Bauhaus in Dessau after Gropius’s resignation and moved in January 1928 to Berlin where he was to work as a stage designer, photographer, and filmmaker, as well as a commercial designer, he was no longer an immigrant in Germany, but a famed artist of that country. It was thus a matter of course for Gropius to call the High Commissioner appointed by the German Foreign Office, to include Moholy-Nagy’s work in the 1930 exhibition of the Werkbund in Paris.

By this time Mannheim had also succeeded not only in getting integrated into German academic life, but to rise to prominence within the sociological profession. In 1928 he was invited already as a keynote speaker to the yearly meeting of the German Sociological Association and in 1930 he was offered the chair of sociology at the University of Frankfurt.

The Second Emigration
Although Mannheim’s work focused on the analysis of contemporary trends in political ideology, the Nazi takeover caught him unaware. He was among the first to be fired, just as Moholy-Nagy was quickly victimized in the raiding and closing, among the first actions of the new regime, of what remained of the Berlin Bauhaus under Mies van der Rohe’s directorship.

Mannheim immediately began planning his next emigration, writing letters for support to find an academic position abroad. The positive but somewhat dragging answers from the United States prompted him to go to Paris in search of a position. Here he received the letter of Lord Beveridge with an invitation to London, where he accordingly arrived in May 1934. In the autumn of that year he began to give lectures in sociology at the London School of Economics and to write the stream of letters of recommendation (concerning, among others, Adorno, Theodor Geiger, Hans Gertth, Hans Jonas, Karl Lowith, Franz Neumann, Karl Polanyi, Charles de Tornay) to the Academic Assistance Council of Britain that was trying to arrange for the immigration of endangered continental scholars. In 1939, he reported to Louis Wirth in a letter that the changes underway within sociology in Britain were so dramatic that the intensity and relevance of the work he was able to accomplish reminded him of the dynamism he had experienced during the Weimar Republic. Moreover, a growing circle of students and followers was giving him the sense of having a social mission again.

Moholy-Nagy was still in Berlin at the beginning of 1934. His letter to Herbert Read who was to sponsor his emigration to Britain gives an emotionally detached picture of the abruptly changed, depressed art scene:

The situation of the arts around us is devastating and sterile. One vegetates in total isolation, perplexed by newspaper propaganda that there is no longer any place for any other form of expression than the emptiest phraseology. No wonder that one can barely bring oneself to assert one’s influence, even in the smallest circle. One is forced into an insane solipsism.

This spell of solipsism was not to last long. Less than a year later, Moholy-Nagy was busy working on various projects. In 1935 he moved to London where he immediately found both large-scale work as a designer, the means and facilities to continue his experiments with new materials and techniques, as well as his way to the art world. In 1937 he was offered the directorship of a new design school in Chicago on the recommendation of Gropius, then already at Harvard. It was to be sponsored by the Association of the Arts and Industries and called the New Bauhaus. Gropius urged him in a letter to accept the offer, suggesting that this might be the first step toward realizing Moholy-Nagy’s pet project, an Academy of Light. Somewhat bored and impatient in London, Moholy-Nagy eagerly responded to the chance to teach again and transferred the ideas of the Bauhaus to the other side of the Atlantic. He left for the United States at the end of June 1937 and immediately found himself in a whirlpool of negotiations, organizational preparations, publicity events, and practical tasks all aimed at opening the school within a few months.

