trouble in finding good translations of both, as well as helpful books about Kant and Aristotle. The crucial influence on Hegel of Kant's philosophy of religion and of Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller is not nearly so easy to determine for oneself; therefore, these influences have been discussed in the first chapter, along with Hegel's development to the age of thirty. People seriously interested in Hegel are more likely to have Kant's Critique and some Aristotle on their shelves than Schiller's On the Aesthetic Education of Man; hence this work, which made a tremendous impression on Hegel and influenced his terminology, is liberally quoted in section 7.

In sum, the method of this book was dictated by its subject matter. I did not impose on Hegel a procedure that had worked on some other subject, say Nietzsche. To put it into Hegelian language: the movement of this book, from beginning to end, comes out of the subject matter itself.

To be very specific: The idea of the first chapter has already been explained. The second deals with Hegel's early publications: a pamphlet, a dissertation, and five philosophical articles. None of these essays is reported on, paragraph by paragraph. In every instance, the account is selective and stresses what is relevant for an understanding of Hegel's books.

The third chapter deals with the Phenomenology but is also meant to facilitate the comprehension of Hegel's later writings. This chapter includes sections on Hegel's terminology—here key terms are taken up, one by one—and on Hegel's dialectic.

The fourth chapter deals with Hegel's next book, the Logic, originally published in three volumes. Here, naturally, more has to be said about the dialectic; further terms have to be discussed; and, as in the case of the Phenomenology, the idea of the whole work needs to be considered at some length. There is also an excursus, apropos of Hegel's treatment of being and nothing, on Hegel vis-à-vis Heidegger.

The fifth chapter deals with Hegel's system and the various editions of the Encyclopedia, for this is the book that presents the famous system, and there are several markedly different editions of it. A little philological exactitude helps us greatly in understanding Hegel's own conception of his system.

The two lecture cycles on aesthetics and philosophy of religion are available in complete English translations and should offer no special difficulties to those who read the present book. But the two cycles on the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy do present problems and are therefore taken up in Chapter VI. The Philosophy of History is probably Hegel's best known book; but in the more demanding sense of that word, it is scarcely "known" at all, and it is not really one of Hegel's "books." The critical edition of 1955 has not been translated, and its findings have never yet been used in any major study of Hegel, in German or in English. And a great many misconceptions stand in the way of comprehension. The same applies to the little known three-volume History of Philosophy, and to the critical edition of the introduction to that work. So the sixth chapter is devoted to "Hegel on History."

This book bears no relation to any dissertation and is plainly not the place for an effort to demonstrate philosophical acuity. What is needed is not for somebody to score on Hegel by tripping him up on numerous details, which would not be especially difficult, but rather an attempt to fashion a comprehensive new interpretation. Because so few of the relevant texts are accessible to most students, and even the majority of scholars have ignored them, a great many quotations have been included. To give the usual footnote citations without quoting would have been strictly academic: it might give some scholars a comfortable feeling that the references are given, but few indeed would be in a position to look up the relevant passages.

Since there are limits to how much one can quote decently without breaking up the text too much, a great deal of the documentation has been saved for Chapter VII where it is presented in chronological order, in such a manner that, I hope, most readers will enjoy reading this chapter straight through when they come to it. Indeed, this may be a pleasant and effective way of letting Hegel's development pass in review once more, by way of letters and contemporary reports. Incidentally, almost none of this material has ever been translated before, nor has any biography or study of Hegel's intellectual development ever been published in English. Even in German one still has to supplement Rosenkranz's Life of 1844 with more recent publications, above all the four volumes of correspondence published after World War II.

What is still needed after that is a new and sound translation of a major Hegel text, with a commentary that follows it paragraph
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### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Abbreviations

The following abbreviations have been used for works cited often:

B  Briefe von und an Hegel, 4 vols. (1952–60)
C  Commentary on V–PG in Chapter VIII
D  Chapter VII of the present book
Dok. Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung, ed. Hoffmeister (1936)
E  Hegel’s Encyclopedia, 3rd ed. (1830)
EGP Hegel’s Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, critical ed.
    by Hoffmeister (1940)
H  Cross references to sections of the present book
PG Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Lasson (1907)
Ros. Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben (1844)
VG Hegel’s Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, critical ed. by Hoff-
    meister (1955). All references are to Hegel’s own MS unless
    the page number is followed by an “L” to indicate that the
    citation is based on the students’ lecture notes.
V–PG Hegel’s Vorrede (Preface) to the Phänomenologie
WK  Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism (Anchor ed.)
CHAPTER I:

Early Development and Influences, 1770–1800

Misconceptions about Hegel begin with his very name. On the cover of the English translation of some of his early writings, he is called "Friedrich Hegel." The professor who for a generation was the authority on Hegel at Harvard usually called him Georg Hegel, as if he and Georg were on a first-name basis. But although Hegel addressed both Schelling and Hölderlin with the familiar Du, he signed his letters to them Dein Hegel. And they called him Du but also signed their last names. Germans did not use first names as much as Americans do, and although Hegel's full name was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, one has to read a lot of letters before one finds a very few that are signed with a first name. Indeed, when his widow wrote his best friend a few days after Hegel's death, she referred to him as "Hegel." But Hegel's letters to his sister and wife are signed—"Wilhelm."

Another, much more important, misconception is that Hegel's life was utterly uneventful; nothing worth talking about ever happened, so one might as well proceed straight to his philosophy. In fact, one cannot understand Hegel's philosophy at all adequately if one ignores his life and times, and there have been few periods in history when so much happened. Hegel himself taught, most notably but by no means only in the preface to his Philosophy of Right, that "philosophy is its age comprehended in thought"; and far from being a web spun in an ivory tower, his own thought was intimately related to what happened during his life time. This

1 In the New York Times Book Review, August 2, 1964, his picture was captioned "Georg Hegel."
Leutwein claims that Hegel's change was brought about when another student was ranked above him, and Hegel was dropped to fourth place in his class instead of being third. This was probably due in part to his behavior, and it supposedly deeply hurt Hegel although he would not admit it. How much truth this bit of amateur psychology may contain is at best uncertain. "At least, metaphysics was not Hegel's special interest during the four years when I knew him. His hero was Rousseau in whose *Emile, Social Contract,* and *Confessions* he was always reading. He thought that this reading liberated him from certain general prejudices and tacit assumptions or, as Hegel put it, fetters. He found special pleasure in the Book of Job on account of its unruly natural language. Altogether, he struck me as at times somewhat eccentric. His later views he acquired only abroad, for in Tübingen he was not even really familiar with father Kant."

The above mentioned newspaper added another story, apparently based on the recollections of another alumnus, which Rosenkranz also quoted: "Hegel is said to have been the most enthusiastic speaker on freedom and equality, and, like all young men at the time, fervently admired the ideas of the [French] Revolution. One morning, on a Sunday—it was a beautiful, clear spring morning—he and Schelling with a few other friends are said to have gone to a meadow not far from Tübingen to put up a freedom tree. A freedom tree! Wasn't that a prophetic word? In the east, where the founder of Critical Philosophy [Kant] had around that time broken Dogmatism, the word of freedom had been sounded; in the west it had emerged from the rivers of blood that had been spilt for it. . . ."

That Hegel did not immerse himself in Kant while at Tübingen is surely true. The year after they left Tübingen, Hölderlin wrote him, "Kant and the Greeks are almost my only reading," and the evidence of Hegel's early writings, too, indicates that he got up Kant on his own, after he had finished his formal studies. Even then it was at first only Kant's views of religion, published in 1793, and his moral philosophy, recapitulated and developed in the same book, that concerned him. The *Critique of Pure Reason* he did not study closely until much later, and his image of Kant was always determined decisively by Kant's *Moralität* and its striking contrast with the *Sittlichkeit*7 of the Greeks, as interpreted in Goethe's *Iphigenia* and in Schiller's "Letters," *On the Aesthetic Education of Man."

7 Another type of morality, more fully explained in H 6 and 21.
5. Kant and religion

part of his so-called Theologische Jugendschriften, full of sarcastic
and then still unpublishable contrasts of the glorious Greeks and
the wretched Christians, Schelling published his first article, at
the age of eighteen: sixty-eight pages “On Myth, Historical Leg-
ends, and Philosophical Dicta in the Most Ancient World”; and be-
fore he was twenty-five he had published five books and become
the foremost disciple of Fichte, who was then, after Kant, Germany’s
most famous philosopher. By 1815, when Schelling’s meteoric career
seemed to have fizzled out long ago though he was only forty, he
had returned to the concerns of his first article, and when he came
once more into the limelight as an old man, ten years after Hegel’s
death, his lectures on the philosophy of mythology and revelation
were heard by, and greatly influenced, Kierkegaard.

From Tübingen Hegel went to Bern, Switzerland, as a tutor
(Hauslehrer). Kant and Fichte, too, had held such positions early
in their careers, and so did, just a little later, Herbart before he
came to teach philosophy at Göttingen and Königsberg.

In Bern, Hegel was entirely on his own for the first time, and he
tried to clarify his thoughts about religion. He had taken his final ex-
aminations in theology three years after his M.A. in philosophy, but
there is no trace of any religious crisis in his development. Emphat-
ically, he was not a believer, and this did not bother him in the
least. Kant’s outright scorn of “religious delusion,” “fetishism,” After-
dienst, and Pfaffentum in the fourth and last part of Religion within
the Bounds of Mere Reason (1793) clearly did not offend Hegel
in the least, although Kant extended to institutionalized religion in
general such abusive terms as Luther had directed only against the
Catholic church. Pfaffe is a derogatory name for a parson or priest,
Pfaffentum an even more scathing term for clericalism; After-
dienst though scrupulously followed in Kant’s semi-scholastic fashion
by a parenthesis with a Latin equivalent “(cultus spurius)” brings
to mind the backside, which Luther often used in composite words
to suggest a perversion. Yet the young theology student accepted
Kant’s views on these matters without the least hesitation.

10 They are omitted in the English translation but discussed at length in the
chapter on “The Young Hegel and Religion” in WK 131–40, which also con-
tains many long representative quotations from these fragments.
Athenian knew his duties and knew what was right, which, even if entirely true, was not really much help here and now. After all, as Hegel put it on the last page but two of his journal article, the Germans were “a dissolved people.”

What Haym sensed, rightly enough, was that Hegel was a man deeply at odds with himself; but in the passage we have quoted Haym did not analyze this tension aright. We should rather say that there was in Hegel, especially but not only at that time, a conflict between activism and quietism. Thus Hegel wrote in his introduction to The German Constitution: “The thoughts contained in this essay cannot have any other aim or effect upon publication than the understanding of that which is,¹⁹ and thus to promote calmer contemplation as well as the ability to endure it...” (5)²⁰

Hegel was not satisfied to find harmony in art, as Schiller and some of the romantics had suggested. He lacked the artistic genius that enabled Schiller to find peace and happiness in writing plays and poems. Like Plato and the Pythagoreans, he felt that the individual in isolation could not attain what he most wanted, apart from an ethical community. But that was out of reach, and meanwhile philosophical “understanding of that which is” might give one the strength to endure what is, without putting on blinders.

The conception of philosophy as therapy has come to be widely associated with Wittgenstein, who said in his Philosophical Investigations that “The philosopher treats a question—like a disease” (255) and who compared philosophical methods to “different therapies” (133). For Hegel, too, philosophy was a kind of therapy—but in the tradition of Spinoza and the Stoics. The young Hegel was not a professor who, sitting at his desk, felt confident that he was omniscient, though this is, more or less, the popular image of the man. In fact, he was at odds with himself and the world, desperately needed the therapy of philosophy, but for many years did not succeed in mastering it sufficiently to cure himself.

¹⁹ These are the words quoted by Rosenzweig in the passage cited in H 11.
²⁰ The sentence, though short, is extremely awkward. Knox renders it into elegant English, but his “tolerant attitude” misses the sadness and force of Hegel’s Erträgen (endure).
Philosophy above all must welcome its appearance and recognize it, while others, impotently resisting it, stick to what is past, and the majority constitutes unconsciously the mass of its appearance. Philosophy, however, recognizing it as what is eternal, must do it honor. Commending myself to your gracious recollection, I wish you merry holidays’” (214 f.).

On occasion, Hegel could be clear enough. Nor is the curious alternation of a powerful and straightforward style with all sorts of obscurities, including tapeworm sentences that demand to be construed, bit by bit, unique with him. When Hegel went to Jena to begin a university career, the greatest living philosopher—and the first world-historical philosopher to have written great works in German—was Kant; the most prominent German philosopher after Kant was Fichte. Both of them had set a curious precedent: they had written popular essays that proved them masters of clear and vigorous prose; but both had written their major philosophical works in highly academic language that bristled with obscurities. Kant’s relatively simple and understandable Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), one of the great classics of ethics, contained a sentence that was a page and a half long.7

Leibniz had written philosophy in French and Latin, not in German. Alongside Kant another tradition had begun to form, spearheaded by Lessing and Schiller. But they were not professional philosophers, and philosophy was a mere sideline with both of them: they were poets, playwrights, and critics who had incidentally written essays that were of great interest philosophically. If anything, Kant’s and especially Fichte’s popular writings compromised this style in Hegel’s eyes; for he did not like Fichte’s popular essays, and in Kant’s case there could be no question whatsoever but that his greatness and stature as a philosopher depended on those of his works that were written in a thoroughly forbidding style. If one wanted to enter the ranks as a worthy successor of Kant and Fichte, it seemed clear to Hegel—unfortunately—how one had to write. Looking into the past and reading philosophy in other languages did not change the verdict: in the more recent past, there was no philosophical work that Hegel admired more than Spinoza’s Ethics; and going further back in time there was Aristotle, whom Hegel esteemed supremely. In time, it became Hegel’s ambition to equal

7In Section II, 34 f.; the whole paragraph following the long footnote about Sulzer.
and should not write in the way in which he was gifted. The only one who saw this clearly and stated it beautifully was Nietzsche. He was not a Hegel scholar, and his early admiration for Schopenhauer makes it surprising that he should have understood Hegel so well. But then it was also Nietzsche who said in *Ecce Homo*: "Who among philosophers before me was a psychologist?" (IV, §6.) Here is Nietzsche's analysis of Hegel, from the *Dawn* (§193):

"Esprit and Morality.—The Germans, who have mastered the secret of being boring with spirit, knowledge, and feeling, and who have accustomed themselves to experience boredom as something moral, are afraid of French esprit because it might prick out the eyes of morality—and yet this dread is fused with temptation, as in the bird faced by the rattlesnake. Perhaps none of the famous Germans had more esprit than Hegel; but he also felt such a great German dread of it that this created his peculiar bad style. For the essence of this style is that a core is enveloped, and enveloped once more and again, until it scarcely peeks out, bashful and curious—as 'young women peek out of their veils,' to speak with the old woman-hater, Aeschylus. But this core is a witty, often saucy idea about the most intellectual matters, a subtle and daring connection of words, such as belongs in the *company of thinkers*, as a side dish of science—but in these wrappings it presents itself as abstruse science itself and by all means as supremely moral boredom. Thus the Germans had a form of esprit permitted to them, and they enjoyed it with such extravagant delight that Schopenhauer's good, very good intelligence came to a halt confronted with it: his life long, he blustered against the spectacle the Germans offered him, but he never was able to explain it to himself."

This aphorism throws more light on "The Secret of Hegel" than Sterling's huge work with that title, either in its two-volume (1865) or its one-volume (1898) edition. This example shows that it was not an idle boast when Nietzsche said in *Twilight of the Idols* (section 51): "It is my ambition to say in ten sentences what everyone else says in a book—what everyone else does not say in a book."

The preface to the *Phenomenology* is full of excellent aphorisms—a few of them quite naked and unconcealed, so no reader can miss them. To be sure, they are buried in mammoth paragraphs
has a second part which it is painful for me to touch on. Why is it that you cannot communicate yourself without insulting . . . ? Do be good enough to put yourself in my place and to think how I should have behaved regarding you when I had to declare that nobody, absolutely nobody had understood me."

An editorial footnote, written by Fichte's son, explains that the final allusion is to the mention of Schelling in Fichte's announcement of his new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre. This is undoubtedly also the source of one of the most popular legends about Hegel, who is alleged to have died with the words: "Only one man has understood me, and he did not understand me either." This story is not only untrue but quite out of keeping with Hegel's character and historical situation. In his last years in Berlin Hegel had many disciples who were applying his ideas in a variety of fields; some of them were themselves respected scholars; others made great reputations after he died. Hegel did not feel lonely and misunderstood. Fichte, on the other hand, did. He kept complaining in print; the most famous and obvious example was the book he had published in 1801, which Schelling mentions at the end of the letter just quoted: Sun-clear Report to the Larger Public about the Real Nature of the Newest Philosophy: An Attempt to Compel the Reader to Understand. Fichte's position could be paraphrased with just a dash of malice by saying that only one man had understood him—namely, Schelling—and that he had not understood him either. But when Fichte's fame was eclipsed by Hegel's, and a great many readers found Hegel's books more difficult than anything they had ever read, the dictum was ascribed to Hegel.

There had been no lack of provocation when Fichte, in his Report on the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre and Its Fate So Far (1806), attacked "one of the most confused heads that the confusion of our day has produced, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling," and said of him: "That the man thus showed his absolute ignorance of what speculation is and wants and his natural incapacity for speculation . . . is self-evident. . . ." He never was given to pussy-footing; he was a passionate and whole-hearted man; and in his dealings with Schelling he had shown considerable

13 Heinrich Heine, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland (1835), Sämtliche Werke, Rechtmässige Original-Ausgabe, V (1861), 211.
14 Werke, vol. 8 (1846), 385.
nobility and had been not easily angered “but, being wrought, perplex’d in the extreme.”

Now “the wheel is come full circle”: Fichte saw his work in the same light in which Kant in 1799 had seen his, and disowned his erstwhile disciple, while the younger man saw the work of his predecessor as a mere stepping stone. Schelling had insulted Fichte, as Fichte had never insulted Kant, and Schelling was not in such straits as Fichte had been in when Kant dissociated himself from him: in these two respects, Fichte stands blameless. But the change in his estimate of the younger man’s ability and work was more extreme and appalling than the transformation of Kant’s judgment of Fichte had been. Still, the difference between Kant’s age and Fichte’s had been thirty-eight years, and they had never been close friends, while the difference between Fichte and Schelling was only thirteen years, and they had been very close for several years.

What matters in the present context is the lively sense of a progression with apocalyptic overtones. Since Hegel’s death there has probably never been a time when there was any widespread agreement that some one individual was unquestionably the greatest living philosopher, and that the whole history of philosophy somehow led up to him. In the case of Kant there was such agreement, and not many philosophers in the twentieth century would dream of denying that no other philosopher in the last quarter of the eighteenth century was in his class. He was clearly one of the greatest philosophers of all time. And he himself said in the closing words of his greatest work: “before the present century runs out... human reason [might attain] complete satisfaction about that which has always engaged its curiosity, but so far in vain.”

When the book appeared, nineteen years were left; when the second, comprehensively revised edition came out, only thirteen. Two years later the French Revolution broke out and convinced thousands of intellectuals that a new era was indeed at hand. Among those who took up Kant’s challenge, Fichte was certainly the outstanding personality, and in 1798 Friedrich Schlegel, the leading spirit of the budding German romantic movement, said in his Athenäums-Fragmente: “The French Revolution, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, and Goethe’s [Wilhelm] Meister are the greatest tendencies of the age.”

Nobody today would rank Fichte with Kant; and Schelling, too, is of interest to few but historians. But in the years when Hegel
Later, in Faust's study, Mephistopheles himself explains the function of his negativity. To Faust's question, "Enough, who are you then?" he replies:

Part of that force which would
Do evil evermore, and yet creates the good.

FAUST: What is it that this puzzle indicates?
MEPHISTO: I am the spirit that negates.
And rightly so, for all that comes to be
Deserves to perish wretchedly;
'Twere better nothing would begin.
Thus everything that your terms, sin,
Destruction, evil represent—
That is my proper element. (1335–44)

This is both a central motif of the Phenomenology and an essential feature of Hegel's later philosophy, especially of his vision of history. Every finite position is destroyed, but tragic as this perpetual destruction unquestionably is, in the long run it serves a positive end by leading to a greater good. History is the realm of sin, destruction, and evil, but out of these terrors and human agonies freedom emerges and grows. The sacrifices are not all in vain; the process is one that leads to salvation and a great vision. Without destruction and suffering the vision could never be had; without the negative, man would seek uninterrupted rest.

Kant already had tried to show in his Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent (1784) how what he called antagonism led to progress and would eventually compel nations to form a League of Nations (Völkerbund). His noble essay, as brief as it is suggestive, partakes of the vision of Isaiah. But Hegel is far closer to Goethe's Faust in his determination to digest all of human experience—and to the poet who fashioned "The Second Part of the Tragedy" (published only after Goethe's, and Hegel's, death), in his attempt to find a place in his work for an incredible number of figures, ideas, and details that almost any other great writer of the age would have excluded without the least hesitation.

What leads to this catholicity, also in Faust II, is by no means a didactic impulse—pedagogically, the result is in both cases impossible—but the artistic need of a vast spirit alienated from his environment. The Second Part of Faust and Hegel's Phenomenology are the creations of men as lonely as the exiled poet of the Divine
it has become so exceedingly difficult, takes the place of critical
evaluation for which no energy seems to be left. It is so hard
to get the point, and so few do, that the big problem is no longer
whether the point stands up but rather whether one has got it.
And the main division is not between those who agree and those
who do not, but between those who understand and belong and
those who do not.

