

HEGEL'S
Science
of
Logic

*Muirhead
Library of
Philosophy*

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN
NEW YORK: HUMANITIES

The Muirhead Library of Philosophy

EDITED BY H. D. LEWIS

SCIENCE OF LOGIC

✓✓
193.5
Se 2

HEGEL'S
SCIENCE OF LOGIC

TRANSLATED BY
W. H. JOHNSTON, B.A., AND
L. G. STRUTHERS, M.A.



With an Introductory Preface by
Viscount Haldane of Cloan
K.T. P.C. O.M. F.R.S.

VOLUME ONE

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
NEW YORK: HUMANITIES PRESS INC

Arendt

B

2942

FIRST PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH IN 1929
SECOND IMPRESSION 1951
THIRD IMPRESSION 1961
FOURTH IMPRESSION 1966

This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no portion may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publisher.

First published in German 1812-1816 under the title "Wissenschaft der Logik."

The greater part of this translation was made from the edition published in 1923 by Felix Meiner, Leipzig, edited by Dr. Georg Lasson, of Berlin.

Printed in Great Britain by Photolitho
UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
WOKING AND LONDON

STEVENSON LIBRARY BARD COLLEGE
Annandale-on-Hudson N.Y. 12504

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTORY PREFACE	7
EDITOR'S NOTE	17
TRANSLATORS' PREFACE	19
TABLE OF CATEGORIES	<i>facing page</i> 24
GLOSSARY	25

VOLUME I: OBJECTIVE LOGIC

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION	33
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION	39
INTRODUCTION:	
GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC	53
GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF LOGIC	70

BOOK ONE

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING

WITH WHAT MUST THE SCIENCE BEGIN?	79
GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF BEING	91

SECTION ONE

DETERMINATENESS (QUALITY)	93
<small>CHAPTER</small>	
I. BEING	94
A—BEING	94
B—NOTHING	94
C—BECOMING	95
1. Unity of Being and Nothing	95
<i>Observation 1.</i> The Opposition of Being and Nothing in Imagination	95
<i>Observation 2.</i> The Inadequacy of the Expression "Unity" or "Identity of Being and Nothing"	102
<i>Observation 3.</i> The Isolation of these Abstractions	106
<i>Observation 4.</i> Incomprehensible Nature of the Beginning	116
2. Moments of Becoming: Arising and Passing Away	118
3. Transcendence of Becoming	118
<i>Observation:</i> The Expression "to transcend"	119

CHAPTER	PAGE
II. DETERMINATE BEING	121
A—DETERMINATE BEING AS SUCH	121
(a) Determinate Being in General	121
(b) Quality	123
<i>Observation: Quality and Negation</i>	124
(c) Something	127
B—FINITUDE	129
(a) Something and an Other	129
(b) Determination, Modification, and Limit	135
(c) Finitude	141
(a) The Immediacy of Finitude	142
(β) Barrier and Ought	144
<i>Observation: Ought</i>	146
(γ) Transition of Finite into Infinite	149
C—INFINITY	150
(a) Infinity in General	150
(b) Reciprocal Determination of Finite and Infinite	151
(c) Affirmative Infinity	156
Transition	163
<i>Observation 1. Infinite Progress</i>	164
<i>Observation 2. Idealism</i>	168
III. BEING FOR SELF	170
A—BEING FOR SELF AS SUCH	170
(a) Being Determinate and Being for Self	171
(b) Being for One	172
<i>Observation</i>	173
(c) One	176
B—THE ONE AND THE MANY	177
(a) The One in Itself	178
(b) The One and the Void	178
<i>Observation: The Atomistic Principle.</i>	179
(c) Many Ones. Repulsion	180
<i>Observation: Leibniz's Monad</i>	182
C—REPULSION AND ATTRACTION	183
(a) Exclusion of the One	183
<i>Observation: Proposition of the Unity of the One and the Many</i>	185
(b) The one One of Attraction	186
(c) The Relation of Repulsion and Attraction	187
<i>Observation: Kant's Construction of Matter out of Attractive and Repulsive Force</i>	192

