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DUNS SCOTUS, John

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PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS

A selection
edited and translated

by

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they are forty-six in number, nineteen of which were held in Paris and the rest in Oxford. Only forty are found in Wadding-Vivès (one being printed among the inauthentic *Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus*, q. 1 Vivès, v.5, 338-53). Of the remaining six, five have been edited by Harris (*Duns Scotus*, v.2., Oxford 1927) and Balić later made another edition of the first three *Collationes* found in Harris (*Bogoslovni Vestnik* IX, 1939, 185-219).

Philosophical Works

The *Tractatus de primo principio* is a short but important compendium of Scotus's natural theology. It seems to be one of his latest works and draws heavily on the *Ordinatio*. It is available in two modern editions, that of M. Mueller, o.f.m. (Freiburg im Breisgau 1941) and E. Roche, o.f.m. (St Bonaventure, N.Y., 1949). Also authentic are the *Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, although the last two books (X and XII) found in the Wadding and Vivès editions are spurious. Once believed to be an earlier work of Scotus, it seems to have been composed or at least revised about the time Scotus was working on the *Ordinatio*. Like the latter, the text of these questions as found in our editions is in a deplorable state.

Somewhat less certain is the question of the authenticity of the *Quaestiones in libros Aristotelis De anima*, which in addition to doctrinal discrepancies with the certainly authentic works, contains passages that are found literally in Gonsalvus of Spain.

Of the logical writings found in the Wadding and Vivès editions, the following are generally accepted as genuine works of Scotus: *Quaestiones super Universalia Porphyrii*, *Quaestiones in librum Praedicamentorum*, *Quaestiones in I et II librum Perihermenias*, *Opus secundum sive octo quaestiones in duos libros Perihermenias*, *Quaestiones in libros Elenchorum*. There are still some difficulties connected with

these works, however, so that perhaps the final word on their authenticity still remains to be said.

Even more dubious are the *Theoremata*. Internal evidence militates very strongly against their authenticity, though external reasons favour it. Even if Duns Scotus is definitely established as their author, the problem of interpretation still remains, for this small tract seems to be simply notes or outlines of problems, rather than a finished composition.

The following philosophical works found in the Wadding and Vivès collections, however, are definitely spurious: *Grammatica speculativa* (Thomas of Erfurt), *Quaestiones in librum I et II priorum Analyticorum Aristotelis* (unknown Scotist), *Quaestiones in librum I et II posteriorum Analyticorum* (John of Cornwall), *Expositio et quaestiones in VIII libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (Marsilius of Inghen), *Meteorologicorum libri quatuor* (author unknown), *Expositio in XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis seu Metaphysica textualis* (Antonius Andreas), *Conclusiones utilissimae ex libris Metaphysicorum Aristotelis collectae* (Gonsalvus of Spain), *Quaestiones disputatae de rerum principio* (Vitalis du Four), *Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus*—except the first question—(Nicholas of Lyra and William of Alnwick), and *De cognitione Dei tractatus imperfectus*.

The editions most frequently used are these. *Opera omnia*, edited by Luke Wadding, o.f.m. (Lyons 1639) in twelve volumes. In addition to the text, this edition contains notes, summaries and commentaries by famous Scotists. The Vivès edition (Paris 1891-5) in twenty-four volumes is practically a reprint of Wadding without the latter's indices. The new critical edition of the *Opera omnia*, prepared by the Scotistic Commission in Rome and published by the Vatican City Press, was begun in 1950 and is still incomplete. Of the single works we have the two modern editions of the *Tractatus de primo principio* mentioned above. The edition of Roche is accompanied by an English translation. The first two

books of the *Opus oxoniense* were edited by M. Fernandez Garcia, O.F.M. under the title *Commentaria oxoniensia* (Quaracchi, 1912-14) and the *Quaestiones quodlibetales* of the Wadding edition are available in a photo-offset reprint by the Franciscan Institute (St Bonaventure, N.Y., 1950).

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discordare, potest esse certus de quocumque quod Deus [*read quilibet*] posuit primum principium esse ens, et tamen propter contrarietatem opinionum eorum, potuit dubitare utrum sit hoc ens vel illud. Et tali dubitanti, si fieret demonstratio concludens vel destruens aliquem conceptum inferiorem, puta quod ignis non erit ens primum, sed aliquid ens posterius primo ente, non destrueretur ille conceptus primus sibi certus quem habuit de ente, sed salvaretur in illo conceptu particulari probato de igne; et per hoc probatur propositio supposita in ultima consequentia rationis, quae fuit quod ille conceptus certus quae est ex se neuter dubiorum in utroque istorum salvatur.

Quod si non cures de auctoritate illa accepta de diversitate opinionum philosophantium, sed dicas quod quilibet habet duos conceptus in intellectu suo propinquos, qui propter propinquitatem analogiae videntur esse unus conceptus. Contra hoc videtur esse quod tunc ex ista evasione videretur destructa omnis via probandi unitatem alicujus conceptus univocam. Si enim dicis hominem habere unum conceptum ad Socratem et Platonem, negabitur tibi et dicetur quod sunt duo, sed videntur unus propter magnam similitudinem.

Praeterea, illi duo conceptus sunt simpliciter simplices, ergo non intelligibiles nisi distincte et totaliter, ergo si nunc non videntur duo, nec post.

Item, aut concipiuntur ut omnino disparati et mirum quomodo videntur unus, aut ut comparati secundum analogiam aut secundum similitudinem vel distinctionem,

perceiving the disagreement among philosophers can still be certain that any of the things that they have acclaimed as the first principle is a being. Nevertheless, in view of the contrariety of opinions, he could be in doubt whether this or that being is primary. Now if we could demonstrate for such an individual the truth or falsity of one of these alternatives, for example that fire is not the first being, but is posterior to the first being, we would not destroy his first certain notion of it as a being, but this notion would survive in the particular conception which we had proven about fire. And this also proves the proposition stated as the final conclusion of the argument, namely that this certain concept, since as such it is neither of the doubtful notions, is preserved in both of them.

You may not recognise the force of this argument based on the diversity of opinion among the philosophers, but insist that each has in his mind two concepts closely resembling each other. Yet because of the very closeness of the analogy, they seem to be one concept. The following consideration, however, may be urged against this. By such an evasion all possibility of proving the unity of any univocal concept would be destroyed. For if you say that "man" is one concept applicable to both Socrates and Plato, some one will deny it, asserting that there are two concepts, but they seem to be one because of their great similarity.

Furthermore, these two concepts are irreducibly simple. Unless, therefore, they are known distinctly and *in toto*, they cannot be known at all. Consequently, if these concepts are not perceived as two concepts now, they will not be perceived as two later on.

Again, either these two concepts are conceived as opposed to each other, and then it is strange how they are perceived as one. Or they are compared according to analogy, or according to similarity or distinction, in which case they are conceived as distinct either prior to

tialiter nec virtualiter inclusus in isto, nec etiam est iste, ergo iste non fiet ab aliquo tali movente.

Et confirmatur ratio, quia objectum praeter conceptum suum proprium adaequatum et inclusum in ipso altero duorum modorum praedictorum nihil potest cognosci ex isto objecto nisi per discursum, sed discursus praesupponit cognitionem istius simplicitatis ad quod discurritur.

Formetur igitur ratio sic : quia nullum objectum facit conceptum simplicem proprium in isto intellectu conceptum simplicem proprium alterius objecti nisi contineat illud aliud objectum essentialiter vel virtualiter, objectum autem creatum non continet increatum essentialiter vel virtualiter, et hoc sub ea ratione sub qua sibi attribuuntur, ut posterius essentialiter attribuitur priori essentialiter, quia contra rationem posterioris essentialiter est includere virtualiter suum prius et patet quod objectum creatum non essentialiter continet increatum secundum aliquid omnino sibi proprium et non commune, ergo non facit conceptum simplicem et proprium enti increato...

[Arg. III]. Tertio arguitur sic : Conceptus proprius alicujus subjecti est sufficiens ratio concludendi de illo subjecto omnia conceptibilia quae sibi necessario insunt. Nullum autem conceptum habemus de Deo per quem sufficienter possumus cognoscere omnia concepta a nobis quae necessario sibi insunt. Patet de Trinitate, et aliis creditis necessariis ; ergo, etc.

Major probatur, quia immediatam quamlibet cognoscimus, in quantum terminos cognoscimus. Igitur patet major de omni illo conceptibili quod immediate inest conceptui subjecti, quod si insit mediate, fiet idem

included in it.¹³ Consequently, it cannot arise by any such moving factor.

And this argument is confirmed by the fact that except through a reasoning process the mind can know nothing from this object besides the proper and adequate concept of the object itself and whatever is included therein in one of the two aforementioned ways. But such a reasoning process presupposes a knowledge of the simple thing towards which one reasons.

Consequently, the argument may be formulated as follows : No object will produce a simple and proper concept of itself and a simple and proper concept of another object, unless it contains this second object essentially or virtually. No created object, however, contains the "Uncreated" essentially or virtually—at least in the way that the two are actually related, namely as what is by nature secondary is related to what is by nature prior. For it is contrary to the very notion of what is essentially secondary to include virtually what is prior to it. It is also obvious that the created does not contain, as part of its essence, something that is not merely common, but is exclusively proper to the "Uncreated". Therefore, it produces no simple and proper concept of the "Uncreated" at all.

[Arg. III]. The third argument is this. The proper concept of any subject provides sufficient ground for concluding to everything conceivable which necessarily inheres in that subject. We have no concept of God, however, that enables us to know every necessary attribute which we conceive of Him, as is evident from the fact of the Trinity, and the other necessary attributes that we know of Him by faith. Therefore, etc.

Proof of the major. We know any immediate proposition in so far as we know its terms. Consequently, the major clearly holds for every concept that is immediately verified existentially of the subject-concept. If it is a question of a notion that is only mediately verified, our

argument will continue to apply to the middle term in reference to the subject-concept until we have what we are seeking—some immediate propositions. Through these immediate truths, then, the mediate truths will be known.

[Arg. iv]. A fourth argument can also be adduced. Either some pure perfection¹⁴ has a common meaning as applied to God and creatures (which is our contention), or not. If not, it is either because its meaning does not apply formally to God at all (which is inadmissible), or else it has a meaning that is wholly proper to God, in which case nothing need be attributed to God because it is a pure perfection. For such an assumption is equivalent to saying that the meaning of such a perfection in so far as it applied to God, is a pure perfection and therefore is affirmed of God. But this is to bring to nought what Anselm teaches in the *Monologion*,* namely that, with regard to everything except relations, whatever is unconditionally better than something which is not it, must be attributed to God, even as everything not of this kind [i.e. everything that is not better than anything positive that is incompatible with it] must be denied of Him. According to Anselm, then, we first know something to be a pure perfection and secondly we attribute this perfection to God. Therefore, it is not a pure perfection precisely in so far as it is in God.

This is also confirmed by the fact that otherwise no pure perfection would exist in creatures. The consequence is evident, for in this hypothesis only such concepts as express such pure perfections analogously can be applied to a creature. But such a notion in itself is imperfect since it is only analogous to the pure perfection. And therefore, nothing is any better for having this analogous perfection than it would be if it did not have it, for otherwise such a perfection would be affirmed of God.

This fourth reason is also confirmed as follows. Every

because we cannot say that the sole purpose or reason for the intelligibility of these substances is that we may know them. Consequently, even if we could know nothing about them, we still could not say they are intelligible to no purpose. Secondly, it does not follow that just because these substances are unintelligible to our minds, they are unintelligible to all minds, for they could be intelligible to themselves. Therefore, we have the fallacy of affirming the consequent.²³ Wherefore I say that even though there are many ways in which this citation of the Philosopher could be explained, still the eye of the bat has only a natural and intuitive knowledge. And on the basis of these two characteristics the Philosopher's words can be explained even in terms of impossibility. For just as it is impossible for the eye of the bat to consider such an object naturally and intuitively, so it is also impossible for our intellect to possess a natural and intuitive knowledge of God.²⁴

*To the third,*²⁵ I reply that the potentially infinite is unknown, because only to the extent that something is in act it is knowable. But it is not so unknown that it would be impossible for an infinite intellect to know it. Nevertheless the [potentially] infinite cannot be known by an intellect which proceeds to know it in the way that it is infinite. For it is infinite only in so far as the mind in considering only one thing after another never comes to an end. Now the mind which considers only one thing after another in this way always considers something finite and never something infinite. An infinite intellect, however, can know the whole thing at once, and not simply one part after another. And to the argument from *Metaphysics*, bk. II, concerning infinite numbers and the "Infinite", I reply that there is no parity between the two, for a knowledge of an infinite number of objects would imply that the faculty of knowledge itself is infinite (as is clear from q. I of dist. II regarding the infinity of God),²⁶ since one can infer a greater power of

[*a. De Primitate Efficientis*]. Prima autem conclusio istarum novem est ista, quod aliquod effectivum sit simpliciter primum, ita quod nec sit effectibile nec virtute alterius a se effectivum. Probatio: quia aliquod ens est effectibile; aut ergo a se aut a nihilo vel ab aliquo alio. Non a nihilo, quia nullius est causa illud quod nihil est. Nec a se, quia nulla res est quae seipsam faciat vel gignat, 1 *De Trinitate*.^{*} Ergo ab alio. Illud aliud sit A. Si est A primum hoc modo exposito, propositum habeo. Si non est primum, ergo est posterius effectivum, quia effectibile ab alio vel a virtute alterius effec[tivum], quia si negetur negatio, ponitur affirmatio. Detur illud alterum et sit B de quo arguitur sicut de A argutum est. Et ita aut proceditur in infinitum quorum quodlibet respectu prioris erit secundum; aut statur in aliquo non habente prius. Infinitas autem impossibilis est in ascendendo. Ergo, primitas necessaria, quia non habens prius, nullo priore se est posterius, nam circulum in causis esse est inconveniens.