The outstanding example of such a style in the twentieth century
is Heidegger. He is anything but a follower of Hegel, and Hegel
exposed some of Heidegger’s principal confusions one hundred
twenty years before Heidegger became famous. Heidegger does
not invoke Hegel’s example, but when his disciples are severely
pressed in argument they not infrequently fall back on Hegel’s
precedent as their last line of defense.

We are considering the dangers of a style, not the originality,
truth, or profundity of the content. Perhaps this is made clearer by
touching on two other examples.

Under the Nazi dictatorship, speakers who opposed the govern-
ment cultivated the art of allusion and innuendo. As one listened
to, or read, say, Niemöller, what seemed to matter was the hidden
content and, of course, his courage, and there was a feeling of
fellowship among those who understood him and shared his
enemies. Whether one agreed with him was wholly secondary. The
same is bound to happen under any oppressive censorship that has
not succeeded in extinguishing dissent, for example in Poland in
the 1960s. What has become important and is discussed is how much
somebody has got away with, how bold he has been, and whether
he might have meant this or that; the question of truth is easily lost
sight of. Obviously, nobody could infer that a Polish philosopher
who depends on indirection and Niemöller in the thirties should be
classed with Hegel as regards either their eminence or their be-
liefs.

What, then, accounts for this peculiarity of style of the Phenom-
omenology? Certainly not political considerations, or any deliberate
obscurantism. At bottom, it is the same impulse that lulls the
critical intelligence to sleep in some of Plato’s dialogues and in some
of Nietzsche’s writings, although both meant above all else to get
us to think critically: the poetic impulse.17

17 Regarding Plato and Nietzsche, see WK Chapter 14: “Philosophy Versus
Poetry.”
most bound to replace the question of whether what Hegel says is right. Until one knows about whom he is writing, one is often at a loss to say whether he is right; and at other times what he says is so plainly not right and his generalizations are so fantastic that the only way to understand how anybody could even think of saying such things is to refer his statements back to the individual of whom he was thinking.

30

Later in the Phenomenology, almost the whole chapter on Sittlichkeit revolves around Sophocles' Antigone: specifically, the first two of its three sections: "a. The ethical world, human and divine law, man and woman" and "b. The ethical deed, human and divine knowledge, guilt and fate." The last section of this chapter is much shorter than the first two.

It may sound odd to say that Antigone is "even" mentioned by name, but in the whole big book only thirteen men and women are named. Six are philosophers: Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Descartes, Diogenes, Kant, and Plato. Five more are historic, mostly writers or poets: Homer, Lichtenberg, Origen, Solon, and Sophocles. And two come out of tragedies: Hamlet and Antigone.

Fifteen others are plainly alluded to or quoted, ten of them historic: Aristophanes, Democritus, Diderot, Fichte, Goethe, Lessing, Leucippus, Schiller, Shakespeare, and Socrates; also Macbeth and Orestes, and Antigone's father and brothers—Oedipus, Eteocles, and Polyneices.

Sophocles' Antigone is mentioned and quoted at the end of Part V; the chapter on Sittlichkeit is the first one of Part VI. The heroine is quoted again, and again mentioned by name, in the middle of the section on "The ethical deed..." But the interpretation of these sections does not depend on these quotations. These pages abound in statements that are simply outrageous in the form in which they are offered and that plainly cry out to be referred to Sophocles' tragedy.

For about three pages Hegel argues that "The feminine therefore has the highest intimation of what is ethical insofar as she is a sister," and that "The loss of the brother is therefore irreplaceable for the sister, and her duty to him is the highest one." In the second
fered some helpful footnotes in his critical edition of the text, and these were taken over by Hoffmeister and by Baillie in his translation. Still, part of the appeal of the book lies in the questions it poses at every turn: Is Hegel thinking of Schelling? Does he mean Jacobi? Is he referring to Iphigenia as well as Antigone? And: To whom since Hegel's own time is what he says applicable?

With this last question we approach the greatness of the book. All too often, Hegel is overly specific and has to drag in, for example, allusions to Antigone's brothers who destroyed each other in the fight for Thebes, lest we miss his string of allusions to Sophocles' Antigone. Or he pontificates: "Actuality therefore contains, concealed, the other side, foreign to knowledge, and does not show itself to consciousness—does not show the son the father in the man who insults him and whom he slays, nor the mother in the queen whom he wives."20 One wishes Hegel had come out into the open, saying something like: in some ways, Sophocles' tragedy—whether Antigone or Oedipus Tyrannus—gives classical formulation to a conflict or predicament that is representative of the human condition, or of a certain stage in the development of culture.

Haym is right that Hegel's "selection is absolutely arbitrary. As a historical figure was especially familiar to the author or especially present to his mind from recent reading, it is seized and made the symbol of an allegedly necessary and indispensable stage of consciousness. . . . As absolute knowledge itself is nothing else than thoughtful contemplation of things, but whitewashed and saturated with an aesthetic conception of them, a romantic-fantastic confusion of what is the poet's business and what is the philosopher's business, so, too, the phenomenological road to this knowledge consists in the perpetual poetic translation of abstract forces into concretely historic ones, but even more in the constant interlarding and mixing of both" (242–44). But although Haym is right, Hegel could be defended on this score.

Why should he not seize on Antigone because he knows the play so well, or on Rameau's Nephew because he has read it recently? Why should he not choose his examples now from history and now from literature? This is not what has gone wrong. The real fault is that the overly heavy dependence on allusions makes Hegel's dis-

20Lasson's ed., 305. Baillie's tr., 490, mentions Oedipus by name, though Hegel does not.
anschauung], as if Hegel kept it back until the end to present it only after everybody else is criticized. As he views Antigone and Kant and all the other points of view he considers, he presents his own view of the world, section upon section.

In his critique of Kant a phrase recurs several times that is an important clue to Hegel's total conception: aber es ist ihm damit nicht Ernst (but he is not really serious about it). That is Hegel's criticism of almost all the positions that pass in review: they are one-sided, and if they are not pushed to a tragic conclusion, like Antigone's in its collision with another, equally one-sided position, they are maintained—and this is the rule—in a half-hearted way, not seriously.

The views that are taken up in turn are not so much "shells," to use Jaspers's term once more, as they are halfway houses, and those who inhabit them dim the lights and move around carefully lest they discover the limitations of their intellectual homes. To remain faithful to his conception, Hegel must never condemn any view from his own point of view, externally: his criticism must always be internal and consist in taking each view more seriously than its professed opponents take it.

The crucial question of organization remains where so much material is to be considered. In the middle of the twentieth century, the most fashionable arrangement would probably be by types, as Jaspers's was in his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. A merely arbitrary assortment would have the great disadvantage that important points of view might be overlooked. But Hegel's arrangement, over half a century before Darwin published his Origin of Species and impressed the idea of evolution on almost everybody's mind, was developmental.

Probably, he was influenced by Goethe's development from style to style, which suggested that there was a "logical" sequence—not "logical" in the ordinary sense, but rather in the way in which, to use a Hegelian image from the beginning of the preface, bud, blossom, and fruit succeed each other. Hegel assumes an organic necessity.

It does not seem to him that some of the views he considers are true and others false; but some are more mature than others, and

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22 In the section on Die Verstellung: in Lasson's edition, four times on p. 401 alone, and over half a dozen times after that; in Baillie's translation, 632 ff.
Part IV has only two subparts: "A. Independence and dependence of self-consciousness; mastership and servitude," and "B. Freedom of self-consciousness; stoicism; skepticism; and the unhappy consciousness." We shall return to this part in the next section.

Parts V, VI, and VII are all divided into A, B, and C; and each of these, in turn, with the exception of VI.B and VII.C, is in turn divided into a, b, and c. There the breakdown ends, except for V.A.a where the author could scarcely curb himself. Here matters become confused, and finally "Observance of the Organic" is broken down into alpha, beta, and gamma, and gamma, finally, into double alpha, double beta, and double gamma, and even under two of these subdivisions we find more than one descriptive title.

VI.B. is handled inconsistently: its three subdivisions are assigned Roman numerals: "I. The world of the spirit alienated from itself" (with a and b), "II. The Enlightenment" (with a and b), and "III. Absolute freedom and the Terror" (with no further subdivisions).

VII.C., "Revealed religion" has no subdivisions any more than "VIII. Absolute knowledge," which follows it.

The table of contents bears out that the work was not planned painstakingly before it was written, that Parts V and VI (Reason and Spirit) grew far beyond the bounds originally contemplated,25 and that Hegel himself was a little confused about what he had actually got when he was finished. Of course, the above account also gives some idea of the actual contents of the book.

The first three parts deal with theory of knowledge and perception and are very heavily influenced by Plato and Aristotle. The fourth part we shall consider in a moment. Part V begins with over a hundred pages on theoretical reason, as it operates in the sciences, and this section ends, rather oddly, with a discussion of phrenology. The second half of Part V deals with practical reason and self-realization, and begins with the aforementioned discussion of "Pleasure and Necessity."

VI.A deals with Sittlichkeit and has been commented on above. VI.B is entitled "Spirit alienated from itself. Bildung."26 The further breakdown of this section has already been given. VI.C is

25 Cf. also Hegel's letter to Schelling, May 1, 1807, in D, and Hegel's remarks in E §25.
26 For a discussion of this word, see C I.3.4.
called “Spirit certain of itself. Moralität” and contains Hegel’s critique of Kant’s ethics.

Part VII begins with a few general pages in which the harassed author looks back on what he has done and tries rather desperately to rationalize it. He seeks to explain why it was all right to take up some forms of religion in the earlier parts, notably in the discussion of the unhappy consciousness (in IV) and of Antigone (in VI). But the worst is to come; speaking of all the preceding forms of the spirit, Hegel says: “Religion presupposes the whole procession of them [den ganzen Ablauf derselben] and is their simple totality or absolute self.” Then we get about ten rather poor pages about “A. Natural religion,” mostly on Persia and Egypt, and wonder what he could possibly have meant: did religion of this sort, either as it really was or as Hegel here portrays it, presuppose the Enlightenment, the “absolute freedom” of 1789, and “the Terror” that ensued? Or did it presuppose comparable events? What could one say in answer to these questions when it comes to “B. Art-religion” (meaning Greek religion) and “C. Revealed religion”? Only that Hegel finished the book under an immense strain; that faults are so easy to find in it that it is not worth while to adduce heaps of them; and that there is a great deal in the book that is infinitely more interesting.

By far the best part of the Phenomenology is its preface, included later in this volume. Next to that, Part IV, on self-consciousness, is most interesting. It begins with a few introductory pages which contain the dictum: “Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.”

Then we are offered one skit and three tableaux, all clearly labeled. In the skit, one self-consciousness encounters another. Here it is relevant that the connotations of the term are different in English and German. While being self-conscious often means being unsure of oneself and embarrassed, selbstbewusst sein means just the opposite: being self-assured and proud. Of course, the primary meaning in both languages is the same: self-awareness. But while this sense is most important, the other connotations are relevant.

As self-consciousness encounters self-consciousness, pride meets pride, and each resolves to destroy the other in order to grow in self-assurance. Each aims at the other’s death and risks his life. For Sartre, in L’être et le néant, this account is still paradigmatic. “The other” is the enemy.

What matters to Hegel is the comprehension of one particular relationship between one self-consciousness and another, namely that between master and servant. He construes it, in the first instance, as the result of the fight. The loser prefers servitude to death.

What follows made the profoundest impression on Karl Marx, who greatly admired the book and called it “the true birthplace and secret of the Hegelian philosophy.” The servant comes to live by his own work and thus becomes self-reliant and independent, while the master comes to rely on the servant’s labor and thus becomes dependent. In Das Kapital, Marx writes: “As man... works on nature outside himself and changes it, he changes at the same time his own nature.”

With this neat and ironical reversal IV.A ends. IV.B is devoted to stoicism, skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness. The transition to the first of these three outlooks is easy to follow: the attitude of the servant who, despite his status, feels essentially self-reliant and independent may be characterized as stoicism. “This consciousness is thus negative against the relationship of mastership and servitude... to be equally free in fetters and on the throne, in spite of all the dependence of its individual existence.”

Here the historical allusion is kept properly subdued: Those who do not know that one of the most famous Stoics was Marcus Aurelius, the Roman emperor, and another Epictetus, a slave, can still accept the point Hegel is making. The same is true of Hegel’s sociological comment that stoicism “could appear as a general form of the world spirit only in an age of general fear and servitude,

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27 Lasson’s ed., 438; Baillie, 689.
28 Lasson’s ed., 121; Baillie, 226.

29 Quoted in Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, 1961, 126, from Marx and Engels, Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, III, 153. Tucker himself argues that “when Marx speaks of Hegelianism he has in mind primarily the philosophy of history set forth by Hegel in his Phenomenology” (125). But Marx also wrote critical essays on The Philosophy of Right (see Bibliography).
30 Vol. I, Volksausgabe, 133.
and of its own nullity." This is still continuous with the preceding development from servitude to stoicism, and hence to skepticism. These transitions are among the most plausible in the whole book, and few indeed of the many other transitions can brook comparison with them. But what needed to be shown now was how the unhappy consciousness, too, is a halfway house, and how, taken in earnest and pushed to extremes, it gives way to another, more mature stage in the development of the spirit.

Not only was Hegel evidently unable to do this, he also wished to deliver himself of a lot of material about the attitudes reason adopts in the study of nature (approximately one hundred pages of it, as it turned out). So he followed up the discussion of the unhappy consciousness, and the seminal chapter on "Self-Consciousness" that ends with it, with an immensely long chapter on "Reason." He devoted the first of its three parts to "A. Observing Reason," which in turn begins with the "Observation of Nature" and ends with "Physiognomy and Phrenology." Hegel certainly did not manage to trace a necessary development from the unhappy consciousness to phrenology, any more than the development from Faust's abandonment of Gretchen in the dungeon, at the end of "The First Part of the Tragedy" to some of the more abstruse discussions in Part Two could be said to be organically necessary. Rather, the framework of the book is loose enough to permit the introduction of all sorts of ideas for which the writer would like to find a place.

The Phenomenology of the Spirit is a profoundly incongruous book and brings to mind some passages in Eckermann's Conversations with Goethe in which the poet insists that Faust "is after all wholly incommensurable, and all attempts to bring it closer to the understanding are in vain. One should also keep in mind that the First Part issued from a somewhat dark state of the individual. But precisely this darkness attracts people, and they exert themselves over it as they do over all insoluble problems" (January 3, 1830). Again: "This act, too, is to receive a character of its own so that, like a small world that exists for itself, it does not touch the rest and is united with the whole only through a faint relation to what precedes and succeeds it." Eckermann then suggested that the poet "uses the story of a famous hero merely as a kind of continuous thread on which he can string what pleases him. It is no different with the Odyssey and Gil Blas." Goethe agreed and
34. Hegel's terminology

instances that imitate or participate in them; he resembles Plato in having a vision of the forms—not in another world, like Plato, but in rebus, in the images, skits, and tableaux that exemplify them.

The same characteristics that make the book so difficult as a whole also make many sentences so exasperating; concrete images turn up out of season and resist being quickly dropped again. Hegel looks for terms that are not abstract—words that retain a sensuous core even when they are used in metaphysical prose. Consider a few examples:

_Anschauung,_ firmly established by now in philosophical English as “intuition,” in translations of Kant as well as other German philosophers, comes from _anschauen_ which means to look at. Hence _Weltanschauung_ is usually rendered “world view.” (Cf. C I.2.2.)

_An sich_, always rendered “in itself,” does not mean in German that a feature is hidden from view and literally inside, but rather that the feature is “on” the thing, visible “for us” (für uns) though not “for it” (für sich); nor does it exist separately, “for” or “by itself” (another meaning of für sich). _An und für sich_ (in and for itself) means that something is both “in itself” and “for itself” in the senses just specified. (Cf. C II.1.8, 10, 30.)

_Aufheben_ (sublimate) means literally “pick up.” Like every single one of the other terms explained so far, it is quite common in ordinary speech: it is what you do when something has fallen to the floor. But this original sensuous meaning has given rise to two derivative meanings which are no less common: “cancel,” and “preserve” or “keep.” Something may be picked up in order that it will no longer be there; on the other hand, I may also pick it up to keep it. When Hegel uses the term in its double (or triple) meaning—and he expressly informs us that he does (H 42)—he may be said to visualize how something is picked up in order that it may no longer be _there_ just the way it was, although, of course, it is not cancelled altogether but lifted up to be kept on a different level. (Cf. H 42 and C II.1.16.)

_Begriff_ (Concept) comes from _begreifen_ which means “comprehend” but also has a sensuous meaning. _Greifen_ means “grab” or “grasp”; the prefix intensifies the relation to the object. Thus _tasten_ means to “feel (one’s way)”; _betasten_ means to touch something all over. Similarly, _dienen_ means to serve; _bedienen_, to wait on somebody. _Denken_ is think; _bedenken_, to think something over.
Begriff thus has the basic meaning of a thorough grasp, and this reverberates through Hegel’s usage. (Cf. C I.1.3.)

Vorstellung (notion) comes from vorstellen (represent). The German verb occurs in the sense of: what is this supposed to represent? (Was soll das vorstellen?) Eine Vorstellung can mean, and in ordinary speech very often refers to, a theatrical performance. In the philosophical sense, the noun is most often connected with the verb form, sich etwas vorstellen, which means literally, to represent something to oneself, but is much less unusual and cumbersome. In everyday language it means as much as, to imagine something. Traditionally, translators of Kant and Schopenhauer have rendered Vorstellung as either “representation” or “idea.” The former smacks of philosophical jargon, which the German term does not. That is why some translators prefer “idea”; but since Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hegel also often use the term Idee, which surely has to be rendered “idea,” this solution is poor, too.

When Hegel uses Vorstellung, he generally has in mind a contrast with Begriff. He relies on two associations Vorstellung usually has in ordinary language: vagueness and a sensuous quality. Hegel’s Begriff, on the other hand, is by definition precise, and it dispenses with visual aids. There is no English word that could serve as a perfect equivalent of Vorstellung, but “notion” is pretty good for at least two reasons. First, it is an ordinary word that does not stop one in one’s tracks every time one comes across it in a sentence. Secondly, it suggests something vague and subscientific. Unfortunately, it has been widely used to render Hegel’s Begriff, a task for which it is particularly ill fitted. A good test is the consistent use of “notion” for Vorstellung not only in the main part of this book but also throughout the translation of the preface to the Phenomenology: in every case it works far better than terms previously used. (Cf. C I.2.1.)

Geist is for Hegel “spirit” and not “mind.” There are many reasons of which only three need be singled out here. The first is sweeping: in a very large number of passages, “mind” simply does not make sense, and only “spirit” will do; so even Baillie, though he entitled his translation The Phenomenology of Mind, had to use “spirit” again and again.

The second reason could be construed as merely an instance of the first: Der heilige Geist is the Holy Spirit, not “the holy mind,” and “spirit,” unlike “mind,” has scores of biblical and religious associations. As a result, “spirit” has overtones and connotations that distinguish it from “mind” and bring it exceedingly close to the German Geist. This also explains why Hegel does not render the nous of Anaxagoras as Geist (VG 37 and 39), and why he claims that the Concept of Geist was introduced by Christianity (VG 47 L, 58 L). Indeed, we shall have to return to Hegel’s conception of Geist when we consider his philosophy of history and its relation to Christianity (H 65; cf. C II.1.27 and III.1.3).

The third reason is in line with the central argument of this section. Who has ever seen “minds”? Minds are almost by definition invisible. They are postulated by philosophers as “ghosts in the machine,” to use Gilbert Ryle’s famous phrase from The Concept of Mind; their home is in epistemology and metaphysics. But many people, both in the Bible and since that time, claim to have seen spirits, and a Geisterreich (the “realm of spirits” Schiller envisages in the first stanza of his poem on Die Freundschaft) is nowhere near as abstract and metaphysical as “a realm of minds” would be.81 Hegel concludes his Phenomenology of the Spirit with his own adaptation of the final two lines of Schiller’s poem, in effect referring back to the book as a “realm of spirits.” Throughout, we suddenly realize, Hegel has been conjuring spirits, letting them pass before us in a gigantic procession.

To appreciate the full significance of the end of the book, one must compare Hegel’s adaptation of Schiller’s lines with the original poem. Schiller celebrates friendship. Twice he speaks of the grosse Geistersonne (the great sun of the spirits) that the spirits seek “as streams flee to the ocean” and that he, too, wants to approach, arm in arm with a friend. Were he all alone in the universe, he says, he would dream up souls in the rocks and embrace them; we are dead as long as we hate, “gods, when we embrace each other lovingly”; “upwards, over the thousands of stages of innumerable spirits who have not created, this urge rules divinely. Arm in arm, ever higher and higher, from the Mongol up to the Greek seer,” the dancing procession ascends. “Friendless was the great world master, felt a lack and therefore created spirits, blessed mirrors of his blessedness! Though the highest being found no equal, from the cup of the whole realm of souls foams for him—infinity.” This prose translation, of course, can give no idea of Schiller’s vigorous rhythms

81 Whether some being has a mind, is a metaphysical question; whether, say, a horse has spirit or not, one can see.
The word *Phänomenologie* was not Hegel's coinage. "The first who used the term 'phenomenology' at all and at the same time also used it to designate a part of his philosophical system was Johann Heinrich Lambert [1728–77]. The work in which he did this was called *New Organon or Thoughts about the Investigation and Designation of the True and Its Differentiation from Error and Mere Appearance* (2 vols., Leipzig 1764)."  