SECTION TWO

MAGNITUDE (QUANTITY) 198

CHAPTER	PAGE
<i>Observation</i>	199
I. QUANTITY	201
A—PURE QUANTITY	201
<i>Observation 1. The Concept of Pure Quantity</i>	202
<i>Observation 2. Kant's Antinomy of the Indivisibility and Infinite Divisibility of Time, Space, and Matter</i>	204
B—CONTINUOUS AND DISCRETE MAGNITUDE	213
<i>Observation: The Customary Distinction between these Magnitudes</i>	214
C—LIMITATION OF QUANTITY	215
II. QUANTUM	217
A—NUMBER	217
<i>Observation 1. The Species of Calculation in Arithmetic. Kant's Synthetic Propositions a priori of Intuition</i>	219
<i>Observation 2. Employment of Numerical Determinations to express Philosophic Concepts</i>	227
B—EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE QUANTUM	232
(a) Their Difference	232
(b) Identity of Extensive and Intensive Magnitude	235
<i>Observation 1. Examples of this Identity</i>	236
<i>Observation 2. Kant's Application of Degree-Determination to the Existence of the Soul</i>	239
(c) The Alteration of Quantum	240
C—THE QUANTITATIVE INFINITY	241
(a) Its Notion	241
(b) The Quantitative Infinite Progress	242
<i>Observation 1. High Esteem enjoyed by the Progress to Infinity</i>	244
<i>Observation 2. Kant's Antinomy of the Temporal and Spatial Limitedness—and Unlimitedness—of the World</i>	249
(c) The Infinity of Quantum	253
<i>Observation 1. The Conceptual Determinateness of the Mathematical Infinite</i>	256
<i>Observation 2. The Purpose of the Differential Calculus deduced from its Application</i>	291
<i>Observation 3. Further Forms connected with the Qualitative Determinateness of Magnitude</i>	321

CHAPTER	PAGE
III. THE QUANTITATIVE RATIO	333
A—THE DIRECT RATIO	334
B—THE INVERSE RATIO	336
C—THE RATIO OF POWERS	340
<i>Observation</i>	343

SECTION THREE

MEASURE	345
I. THE SPECIFIC QUANTITY	351
A—THE SPECIFIC QUANTUM	351
B—SPECIFYING MEASURE	355
(a) The Rule	355
(b) The Specifying Measure	355
<i>Observation</i>	357
(c) Relation of Both Sides as Qualities	357
<i>Observation</i>	360
C—BEING FOR SELF IN MEASURE	362
II. REAL MEASURE	367
A—THE RELATION OF STABLE MEASURES	368
(a) Union of Two Measures	368
(b) Measure as a Series of Measure-Relations	371
(c) Elective Affinity	374
<i>Observation: Berthollet on Chemical Elective Affinity and</i> <i>Berzelius's Theory on this Subject</i>	376
B—NODAL LINE OF MEASURE-RELATIONS	386
<i>Observation: Examples of such Nodal Lines; natura non</i> <i>facit saltum</i>	388
C—THE MEASURELESS	391
III. THE BECOMING OF ESSENCE	394
A—THE ABSOLUTE INDIFFERENCE	394
B—INDIFFERENCE AS INVERSE RELATION OF ITS FACTORS	395
<i>Observation: On Centripetal and Centrifugal Force</i>	399
C—TRANSITION TO ESSENCE	403

into whatever becomes for man *something inner*—becomes, that is, an idea, something which he makes his very own;—and what man transforms to Language contains—concealed, or mixed up with other things, or worked out to clearness—a Category; so natural to man is Logic—indeed, Logic itself is just man's peculiar nature. But if Nature in general is opposed, as *physical*, to what is *mental*, then it must be said that Logic is rather that something Super-natural which enters into all the natural *behaviour* of man—Feeling, Intuition, Desire, Need, Impulse—and thereby alone transforms it all to something human—to ideas and purposes—though, perhaps, only formally human. It is a great advantage to a language when it has a wealth of logical expressions—that is, expressions characteristic and set apart—for the determinations of thought; of prepositions and articles many belong to those relationships which depend upon thinking; the Chinese language is said not to have developed so far, or only in a very small degree; these particles in fact perform an entirely subordinate office, the same as prefixes and suffixes, and in an only slightly more independent form. It is much more important that in a language the determinations of thought should be manifested in Substantives and Verbs and thus receive the stamp of objective form; the German language has here many advantages over other modern languages; indeed, many of its words have the further peculiarity that they have not only various, but even opposed, meanings, so that we must recognize here a speculative spirit in the language; it is a joy to thought to stumble upon such words, and to meet with the union of opposites (a result of Speculative Thought which to Human Understanding seems senseless) in the naïve shape of one word with opposite meanings registered in a dictionary. For this reason, in German, Philosophy for the most part requires no peculiar terminology. Of course some words from foreign languages (which indeed have already acquired by prescription the right of citizenship in the philosophic realm) have to be adopted in German, and an affected purism would be least in place where it is the thing and not the word that is of capital importance. The progress of culture generally, and of the sciences in particular, gradually brings to light higher relations of thought, or at any rate raises these relations to greater

