Martin Heidegger

Early Greek Thinking
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For Hannah Arendt,
In esteem and friendship.

Dave Krell
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historians speak of the “language of forms.” Once, however, in the beginning of Western thinking, the essence of language flashed in the light of Being—once, when Heraclitus thought the Δόγος as his guiding word, so as to think in this word the Being of beings. But the lightning abruptly vanished. No one held onto its streak of light and the nearness of what it illuminated.

We see this lightning only when we station ourselves in the storm of Being. Yet everything today betrays the fact that we bestir ourselves only to drive storms away. We organize all available means for cloud-seeding and storm dispersal in order to have calm in the face of the storm. But this calm is no tranquility. It is only anesthesia; more precisely, the narcotization of anxiety in the face of thinking.

To think is surely a peculiar affair. The word of thinkers has no authority. The word of thinkers knows no authors, in the sense of writers. The word of thinking is not picturesque; it is without charm. The word of thinking rests in the sobering quality of what it says. Just the same, thinking changes the world. It changes it in the ever darker depths of a riddle, depths which as they grow darker offer promise of a greater brightness.

The riddle has long been propounded to us in the word “Being.” In this matter “Being” remains only the provisional word. Let us see to it that our thinking does not merely run after it blindly. Let us first thoughtfully consider that “Being” was originally called “presencing”—and “presencing”: enduring-here-before in unconcealment.

THREE

Moira
(Parmenides VIII, 34-41)

The relation between thinking and Being animates all Western reflection. It remains the durable touchstone for determining to what extent and in what way we have been granted both the privilege and the capacity to approach that which addresses itself to historical man as to-be-thought. Parmenides names this relation in his saying (Frag. III):

το γάρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.

For thinking and Being are the same.

In another verse, Fragment VIII, he elaborates this saying. The lines read:

ταὐτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκέν ἐστι νόμιμο, οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, εἰ συν εἰς ημερήμερόν ἐστιν, εἰρημένει τὸ νοεῖν: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἐσται ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε Μοίρ’ ἐπεθύμεν οὐλον ἐκάκινην τ’ ἐμενείν: τῷ πάντ’ ἄνου’ ἐσται, δόμα βροτολ κατέπνευν πεποιθήτες εἰναι οἰληθή, γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ὀλλωθή, εἰναι τε καὶ οὐχι, καὶ τόπον ἀλλοιςεν οὐδ’ τε κρόδα φανόν δειμεθείν.

Thinking and the thought “it is” are the same. For without the being in relation to which it is uttered you cannot find thinking. For there neither is nor shall be anything outside of being, since Moira bound it to be whole and immovable. For that reason, all these will be mere names which mortals have laid down,
with symbolic logic, are its most effective exponents), it is necessary to emphasize more distinctly that definitive outlook within which the modern interpretation of Parmenides' fragment operates.

Modern philosophy experiences beings as objects [Gegenstand]. It is through and for perception that the object comes to be a "standing against." As Leibniz clearly saw, percipere is like an appetite which seeks out the particular being and attacks it, in order to grasp it and wholly subsume it under a concept, relating this being's presence [Präsenz] back to the percipere (repraesentare). Repraesentatio, representation [Vorstellung], is defined as the perceptive self-presentation (to the self as ego) of what appears.

Among the doctrines of modern philosophy there is one outstanding formulation which is unfailingly regarded as the final solution by all those who with the help of modern philosophy undertake to clarify Parmenides' saying. We mean Berkeley's proposition, which is based on the fundamental position of Descartes' metaphysics and says: esse = percipi, to be is at once to be represented. Being falls under the sway of representation, understood in the sense of perception. This proposition fashions the context in which the saying of Parmenides first becomes accessible to a scientific-philosophical explanation which removes it from that aura of half-poetical "presentiment" to which Presocratic thinking is usually consigned. Esse = percipi. Being is being represented. It is by virtue of representing that Being is. Being is identical with thinking insofar as the objectivity of objects is composed and constituted in the representing consciousness, in the "I think something." In light of this assertion regarding the relation between Being and thinking, the saying of Parmenides comes to be viewed as a crude prefiguring of contemporary doctrines of reality and the knowledge of reality.

It is no accident that Hegel, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Works, 2d ed., XIII, 274), translates and discusses this saying of Parmenides concerning the relation of Being and thinking:

"Thinking, and that for the sake of which there is thought, are the same. For without the beings in which it is expressed (ἐν ἄλλησι προηγομένων ἐστίν) you will not find thinking; for thinking, without beings, is and shall be nothing." This is the main thought. Thinking produces itself, and what is produced is a thought.

Thinking is thus identical with its Being; for there is nothing outside of Being, this great affirmation.