The fourth and last part of this *Organon* was "Phenomenology or the Doctrine of Mere Appearance."

Herder picked up the term, particularly in two pertinent passages. In 1769 (in *Kritische Wilder IV*) he spoke of "an aesthetic phenomenology, which waits for a second Lambert." And in 1778: "If only we had . . . a real phenomenology of the beautiful and the true . . . !"  

Kant even thought of dedicating his first *Critique* to Lambert. And on September 2, 1770—the week Hegel was born—Kant wrote Lambert: "It seems that an altogether separate, albeit merely negative, science (*Phaenomenologia generalis*) must precede metaphysics to determine the validity and limits of the *principles* of the sensibility lest they confuse our judgments about the objects of pure reason, as has almost always happened hitherto." And on February 21, 1772, Kant wrote Markus Herz that he had thought of writing "a work which might have a title like *The Limits of Sensibility and Reason*. I thought of two parts, one theoretical and one practical. The first contained in section 1, *phenomenology* in general, and in section 2, metaphysics, albeit only according to its nature and method. The second part also in two sections: 1. General principles of feeling and sense desire, 2. The first principles of *Sittlichkeit*. . . ."

Hegel probably knew Kant's letter to Lambert, as the correspon-

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82 Hoffmeister's introduction to his critical ed. of the *Phänomenologie* (1952), vii. The account and quotations that follow are based on pp. vii–xvii. Cf. Ros. 204.


84 *Werke*, ed. cit., XVIII, 64.
dence of the two men was published in 1786 and a few years later reprinted in Kant's "Kleine Schriften." Novalis had also used the word a couple of times, once to say that "phenomenology is perhaps the most useful and comprehensive science," and Fichte had spoken of it in Lambert's sense, in 1804. So the term was not new; but what Hegel offered under this title was.

Hoffmeister has argued that "the position of the Phenomenology of the Spirit in the whole of Hegel's system... corresponds precisely to that which Kant assigned to his Critique of Pure Reason"—on the one hand a preliminary treatise, on the other a work that contains what was to come after (xv). His points are interesting and may appeal to those who feel that neither philosopher ever succeeded in equaling the stature of his first great masterpiece. One can even add to Hoffmeister's consideration that both Kant and Hegel had taken a long time to publish their magnum opus, had collected thoughts and notes for many years, and then wrote their books in a single spurt in a few months. This genesis helps to explain some of the roughness of the prose as well as the fact that so much was stuffed into a single volume. But after all that has been said about the Phenomenology in this chapter, it should be plain that its differences from Kant's Critique far outweigh the similarities.

One difference among many is that what has just been shown about Hegel's terminology does not apply to Kant's, even though some of the very same words were used by Kant, too. What is true of the word Phänomenologie is true of most of Hegel's terms; they had been used before Hegel, but he gave them a new nuance, usually by carrying over into their technical use something of their sensuous core. For Hegel, Schein is not "mere appearance" in the sense of error and illusion. Nor does Hegel, like Kant, begin with a fixed contrast of noumena and phenomena from which he then derives "phenomenology." He knows that the Greek, like the German, root also means to shine, to become visible, and for him "phenomenology of the spirit" means the study of the Gestalten des Bewusstseins, the study of the spirits in which spirit manifests itself. The alleged archrationalist Hegel was much less of a rationalist than Kant.

The term "phenomenology" acquired new meanings after Hegel's death. Moritz Lazarus (1824–1903), for example, used it in his Werke, X, 195.

major work, Das Leben der Seele (1855–57, 3d ed., 1883), to distinguish the description of the phenomena of mental life from psychology which seeks causal explanations. This emphasis on description was equally marked in the usage of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), with whom the term has come to be associated preeminently.

When Husserl employed it to designate his own philosophy, Hegel's Phenomenology was an almost forgotten book, and Husserl did not choose the word to suggest a link with Hegel. He stood in an altogether different tradition: his master was Franz Brentano (1838–1917), a declared opponent of Kant and philosophical idealism. Brentano had resigned his Catholic priesthood after the proclamation of the dogma of papal infallibility in 1870 and had published a Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt in 1874.

It is not feasible to attempt a brief account of the meaning of "phenomenology" in Husserl's school. Husserl's views changed considerably in the course of his long life, and his leading disciples changed their ideas, too—indeed, they revised their own conceptions of philosophy—and they are far from agreeing with each other. Some of them, including Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger, did not remain disciples. The only major figure who admittedly owes a great deal both to Husserl's "phenomenology" and to Hegel's Phenomenology is Sartre.

The features of Hegel's style and sensibility that have been stressed here have often been overlooked. Unquestionably, Hegel also had rather stuffy ideas about what was academically proper and "scientific," and frequently his terminology, which makes good sense when one examines one or two terms at a time, degenerates into a jargon that obscures his meaning instead of making it more precise. This vice, of course, is not peculiar to him; if anything, it is more widespread one hundred fifty years after his time than it was in his day. Symbolism, technical terms, and footnotes can all be extremely useful, but it is common for professors to employ such devices beyond all reason, with an eye more to their preconceptions about what looks scholarly than to the clarity of their work. Just as some modern philosophers and literary critics, and a great many sociologists, give themselves scientific airs and say at length
One aspect of Hegel's thought and influence that so far has been neglected here can be summed up in one word: dialectic. But while almost everybody who has heard of Hegel associates him with this term, its meaning is far from clear. According to an ancient tradition (Diogenes Laertius IX.5), Zeno of Elea, renowned for his paradoxes, was the inventor of the dialectic; and Plato called the supreme science dialectic. Some Neoplatonists developed the idea that the course of the world is governed by a process with three stages: unity (monê), going out of oneself (prôhodos), and return into oneself (epistrophê). In the Middle Ages, dialectic was one of the seven liberal arts.

In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, dialectic becomes *die Logik des Scheins* (A 61, B 86): the logic of mere appearance, of error and illusion. Considering Plato's usage, it is rather odd that Kant explains his definition by saying: "Different as the meanings are which the ancients attached to a science or art, one can yet see for certain from their actual use of this term that among them it was nothing else than *die Logik des Scheins*. A sophistical art of giving one's ignorance, and even the illusions that one produced deliberately, the whitewash of truth by imitating the method of thoroughness, prescribed by logic..." But half of the *Critique* (412 of the 856 pages of the first edition) is taken up by Kant's own "transcendental dialectic" which he defines as "a critique of this dialectical Schein." This "is called transcendental dialectic, not as an art to stimulate such illusion dialectically (an unfortunately very viable art...) but as a critique of the understanding and of reason in respect to their hyper-physical use, to uncover the false illusion of their unfounded presumptions..." (A 63, B 88).

Kant's greatest achievement, then, his critical discussion of the "paralogisms" about the soul, the antinomies about the world, and the traditional proofs of God's existence—his attempt to destroy dogmatic psychology, cosmology, and theology—went under the name of "transcendental dialectic." His treatment of the antinomies was particularly impressive: thirty-six pages in the center of the book presented, on facing pages, four "theses" and four "antitheses," each followed by a "proof" and a "note." The first thesis was: "The
world has a beginning in time and is also enclosed in boundaries spatially." The first antithesis: "The world has no beginning and no boundaries in space but is, in respect to both time and space, infinite." The four antinomies, said Kant, were due to the illicit use of reason, and he considered it one of the greatest accomplishments of his own work that he had succeeded in resolving these antinomies.

In an interesting note in the second edition, Kant called attention to the fact that his twelve categories of the understanding are arranged in four groups of three, and that the third category in each group is a synthesis of the two preceding it. (He did not use the word "synthesis" at this point; the passage is translated below, C III.3.11.)

Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this terminology; Hegel did not. He never once used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of his books. And they do not help us understand his Phenomenology, his Logic, or his philosophy of history; they impede any open-minded comprehension of what he does by forcing it into a schema which was available to him and which he deliberately spurned. The mechanical formalism, in particular, with which critics since Kierkegaard have charged him, he derides expressly and at some length in the preface to the Phenomenology.

Whoever looks for the stereotype of the allegedly Hegelian dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology will not find it. What one does find on looking at the table of contents is a very decided preference for triadic arrangements. As already noted (H 32), Parts V, VI, and VII are all divided into A, B, and C, and all but one of these nine sections are further subdivided into three parts. But these many triads are not presented or deduced by Hegel as so many theses, antitheses, and synththeses. It is not by means of any dialectic of that sort that his thought moves up the ladder to absolute knowledge.

Skepticism, for example, is not the antithesis of stoicism, nor does Hegel make any effort to present it that way; rather he introduces

37 Cf. G. E. Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis,'" and WK 166ff. The only place where Hegel uses the three terms together occurs in his lectures on the history of philosophy, on the last page but one of the section on Kant—where Hegel roundly reproaches Kant for having "everywhere posited thesis, antithesis, synthesis" (Werke, ed. Glockner, XIX, 610).
cast aspersions on what he is actually doing. The "introduction" begins: "There is no science where the need is felt more urgently to begin with the subject matter itself, without preliminary reflections, than in the science of Logic." And more in the same vein, Hegel apologizes for his argumentative and historical style in these early pages, feeling that he ought to be properly "scientific" from the start; but he obviously feels at home in what he is doing and writes, on the whole, with surprising clarity and vigor. In this respect, his Encyclopedia and Philosophy of Right, with their crabbed, consecutively numbered paragraphs cannot compare with these for the most part extremely lucid pages.

Since Kant, we are told in the preface, the Germans have become "a civilized people without metaphysics," which Hegel considers a "strange spectacle." In the introduction Hegel suggests that "ancient metaphysics had in this respect a higher concept of thinking than has become prevalent in recent times. For it assumed that what in things is recognized by thinking is what alone in them is truly true; thus not they in their immediacy, but only they as lifted into the form of thinking, as thought. This [Platonic and Aristotelian] metaphysics thus held that thinking and the determinations of thought were not alien to objects but rather their essence, or that things and the thinking of them (even as our language expresses some relation between them) agree in and for themselves. . . ." 12

While Hegel is right about Plato and Aristotle, the etymologies of "thing" and Ding on the one hand, and "think" and Denken on the other seem to be actually different. Like Plato, Hegel takes pleasure in calling attention to linguistic points; and in the preface added to the second edition he commends the German language for containing words that "have not only different meanings but even opposed meanings," which he considers evidence of "a speculative spirit of the language; it can afford thinking a delicate hit upon such words and to find the reconciliation of opposites, which is a result of speculation but an absurdity for the understanding, present lexicographically in this naiveté manner in a single word of opposite meanings. Philosophy therefore requires no particular terminology at all; of course, a few words have to be accepted from foreign languages, but words that by much use have already acquired citizenship; any affected purism would be most out of place where the subject matter is all-important."

12 1812, p. v; 1841, p. 27.

42. The conception of the Logic

What matters to Hegel is not etymology as such. The point is that he does not see himself as one who comes to say: Ye have been told—but I say unto you. Rather he wants to bring into clear daylight and systematic order what is available before he begins. The motto is always Goethe's:

What from your fathers you received as heir,
Acquire if you would possess it.

One may also recall Mephisto's lines, in Faust II, published only after Hegel's (and Goethe's) death:

Depart, "original" enthusiast!
How would this insight peev you: whatsoever
A human being thinks, if dumb or clever,
Was thought before him in the past.

Goethe also said on occasion that everything true has already been thought in the past; one merely needs to think it once more. And in a late poem, written in 1829 and entitled "Legacy [Vermächtnis]," he said:

Das Wahre war schon längst gefunden, . . .
Das alte Wahre, fass es an!

These lines are wholly in Hegel's spirit: "The true has long been found, . . . The ancient true, take hold of it!" Grasp it—or as Hegel might say, what matters is to comprehend it, es begreifen.

The prime example of an ordinary word that shows the "speculative spirit of the language" by having seemingly opposed meanings is, of course, aufheben (sublimate), which was explained briefly above in section 34. The first chapter of the Logic ends with a "Note" on this term:

"Aufheben und das Aufgehabene (das Ideelle) is one of the most important concepts of philosophy, a basic determination which recurs practically everywhere. . . . What sublimates itself does not thereby become nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublimated, on the other hand, is mediated; it is that which is not, but as a result, having issued from what had being; it is therefore still characterized by the determinateness from which it comes.

"Aufheben has in the [German] language a double meaning in that it signifies conserving, preserving, and at the same time also making cease, making an end. Even conserving includes the negative
aspect that something is taken out of its immediacy, and thus out of an existence that is open to external influences, to be preserved.
—Thus what is aufgehoben is at the same time conserved and has merely lost its immediacy but is not for that reason annihilated.  
—Lexicographically, the two definitions of aufheben can be listed as two meanings of the word. But it should strike us that a language should have come to use one and the same word for two opposed definitions. For speculative thinking it is a joy to find in the language words which are characterized by a speculative significance; German has several such words. The double meaning of the Latin tollere (which has become famous through Cicero's joke: tollendum esse Octavium) does not go so far; here the affirmative definition reaches only as far as raising up. Something is aufgehoben only insofar as it has entered into a union with its opposite; in this more exact definition, as something reflected, it can suitably be called a moment.  

More often, the observation will press itself upon us that philosophical terminology uses Latin expressions for reflected definitions, either because the mother tongue lacks pertinent expressions or, if it has them, as here, because its expressions remind us more of the immediate, and the foreign language more of the reflected.

As this passage on Hegel's most "dialectical" term suggests, his dialectic, even in the Logic, is not meant to flout the law of contradiction; it is not even intended to be counterintuitive. In fact, Hegel's delight at finding such a word as aufheben is plainly due to the opportunity it provides for him to appeal to the intuition that is embedded in the language. And his detailed explanation, as quoted, tries to overcome the rigid prejudices of the understanding by showing how both reason and intuition can make perfectly good sense of something that the understanding might be inclined to rule out without a hearing because opposite meanings must be mutually incompatible and therefore, if nevertheless combined, yield nonsense.

In his introduction to the Logic, Hegel is no less plain on this all-

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13 vernichtet. 1812: verschwinden (vanished). The remainder of this paragraph is not found in the first edition, which proceeds instead: "That which is aufgehoben may be defined more precisely by saying that something is here aufgehoben only insofar as it has entered into a union with its opposite; in this narrower definition it is something reflected and can suitably be called a moment. Indeed, we shall have to observe frequently that philosophical terminology uses Latin expressions for reflected definitions."

14 1812, vii f.; 1841, 29 f., unchanged.
the place to mention that it is... the categories for themselves which bring about the contradiction. This thought, that the contradiction which arises in reason through the determinations of the understanding is essential and necessary, must be considered one of the most important and profound advances of modern philosophy. But the solution is no less trivial than this point of view is profound..." (§48).

What is needed is a comprehensive review and analysis of our categories, and this is what Hegel attempts in his Logic. The point is to comprehend the concepts of being and nothing, of finite and infinite; then we shall see that they are all one-sided abstractions from a concreteness of which they are merely partial aspects. That is the heart of Hegel's Logic; that is the meaning of its much misunderstood dialectic.

The dialectic of the Logic is thus somewhat different from the dialectic of the Phenomenology: one could not possibly call it a logic of passion. As Hegel says in the penultimate paragraph of the introduction: "The system of Logic is the realm of shadows, the world of the simple essences [Wesenheiten], freed from all sensuous concretion. The study of this science, the sojourn and the work in this realm of shadows, is the absolute education and discipline of consciousness. Here it pursues tasks remote from sensuous intuitions and aims, from feelings, from the merely intended world of notions. Considered from its negative aspect, these tasks consist in the exclusion of the accidental nature of argumentative thinking and the arbitrary business of allowing these or rather the opposite reasons to occur to one and prevail."16

Hegel still confronts us as another Odysseus: in the Phenomenology we followed his Odyssey, the spirit's great voyage in search of a home where it might settle down; in the Logic we are asked to follow him into the realm of shadows. There we moved in a world where the passions had their place; here the passions are left behind. We are to contemplate Concepts and categories—and see them as one-sided abstractions and mere shadows that are not what they seem.

15 This term has been used so often to render Begriff that it may be well to remind the reader that in this book it is employed consistently to translate Vorstellung. (Cf. H 34).

16 1812, xxvii f.; 1841, 44. The only change: Hegel added "intuitions and."

42. The conception of the Logic

We are now ready to understand in context a metaphor mentioned once before (end of H 40)—on the face of it, perhaps the maddest image in all of Hegel's writings: "The Logic is thus to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without any shroud in and for itself. One might therefore say that this content is the account of God, as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and any finite spirit" (Introduction).17

The image of the realm of shadows seems superior, but what both metaphors have in common is the abstraction from the world and from concreteness. The suggestion that the Logic takes us back in some sense "before the creation of nature and any finite spirit" undoubtedly came from the structure of Hegel's system: he had decided to begin with the Logic, to follow that with the philosophy of nature, and to place the philosophy of spirit in the end; and the philosophy of spirit, as we shall see when we take it up in detail, deals with the human (or "finite") spirit.

One might suppose that the Logic should belong to the philosophy of (finite) spirit—and one might favor the abandonment of any attempt to offer a philosophy of nature. In the twentieth century, the philosophy of (natural) science seems to have replaced the philosophy of nature, which is now apt to strike us as an excrecence of romanticism; and once the philosophy of nature is thus transposed into the study of a human pursuit (natural science), one is bound to wonder whether Logic, too, cannot be absorbed into the philosophy of man, or philosophical anthropology.

Most of this problem can be postponed until we consider the system, but something can and must be said at this point about the status and priority of the Logic. Hegel plainly does not consider it a branch of psychology, and beyond that he claims some priority for it, even over investigations of nature, and, for that matter, over science. On both points he is far from being out of date. Indeed, he could be said to have effected a revolution in metaphysics which is as timely one hundred fifty years later as it ever was.

With Hegel, metaphysics ceases to be speculation about the nature of ultimate reality. He is still fond of speaking of "speculation" and "speculative," but as a matter of fact he does not speculate about things of which we could say that the time for speculation is
through the whole execution and therefore knows the sequence of
the moments in advance and indicates them. . . .”

Once again, as in the Phenomenology, Hegel first wrote each
volume and then asked himself what precisely he had got and how
it might be arranged neatly. He never set as much store by his
triads or by the precise sequence as some of his expositors have
done. In fact, in the Encyclopedia of 1817, the order differs some-
what from the Logic of 1812–16. In 1830 Hegel published a
third, revised, and definitive edition of the Encyclopedia, but when
he prepared a second and definitive edition of the Logic in 1831—he
completed his work on the first volume—he did not make the order
conform to that of the Encyclopedia. The precise sequence was, after
all, as he had already said in 1812, not part of the “body of the
science,” any more than the neat disposition and headings.

What did matter was not any such progression from thesis to
antithesis to synthesis, and hence to another antithesis, and so
forth, as McTaggart claimed, but a comprehensive analysis of
categories and the demonstration that any two opposite categories
are always both one-sided abstractions.

Hegel has been called an archrationalist and an essentialist, but
his central purpose in the Logic is to demonstrate the inadequacy,
the one-sidedness, the abstractness of our categories. Some are more
abstract than others; hence some sort of sequential arrangement is
possible; but this is not the main thesis or point of the book.

Only the somewhat cut-and-dried style of the Encyclopedia,
which will be considered in due course, could give the impression
that the table of contents structure was what mattered. The Logic
belies it at every turn—quite especially the first volume in which
the reader is introduced to the whole enterprise. But while the de-
hydrated summary of the “Logic” in the Encyclopedia was rendered
into English, badly, in 1873 (the revised edition of 1892 was still
bad), no complete translation of the Logic itself appeared until
1929. When Stace’s influential interpretation of Hegel appeared

22 1812, xxi; 1841, 39; Glockner’s ed., IV, 52; Lasson’s ed. (1923), 366. In
the original only historical is emphasized.


24 Moreover, much of the text Wallace chose to translate consists of “addi-
tions” of doubtful value which will be considered below (H 52). Wallace
published an English version of the final part of the Encyclopedia in 1894;
the middle part, containing the philosophy of nature, has never appeared in
English.
and his decision, in 1800, to view the past in a different perspective, with the faith that what so many millions have died for was "not bare nonsense or immorality" (H 12).

There is a moving passage, again in Hegel's own manuscript, that suggests that he no longer found it easy to talk or write about the wretched side of history. The prose is complex, but the thought is perfectly clear:

"When we consider this spectacle of the passions; when the consequences of their violence and the folly that accompanies not only them but even, and indeed pre-eminently, good intentions and legitimate aims, come before our eyes—the ills, the evil, the destruction of the most flourishing realms that the human spirit has created; when we behold individuals with the deepest sympathy for their indescribable misery—then we can only end up with sadness over this transitoriness and, insofar as this destruction is not only a work of nature but of the will of men, even more with moral sadness, with the indignation of the good spirit, if there be any in us, over such a spectacle. We can raise such events, without any rhetorical exaggeration, merely by putting together all the misfortune that the most glorious peoples and states as well as individual virtues or innocence have suffered, into the most horrible portrait, and thus intensify our feeling into the most profound and helpless sadness which cannot be balanced by any conciliatory result....

But even as we contemplate history as this slaughter bench on which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed, our thoughts cannot avoid the question for whom, for what final aim these monstrous sacrifices have been made" (VG 79 f.).

The explicit mention of innocence is noteworthy. Hegel does not believe that suffering proves guilt. Recalling how a former fellow student at Tübingen later related that the young Hegel had "found special pleasure in the Book of Job on account of its unruly natural language" (H 3), one wonders whether it was only the language that attracted him. Hegel's letter to Knebel, written in December 1810 (translated in D) comes to mind, too: So far from closing his eyes to the misery of humanity, Hegel needed his work, his philosophy, to cope with it. He tried to show himself and others that the indubitably monstrous sufferings recorded throughout history had not been altogether for nothing. There is something we can show in return for all this, though it cannot balance the misery: while even Plato and Aristotle, not to speak of the sages of India, had not known that man as such was free, this was now widely recognized, though it might still take considerable time before such freedom would be fully actualized.