generality, and thereby attracts to them more attentive consideration. This is true even of those sciences which relate to what is empirical and sensuous, since they use in general the most familiar categories (for example, Whole and Parts, a Thing and its Properties, and the like). For instance, though in Physics the idea of Force had become supreme, in more modern times the most important part here has been played by the Category of Polarity—which indeed has been too much dragged in everywhere at random, and even into the theory of Light. In this determination of thought a distinction is drawn, while the things distinguished are inseparably bound up together. It is of infinite importance that in this way the abstract form (Identity) by which a thought-determinateness is endowed with independence (as, for example, Force) has been abandoned, and the form of the determination, of a distinction which remains all the while in identity because it is inseparable, is emphasized and becomes a current idea. Owing to the reality which appertains to natural objects, the observation of nature compels us to establish those natural Categories which we cannot ignore even when they may be thoroughly incoherent with others to which also validity is allowed, and does not permit here that passage from opposites to abstracts and universals, which more easily takes place in the case of ideational objects.

But whilst logical objects and the expression of them are thus something that is everywhere familiar in *cultivated thought*, still, as I have elsewhere observed, what is familiar is not on that account necessarily understood. It even rouses one's impatience to have to go on merely busying oneself about what is thus familiar—and what is more familiar than just those determinations of thought of which we make use at every turn, which proceed out of our mouths with every sentence that we speak? This foreword is intended to give the fundamental points in that course of the progress of Cognition which starts from what is thus known and familiar, and in the relation of Scientific thinking to Natural thinking; this, together with what is contained in the earlier *Introduction*, will suffice to furnish that general notion of the meaning of logical Cognition which one is accustomed to demand in the case of any Science, as a preliminary to the presentation of the Science itself.

In the first place, it is to be regarded as an immense advance that the Forms of Thought should be disengaged from the *Matter of Thought* in which they are imbedded in self-conscious Intuition and Ideation as well as in Desire and Will—or rather (since there is no human Desire nor Will without Ideas) in ideating Desire and Will; it is an immense advance that these Universals should be drawn forth and set up as objects of contemplation on their own account, as was done by Plato and then more especially by Aristotle; we have in this the beginning of knowledge. “It was only,” says Aristotle, “after nearly everything that was necessary, and that pertained to the convenience and intercourse of life, had been obtained, that people began to trouble themselves about philosophic knowledge.”¹ “In Egypt,” he had previously remarked, “the mathematical sciences were early developed, because there the priestly caste at an early period was in such a position as to make leisure possible.”² In truth the need to busy oneself with pure thought presupposes a long stretch of road already traversed by the mind of man. It is, one may say, the need of a need already satisfied as regards necessities, the need of an attained absence of need, of abstraction from the matter of intuition, imagination, and so forth—from the concrete interests of Desire, Impulse, and Will, in which the determinations of thought are wrapped up and concealed. In the still spaces of Thought which has come to itself and is purely self-existent, those interests are hushed which move the lives of peoples and of individuals. “In so many directions,” says Aristotle in the same connexion, “the nature of man is dependent; but this science, which is not sought for the sake of utility, this alone, in itself and for itself, is free, and seems therefore to be a possession not wholly human.”³ Philosophy generally still has in its thinking to deal with concrete objects—God, Nature, Mind—; but Logic is concerned with such thought wholly and solely on account of the thought itself, in complete abstraction from its objects. It is customary to assign to Logic a place among the studies of youth, because the young have not yet entered upon the interests of concrete life. Youth lives at leisure in respect of these interests; its business is to acquire the means and power of entering actively

¹ *Metaph.*, A 2. 982b.

² *Ibid.*, A 1. 981.

³ *Ibid.*, A 2. 982b.

He thus laid the foundation of an intellectualist view of the Universe, and of this view Logic must be the pure form. In it we are not concerned with thinking *about* something lying outside thought, as the basis of thought, nor with Forms which serve merely as *signs* of Truth; on the contrary, the necessary Forms and characteristic determinations of thought are the Content and the Supreme Truth itself.