Contra istam rationem sic instatur primo quod petat stare in causis; secundo quod procedit ex contingentibus et ita non fit demonstratio. Secundum probatur, quia praemissae accipiunt esse de aliquo causato et omne causatum contingentiter est. Similiter, procedit ex contingentibus quia ex rationibus productis et producti qui tantum sunt termini contingentes. Primum confirmatur per hoc quod secundum philosophantes infinitas est ascendendo, sicut ponunt exemplum de generationibus infinitis, quorum nullum est primum sed quodlibet

^{*} *De Trinitate*, 1, cap. i (Migne, P.L., XLII, 320).

[*a. The Primacy of Efficient Causality*]. Now the first of these nine conclusions is this: *Among beings which can produce an effect one is simply first*, in the sense that it neither can be produced by an efficient cause nor does it exercise its efficient causality in virtue of anything other than itself. Proof: Some being can be produced. Therefore, it is either produced by itself or by nothing or by something other than itself. Now it cannot be produced by nothing, for what is nothing causes nothing. Neither can it be produced by itself, for as Augustine points out in his work *De Trinitate*, bk. 1,^{*} nothing ever makes itself or begets itself. Therefore it can only be produced by another. Now let this other be called A. If A is first in the way we have described, then I have what I seek to prove. But if it is not first, then it is some posterior agent—either because it can be produced by something else or because it is able to produce its effect only in virtue of something other than itself. To deny the negation is to assert the affirmation. Let us assume that this being is not first and call it B. Then we can argue of B as we did of A. And so we shall either go on *ad infinitum* so that each thing in reference to what precedes it in the series will be second; or we shall reach something that has nothing prior to it. However, an infinity in the ascending order⁸ is impossible; hence a primacy is necessary because whatever has nothing prior to itself is posterior to nothing prior, for a circle in causes is inadmissible.

Against this argument, it is objected, first, that the argument assumes an end in the series of causes; secondly, that it begins with contingent propositions and hence is not a demonstration. This second objection is argued in this way. The premises assume the existence of something that has been caused, and everything caused exists contingently. The first objection is confirmed from the admission of those who philosophise that an infinity is possible in an ascending order, as for instance, when they assume infinite generations, where no single one is

secundum, quia secundum eos, non est inconueniens procedere in infinitum in productionibus ejusdem rationis ubi nullum est primum sed quodlibet secundum, et tamen hoc ab eis sine circulo ponitur.

Ad primam instantiam primo excludendam dico quod philosophi non posuerunt infinitatem possibilem in causis essentialiter ordinatis, sed tantum in accidentaliter ordinatis, sicut patet per Avicennam sexto *Metaphysicae*, cap. v, ubi loquitur de infinitate individuorum in specie. Et ad propositum melius ostendendum sciendum quae sunt causae essentialiter et accidentaliter ordinatae, ubi notandum quod aliud est loqui de causis per se et per accidens; et aliud est loqui de causis per se sive essentialiter et accidentaliter ordinatis, nam in prima est tantum operatio unius ad unum, scilicet causae ad causatum, et est causa per se quae secundum naturam propriam, et non secundum aliquid sibi accidens, causat ut subjectum est causa per se respectu suae propriae passionis et in aliis ut album disgregat et aedificator aedificat; sed causa per accidens econverso ut Polycletus aedificat. In secundo est comparatio duarum causarum inter se in quantum ab eis est causatum.

Et differunt causae per se sive essentialiter ordinatae a causis per accidens sive accidentaliter ordinatis in tribus. Prima differentia est, quod in per se ordinatis secunda in quantum causa dependet a prima; in per accidens non, licet in esse vel aliquo modo alio dependeat. Filius enim licet secundum esse dependeat a patre, non

it cannot be caused in any way. These last two consequences are proved from the second conclusion about the efficient cause.

Another consideration proves that this supreme nature cannot be an effect. Everything which can be produced has some essentially ordered cause, as is evident from the proof of the proposition *B* in support of the first conclusion about the possibility of a first efficient cause. Now an essentially ordered cause excels its effect ; therefore, if it could be produced, it would not be supreme.

The *third conclusion* is that *the supreme nature actually exists*, and this is proved from what we have said above.¹⁶ Corollary : It is contradictory that any nature should be more excellent or higher than this nature. This is proved in the same way as were the corollaries about the efficient and final cause.¹⁷

[*Part II. Interrelation of the Three Primacies*]. Regarding the second part, I say that *the first cause is the ultimate end*. Proof : Every *per se* efficient cause acts for the sake of an end, and a prior cause acts for a prior end ; therefore, the first cause acts for the sake of the ultimate end. Now the first efficient cause does not act primarily or ultimately for the sake of anything distinct from itself ; hence, it must act for itself as an end ; therefore, the first efficient cause is the ultimate end. If it were to act *per se* for the sake of any end other than itself, then something would be more noble than the first efficient cause, for if the end were anything apart from the agent intending the end, it would be more noble than the agent.

Now *the first efficient cause is also the supreme nature*. Proof : The first efficient cause is not a univocal cause with reference to the other efficient causes but rather an equivocal cause. Such a cause, therefore, is more excellent and noble than they. Consequently, the first efficient cause is the most excellent.¹⁸

[*Part III. Unity of the Divine Nature*]. Regarding the third part, I say that since this triple primacy is

minus videtur. Sed omne agens per se agit propter finem. Et ex hoc arguitur dupliciter: Primo sic: Omne agens naturale, praecise consideratum ex necessitate et aequae ageret si ad nullum finem alium ageret, sed sit independenter agens; ergo si non agit nisi propter finem, hoc est quia dependet ab agente amante finem; tale est primum efficiens; ergo etc.

Item, si primum agens agit propter finem, aut ergo finis ille movet primum efficiens ut amatus actu voluntatis, aut ut tantum naturaliter amatus. Si ut amatus actu voluntatis, habetur propositum. Si tantum amatus naturaliter, hoc est falsum, quia non naturaliter amat alium finem a se, ut grave centrum, et materia formam. Tunc enim esset aliquo modo ad finem, quia inclinatus ad illum. Si autem tantum naturaliter amat finem qui est ipse, hoc nihil est nisi ipsum esse ipsum. Hoc enim non est salvare duplicem rationem in ipso.

Item arguitur quasi confirmando [*MS* conferendo] rationem jam factam sic. Ipsum primum efficiens dirigit effectum suum ad finem; ergo vel naturaliter dirigit, vel cognoscendo et amando illum finem. Non naturaliter, quia non cognoscens nihil dirigit nisi in virtute cognoscentis: sapientis enim est prima ordinatio, primo *Metaphysicae*.* Sed primum efficiens nullius alterius virtute dirigit, sicut nec causat; tunc enim non esset primum; ergo, etc.

Item, aliquid causatur contingenter; ergo prima causa contingenter causat; ergo volens causat. Probatio

* I, cap. ii (982^a, 17-18).

less [than of a deliberate cause]. Now every *per se* agent acts for the sake of an end. From this I draw a double argument: First, that every natural agent, considered precisely as natural, acts of necessity²¹ and would act just as it does now even if it had no other end but was an independent agent. Therefore, if it acts only because of an end, this is so only because it depends upon an agent which loves the end. But the first efficient cause is such an agent, therefore, etc.

[Secondly,] if the first agent acts for the sake of an end, then this end moves the first efficient cause inasmuch as it is loved either naturally or by an act of the will. If the latter be the case, you grant what I seek to prove. If you assume that the end is loved naturally, the assumption is false, for the first agent loves naturally no end other than itself, as matter, for instance, naturally loves form or the heavy object the centre [of the earth]. If it did, the first agent would be oriented to it as an end, since it is inclined to it by its very nature. But if this end which it loves naturally is nothing other than itself, then we assert nothing more than that the thing is itself.²² In such a case, however, the twofold [causal] aspect would not be saved.

In confirmation of the argument just given we could argue that the first efficient cause directs its effect to some end. Now, it directs it either naturally or by consciously loving this end. The first alternative is untenable, inasmuch as whatever lacks knowledge can direct its effect to some end only in virtue of something which does possess knowledge, for "to order ultimately" pertains to wisdom according to *Metaphysics*, bk. I.* Now just as the first efficient cause does not cause in virtue of something else, neither does this cause direct its effect to an end by reason of something other than itself, for otherwise it would not be first; therefore, etc.

Another proof is this. Something causes contingently. Therefore, the first cause causes contingently;

consequently, it causes voluntarily. Proof of the first consequence : Every secondary cause causes in so far as it is moved by the first cause. If the first cause moves necessarily, then, every other cause will be moved necessarily and everything will be caused necessarily. Consequently, if any secondary cause moves contingently, the first cause also moves contingently, since the secondary cause can cause only in so far as it is moved by the first. Proof of the second consequence : The only source of contingent action is either the will or something accompanied by the will. Everything else acts with a natural necessity and, consequently, not contingently ; therefore, etc.

One objection to this argument is directed against the first consequence, namely that our volition would still be able to cause something contingently and therefore it is unnecessary that the first cause should cause contingently. Furthermore, the Philosopher ²³ concedes the antecedent (that something is caused contingently), yet denies the consequent (that the first cause causes contingently). He places contingency in the lower beings and not in the fact that God wills things contingently. Contingency arises from motion, which, though it is caused necessarily in so far as it is uniform, gives rise to difformity owing to its parts.

The other objection is to the second consequence. Just because something causes contingently, it does not seem to follow that therefore this cause is endowed with a will, for even what is moved naturally can be impeded. Hence, the opposite can happen either contingently or violently.

To the first objection we must reply that if God is the first mover or efficient cause with regard to our will, then the same holds of our will as of other things. Whether God moves our will immediately with necessity or whether He first moves something else necessarily and this latter in turn moves our will with necessity,

non nisi ex hoc quod movetur, sequitur tandem quod proximum voluntati necessario moveat voluntatem, etiam si proximum voluntati sit ipsamet voluntas, et ita necessario volet, et erit volens necessario. Et sequitur ulterius impossibile, quod necessario causat quodlibet causatum [, et non est aliquid contingens].

Ad secundum dico, quod non voco hic contingens quodcumque non necessarium, vel non sempiternum, sed cuius oppositum posset fieri quando illud fit. Ideo dixi: aliquid contingenter causatum, et non aliquid est contingens. Nunc dico, quod Philosophus non potest consequens negare salvando antecedens per motum; quia si ille totus motus necessario est a causa sua, quaelibet pars ejus necessario causatur quando causatur, id est, inevitabiliter, ita quod oppositum non potest tunc causari. Et ulterius, quod causatur per quamcumque partem motus, necessario causatur et inevitabiliter. Vel igitur nihil fit contingenter, id est, evitabiliter, vel primum sic causat immediate, quod posset etiam non causare.

Ad tertium dico, quod si aliqua causa potest impedire istam, hoc non est nisi in virtute superioris causae, et sic usque ad primam causam quae si immediatam causam sibi necessario movet, usque ad ultimam erit necessitas; ergo necessario impedit, et per consequens, non potest alia causa naturaliter causare.

Sic ergo videtur triplici via ostensum quod primum agens est intelligens et volens. Quarum prima est quod natura agit propter finem, et non nisi quia dependens

in any case the will would be necessarily moved by whatever is proximate to it. This would be true even if this proximate cause were itself will. The will, therefore, would will necessarily and would be a necessary voluntary agent. And there is still another absurdity that would follow, viz. that it would cause necessarily anything that is caused, and there would be nothing contingent.

As to the second objection, let me say that by "contingent" I do not mean something that is not necessary or which was not always in existence, but something whose opposite could have occurred at the time that this actually did. That is why I do not say that something is contingent, but that something is *caused contingently*. Now I maintain that the Philosopher cannot deny the consequent and still save the antecedent through the expedient of motion, because if the motion as a whole proceeds from its cause in a necessary manner, every single part of it is caused necessarily at the time it occurs. In other words, it is inevitable, so that the opposite effect could not possibly be caused at just this moment. Furthermore, whatever is caused by any part of this motion is caused necessarily and inevitably. Therefore, either nothing ever happens unavoidably or contingently, or the first cause immediately causes what it was also able not to cause.

To the third objection, I say that if any cause can impede a natural cause, it can do so only in virtue of a higher cause, and so we are forced back again to the first cause. If this first cause necessarily moves the cause immediately below it, this necessity will continue down to the last cause, which will consequently be necessarily impeded in its action. As a result, this last cause could not cause anything naturally.

There appears to be three ways, then, of proving that the first agent is intelligent and endowed with will. The first of these is that nature acts on account of an end,

and it does this, only because it is dependent upon and directed by someone who knows the end. The second is that this first agent acts for the sake of an end. The third is that some effects are caused contingently. But let us proceed with the preliminaries to the proof for infinity.

[Second Conclusion]. The *second conclusion* I establish is this: *the knowledge and volition of this First Being is the same as its essence.* This is true, first, of its volition of itself as object, so that to love the first cause is something essentially identified with the nature of this cause, and the same holds for every act of its will. Proof: The causality and causation of the final cause is simply first according to Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, BK. VI, where he says: "If we had scientific knowledge of any cause, that of the final cause would be the most excellent". The reason is this. The final cause from the standpoint of causality precedes the efficient cause inasmuch as it moves it to act. Therefore, the causality of the ultimate end and its causation is completely incapable of being caused in any way. Now the causality of the ultimate end consists in this. By being loved it moves the first efficient cause. But it is one and the same thing whether the ultimate end moves the first efficient cause by being loved by this cause or whether the first efficient cause loves for the sake of an end. For an object being loved by the will means the same as a will loving an object. Hence, the love by which the first efficient cause loves the ultimate end is completely incapable of being caused. Therefore, it exists necessarily and consequently is the same as the first nature. Or to use the argument in reverse, if this first love is directed towards anything other than the first nature itself, it can be caused and therefore produced, and this by some *per se* efficient cause which in turn loves some end. Consequently, this first love of itself would be caused by some prior love of an end, which is impossible.

Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, BK. XII,* proves that the knowledge which the First Being possesses is the same as

substantia, quia per intelligere est honorabile; secundo quia alias laboriosa erit ejus continuatio. Item si non sit illud, erit in potentia contradictionis ad illud. Ad illam naturam sequitur labor, secundum ipsum.

Istae rationes possunt ratione declarari. Prima sic: cum omnis entis in actu primo perfectio ejus ultima sit in actu secundo quo conjungitur optimo, maxime si sit activum et non tantum factivum. Omne autem intelligibile est activum, et prima natura est intelligibilis ex praemissa, sequitur ergo quod ultima ejus perfectio erit in actu secundo. Igitur si ille non sit ejus substantia, substantia ejus non est optima, quia aliud est suum optimum.

Secunda ratio potest declarari sic: potentia solummodo receptiva est potentia contradictionis; ergo cum hoc non sit hujusmodi; ergo etc. Sed quia secundum Aristotelem, nec ista est ratio demonstrativa, sed tantum probabilis, aliter propositum ostendatur ex identitate potentiae et objecti in se; ergo actus erit eis idem. Sed consequentia non valet. Patet instantia: quia angelus intelligit se et amat se, et tamen actus angeli amandi et intelligendi non sunt idem substantiae ejus.

Haec conclusio, videlicet, quod essentia divina sit eadem quod volitio sui ipsius, foecunda [*MS vera*] est ex corollariis. Nam sequitur primo quod voluntas est idem primae naturae; quia velle non est nisi voluntatis; ergo illa voluntas cujus velle est incausabile, est

its essence, first, because it would not be the best substance, were such not the case, since this is the most excellent of substances precisely because of the knowledge it possesses. And secondly, because otherwise the First Being would grow weary if it continued to think, for if its thought were not its substance, the latter would be in potency of contradiction²⁴ to thinking, and this would produce weariness according to Aristotle.

These arguments from authority can be established by reason. As to the first, every being which is in first act finds its ultimate perfection in its second act, through which it is united to that which is best for it.²⁵ This is true especially if this being is capable of acting in the proper sense of the term and not merely in the sense of producing or fashioning some external object.²⁶ Now whatever is intelligible is active in the proper sense of the term, and the first nature is intelligible from what we said above. Therefore, it follows that the ultimate perfection of this Being will be in its second act. But if this act is not the substance itself, the latter will not be the best inasmuch as its ultimate perfection is something other than itself.

[Aristotle's] second reason can be put in this way. Only a receptive potency is in potency of contradiction. But this Being has no receptive potencies; therefore, etc. Since Aristotle, however, did not consider his proof demonstrative but merely probable, some²⁷ would prove the thesis in another way, viz. since the faculty and the object are identical, therefore the act is identified with them. This inference, however, is invalid as is clear from the case of an angel, which knows and loves itself and nevertheless, its acts of loving and knowing are not identical with its substance.

This conclusion, viz. that the divine essence is identical with its volition, is fruitful because of its corollaries. First of all, it follows that the will is the same as the first nature, because willing is a function only of the will; wherefore, if the volition itself is uncausable, the same is true of the

will to which it belongs ; consequently [the will is identified with the nature]. Furthermore, since the act of the will is conceived as though it were posterior to the will, if the former is identical with that nature, then the latter will be all the more so.

Secondly, it follows that this self-knowledge is identical with that nature, for nothing is loved unless it is known. Hence it follows that just as this self-love exists necessarily in virtue of itself, so also this self-knowledge.

Then too, knowledge, as it were, is more closely connected with that nature than is volition. Therefore, it follows in the third place that the intellect is the same thing as that nature. We prove this in the same way as we previously established the identity of the will from the act of willing.

Fourthly, it follows that whatever is required for this nature to know itself is also identical with the nature,²⁸ for if the knowledge exists in virtue of itself, then the same is true of the reason for knowing, because the latter, as it were, must first be known to the intellect.

[Third Conclusion]. Having proved that this self-knowledge and self-love of the first being are the same as its essence, I go on to show the same to be true of other acts, namely of all its knowledge and all its acts of volition. Let the *third conclusion* be that *no knowledge can be an accident of the first nature*. Proof: The first nature has been shown to be first in the order of efficiency, and therefore has of itself and apart from anything else, the ability to produce whatever can be produced, at least in so far as it is the first cause of that which can be produced. But without a knowledge of the latter, the first nature would be unable to produce what can be produced. Hence, the knowledge of any of these other beings is not something distinct from its own nature. Proof of the last assumption: Nothing can cause an effect except by willing it for the sake of an end. Otherwise it would not be a *per se* agent, since it would not

in duo tantum, tantum enim est possibilis infinitas numeralis secundum philosophos. Si quis autem probet infinitatem specierum possibilem, probando aliquos motus coelestes esse incommensurabiles, et ita numquam posse redire ad uniformitatem, etiam si per infinitum durarent, et infinitae conjunctiones specie causarent infinita generabilia specie, de hoc, quidquid sit in se, nihil tamen ad intentionem Philosophi, qui infinitatem specierum negaret.

Ultima probabilitas quae occurrit pro consequentia Philosophi declaranda est ista : quidquid potest in aliqua multa simul quorum quodlibet requirit aliquam perfectionem sibi propriam, illud concluditur esse perfectius ex pluralitate talium, ita videtur de primo agente esse concedendum, quod si posset causare simul infinita, quod esset ejus virtus infinita, et per consequens si primum agens simul habet virtutem causandi infinita, quantum est ex se simul posset ea producere, licet natura effectus non permittat, adhuc sequitur infinitas virtutis ejus. Haec consequentia ultima probatur : quia potens causare albedinem et nigredinem, non est minus perfectum quia non sunt simul causabilia. Haec enim non similtas est ex repugnantia eorum et non est ex defectu agentis.

Et ex isto probo infinitatem sic : si primum haberet omnem causalitatem formaliter simul, licet non possent causabilia simul poni in esse, esset infinitum, quia simul, quantum est ex se, posset infinita producere, et posse

things successively (for only a numerical infinity is possible according to the philosophers) than there would be if it could do but two. But suppose someone should prove that an infinity of species is possible by proving that some heavenly movements are incommensurable and so the same arrangement would never recur even though the movement should continue *ad infinitum*. The infinite variety of [planetary] conjunctions, then, would cause an infinite variety in the effects that can be produced. Whatever is to be said of this view, however, it is definitely not the position of Aristotle, who denies the infinity of the species.³²

The final probable interpretation advanced to reinforce the Philosopher's reasoning may be put in this way. If an agent can do many things at once, where each of the things in question needs some perfection proper to itself, then the greater the number of such things, the greater the perfection of the agent. And so it seems that we must concede that if the power of the First Agent could produce an infinity of effects at one and the same time, it must be infinite. This conclusion would follow even where the nature of the effect was such as to make its simultaneous existence in an infinite number impossible, provided that, so far as the causal power of the agent was concerned, it could produce simultaneously an infinite multitude.—This last inference is proved as follows. An agent that can cause both whiteness and blackness is not less perfect because it cannot cause the two simultaneously, for this inability to exist simultaneously arises from the repugnance of the effects to each other, and not from any defect in the agent.

From this I prove infinity in this way : If the First Being at one and the same time *formally* possessed all causal power, even though the things which it could cause could not be given simultaneous existence, it would be infinite, because—as far as it is concerned—it has power enough to produce an infinite number all

plura simul concludit majorem potentiam intensive ; ergo si habet perfectius quam si haberet omnem causalitatem formaliter, magis sequitur infinitas intensiva. Sed habet omnem causalitatem cujuslibet rei secundum totum quod est in re ipsa eminentius quam si esset formaliter.

Licet ergo omnipotentiam proprie dictam secundum intentionem theologorum tantum creditam esse et non naturali ratione credam posse probari, sicut dicitur distinctione XLII et *Quodlibet* q. vii,* tamen probatur naturaliter infinita potentia, quae simul, quantum est ex se, habet omnem causalitatem, quae simul posset in infinita, si essent simul factibilia.

Si objicis, primum non potest ex se simul in infinita, quia non est probatum quod sit totalis causa infinitorum, hoc nihil obstat, quia si haberet simul unde esset totalis causa, nihil perfectius esset quam nunc sit, quando habet unde sit prima causa : tum quia illae secundae causae non requiruntur propter perfectionem in causando, quia tunc remotius a prima esset perfectius, quia perfectiorem requireret causam, sed si requiruntur causae secundae cum prima, secundum philosophos, hoc est propter imperfectionem effectus, ut primum cum alia causa imperfecta posset causare imperfectum, quod secundum ipsos, non posset immediate causare : tum quia perfectiones totae secundum Aristotelem eminentius sunt in primo quam si ipsae formalitates earum sibi inessent, si possent inesse. Quod probatur, quia causa secunda proxima

* *Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. XLII, q. unica ; *Quodlibet*, q. vii.

at once, and the more one can produce simultaneously, the greater the power in intensity. But if the First Being possessed such power in an even more perfect way than if it had it formally [as Avicenna, for instance, assumes], its intensive infinity follows *a fortiori*. But the full causal power that each thing may have in itself, the First Being possesses even more perfectly than if it were formally present.

Therefore, although I believe that the omnipotence in the proper sense of the word as the theologians understand it,³³ cannot be proven by natural reason, but is only believed (as will be shown in dist. XLII and *Quodlibet* q. vii),* nevertheless we can establish naturally the existence of an infinite power which on its part possesses simultaneously the fulness of causality and could produce an infinite number of things at once, if only they were capable of existing simultaneously.

It is objected that the First Cause on its part cannot cause an infinite number of effects at one time, so long as it is not proved that it is the total cause of these effects. This objection, however, presents no obstacle, since the requirements to be a total cause would not make it any more perfect than it would have to be if it were the First Cause. This is clear, first of all, because secondary causes are not required simply to supply some additional perfection to the causality, for if that were the case, the more remote effect would be the more perfect inasmuch as it would require a more perfect cause. But if secondary causes are needed in addition to the First Cause, the reason, according to the philosophers,³⁴ lies in the fact that the effect is imperfect. That is to say, the First Cause, which immediately would be unable to cause anything imperfect, could do so in conjunction with another imperfect cause. Also, the First Being, according to Aristotle, contains all the perfections in a more perfect manner than if they were formally present, were this latter possible. The proof of this lies in the fact that

cause can add some perfection to the causality of the First Cause, even when the latter acts to the utmost of its power. In such a case, if the First Cause were to act alone, its effectiveness would seem to be less perfect than that of the two causes together. Therefore, if something which a secondary cause can produce together with the First Cause, can be done much more perfectly by the First Cause alone, the secondary cause adds no perfection to the first. But a finite thing always adds some perfection to what is finite. Hence, a first cause whose causality cannot be perfected is infinite. To apply this to the question at issue. Knowledge of any object is by its very nature apt to be engendered by that object as its proximate cause, and this is especially true of intuitive knowledge or vision. Therefore, if some intellect possesses such knowledge without any action on the part of the object known, but solely in virtue of some prior object which by nature is a higher cause of such knowledge, it follows that the higher object is infinitely intelligible, because the lower object adds nothing to it in the way of cognoscibility. Now, the supreme nature is such a superior object, since in the absence of all other objects by the mere fact that it is present to the intellect of the First Being, it gives to that intellect a knowledge of every object without exception. Therefore, nothing else that can be known adds anything to this nature in the way of cognoscibility. Consequently, it is infinitely intelligible; therefore, its entity is also infinite, for a thing can only be known to the extent that it has entity, according to *Metaphysics*, bk. II.*

[c. Third Proof]. The fact that the First Being is also the ultimate end provides a third way of arguing to infinity. Our will can always love and seek something greater than any finite being, even as our intellect is always able to know more. And, what is more, there seems to be a natural inclination to love an infinite good to the greatest degree possible, because the free will of

itself and without the aid of any habit promptly and delightfully loves this good, so that we seem to experience an act of love for an infinite good. Indeed it seems that the will is not perfectly satisfied with anything else. And if such an infinite good were really opposed to the natural object of the will, why is it that the will does not naturally hate an infinite good, just as it naturally hates non-existence, according to Augustine in *De libero arbitrio*, III, viii?* For it seems that if "infinite" and "good" were incompatible, then there would be no way in which the will could be satisfied in such a good, nor could it readily tend towards such a good just as it cannot readily tend towards anything which is opposed to its proper object. This argument will be confirmed in the following by a similar argument from the intellect.

[*d.* Fourth Proof]. The thesis is shown also by the way of eminence, and here I argue that it is incompatible with the idea of a most perfect being that anything should excel it in perfection, as has been previously explained. Now there is nothing incompatible about a finite thing being excelled in perfection ; therefore, etc. The minor is proved from this, that to be infinite is not incompatible with being ; but the infinite is greater than any finite being.

Another formulation given to the same argument is this. That to which intensive infinity is not repugnant is not all perfect unless it be infinite, for to be infinite is compatible with it. And if it is finite, it can be exceeded or excelled. Now infinity is not repugnant to being, therefore the most perfect being is infinite. The minor of this proof, which was used in the preceding argument, cannot, it seems, be proven *a priori*. For, just as contradictions by their very nature contradict each other and their opposition cannot be made manifest by anything more evident, so also these terms [viz. "being" and "infinite"] by their very nature are not repugnant to each other. Neither does there seem to be any way of

proving this except by explaining the meaning of the notions themselves. "Being" cannot be explained by anything better known than itself. "Infinite" we understand by means of finite. I explain "infinite" in a popular definition as follows: The infinite is that which exceeds the finite, not exactly by reason of any finite measure, but in excess of any measure that could be assigned. X

The following persuasive argument can be given for what we intend to prove. Just as everything is assumed to be possible, if its impossibility is not apparent, so also all things are assumed to be compatible, if their incompatibility is not manifest. Now there is no incompatibility apparent here, for it is not of the nature of being to be finite; nor does finite appear to be an attribute coextensive with being. But if they were mutually repugnant, it would be for one of these reasons. The coextensive attributes which being possesses, seem to be sufficiently evident.