In Hegel's mature work the emphasis is almost the opposite of the Book of Job, and also far from Nietzsche and some of the existentialists. Mostly, he stresses the goal rather than the sacrifices, the growing recognition of freedom rather than the slowness of its implementation, and reason rather than unreason.

If we ask why, two reasons offer themselves. They are supplementary. First, as Goethe said: "The greatest men always are attached to their century by some weakness." Or we might express the same point by likening Hegel in one respect to his "world-historical individuals," whom we shall have to consider in a moment: he, too, knew "for what the time had come." Either way, his distribution of emphasis reveals him as a man of the nineteenth century, not of the twentieth—not necessarily a child of the nineteenth century, but perhaps rather one of those who helped to mold its distinctive temper.

As we follow Hegel's development, we may also venture a psychological explanation, which is in no way incompatible with the first point. Human misery was perfectly obvious to him. His closest friend, Hölderlin, had become insane, and now this most lovable human being, by far the most gifted poet of his generation, vegetated mutely toward his long delayed death. Hegel's only sister lived on the verge of madness and was deeply despondent. His only brother had been killed in the Napoleonic wars. His mother had died when he was barely thirteen. It did not seem manly to Hegel to dwell on that aspect of life. But it was never far from the surface and found expression in, for example, his writings and lectures on tragedy and his immense admiration for Sophocles and Shakespeare. On the rare occasions when it finds more direct expression, as in the passage we have cited that ends with the image of the slaughter bench, one gets the feeling that he did not altogether trust himself to speak of these matters.

The popular view of Hegel as an "optimist" is certainly mis-

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3 Elective Affinities (1809); Maximen und Reflexionen, §49.
4 VG 97 L: was an der Zeit, was notwendig ist. Cf. Nohl 143, cited at the beginning of section 12, above: what is there said to be "a need of our time" is precisely what is at stake here.
leading. He never shared the view that gained ground in the later nineteenth century, and beyond that until 1914, that happiness had grown throughout history, and that ultimate happiness was around the corner. Nor did he believe that gradually so much had been learned from history that at long last tragedy was avoidable. On these points he expressed himself with vigor:

“What experience and history teach is this: peoples and governments have never learned anything from history and acted according to what one might have learned from it” (VG 19 L).

“History is not the soil of happiness. The times of happiness are empty leaves in it” (VG 92 L).

It would not go too far to call his vision of history tragic. The themes represented here by a few quotations are pursued throughout and recur again and again.\(^5\) Hegel is still far from the type of the “Alexandrian” scholar of the later nineteenth century, whom the young Nietzsche derides in his first books. He is much closer to Nietzsche himself; say, to Zarathustra’s “I have long ceased to be concerned with happiness; I am concerned with my work.” Hegel says of the world-historical individuals: “It is not happiness they choose, but toil, struggle, work for their purpose.”\(^6\) That Hegel personally felt the same way appears from his two letters to his bride in the summer of 1811 (D): indeed, immediately upon becoming engaged he hurt her feelings by questioning whether “happiness is part of the destiny of my life.”

Hegel is also close to Nietzsche when he says that “nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion” (85). Or when he attacks envy (100ff. L). Indeed, part of this attack deserves a place here:

“What schoolmaster has not demonstrated to his class that Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar were driven by such passions and were therefore immoral men? From which it immediately follows that he, the schoolmaster, is a more excellent human being than they, because he does not possess such passions, which he can prove, for he has not conquered Asia, nor vanquished Darius and Porus. He lives comfortably, to be sure, but he also lets live. . . . For a valet there are no heroes, says a familiar proverb. I have added—and Goethe repeated this two years later—not be-

\(^5\) For example, 34 f. L, 72 L, and 100 L.

\(^6\) VG 100 L; cf. 93 L. The Zarathustra quotation comes from the first chapter of Part IV.

60. Reason and misery in history; Sartre

cause there are no heroes but because he is a valet. . . . Homer’s Thersites who reproaches the kings is a stock figure of all ages. Blows, i.e., a beating with a solid stick, he does not receive in all ages, as he did in Homer’s; but his envy . . . is the thorn he carries in his flesh; and the undying worm that gnaws him is the torment that his excellent intentions and reproofs remain without any success in the world” (102 f. L).

What is perhaps most like Nietzsche and Sartre is Hegel’s constantly repeated insistence that “the organic individual produces himself: it makes of itself what it is implicitly; thus the spirit, too, is only that which it makes of itself, and it makes of itself what it is implicitly.”\(^10\) This is almost a definition of spirit: “Spirit is this, that it produces itself, makes itself into what it is” (74). Compare this with Sartre’s: “Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.”\(^11\) Of course, Sartre applies emphatically to each individual what Hegel had more often said of spirit and of peoples, and Sartre does not stress as Hegel does—but this is a mere truism in any case—that potentially one was all along what one makes of oneself explicitly. Where they really differ is in Sartre’s suggestion that we could have chosen to make something utterly different of ourselves—a point Hegel does not discuss.

On a related point, however, Sartre’s moral is also Hegel’s. Sartre presents this as the distinctive doctrine of existentialism: “Man . . . is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions. . . . For the existentialist, there is no love apart from the deeds of love; . . . there is no genius other than that which is expressed in works of art. The genius of Proust is the totality of the works of Proust. . . . In life, a man commits himself, draws his own portrait, and there is nothing but that portrait. No doubt, this thought may seem comfortless to one who has not made a success of his life.”\(^12\)

Hegel says in a similar vein—and only Descartes, Husserl, and Heidegger are mentioned more often in Sartre’s Being and Nothing-
61. Philosophy as comfort; the actual

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From Hegel's own point of view, however, all this is incidental to the central point that history relates the development of freedom. And when in the following passage he contrasts youth and maturity, we know by now that he is not merely comparing his own wisdom with his students' lack of it but also, and perhaps mainly, his hard-won insight with the views of his own youth:

"It is easier to see the faults of individuals, states, and the governance of the world than to see what they contain of truth. For as long as one is negative and reproaches, one stands nobly, with a lofty mien, above the subject, without having penetrated into it and grasped it and what is positive in it. Certainly, the reproach may be well founded; only what is faulty is much easier to find than what is substantial (e.g., in works of art) . . . It is the sign of the greatest superficiality to find what is bad everywhere and to see nothing of the affirmative and genuine. Age generally makes milder; youth is always dissatisfied; that is due to the maturity of judgment in age which does not merely, from disinterestedness, put up with the bad, too, but which has also been taught more profoundly by the seriousness of life and been led to the substantial and solid aspect of the matter . . .

"Thus the insight to which philosophy should help us is that the actual world is as it ought to be . . . God rules the world; the content of his government, the execution of his plan, is world

history; to grasp this is the task of the philosophy of world history, and its presupposition is that the ideal accomplishes itself, that only what accords with the idea has actuality. Before the pure light of this divine idea, which is no mere ideal, the semblance that the world is a mad, foolish happening disappears. . . . What is ordinarily called actuality is considered something rotten by philosophy; it may well seem, but it is not actual in and for itself. This insight contains what one might call the comfort against the notion of absolute misfortune, of the madness of what has happened. Comfort, however, is merely a substitute for some ill that ought not to have happened, and is at home in the finite. Thus philosophy is not a comfort; it is more, it reconciles, it transfigures the actual, which seems unjust, into the rational . . ."14

Until we reach "the insight . . . that the actual world is as it ought to be," all one can say against Hegel is that he generalizes too much. Whether the positive or the negative is easier to see, and which it is more important to point out, depends greatly on the historical context. After the polemics of the Enlightenment, and after he himself had written his fragments on folk religion and "The Positivity of the Christian Religion," Hegel might well feel, as he put it in 1800, that "the horrible blabbering in this vein with its endless extent and inward emptiness has become too boring and has altogether lost interest—so much so that it would rather be a need of our time to hear . . . the opposite" (H 12). In another time and place, the horrible blabbering in quite a different vein might make it a need of the time to hear some pungent criticism.

The second half of the long quotation is open to even graver objections. Here Hegel goes against the spirit of not only his early fragments but also the preface to the Phenomenology, where he had announced that "philosophy, however, must beware of wishing to be edifying" (1.2.9). Then he had felt that philosophers must not "aim at edification and replace the pastor"15; now he seems to be doing just that. In these lectures "God" comes to his lips easily and frequently, and philosophy is invoked frankly to offer more than comfort, to reconcile us to the horrors of life and history, and to transfigure the actual—by what looks like a verbal trick.

In any ordinary sense of these words, Hegel himself does not

13 VG 66 L; cf. also 100 L. Hegel also anticipates Spengler both in stressing the organic unity of all the aspects of a culture (121 L, with an appropriate bow to Montesquieu), and in pushing the organic metaphor still further: "The spirit of a people is a natural individual; as such, it flourishes, is strong, declines, and dies" (67 L). On the following page this point is developed further, in language at points quite close to Spengler's.

14 VG 77 f. L. Cf. 29 ff. L, 42 L, 48, 52 L.
15 Jena "aphorism" #66, Dok. 371; Ros. 552.
believe that "the actual world is as it ought to be." This dictum depends on calling actual only what "accords with the idea." What is ordinarily called actual (wirklich) is admittedly "rotten"—but simply not called actual "by philosophy." Is it really an "insight" that reconciles Hegel to the terrors of history, or merely the redefinition of "actual"?

First of all, it should be noted that Hegel's definition is not offered ad hoc at this point. It goes back to the famous preface to the Philosophy of Right, to the discussion of this category in the Logic, and beyond that to the Phenomenology. Beyond that, it goes back to Aristotle and Plato. Plato had taught that only perfect justice and goodness, perfect circles and squares—or in other words, only what he called the Forms—were actual; everything in the world of experience that participates imperfectly in these Forms is not actual but mere appearance. Aristotle had abandoned the belief in otherworldly Forms, had found the Forms in things, as entelechies which strive toward actuality through development. Hegel does not believe that a pattern of a perfect state is laid up in the heavens, to echo Plato's famous remark in the Republic (592); he does believe, however, that there is a Concept of the state that existing states actualize more or less—and then suggests in places that those states that are not states in the highest normative sense of that word are not actual.

While it makes perfectly good sense to say of a badly drawn circle that it is not actually a circle, seeing that the definition of a circle is generally and precisely understood, it would involve stretching a point, more often than not, to say that a poorly instituted state is not actually a state. But to go still further and say that it is not actual is surely utterly misleading. And if Hegel's comfort and reconciliation to misfortune and madness depended solely on this redefinition of terms, his philosophy of history would be far worse than it is.

The following quotations, all from Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, explain the major points of Hegel's approach. The first requires comment: "The philosophical approach to history has no other intention than to eliminate the incidental" (29 L). Das Zufäll-
wholly on comparing different societies *in the 1820s*, as there is no suggestion whatsoever in Hegel's lectures that history will not go on; on the contrary. And at that time it would have been less ridiculous to single out Prussia than, say, the United States in which there was a large slave population.

Secondly, Hegel does *not* present Prussia as the culmination of the historical process, and his construction of world history does not depend on any such implicit assumption. That Germany was, during Hegel's lifetime, in the forefront of Western civilization seems undeniable; but Hegel does not say that Germany represents the pinnacle of the historical process. He merely believes, and wants to show, that for all its many ups and downs there has been a slow and painful development to the point where it is widely admitted, certainly in the Protestant North of Europe, that all men as such are free. And he understands world history as the gradual development of this recognition.

Armed with this insight, he tells his students that there has been reason in history; that all has not been in vain; that one must approach the study of history with this faith; but that for him it is no mere faith but "a result with which I am acquainted because I am already acquainted with the whole" (30).

"But we have to take history as it is; we must proceed historically, empirically" (30). That does not mean that one even *could* approach history without any prior ideas in one's head. "Even the ordinary and mediocre historian, who may believe and pretend that his attitude is only receptive . . . brings along his categories and sees the data through them." And now comes the famous epigram: "The world looks rational to those who look at it rationally" (31). The other way around: "If one approaches the world only with subjectivity, then one will find it as one is constituted oneself; everywhere, one will know everything better and see how it should have been done, how things should have happened" (32 L).

People say that it is presumption to try to understand Providence, but "When theology itself has been reduced to such despair, then one has to seek refuge in philosophy if one wants to know God." It is "a tradition that God's wisdom is to be recognized in nature"; how much more, then, should it be discoverable in human history, considering that this, much more than nature, is the realm of the spirit (42 L). "The time must finally have come to comprehend
dantical) invalid whom his doctor advises to eat fruit and who is offered cherries or plums or grapes, but who will not take any . . . because none of these are fruit but merely cherries or plums or grapes" (28).

“But this proposition that truth is only one, is itself still abstract and formal. And what is most essential is to recognize that the one truth is not a merely simple abstract thought or proposition; rather it is something concrete” (29).

“. . . The idea is essentially concrete, the unity of differentiated determinations. It is at this point that the knowledge of reason differs from the knowledge of the mere understanding, and it is the business of philosophy to show that the true, the idea, does not consist in empty generalities but in something general that is essentially particular and determinate. . . . Here the consciousness not yet trained in philosophy steps back and says that it does not understand this. That it does not understand this means first of all that it does not yet find this among its customary notions and convictions. . . . But to understand it and form some notion of it is easy. Red, e.g., is an abstract sensuous notion, and when ordinary consciousness speaks of red it is not of the opinion that it is dealing with anything abstract. But a rose that is red is a concrete red; it is a unity of leaves, of form, of color, of smell, something living and growing in which many such abstractions can be differentiated and isolated, and which can also be destroyed and torn, and which is nevertheless, in all the manifoldness it contains, one subject, one idea. Thus the pure abstract idea is essentially not something abstract, not empty simplicity like red, but a flower, something essentially concrete. Or to take an example from a determination of thought, the proposition ‘A is A,’ the principle of identity, is an entirely abstract simplicity. . . . But when I go on to the category of ground [Grund], this is already an essentially concrete determination. Ground, the grounds, what is essential in things is also that which is identical with itself and rests in itself; but ground is at the same time defined as something that goes out of itself to relate itself to something of which it is the ground. The simple Concept, therefore, contains not only what the ground is but also the other of which it is the ground; the cause contains also the effect. Something that was supposed to be a ground, taken without anything of which it is the ground, is no ground; just so, something that is supposed to be determined as a cause, but without effect. . . . This, then, is what it means to be
concrete: to contain not only one immediate determination but also another.

“After having thus explained the nature of the concrete, I now add about its significance that the true . . . has the drive to develop itself. Only the living, that which is spirit, moves and stirs essentially, and develops. The idea, concrete in itself and developing, is thus an organic system, a totality which contains a wealth of stages and moments.

“Now philosophy is for itself the recognition of this development, and as thinking that comprehends, it is itself this thinking development. The further this development has reached, the more perfect is the philosophy” (30 ff.).

“Thus philosophy is system in the process of development” (33).

“Now I claim that the sequence of the systems of philosophy in history is the same as the sequence in the logical derivation of the conceptual determinations of the idea” (34).

It is time to stop and take stock. Hegel takes more seriously than any major philosopher before him the problem posed by the disagreement among the great philosophers. Leibniz had made a few scattered remarks about this problem; Aristotle, in the first book of his Metaphysics, had related the views of his predecessors and integrated them in his own system. Hegel discusses the problem at some length.

If philosophy were as simple as a single abstract proposition, there would be no point, Hegel admits implicitly, in studying the history of philosophy. But philosophy is highly complex, much more like a flower or a living organism than like a simple quality, such as red, or such a proposition as the principle of identity. Since it is complex and alive, no simple proposition can exhaust it, and even a small collection of such propositions may do justice to only a few aspects of it. Indeed, the possibility arises that different collections of propositions—different philosophies, in other words—might be partially true, might supplement each other, and might therefore be worth studying one after the other. Not only might this be worth while; nobody who wants to do justice to the whole complex organism should dare to venture his own little collection of propositions without first studying the results of the cumulative labor of many centuries. The great philosophers of the past erred in not comprehending their own relation to their rivals in the most fruitful way; indeed they were wrong insofar as they considered their fellow
not bear the stamp of his spirit. Such German scholars as Erdmann, Zeller, and Kuno Fischer, as well as Windelband, stood directly in the main line of this influence, but others—even if they despise him, like Bertrand Russell in his *History of Western Philosophy*—are still following in his footsteps.

Hegel's influence has not been confined to the historiography of philosophy, or to the study of *Geisteswissenschaften*. Liberal Protestantism is unthinkable without it, and so are the British Idealism of F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green, and Bernard Bosanquet, the philosophies of Josiah Royce, Benedetto Croce, and R. G. Collingwood, and large parts of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.

Much intellectual history since Hegel's time is best understood as a series of revolts against Hegel's influence. It may be stretching a point to bring this under the heading of influence; but there are few men in history of whom such a statement could be made. In the end it matters little whether we call this some sort of influence or not: the significant fact is that without understanding Hegel one can comprehend relatively little of many movements since his time, while a study of his thought opens scores of doors.

The most obvious example, and by far the single most important one, is furnished by Marxism. Marx accepted a great deal from Hegel—especially what he took to be his dialectic, though he claimed that Hegel's idealism turned things upside down. As a matter of fact, Hegel's dialectic never was the rigorous method that Marx and his followers sought to make of it; and this we have tried to show in this book. By depriving it of its primary reference to ideas and applying it instead to modes of production, one cannot make the dialectic more precise; or materialism, "scientific." On the contrary, beliefs are at least capable of being literally contradicted and then subsumed in a higher synthesis, while any dialectic of modes of production or material circumstances is bound to be utterly lacking in rigor. The fact that Marxism further claims that the dialectic can be used to make predictions—Hegel never did and, on the contrary, insisted that philosophy must confine itself to the present and past—has led Marxism much further in the direction of pseudo-scientific rigor than Hegel himself ever went. But the fact that Marxism is in this respect intellectually indefensible obviously does not enable us to ignore it; and those who wish to comprehend it must study Hegel.

"One cannot completely comprehend Marx's *Capital*, and espe-
cially the first chapter, unless one has studied and comprehended the whole of Hegel's *Logic*. Consequently, after half a century not one of the Marxists has comprehended Marx." Thus wrote Lenin.\(^{43}\)

William James polemicized against Hegel again and again, but hardly knew Hegel and really meant Royce who, ironically, was often less close to Hegel than James was. James's attack against the block universe, though aimed at Hegel, would have found an enthusiastic ally in Hegel. So, of course, would have James's "pragmatic" insistence that truth should make a difference in our lives, that philosophy is vision, and that the realm of faith and morals must not be severed from the realm of epistemology and metaphysics. In James it may have been partly an elective affinity rather than influence that drew him to Hegel's old paths. In his fellow pragmatist, John Dewey, it was clearly a direct influence; for Dewey, as is well known, began his philosophic career as a Hegelian.

In British philosophy, R. G. Collingwood was the last major representative of Hegel's direct influence. But the main drift of British philosophy, since G. E. Moore published his famous "Refutation of Idealism" in 1903, has been a revolt against Hegel's influence, specifically against McTaggart and the other British Idealists. Some of the excesses and the one-sidedness of this movement—features that constitute limitations though they certainly have not prevented a great many fine contributions—must be explained as an overreaction. Hegel's own conception of the development of philosophy helps us to comprehend these reactions against his impact.

A related movement requires a similar analysis: the so-called New Criticism. Here we have the same reaction against the historical school. The Hegelian as well as the Marxist approach is rejected in favor of close analysis, often with a deliberate disregard for historical context. What had been neglected tends to be made the alpha and omega.

Finally—there is no need for a more inclusive list here—there is existentialism. Even more than Marx, Kierkegaard saw himself in revolt against Hegel; unlike Marx, he was not clearly aware of how much he had taken from the man he fought. Through him, "dialectical" theology and neo-Orthodoxy are almost as incomprehensible without Hegel as is the liberal Protestantism they rose to attack.

Others have seen him differently. To review their Hegel images would be subject matter enough for an interesting book. But let us go back once more to Schelling’s triumph over Hegel in 1841 and see how Hegel’s philosophy looked to the King of Prussia a little less than ten years after Hegel’s death.

Even while Friedrich Wilhelm III was king, the crown prince felt drawn to Schelling: “In the forefront of his ideals stood the religious renewal and restoration of the church, while Schelling proclaimed the speculative renewal and restoration of positive religion, and promised to effect this in his Philosophy of Revelation.”

So the crown prince tried to bring Schelling to Berlin, as Hegel’s successor. But this did not work out. In June 1840, his father died, and the crown prince ascended the throne as Friedrich Wilhelm IV. On August 1, 1840, Bunsen, close both to the new king and to Schelling, invited Schelling on behalf of the king.

“Schelling’s call to Berlin was the declaration of war from above against the Hegelian philosophy. In the letter itself it was stated clearly against what enemy one wished to lead Schelling’s intellectual power into the field. . . . It was against ‘the dragon seed of the Hegelian pantheism’; thus the king himself had expressed it recently in a letter to Bunsen.”

For the Prussian king and the old Schelling, Hegel was the enemy of Christianity. For Kierkegaard, too, he was the philosopher who had dared to place philosophy above faith. For Marx he was a great genius who, however, had turned things upside down:

“He stands the world on its head and therefore also can dissolve all barriers in his head, while of course they endure for the bad sensibility, for the actual human being.”