The New Bauhaus-American School of Design, opened in 1938, closed down after the first, sometimes troubled but on the whole promising, partly because of the sponsor’s losses in the stock market, but more importantly because of various intrigues originating with the founder association. Moholy-Nagy tried various ways to save the school or attach it to some other educational institution. Finally, he decided to found his own School of Design (reorganized and renamed Institute of Design in 1944), supported by corporate sponsors. It opened February 1939. Partly because of the faculty he had recruited for the New Bauhaus, agreed to work on without a salary until the financial position of the school got stabilized. Moholy-Nagy supported himself by working as a design consultant or designer for several large firms, among them the Parker Pen Company.
Hardly had his school consolidated its position when the war broke out and the school’s operation drastically changed. Facing reduced numbers of professors and students, involvement in defence preparations and meager funds, Moholy-Nagy was able to maintain the school only by making more and more cuts and concessions. These amounted to a failure to realise the original program of art education, instead opening up the school to the “commercial arts” of product styling and publicity, as well as aligning its management and administration with the more formal, hierarchically organised structures of other American institutions of higher education. Put simply, the last eight years of his life Moholy-Nagy spent in Chicago struggling to maintain his school and uphold its original educational goals, years of incessant work. It was an exhausting period, full of hopes and disappointments.

Moholy-Nagy died of leukaemia in November 1946. Mannheim, after an equally busy decade spent teaching, writing, editing, and organising in Britain, survived him by a few months. Both were eager not simply to prove themselves but to offer what they thought to be invaluable service in postwar reconstruction: education.

This is certainly no happy end and no happy note to conclude a presentation. One may only add that the distortion of the Bauhaus educational program was not peculiar to America. It was prefigured in the embattled history of the Bauhaus from Weimar through Dessau to Berlin, and the devastating results were clearly described in an ironic essay by Ernst Källai, “Kunst liegt auf der Straße, lacht Dr. Behne an Das neue Berlin, happy-end, keep smiling.”

Notes
3. ibid., p. 125.

Zeltgenossenwithout Genossen The Contemporary without Friendship or History—Exile and Community in an Age that Denies Exile

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Jeden Menschen drängt es danach, das Wertvolle seines vergänglichen Daseins dem Fluss der Zeit zu entreißen, es aus sich herauszustellen und irgendwie zu verwerten.

(Every human being is driven to snatch what is most valuable in his fleeting existence from the flood of time, to set it apart, and somehow to render it timeless.)— Siegfried Krausser, Über die Freundschaft, 1917–18

In the fall of 1953 I returned to Europe. Since then I have not been back to America.

— T. W. Adorno

If I were to summarize what I hope I have learned in America, then I would first say it was something sociological and infinitely important for the sociologist that over there, indeed beginning with my English stay, I was induced no longer to regard as natural the conditions that had developed historically, like those in Europe: “to not take things for granted.”

— T. W. Adorno

I am interested in the way we are still compelled to think about exiles and the consciousness of exiles and in what we can say today that has not been said before. Our hunger for an image of time and place at the end of the century should be seen through our fascination with and denial of the intellectual’s history—a history from a marginal and powerless position in European culture after World War I to center stage in our consciousness. This is a divided blessing, since the “ exile” has become a permanent sign of our times, even though our fascination with memory and forgetting refuses to be permanently stunted by postmodern appeals to the necessity of fragmentation. The previous generation of the exiled intellectuals would have to be an exemplar—a symbol—for a community grounded in homelessness in an era in which cultural memory has become a cheap tourist trap and is perhaps a sign not of continuity but of a substance culture that feeds on the memory of the dead. Death worship is clear in the fascination with monuments to remembrance, in Holocaust memorials, reconciliation tribunals, and in redress movements in nations still attempting to master their pasts by reclaiming the memory of those who were ostracised, banned, exiled, murdered, or silenced.

In this way we bring into focus both the inner exile of, say, a figure like Hans-Georg Gadamer and an authentic exile like Siegfried Krausser.

In my recent essay “Vindicating Popular Culture in Latin America: A Response to García Canclini” (Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 1998) I criticized the social and cultural theorist Nestor Garcia Canclini because of his adoption of terms like “transborderization” and “polycentrism.” Though he does not discuss exile as such, he finds that the migration of workers across borders to the promised northern lands is endemic to the globe. I agree. I argued, however, that this terminology moves the discourse of forced migration too far away from the lessons of the older discourses that described exile, nomadic wandering, and other forced migrations. Discussions of “exile” today appear to be framed by an acceptance of the reality of migrations in a postcolonial context.