In order that we may at least envisage this we must put aside the opinion that Truth is something tangible. Such tangibility has for example been imported even into the Platonic Ideas, which are in the thought of God, as though they were things existing, but existing in a world or region outside the world of Reality, a world other than that of those Ideas, and only having real Substantiality in virtue of this otherness. The Platonic Idea is nothing other than the Universal, or more precisely the Concept of an Object of Thought; it is only in its concept that anything has actuality; in so far as it is other than its concept, it ceases to be actual and is a non-entity; the aspect of tangibility and of sensuous externality to self belongs to that non-entical aspect.—From the other side, however, one can refer to the characteristic ideas of ordinary Logic; for it is assumed that, for instance, Definitions comprise not determinations which belong only to the cognizing Subject, but determinations which belong to the Object, and constitute its most essential and inmost nature. Again, when from given determinations we conclude to others, it is assumed that what is concluded is not something external to the Object and foreign to it, but that it belongs to the object,—that Being corresponds to Thought.—Speaking generally, it lies at the very basis of our use of the Forms of Concept, Judgment, Inference, Definition, Division, and so on, that they are Forms not merely of self-conscious Thinking but also of the objective understanding.—*To think* is an expression which attributes specially to Consciousness the determination which it contains. But in as far as it is allowed that *Understanding, and Reason, are of the World of Objects*, that Spirit and Nature have General Laws in accordance with which their life and their mutations are governed, in so far as it is admitted that the determinations of Thought also have objective validity and existence.

The Critical Philosophy has indeed turned Metaphysics

WITH WHAT MUST THE SCIENCE BEGIN?

It has only recently been felt that there is a difficulty in finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty, as well as the possibility of solving it, has been much discussed. The beginning of philosophy must be either mediate or immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other: so that either method of beginning is refuted.

It is true that the principle of any philosophy also expresses a beginning, but this beginning is objective and not subjective; it is the beginning of all things. The principle is a content somehow determined,—Water, the One, Nous, Idea,—Substance, Monad, and so forth; or, where it relates to the nature of cognition and so is designed rather to be a criterion than an objective determination (like Thought, Intuition, Sensation, Ego, or Subjectivity itself), it is still the determination of the content to which interest is directed. On the other hand the beginning as such, considered as something subjective in the sense of some contingent way of introducing the exposition, remains neglected and indifferent; and so the need of the question, with what we are to begin, still seems unimportant compared with the need of a principle, which alone seems to contain the interest of the matter,—the interest as to what is the truth and the absolute basis of all things.

The modern embarrassment about a beginning arises from yet another need with which those are unacquainted who, as dogmatists, seek a demonstration of the principle, or who, as sceptics, seek a subjective criterion with which to meet dogmatic philosophy;—a need which, finally, is entirely denied by those who begin with explosive abruptness from their inner revelation, faith, intellectual intuition, and so forth, and desire to dispense with Method and Logic. If thought at first is abstract and concerns itself merely with the principle regarded as content, but in the progress of its evolution is forced to regard also the other side, the behaviour of cognition, then subjective activity is perceived as an essential moment of objective truth, and the need arises of uniting method with

to that origin and truth on which depends and indeed by which is produced that with which the beginning was made, then it must be admitted that this consideration is of essential importance; and it will be more clearly evident in the Logic itself.—Thus consciousness is led back on its road from immediacy, with which it begins, to absolute knowledge as its inmost truth; and the first term, which entered the stage as the immediate, arises, precisely, from this last term, the foundation.—Still further, we see that Absolute Spirit, which is found to be the concrete, last, and highest truth of all Being, at the end of its evolution freely passes beyond itself and lapses into the shape of an immediate Being; it resolves itself to the creation of a world which contains everything included in the evolution preceding that result; all of which, by reason of this inverted position, is changed, together with its beginning, into something dependent on the result, for the result is the principle. What is essential for the Science is not so much that a pure immediate is the beginning, but that itself in its totality forms a cycle returning upon itself, wherein the first is also last, and the last first.

Hence it equally results on the other hand that we must regard as result that to which the movement returns as into its foundation. From this point of view the first is equally the foundation, and the last derived: it is a result, in so far as we start from the first and reach the last (the foundation) by a series of correct conclusions. And further, the movement away from the beginning is to be considered merely as a further determination of it, so that the beginning remains the foundation of all that follows without disappearing from it. The movement does not consist in the derivation of an Other, or in a transition into something veritably Other;—in so far as such a transition occurs, it cancels itself again. Thus the beginning of philosophy, the basis which is present and preserves itself in all the developments which follow, remains a something immanent throughout its further determinations.

What is one-sided in the beginning, owing to its general determination as something abstract and immediate, is lost in this movement: it becomes mediated, and the line of scientific advance becomes a circle.—It also follows that the constituents of the Beginning, since at that point they are undeveloped and

without content, are not truly understood at the Beginning; only the Science itself fully developed is an understanding of it, complete, significant, and based on truth.

Now precisely because the Result stands out as the absolute foundation, the advance of this knowledge is not something provisional, problematical, or hypothetical; it must be determined by the nature of the subject and the content. This beginning is not arbitrary nor temporarily accepted, nor is it something which, appearing arbitrary and assumed under correction, in the event turns out rightly to have been made the beginning. (The case is not that of the construction we are directed to make in order to prove a theorem in geometry, where it is only the proof which shows that we did right to draw just these lines, and then, in the proof itself, to begin with comparisons of just those lines or angles. For itself, the drawing such lines and making such comparisons does not render the proof self-evident.)