For Hegel Being is the affirmation of self-productive thought. Being is the product of thinking, of perception, in the sense in which Descartes had already interpreted idea. Through thinking, Being as affirmation and as the positing of representation is transposed into the realm of the "ideal." For Hegel also—though in an incomparably more thoughtful way, a way mediated by Kant—Being is the same as thinking. It is the same as thinking in that Being is what is expressed and affirmed by thinking. Thus, from the standpoint of modern philosophy, Hegel can pass the following judgment upon the saying of Parmenides:

In that this saying gives evidence of ascending into the realm of the ideal, genuine philosophizing began with Parmenides... this beginning is of course still dark and indefinite and does not further explain what is contained in it; but just this explanation constitutes the development of philosophy itself—which is not yet present here. (pp. 274 ff.)

For Hegel philosophy is at hand only when the self-thinking of absolute knowledge is reality itself, and simply is. The self-perfecting elevation of Being into the thinking of Spirit as absolute reality takes place in and as speculative logic.

On the horizon of this consummation of modern philosophy Parmenides' saying appears as the very beginning of genuine philosophizing, i.e. as the beginning of logic in Hegel's sense—but only as a beginning. Parmenides' thought lacks the speculative, dialectical form which Hegel does however find in Heraclitus. Referring to Heraclitus Hegel says, "Here we see land; there is no sentence in Heraclitus which I have not taken up into my Logic." Hegel's Logic is not only the one and only suitable interpretation of Berkeley's proposition in modern times; it is its unconditioned realization. That Berkeley's assertion esse = percipi concerns precisely what Parmenides' saying first put into words has never been doubted. But this historical kinship of the modern proposition and the ancient saying at the same time has its proper foundation in a difference between what is said and thought in our times and what was said and thought at that time—a difference which could hardly be more decisive.

The dissimilarity between the two is so far-reaching that through it
the very possibility of comprehending the difference is shattered. By indicating this difference we are at the same time giving an indication of the degree to which our own interpretation of Parmenides' saying arises from a way of thinking utterly foreign to the Hegelian approach. Does the statement esse = percipi contain the proper interpretation of the saying to γνω αυτό νοειν ἐστιν τε καὶ ειναι? Do both propositions—provided we may call them propositions—say that thinking and Being are the same? And even if they do say so, do they say so in the same sense? To the attentive eye a distinction at once makes itself clear which might easily be dismissed as apparently external. In both places (Frgs. III and VIII, 34-41) Parmenides words his saying so that νοειν (thinking) each time precedes ειναι (Being). Berkeley, on the other hand, puts esse (Being) before percipi (thinking). This would seem to signify that Parmenides grants priority to thinking, while Berkeley grants priority to Being. Actually the situation is just the reverse: Parmenides consigns thinking to Being, while Berkeley refers Being to thinking. To correspond more adequately to the Greek saying, the modern proposition would have to run: percipi = esse.

The modern statement asserts something about Being, understood as objectivity for a thoroughgoing representation. The Greek saying assigns thinking, as an apprehending which gathers, to Being, understood as presencing. Thus every interpretation of the Greek saying that moves within the context of modern thinking goes awry from the start. Nonetheless, these multiform interpretations fulfill their inexorable function: they render Greek thinking accessible to modern representation and bolster the latter in its self-willed progression to a "higher" level of philosophy.

The first of the three viewpoints that determine all interpretations of Parmenides' saying represents thinking as something at hand and inserts it among the remaining beings. The second viewpoint, in the modern fashion, grasps Being, in the sense of the representedness of objects, as objectivity for the ego of subjectivity.

The third point of view follows one of the guidelines of ancient philosophy as determined by Plato. According to the Socratic-Platonic teaching, the Ideas endow every entity with "being," but they do not belong in the realm of αἰσθησις, the sense-perceptible. The Ideas can be purely seen only in νοειν, nonsensible perception. Being belongs in the realm of the νοειν, the non- and supersensible. Plotinus interprets Parmenides' saying in the Platonic sense, according to which Parmenides wants to say: Being is something nonsensible. Here the emphasis of the saying falls on thinking, although not in the way this is understood in modern philosophy. Being is identified in terms of thinking's nonsensible nature. Interpreted from the Neoplatonic perspective, Parmenides' saying is an assertion neither about thinking nor about Being, nor even about the essential belonging-together of both in their difference. The saying is rather an assertion about the equal participation of both in the realm of the nonsensible.

Each of these three viewpoints draws the early thinking of the Greeks into a region dominated by the spheres of questioning of subsequent metaphysics. Presumably, however, all later thinking which seeks dialogue with ancient thinking should listen continually from within its own standpoint, and should thereby bring the silence of ancient thinking to expression. In this process, of course, the earlier thinking is inevitably accommodated to the later dialogue, into whose frame of reference and ways of hearing it is transposed. The earlier thinking is thus, as it were, deprived of its own freedom of speech. But this accommodation in no way restricts one to an interpretation completely dedicated to reinterpreting the to-be-thought at the beginning of Western thinking exclusively in terms of subsequent modes of representation. All depends on whether the dialogue we have undertaken first of all and continually allows itself to respond to the questioning address of early thinking, or whether it simply closes itself off to such an address and cloaks early thought with the mantle of more recent doctrines. This happens as soon as subsequent thinking neglects to inquire properly into the ways of hearing and frames of reference of early thinking.