The question becomes: Why is the older discourse, based on European patterns of exile, loss of recognition, and loss of time and place weakened or displaced by a new discourse that emphasizes the “hybridity” of postmodernity? Exile was associated with forced migrations, liberation from political repression, and the broad indictment of fascism; yet the new discourse carries with it a normative instrumentality that accepts loss as inevitable to the postmodern emphasis on the fetish of the “contemporary,” that is, being in tune with post-modernism.

In what way can loss be redemptive? In what way can the loss of friendship and community be in any way the grounds...
for a future that has hope? One thinks of Kafka, quoted by Max Brod, as saying that there is hope in the world if it is not for us, by which he meant that for "us" exiles there is only the work in progress, never finished, always in the making.

The premodern discourse on exile is formed around concepts like “hybridity,” “diapora,” “marginality,” and “otherness.” Hybridity as a modern chronotope does not describe anything traumatic, although it is assumed that the older discourse did. Exile can also be seen as an “alibi of being” (Bakhtin) in which historical consciousness and formative memory of place are reduced to a series of breaks, rather than a continuous flow of “friendly time.”

The deepest loss might be called “Zeitgenossen without Gesinnung.” My exemplary figure is Siegfried Kracauer, and, in particular, how he “Americanized” the loss of friendship as the most fundamental loss of his new life in America. His earlier concepts of cosmopolitanism through film that answered to the “extraterritoriality” of life in the cities is dramatically illustrated in Kracauer’s letters, written throughout his life, in a Proustian attitude to everyday living. His letters provide a framework for understanding how friendship played a major role in his capacity to survive in exile. In addition, he uses a phenomenological analysis of the photograph and film both in his Weimar period and later during his American exile in order to overcome and recreate his past as a “psychological study of the going of people.”

Kracauer’s enforced exile experience and his deeply sublimated coming to terms with the murder of his mother and aunt in Auschwitz also provide a way of looking at exile through the idea of a lost community as the normative response to constructing an “alibi” for living exile.

Siegfried Kracauer’s Antinomian Exile

From 1933 until 1941, in his enforced exile in Paris, Siegfried Kracauer carried on an intense correspondence with Hedwig Kracauer, his mother’s sister, whom he regarded as his “queen mother” of the Jews of Frankfurt. The correspondence is framed by his attempts to survive as a writer within the intimate culture of Paris, and by Hedwig Kracauer’s futile attempts to organize her and her sister’s flight from Frankfurt for another country. Kracauer had been banished from his position with the Frankfurter Zeitung in 1933, and while ostracized in Paris he maintained a steady correspondence, rich in details and observations about the everyday life of the exiled life in France and the internally exiled mother and aunt in Germany. During this period of his exile, Kracauer completed his Der Buchhändler, Orpheus in Paris, Jacques Offenbach and His Times, as well as a major study on propaganda, while beginning his pathbreaking historical-philosophical study on the rise of the German film during the Weimar Republic, Kracauer as a Psychological Study of the German Film. He was also gathering material for what would later become The Theory of Film, as well as planning other projects, including a film script. In this period he also wrote and rewrote his only two novels, Ginde and Georg, works about friendship that would take on meaning for him only later, in his posthumous History: The Last Thing before the Last. In this work, a personal memoir as well as a historiographical study, he clarified his own understanding and manifest differences from those refugee archivists, his compatriots Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, and T. W. Adorno, with always a look backward toward their nannies, Brecht. His virtually impoverished years in Paris are marked by attempts to reground his life, work, and identity as both a radical cultural activist and as a poet-novelist of unusual prose stylists who wrote in a socially engaged genre that departed from crude sociology or spare realism.