In this way the reason why in the pure Science we begin from Pure Being was above indicated immediately in the Science itself. This Pure Being is the unity into which pure knowledge returns, or, if pure knowledge as form is to be kept separate from its unity, then Pure Being is the content of pure knowledge. It is in this respect that pure Being, the absolutely immediate, is also absolutely mediated. But it is equally essential to take it one-sidedly as pure immediacy, just because it is here taken as the beginning. Were it not to be taken as this pure indeterminateness, then, in so far as it were determinate, it would be taken as mediated and as thus already carried a step further; for what is determinate contains an Other for a first element. It is therefore in the nature of the Beginning to be Being and nothing else. For entering into philosophy there is therefore no further need of preparations, nor of other considerations or connections.

We cannot extract any closer determination or positive content for the beginning from the fact that it is the beginning of philosophy. For here at the beginning, where there is as yet no philosophy, philosophy is an empty word, or an idea taken at random and not justified. Pure knowledge affords only this negative determination, that the beginning must be the abstract beginning. In so far as Pure Being is taken as the

content of pure knowledge, the latter must draw back from its content and leave it to itself without further determining it.—Or again, if Pure Being is to be regarded as the unity into which knowledge has collapsed at the point where its union with the object is consummated, then knowledge has disappeared into this unity, leaving no distinction from it, and hence no determination for it.—Nor is there any other something, nor any content, which could be used to make a more closely determined beginning.

But even the determination of Being, which has been accepted so far as beginning, could be omitted, so that the only requirement would be to make a pure beginning. There would then be nothing but the beginning itself, and it would remain to be seen what that is.—This position might be used to pacify those who partly will not be satisfied because we begin with Being (from whatever considerations), still less with the resulting transition of Being into Nothing, partly know no better than that in any science a beginning is made by presupposing some idea;—such idea being next analysed, so that it is only the result of this analysis which affords the first definite concept of the science. Were we too to observe this procedure we should have no particular Object before us, because the beginning, as being the Beginning of Thought, must be perfectly abstract and general, pure form quite without content: we should have nothing but the idea of a bare beginning as such. It remains to be seen what we possess in this idea.

So far, there is Nothing: Something is to become. The Beginning is not pure Nothing, but a Nothing from which Something is to proceed; so that Being is already contained in the Beginning. The Beginning thus contains both, Being and Nothing; it is the unity of Being and Nothing, or is Not-being which is Being, and Being which also is Not-being.

Further, Being and Nothing are present in the Beginning as distinct from one another: for the Beginning points forward to something Other;—it is a Not-being related to Being as to an Other: that which *is-beginning*, as yet *is* not: it is advancing towards Being. The Beginning therefore contains Being as having this characteristic, that it flies from and transcends Not-being, as its opposite.

own immediate and contingent idea. The relation contained in a concrete, that is, a synthetic unity, is necessary only in so far as it is not a datum, but is produced by the inherent movement of the moments tending back into this unity;—a movement which is the opposite of the analytic method, which is an activity belonging to the subject and external to the object.

What has been said implies this further point, that that with which we must begin, cannot be something concrete, something containing a relation within itself. For such presupposes a mediation and a transition within itself from a first to an other, of which process the concrete, now reduced to simplicity, would be the result. But the beginning must not be a first *and* an other: in a thing which in itself is first *and* an other, progress has already advanced a step. That which constitutes the beginning (and that is, the very Beginning itself) must therefore be taken, in its simple immediacy without content, as something not admitting analysis, hence as pure vacuity, as Being.

If anyone, impatient of the consideration of the abstract Beginning, should demand that we begin, not with the Beginning, but directly with the matter itself, the answer is that the matter is just this empty Being: it is in the course of the Science that we are to discover what the matter is; the Science must not therefore presuppose this as known.

If any other form is taken for the beginning in preference to empty Being, then the beginning suffers from the flaws mentioned. Those who remain dissatisfied with this beginning are asked to set themselves the task of beginning differently in order to avoid these faults.

