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lost in the "they", can dwell in tranquillized familiarity. When in falling we flee into the "at-home" of publicness, we flee in the face of the "not-at-home"; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein—in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being. This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the "they", though not explicitly. This threat can go together factically with complete assurance and self-sufficiency in one's everyday concern. Anxiety can arise in the most innocuous Situations. Nor does it have any need for darkness, in which it is commonly easier for one to feel uncanny. In the dark there is emphatically 'nothing' to see, though the very world itself is still 'there', and 'there' more obtrusively.

If we Interpret Dasein's uncanniness from an existential-ontological point of view as a threat which reaches Dasein itself and which comes from Dasein itself, we are not contending that in factical anxiety too it has always been understood in this sense. When Dasein "understands" uncanniness in the everyday manner, it does so by turning away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the "not-at-home" gets 'dimmed down'. Yet the everydayness of this fleeing shows phenomenally that anxiety, as a basic state-of-mind, belongs to Dasein's essential state of Being-in-the-world, which, as one that is existential, is never present-at-hand but is itself always in a mode of factical Being-there— that is, in the mode of a state-of-mind. That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar is a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the reverse. From an existential-ontological point of view, the "not-at-home" must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon.

And only because anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world, can such Being-in-the-world, as Being which is alongside the 'world' and which is concernful in its state-of-mind, ever be afraid. Fear is anxiety, fallen into the 'world', inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself.

After all, the mood of uncanniness remains, factically, something for which we mostly have no existentiell understanding. Moreover, under the ascendancy of falling and publicness, 'real' anxiety is rare. Anxiety is often conditioned by 'physiological' factors. This fact, in its facticity, is a problem ontologically, not merely with regard to its ontical causation and course of development. Only because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically.

Even rarer than the existentiell Fact of "real" anxiety are attempts to

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1 Here we follow the earlier editions in reading 'Da-seins'. In the later editions the hyphen appears ambiguously at the end of a line.
that totality of the structural whole which we are seeking. In the unity
of those characteristics of Dasein’s Being which we have mentioned, this
Being becomes something which it is possible for us to grasp as such
ontologically. How is this unity itself to be characterized?

Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue. The
phrase ‘is an issue’ has been made plain in the state-of-Being of under-
standing—of understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being. This potentiality is that for the sake of which any
Dasein is as it is. In each case Dasein has already compared itself, in its
Being, with a possibility of itself. Being-free for one’s ownmost potentiality-
for-Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and inauthen-
ticity, is shown, with a primordial, elemental concreteness, in anxiety.
But ontologically, Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being
means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself [ihm selbst . . .
vorweg] in its Being. Dasein is always ‘beyond itself’ [‘über sich hinaus’],
not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is not, but as
Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This structure
of Being, which belongs to the essential ‘is an issue’, we shall denote as
Dasein’s “Being-ahead-of-itself”.

But this structure pertains to the whole of Dasein’s constitution. “Being-
ahead-of-itself” does not signify anything like an isolated tendency in a
worldless ‘subject’, but characterizes Being-in-the-world. To Being-in-the-
world, however, belongs the fact that it has been delivered over to itself—
that it has in each case already been thrown into a world. The abandon-
ment of Dasein to itself is shown with primordial concreteness in anxiety.
“Being-ahead-of-itself” means, if we grasp it more fully, “ahead-of-itself-
in-already-being-in-a-world”. As soon as this essentially unitary structure is
seen as a phenomenon, what we have set forth earlier in our analysis of
worldhood also becomes plain. The upshot of that analysis was that the
referential totality of significance (which as such is constitutive for world-
hood) has been ‘tied up’ with a “for-the-sake-of-which”. The fact that this
referential totality of the manifold relations of the ‘in-order-to’ has been
bound up with that which is an issue for Dasein, does not signify that a
‘world’ of Objects which is present-at-hand has been welded together with
a subject. It is rather the phenomenal expression of the fact that the con-
stitution of Dasein, whose totality is now brought out explicitly as ahead-
of-itself-in-Being-already-in . . . , is primordially a whole. To put it other-
wise, existing is always factual. Existentiality is essentially determined by
facticity.

Furthermore, Dasein’s factual existing is not only generally and without
further differentiation a thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world; it is
manifold ‘world’ of its concern, than the Self which has been individualized down to itself in uncanniness and been thrown into the “nothing”? ‘It’ calls, even though it gives the concernfully curious ear nothing to hear which might be passed along in further retelling and talked about in public. But what is Dasein even to report from the uncanniness of its thrown Being? What else remains for it than its own potentiality-for-Being as revealed in anxiety? How else is “it” to call than by summoning Dasein towards this potentiality-for-Being, which alone is the issue?

The call does not report events; it calls without uttering anything. The call discourses in the uncanny mode of keeping silent. And it does this only because, in calling the one to whom the appeal is made, it does not call him into the public idle talk of the “they”, but calls him back from this into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being. When the caller reaches him to whom the appeal is made, it does so with a cold assurance which is uncanny but by no means obvious. Wherein lies the basis for this assurance if not in the fact that when Dasein has been individualized down to itself in its uncanniness, it is for itself something that simply cannot be mistaken for anything else? What is it that so radically deprives Dasein of the possibility of misunderstanding itself by any sort of alibi and failing to recognize itself, if not the forsakenness [Verlassenheit] with which it has been abandoned [Überlassenheit] to itself?