Another persuasive argument adduced is this. Infinity, in its own way, is not opposed to quantity (that is, where parts are taken successively); therefore, neither is infinity, in its own way, opposed to entity (that is, where perfection exists simultaneously).

Again, if the quantity characteristic of power is simply more perfect than that characteristic of mass, why is it possible to have an infinity [of small parts] in an [extended] mass and not an infinite power? And if an infinite power is possible, then it actually exists, as is evident from the third conclusion about the first efficient cause, and will also be proved again later.³⁸

Again, why is it that the intellect, whose object is being, does not find the notion of something infinite repugnant? Instead of this, the infinite seems to be the most perfect thing we can know. Now, if tonal discord so readily displeases the ear, it would be strange if some intellect did not clearly perceive the contradiction between infinite and its first object [viz. being] if such existed.

statim ut percipitur offendit, cur nullus intellectus ab intelligibili infinito naturaliter refugit sicut a non conveniente, suum ita primum objectum destruentem?

Per illud potest colorari illa ratio Anselmi de summo bono cogitabili, *Proslogion*,* et intelligenda est ejus descriptio sic. Deus est quo cognito sine contradictione majus cogitari non potest sine contradictione. Et quod addendum sit contradictione, patet: nam in cujus cognitione vel cogitatione includitur contradictio, illud dicitur non cogitabile, quia sunt tunc duo cogitabilia opposita nullo modo faciendo unum cogitabile, quia neutrum determinat alterum, ut quod homo sit irrationalis est incogitabile. Unde sicut in rebus nihil est nisi sit simplex vel compositum ex potentia et actu, ita in conceptibus. Contradictoria autem nihil faciunt unum nec simplex, nec compositum.

Summum cogitabile praedictum, sine contradictione potest esse in re. Hoc probatur primo de esse quidditativo: quia in tali cogitabili summo quiescit intellectus; ergo in ipso est ratio primi objecti intellectus scilicet entis, et hoc in summo.

Et tunc arguitur ultra, quod illud sit loquendo de esse existentiae. Summe cogitabile non est tantum in intellectu cogitante, quia tunc posset esse, quia cogitabile possibile, et non posset esse, quia repugnat rationi ejus esse ab aliqua causa, sicut patet prius in secunda conclusione de via efficientiae. Majus ergo cogitabile est

* Cap. iii (Migne, P.L., CLVIII, 228).

For if the disagreeable becomes offensive as soon as it is perceived, why is it that no intellect naturally shrinks from the infinitely intelligible as it would from something out of harmony with, and even destructive of, its first object?

In this same way Anselm's argument in the *Proslogion** about the highest conceivable good can be touched up. His description must be understood in this way. God is a being conceived without contradiction, who is so great that it would be a contradiction if a greater being could be conceived. That the phrase "without contradiction" must be added is clear, for anything, the very knowledge or thought of which includes a contradiction, is called "inconceivable", for it includes two conceivable notions so opposed to each other that they cannot in any way be fused into a single conceivable object, since neither determines the other. Thus "man is irrational" cannot be conceived. Hence, just as in the world of reality nothing exists that is not either simple or at least composed of act [the determining element] and potency [the determinable element], so also with concepts. Contradictories, however, do not form a unity, be it simple or composed.

It follows then, that the greatest object conceivable without contradiction can actually exist in reality. This is proved first of its essential being, for in such an object the intellect is fully satisfied; therefore, in it the primary object of the intellect, viz. "being", is verified and this in the highest degree.

It is further argued, then, that this being actually exists because the highest conceivable object is not one which is merely in the intellect of the thinker, for then it both could exist, because as something possible it is conceivable, and yet could not exist, because the idea of existing in virtue of some cause is repugnant to its very nature. This latter was shown above in the second conclusion of the proof from efficiency.³⁹ Therefore, what

exists in reality is conceivably greater than what exists only in the intellect. This is not to be understood, however, in the sense that something conceived if it actually exists, is, by the fact of existing, conceivable to any greater extent. The meaning is that whatever exists is greater than whatever is solely in the intellect.

Or the argument could be retouched in this way. Whatever exists is conceivable to a greater extent [than what does not]; that is to say, it can be known more perfectly, because it is intuitively intelligible or visible. What does not exist either in itself or in something more noble to which it adds nothing, is not capable of being intuited. Now what can be seen is able to be known more perfectly than what can not be intuited, but known only abstractively. Therefore, the most perfect thing that can be known exists. The difference between intuitive and abstractive knowledge, and the superiority of the former over the latter, will be treated in distinction three and elsewhere as occasion offers.⁴⁰

[*e.* An Ineffective Proof]. Finally, some⁴¹ argue to the proposed conclusion from the absence of any intrinsic cause, for matter is determined by form as the potential is determined by act, perfection, and the existence of its form. Conversely, the form is limited by matter as act is limited by potency. Any form incapable of being in matter, therefore, is infinite. God is of such kind.

This reason does not hold, for according to these men,⁴² the angel is immaterial; therefore, its nature is infinite. They cannot avoid this conclusion by saying that the existence of the angel limits its essence, for they maintain that existence is accidental to the essence and naturally posterior to it. And so in the first instance of nature,⁴³ the essence, considered in its own right and as prior to existence, seems to be intensively infinite. Consequently, it cannot be limited by existence in the second instance of nature.

Briefly, then, I reply to the argument. If an entity is finite or infinite, it is so not by reason of something incidental to itself, but because it has its own intrinsic degree of finite or infinite perfection respectively.

It is also argued that,⁴⁴ if form is limited with reference to matter, where there is no matter, there the form is infinite. This is the fallacy of asserting the consequent, just as is the following : a body is limited with reference to a body ; therefore, if a body is not limited with reference to another body, it will be infinite ; hence, the outermost heaven will be actually infinite. This is the fallacy of *Physics*, bk. III.* For, just as a body is first limited in itself by its own proper boundaries before it is limited with respect to anything else (as is the case with the heavens), so the finite form is first limited in itself before it is limited with respect to matter. That is to say, it is of such a nature that it is limited, and this, prior to any union with matter ; for the second limitation presupposes, and does not cause, the first. The finite character of the angelic essence, then, is something that is prior by nature to its existence. Consequently, it is not its subsequent existence that makes such an essence limited. To put the argument briefly in one sentence, I say that every finite essence is such absolutely and prior to any reference it may have to another essence.

[*Solution of the Question*] ⁴⁵

The solution to the question, then, is clear from the foregoing, for the first article establishes the existence of some being that is simply first by the triple primacy of efficiency, finality and eminence, and is first in such an unqualified sense that it would be impossible for anything to be prior to it. This is to establish the existence of God so far as the divine properties that have reference to creatures are concerned, or in so far as creatures are dependent upon him. The second article shows in four

his nature, also admit the existence of evil in the universe? As I have already made clear in proving that God acts with knowledge,⁴⁸ I reply that they could not consistently explain the contingent character of the evil in the universe. All they could maintain would be that one order of causes could produce something capable of receiving a given perfection, whereas another order of necessity would produce the opposite of this perfection. In other words, if we considered all the causes actually concurring at that time, this perfection could not be induced at this particular moment. Absolutely speaking, however, if we consider not this particular event, but one similar in kind, then a thing produced by some of these causes could also be the recipient of a perfection which *de facto* was necessarily absent at this particular time. According to them, therefore, just as the efficient causes in one group act necessarily, so the impeding efficient causes of the other group act necessarily. The sun dissolves something, then, with the same necessity with which Saturn condenses it. Therefore, since every defect of matter is due to a deficiency in the strength of the efficient causes, if each efficient cause acts necessarily, then every defect, monstrosity, or evil in the universe occurs necessarily. What the philosophers can say of our free will and moral evil, however, will have to be treated elsewhere.

*To the second argument,*⁴⁹ I say that the consequence is invalid. As to the proof adduced in its favour, I show that there is no parity between the impossibility of several extended things filling the same place and several essences existing simultaneously. For no entity so fills the whole nature of being as to render impossible the coexistence of another. "Coexistence" in this latter case, however, should not be understood in the sense of filling a place, but rather as a kind of essential commensuration.⁵⁰ The extension of one thing, however, fills any place to the utmost of its capacity. More than one entity, therefore,

would not move, properly speaking, since the two reasons for succession would be absent in that on which it acts. The Philosopher, therefore, does not mean that an infinite power would move instantaneously as the argument assumes, but that a power infinite in magnitude, though it is not in time, nevertheless moves in the proper sense, which is a contradiction. From this it follows that such an antecedent includes contradictory notions, namely a power infinite in magnitude.

But a doubt arises. Since an infinite motive power acting of necessity is assumed, it would seem to follow necessarily that this power acts instantaneously, even though it may not move instantaneously. Consequently, it follows further, that no agent will move another properly speaking. That this would follow is clear from what was just proved above regarding an infinite necessarily acting power.

Averroes in *Metaphysics*, bk. XII,* replies that it is not enough simply to have an infinitely powerful First Mover. What is further required is that this First Mover and some additional finite power co-operate in such a way that the infinity of the motion is due to the First Mover, whereas the succession is due to the other. Without the co-operation of some finite mover, succession would be impossible; for if only the infinite agent acted, it would act instantaneously. This solution will be disproved in the last question of distinction eight † where the philosophers who assume that whatever the First Cause does immediately, it does with necessity, are attacked.

But for Christians, who say that God acts contingently, the objection presents no difficulty, since they can answer it with ease. For, even if an infinite power which acts necessarily and to the utmost of its power, does instantaneously whatever it does immediately, this is not true of an infinite power which acts freely and contingently. As it is in the power of such an agent either to act or not to act, so it has the power either to act in time or to act

necessary being, if it exist, is necessary being without qualification. But if another God exists, He is a necessary being. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major : If you grant the opposite of the predicate (viz. "[it] is not necessary being without qualification"), the opposite of the subject follows (viz. "It is not necessary but only possible being, if it exists").—Reply : The opposite of the subject which is to be inferred is this. "It is not a necessary being, if it exists." Here, then, the relation between antecedent and consequent may be denied.

To the contrary :

In *Deuteronomy** we read : "Hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord", and in *Isaias* † : "There is no God besides me".

[Body of the Question]

In this question, the conclusion is certain.

[*First Opinion*]

Some say,⁶ however, that the unicity of God cannot be demonstrated but is accepted only on faith. And in this they follow the authority of Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] ‡ who says that it is known from the Law that God is one. Reason supports this view, for if the mind by its natural powers could know that God is one, then it could also know naturally that God is singular. In this case, natural reason could know the singularity of God and could also know the essence of God as singular, which is false and contradicts what was said in the question about the subject of theology.⁷

[*Scotus's Opinion*]

Nevertheless, it seems that natural reason could establish the unicity of God by arguing from (1) the infinite

A second argument based on the intellect is this. One and the same act of intellection cannot have two adequate objects. Now *A* is its own adequate object of intellection, for the essence of *A* is the adequate object of *A*'s intellection. Consequently *B*'s essence is not its adequate object. But if *A* could know perfectly both itself and *B* at one and the same time, then *B* would be an adequate object of *A*'s intellection. The major is evident, for otherwise the intellect could be perfectly satisfied and have all that it is capable of even though its adequate object were non-existent. Such an object, consequently, would be useless.

[*Second Proof*]. A second way is this. Any will that is infinite wills things the way they should be willed. Therefore, it loves whatever is lovable to the extent that it is lovable. If the object is infinitely lovable, then such a will loves it to the utmost of its ability. But since *B* is assumed to be another God, it must be loved infinitely. Consequently, *B* inasmuch as it is infinitely good must be loved infinitely by any power capable of infinite love. The will of *A*, then, loves *B* infinitely. Now this is impossible since *A* naturally loves itself more than *B*.⁸ Proof: Everything naturally loves its own being more than any other if it is neither a part nor an effect of this other. But *A* is neither a part nor the effect of *B*; therefore *A* loves itself naturally more than *B*. But a free will that loves things as they should be loved conforms itself to this natural will; otherwise the natural will would not always be as it should be. Therefore, if *A* wills as it should, then it elicits a greater act of love for itself than for *B* and hence does not love *B* infinitely.

A second argument based on the will runs as follows. Either *A* finds its happiness in *B* or it simply uses *B*. If it merely uses *B*, then *A*'s love is inordinate.⁹ If it finds its happiness in *B* as well as in itself, then *A* is beatified by two distinct objects, neither of which depends upon the other, for *A* is made just as happy by *B* as it is by itself.

objectis beatificantibus totalibus. Probatio : quia utroque destructo, nihilominus esset beatus ; ergo in neutro est beatus.

[*Tertia Via*]. De tertia via, scilicet de ratione infiniti [boni], arguitur sic : voluntas ordinate potest appetere majus bonum et magis amare majus bonum. Sed plura bona infinita, si sint possibilis, plus includunt bonitatis quam unum infinitum ; ergo voluntas ordinate plus posset amare plura infinita quam unum, et per consequens in nullo uno objecto infinito quietaretur. Sed hoc est contra rationem boni quod sit infinitum et non quietativum cujuscumque voluntatis.

[*Quarta Via*]. Quantum ad quartam viam de potentia infinita arguo sic : non possunt esse duae causae totales ejusdem effectus in eodem ordine causae ; sed infinita potentia est causa totalis respectu cujuscumque effectus in ratione primae causae ; ergo nulla alia potest esse in ratione causae primae respectu alicujus effectus, et ita nulla alia causa infinita in potentia. Primam propositionem probo : quia tunc posset aliquid esse causa alicujus a quo illud non dependeret. Probatio : a nullo aliquid dependet essentialiter, quo non existente, nihilominus esset ; sed si C habet duas causas totales A et B, et in eodem ordine, utroque eorum non existente, nihilominus esset ipsum C ab altero eorum, quia non existente A, nihil minus est ipsum C ab ipso B et non existente B, nihil minus est C ab A.