The Paris letters were a laboratory for survival and self-discipline, as well as practical appeals for a way to exit Europe. He wrote hundreds of letters, to his aunt and to many other intellectual figures of the time, self-consciously and deliberately recording his efforts to escape from Europe while maintaining his life as a writer and social critic. This was “record of Erfahrung” (memoir) with a vengeance! He would describe his work in this period as a “chronotope” of the ostracized—a “fugitive’s aesthetics”—characterized by his attempts to establish an extraterritorial “elsewhere” in film and in letters that would continue to reflect his historical understanding of the relationship of political exile to the ongoing world-historical dispersion of peoples that was halted briefly in post-Enlightenment Europe. Kracauer’s vision of a cosmopolitan world of universal justice was tempered by a range of critical positions, including Marx, Simmel, and Freud. However, the letters throughout his Paris exile are marked by his attempts to maintain friendships and liaisons with other exiles, even as these friendships are severely strained by his disputes with the Frankfurter Zeitung, where he was a long-time cultural editor, and his fear of losing his friends in New York. His fear of the war was played out as well, through his futile attempts to save his mother and his aunt from the German misery; he was unsuccessful, and their lives ended in Terezin and Auschwitz.

Kracauer defines the prototype of the exile allows me to describe his experience of arrested cosmopolitanism with the concept of “loss of friendship” as the deepest loss of all. The pre-exile conditions of a generation of writers prepared the way for a deeper understanding of exile, to which we are not only indebted, but which we are forced to interpret at the end of the century. The century’s “ends” that produced so many exiles—World War 1, the Russian revolution, fascism, and forced migrations—changed the face of history forever. The rituals and laws associated with ostracism in ancient Greece, are mildly civil in comparison to the uprooted persons who become stateless in the colonizing civilizations of the “world-homeless” condition that Hannah Arendt described in a kind of Dantesque metaphor for the permanence of the pariah as an actor in modernity. This century’s events make a mockery of the search for peace that marked Kant’s vision of a world of law and which Brecht himself mocked in his Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny:

Yet here we are in the City of Mahagonny:
Whoever stayed in Mahagonny
Had to have five dollars a day.
And if he lived up more than the others
He needed some extra maybe.
But in those days they all stayed.
They lost every other
But they got something out of it.

This same extraterritoriality infused Kracauer’s life and work from the time he abandoned architecture for the study of culture and which had such a lasting influence on Adorno and Benjamin, who had already experienced a form of exile in their intellectual odyssey outside accepted German philosophy. In establishing an anti-philosophy by transposing one intellectual discourse into another, Kracauer set the stage for Adorno, whose discourse was created out of the fragments of philosophy, the novel, and storytelling. While Kafka became the archetype author in this regard, the philosophical form in which exile could be rendered had to wait for a new configuration of art and history.

Exile suspends time and creates a “constellation” that forces us to find the key to the relationship of the new art to the conditions of homelessness. This led Kracauer to the search for an archiarchistic pattern to history in which there might be found some small hope for the hopeless, that is, in the sense of the earth-shattering phrase, “I there is hope it is not for us” (Kafka). The search for a utopic home for the exile, ostracized from the cosmos, means that exiles are united in a kind of enforced comradeship that provides them with an “alibi of being”—to use Mikhail Bakhtin’s words. This alibi is a camouflage that permits us to think about the deepest losses we can imagine and to play with these losses—what Kracauer termed a kind of Proustian history of the “last things before the last.” They become emblematic of the historical conditions after 1945 and form the basis of the chronotope of exile, friendship, and the search for a cosmopolitan worldview that would accommodate the new world and the old. America provided a kind of “laboratory for friendship” in
which communal forms of regaining friendships meant the establishment of a rights-based vision of the future in which all forms of homelessness would be eliminated. This provided the exile with a set of “safeguards” against going back to the past that created the terms of the exile in the first place.

Thinking about exile is both thinking about a future, in which friendship might become the basis of a new ethics, and thinking about the past, in which the trauma of separation from friends marked the beginning of a new historical epoch. It is that historical future, in which friendship might become the basis of the terms of the exile in the first place.

Thinking about exile is both thinking about a future in which all forms of homelessness would mean the establishment of a rights-based vision of the epoch in which we are now embedded—the century of total war, as Jan Patocka placed us—that gives us a sense that exile is over and the older paragons of exile no longer speak to us in the same way or with the same urgency.