“In direct opposition to German philosophy [i.e., Hegelianism], which descends from heaven to earth, we ascend from earth to

50 Ibid., 239.
51 Marx and Engels, *Die Heilige Familie* in *Literarischer Nachlass*, II (1902), 304. This chapter was written by Marx, and page 304 refers expressly to the *Phenomenology*. 
HEGEL to NIETHAMMER

Jena, Monday, October 13, 1806,
the day Jena was occupied by the French
and the Emperor Napoleon arrived in it.

What worry I must feel about the former batches of manuscript,
dispatched last Wednesday and Friday, you see from the date-
line. . . . The Emperor—this world soul—\(^{12}\)I saw riding through
the city to a review of his troops; it is indeed a wonderful feeling
to see such an individual who, here concentrated in a single point,
sitting on a horse, reaches out over the world and dominates it. . . .

From the whole appearance of things I must doubt whether my
manuscript, dispatched Wednesday and Friday, arrived—my loss
would really be too great—my other acquaintances did not suffer
anything; should I be the only one? How much I wish that you
had forgone the cash payment of part of the sum and had not made
the deadline so strict. But since the mail left from here I had to risk
the dispatch. God knows with what a heavy heart I now risk this
one, yet I do not doubt that the mails circulate freely now behind
the armies. . . .

HEGEL to NIETHAMMER: Jena, October 18, 1806

. . . Coming to my problems now, I have asked Asverus about
the legal side. He declares most emphatically that such circum-
stances set aside all obligations. Monday the first mail, either by
coach or on horseback, goes out again; so I shall send the last
pages then, having carried them for days in my pocket along with a
letter written during the night of terror before the fire [which raged
October 13]. . . .

The money now due me should enable me entirely to get through
this winter without trouble. If, moreover, one of the manuscript
packages got lost, my presence here will be absolutely necessary. To

\(^{12}\)Den Kaiser—diese Weltseele—sah ich durch die Stadt zum Rekognoszieren
hinausreiten; misquoted by Royce, p. 73, and not only by him: “Hegel . . .
said that he had met the Weltgeist zu Pferde.”
HEGEL to C. G. ZELLMANN (one of his best students at Jena, who died in 1808): Jena, January 23, 1807

... I was glad that you still think of me now that you are away; even more, that you are devoting this winter of solitude to the study of philosophy. Both are still united in any case: philosophy is something solitary... But you, too, show that you pay attention to the history of the day; and indeed nothing could show more convincingly how education triumphs over brutality, and the spirit over understanding devoid of spirit and over mere cleverness. Science alone is the theodicy: it keeps one both from looking at events with animal amazement, or ascribing them, more cleverly, to accidents of the moment or of the talents of one individual—as if the destinies of empires depended on an occupied or not occupied hill—and from lamenting the triumph of injustice and the defeat of right...

Through the bath of its Revolution, the French nation has been liberated from many institutions which the human spirit had outgrown like baby shoes and which therefore weighed on it, as they still do on others, as fetters devoid of spirit; and the individual has taken off the fear of death and that life as usual which lacks all internal steadiness as soon as the scene is changed. This is what gives the French the great strength they are demonstrating against others...

One hardly needs to fear anything for northern Germany from Catholicism. It would be interesting if the point of religion were raised; and in the end it might come to that. Fatherland, princes, constitution, et al., do not seem to be the levers that could raise the German people; the question remains what might happen if religion were touched. Without a doubt, nothing deserves to be feared more than this. The leaders are separated from the people; both sides do not understand each other. What the former can accomplish, these days have pretty well shown us; and how the latter carry on when they act on their own, that you will have seen best at close quarters...
SCHELLING to K. J. H. WINDISCHMANN (1775–1839; a Catholic writer who had studied philosophy and medicine at Würzburg and practiced medicine before becoming Professor of Philosophy and History at Aschaffenburg in 1803. In 1818 he became Professor of Philosophy at Bonn): July 30, 1808

... I am eager to see what you will make of Hegel. I want to see how you have disentangled the braid. I hope you have not approached it from the God-fearing side, though it would be very wrong on the other hand to let him get away with the manner in which he wants to make a general standard of what is in accord with and granted to his individual nature.

HEGEL to NIETHAMMER: Bamberg, October 28, 1808

... Theoretical work, as I am becoming more convinced every day, accomplishes more in the world than practical work; once the realm of notions is revolutionized, actuality does not hold out. ...

WINDISCHMANN: The First Review of The Phenomenology²⁰

Whether we have completely understood Herrn Hegel, we leave for him to judge. We have understood ourselves, but this is precisely the author's most profound intention in his work. Regarding the author's manner, however, we have often missed that necessity which should strike us as we consider each moment in turn. His manner is often harsh, dry, and more difficult to cope with than the subject matter; nor is it rare for it, though this is easily comprehensible at the beginning of such a work, to move around the subject uncertainly and hesitate anxiously before it finally hits it squarely. The fruit is delectable enough: the shell will fall off by itself as it grows ripe.

²⁰Jenaer Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung, February 7–10, 1809; conclusion reprinted in Hoffmeister's edition of Phänomenologie (1952), xxxix. The bulk of the review was taken up by a lengthy summary of the book.
very necessary because now that the sorry commotion around the bread-and-butter studies is so notable everywhere, this science above all requires that the spirit of the young people should be stirred up by vivid lectures and thus led toward it. With full confidence in your own insight into the duties of a teacher of philosophy and the requirements of science, the Ministry therefore leaves it to you to examine yourself whether you consider yourself fit to satisfy fully the obligations you would have to undertake here, and will wait for your explanation before deciding anything further.

HEGEL to DAUB: Nürnberg, August 20, 1816

P.S. . . . There is indeed no science in which one is as lonely as one is lonely in philosophy, and I long from my heart for a livelier sphere of action. I can say this is the highest wish of my life. I also feel keenly how the lack of a lively give and take [Wechselwirkung] has had an unfavorable effect on my works so far.

But how is it with theology? Is not the contrast between your profound, philosophical view of it and that which is frequently considered theology just as glaring or still more hair-raising? My work will also give me the satisfaction that I shall have to consider it as a propaedeutic for your science. . . .

HEGEL to VON SCHUCKMANN: Nürnberg, August 28, 1816

Your Excellency's gracious letter of the 15th, received the 24th, I believe I must answer with the information that, since I had the honor of speaking with Herrn Staatsrat Niebuhr, I received such an agreeable offer from the Grand-Ducal Government of Baden, regarding the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg, that I could not fail to accept, and I dispatched my decisive letter several days before I received the gracious missive of Your Excellency, and thus regret that thereby I have already renounced the prospect of the wider field of action at the University of Berlin which the grace of Your Excellency opened before me. Although I therefore refrain from detailed comments about my experience in lecturing freely at the Gymnasium for the past 8 years, since my first shy attempts, and
TRANSLATION

1. *Of scientific knowledge*¹

[1.1]

In the preface of a book it is customary to explain the author's aim, the reasons why he wrote the book, and what he takes to be its relationship to other treatments, earlier or contemporary, of the same subject. In the case of a philosophical work, however, such an explanation seems not only superfluous but, owing to the nature of the subject matter,² altogether improper and unsuited to the end in view. For what contents and tone would be appropriate for a preface to a philosophical work? Perhaps a historical statement concerning the tendency and point of view, the general contents and results of the work, an attempt to connect sundry claims and assertions about the truth? Philosophical truth cannot be presented in this manner.

Philosophy deals essentially with the general in which the particular is subsumed. Therefore it *seems*, more than in the case of other sciences, as if the aim or the final results gave expression to the subject matter itself, even as if they did entire justice to its very essence, while the way in which things are worked out in detail may seem to be unessential. Yet people do not suppose that the general idea of, say, the nature of anatomy—perhaps as the knowledge of the parts of the body, considered *qua* their lifeless existence—automatically furnishes us with the subject matter itself. Everybody realizes that, if we want possession of the contents of this science, we must also exert ourselves to master the particulars, the detail.

Moreover, such an aggregate of information really has no right to the name of science; and any discussion of its aim and other such generalities is usually no different from the manner in which the content—i.e., the nerves, the muscles, etc.—is discussed, too: in both cases, the manner is equally historical and void of Concepts.³ In the case of philosophy, however, such an introductory discussion would be an oddity: for it would employ this same manner while demonstrating that this manner is incapable of grasping the truth.⁴
The very attempt to determine the relationship of a philosophical work to other efforts concerning the same subject, introduces an alien and irrelevant interest which obscures precisely that which matters for the recognition of the truth. Opinion considers the opposition of what is true and false quite rigid, and, confronted with a philosophical system, it expects agreement or contradiction. And in an explanation of such a system, opinion still expects to find one or the other. It does not comprehend the difference of the philosophical systems in terms of the progressive development of the truth, but sees only the contradiction in this difference. The bud disappears as the blossom bursts forth, and one could say that the former is refuted by the latter. In the same way, the fruit declares the blossom to be a false existence of the plant, and the fruit supplants the blossom as the truth of the plant. These forms do not only differ, they also displace each other because they are incompatible. Their fluid\textsuperscript{6} nature, however, makes them, at the same time, elements of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which one is as necessary as the other; and it is only this equal necessity that constitutes the life of the whole.\textsuperscript{6}

The opposition to a philosophical system, however, usually does not understand itself in this way. And the consciousness that is confronted with this opposition usually does not know how to liberate it, or how to keep it free, from its one-sidedness. Nor does it know how to penetrate this appearance of contention and mutual opposition in order to recognize elements which are necessary to each other.

The demand for such explanations or confessions and the satisfaction of this demand are easily mistaken for a concern with what is essential. Where could one hope for a better expression of the core of a philosophical work than in its aims and results? And how could these be determined better than by noting their difference from that which the age generally produces in the same sphere? But when this procedure is taken for more than the beginning of knowledge, when it is mistaken for knowledge itself, then we must indeed count it among the devices for bypassing the real subject matter, while combining the semblance of seriousness and exertion with a dispensation from both.

For the subject matter is not exhausted by any aim, but only by the way in which things are worked out in detail; nor is the result the actual whole, but only the result together with its becoming. The aim, taken by itself, is a lifeless generality; the tendency is a mere drift which still lacks actuality; and the
naked result is the corpse which has left the tendency behind.\textsuperscript{7}

In the same way, the difference is really the limit of the subject matter; it indicates where the subject matter ceases, or it is what the subject matter is not. Such exertions concerning the aim, the results, the differences that may exist in this respect, or the critical judgments of aim and results, are therefore easier work than they may seem to be. For instead of dealing with the subject matter, such talk is always outside it; instead of abiding in the subject matter and forgetting itself in it, such knowledge always reaches out for something else and really remains preoccupied with itself instead of sticking to, and devoting itself to, the subject matter.\textsuperscript{8}

To judge that which has contents and workmanship is the easiest thing; to grasp it is more difficult; and what is most difficult is to combine both by producing an account of it.\textsuperscript{9}

How should education begin, and how the process of working oneself up out of the immediacy of the substance of life? The beginning will always have to be made by acquiring some cognizance of general principles and points of view and by working oneself up, first of all, to the idea\textsuperscript{10} of the subject matter. No less, one must learn to support or refute it with reasons, to comprehend a concrete and copious fullness in terms of exact determinations, and to be able to offer accurate information and serious judgments. Then, however, this beginning of education will have to give way to the seriousness of life in its fullness which leads us into the experience of the subject matter itself. And when, in addition to all this, the seriousness of the Concept\textsuperscript{11} descends into the depth of the subject matter, then such knowledge and judgment will always retain a proper place in discussion.

2. \textit{The element of truth is the Concept, and its true form the scientific system\textsuperscript{12}}

The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of it. To contribute to this end, that philosophy might come closer to the form of science—the goal being that it might be able to relinquish the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge—that is what I have resolved to try. The inner necessity according to which knowledge is science is grounded in the nature of knowledge, and the only satisfactory explanation of this is to be found in the presentation of philosophy it-
self. The external necessity, however, can also be understood more generally, apart from the accidents of the author’s person or his individual motivation; and so understood, it coincides with the inner necessity; only the form is different in accordance with the manner in which time exhibits the existence of its stages. To demonstrate that the time has come for the elevation of philosophy to a science—this would be the only true justification of the attempts which have this aim. For this would show the necessity of this aim even while accomplishing it.

[I.2]

Truth can attain its true form only by becoming scientific, or, in other words, I claim that truth finds the element of its existence only in the Concept. I know that this view seems to contradict a notion and its consequences that are as presumptuous as they are widely accepted in our time. Therefore some discussion of this contradiction seems hardly superfluous, although at this point it can only take the form of a mere assertion—just like the view against which it is aimed.

Others say that truth exists only in that, or rather as that, which is called now intuition, now immediate knowledge of the absolute, religion, or being—not at the center of divine love but the being itself of this very center. It follows that what is then demanded for the presentation of philosophy is the opposite of the form of the Concept. The absolute is supposed to be not comprehended but felt and intuited; it is not its Concept that is meant to prevail and be proclaimed but its feeling and intuition.

3. Present position of the spirit

The appearance of such a demand should be considered in its more general context, and one should see what stage the self-conscious spirit occupies at present. Clearly, it has passed beyond the substantial life that it formerly led in the element of thought—beyond this immediacy of its faith, beyond the satisfaction and security of that certainty which consciousness possessed about its reconciliation with the essence and its general, internal as well as external, presence. The spirit has not only passed beyond all this into the other extreme of its insubstantial

Commentary requires, “in addition to all this, the seriousness of the Concept.” The page number assigned to this heading in the original edition (vii) is clearly mistaken (vi must be meant); vii would move it down one paragraph.

Fichte already had spoken of his “exertions to elevate philosophy to a science,” on the second page of his preface to Sun-clear Report to the Public at Large about the True Nature of the Newest Philosophy: An attempt to compel the readers to understand (Berlin, 1801). “The time has come for”: an der Zeit ist; a common idiomatic expression that is ill rendered by Baillie’s “the time process does raise philosophy . . . .”

I.2. Inner necessity that philosophy become scientific

In keeping with the preceding paragraph, Hegel proceeds to discuss, first, the “inner necessity” and then (I.3) the “external necessity.”

1 “notion”: Vorstellung. This German word is usually rendered, by translators of Kant and Schopenhauer, as either “representation” or “idea.” The former is literally correct but often, as in the present context, exceedingly clumsy. “Idea,” on the other hand, is often needed to render the German Idee. An examination of all occurrences of Vorstellung in this long preface shows that Hegel generally means to suggest something vague and distinctly less scientific than a Concept. “Notion” seems just right.

2 “intuition”: Anschauung. This translation seems firmly established in English translations of German philosophy; and according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, “intuition” means in “Mod. Philos. The immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the intervention of any reasoning process.” This sense, which goes back to 1600, is exactly right here.

3 Mid-twentieth-century readers may associate this view with Paul Tillich, without realizing that Tillich wrote his doctoral dissertation on Schelling and owes much to German romanticism. Lasson, in 1907, associated the views criticized here with “Jacobi, the romantics, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher.”

reflection in itself; it has also passed beyond that. Not only has it lost its essential life; it is also conscious of this loss and of the finitude that is its contents. The spirit is turning away from the husks\textsuperscript{5} and, confessing that it is in trouble and cursing, it now demands from philosophy not so much self-knowledge as that philosophy should help the spirit to establish such substantiality and the solidity of being. Philosophy is asked to answer this need not by unlocking the locks of substance and raising it to the level of self-consciousness, nor by returning the chaotic consciousness to the order of thought and the simplicity of the Concept, but rather by confounding the distinctions of thought, by suppressing the discriminating Concept, and by establishing the feeling of the essence,\textsuperscript{6} granting not so much insight as edification.

The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, and love are the bait that is required to arouse the desire to bite. Not the Concept but ecstasy, not the coldly progressing necessity of the subject matter but fermenting enthusiasm is held to be the best attitude and guide to the spread-out riches of the substance.\textsuperscript{7}

In line with such demands one exerts oneself almost zealously and angrily to tear men out of their absorption in the sensuous, the vulgar, the particular, and to raise their sights to the stars—as if, utterly forgetful of the divine, they were at the point of satisfying themselves with dust and water, like worms. Formerly they had a heaven, furnished with abundant riches of thoughts and images. The significance of all that is used to lie in the thread of light that tied it to the heavens; and following this thread, the eye, instead of abiding in the present, rose above that to the divine essence, to, if one may say so, a presence beyond. The eye of the spirit had to be directed forcibly to the things of this earth and kept there. Indeed, it took a long time to work that clarity which only the supernatural possessed into the must and confusion in which the sense\textsuperscript{8} of this world lay imprisoned; it took a long time to make attention to the present as such—what was called, in one word, experience—interesting and valid.

Now the opposite need meets the eye: sense\textsuperscript{8} seems to be so firmly rooted in what is worldly that it takes an equal force to raise it higher. The spirit appears so poor that, like a wanderer in the desert who languishes for a simple drink of water, it seems to crave for its refreshment merely the bare feeling of the divine in general. By that which suffices the spirit one can measure the extent of its loss.
This modest contentment in accepting, or stinginess in giving, is, however, improper for science. Whoever seeks mere edification, whoever desires to shroud the worldly multiplicity of his existence and of thought in a fog to attain the indeterminate enjoyment of this indeterminate divinity, may look out for himself where he can find this; he will easily find the means to impress himself with his enthusiasm and thus to puff himself up. Philosophy, however, must beware of wishing to be edifying.

Least of all should such modest contentment which renounces science make claims that such ecstasy and dimness are something higher than science. Such prophetic talk supposes that it abides right in the center and in the depths, views the determinate (i.e., the horos) contemptuously, and deliberately keeps its distance from the Concept and from necessity, associating them with reflection that makes its home in the finite. But even as there is an empty breadth, there is also an empty depth; even as there is an extension of the substance that pours itself out into finite multiplicity without the strength to hold it together, there is also an intensity void of content—pure force without any spread—which is identical with superficiality. The strength of the spirit is only as great as its expression; its depth is only as deep as it dares to spread and lose itself in its explication.

Moreover, when this substantial knowledge without Concept pretends to have drowned the personality of the self in the essence and to philosophize in a true and holy manner, it really hides the truth from itself: for instead of devoting itself to the god, it is undone because it spurns measure and determination, and now the accidental contents, now personal arbitrariness will lord it. As they abandon themselves to the untamed ferment of the substance, they suppose that by shrouding self-consciousness and yielding up the understanding they become His beloved to whom God gives wisdom in sleep; what they thus conceive and give birth to in sleep indeed are, naturally, dreams.
[I.3]

It is surely not difficult to see that our time is a time of birth and transition to a new period. The spirit has broken with what was hitherto the world of its existence and imagination and is about to submerge all this in the past; it is at work giving itself a new form. To be sure, the spirit is never at rest but always engaged in ever progressing motion. But just as in the case of a child the first breath it draws after long silent nourishment terminates the graduality of the merely quantitative progression—a qualitative leap—and now the child is born, so, too, the spirit that educates itself matures slowly and quietly toward the new form, dissolving one particle of the edifice of its previous world after the other, while its tottering is suggested only by some symptoms here and there: frivolity as well as the boredom that open up in the establishment and the indeterminate apprehension of something unknown are harbingers of a forthcoming change. This gradual crumbling which did not alter the physiognomy of the whole is interrupted by the break of day that, like lightning, all at once reveals the edifice of the new world.

Yet what is new here does not have perfect actuality any more than the newborn child; and it is essential not to overlook this. The first emergence is only its immediacy or its Concept. Even as a building is not finished when its foundation has been laid, the attained Concept of the whole is not the whole itself. When we wish to see an oak—the strength of its trunk, the spread of its branches, and the mass of its foliage—we are not satisfied when in its place we are shown an acorn. Thus science, the crown of a world of the spirit, is not complete in its beginning. The beginning of the new spirit is the product of a far-reaching revolution in ever so many forms of culture and education; it is the prize for an immensely tangled path and an equally immense amount of exertion and toil. It is the whole which has returned into itself from succession as well as extension, the resultant simple Concept of it. But the actuality of this simple whole consists in this, that these forms which have become mere moments now develop anew and give themselves form, but in their new element, in the sense that has emerged.
4. The principle is not the completion; against formalism

While on the one hand the first appearance of the new world is only the whole shrouded in simplicity or its general basis, the wealth of its previous existence is; on the other hand, still present to consciousness in memory. In the newly appearing form it misses the spread and the particularization of the contents; but even more it misses the cultivation of the form whereby the distinctions are determined with certainty and ordered according to their firm relationships. Without this elaboration science lacks universal intelligibility and has the appearance of being an esoteric possession of a few individuals. An esoteric possession: for it is present only in its Concept—only its inside is there. Of a few individuals: for its inarticulate appearance makes its existence merely individual. Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and of thus becoming the property of all. The intelligible form of science is the way to science which is offered to all and made equal for all; and to reach rational knowledge by means of the understanding is the just demand of consciousness as it approaches science. For the understanding is thinking, the pure ego; and the sensible is the already familiar and that which science and the unscientific consciousness have in common—that whereby the latter can immediately enter science.