Uncanniness is the basic kind of Being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday way it has been covered up. Out of the depths of this kind of Being, Dasein itself, as conscience, calls. The ‘it calls me’ [“es ruft mich’”] is a distinctive kind of discourse for Dasein. The call whose mood has been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible first and foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The call of conscience, existentially understood, makes known for the first time what we have hitherto merely contended: that uncanniness pursues Dasein and is a threat to the lostness in which it has forgotten itself.

The proposition that Dasein is at the same time both the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made, has now lost its empty formal character and its obviousness. Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (ahead of itself . . .). Dasein is falling into the “they” (in Being-already-alongside the world of its concern), and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience—that is, conscience itself—has its

1 ‘. . . sich ängstigen . . .’ The older editions have ‘sich ängstend’, which has virtually the same meaning, and is more characteristic of Heidegger’s style.
which could be either positive or negative as something with which we can concern ourselves; for what it has in view is a Being which is ontologically quite different—namely, existence. On the other hand, when the call is rightly understood, it gives us that which in the existential sense is the ‘most positive’ of all—namely, the ownmost possibility which Dasein can present to itself, as a calling-back which calls it forth into its factual potentiality-for-being-its-Self at the time. To hear the call authentically, signifies bringing oneself into a factual taking-action. But only by setting forth the existential structure implied in our understanding of the appeal when we hear it authentically, shall we obtain a fully adequate Interpretation of what is called in the call.

We must first show how the only phenomena with which the ordinary interpretation has any familiarity point back to the primordial meaning of the call of conscience when they are understood in a way that is ontologically appropriate; we must then show that the ordinary interpretation springs from the limitations of the way Dasein interprets itself in falling; and, since falling belongs to care itself, we must also show that this interpretation, in spite of all its obviousness, is by no means accidental.

In criticizing the ordinary interpretation of the conscience ontologically, one might be subject to the misunderstanding of supposing that if one demonstrates that the everyday way of experiencing the conscience is not existentially primordial, one will have made some judgment as to the existentiell ‘moral quality’ of any Dasein which maintains itself in that kind of experience. Just as little as existence is necessarily and directly impaired by an ontologically inadequate way of understanding the conscience, so little does an existentially appropriate Interpretation of the conscience guarantee that one has understood the call in an existentiell manner. It is no less possible to be serious when one experiences the conscience in the ordinary way than not to be serious when one’s understanding of it is more primordial. Nevertheless, the Interpretation which is more primordial existentially, also discloses possibilities for a more primordial existentiell understanding, as long as our ontological conceptualization does not let itself get cut off from our ontical experience.

¶ 60. The Existential Structure of the Authentic Potentiality-for-Being which is Attested in the Conscience

The existential Interpretation of conscience is to exhibit an attestation of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being—an attestation which is [sentende] in Dasein itself. Conscience attests not by making something known in an undifferentiated manner, but by calling forth and summoning us to Being-guilty. That which is so attested becomes ‘grasped’
in the hearing which understands the call undisguisedly in the sense it has itself intended. The understanding of the appeal is a mode of Dasein’s Being, and only as such does it give us the phenomenal content of what the call of conscience attests. The authentic understanding of the call has been characterized as “wanting to have a conscience”. This is a way of letting one’s ownmost Self take action in itself of its own accord in its Being-guilty, and represents phenomenally that authentic potentiality-for-Being which Dasein itself attests. The existential structure of this must now be laid bare. Only so can we proceed to the basic constitution of the authenticity of Dasein’s existence as disclosed in Dasein itself.

Wanting to have a conscience is, as an understanding of oneself in one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, a way in which Dasein has been disclosed. This disclosedness is constituted by discourse and state-of-mind, as well as by understanding. To understand in an existential manner implies projecting oneself in each case upon one’s ownmost factual possibility of having the potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. But the potentiality-for-Being is understood only by existing in this possibility.

What kind of mood corresponds to such understanding? Understanding the call discloses one’s own Dasein in the uncanniness of its individualization. The uncanniness which is revealed in understanding and revealed along with it, becomes genuinely disclosed by the state-of-mind of anxiety which belongs to that understanding. The fact of the anxiety of conscience, gives us phenomenal confirmation that in understanding the call Dasein is brought face to face with its own uncanniness. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety.

The third essential item in disclosedness is discourse. The call itself is a primordial kind of discourse for Dasein; but there is no corresponding counter-discourse in which, let us say, one talks about what the conscience has said, and pleads one’s cause. In hearing the call understandingly, one denies oneself any counter-discourse, not because one has been assailed by some ‘obscure power’, which suppresses one’s hearing, but because this hearing has appropriated the content of the call unconcealedly. In the call one’s constant Being-guilty is represented, and in this way the Self is brought back from the loud idle talk which goes with the common sense of the “they”. Thus the mode of Articulative discourse which belongs to wanting to have a conscience, is one of reticence. Keeping silent has been characterized as an essential possibility of discourse. Anyone who keeps silent when he wants to give us to understand something, must ‘have something to say’. In the appeal Dasein gives itself to understand its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This calling is therefore a keeping-silent. The discourse of the conscience never comes to utterance,