Mastering the past is no longer a method of coming to terms with one’s own necessary exile, but is a way of forgetting that the century that began with World War I “ended” with the dismantling of the Soviet Union. This is a century in which exile became the norm for modernist writing and for measuring how the next generation before the last generation would establish their relationship to the violence that is inside the chronotope of exile.

III. CONCLUSION

In Preparation for “Contested Legacies: The German-Speaking Intellectual and Cultural Emigration to the United States and United Kingdom, 1930–45,” Bard College, August 2002

The “Contested Legacies” conference is the sequel to the “No Happy End” workshop, and its design is a product of that experience. The title refers to the claims and counterclaims of the emigrants about the intellectual legacies they brought with them from Hitler’s domain. Additionally, “Contested Legacies” is about the debates generated by the emigrants’ rich and diverse body of work, continuously contested within the emigrant cohort and then among succeeding generations of their followers and detractors. Given the obligation to select representative complexes of contestation, no single conference can cover every topic.

Instead, the conference is organized around a central methodological consideration, which is that the persons presenting the papers care about the substance of the intellectual and cultural achievements that draw them to their subjects. These participants continue to learn from their encounters with the emigrants’ work, a relationship that naturally includes questioning, criticism, and disputed interpretations. The persons documented in the texts and productions are considered as partners in continuing negotiations.

The inherited materials that form the basis of this project are widely referred to as seminal works. Indeed, many of these writings and works of art have been included in the core curricula of American university education since the mid 1950s. Initially, the emigrants themselves as teachers introduced their own and the work of their fellow emigrants to the classroom. It was through the reception of these productions by American critics, intellectuals, and scholars, however, that they became part of the canon in the humanities in such diverse disciplines as art, music, philosophy, sociology, history, art history, literature, political science, and cultural studies. The emigrant intellectuals introduced several generations of American and British students to what has been well-called the “Weimar conversation” (Gunnell 1993). As these students emerged as the next generation of scholars and intellectuals, questioning their teachers and what they were taught, they nonetheless felt that the intellectual tradition handed down by the emigre intellectuals was sufficiently important to require them to negotiate with their professors, even as they reconsidered the legacy and transformed its teachings.

Yet there were those who began to view this emigre intellectual tradition with alarm and who saw it as the source of a destructive upheaval in academic culture. Allan Bloom’s Closing of the American Mind, published in 1987, articulated this attack most forcefully, suggesting that before the emigrés and the German influence, American education reflected a consensus view, an ethically charged agreement on a curriculum of valid studies and a canon of classical texts. It was the German emigrés, according to Bloom, who taught corrosive methods of criticism and encouraged the ideological and social critique of American culture and society that was first manifested in the disruptive university protests of the 1960s and that in turn generated such ethically divisive fields as gender studies, deconstruction, cultural theory, and postcolonial studies, resulting in a cacophony of ideas, fiercely contested, that ultimately led to the failure of the American system to educate and to function in the public sphere.

This supposed cacophony of ideas, which others find a promising opening up of standardized formulations, is only one of the contested legacies of the emigrés. The “Contested Legacies” project will weigh other challenges as well. Certain questions are central. While the work produced by the emigrés remains vital, its significance in the context of the historical time in which it was produced and through several generations to the present is open to debate. How can these works be taught today so that new generations of professors, teachers, and students can be inspired by them to probe deeply into the significance of intellectual and cultural production to democratic society and the larger political culture? This is one of the most pervasive themes in this literature and one of the most significant concerns today.