The science which is still close to its beginnings and thus has achieved neither completeness of detail nor perfection of form is open to reproach for this reason. But if such censure is aimed at the very essence of science it is as unjust as it would be to refuse to recognize the demand for such elaboration. This opposition seems to be the most important knot on which scientific education is working today, wearying itself without as yet properly understanding the situation. One side insists on the wealth of its material and its intelligibility; the other side spurns at least the latter and insists on immediate rationality and divinity. Even though the first party has been reduced to silence, whether by the power of truth alone or also by the impetuousity of the other party, and though they feel overwhelmed in respect to the fundamentals of the case, they still have not been satisfied regarding their demands: their demands are just but have not been fulfilled. Their silence is only half due to victory
—half to the boredom and indifference which are usually the consequences of constantly excited expectations when the promises made are never fulfilled.16

Regarding the contents, the others certainly sometimes make it easy enough for themselves to have great spread. They drag a lot of material into their field, namely material that is already familiar and well ordered. And when they deal preferably with the queer and curious, they only seem that much more to have firm possession of the rest which knowledge has long taken care of in its way, as if their mastery of the unruly came in addition to all this. Thus they subject everything to the absolute idea which then appears to be recognized in everything and to have developed into a comprehensive science. But when this comprehensiveness is considered more closely, it becomes manifest that it was not attained insofar as one and the same principle differentiated itself into different forms, but it is rather the formless repetition of one and the same principle which is merely applied externally to different material and thus receives a dull semblance of differentiation. The idea, true enough by itself, remains in fact just where it was in the beginning as long as the development consists merely in such repetition of the same formula. When the knowing subject applies the one unmoved form to whatever is presented, and the material is externally dipped into this resting element, this is not, any more than arbitrary notions about the contents, the fulfillment of that which is in fact required— to wit, the wealth that wells forth out of itself and the self-differentiation of the forms. Rather it is a drab monochromatic formalism that gets to the differentiation of the material solely because this is long prepared and familiar.

Yet he17 proclaims this monotony and abstract generality as the absolute; he assures us that any dissatisfaction with this is mere incapacity to master the absolute point of view and to abide there. Formerly, the mere possibility that one could also imagine something in another way was sufficient to refute a notion,18 and this same bare possibility, the general thought, also had the full positive value of actual knowledge. Now here we find that all value is also ascribed to the general idea in this form of non-actuality, while the dissolution of the distinct and determinate— or rather the resolve, which is neither developed further nor self-justifying, to thrust the distinct and determinate into the abyss of emptiness—is presented as the speculative mode of study.
To study anything as it is in the absolute here means merely that one says of it: to be sure, it has just been spoken of as something, but in the absolute, the A=A, there is nothing of the sort, for in the absolute everything is one. To pit this one piece of information, that in the absolute all is one, against all the distinctions of knowledge, both attained knowledge and the search and demand for knowledge—or to pass off one’s absolute as the night in which, as one says, all cows are black—that is the naïveté of the emptiness of knowledge.19

Recent philosophy accuses and derogates formalism, and yet formalism has regenerated itself in its very midst. But though the inadequacy of formalism is familiar and felt, it will not disappear from science until the knowledge of absolute actuality has gained perfect clarity about its nature.29

Since the general notion, if it precedes an attempt to execute it, makes it easier to understand the latter, it may be helpful to offer some suggestions at this point. At the same time, this occasion may be used to eliminate a few forms whose customary acceptance constitutes an obstacle for philosophical knowledge.
II. The idea of a phenomenology of the spirit

1. The true not only substance but also subject

In the second, posthumously published, edition "only" (nur) was inserted at this point; and subsequent editions have retained this stylistic horror. Since the beginning of the preface had been revised for a second edition by Hegel just before he died—the point to which he got will be indicated in this commentary—the change was presumably made by him; but if "only" is inserted, "must" should be changed to "can."

2. "substance" here remotely resembles Aristotle's matter, and "subject" his form. The two terms allude, respectively, to Spinoza and Fichte, and it is relevant that Fichte had claimed at a time when Spinoza was still in ill repute as an atheist that at bottom there were only two types of philosophy: Spinoza's "Dogmatism" and Fichte's "Idealism."

3. One of Hegel's central ideas: philosophy should deal neither with the modes of knowledge alone nor with the objects alone, but with both in their correlation. Where the absolute is conceived as an undifferentiated, unmediated substance, it will be claimed that the absolute is accessible only to immediate knowledge.

4. Spinoza.
5. According to Lasson, Kant is meant.
7. Cf. Spinoza's famous "determinatio negatio est" Letter 50; June 2, 1674.
8. In this paragraph Hegel explains what he means by calling "the true" a "subject." A subject is that which is "actual only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or the mediation between a self and its development into something different. As subject, it is pure, simple negativity and thus the bifurcation of the simple, that which produces its own double and opposition, a process that again negates this indifferent diversity and its opposite: only this sameness which constitutes itself, or the reflection into itself in being different—not an original unity as such, or an immediate unity as such—is the true. The true is in itself becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its aim and thus has it for its beginning—that which is actual only through its execution and end."

Thus the life of God and divine knowledge may indeed be spoken of as love's playing with itself; yet this idea descends
to the level of edification\(^9\) and even insipidity when seriousness, pain, and the patience and work of the negative have no place in it. In itself\(^10\) this life is indeed untaught sameness and unity with itself which is not serious about otherness, estrangement, and the overcoming of this estrangement. But this in-itself is abstract generality in which the nature of this life to be for itself,\(^9\) and thus also the self-movement of the form, are ignored.

When the form is said to be the same as the essence, it is plainly a misunderstanding to suppose that knowledge can be satisfied with the in-itself or the essence while sparing itself concern with the form—as if the absolute principle or the absolute intuition made the explication of the former or the development of the latter dispensable. Precisely because the form is no less essential to the essence than the essence itself, the essence is to be comprehended and spoken of not merely as essence, i.e., as immediate substance or as the pure self-contemplation of the divine, but just as much as form—and in the whole wealth of the developed form. Only in that way is it comprehended and spoken of in its actuality.\(^11\)

But the whole is only the essence perfecting itself through its development. Of the absolute it should be said that it is essentially result, that it is only in the end what it is in truth; and precisely in this consists its nature: to be actual, subject, or that which becomes itself.\(^12\)

Though it may seem contradictory that the absolute is to be comprehended essentially as result, it requires only a little reflection to clear up this semblance of contradiction. The beginning, the principle, or the absolute, as it is spoken of at first and immediately is merely the general. Just as when I say, “all animals,” this phrase is not acceptable as a zoology, it is obvious that such words as the divine, absolute, eternal, etc., do not express what they contain. And only such words do indeed express the intuition as something immediate. Whatever is more than such a word, even the transition to a mere proposition, contains a becoming something other which must then be taken back, and is thus a mediation. This, however, is precisely what some people abhor, as if absolute knowledge had been abandoned as soon as one makes more of mediation than to say that it is nothing absolute and that it has no place in the absolute.\(^13\)

This abhorrence, however, is really rooted in ignorance of the nature of both mediation and absolute knowledge. For mediation is nothing else than self-identity that moves itself; or it is reflection into itself, the moment of the ego which is for itself,  

\((5270)\): “You shall become who you are.” Much later he sub-titled his *Ecce Homo: How one becomes what one is*. What Hegel means by a subject is that which makes itself what it becomes. Cf. Hegel’s own formulations in his introductory lectures on the philosophy of history: “Thus the organic individual produces itself: it makes of itself what it is implicitly [an sich]; thus the spirit, too, is only that which makes itself of it, and it makes of itself what it is implicitly” (VG 151). Also: “The spirit essentially acts; it makes of itself what it is implicitly—makes itself into its own deed, its own work” (67 L); and “The spirit is essentially the result of its own activity: its activity is transcending of immediacy, negating it, and returning into itself” (72 f. L). Cf. H 60 and 12 and 17 below.

\(^9\) Cf. I.2.9.

\(^10\) “In itself”: *an sich*. Often, as in note 8 above, what is meant is implicitly or potentially, but here the meaning is almost the opposite: looked at superficially, without regard for its entelechy, or, as Hegel says, ignoring its inner nature. The meaning here accords with both ordinary usage and Kant’s precedent (the thing in itself, *das Ding an sich*). *An sich*, like in itself, often means: taken by itself, apart from its relations to other matters, or, in effect, considered superficially. Hegel’s usage of this key term of his philosophy is thus not consistent.

The term is often paired by Hegel with “for itself” (*für sich*) which is meant to suggest individuality or, more specifically, both separate being and self-conscious being. This pair of terms has been adopted and adapted by Sartre: *en sol* and *pour sol*.

\(^11\) Schelling already had identified form and essence, but in the sense of an undifferentiated identity. Any contrast was due merely to the finite point of view. Hegel, on the other hand, insists that philosophy must not concern itself exclusively with the undifferentiated essence [*Wesen*], which he equates with the in-itself; it must also try to comprehend the forms in which this essence reveals itself and through which it develops.

\(^12\) Cf. note 8 above; also I.1, note 6 on the proper approach to philosophy. Hegel’s insistence that the absolute is subject as well as substance may at first seem less heretical than Spinoza’s position; but here it becomes perfectly plain that Hegel’s conception is no less heretical though in a different way.

\(^13\) One might communicate immediate knowledge by exclaiming “God!” But as soon as we describe the content of knowledge
pure negativity or, reduced to its pure abstraction, simple becoming. The ego or becoming in general—this mediation is on account of its simplicity precisely growing immediacy and the immediate itself.

It is therefore a misapprehension about reason when reflection is excluded from the true instead of being comprehended as a positive moment of the absolute. It is reflection that makes the true a result while also sublimating this opposition to its becoming; for this becoming is also quite simple and therefore not different from the form of the true which manifests itself in the result as something simple: rather it is precisely this return into simplicity.

While the embryo is surely in itself human, it still is not human for itself: human for itself is only the educated reason which has made itself that which it is in itself. Only this is its actuality. But this result is itself simple immediacy; for it is self-conscious freedom which rests in itself and has not laid opposition aside to let it lie there, but is reconciled to it.

What has been said here can also be expressed by saying that reason is purposive activity. The elevation of what is supposed to be nature above thinking, which is also misunderstood, and especially the banishment of external purposiveness, have brought the form of purpose in general into disrepute. Yet even as Aristotle, too, defines nature as purposive activity, purpose is the immediate, that which is at rest, the unmoved mover; thus it is subject. Its power to move, taken abstractly, is being-for-itself or pure negativity. The result is the same as the beginning only because the beginning is purpose. In other words, the actual is the same as its Concept only because the immediate, being purpose, contains the self or pure actuality in itself. The executed purpose or the actual as existent is movement and unfolded becoming; but precisely this unrest is the self. And it is like the immediacy and simplicity of the beginning because it is the result, that which has returned into itself—and that which has returned into itself is the self, and the self is the identity and simplicity that relates itself to itself.

The need to represent the absolute as subject has employed the propositions: God is what is eternal, or the moral world order, or love, and so forth. In such propositions the true is only posited straightway as the subject, but it is not represented as the movement of that which reflects itself into itself. In a proposition of this kind one begins with the word God. This by itself is a senseless sound, a mere name; only the predicate
It is therefore easy to refute it. The refutation consists in demonstrating its deficiency; and it is deficient because it is merely general or a principle—the mere beginning. If the refutation is thorough, it is taken and developed out of the principle itself—and not effected externally by opposite assurances and notions. Thus it would really be the development of this principle and the completion of its deficiency, if only the refutation would not misunderstand itself by paying attention solely to its negative activity without also becoming conscious of its progress and results on their positive side.

The positive explication of the beginning is at the same time also, conversely, a negative treatment of it insofar as it is directed against the one-sided form of the beginning which is only immediate or purpose. Therefore it can also be taken for a refutation of that which constitutes the basis of the system; but it would be more correct to look upon it as a demonstration that the basis or the principle of the system is in fact only its beginning.

That the true is actual only as system, or that the substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the conception which speaks of the absolute as spirit. This is the most sublime Concept, and it belongs to the modern age and its religion. The spiritual alone is the actual; it is [i] the essence or being-in-itself; [ii] that which relates itself and is determinate, that which is other and for itself; and [iii] that which in this determinateness and being outside itself remains in itself—or, in other words, it is in and for itself.

This being-in-and-for-itself, however, it is first for us or in itself: it is the spiritual substance. Then it must also become this for itself and attain the knowledge of the spiritual and of itself as the spirit; i.e., it must become an object for itself, but just as immediately an object which is sublimated, reflected into itself. It is for itself only for us, insofar as its spiritual content is generated by it itself. But insofar as it is for itself also for itself, this self-generation, the pure Concept is for it at the same time the objective element in which it has its existence, and in this way it is in its existence for itself an object reflected into itself.

The spirit that, so developed, knows itself as spirit is science. Science is the actuality of the spirit and the realm that the spirit builds for itself in its own element.

Commentary

Hegel took up this polemic and developed it in his *Encyclopedia* (1817, §§14 ff.; 1827, §§28 ff.; and in definitive form in the 3d edition of 1830, §§26–36; indeed, the following sections down through 78 are of the utmost interest in connection with the preface to the *Phenomenology*). See, for example, the last sentence of §28 (1830): “One failed to inquire whether such predicates were in and for themselves something true, and whether the form of the judgment could be the form of truth.” And the end of §31: “the judgment is through its form one-sided and insofar false.”

This commendation of internal criticism, though original, owes something to the practice of Fichte vis-à-vis Kant, and of Schelling vis-à-vis both: whatever one may think of their work—and Kant disowned Fichte; and Fichte, Schelling—these men tried to remedy deficiencies in their predecessors.

In view of the following sentence, even Baillière has to write “Spirit” here, as indeed he has to again and again because “spirit” is so plainly right and “mind” impossible; and yet Baillière’s translation bears the title *The Phenomenology of Mind*, and often he translates Geist as mind. Cf. H 34 and 65.

See I,3, note 6 above, and cf. Hegel’s famous dictum in the preface to the *Philosophy of Right* (1821): “What is rational, is actual; and what is actual, is rational.” Some of Hegel’s detractors have claimed that this view was improvised to please the King of Prussia, as Hegel was by then a professor at the University of Berlin, but here we find the same view expressed in almost the same words in 1807.

The Roman numerals in brackets are not found in any of the early editions and have been added to help the reader.

See note 18 above. The first edition read: “an object which is mediated, i.e., sublimated . . .” Hegel’s revision.

“in itself” and “for itself”: see note 10 above. “In and for itself”: *an und für sich* is a common German idiom with a minimum of meaning, really little more than a slightly more elegant equivalent of the “ah” and “er” with which some people sprinkle public speeches. Hegel employs this phrase as a technical term and defines it, under [iii]. “For us or in itself”: the embryo is human only in itself and for us, not yet for itself. The infant is “for itself only for us.”
7. The element of knowledge

[II.2]

Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness, this ether as such, is the ground and basis of science or knowledge in general. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or demands that consciousness dwells in this element. But this element itself receives its perfection and transparency only through the movement of its becoming. It is pure spirituality as the general that has the manner of simple immediacy; this simple, as it has existence as such, is the basis that is thinking and only in the spirit. Because this element, this immediacy of the spirit, is the very substance of the spirit, it is the transfigured essence and the reflection which itself is simple and immediacy as such for itself—being that is reflection into itself. Science on her part demands of self-consciousness that it should have elevated itself into this ether to be able to live—and to live—with her and in her. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science should at least furnish him with the ladder to this standpoint—and show him this standpoint within himself. His right is based on his absolute independence which he possesses in every form of his knowledge; for in all of them, whether they are recognized by science or not and regardless of their contents, the individual is the absolute form, i.e., he is the immediate certainty of himself and, if this expression should be preferred, he is therefore unconditioned being. It is the standpoint of consciousness to know of objective things in opposition to itself, and to know of itself in opposition to them. Science considers this standpoint as the other—and precisely that through which consciousness knows itself to be at home with itself is for science the loss of the spirit. Conversely, the element of science is for consciousness a distant beyond in which consciousness no longer has possession of itself. Each of these two appears to the other as the perversion of truth. That the natural consciousness immediately entrusts itself to science is an attempt it makes, attracted by it knows not what, to walk for once also on its head. The compulsion to adopt this unaccustomed position and to move in it amounts to the presumption that the natural consciousness should do itself violence in a manner as unexpected as it must seem unnecessary.
Whatever science may be in itself,\textsuperscript{10} in relation to immediate self-consciousness it presents itself as something topsy-turvy. Or: because immediate self-consciousness\textsuperscript{11} has the principle of its actuality in its certainty of itself, science bears the form of un-actuality for this immediate self-consciousness which seems to itself to stand outside science. Science must therefore join this element\textsuperscript{12} to herself,\textsuperscript{13} or rather she must show that and how it belongs to her. As long as she lacks such actuality, she is merely the content as\textsuperscript{14} the in-itself, the purpose which is still only something inward—not yet spirit, only spiritual substance. This in-itself\textsuperscript{15} has to express itself and become for itself; in other words, it\textsuperscript{16} has to posit self-consciousness as one with itself.

8. The ascent into this is the Phenomenology of the Spirit

This becoming of science in general or of knowledge is what this phenomenology of the spirit\textsuperscript{17} represents. Knowledge in its initial form, or immediate spirit, is that which lacks spirit,\textsuperscript{18} the consciousness of the senses. To become true knowledge, or to generate the element of science which is her pure Concept itself,\textsuperscript{19} it has to work its way through a long journey.

This becoming, as it will\textsuperscript{20} appear in its content and the forms that will\textsuperscript{29} show themselves in it, will\textsuperscript{20} not be anything like what one would at first associate with an introduction to science for the unscientific consciousness. It will also be quite different from a foundation of science. Above all, it will differ from that enthusiasm which, as shot from a pistol, begins immediately with absolute knowledge, having done with other viewpoints simply by declaring that it will not deign to take notice of them.
The task of leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge had to be taken in its general sense, and the general individual, the self-conscious spirit, had to be considered in its education.

As for the relation of the two: in the general individual every moment shows itself as it gains concrete form and its own shape. The particular individual is the incomplete spirit, a concrete form in whose whole existence one determination predominates, while the others are present only in blurred features. In the spirit who stands on a higher level than another, the lower concrete existence has been reduced to an insignificant moment; what formerly was the matter itself has become a mere trace; its form is shrouded and become a simple shade.

Through this past the individual whose substance is the spirit that stands on a higher level passes in the same manner in which the student of a higher science goes once more through the preparatory knowledge that he has long mastered, to present the contents to his mind: he recalls these memories without being interested in them for their own sake or wishing to abide in them. The individual must also pass through the contents of the educational stages of the general spirit, but as forms that have long been outgrown by the spirit, as stages of a way that has been prepared and evened for him. Thus we see that as far as information is concerned, what in former ages occupied the mature spirits of men has been reduced to information, exercises, and even games suitable for boyhood; and in the boy's pedagogical progress we recognize the history of the education of the world as if it had been traced in a silhouette. This past existence is property that has already been acquired by the general spirit which constitutes the substance of the individual and, by thus appearing to him externally, his inorganic nature.

In this respect, education, considered from the point of view of the individual, consists in his acquiring what is thus given to him; he must digest his inorganic nature and take possession of it for himself. But from the point of view of the general spirit as the substance this means nothing else than that this should acquire self-consciousness and produce its becoming and reflection in itself.

Science represents this educational movement both in its detail and necessity and also as that which has already been reduced to a moment and property of the spirit. The aim is the
spirit's insight into what constitutes knowledge. Impatience demands the impossible, namely the attainment of the aim without the means. First, the length of this way must be endured, for every moment is necessary. Secondly, one must take time over every one, for each is itself an individual and entire form and is considered absolutely insofar as one considers its determinateness as something whole and concrete, or the whole in the individuality of this determination.

Because the substance of the individual, because the world spirit has had the patience to pass through these forms in the long expanse of time, taking upon itself the tremendous labor of world history in which it imparted as much of its content to every form as that form was capable of holding, and because it could not attain consciousness about itself with less labor, therefore the individual cannot in the nature of the case comprehend his own substance with less than this; and yet he has less trouble because this is already accomplished in itself; the content is by now the actuality reduced to a possibility, vanquished immediacy, and the forms have been reduced to abbreviations and to the simple determinations of thought. Having already been thought, the content is the possession of the substance. No longer must existence be transformed into the in-itself; only the in-itself—which is neither raw any more, nor immersed in existence, but rather something recalled—needs to be transmuted into the form of the for-itself. How this is to be done must now be described in some detail.

9. The transmutation of the notion and the familiar into thought

What is no longer necessary at the point at which we are here taking up this movement is the sublimation of existence. But what remains and still requires a higher transformation is the notion of and familiarity with the forms. Existence, taken back into the substance, has merely been transposed immediately by this first negation into the element of the self. This possession which the self has acquired thus still has the same character of uncomprehended immediacy and unmoved difference as does existence itself: all this is retained in the notion.

At the same time it is thus something familiar, something that the existing spirit has mastered so that its activity and interest no longer abide in it. The activity that masters existence is itself only the movement of the particular spirit which
does not comprehend itself; but knowledge is directed against the notion that arises in this way, against this familiarity: knowledge is the activity of the general self and the interest of thinking.