Juxta illud arguitur de unitate cujuscumque primi in quacumque primitate praedicta. Nihil enim est excessum a duobus primo precedentibus ; vel finitum essentialiter ordinatur [*MS* ordinantur] ad duos primos fines. Esset [*MS* essent] enim aliquid ad finem, quo non

end for whose sake the other exists. Neither is anything excelled to the ultimate degree by two most perfect beings, for then something could be non-existent and still excel something either as its essential measure of perfection or as that from which it receives its essential perfection. This, however, is impossible. It is not possible, then, that two infinite beings should be ultimate ends, or that of two more perfect beings, both should be the most excellent.

[*Fifth Proof*]. As to the fifth way, I say that what is absolutely infinite, cannot be excelled. And I argue thus. Any perfection that can exist in numerically different things is more perfect if it exist in several than if it exist merely in one, as [Augustine] points out in *De Trinitate*, BK. VIII, c. i.* Therefore, what is absolutely infinite cannot be found in several numerically different things.

[*Sixth Proof*]. The sixth way that I argue is this. A species which can be multiplied in more than one individual, is not of itself determined to any certain number of individuals but is compatible with an infinity of individuals. This is evident in the case of all perishable species. Therefore, if the perfection of necessary existence can be multiplied in more than one individual, it is not of itself restricted to any certain number, but is compatible with infinity. But if an infinity of necessary beings can exist, they do exist. Therefore, etc. The consequence is false ; hence the antecedent is also false.

This argument can be reformulated on the basis of [God's] primacy as follows. One thing of a given kind is not related to others of its kind in such a way that it is limited to just this plurality or to a certain number of such things. There is nothing in the nature itself which requires that there be just so many individuals, nor in a cause that says there must be only so many things caused, unless you insist on what we seek to prove [viz. that the nature is such that it be found in but one individual]. But "deity" is one given kind of thing, and

according to you is found in more than one individual of its kind. Therefore, deity as such is not determined to any certain number of individuals nor can it be so determined by anything other than itself, for this would be repugnant to what is truly first. Therefore, deity exists in an infinite number of individuals. This argument, as we see, is based upon the notion that primacy of itself is indetermined.

The second argument I give, based on this way, runs as follows. If several necessary beings existed, they would be distinguished from one another by some real perfections. Let us call these *A* and *B*. Then I argue, either these two necessary beings which differ by *A* and *B* are necessary formally in virtue of *A* and *B*, or they are not. If not, then *A* is not a formal reason for necessary existence, and the same is true of *B*. Hence, whatever includes *A* or *B* is not primarily a necessary being, because it includes some entity which is neither its necessity of existence nor is it necessary of itself. If, however, these two beings are formally necessary in virtue of *A* and *B*, in addition to being necessary by reason of what they have in common, then each being contains two reasons why it is formally necessary. This, however, is impossible for neither of these two reasons includes the other, and hence if either of the two were absent, the being would still exist necessarily in virtue of what remains. In such an impossible situation, something would owe its formal necessity to what could be removed and still leave the being a necessary being.

[*Seventh Proof*]. As regards the seventh way, from omnipotence, it seems that the thesis cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, for omnipotence—as Catholics understand the term—cannot be demonstrated from natural reason, nor does it follow from the notion of infinite power, as will be shown later. Still, if omnipotence be accepted on faith, then one can argue that if *A* is omnipotent, it can make everything other than itself

come into existence or go out of existence. Consequently, it can destroy *B* and thus render *B* impotent. From this it follows that *B* is not God.

Some¹² object that this reason does not hold since *B* is not an object of omnipotence, for omnipotence has as its object only what can, yet need not, exist, whereas *B* is assumed to be just as necessary as *A*.

Wherefore, we must reformulate the argument of Richard [of St Victor] in his work *De Trinitate** where he says: "Whoever will have been omnipotent, will easily be able to make everything else impotent". Just as an omnipotent being can produce whatever is possible simply by willing that it should be, so also he can impede or destroy everything that is possible by willing that it should not be. But if *A* is omnipotent, he can will everything other than himself and so, by his will, cause everything to exist. It is not necessary, however, that *B* will everything which *A* wills because the will of *B* is related only contingently to what *A* wills, even as the will of *A* is related contingently to what *B* wills, assuming here that each is God. But if *B* wills that none of these things should exist, then none will exist. Consequently, if two omnipotent beings exist, each will make the other impotent, not indeed by destroying the other, but because one by his positive will could keep non-existent what the other wills should exist.

And if you say, to argue sophistically, that they voluntarily agree on a common way of acting through some sort of pact, even though there is really no intrinsic necessity that they do so, still I prove that neither will be omnipotent. For if *A* is omnipotent, by willing he can produce every possible thing that can be produced and thus *B* can produce nothing by willing and hence will not be omnipotent. That this follows is clear from what was said in the fourth way. For it is impossible that two total causes should produce one and the same effect,

for what is caused completely by one cannot be caused by the other.

[*Reply to the arguments for the First Opinion*] ¹³

First I answer the arguments for the other opinion, replying first to the authority of Rabbi Moses. I say that the reason God's unicity was a matter of belief in the Law is to be found in the fact that the people were uneducated and prone to idolatry. Consequently, they needed the Law to tell them that there is but one God even though this truth could be demonstrated by natural reason. The fact that God exists is also known from the Law, for instance, *Exodus*, III* : "I am who am", and the Apostle to the Hebrews † : "For he who comes to God must believe that God exists". Nevertheless, we do not deny that God's existence is demonstrable. On the same grounds, then, we must not deny that reason can demonstrate that there is but one God just because this is accepted from the Law. Indeed it is good that many things demonstrable in themselves be transmitted to the human race by way of authority also because of man's weakness of intellect, his neglect to seek the truth and because of the mistakes he makes when he tries to demonstrate something. As Augustine says in the *City of God*, ‡ much falsity is mixed with truth, and since simple people following such demonstrators could still be in doubt about what they must assent to, the firm, safe and common way is by means of authority so certain it can neither deceive nor be deceived.

As for the second reason about the singular, I say that it is one thing to conceive singularity as an object or part of an object. It is quite another thing to have singularity as a mode of conception or as the aspect under which the object is conceived. For example, when I say "a universal", the object conceived is plurality, but singularity is the mode of conception, that is, it is conceived as a singular thing. So also with logical intentions. When

case, however, with the other co-significates of a noun or verb, for from the proposition "God is" [where the noun God or *Deus* is masculine gender] it does not follow that God Himself is masculine, for it suffices for a noun to be masculine if there is something about the reality that would justify this gender, for instance, activity. I say, therefore, that the subject "gods" conceived in the plural form includes a contradiction since the mode of conception is repugnant to what is conceived under this mode. As for the proof of the consequence, viz. that the singular and plural include the same thing, I reply that the singular includes it in a conceptual mode that is in harmony with the thing conceived whereas the plural includes it in a conceptual mode that is incompatible with the thing conceived. So far as the conceptual mode and the thing conceived are concerned, then, the singular includes a notion that is, as it were, true in itself, whereas the plural includes a notion that is, as it were, false in itself. Consequently, it does not follow that the plural is true of several as the singular is true of one, for nothing is true that is false in itself. And in this way we can answer the other proof for the consequence based on the proposition: "There is something in comparison with which nothing greater can be conceived." For "gods" is not something conceivable without contradiction, since the mode of conception is repugnant to the thing conceived. Consequently, the major must be glossed the way it was in the previous question. For if the proposition is to be true or to make any sense, it is necessary that the notion of the subject includes no inherent contradiction, as has been pointed out in the second question of this distinction.*

To the *third argument* ¹⁷ I reply that its major premise is not a primary truth but is reduced to this: "Everything imperfect is traced back to something perfect".¹⁸ Since every being by participation is imperfect and only that being which is such by its essence is perfect, therefore this

[V. CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE]

Finally, on the subject of what we can know, I ask *whether any certain and unadulterated truth can be known naturally by the intellect of a person in this life without the special illumination of the Uncreated Light?*

[Pro et Contra]

I argue that no such truth can be known ¹:

[Arg. I]. From [St Augustine]: *De Trinitate*, BK. IX †: “But we gaze upon the indestructible truth by reason of which we may define perfectly what the mind of man should be according to the eternal reasons”. And again: “When we accept or reject something correctly, our incontestable conviction arises from other immutable rules above our minds”. And again: “Grasping by simple intelligence the unspeakably beautiful art that lies beyond the eye of the mind. . .”. And in the same work ‡: “In the eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we behold the form . . . and we have within us like a Word the knowledge of what we have conceived”.

[Arg. II]. Also in BK. XII **: “But it pertains to higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to eternal reasons”.

[Arg. III]. And in the same BK. XII ††: “And not only are there immutable reasons for sensible things posited in place, etc. . .”. That Augustine here is speaking of the eternal reasons that are really in God is proved by the fact that he says in the same passage that

assents to the proposition "Socrates is white", because it saw the terms united in reality.

Indeed, if the senses from which these terms were received were all false, or what is more deceptive, if some were false and others true, I still maintain that the intellect would not be deceived about such principles, because the terms which are the cause of the truth would always be present to the intellect. And so it would be if the species of whiteness and blackness were impressed miraculously in sleep upon one who was blind from birth and they remained after he awoke. The intellect could abstract from these and form the proposition "White is not black". And it would not be deceived with regard to this proposition even if the terms were derived from erring senses, because the formal meaning of the terms at which the intellect has arrived is the necessary cause of this negative truth.

[*b. Experimental Knowledge*]. As for what is known by experience, I have this to say. Even though a person does not experience every single individual, but only a great many, nor does he experience them at all times, but only frequently, still he knows infallibly that it is always this way and holds for all instances. He knows this in virtue of this proposition reposing in his soul: "Whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free, is the natural effect of that cause". This proposition is known to the intellect even if the terms are derived from erring senses, because a cause that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce. The chance cause, however, is ordained either to produce or not produce the opposite of the chance effect. Consequently, if the effect occurs frequently it is not produced by chance and its cause therefore will be a natural cause if it is not a free agent. But this effect occurs through such a cause. Therefore, since the latter

state to such an extent that the sense image would represent itself as an object, for it is self-evident to the intellect that when it knows, it is awake, and that, consequently, the imagination is not bound in a waking state as it is in sleep.

But there is still another objection to the aforementioned certitude about our actions. It runs as follows. I seem to see and to hear, whereas in reality I neither see nor hear ; consequently, I have no certainty on this point. I reply that it is one thing to show someone who denies a given proposition that it is true and quite another to indicate to someone who admits the given proposition how it is true. For example in *Metaphysics*, bk. iv,* the Philosopher does not adduce the inconsistency that "contrary opinions would be present in the soul at one and the same time" against those who deny the first principle [viz. of contradiction], for they indeed would concede this as a premise. Instead he brings out other inconsistencies which are more manifest to them though they are not more evident in themselves. But he does show those who grant this first principle how this principle is known. For it is known in such a way that its opposite could not even enter the mind. This he proves from the fact that otherwise contrary opinions could exist simultaneously in the mind. Such a conclusion is, in this case, even more inconsistent than the hypothesis.

So it is in our case. If you hold that nothing is self-evident, I will not argue with you for it is clear that you are a quibbler and are not to be convinced. This is apparent from your actions, as the Philosopher indicates in *Metaphysics*, bk. iv,† for if you dream of obtaining or going after some nearby object, after you awake you no longer seek it as you would do, or would have done, had you been that close to getting it while awake.

If, however, you admit that some proposition is self-evident and that a power indisposed can err with regard to anything, as is clear in the case of dreams, then from

the fact that something can be recognised as self-evident it follows that a person can tell when a faculty is disposed and when it is not. Consequently, in regard to our actions it is possible to know that a faculty is so disposed that what appears to be self-evident is actually so.

As to the form of this sophistical argument, then, I say this. Just it appears to the dreamer that he sees, so also the opposite of some self-evident speculative principle might appear to him. But from this it still does not follow that such a principle is not self-evident. Likewise it does not follow that it is not self-evident to the hearer that he hears. For if a power that is indisposed can err with regard to either truth, a power that is disposed cannot. And it is self-evident when it is disposed and when it is not. Otherwise, nothing else would be recognised as self-evident, for one could never tell what would be self-evident, or whether this is something to which the intellect is disposed or to which it would assent in this way.

[*Article IV. Concerning Henry's Conclusion*]. In the fourth article I argue against the conclusion of [Henry's] view²⁰ as follows: What, I ask, is meant by certain and unadulterated truth? Either it means infallible truth, that is, a truth which excludes all doubt and deception. And in this case, we have proved and declared already in the second and third articles that such truth is possible on purely natural grounds. Or by such truth he means truth as an attribute of "being". In which case, since we can know "being" we can also know its attribute "true". And if we know "true" we can also know truth by a kind of abstraction. For any form that can be recognised in a subject can also be known in itself and in the abstract apart from the subject. Or truth is to be understood in still another way, as truth of conformity to an exemplar. If the exemplar in question is taken to be created, we have what we seek to prove. If conformity to an uncreated exemplar is meant, why such

things in their light. And in the fourth book, in the chapter cited above, he maintains that the philosophers saw truth in the eternal reasons even though they lacked faith. And in the same question, he holds that no one can be wise without a knowledge of the ideas in the way, for instance, that they would concede Plato to be wise. But this purity must be understood of the elevation of the intellect to the contemplation of these truths as they are in themselves and not as they appear in the sense image.

Here we must remember that the sensible thing outside causes a confused sense image, something with only an incidental unity in the faculty of imagination, which represents the thing according to its quantity, colour and other sensible accidents. And just as the sense image represents things only confusedly and according to an incidental unity, so many perceive only such incidental combinations. Now, primary truths are primary precisely because their terms are grasped in their proper nature and apart from all that is merely incidental to them. Now this proposition, "The whole is greater than its part", is not primarily true of the whole as realised in a stone or in wood, but of "whole" in the abstract, i.e. apart from everything with which it merely happens to be joined. Consequently, the mind which never conceives totality except in an incidental concept such as the totality of a stone or the totality of wood, never really understands the pure truth of this principle, because it never grasps the precise nature of the terms to which the principle owes its truth. It is only within the power of the few to attain the eternal reasons, because it is only the few that have an understanding of the essentials, whereas the many grasp things merely in incidental concepts such as those mentioned above. But these few are not said to be distinguished from the others by a special illumination, but by better natural powers, since they have a sharper and more abstractive mind, or be-

cause of greater research which enables one person to know those essences which another equally talented individual does not discover because he does not investigate them.