There is however one novel beginning in philosophy, which recently has become famous and cannot be passed over without mention, namely that which begins with the Ego. It arose partly from the reflection that all that follows must be derived from the first truth, partly from the need that the first truth should be something known and, even more, something immediately certain. Such a beginning generally is not a contingent idea which can take a different form in different subjects. For, the ego, this immediate consciousness of self, first manifests itself partly as something immediate, partly as something known in a far higher sense than any other idea; things other-

C

BECOMING

1. UNITY OF BEING AND NOTHING

Pure Being and pure Nothing are, then, the same; the truth is, not either Being or Nothing, but that Being—not passes—but has passed over into Nothing, and Nothing into Being. But equally the truth is not their lack of distinction, but that they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet unseparated and inseparable, each disappearing immediately in its opposite. Their truth is therefore this movement, this immediate disappearance of the one into the other, in a word, Becoming; a movement wherein both are distinct, but in virtue of a distinction which has equally immediately dissolved itself.

Observation I

Nothing is generally opposed to Something; but Something is an already determinate existent distinguished from another Something: such a Nothing opposed to Something, therefore, such a negation of Something, is a determinate Nothing. Here, however, Nothing must be taken in its indeterminate simplicity.—If it were held more correct to oppose Not-being, instead of Nothing, to Being, no objection could be made as far as the result is concerned, for Not-being contains the relation to Being: both Being and its negation are simultaneously asserted, and this assertion is Nothing as it exists in Becoming. Primarily, however, we are not concerned to have a formal opposition (that is, a relation) so much as abstract and immediate negation, Nothing purely for itself, unrelated repudiation, or what one might express if one so wished, merely by “Not.”

The simple idea of pure Being was first enunciated by the Eleatics, as the Absolute and as sole truth; especially by Parmenides, whose surviving fragments, with the pure enthusiasm of thought first comprehending itself in its absolute abstraction, proclaim that “Being alone is, and Nothing is not at all.”—It is well known that in oriental systems, and essentially in Buddhism, Nothing, or the Void, is the absolute

principle.—Herakleitos was profound enough to emphasize in opposition to this simple and one-sided abstraction the higher total concept of Becoming, saying: "Being is no more than Nothing is," or "All things flow," which means, everything is Becoming.—Popular sayings, chiefly oriental, to the effect that everything which is has in its birth the germs of its decay, while death conversely is entrance to a new life, express at bottom the same union of Being and Nothing. But such expressions have a substratum upon which the transition takes place: Being and Nothing are held apart in Time; they are presented as alternating in Time, and they are not thought in their abstraction, and therefore not thought in such a manner as makes them in and for themselves the same.

Ex nihilo nihil fit is one of the maxims to which great importance was at one time ascribed in metaphysics. Either it is just the empty tautology, "Nothing = Nothing;" or, should Becoming be supposed to have real meaning in it, there is in fact no Becoming contained in it, for, since only Nothing comes out of Nothing, Nothing still remains Nothing here. Becoming implies that Nothing should not remain Nothing but pass over into its Other, into Being.—In rejecting the proposition that nothing comes out of nothing, later (chiefly Christian) metaphysics asserted the transition of Nothing into Being; however synthetically or merely imaginatively this proposition was taken, even the least complete union contains a point where Being and Nothing coincide and their distinction vanishes.—The true importance of the proposition that Nothing comes out of Nothing, that Nothing is just Nothing, resides in its opposition to Becoming generally and therefore to the creation of the world out of nothing. Those who assert the proposition that Nothing is just Nothing, and even grow heated in its defence, do not know that in so doing they are subscribing to the abstract Pantheism of the Eleatics and, in essentials, of Spinoza. That view in philosophy which takes for principle that Being is merely Being, and Nothing merely Nothing, deserves the name of system of identity: this abstract identity is the essence of Pantheism.

If the result which identifies Being and Nothing is startling in itself or seems a paradox, no further attention is here to be paid to this: rather should we wonder at this wonderment

which shows itself such a tiro in philosophy, and forgets that in this Science there occur determinations quite different from those of ordinary consciousness and so-called common-sense,—which is not exactly sound understanding, but understanding educated up to abstractions and the faith, or rather superstition, of abstractions. It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of Being and Nothing in every example, in every fact and thought. What was said above about immediacy and mediation (which latter contains a relation and therefore negation), must also be said of Being and Nothing: that neither in heaven nor on earth is there anything not containing both Being and Nothing. Since here we are speaking of a Something, of an actual fact, these determinations admittedly are no longer found in that complete untruth in which they manifest themselves as Being and Nothing: they have already been further determined and are taken, for example, as positive and negative, the former being posited and reflected Being, the latter posited and reflected Nothing: now of positive and negative, the former has Being and the latter Nothing for abstract basis.—And so, in God himself, his quality (energy, creation, might, and the like) essentially contains the determination of the negative,—it is the production of an Other. But an empirical elucidation of this assertion by means of examples would here be entirely superfluous. This unity of Being and Nothing, as being the primary truth, is, once and for all, the basis and the element of all that follows: therefore, besides Becoming itself, all further logical determinations, such as Determinate Being, Quality, and in short all philosophic concepts, are examples of this unity.—As for what calls itself sound or common sense, so far as it rejects the inseparateness of Being and Nothing, it might be invited to find an instance where One can be found separate from Other—Something from limit (or barrier), or the infinite (or God), as we have just remarked, from energy. Only the empty thought-structures, Being and Nothing, are thus separate, and those are they which common sense prefers to the truth which everywhere faces us—the unity of both.