What is familiar is not known simply because it is familiar.\textsuperscript{22} It is the most common self-deception and deception of others to presuppose something as familiar when it comes to knowledge, and to accept this; but with all its talking back and forth such knowledge, without knowing what is happening to it, never gets anywhere. The subject and object, etc., God, nature, the understanding, the sensibility, etc., are presupposed as familiar and valid foundations without having been scrutinized, and they are accepted as fixed points of both departure and return.\textsuperscript{23} They remain unmoved as one moves back and forth between them—and thus only on their surfaces. Thus apprehension and examination, too, consist merely in seeing whether everybody finds what has been said of them in his notion, too, whether it seems and is familiar to him that way or not.\textsuperscript{24}

The analysis of a notion, as it used to be performed, was nothing else than the sublimation of the form of its familiarity. Dissecting a notion into its original elements means going back to its moments which at least do not have the form of the notion encountered as a datum, constituting rather the immediate property of the self. To be sure, this analysis only reaches thoughts which are themselves familiar, fixed, and static determinations. But what is thus differentiated and unactual is itself an essential moment; for it is only because the concrete differentiates itself and makes itself what is unactual, that it is that which moves itself. The activity of differentiating is the strength and work of the understanding, which is the most astonishing and the greatest, or rather the absolute, power.\textsuperscript{25}

The circle that rests closed in itself and, being substance, holds its moments, is the immediate and therefore not perplexing relation. But that the accidental as such, separated from its circumference, that the bounded which is actual only in its connection with others, should gain an existence of its own and separate freedom, this is the tremendous power of the negative; this is the energy of thought, of the pure ego.\textsuperscript{26} Death, if we care to call this unactuality by this name, is what is most terrible, and to hold on to what is dead requires the greatest strength. That beauty which lacks strength hates the understanding because it asks this of her and she cannot do it. But not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself undefiled by devasta-
tion, but the life that endures, and preserves itself through, death is the life of the spirit. Spirit gains its truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment. This power it is not as the positive that looks away from the negative—as when we say of something, this is nothing or false, and then, finished with it, turn away from it to something else: the spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and abiding with it. This abiding is the magic force which converts the negative into being.

It is the same which above was called the subject which, by giving determinateness existence in its element, sublimates abstract immediacy—i.e., immediacy which barely is—and thus is true substance: that being or that immediacy which does not leave mediation outside itself but which is mediation itself.

10. —and this into the Concept

That notions become the property of pure self-consciousness, this elevation to generality is only one side and not yet the completed education. Study in antiquity differed from that current in modern times: it was nothing less than the thorough education of the natural consciousness. Testing itself against every separate part of its existence, and philosophizing about everything it encountered, it made itself into a generality that was active through and through. In modern times, on the other hand, the individual finds the abstract form ready-made; the exertion of grasping it and appropriating it is rather more the unmediated production of the inward and the cut-off generation of the general than the emergence of the general out of the concrete and the multiplicity of existence. The work cut out for us now, therefore, is less to purify the individual from the manner of immediacy and the senses while making it into a thinking and thought substance, than to attempt the opposite: to sublimate fixed, determinate thoughts and thus to actualize the general and infuse it with spirit. But it is far more difficult to make fixed thoughts fluid than sense existence. The reason for this has been mentioned above: the substance and the element of existence of these determinations is the ego, the power of the negative, or pure actuality; but the element of the sense determinations is merely powerless, abstract immediacy, or being as such. Thoughts become fluid when pure thinking, this inner immediacy, recognizes itself as a moment,
or when pure self-certainty abstracts from itself—not by leaving itself out or setting itself aside, but by abandoning the fixity of its self-positing—both the fixity of the pure concreteness which characterizes the ego even in its opposition to differentiated content and the fixity of differentiations which, posited in the element of pure thinking, share in the unconditionality of the ego.66 Through this movement the pure thoughts become Concepts and come to be what they are in truth: self-movements, circles, that which is their substance, spiritual entities.37

This movement of the pure entities constitutes the nature of what is scientific.38 As far as the coherence of the contents is concerned, it means the necessity and elaboration of the contents into an organic whole. The way in which the Concept of knowledge is reached thus also becomes a necessary and complete becoming. Hence this preparation ceases to be a fortuitous bit of philosophizing that takes off from these or those objects, relationships, and thoughts of the imperfect consciousness, depending on fortuitous circumstances, nor does it seek to establish what is true by reasoning back and forth, inferring and drawing consequences from determinate thoughts. Rather this way will encompass, by virtue of the movement of the Concept, the complete worldliness of consciousness in its necessity.

Such a presentation constitutes the first part of science because the existence of the spirit is at first nothing else than the immediate or the beginning, but the beginning is not yet its return into itself. The element of immediate existence is therefore that which distinguishes this part of science from the others.39—The indication of this difference leads us into a discussion of a few fixed thoughts which usually crop up in this connection.
The immediate existence of the spirit, i.e., consciousness, contains the two moments of knowledge and the objectivity which is negative to knowledge. It is in this element [of consciousness] that the spirit develops itself and explicates its moments which are therefore characterized by this opposition and, without exception, appear as forms of consciousness. The science of this way is the science of the experience made by consciousness: the substance is studied insofar as it and its movement are objects of consciousness. Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what lies within its experience; for what is within that is only the spiritual substance—specifically, as the object of its self. The spirit, however, becomes an object, for the spirit is this movement of becoming something other for itself, i.e., an object for its self, and then to sublimate this otherhood. And experience is the name we give to just this movement in which the immediate, the unexperienced, i.e., the abstract, whether of sensible being or of a bare, simple thought, becomes estranged and then returns to itself from estrangement, and is only then presented in its actuality and truth and becomes the property of consciousness.

The non-identity we find in consciousness between the ego and the substance that is its object, is their difference, the negative in general. It can be considered as the defect of both, but is really their soul or that which moves them. Therefore some of the ancients comprehended the void as that which moves, seeing well that that which moves is the negative, but not yet that it is the self.

When the negative thus appears at first as the non-identity of the ego and its object, it is just as much the non-identity of the substance with itself. What seems to happen outside it, as an activity directed against it, is its own doing; and thus the substance shows that it is essentially subject. When it has shown this completely, the spirit has made its existence equal to its essence; it becomes an object for itself as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy and of the separation of knowledge and truth is overcome. Being is mediated absolutely; it is substantial content which is just as immediately property of the ego, self-like, or Concept. With this the phenomenology of the spirit is concluded. What the spirit prepares for itself in this phenomenology is the element of knowledge. In this element
the moments of the spirit spread themselves out in the form of simplicity which knows its object as itself. They no longer fall apart into the opposition of being and knowledge but abide in the simplicity of knowledge; they are now the true in the form of the true, and their difference is only the difference of content. Their movement which in this element organizes itself into a whole is Logic or speculative philosophy.

11. In what way the Phenomenology of the Spirit is negative or contains what is false

The system of the experience of the spirit deals only with the appearance of the spirit. Hence the progression from this system to the science of the true that also has the form of the true seems to be merely negative. Therefore one might wish to be spared the negative as something false, and one might ask to be led to truth without delay: Why bother with the false? This demand, mentioned previously, that one should begin straightway with science, one has to answer here by considering quite generally the nature of the negative as something false. The conceptions people have about this are pre-eminent obstacles on the way to truth. This also provides an occasion for speaking of mathematical knowledge which unphilosophical knowledge considers the ideal that philosophy should strive to reach, though so far it has striven in vain.

True and false are among the determinate thoughts which are considered immobile separate essences, as if one stood here and the other there, without community, fixed and isolated. Against this view one must insist that truth is not a minted coin which can be given and pocketed ready-made. Nor does something false exist any more than something evil exists. To be sure, the evil and the false are not as bad as the devil, for in the devil they are even made into a particular subject; as the false and evil they are merely something general but still have opposed individual essences.

The false (for only this has a place in our discussion) would be the other, the negative of the substance which, as the content of knowledge, is the true. But the substance is itself essentially the negative, partly as the differentiation and determination of the content, partly as simple discrimination, i.e., as self and knowledge in general. One can know something falsely. That something is known falsely means that knowledge is not identical with its substance. Yet precisely this non-identity is
differentiation which is an essential moment. Out of this differentiation their identity comes, and this resulting identity is the truth. But it is not truth as if non-identity had been thrown away, like dross from pure metal—nor even as the tool is excluded from the finished vessel; rather non-identity is, as the negative, as the self, still immediately present in the true as such. Yet it does not follow that the false may be called a moment of the true, let alone a part of it. That in everything false there is something true—in this dictum both are treated like oil and water which are unmixable and united only externally. Precisely on account of the meaning associated with the moment of complete otherhood, such expressions must no longer be used where such otherhood is sublimated. Talk of the unity of subject and object, of the finite and the infinite, of being and thinking, etc., is misleading because object and subject, etc., signify that which they are outside their unity, and in the unity they are not meant in the sense suggested by such an expression. Just so, the false is no longer something false as a moment of truth.

Dogmatism as a style of thought in knowledge and in the study of philosophy is nothing else than the opinion that the true consists in a proposition that is a fixed result or that is known immediately. To such questions as, when Caesar was born, or how many feet there were in a stadium, etc., a neat answer should be given, just as it is surely true that the square of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares of the other two sides of a right-angled triangle. But the nature of such so-called truths is different from the nature of philosophical truths.

12. Historical and mathematical truth

[III.2]

Regarding historical truths—to mention these briefly—insofar as their purely historical aspect is considered, it will be readily granted that they concern particular existence and the accidental and arbitrary side, the features that are not necessary.

But even such bare truths as those adduced here as examples do not lack the movement of self-consciousness. To know one of them one must compare much, consult books, or inquire in some manner; and even where one might appeal to immediate intuition, such knowledge is held to have true value only when
it is backed up by reasons, although it may be alleged that only the bare result matters.\(^2\)

As for mathematical truths, it is even more obvious that one would not consider a man a geometer if he knew Euclid's theorems by heart, but without their proofs—without, as one might say by way of juxtaposition, also knowing them by mind.\(^3\) In the same way, if a man by measuring many right-angled triangles acquired the knowledge that their sides have the well-known relation to each other, such knowledge would be considered unsatisfactory. Yet even in mathematical knowledge, the importance of the demonstration still does not have the significance and characteristic that it is a moment of the result itself; in the result the demonstration is over and has disappeared. As a result, to be sure, the theorem is something whose truth is apprehended. But this additional circumstance does not concern its content but only its relation to the subject; the movement of the mathematical demonstration does not belong to that which is the object but is an activity that remains external to the matter. Thus the nature of the right-angled triangle does not take itself apart after the manner of the construction that is required for the demonstration of the proposition that expresses the relations; the whole production of the result is a way and means of knowledge.

In philosophical knowledge, too, the becoming of the existence as existence is different from the becoming of the essence or inner nature of the matter. But in the first place philosophical knowledge contains both, while mathematical knowledge represents only the becoming of the existence, i.e., the emergence of the nature of the matter in knowledge.\(^4\) Secondly, philosophical knowledge also unites these two separate movements. The internal genesis or becoming of the substance is undivided transition into the external or into existence, into being for another; and, conversely, the becoming of existence is a retreat into essence. In this way the movement is the double process and becoming of the whole; each posits the other simultaneously, and therefore each also has both as two aspects of itself. Together they constitute the whole by dissolving themselves and making themselves into its moments.

In mathematical knowledge, insight is an event that is external to the matter; it follows that the true matter is changed by it. The means, construction and demonstration, contain true propositions; but at the same time it must be said that the content is false.\(^5\) In the above example, the triangle is dismem-
bered and its parts are allotted to other figures which the construction brings into being alongside it. Only in the end one reconstitutes the triangle which really matters, but which during the procedure was lost from view and appeared only in pieces which belonged to other wholes.—Here, then, we also see the negativity of the content enter, which would just as much have to be called a falseness of the content as is the disappearance in the movement of the Concept of the thought that had been considered fixed.

The real defectiveness of mathematical knowledge, however, concerns both the knowledge itself and its content.—Regarding the knowledge, the first point is that the necessity of the construction is not apprehended. This does not issue from the Concept of the theorem; rather it is commanded, and one must blindly obey the command to draw precisely these lines instead of an indefinite number of others, not because one knows anything but merely in the good faith that this will turn out to be expedient for the conduct of the demonstration. Afterwards this expediency does indeed become manifest, but it is an external expediency because it manifests itself only after the demonstration.6

Just so, the demonstration follows a path that begins somewhere—one does not yet know in what relation to the result that is to be attained. As it proceeds, these determinations and relations are taken up while others are ignored, although one does not by any means see immediately according to what necessity. An external purpose rules this movement.

The evident certainty of this defective knowledge, of which mathematics is proud and of which it also boasts as against philosophy, rests solely on the poverty of its purpose and the defectiveness of its material and is therefore of a kind that philosophy must spurn.—Its purpose or Concept is magnitude. This is precisely the relation that is not essential and is void of Concept.7 The movement of knowledge therefore proceeds on the surface, does not touch the matter itself, not the essence or the Concept, and is therefore not comprehension.

The material about which mathematics offers such a pleasing treasure of truths is space and the unit. Space is the existence into which the Concept writes its distinctions as into an empty, dead element in which they are equally immobile and lifeless. The actual is not something spatial the way it is considered in mathematics; with such unactuality as is exemplified by the things of mathematics neither concrete sense intuition nor phi-
losophy concerns itself. In such an unactual element there are only unactual truths, i.e., fixed, dead propositions: one can stop with any one of them; the following one starts anew for itself, and the first one does not move itself on to the next, nor does a necessary connection come about in this way through the nature of the matter.—Also, on account of this principle and element—and in this consists the formalism of the evident certainty of mathematics—knowledge proceeds along the line of equality. For what is dead and does not move itself does not attain the differentiation of its essence or the essential opposition and inequality; and therefore it also does not attain the transition from the opposed into the opposed, nor the qualitative, immanent movement, nor self-movement. For mathematics considers only magnitude which is the unessential difference. Mathematics abstracts from the fact that it is the Concept that bifurcates space into its dimensions and determines the relations of and in these. It does not consider, e.g., the relation of the line to the plain; and when it compares the diameter of the circle with the circumference it comes up against incommensurability, i.e., a relation of the Concept, something infinite that escapes mathematical determination.

Immanent or so-called pure mathematics also does not juxtapose time as time with space, as the second material for its consideration. Applied mathematics, to be sure, does treat of it as well as of movement and other actual things. But it takes the synthetic propositions, i.e., those about their relations which are determined by their Concept, from experience, and it merely applies its formulas to these assumptions. The so-called demonstrations of such propositions as those about the equilibrium of the lever, or the relation of space and time in the movement of a fall, etc., are often given and accepted as demonstrations; but this only demonstrates how great a need knowledge has of demonstrations: where it lacks anything more, it respects even the empty semblance of a demonstration and thus gains some satisfaction. A critique of these demonstrations would be as remarkable as it would be instructive and might both cleanse mathematics of this false finery and show the limitations of mathematics and thus also the necessity of another kind of knowledge.

As for time, of which one should think that, juxtaposed with space, it would constitute the material of the other part of pure mathematics, it is the existing Concept itself. The principle of magnitude, that difference void of Concept, and the principle of
equality, that abstract and lifeless unity, are incapable of concern ing themselves with this pure unrest of life and this absolute differentiation. This negativity, therefore, becomes the second material for this knowledge only in paralyzed form, namely as the unit; and this knowledge, being external to its content, reduces that which moves itself to mere material in which it then has an indifferent, external, lifeless content.

13. The nature of philosophical truth and its method

[III.3]

Philosophy, on the other hand, considers not the inessential determination but the determination insofar as it is essential. Not the abstract or unactual is its element and contents but the actual, that which posits itself and lives in itself, existence in its Concept. It is the process that generates and runs through its moments, and this whole movement constitutes the positive and its truth. This truth, then, includes the negative as well—that which might be called the false if it could be considered as something from which one should abstract. The evanescent must, however, be considered essential—not in the determination of something fixed that is to be severed from the true and left lying outside it, one does not know where; nor does the true rest on the other side, dead and positive. The appearance is the coming to be and passing away that itself does not come to be or pass away; it is in itself and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of the truth. The true is thus the bacchanalian whirl in which no member is not drunken; and because each, as soon as it detaches itself, dissolves immediately—the whirl is just as much transparent and simple repose. In the court of justice of this movement, to be sure, the individual forms of the spirit endure no more than determinate thoughts do, yet they are just as much positive and necessary moments as they are negative and evanescent. In the whole of the movement, considering it as repose, that which distinguishes itself in it and gives particular existence is preserved as something that remembers, and its existence is knowledge of itself even as this knowledge is just as immediately existence.

It might seem necessary to devote a lengthy preamble to the
method of this movement or of science. But the Concept of this method is implicit in what has been said, and its real exposition belongs to the Logic, or rather constitutes the Logic. For the method is nothing else than the edifice of the whole, constructed in its pure essence. But the entire system of prevalent notions of philosophical method belongs to an extinct form of education.

If this should sound boastful or revolutionary, though I know that my tone is altogether different, it should be noted that the scientific finery furnished by mathematics—such as explanations, divisions, axioms, rows of theorems, their demonstrations, principles, and deductions and inferences from them—is at least according to current opinion quite outmoded. Even if the unfitness of these procedures is not yet clearly understood, one makes little or no use of them; and if one does not disapprove of them, at least they are not loved. And we must have the prejudice in favor of what is excellent that it will get itself used and loved.

But it is not difficult to see that positing a proposition, ad- ducing reasons for it, and in the same way refuting the opposite by giving reasons, cannot be the form in which truth appears. Truth is its own self-movement, while this is the method of knowledge that remains external to its material. It is peculiar to, and must be left to, mathematics which, as we have noted, has for its principle the relation of magnitude—a relation void of Concept—and for its material dead space and the equally dead unit. In a somewhat freer style, i.e., mixed more with the arbitrary and the accidental, this method may retain its place in ordinary life, in conversation, or in historical instruction which is aimed at curiosity more than at knowledge—and therefore perhaps also in a preface. In ordinary life, consciousness has for its contents information, experiences, sense concretions, also thoughts, principles—altogether, what is considered as a datum or as a being or essence in fixed repose. Now consciousness follows this thread, now it interrupts the connection by freely and arbitrarily disposing of such contents, and altogether consciousness here treats and determines its contents from the outside. Things are led back to some certainty, even if that is only the feeling of the moment; and conviction is satisfied when it has reached a familiar point of rest.

While the necessity of the Concept banishes the looser gait of conversational arguments as well as the stiffer gait of scientific pomp, it has been pointed out above that their place must not be
taken by the unmethhood of intimation\(^6\) and enthusiasm and the arbitrariness of prophetic speech which despises not only this scientific pomp but scientific procedures quite generally.

14. Against schematizing formalism

Now that Kant, by instinct, has rediscovered triplicity, albeit still dead and still uncomprehended, and it has subsequently been raised to its absolute importance, and with it the true form in its true content has been presented and the Concept of science has emerged, it is equally obvious that we must not consider scientific that use of this form which reduces it to a lifeless schema,\(^9\) really to a phantom,\(^10\) and scientific organization to a table.\(^11\)

In a general way this formalism has already been discussed above, but we now want to describe its manner in a little more detail. This formalism supposes it has comprehended and expressed the nature and life of a form when it merely ascribes to it as a predicate some determination of the schema; e.g., subjectivity or objectivity, or magnetism, electricity, etc., contraction or expansion, east or west, \textit{et al.} This sort of thing can be multiplied \textit{ad infinitum} because in this manner every determination or form can be used again as a form or moment of the schema when it comes to another, and each can gratefully perform the same service for another. But in this circle of reciprocity one never learns what the matter itself is—neither what the one nor what the other is. In this process one sometimes uses sense determinations from common intuition—but then these are supposed to mean something different from what they say—and sometimes one uses the pure determinations of thoughts, meaningful in themselves, such as subject, object, substance, cause, the general, etc.—but just as uncritically and without examination as in ordinary life and as strengths and weaknesses, expansion and contraction. This metaphysics, then, is as unscientific as these sense conceptions.

Instead of the inner life and the self-movement of its existence, such a simple determinateness is taken from intuition, which here means the knowledge of the senses, and expressed according to a superficial analogy, and then this external and empty application of a formula is called construction.—Such formalism is like any other. How dull would a mind have to be that could not learn in a quarter of an hour the theory that there are asthenic, sthenic, and indirectly asthenic diseases, and
equally many attempts at cures! And since such instruction was until quite recently considered sufficient, anybody but a dullard could in such a short span of time be transformed from a routinier into a theoretical physician. The formalism of such philosophy of nature teaches, say, that the understanding is electricity, or that animals are nitrogen or equal the south or north, etc., or represent it—whether all this is expressed as nakedly as here or brewed up with a little more terminology. Confronted with such power that brings together what had seemed far apart, and with the violence that the calmly restful things of sense suffer from such connections while they thus receive the semblance of a Concept, though they are spared the main thing, namely to express the Concept itself or the significance of the notion of the senses—confronted with all this, inexperience may well be plunged into admiration and amazement, and it may even venerate in all this the signs of profound genius. Inexperience may also be delighted by the good cheer of such determinations, since they substitute something that can be intuited for the abstract Concept and thus make things more pleasing, and inexperience may even congratulate itself on its intimation of an affinity of souls with such glorious activity.

The trick of such wisdom is learned as quickly as it is easy to master it; its repetition, once it is known, becomes as insufferable as the repetition of a sleight of hand one sees through. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is no more difficult to handle than a painter's palette on which there are only two colors, say, red and green, one if an historical piece is wanted, the other for landscapes.

It would be difficult to decide what is greater—the smugness with which everything in the heavens, on earth, and beneath the earth is coated with such a broth of paint, or the conceit that is based on the supposed excellence of this panacea: each supports the other. The product of this method of labeling everything in heaven and earth, all natural and spiritual forms, with a few determinations of the general schema, and thus peignholing everything, is nothing less than a sun-clear report on the organism of the universe—namely a tabulation that is like a skeleton with little pieces of paper stuck all over it, or like the rows of closed, labeled jars in a spicer's stall. While it is as explicit as both of these, it is like them in other ways too: here, flesh and blood are removed from the bones; there, the also not living matter is concealed in jars; and in the report, the living essence of the matter is left out.
This manner has been further perfected into monochromatic absolute painting: ashamed of the distinctions of the schema, one drowns them in the emptiness of the absolute because they belong to reflection, and the new product is then pure identity, formless white. But this has been noted above. That monotony of the schema and its lifeless determinations and this absolute identity, and the transition from one to the other—all are equally dead understanding and equally external knowledge.