The project originated in an ongoing exchange of ideas among five scholars who had arrived at this
common set of puzzles by different routes. We all have been working on the thought of certain major 20th-century figures of the German emigration, while, as theorists, exploring these questions as well. Director of this project and a political theorist, I have over the years published on Karl Mannheim, Franz L. Neumann, Hugo Sinzheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and others. Peter Breiner, also a political theorist, has written a philosophical book on the work of Max Weber and its significance to subsequent political writers. Peter Baehr is a sociological theorist, a specialist on Max Weber and Hannah Arendt, who has just completed a defense of the continuing importance of a canon in social thought. Jerry Zolov, founder and long-time director of the Humanities Institute at Simon Fraser University, has addressed the achievements of Arnold Hauser and Siegfried Kracauer and the work of this project and a political theorist, I have over others. Peter Breiner, also a political theorist, has written

The shared recourse to the title “Contested Legacies” reflects insights gained at the workshop into the conflicting relations among the intellectual exiles and the arguments about the successive waves of interpretation of exile. That the intrinsic value of the 1930s case the investigation is important because it is the simplified interpretations of this emigration that are too often used as paradigms for understanding many different and succeeding cultural emigrations. As is evident in the range and variety of papers in this collection, there is no single method common to all of the collaborators. The core group of researchers recognize the need to complement a critical response to the intrinsic claims of intellectual and cultural production with a study of those productions in context. The point is, first of all, to examine the character of these texts and productions as documenting actions (as well as fates) in a given social, political, and cultural time and place. Perhaps this should be termed a “strategic” and an “exegetical” one. The philosophical accounts of the complementarity between immanent and extrinsic interpretations range from critical theory and Wittgenstein to sociology of knowledge and Begriffgeschichte. The shared recourse to problematic concepts like “exeile,” “intellectuals” and even “legacy” as well as the common recognition of conflicts, discontinuities, and plural dimensions of experience, provide a kind of “constitutional” framework for exchanges among the participants. Thus the empirically enriched disputes about these concepts frame a complex of illustrative inquiries, capable of providing a model for the many additional studies that are needed and also generating an agenda of inquiry that the conference program reflects.

It is difficult to write a methodological manifesto for a group of scholars united by a certain weariness about the almost autopoeitic self-enclosure of methodological discourses in recent cultural studies. We are inclined to tolerance, negotiation, and compromise, at least insofar as we are eager to learn from one another, but each of us is also vigorous in working out the problems we face in our research and interpretations. We share a similar attitude toward the works at the center of our inquiries and an appetite for understanding what draws us—and others—to them. And, perhaps most significantly, we also share an understanding of why it matters when we differ. Ours is a puzzle-centered undertaking.

The authoritative Handbuch der deutschsprachi-
gen Emigration, 1933-1945 (Krohn 1998) lists 134 titles in its selected bibliography alone, and each of its 108 entries has an extended bibliographic of its own. There are 25 items in the list of sources and bibliographies, many of them consisting of multiple volumes. Then there are journal articles, where most contemporary scholarly work appears. None of us has mastered this whole literature, although all of us have read a good deal of it. In an attempt to characterize our undertaking in brief, we will select a few influential books on the intellectual emigration and make some comparisons to elucidate our project and to distin-
guish it from comparable scholarship and study.

First and foremost, we do not know of any comparable effort to develop a process of collective inquiry across so many boundaries and over such an extended period of time. Our book will not be simply the record of a conference. The book is not merely a collection of papers at the conference or a record of a workshop that organizes the relations between emigrants and scientific development through the study of the science policies of leading foundations (Gemelli 2000) or the proceedings of the clearly well-prepared Bonn meetings where German and American legal scholars gave parallel accounts of the careers of certain prominent jurists in exile (Lutter, Steifel, Hoeflich 1993). These two projects, however, are far narrower in their scope and much more limited in their questions. Certain specialized inquiries into the relations between the exile and German developments—before, during, and after the exile—have produced excellent collaborative inquiries, as exemplified by recent studies of postwar German political science (Göhrer and Zeuner 1991). Such work offers important suggestions with regard to examining the time before and after the exile, especially for the generation of 1900.