It cannot be our intention to meet at all points the confusions into which ordinary consciousness falls when faced by such a logical proposition, for they are inexhaustible. Only a few can be mentioned. One source among others of such confusion is

Observation 3

The unity whose moments, Being and Nothing, exist as inseparable, is at the same time different from them, and therefore stands to them in the relation of a third: this, in its most characteristic form, is Becoming. Transition is the same thing as Becoming; only in the former the two, between which, as One and an Other, the transition takes place, are imagined rather as resting apart, transition taking place between them. Now, in whatever place or manner Being or Nothing is discussed, this third must be there too; for these two do not subsist for themselves, but are only in this third, in Becoming. This latter however has many empirical forms which abstraction shelves and neglects, in order to retain severally these its creations, Being and Nothing, and to prove them armed against transition. This simple attitude of abstraction is met, equally simply, by the reminder that in empirical Existence this abstraction itself is only Something, and has Determinate Being. Or the attempt is made to give fixity to this separation of inseparables by other Forms of Reflection. Such a determination contains its own opposite in itself, and this determination of reflection is refuted in itself, without any return or appeal to the nature of its object, by taking it as it is and showing it to contain its Other within itself. It would be wasted labour to spread a net for all the twistings and objections of reflection and its reasonings, in order to cut off and render impossible all the evasions and digressions which it uses to hide from itself its own internal contradictoriness. I therefore refrain from noticing much that calls itself objection or refutation of the assertion that neither Being nor Nothing is true and only Becoming is their truth. That temper of mind which alone can perceive the futility of such refutations, or rather alone can expel them, is only brought about by critical cognition of the forms of Understanding; but those who are readiest with such objections immediately assault with their reflections the very first propositions; not attaining nor having attained, through a further study of Logic, to any consciousness of the nature of these crude reflections.

We must now consider some of the phenomena which result from the isolation of Being and Nothing, when one is placed

without the sphere of the other, and transition is thus denied.

Parmenides held fast to Being, and was the most consistent of all when at the same time he said of Nothing that it is not at all; Being alone is. Being thus isolated is the indeterminate; it is not related to Other; it therefore seems that no progress could be made from this Beginning (that is, from out of Being itself): progress could only be effected by connecting something foreign from without. The progress made by asserting that Being is the same as Nothing, therefore, appears like a second and independent Beginning,—a transition dependent on itself and merely added to Being from without. In short, Being would not be the absolute Beginning if it were in any way determined; for, if it were, it would be dependent on something else, would not be immediate, would not therefore be the Beginning. But if Being is indeterminate and therefore the true Beginning, it lacks whatever could transform it into an Other; it is End as well as Beginning. Nothing can assault it from without; but also, nothing can sally forth from within; Parmenides, equally with Spinoza, will not admit progress from Being, or the absolute Substance, to the negative or finite. We have remarked that, on this showing, Being admits of no relation and therefore no progress; if a progress is made nevertheless, it can only be effected in an external manner, and must be a second and new Beginning. Thus Fichte's most absolute and unconditional, fundamental assertion, $A = A$, is Thesis; his second is Antithesis: the latter is supposed to be partly conditioned, partly unconditioned, and thus self-contradictory. This progress is therefore one of external reflection, which, first, denies what, as being an Absolute, it made its Beginning (Antithesis being the negation of the first identity); and, secondly, forthwith expressly makes conditioned its second unconditioned element. But if there were any justification for the progress, that is, for transcending the first Beginning, then this first Beginning would itself have to possess the capacity of having an Other related to itself: it would have to be determinate. But such neither Being nor Absolute Substance professes to be: quite the reverse. It is the immediate, that which is as yet utterly indeterminate.

The most eloquent descriptions—perhaps already forgotten—

2. MOMENTS OF BECOMING: ARISING AND PASSING AWAY

Becoming is the unseparateness of Being and Nothing, not the unity which abstracts from Being and Nothing; rather, Becoming as the unity of Being and Nothing is this determinate unity in which there *is* Being as well as Nothing. But each, Being and Nothing, in so far as it is unseparated from its Other, is not. They *are*, therefore, in this unity; but only as disappearing and transcended. From the independence (which they were primarily imagined as possessing) they fall to the status of *moments*, which still are distinct, but at the same time are transcended.