And in this way we can understand Augustine's statement in *De Trinitate*, bk. ix, c. vi,* regarding the individual on the mountain who sees the pure light above and the mist below. For whoever grasps nothing but incidental notions in the way that the sense image represents such objects, viz. as a kind of accidental aggregate, is like one in a valley surrounded by mist. But by grasping just what things are of themselves, a person separates the essences from the many additional incidental features associated with them in the sense image. Such a one, as it were, has the sense image in the mist beneath him, but he himself is on the mountain to the extent that in virtue of the uncreated intellect, the Eternal Light, he knows this truth and sees what is true from above, as a more universal truth.

[The Fourth Way]. And finally, we can concede that pure truths are known in the Eternal Light as in a remotely known object. For the Uncreated Light is the first source of speculative things and the ultimate end of practical things. The first speculative and practical principles, then, are derived from it. Hence, the knowledge of speculative and practical things by means of principles derived from the Eternal Light, where the latter is known,³⁰ is more perfect and prior to knowledge derived from principles from the respective class of things as such, as has been pointed out in the question on the subject of theology. Such knowledge is more eminent than any other. Now it is in this way that the knowledge of all things pertains to the theologian. In this way pure truth is said to be known, since truth alone without admixture of anything else is known, for it is known through the First Being. And once this Being is known, the principles for knowing in this perfect way are derived

or neither. If unwillingly, how is the life blessed which is so within his will as not to be within his power? And whereas no one is blessed who wills something that he does not have, how much less is he blessed who is quitted against his will, not by honour, nor by possessions, nor by any other thing, but by the blessed life itself, since he will have no life at all. . . . But neither is that a blessed life which is such as to be unworthy of his love whom it makes blessed”.

[Arg. III]. Furthermore, it is known naturally that an entire species cannot fail to attain its end. At least the end must be achieved in some individuals. But it is naturally known that beatitude is the end of the human species. Therefore, it is naturally known that at least some individual can attain it. But he cannot attain it in this life because of the many concomitant miseries such as the vicissitudes of fortune, bodily infirmity, imperfect knowledge and virtue, instability and fatigue in the exercise of even the most perfect acts, inasmuch as no operation, be it ever so delightful in the beginning, can continue to be delightful. Furthermore, when such an operation causes what is delightful to become distasteful, it will no longer be performed. Now it is known by natural reason that the beatific vision is not something distasteful. Neither is it something that the soul can possess alone in separation from the body, for in this way man would not attain his goal. Consequently, this end will be attained in another life by the whole man, body and soul together. It seems, then, that natural reason can reach this conclusion at least in regard to those ways by which man will attain his end.

[Arg. IV]. Furthermore, by natural reason it is known that every species required for the integrity of the universe, is eternal. For the universe as an integral whole is eternal. Now man is the most perfect species, at least among terrestrial beings, for, *Physics*, BK. II,* “we are in some way the end of all things”. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary :

[Arg. i]. Augustine, speaking of the life that is eternal and immortal in *De Trinitate* BK. XIII, c. ix,* says : "Whether human nature can receive this . . . is no small question. . . . Assuredly, of those who endeavour to discover it from human reasonings, scarcely a few, and they endowed with great abilities and abounding in leisure, and learned with the most subtle learning, have been able to attain to the investigation of the immortality of the soul alone".

[Arg. ii]. Furthermore, in *Acts* xvii,† it is related that certain Athenians listening to Paul said : " 'He seems to be a herald of strange gods', because he proclaimed to them Jesus and the resurrection". Nevertheless, these Athenians were philosophers whose forte was the use of natural reason, as is clear from the case of the convert Dionysius, who was one of them. But it does not seem that what appeared to them to be so far from the truth is known adequately by natural reason. Hence, it is evident here that what Paul adduces in this connexion is meant to be nothing more than a kind of persuasive form of argumentation.

[Arg. iii]. Furthermore, when Paul said in *Acts* xxvi,‡ "that Christ was to suffer, that he first by his resurrection [from the dead was to proclaim light to the people and to the Gentiles . . .] Festus said with a loud voice, 'Paul, thou art mad !' "

[Body of the Question]

[Part I. A Kind of A Priori Proof]

This much is clear, if any argument proves the resurrection, it must be one based on something that is proper to man and does not belong to other perishable things. But such a thing would not be matter, not even incorruptible matter.² Neither is it some form that can be destroyed. For even if such a form exist in man and

indeed, one even more excellent than any brute form, still this would not provide an adequate argument for the resurrection of man as a whole. Hence, the argument must be based upon that form which is specific to man or upon some operation which man enjoys by reason of this form.

[*Method of Procedure*]. The method used to establish the thesis is to proceed from three propositions. If all three of these can be known by natural reason, the proposed conclusion will follow. The three propositions are these: (1) *The intellectual soul is the specific form of man*; (2) *The intellectual soul is incorruptible*. From these two it follows that the specific form of man is incorruptible. To these a third is added: (3) *The specific form of man will not remain forever outside the composite*. Hence it follows that at some time the same composite will be restored. This second return Damascene calls the resurrection*: "The resurrection is the second rising of what has been dissolved". Let us consider these three propositions in order and see to what extent they are evident.

[*First Proposition. The intellectual soul is the specific form of man*]. This first proposition is said to be known by natural reason and is proved in two ways. The first proof is based upon the testimony of philosophers who assert this as something known by natural reason alone. The other proceeds from natural arguments which lead to this conclusion.

[Proof based on the testimony of the philosophers]. As to the first, Aristotle defines the soul in the *De anima*, BK. II,† as "the act of the natural organised body", and so on. And in the beginning of BK. III,‡ he speaks of "the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks . . .", where he seems to make the intellectual soul at least a subjective part,³ of what he has previously defined as the soul in general.

Furthermore, all philosophers commonly assign "rational" as the difference that properly defines man,

meaning by "rational" that the intellectual soul is an essential part of man.

In fact, to put it briefly, no philosopher of any note can be found to deny this except that accursed Averroes in his commentary on *De anima*, bk. III,* where his fantastic conception, intelligible neither to himself nor to others, assumes the intellectual part of man to be a sort of separate substance united to man through the medium of sense images. But neither he nor his followers to the present day have been able to explain this union. Nor can it be maintained that in virtue of such a union man himself understands, for according to him, man as such is nothing more than a kind of irrational animal which excels the other animals by reason of an irrational sensitive soul that is more excellent than other souls.

[Proof from reason]. As to the second, it is not easy to find either an *a priori* or an *a posteriori* argument, unless it be based on a function proper to man, for the form is known from its proper function, even as matter is known from the existence of change.

[1. *An Unsatisfactory Formulation*]. One argument⁴ based on the function of the intellect that is used to establish the proposed conclusion is this. To understand is a function proper to man. Therefore, it has its source in the form proper to man. The intellectual form then is that proper to man.

This argument, however, is open to criticism inasmuch as those who propound it admit that the intellect has only a passive and not an active relation to intellection. Hence, this proposition "A function that is proper proceeds from the proper form" really does not prove that the intellectual part is the proper form of man, for this operation does not proceed from the form but according to them⁵ it is caused by the intelligible object, or according to the view of others it proceeds from the sense image.⁶

[2. *Scotus's Formulation*]. I put this argument, then,

rationem aliter sic: Homo intelligit formaliter et proprie; ergo anima intellectiva est proprie forma hominis.

Antecedens videtur satis manifestum secundum auctoritates Aristotelis tertio *De anima*,* et primo *Ethicorum*,† quod intelligere est propria operatio hominis. Operatio autem ut distinguitur contra actionem seu factionem formaliter inest operanti, et non est ab ipso in alterum. Consimiliter decimo *Ethicorum* ‡ in intelligere ponit felicitatem hominis, et manifestum est quod illa felicitas inest formaliter homini; ergo et illa operatio in qua consistit.

Sed tentandum est probare antecedens per rationem contra protervum si neget, et hoc intelligendo in antecedente intelligere proprie dictum per quod intelligo actum cognoscendi transcendentem totum genus sensitivae cognitionis.

Probatur ergo illud antecedens uno modo sic. Homo cognoscit actu cognoscendi, non organico; ergo intelligit proprie. Consequentia patet ex ratione jam posita, quia intellectio proprie est cognitio transcendens totum genus sensationis; omnis autem sensatio est cognitio organica ex secundo *De anima*. Antecedens hujus enthymematis probatur, nam organum determinatur ad certum genus sensibilibus ex II *De anima*,** et hoc ideo quia consistit in media proportionem extremorum illius generis. Sed aliquam cognitionem experimur in nobis quae non competit nobis secundum tale organum, quia tunc determinaretur praecise ad sensibilia determinati generis, cujus oppositum experimur, quia cognoscimus

* III, cap. iii, passim.

† *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, cap. vii (109^a, 7).

‡ X, cap. viii (117^b, 21).

** II, cap. v-xii, passim (416^b, 32^{ss}; 424^a, 25-26).

in another form. *Man formally and properly understands; therefore, the intellectual soul is the proper form of man.*

[a. Proof of the antecedent]. The antecedent seems to be clear enough according to the testimony of Aristotle in *De anima*, BK. III,* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, BK. I,† since to understand is the proper operation of man. Now an operation, in contradistinction to an act of fashioning something or to an action, is formally in the one who performs the operation and is not produced by the agent in something else. Similarly Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics*, BK. X,‡ makes man's happiness consist in understanding. Now it is clear that this felicity is formally in man. Consequently the operation in which this felicity consists must also be in man formally.

Nevertheless, we should try to prove the antecedent by reason lest some contentious individual deny it. Now in the antecedent, I take "to know" or "to understand" in the proper sense of the term as an act of knowledge which transcends every type of sense knowledge.

[First proof]. One way of proving this antecedent, then, is this. Man knows by an act of knowledge which is not organic; hence he knows or understands in the proper sense of the term. The consequence is evident for the reason already given, since intellection properly speaking is a knowledge which transcends all sense knowledge. All sensation, however, is organic knowledge as Aristotle shows in *De anima*, BK. II. There the antecedent of this enthymeme is proved from the fact that every organ is determined to a certain kind of sensible,⁷ and this because it consists in a balance between two extremes.⁸ But we do experience in ourselves some knowledge which we do not have in virtue of some organ, for if it were organic, this knowledge would be limited precisely to the sensibles of some determined kind, which is the very opposite of what we actually

experience. For by such an act we know precisely how one kind of sensible differs from another, and consequently we know both extremes. This consequence is evident from the Philosopher, who uses this argument in *De anima*, bk. II,* in regard to common sense.

But to this some object, *first* of all, that organic knowledge is that which is present in some determinate part of the body, whereas the aforesaid knowledge by which we distinguish sensibles from things that cannot be perceived by the senses, is present in the body as a whole and for this reason is not had in virtue of some organ in the proper sense of the word. For an attribute of the whole is as material as something which exists in one of its parts. Nevertheless, this knowledge does not transcend in perfection the whole class of sense knowledge since it is primarily in the body as a whole and hence is just as material in character as the knowledge in only a part of the whole. *Secondly*, they deny the assumption that this act of knowledge is not present in virtue of some organ because it is there by reason of the organ of the imagination. Proof for this is found in the fact that when this organ is damaged, such knowledge is no longer possible. Neither is the proof from the limitation of the organ to a certain kind of sensible conclusive, because the imagination extends to all sensibles.

The first objection, however, has already been excluded by what was treated above, for through this act of knowledge we discern the difference between the whole class of sensibles and something that is outside the class as a whole. Neither does the argument that this act is impeded by damage done to the imagination prove anything. For this is due to the functional relation that exists between these powers and not because the act of understanding is exercised through the medium of an organ.

[*Second proof*]. Another proof for the principal antecedent is based on the fact that we possess some immaterial

knowledge. No sense knowledge, however, can be immaterial ; therefore, etc.

This word "immaterial" is frequently used by the Philosopher in this connexion, but it appears to be ambiguous. There are three relevant ways in which it can be understood. (a) Either this knowledge is immaterial because it is incorporeal in the sense that it is not an operation that involves a corporeal part or organ. In this sense, the present proposition is the same as that previously posited with regard to non-organic knowledge. (b) Another way in which this knowledge could be immaterial would be that it is not extended in any way. In this case much more is asserted than the fact that it is not organic. For although everything organic is extended inasmuch as it is received into something extended [viz. the organ], this is not the only reason. It would still be extended if it were received immediately by the composite as a whole, because the composite is itself extended. (c) Immateriality can be understood in a third sense, namely with reference to the object, inasmuch as this knowledge considers the object under immaterial aspects, as for instance, abstracting from the "here and now" and such like, which are said to be material conditions. If we would prove this knowledge to be immaterial in the second sense and not merely in the first our proposed conclusion would follow all the more. But it seems that the only way we could do this would be from the conditions which characterise the object of such an act (unless perhaps we could do so on the basis of reflection, since we experience ourselves reflecting on this act of knowledge, for what has quantity is not capable of reflecting upon itself.) At any rate the proof of the antecedent ultimately rests upon the object of this act.