The first studies of the intellectual and cultural emigration of 1933-45 have important documentary value, but they can no longer be taken as guides. A sociological study of the “refugee intellectual” published in 1963, for example, is marred in a normative conception of “Americanization” and very judgmental about people deficient in adaptability (Kent 1953). The companion writings of Franz L. Neumann (1953) and Helge Pross (1953) are framed by the rhetoric of gratitude while they classify emigrant experiences into homogenized alternatives that are called into question by tensions and elisions evident in the works themselves. A decade later, when a handful of the emigrants, notably Herbert Marcuse, had been raised to iconic status, American exile scholarship employed a laudatory voice that was caught up in the drama of the emigrant success and that was eager to develop a pantheon (Fleming and Ballyin 1969; Byers 1972; Hughes 1977). It is little surprising, but it is nevertheless a revealing caricature, to speak of this as a literature of “happy end.”

Analytical questions become more important in the next wave of publications. A Smithsonian confer-
ce posed useful questions about cultural transfer and adaptation (Lakoff and Borden 1983) but pre-
sented rather thin, descriptive papers. A German conference assembled outstanding people and published a collection containing several excellent individual essays (Scharn 1953) which contributed little consensus, rather participating in the conference on “the musical migration” breaks new ground (Brinkmann and Wolff 1999) in combining acute analyses with anecdotes and documentations, but it is situated somewhere between the two examples just considered.

Close to our project, in one sense, is the work of Mitchell G. Ash and Alfonso Sollner (1996), who show the possibilities of a strategic unification of inquiries. They bring together a group of scholars prepared to reconsider the intellectual emigration from a position that argues for a view of the sciences as a cosmopolitan endeavor: they ask whether the movement of scholars under duress is not similar to international migrations taking place under different conditions. This is a coherent and challenging thesis. It also helps to provoke our alternative questions about the extent to which some, or many, of these scientists may or may not be referred to as a generational cohort of intellectuals (whose
The "contested legacies" of prime interest to our work is the concept of "aculturation," and the focus of this inquiry is the contested public in attendance at the Bard Music Festival to show how exile must be seen as a negotiation full of complexities, conflicts, and reversals. On the third day, then, we combine four topics that give special prominence to reflexive questions about the successive waves of reception. The legacies at issue are expressly of a different order, examining the multiple ways of encountering the central figures of the emigration. The sessions are organized around four focal points: Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno's representative study of Mahler; the collapse of conventional left-right distinctions in cultural interpretation; and the transcendence of ideological categories of the left. As on the previous days, the search is both for comprehensiveness but for the topics that serve best for theoretical clarification. Hannah Arendt has been selected for special attention because her resonance and audiences shifted so dramatically, both during and after her lifetime. Arendt's special tie to Bard College, repository of her ashes and her library, also contribute to the decision to focus on her as a case study of multiple receptions. The other three sessions on the last day raise other questions about the contemporaneity and noncontemporaneity of exile cultural thought.

The project, in short, has a history that resembles the history we study. It is also multidimensional and integrated by complex negotiations. In the end, however, the product of this work is a collaboration whose efforts will be documented in our collective publication and which will transform the kinds of questions asked in this area of study in the future. Our project is not only interdisciplinary but also intergenerational, which means, above all, that we include younger people (for whom the controversial interpretative innovations of the past 25 years are pragmatically diversified instruments rather than alternative professions of faith), as well as older people (for whom key figures in the exile cohort remain active working partners rather than figures relegated to the canon). Next, we are united by our openness to multidimensionality in intellectual life, including the intellectual life of creative individuals, their capacity to tolerate inner tension and to be creative by virtue of the often painful management of that condition. The program is skeptical of linear narratives of individual or group "development" (let alone "progress"), and we eschew the concomitant idea of measuring "success," especially by criteria of movement. Another face of multidimensionality is pluralism, contestation, and contention within the class. Certainly, among the exile cohort there were all of these things, including shifting conflicts as well as continuities in their formative experiences. In the final analysis, however, we recognize the importance of reflecting on successive appropriations of the "legacy," including our own appropriation—but always with the aim of returning to the substance and context of the works of the exiles, and thus ultimately, to the original question of why our affiliations for them remain so strong.