The moments being thus taken in this their distinctness, each is in it as unity with its other. Becoming thus contains Being and Nothing as two such unities, each of which itself is unity of Being and Nothing: one of them is Being taken immediately and as relation to Nothing; the other Nothing taken immediately and as relation to Being. The determinations are of unequal value in these unities.

In this manner Becoming is in a twofold determination. In one of these, Nothing is immediate, that is, the determination begins with Nothing which relates itself to Being, or passes over into it; in the other, Being is immediate, that is, this determination begins with Being which passes over into Nothing: *Arising and Passing Away*.

Both are the same thing, namely Becoming; and even when taken as these different directions they penetrate and paralyse each other. One direction is *Passing Away*: Being passes over into Nothing; but equally Nothing is its own opposite, a transition to Being, that is, *Arising*. This *Arising* is the other direction: Nothing passes over into Being, but Being equally cancels itself (*hebt sich auf*) and is rather a transition to Nothing, a *Passing Away*.—They do not cancel mutually, nor one the other externally; each cancels itself in itself, and in itself is its own opposite.

3. TRANSCENDENCE OF BECOMING

The equipoise of *Arising and Passing Away* is, first, Becoming itself. But this equally collapses into static unity. In it Being

and Nothing exist only in so far as they disappear, but Becoming as such exists only by virtue of their distinctness. Their disappearance therefore is the disappearance of Becoming, or the disappearance of disappearance itself. Becoming is a baseless unrest which collapses into a static result.

This might also be expressed as follows:—Becoming is the disappearance of Being in Nothing and of Nothing in Being, and the disappearance of Being and Nothing in general; but also it depends upon the difference between these. It is therefore self-contradictory, because it unites contradictories within itself; but such a union destroys itself.

The result is, that disappearance has taken place; but this is not Nothing: that would be merely a relapse into one of the determinations which have already been transcended (*aufgehoben*), and not the result of Nothing and of Being too. It is the union of Being and Nothing, which has become a static simplicity. But this static simplicity is Being, which again, however, exists no longer for itself, but as a determination of the whole.

Becoming, then, taken as transition into the unity of Being and Nothing, which exists because it is, or has the form of, the one-sided immediate unity of these moments, is *Determinate Being*.

Observation

To transcend (*aufheben*), and that which is transcended (the ideal), are among the most important concepts of philosophy,—a fundamental determination which reappears everywhere without exception, the meaning of which must be taken definitely, and must especially be distinguished from Nothing.—What transcends itself does not thereby become Nothing. What is Nothing is immediate: what is transcended is mediated, and, though it is not, yet it has reached nonentity as a result approached from Being. It therefore retains the determinateness whence it started.

To transcend (*aufheben*) has this double meaning, that it signifies to keep or to preserve and also to make to cease, to finish. To preserve includes this negative element, that something is removed from its immediacy and therefore from a *Determinate Being* exposed to external influences, in order that

it may be preserved.—Thus, what is transcended is also preserved; it has only lost its immediacy and is not on that account annihilated.—In the dictionary the two determinations of transcending may be cited as two meanings of this word. But it should appear as remarkable that a language should have come to use one and the same word for two opposite determinations. It is a joy for speculative thought to find words which in themselves have a speculative meaning; the German language has several such. The double meaning of the Latin *tollere* (which has achieved fame through the Ciceronian pun *tollendum esse Octavium*) does not go so far; the affirmative determination only goes so far as to mean elevation. A thing is transcended only in so far as it has come into unity with its opposite; in this narrow determination, as something reflected, it may fittingly be called moment. With the lever, weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments, on account of the sameness of their operation and in spite of the difference between something real (such as a weight) and something ideal (the mere spatial determination, the line): see *Encyclopaedia*, 3rd Ed., section 261, note.—Even more frequently the observation will force itself into notice that the technical language of philosophy employs Latin expressions for reflected determinations, either because the mother tongue has no expressions for them, or because, when it has such, as happens here, its own expressions call to mind rather what is immediate, and the foreign language what is reflected.

The more precise meaning and expression which Being and Nothing receive, now that they are moments, must result from the consideration of Determinate Being as the unity in which they are preserved. Being is Being, and Nothing Nothing, only in the distinctness of one from the other; but, truly considered and in their unity, they have disappeared as these determinations, and are now something different. Being and Nothing are the same: but just because they are the same they no longer are Being and Nothing, and have a different determination. In Becoming they were Arising and Passing Away: in Determinate Being, as in a differently determined unity, they are moments differently determined. This unity now remains their basis, from which they no more issue to the abstract meaning of Being and Nothing.