The excellent, however, not only cannot escape the fate of being thus deprived of life and spirit, of being flayed and then seeing its skin wrapped around lifeless knowledge and its vanity. Rather we can recognize even in this fate the power of the excellent over the hearts, even if not over minds; also the development toward the generality and determinateness of the form which constitutes its perfection and which alone makes it possible that this generality can be used in the service of superficiality.

Science may organize itself only through the life of the Concept; the determinateness which some would take externally from the schema to affix it to existence is in science the self-moving soul of the abundant content. The movement of beings is, first, to become something other and thus to become their own immanent content; secondly, they take back into themselves this unfolding or this existence of theirs, i.e., they make themselves into a mere moment and simplify themselves into determinateness. In the first movement negativity consists in the differentiation and positing of existence; in the return into oneself it is the becoming of determinate simplicity. In this way, the content does not receive its determinateness from another, like a label; instead it determines itself and assigns itself its place as a moment of the whole. The tabular understanding keeps to itself the necessity and the Concept of the contents—that which constitutes the concreteness, the actuality, and the living movement of the matter that it arranges—or rather, the tabular understanding does not keep this to itself, it does not know this; for if it had this insight it would surely show it. It does not even know the need for it; otherwise it would stop schematizing, or at least know that this process produces no more than a table of contents: it gives only the table of contents; the content itself, however, it does not furnish.

Suppose even that the determinateness is, like magnetism, e.g., concrete in itself and actual: even then it is reduced to
something dead, as it is merely predicated of some other existence instead of being known as the immanent life of this existence, or as that which has its native and characteristic self-generation and presentation in this existence. The formal understanding leaves it to others to add this main point.

Instead of entering into the immanent content of the matter, it always looks over the whole and stands above the individual existence of which it speaks, i.e., it simply overlooks it. Scientific knowledge, however, demands precisely that we surrender to the life of the object or—and this is the same—that we confront and express its inner necessity. Thus immersed in its object, scientific knowledge forgets that survey which is merely the reflection of knowledge out of the content into itself. But absorbed in the matter and following the movement of that, it returns to itself—but not until the abundance of the content, simplified into determinateness, returns into itself, reduces itself to one side of existence, and develops into its higher truth. Thus the simple whole that surveys itself emerges from the riches in which its reflection had seemed lost.

Because, as we put it above, the substance is in itself subject, all content is its own reflection in itself. The subsistence or substance of an existence is self-identity; for its non-identity with itself would be its dissolution. But self-identity is pure abstraction; but this is thinking. When I say quality, I say simple determinateness. By its quality an existence is different from another, or is existence; it is for itself, or it subsists through this simplicity with itself. But through this it is essentially thought. In this the fact is comprehended that being is thinking; and this includes the insight that eludes the usual talk, void of Concept, of the identity of thinking and being.

Inasmuch as the subsistence of existence is self-identity or pure abstraction, it is its own abstraction from itself, or it is itself its non-identity with itself and its dissolution—its own inwardness and return into itself—its becoming. Insofar as this is the nature of beings, and beings have this nature for knowledge, knowledge is not an activity that handles its content as something strange—not reflection into itself, away from the content. Science is not that idealism that replaced the dogmatism of assertions with a dogmatism of assurances or a dogmatism of self-certainty. Rather, when knowledge sees the content return into its own inwardness, the activity of knowledge is both absorbed in the content, being its immanent self, and at the same time this knowledge has returned into itself, for it is pure self-
IDENTITY IN OTHERHOOD. Thus it is the cunning that seems to abstain from activity while it looks on as determinateness and its concrete life suppose that they are pursuing their self-preservation and particular interests though in fact they are the converse, an activity that dissolves itself and makes itself a moment of the whole.

Above, we indicated the significance of the understanding with reference to the self-consciousness of substance; from what has now been said one can see its significance with reference to the determination of substance as having being. Existence is quality, self-identical determinateness or determinate simplicity, determinate thought; this is the understanding of existence. Thus it is nous, as Anaxagoras was the first to recognize. Those who came after him comprehended the nature of existence more determinately as eidos or idea, i.e., determinate generality, species. The expression "species" may seem too common and inferior for the Ideas, for the beautiful, holy, and eternal which are now in fashion. But in fact the Idea expresses no more, nor less, than the species. Yet in our day an expression that designates a Concept precisely is often spurned in favor of another term which, if only because it belongs to a foreign language, shrouds the Concept in a fog and thus sounds more edifying.

Precisely when existence is determined as species it is simple thought; the nous, the simplicity, is the substance. On account of its simplicity or self-identity it appears firm and enduring. But this self-identity is also negativity; therefore this firm existence passes over into its dissolution. The determinateness at first seems merely due to the fact that it is related to something else, and the movement seems imposed on it by an alien power; but what is contained in this simplicity of thinking is precisely that this determinateness is qualified by its own otherhood and is thus self-movement. For it is the thought that moves and differentiates itself, its own inwardness, the pure Concept. Thus reasonableness is a becoming, and as such becoming it is rationality.

In this nature of beings, to be their Concept in their being, consists logical necessity. This alone is the rational and the rhythm of the organic whole; it is just as much the knowledge of the content as the content is Concept and essence—or it alone is what is speculative.

The concrete form, moving itself, makes itself into simple determinateness. Thus it raises itself to become logical form and attain its essential nature. Its concrete existence is nothing but this movement and is immediately logical existence. Therefore it
is unnecessary to impose formalism externally on the concrete content: the content is in itself the transition into formalism which, however, ceases to be this external formalism because the form is the native development of the concrete content itself.

This nature of the scientific method—to be partly not separate from the content, and partly to determine its rhythm by itself—receives, as already mentioned, its proper exposition in speculative philosophy. 32

What has here been said, to be sure, expresses the Concept, but cannot count for more than an anticipatory assurance. Its truth does not lie in this partly narrative exposition; therefore it also cannot be refuted by the opposed assurance that things are not so but otherwise, or by recalling and recounting conventional conceptions as if they were established and familiar truths, or by assurances of something newly dished up from the shrine of inward divine intuition.

A reception of this sort is usually the first reaction of knowledge to something unfamiliar: one wants to save one's freedom and one's own insight and authority from the alien one—for that which is now first encountered appears in this form. Also, one wants to remove the appearance, and the sort of shame that is supposed to lie in this, that something has been learned. Similarly, when the unfamiliar is accepted with applause, the reaction is motivated the same way and consists in what in another sphere would take the form of ultra-revolutionary speech and action.
15. The demands of the study of philosophy

[IV.1]

What therefore matters in the study of science is taking upon oneself the exertion of the Concept. What is wanted is attention to the Concept as such, to the simple determinations, e.g., of being in itself, being for itself, self-identity, etc.; for these are such pure self_movements which one might call souls if their Concept did not designate something higher. To those accustomed to progress from notion to notion, being interrupted by the Concept seems just as bothersome as it does to formalistic thinking that argues back and forth in unactual thoughts. The former custom should be called material thinking—an accidental consciousness that is merely absorbed in the material and therefore finds it hard to lift the self at the same time clear out of the material to be with itself. The other type, argumentative thinking, is, on the contrary, the freedom from the content and the vanity that looks down on it. This vanity is expected to exert itself, to give up this freedom and to immerse it in the content, instead of merely being the arbitrary moving principle of the content: the content should be made to move itself by virtue of its own nature, i.e., through the self as its own self, and then to contemplate this movement. One should not intrude into the immanent rhythm of the Concepts either arbitrarily or with wisdom gained elsewhere: such restraint is itself an essential moment of attention to the Concept.

16. Argumentative thinking in its negative attitude—

One should note the two ways in which the argumentative manner is opposed to the thinking that comprehends. First, such reasoning adopts a negative attitude against its content and knows how to refute and destroy it. That things are otherwise—this insight is merely negative; it is a finality that does not proceed beyond to a new content. Rather, to gain a content again one has to find something somewhere else. This is the reflection into the empty ego, the vanity of its knowledge. This vanity, however, does not only express that this content is vain but also that this insight itself is vain; for this insight is the negative that does not see what is positive in itself. By never making its own negativity its content, such reflection is
never in the matter but always beyond it; therefore it imagines that with its claim of emptiness it is always more advanced than a contentful insight. On the other hand, as shown above, in the thinking that comprehends the negative belongs to the content itself and is the positive both as the immanent movement and determination of the content and as the whole of this. Seen as a result, it is the determinate negative that comes out of this movement, and thus just as much a positive content.

But considering that such thinking has a content, whether it be of notions or of thoughts or of a mixture of both, it has another side that makes comprehension difficult for it. The strange nature of this second side is closely connected with the above-mentioned essence of the idea\textsuperscript{11}—or rather expresses it as it appears as the movement which is thinking apprehension.\textsuperscript{12}

17. —\textit{in its positive attitude; its subject}

In its negative behavior, just discussed, argumentative thinking is itself the self into which the content returns; in its positive knowledge, on the other hand, the self is a represented subject\textsuperscript{13} to which the content is related as an accident and predicate. This subject constitutes the basis to which the content is tied and on which the movement runs back and forth.

It is different with the thinking that comprehends. The Concept is the object's own self which presents itself as its becoming; thus it is not a subject at rest\textsuperscript{14} that carries its attributes unmoved, but it is the Concept that moves itself and takes its determinations back into itself. In this movement the resting subject itself perishes;\textsuperscript{15} it enters into the differences and the content and constitutes the determinateness, i.e., the differentiated content and its movement, instead of abiding outside it. The firm ground that argumentative reasoning found in the resting subject thus quakes, and only this movement itself becomes the object. The subject that fills its content ceases to go beyond that and cannot have any other predicates or attributes. The dispersion of the content, conversely, is bound under the self, and the content\textsuperscript{16} is not something general that, free from the subject, could be assigned to several others.\textsuperscript{17} The content is thus in fact no longer the predicate of the subject; rather it is the substance and the essence and Concept of that which is dis-
cussed. It is of the nature of representational thinking to follow the attributes or predicates and to go beyond them, quite rightly, too, because they are mere predicates and attributes; but because that which in a proposition has the form of a predicate is really the substance itself, representational thinking is stopped in its advance. To represent it that way: it suffers a counterthrust. Beginning with the subject, as if this remained the basis, it finds, because the predicate is really the substance, that the subject has moved into the predicate and has thus been sublimated. Thus that which seemed to be predicate has become the whole and independent mass, and thinking can no longer stray freely but is brought to a stop by this gravity.

Usually, the subject is first made the basis as the objective, fixed self, and the necessary movement to the multiplicity of the determinations or predicates proceeds from there. Here, however, this subject is replaced by the knowing ego itself which connects the predicates and becomes the subject that holds them. The first subject enters into the determinations and is their soul; thus the second subject, which knows, still finds in the predicate that with which it had wished to be done so it could return into itself; and instead of being in a position to function as the active element in the movement of the predicate—arguing back and forth whether this or that predicate would be suitable—the second subject is still preoccupied with the self of the content and has to stay with that instead of being by itself.

What has here been said can be expressed more formally: the nature of the judgment or proposition, which involves the distinction between subject and predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition; and the identical proposition into which the former turns contains the counterthrust against this relation. This conflict between the form of a proposition and the unity of the Concept that destroys it resembles the conflict between meter and accent in rhythm. Rhythm results from the floating center and unification of both. Thus, in the philosophical proposition, too, the identity of subject and predicate is not meant to destroy the difference between both that is expressed by the form of the proposition; rather their unity is meant to emerge as a harmony. The form of the proposition is the appearance of the determinate sense, or the accent that distinguishes its fulfillment; but that the predicate expresses the substance, and the subject itself falls into the general, that is the unity in which this accent fades away.
Examples may help to explain this. In the proposition "God is being," the predicate is "being." It has substantial meaning in which the subject dissolves. Being here is not meant to be a mere predicate but rather the essence, and God apparently ceases to be the firm subject, in spite of his position in the sentence.—Thinking here does not progress in the transition from the subject to the predicate: the subject gets lost, and thinking feels inhibited and, missing the subject, is thrown back to the thought of the subject. Or, because the predicate is expressed as itself a subject, as being, as the essence which exhausts the nature of the subject, thinking finds the subject immediately in the predicate; and now, instead of attaining in the predicate the free position to argue, it is still absorbed in the content—or at least the demand is present that it ought to be so absorbed.

It is similar when one says: the actual is the general. The actual as a subject vanishes in the predicate. The general is not meant to have merely the meaning of the predicate, as if the proposition were merely meant to say that the actual is general. Rather, the general is supposed to express the essence of the actual.—Thus thinking loses the firm objective ground it had in the subject whenever the predicate throws it back to the subject, so that in the predicate it returns not to itself but to the subject of the content.

This unaccustomed inhibition is the main source of the complaints about the unintelligibility of philosophical writings—at least from those who do not lack other educational prerequisites for understanding them. In what has here been said we find the reason for the specific reproach, which is often heard, that many passages have to be read several times before one can understand them. This is considered improper, and it is supposed that this reproach, if well founded, is final and unanswerable.—From the above it should be clear what this amounts to. The philosophical proposition, being a proposition, gives rise to the opinion that the relation of subject and predicate and the procedure of knowledge are as usual. But the philosophical content destroys this procedure and this opinion; one learns that what one supposed was not what one was supposed to suppose; and this correction of one's opinion requires knowledge to return to the sentence and to reinterpret it.

One difficulty should be avoided: mixing up the speculative style with the argumentative style so that what is said of the subject sometimes has the meaning of its Concept, at other times
only the meaning of its predicate or attribute.—One style interferes with the other, and only a philosophical exposition that strictly precluded the usual relation of the parts of a sentence would attain the goal of being really vivid.

Yet non-speculative thinking also has its valid rights that are ignored in the style of the speculative proposition. That the form of the proposition is sublimated should not merely happen immediately, through the mere content of the proposition. Rather, this opposite movement must be expressed; it must not be a mere internal inhibition, but the return of the Concept into itself must be represented expressly. This movement which takes the place of that which proof was once supposed to accomplish is the dialectical movement of the proposition itself. This alone is the actually speculative, and only the expression of this is speculative exposition. As a proposition the speculative is merely internal inhibition and the failure of the essence to return into itself. Therefore we often find that philosophical expositions refer us to this internal intuition and thus spare themselves the presentation of the dialectical movement of the proposition, which we demanded.

The proposition should express what the true is, but essentially this is subject; as such it is merely the dialectical movement, this way that generates itself, leads itself on, and returns into itself.—In non-speculative knowledge proof constitutes this side of expressed inwardsness. But since dialectic has been separated from proof, the Concept of philosophical proof has been lost.

Here it may be recalled that the dialectical movement also has propositions for its parts or elements; the difficulty shown here therefore appears to recur always and to be a feature of the matter itself.—This is similar to the situation in ordinary proof where the reasons used require reasons in turn, and so forth ad infinitum. Yet this form of finding reasons and conditions is a feature of those proofs which differ from dialectical movement; it belongs to external knowledge. But the element of the dialectical movement is the pure Concept; thus it has a content that is through and through subject in itself. Thus no content occurs that functions as an underlying subject and receives its meaning as a predicate; the proposition is immediately a merely empty form.

Apart from the self that is intuited or represented by the senses, it is above all the name as name that designates the pure subject, the empty unit void of Concept. For this reason
the other sciences try to get somewhere by arguing without philosophy as much as they please: without it, they cannot contain life, spirit, or truth.

18. Natural philosophizing as healthy common sense and as genius

When it comes to real philosophy, the long path of education and the movement, as rich as it is profound, through which the spirit reaches knowledge are now considered dispensable, and the immediate revelation of the divine and a healthy common sense that has never troubled or educated itself with other knowledge or with philosophy proper are held to be just as good and as perfect a substitute as some claim chicory is for coffee. It is not pleasant to remark that ignorance, indeed even crudeness that lacks form as much as taste and is incapable of concentrating thought on an abstract sentence, not to speak of the connection of several, assures us now that it is the freedom and tolerance of thought, now that it is nothing less than genius.

As is well known, such genius, now the rage in philosophy, once raged no less in poetry; but when the products of such genius had any meaning at all, they were not poetry but trivial prose or, when they were more, mad oratory. Thus a supposedly natural philosophizing that considers itself too good for Concepts and thinks that this lack makes it an intuitive or visionary and poetical thinking, in fact brings to market arbitrary combinations of an imagination that has merely been disorganized by thought—fabrications that are neither flesh nor fish, neither poetry nor philosophy.

Flowing along in the calmer bed of healthy common sense, natural philosophizing entertains us with a rhetoric of trivial truths. Reproached with the insignificance of all this, it assures us that meaning and fulfillment reside in its heart and must reside in other hearts, too—and one supposes that such references to the innocence of the heart, the purity of conscience, et al., represent final matters which brook no objections or further demands. But the task was not to leave the best deep inside but to bring it to light out of these depths. To produce final truths of that sort was trouble one might easily have spared oneself, for it has long been easy to find them in the catechism, in popular proverbs, etc.

It is not difficult to show how indeterminate and vague, or how misleading, such truths are, or even to show to consciousness how it also contains diametrically opposite truths. As con-
sciousness tries to extricate itself from this confusion it is likely

to fall into new confusions⁹ and may finally expostulate that as

a matter of fact things are thus and thus while those supposed

truths are sophistries. "Sophistries" is a slogan that common

sense likes to use against educated reason, even as ignorance

of philosophy likes to apply the expression "idle dreams" to

philosophy.

Those who invoke feeling as their internal oracle are finished

with anyone who does not agree: they have to own that they

have nothing further to say to anyone who does not find and

feel the same in his heart—in other words, they trample under

foot the roots of humanity. For it is the nature of humanity to

struggle for agreement with others, and humanity exists only in

the accomplished community of consciousness. The anti-human,

the animalic consists in remaining at the level of feeling and

being able to communicate only through feelings.⁷

If someone asked for a royal road to science, no road could

be more comfortable than this: to rely on healthy common sense

and, in order to progress with the times and with philosophy,

to read reviews of philosophic essays, at most the prefaces and

first paragraphs; for the latter offer the general principles, which

are all-important, and the former, in addition to a historical

notice, also some judgment which, being a judgment, goes be-

yond what is judged.⁸ This vulgar road can be taken in one's

dressing gown; but the elevated feeling of the eternal, the holy,

and the infinite struts about in a high priest's robes—on a road

that⁹ itself is immediate being at the core, the genius of pro-

found and original ideas and lofty flashes of inspiration.¹⁰

Yet even as such profundity still does not reveal the fount of

essence, so, too, such rockets are not yet the empyrean.¹¹ True

thoughts and scientific insight are to be won only through the

work of the Concept. This alone can produce the generality of

knowledge which is neither the common vagueness and paltri-

ness of common sense, but educated and complete knowledge,

nor the uncommon generality of the disposition of reason that

has corrupted itself through laziness and the conceit of genius,

but truth that has developed into its native form—and is thus

capable of being owned by all self-conscious reason.
19. Conclusion: the author's relation to the public

[IV.3]

I find the distinctive mark of science in the self-movement of the Concept but have to admit that the above-mentioned, as well as several other peripheral, features of the notions of our time about the nature and form of truth are different and indeed quite opposed to my view. It would therefore seem that an attempt to present the System of Science from this point of view is not likely to meet with a favorable reception. But there are other considerations. Occasionally, e.g., the excellence of Plato's philosophy was supposed to be due to his scientifically worthless myths; but there have also been times, which are even called times of wild enthusiasm, when Aristotle's philosophy was esteemed for its speculative profundity and Plato's Parmenides, probably the greatest work of art of ancient dialectic, was considered the true disclosure and the positive expression of the divine life, and in spite of the frequent turbidity of the products of ecstasy, this misunderstood ecstasy was in fact supposed to be nothing less than the pure Concept. Furthermore, what has excellence in the philosophy of our time finds its own value in being scientific; and although others understand this differently, it is only through this scientific posture that it actually gains credit. Therefore I can also hope that this attempt to vindicate science for the Concept and to present it in this, its proper, element may win acceptance through the inner truth of the matter.

We must have the conviction that it is of the nature of truth to prevail when its time has come, and that truth appears only when its time has come—and therefore never appears too early, nor ever finds that the public is not ready for it. And the individual needs public acceptance to prove the truth of what is as yet his solitary concern; he needs to see how the conviction that is as yet particular becomes general. But at this point the public must often be distinguished from those who act as if they were its representatives and spokesmen. In some respects the public behaves differently from these people, even in the opposite way. When a philosophical essay is not found appealing, the public may good-naturedly ascribe the fault to itself, but the others, sure of their competence, ascribe the sole fault


NOTE: Just before his death, Hegel made minor revisions for a planned second edition but got only through the early pages of the preface. A.1 and A.2 embody the revisions; so does Lasson, but he lists the variants in the back. Kaufmann’s commentary calls attention to interesting differences.


NOTE: Just before his death, Hegel made very considerable changes for a planned second edition and got through the 1812 volume. The rare original edition has never been reprinted or translated, nor does any edition list the variants. In Chapter IV, above, all citations are based on comparisons with the first edition, and interesting differences are duly noted. The volumes of 1813 and 1816 are not affected.

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D. Posthumously Published “Works”


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