—David Kettler

Bibliography


Lutter, Marcus; Ernst C. Stiefel; and Michèle H. Hoeflich, eds. Der Einfluss deutscher Emigranten auf die Rechtsentwicklung in den United States und in Deutschland. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1993.


IV. “CONTENDED LEGACIES” CONFERENCE PROGRAM

TUESDAY, AUGUST 13, 2002
Contested Classics

1. MAX WEBER
   Paul Breiner, State University of New York Albany: Weber and Political Writers
   Rheinhard Blomert, University of Graz, Austria: Norbert Elias
   John Gunnell, State University of New York, Albany: Leo Strauss Reads Max Weber
   Gunther Roth, Columbia University: Social Science Reception

2. SIGMUND FREUD
   Neil McLoughlin, Hamilton College: Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse
   Lawrence J. Friedman, University Indiana: Erik Eriksen
   Russell Jacoby, UCLA: The Freudians
   Eli Zaretsky, New School
   Paul Roazen, York University

3. KARL MARX
   James Schmidt, Boston University
   Russell Jacoby, UCLA
   Michael Lowy, Paris

4. GOETHE
   Ernst Osterkamp, Humboldt University, Berlin: Goethe as a Figure of Identification for German-Speaking Emigrés
   Jack Zipes, University of Minnesota: Ernst Bloch
   Irene Bonnaud, École Normal Superieur, Paris: Brecht in America

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 14, 2002
Contested Concepts

1. SCIENTISTS AND INTELLECTUALS
   David Kettler, Bard College: Political Science and the Emigrants—Franz L. Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel in Parallel
   Christian Fleck, University of Graz, Austria: The Needy and the Dignified—Contemporary, Sociological, and Voguish Evaluations of Refugee Scholars
   Claus-Dieter Krohn, University of Lueneburg, Germany: Emigrants into Immigrants

*as of November 1, 2001

2. JEWISHNESS
   Mihaly Vajda, University of Debrecen, Hungary
   Jack Jacobs, John Jay College, City University of New York
   Judy Gerson, Rutgers University
   Joerg Hackeschiempt, University of Hannover, Germany

3. SOCIALISM
   Catherine Epstein, Amherst College, Massachusetts: Two Eisler Brothers and a Sister
   Berndt Nikola, University of Trier, Germany: Bauhaus
   Hubertus Buchstein, University of Greifswald, Germany

4. ART (KUNST)
   Gregory Moynahan, Bard College: Cassirer and Panofsky
   Anna Weisely, University of Budapest, Hungary: Moholy-Nagy
   Martha Langford, Montreal, Canada: Problems of Photography
   Jeff Wall, Vancouver, British Columbia: Photography and Memory

THURSDAY, AUGUST 15, 2002
Contested Legacies

1. THE RESONANCES OF HANNAH ARENDT
   Peter Baehr, Lingnan University, Hong Kong: Arendt and Gerth
   Suzanne Wornen, Sociology, Bard College: Arendt
   Wolfgang Heuer, Berlin, Germany: Arendt and Blücher
   Joanna Scott, Eastern Michigan University, Michigan: Arendt and America

2. ARTISTIC MODERNISM: ADORNO ON MAHLER
   Lydia Goehr, Columbia University: Theodor Adorno on Gustav Mahler
   Michael P. Steinberg, Cornell University
   Daniel Herwitz, University of Natal, South Africa

3. A NEW CULTURAL POLITICS
   Jonathan Bordo, Trent University, Ontario: Benjaman, Kantorowicz, and George Kreis
   Reinhard Laube, University of Gottingen, Germany: Kahler and George Kreis
   Gerhard Lauer, University of Munich: Kahler in Exile
   Ernst Osterkamp, Humboldt University, Berlin: Benjamin, Kantorowicz, and George Kreis

4. EXILE AND THE PERCEPTION OF THE PRESENT
   John McCormick, Yale University: Dialectics of Enlightenment
   Jerry Zaslove, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia: Siegfried Krakauer

*as of November 1, 2001