The proof is as follows. We possess some knowledge of an object under an aspect it could not have as an object of sense knowledge ; therefore, etc.—Proof of the antecedent : (i) We experience in ourselves that we

et experimur quia cognoscimus ens, vel qualitatem [*MS* quantitatem] sub ratione aliqua communiore quam sit ratio primi objecti sensibilis, etiam respectu supremae sensitivae. Experimur etiam quod cognoscimus relationes consequentes naturas rerum, etiam non sensibilium. Experimur etiam quod distinguimus totum genus sensibile ab aliquo quod non est illius generis. Experimur etiam quod cognoscimus relationes rationis, quae sunt secundae intentiones, scilicet relationem universalis, generis et speciei et compositionis, et aliarum intentionum logicalium. Experimur etiam quod cognoscimus actum illum quo cognoscimus ista, et illud, secundum quod inest nobis iste actus, quod est per actum reflexum super actum rectum et susceptivum ejus. Experimur etiam quod assentimus complexionibus quibusdam sine possibilitate contradicendi vel errandi, utpote primis principiis. Experimur etiam quod cognoscimus ignotum ex noto per discursum, ita quod non possumus dissentire evidentiae discursus, nec conclusionis illatae; quodcumque istorum cognoscere est impossibile cuicumque potentiae sensitivae, ergo, etc.—Si quis autem proterve neget istos actus inesse homini, nec se experiri istos actus in se, non est ulterius cum eo disputandum, sed dicendum est sibi quod est brutum; sicut cum dicente, non video colorem ibi, non est disputandum, sed dicendum sibi, tu indiges sensu quia caecus es. Ita quod quodam sensu, id est, perceptione interiori, experimur istos actus in nobis; et ideo si quis istos neget, dicendum est eum non esse hominem, quia non habet istam visionem quam alii experiuntur.—Assumptum, scilicet quod nullus istorum actuum potest inesse secundum aliquam potentiam sensitivam, probatur, quia actu universale cognoscitur sub tanta indifferentia

know the actual universal. (ii) We experience that we know being or quality under a more general notion than that characteristic of the primary object of even the highest sense faculty. (iii) We experience that we also know relations that follow from the nature of things, even when the latter are not capable of being perceived by the senses. (iv) We experience that we distinguish the whole class of sensible objects from what is not such. (v) We experience that we know conceptual relations, which are second intentions, such as that of the universal, the genus, the species, the judgment and other logical intentions. (vi) We also experience that we know the very act whereby we know these things and we experience that this act exists within us. This we do by an act of reflection upon the direct act and its recipient. (vii) We experience that we assent to propositions such as the first principles without a possibility of error or contradiction. (viii) We also experience that we learn the unknown from the known by means of discursive reasoning, so that we are unable to refuse our assent to the evidence of the reasoning process or to the conclusion that is inferred. But the knowledge of any of these cannot be attributed to any sensitive faculty; therefore, etc.—Should a contentious individual deny that such acts are present in man or that he experiences these acts in himself, a person ought not to argue with him any further, but he ought to be told that he is a brute animal. It is the same with one who says: "I do not see colour here". We should not argue with such a one but simply tell him: "You need senses because you are blind". And so by a certain "sense", namely internal perception, we experience these acts within ourselves. Hence, if someone were to deny their existence we would have to say that he is not a man because he lacks this interior vision which others experience.—The assumption that a sense faculty is not the source of any of these acts [viz. (i) to (viii)] is proved as follows: The actual universal has such an indifference

about it that what is known in this way can be predicated simultaneously of all the singulars of which it is characteristic ; no sense faculty, however, knows things in this way. The same is even more evident as regards the second, for no faculty can know something under an aspect more universal than that of its proper object, even as vision perceives nothing under some aspect common to colour and to sound. Consequently, a knowledge of something in even more general terms than that characteristic of the first object of even the highest sense cannot be a sensation. The same holds true of the fourth, for no sensation can distinguish between the most universal of all sensible objects and that which is not sensible, because it cannot perceive both extremes. This is also true of the relations which exist between things imperceptible to the senses or between such things and those which can be perceived by the senses, for the sense faculty has no ability to perceive such relationships. And this is all the more true of those relations which are purely conceptual, since the senses can be moved to perceive only what is included in a sensible object as such. But conceptual relations are not included in any existing thing as such, whereas the senses have to do with existing things as existing. The same argument could be applied to the actual universal, for it is absurd that the actual universal should exist as such. The other, regarding our ability to reflect upon the act and the faculty, is proved from the fact that anything that has quantity cannot reflect upon itself. As for the other two (viz. the act of judgment and the assent to the same or the act of reasoning and the assent given to the evidence for the same), what was said of conceptual relations proves these acts do not proceed from a sense faculty, for neither of these two exist without a conceptual relation.

[*b. Proof of the consequent*]. The consequence of the first enthymeme ⁹ is proved as follows :

[*First proof*]. If we formally possess such an act, since

nostra, quia quandoque inest et quandoque non inest, ergo oportet dare illi aliquod receptivum proprium; non autem aliquod extensum, sive sit pars organica sive totum compositum, quia tunc illa operatio esset extensa; nec posset esse talis qualis dicta est, circa objecta talia qualia dicta sunt; ergo oportet quod insit secundum aliquid non extensum; et quod illud sit formaliter in nobis, illud non potest esse nisi anima intellectiva, quia quaecumque alia forma est extensa.

Vel aliter potest probari consequentia ista eundo ad conditionem objecti istius actus, quia quaelibet forma inferior intellectiva, si habet operationem, habet praecise respectu objecti sub rationibus oppositis istis rationibus dictis; ergo si habemus operationem circa objectum sub istis rationibus, illa non inest nobis secundum aliquam formam aliam ab intellectiva; ergo inest nobis secundum intellectivam; ergo intellectiva formaliter inest nobis, aliter non essemus formaliter operantes secundum illam operationem.

Ex secunda operatione humana, scilicet voluntate, potest probari idem, quia homo est dominus actuum suorum, ita quod in potestate ejus est per voluntatem determinare se ad hoc vel ejus oppositum, sicut dictum est distinctione xxii, secundi vel xxiii,* q. iii, et hoc est notum non tantum ex fide sed etiam per rationem naturalem. Ista autem indeterminatio non potest esse in aliquo appetitu sensitivo seu organico vel extenso quia quilibet appetitus organicus vel materialis determinatur ad certum genus appetibilem sibi conveniens, ita quod illud apprehensum non potest non convenire nec appetitus nec appetere; ergo voluntas, qua sic indeterminate volumus est appetitus non alicujus talis formae, scilicet

* *Opus oxoniense*, II, dist. xxv, q. unica (Vivès ed.).

it is not our substance as such—for it is not always present in us—it follows, therefore, that this act needs a proper subject. Now the latter cannot be something extended, whether it be a part of the organism or the whole composite, for then this operation itself would be extended and would lack the prescribed characteristics. Neither would it be concerned with such objects as have been described above. Hence, it is necessary that this act be in us in virtue of something unextended and that the latter be formally in us. Now this can be nothing else than the intellectualive soul, for every other form is extended.

[*Second proof*]. Another way to prove this consequence would be to consider the condition of the object of this act, for if any form inferior to the intellectualive form functions, it is always with reference to an object having characteristics the very opposite of those cited above.¹⁰ Therefore, if we have an operation which regards an object under the aforementioned aspects, this will not be present in us in virtue of any form other than the intellectualive. Hence, it is by reason of this form that it is present in us, and consequently the intellectualive form itself is formally in us, for otherwise we would not formally function in this way.

[*Third proof*]. We can prove the same from the second operation characteristic of man, namely volition, for man is master of his acts to such an extent that it is within his power to determine himself at will to this or to its opposite, as has been said in BK. II, dist. xxii or xxiii, q. iii.* And this is something known by natural reason and not merely by faith. Such a lack of determination, however, cannot exist in any organic or extended appetite, because every organic or material appetite is determined to a certain class of suitable objects so that what is apprehended cannot be unsuitable nor can the appetite fail to seek it. The will, therefore, by which we can will in such an indeterminate way, is not the appetite of a

existence and still be eternal and imperishable. And in the *Physics* he says* : "Whatever has a beginning has an end".

[*Scotus's Opinion*]. It can be stated that although there are probable reasons for this second proposition, these are not demonstrative, nor for that matter are they even necessary reasons.¹⁴

[*Reply to the arguments for immortality*]. The testimonies of the philosophers—the first way used to prove the proposition—can be solved in two ways. First of all, it is doubtful what the Philosopher really held on this point, for he speaks differently in different places and has different principles, from some of which one thing seems to follow whereas from others the very opposite can be inferred. Wherefore, it is probable that he was always doubtful about this conclusion and at one time seems to be drawn to one side and at other times to the other depending on whether the subject matter he was treating at the moment was more in accord with the one or with the other.

Another answer, and one more in accord with facts, is that not all the statements by the philosophers were established by proofs both necessary and evident to natural reason. Frequently, what they gave was nothing more than rather persuasive probable arguments or what was commonly held by earlier philosophers. For this reason, the Philosopher in *De caelo et mundo*, bk. II,† in the chapter on the two difficult questions, says : "We must now attempt to state the probable solution, for we regard the zeal of one whose thirst after philosophy leads him to accept even slight indications where it is very difficult to see one's way, as a proof rather of modesty than of over-confidence". Hence, in those matters where they could find nothing better without contradicting the principles of philosophy, "slight indications" frequently had to suffice for the philosophers. As he says in the same chapter : "Accounts of other stars are given by the

Egyptians and Babylonians . . . from whom many of our beliefs about particular stars are derived". Therefore, the philosophers agreed to things sometimes because of probable persuasive reasons, at other times because they had asserted as principles, propositions which were not necessary truths. And this reply would suffice for all the testimonies cited above; even if they clearly asserted the proposed conclusion, they still do not establish it. Nevertheless, these arguments can be answered in order as follows.

[To I]. To the first: Aristotle understands this separation to mean nothing more than that the intellect does not use the body in performing its operation, and for this reason it is incorruptible as to function. This is to be understood in the sense that it is unlike an organic power which perishes precisely because the organ decays. This type of decay pertains exclusively to an organic faculty. For according to the Philosopher in *De anima*,* BK. I, if an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would indeed see as well as the youth. Hence, the faculty of vision grows weak or decays only from the standpoint of its organ and not in so far as its operation directly is concerned. From the fact that the intellect, however, is incapable of decay in the sense that it has no organ by which it could perish, it does not follow that the intellect is imperishable as to function in an unqualified sense, for then it would indeed follow that it is also imperishable in being as the argument maintains. What does follow is this. So far as its ability to operate alone is concerned, the intellect is incapable of dissolution in the same sense that an organic power is corruptible. Absolutely speaking, however, the intellect is assumed to be perishable according to the Philosopher's statement in *De anima*, BK. III, † that the intellect perishes in us once the interior sense perishes. And this is just what one would have to maintain if he assumed the soul to be a principle which has an operation proper to the composite

say it was by one of the Intelligences, then we encounter a double difficulty ; one, because an Intelligence cannot create a substance (as I prove in BK. IV, dist. i) * ; the other, because such a being cannot immediately produce anything new any more than God could, for according to the Philosopher's principles regarding the immutability of the agent it follows that the action of such a being is eternal. Neither do we see any way in which Aristotle could claim that the intellective soul is the effect of some natural agent ¹⁶ without violating his principles, because he seems to assume the soul to be imperishable in *Metaphysics*, BK. XII. † And no form that is the effect of a natural agent is imperishable in an unqualified sense.

But it can be said that he assumed the soul received existence immediately from God and that this existence was something new. For it would follow readily enough from his principles that it would have received existence, since Aristotle assumed no eternal bodiless pre-existence ; neither did he hold that the soul existed previously in some other body ; nor does it seem possible according to reason that a soul which presupposes no material principle could have received its existence from anyone other than God.

To the contrary : If this explanation were true, Aristotle would have admitted creation.—I reply that this does not follow, for he did not assume a production of the intellective soul distinct from the production of the composite, just as he did not assume one production for fire and another for the fire form. What he posited was the animation of the organic body and this incidentally involved the production of its soul. Now we admit two types of production, one from the soul's non-existence to existence and this we call creation, the other is the passage of the body from an inanimate to an animate state and this is the production of a living body by a change in the proper sense of the word. If anyone, therefore, were to assume merely the second type of production

in the sense that a thing which has matter as one of its parts is able to exist and not exist, but also that a thing composed of matter or received into matter is able to exist and not exist. Otherwise the form of fire could not be non-existent, for matter is not a part of the fire form.

[To VII]. To the other about the brave man, there is a great dispute whether according to right reason one must expose himself to death in this way. Be that as it may, one could solve this objection the way the Philosopher does.* One could say that by performing such a great act of virtue, this individual has obtained the highest good, whereas if he had saved his life by omitting this act, he would have deprived himself of this good and what is more, his life would be morally evil. Absolutely speaking it is better to have this greatest good even momentarily than to be without it or to have a long, but a morally evil, life. Wherefore, evident proof is had from this that according to right reason the common good is to be preferred to one's individual good, because even if a man is unaware that his soul is immortal, he is still bound to expose his entire personal good to destruction in order to save the common good. And that must be loved all the more, absolutely speaking, to save which the existence of another is regarded as of little account.

[To VIII]. As for the arguments of certain teachers, if the meaning is that the soul has the same *per se* existence¹⁸ in the composite as it has outside the composite, where *per se* existence is understood as contrasted with the existence characteristic of an accident, then the fire form, if it were to exist apart from matter, would also have *per se* existence, and then we could admit that the fire form is imperishable. But if by *per se* existence is meant that characteristic of the composite in the line of substance, then it is false to say that the soul has *per se* existence outside the body. For were such the case, it could not communicate its being to another, for even in what is divine, *per se* being in this sense is incommunicable.

composite. Now the soul does not receive perfection but communicates perfection. Consequently, one could twist this argument in favour of the opposite view. For there is nothing absurd about a thing existing apart, even though it does not communicate its perfection to another, so long as it is equally perfect existing in this way. This is clear from the [similar] case of an efficient cause. For it is not repugnant that such a cause should exist without causing an effect. Now the soul, so far as its own being is concerned, is equally perfect whether it is separated from or joined to a body. There is, of course, this difference. As separated, the soul does not communicate its being to another.

[To II]. This also answers the other argument, since there are two kinds of natural inclinations. One regards the primary act or actualisation, and this is the natural inclination of the imperfect for its perfection and is something that accompanies an essential potency in relation to its second act. But there is another inclination towards a second act where the latter is a perfection to be communicated and this is the natural inclination that accompanies an accidental potency. Of the first, it is true that the opposite of the natural inclination is something unnatural and not eternal, because it would imply eternal imperfection, which the Philosopher regards as something improper inasmuch as he has postulated that causes exist in the universe which will in time do away with any imperfection. The second inclination, however, even though it would be forever suspended, implies nothing unnatural in the proper sense of the term since no imperfection is involved. Now the inclination that the soul has for the body is of the second type. Or it can be said with Avicenna that once the soul has perfected the body, this desire of the soul has been sated, since the purpose of this union is that the soul through the medium of the body may acquire those of its perfections which it could not acquire without the senses or without a body.

But if at any time the soul was joined to the body, then it has acquired the perfections that it simply desired to acquire in this way.

[*Evaluation of the a priori proof*]. Of the three propositions used to construct a kind of *a priori* argument in the sense that the proof is based on the nature of the form of man that is to be restored, I say that the first is known by natural reason and that the contrary error, which is proper to Averroes only, is of the very worst kind. Not only is it opposed to theological truth but to philosophical truth as well. For it destroys knowledge itself inasmuch as it denies any act of knowledge distinct from sensation or any act of choice distinct from sense appetite and hence does away with all those virtues which require an act of choice in accord with right reason. One who errs in this way, consequently, should be banished from the company of men who use natural reason.

The other two propositions, however, are not known adequately from natural reason even though there are a number of probable persuasive arguments in their favour.²¹ The reasons for the second, indeed are more numerous as well as more highly probable. For this reason, the Philosopher appears to have held this doctrine more expressly.²² For the third, however, the reasons are fewer. The conclusion, then, which follows from these three propositions is not sufficiently known *a priori* by natural reason.

[Part II. *The A Posteriori Proofs*]

The second way to prove the resurrection is by *a posteriori* arguments. Some probable arguments of this kind were mentioned in the initial arguments, for instance, those concerning the happiness of man. To the latter this argument based on the justice of a rewarding God is added. In the present life the virtuous suffer

more punishments than those who are wicked. It is this line of argument that the Apostle seems to have in mind in the first letter to the Corinthians* : "If with this life only in view we have had hope in Christ, we are of all men the most to be pitied, etc".

[*Evaluation of the a posteriori arguments*]. These *a posteriori* arguments, however, are even less conclusive than the *a priori* proof based on the proper form of man, since it is not clear from natural reason that there is one ruler who governs all men according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice.²³ It could also be said that the good act is itself sufficient reward for anyone, as Augustine says in the *Confessions*, bk. 1 † : "For it is even as Thou hast appointed, that every inordinate desire should bring its own punishment", so that sin itself is the first punishment of sin.

It is clear then that when the saints argued *a posteriori* for the proposed conclusion, they did not intend to give anything more than probable persuasive proofs. Gregory, for instance, having put down certain such proofs says ‡ : "Whoever does not wish to believe because of these reasons, let him believe because of faith". The same is true of Paul's teachings in the *Acts*** and in the first epistle to the Corinthians †† where he uses the example of the grain that falls into the earth, or where he argues from the resurrection of Christ that if Christ be risen, the dead will rise again, or where he appeals to the notion of a just reward. Such arguments are nothing else than probable persuasive proofs, or they are reasons derived from premises that are matters of belief, as is evident if we examine them individually.

[Part III. Solution to the Question]

To put it briefly, then, we can maintain that natural reason cannot prove that the resurrection is necessary, neither by way of *a priori* reasons such as those based on

the notion of the intrinsic principle in man, nor by a *posteriori* arguments, for instance, by reason of some operation or perfection fitting to man. Hence we hold the resurrection to be certain on the basis of faith alone.

Furthermore, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, BK. XIII, c. ix,* the second proposition used in the first [or a *priori*] proof [viz. of the immortality of the human soul] is not held because reason dictates this, but solely because of the Gospel † where Christ tells us: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul".

[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]

To the *first argument* ²⁴: If the argument is based on the notion of natural desire taken in an exact and proper sense, and a natural desire in this sense is not an elicited act but merely an inclination of nature towards something, then it is clear that the existence of such a natural desire for anything can be proved only if we prove first that the nature in question is able to have such a thing. To argue the other way round, therefore, is begging the question. Or if natural desire is taken in a less proper sense, viz. as an act elicited in conformity with the natural inclination, we are still unable to prove that any elicited desire is natural in this sense without first proving the existence of a natural desire in the proper sense of the term.

But suppose that someone were to argue that whatever is immediately desired, once it is known, is something that is desired naturally, since such proneness seems to arise only from some natural inclination. One answer to this objection would be to deny the first statement, since a person with bad habits is inclined to desire immediately whatever is in accord with these habits just as soon as such a thing presents itself. However, if nothing else intervenes, nature of itself is not vicious; neither is it vicious in everyone. Consequently, if everyone

did not seem to go beyond the most perfect speculation possible in this life. Hence, having inquired into the nature of this happiness of man, Aristotle adds²⁸ : "To be happy it is necessary for man that his body be healthy, that he have food, companionship, that he does not crave too much or want too much". Since we assume that man is capable of a speculation far more perfect than anything possible in this life, the special happiness which we postulate is not known naturally to be our end, neither is it known naturally that we seek it as an end.

When you argue from Augustine's proof that happiness cannot be anything but eternal, a person who holds that human happiness is possible in this life will reply that he does wish to lose it. For according to right reason, he must wish whatever is the lot of his nature. But to a person who has no faith, right reason seemingly reveals the lot of our nature to be mortal both in body and soul. Therefore, he must wish to lose life and therefore to lose the happy life. And when you say that such a life is not happy which had not been loved by the one who possessed it, this is true only if such a life had not been loved at a time when it was both possible and fitting to have it. But it is not known by natural reason that to be happy forever is something in accord with our nature.

As for the other [or *third* argument], we grant that man knows he can attain his end in some individual, and consequently, that he knows he can attain happiness in the degree recognised to be man's end. When you say that such happiness is not possible in this life, I reply that this impossibility is not known by natural reason. When you adduce the misfortune, bodily infirmity, imperfection of virtue and knowledge, the answer is that these are inconsistent with the type of perfect happiness known to be characteristic of an Intelligence²⁹ but they are not inconsistent with the happiness known to be within the reach of man.

To the *fourth*, it might be said that in the universe it is the species that will go on forever through the continuous succession of individuals. It is this which the Philosopher postulated by his doctrine of continuous generation. But it is not the life of any single individual or individuals within the species that will continue to exist.

From all this it is apparent how much thanks must be given to our Creator, who through faith has made us most certain of those things which pertain to our end and to eternal life—things about which the most learned and ingenious men can know almost nothing according to Augustine's statement in *De Trinitate*, bk. XIII, c. ix* : "Scarcely a few, etc".³⁰ "But if faith be there—that faith which is to be found in those to whom [Jesus] has given the power to become the sons of God—there is no question about it,"³¹ for of this He has made those who believe in Him most certain.

- ²⁵ See p. 14.
²⁶ See pp. 68 ff.
²⁷ See p. 14.
²⁸ See p. 17.

SECTION III

- ¹ For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see p. 76.
- ² This is the solution given by Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. xxi, q. i.
- ³ See Aristotle, *De caelo*, I, cap. iii (270^a, 12-13); cap. xii (281^b, 18 ff.); II, cap. iv (287^a, 23-24); cap. vi (289^a, 8-9); *Metaphysica*, IX, cap. viii (1050^b, 22-24).
- ⁴ See p. 173, note 17.
- ⁵ Cf. *Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. xxxvi, q. unica, n. 5.
- ⁶ Cf. St Thomas, *Summa theologica*, I, q. ii, art. iii corpus, quarta via.
- ⁷ "Natural" is understood in the technical sense of a cause that acts by a necessity of nature and not deliberately or freely. Efficient causes, according to Scotus, fall into two classes: (1) those which possess antecedent rational knowledge and act deliberately; (2) those which lack such knowledge and act automatically or by a necessity of nature. See *Quaest. in Metaphysicam*, IX, q. xv, n. 4 (Vivès, VOL. VII, 608^b ff.) where he divides all active powers into either *nature* or *will*. Here he proves paradoxically that according to Aristotle's division of rational and irrational powers the intellect is "irrational" in the sense that it acts automatically in the presence of evident truth whereas the will is "rational" in the sense that it can freely choose to love or not to love an object known through reason or intellect.
- ⁸ In an ascending order one progresses by going from the posterior to the prior; in a descending order, from the prior to the posterior. For instance, in regard to a series of temporally ordered causes where one precedes the other in time, many philosophers (e.g. St Bonaventure) deny the possibility of an

- ²³ See Aristotle, *Physica*, viii, cap. vi (259^b, 32 ff.) ; *De caelo*, ii, cap. iii (286^a, 34 ff.) ; *De generatione et corruptione*, ii, cap. x (336^a, 23 ff.) ; *Metaphysica*, xii, cap. vi-vii (1072^a, 9 ff.).
- ²⁴ A subject is said to be in contradictory potency to something if it can either have it or not have it. The argument here is this. If thought can either be present or absent so far as the nature itself is concerned, then to think requires some effort on the part of the nature and this would eventually produce weariness.
- ²⁵ The first act or actualisation of a being is that it exists with its various faculties or powers. Thus, for instance, so far as man's body is endowed or informed by the human soul, man is in *first act*. When a man actualises his human faculties or powers by acts of seeing, thinking, willing, etc., he is in *second act*. For Scotus, a rational nature achieves its highest perfection by loving the highest good.
- ²⁶ *Activum* implies an immanent operation, that is one which is not only initiated by the subject but remains in and perfects that subject. Vital activities such as thought, volition and the like are immanent operations. *Factivum*, on the other hand, implies that the operation is transient, that is, has a term outside the agent. Man's artifacts are produced by a transient activity.
- ²⁷ Cf. St Thomas, *Sent.*, i, dist. xxxv, q. i, art. i ad iii ; *Summa theologica*, i, q. xiv, art. ii.
- ²⁸ Scotus uses the term *ratio intelligendi* (literally "the reason for knowing"). The allusion here is probably to the notion of an "intelligible species", which in human knowledge is supposed to substitute for the object in such a way as to make universal concepts possible. Even if one were to postulate something analogous to the species in regard to God's knowledge, it would still be identical with His essence and intellect.
- ²⁹ Since whatever receives something is perfected by the form received, it would follow that the more perfect knowledge would be perfected by the less perfect.
- ³⁰ See *Quaest. in Metaphysicam*, vii, q. xv, n. 9.

³¹ "Infinity" is regarded here as a degree of intensity which the perfection in question possesses. Scotus distinguishes between intensive and extensive infinity. A thing is said to be extensively infinite if there is no pure perfection (cf. p. 172, note 14) which it does not possess. Nothing, however, is said in regard to the intensity or degree to which such perfections are possessed. Each pure perfection, however, is said to be intensively infinite if it exists in the highest degree possible for that respective perfection. Thus God would not be extensively infinite if He lacked knowledge and love. But His knowledge is intensively infinite if it is a comprehensive knowledge of all that can be known, including His infinitely intelligible nature.

³² Cf. e.g. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, II, v (994^a, 1-2).

³³ Scotus distinguishes between the omnipotence of God as an article of his Catholic creed (omnipotence in the proper sense of the term) and the infinite power of God (omnipotence in a qualified sense) as demonstrated philosophically by reason unaided by faith (Cf. *Quodlibet*, q. vii; *Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. xlii, q. unica). In this distinction we see the influence of the philosophy of Alfarabi and Avicenna. The latter, influenced by Plotinus's theory of emanation, maintained that God can create only one being immediately, viz. the highest Intelligence. This creature in turn produces subordinate Intelligences. The creation of the earth as well as the heavenly bodies and their souls is the work of these created Intelligences. Even in this theory, however, God is the ultimate cause of all things that emanate directly or indirectly from Him, and therefore the First Cause in some qualified sense at least is omnipotent. As a theologian, however, Scotus could not subscribe to this view, for according to his theology, he believed that whatever God can do through the medium of the secondary cause He has created He can do directly or immediately if He so willed. But Scotus makes this much of a concession to Arabic philosophy, namely, that in our present state we can only demonstrate that God can create all things either mediately or immediately and in this sense God's power must be infinite intensively. We can give only probable arguments for

which Scotus held the saint but it also illustrates the cardinal principle he uses in interpreting other thinkers. "I wish to give the most reasonable interpretation to their words that I possibly can" (*Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. viii, q. v, n. 8). The intricate and subtle explanation that follows is typical of the reasoning that earned Scotus the title *Doctor subtilis*.

- ²⁶ According to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript, the subsequent section in parentheses in the Latin text is missing in Scotus's own copy.
- ²⁷ Scotus tells us (*Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. xliii, q. unica) that prior to their actual existence, God knows all possible creatures whether they shall ever be given existence or not. Absolutely speaking, these creatures may consequently be said to "have an intelligibility" or *esse intelligibile*; this, however, is dependent upon the divine intellect so that one can say that God does not know these things because they are intelligible, but rather they are intelligible because God knows them. For in knowing the possible, God gives it a kind of "existence", viz. that characteristic of the content or object of thought. Even though the human intellect in the present life has no immediate intuitive knowledge of God, of the divine intellect or its thought content, it still remains true that the ultimate reason why the notions derived from created objects are intelligible is because God first gave them intelligibility in knowing them. This intelligibility or meaning can be called the "eternal light" in a qualified sense. And all propositions that are evident from the meaning of the terms can be said to be seen in the eternal light.
- ²⁸ Only something that exists in the proper sense of the word can be an efficient cause. Consequently, we cannot ascribe any such causality to something that exists only in an improper sense as the content or object of thought. Nevertheless, it is the intelligibility of the object that is said to "move" the intellect to know the thing in question. Scotus argues that we should rather ascribe that causality which meaning has in regard to our intellect to the divine mind or intellect which gave to all created things their meaning or intelligibility.