An effort at proper inquiry should not end in a historical investigation which merely establishes the unexpressed presuppositions underlying early thought; that is, proper inquiry is not an investigation in which these presuppositions are taken into account solely with respect to whatever subsequent interpretation either validates as already posited truth or invalidates as having been superseded by further de-
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Unlike this type of investigation, proper inquiry must be a dialogue in which the ways of hearing and points of view of ancient thinking are contemplated according to their essential origin, so that the call [Gehetiss] under which past, present, and future thinking—each in its own way—all stand, might begin to announce itself. An attempt at such inquiry should first direct its attention to the obscure passages of the ancient text, and should not settle upon those which give the appearance of easy intelligibility. To focus on the latter would end the dialogue before it has begun.

The following discussion limits itself to working through the cited text by a series of individual commentaries. These may help to prepare a thoughtful translation of early Greek speech by advancing a thinking which is awake to beginnings.

I

The topic under discussion is the relation between thinking and Being. In the first place we ought to observe that the text (VIII, 34-41) which ponders this relation more thoroughly speaks of ἐόν and not—as in Fragment III—about ἐν. Immediately, and with some justification, one concludes from this that Fragment VIII concerns beings rather than Being. But in saying ἐόν Parmenides is in no way thinking “beings in themselves,” understood as the whole to which thinking, insofar as it is some kind of entity, also belongs. Just as little does ἐόν mean ἐν in the sense of “Being for itself,” as though it were incumbent upon the thinker to set the nonsensible essential nature of Being apart from, and in opposition to, beings which are sensible. Rather ἐόν, being, is thought here in its duality as Being and beings, and is participially expressed—although the grammatical concept has not yet come explicitly into the grasp of linguistic science. This duality is at least intimated by such nuances of phrasing as “the Being of beings” and “beings in Being.” In its essence, however, what unfolds is obscured more than clarified through the “in” and the “of.” These expressions are far from thinking the duality as such, or from seriously questioning its unfolding.

“Being itself,” so frequently invoked, is held to be true so long as it is experienced as Being, consistently understood as the Being of beings. Meanwhile the beginning of Western thinking was fated to catch an appropriate glimpse of what the word ἐνοί, to be, says—in Φύος, Ἀγός, Ἐν. Since the gathering that reigns within Being unites all beings, an inevitable and continually more stubborn semblance arises from the contemplation of this gathering, namely, the illusion that Being (of beings) is not only identical with the totality of beings, but that, as identical, it is at the same time that which unifies and is even most in being [das Setendste]. For representational thinking everything comes to be a being.

The duality of Being and beings, as something twofold, seems to melt away into nonexistence, albeit thinking, from its Greek beginnings onward, has moved within the unfolding of this duality, though without considering its situation or at all taking note of the unfolding of the twofold. What takes place at the beginning of Western thought is the unobserved decline of the duality. But this decline is not nothing. Indeed it imparts to Greek thinking the character of a beginning, in that the lighting of the Being of beings, as a lighting, is concealed. The hiddenness of this decline of the duality reigns in essentially the same way as that into which the duality itself falls. Into what does it fall? Into oblivion, whose lasting dominance conceals itself as Ἄργη, to which Ἀρίστη belongs so immediately that the former can withdraw in its favor and can relinquish to it pure disclosure in the modes of Φύος, Ἀγός, and Ἐν, as though this had no need of concealment.

But the apparently futile lighting is riddled with darkness. In it the unfolding of the twofold remains as concealed as its decline for beginning thought. However, we must be alert to the duality of Being and beings in the ἐόν in order to follow the discussion Parmenides devotes to the relation between thinking and Being.

II

Fragment III states very concisely that thinking belongs to Being. How shall we characterize this belongingness? Our question comes too late, since the laconic saying has already given the answer with its first words: τὸ γὰρ αὐτό, “For, the Same. . . .” The construction of the
saying in Fragment VIII, 34 begins with the very same word: τὸ ὑόν. Does this word give us an answer to the question of how thinking belongs to Being, in that it says both are "the Same"? The word gives no answer. In the first place, because the determination "the Same" precludes any question about "belonging together," which can only exist between things that are different. In the second place, because the word "the Same" says nothing at all about the point of view from which, and for what reason, difference passes over into sameness. Thus τὸ ὑόν, the Same, remains the enigmatic key word for both fragments—if not for the whole of Parmenides' thought.

Of course if we are of the opinion that the word τὸ ὑόν, the Same, means "identical," and if we accept "identity" completely as the most transparent presupposition for the thinkability of whatever is thinkable, then by this opinion we become progressively more deaf to the key word, assuming that we have ever heard its call. It is sufficient, however, to keep the word in our hearing in its thought-provoking character. In doing so we remain listeners, prepared to let this enigmatic key word alone for a while in order to listen for a saying which could help us to contemplate the enigma in all its fullness.

Parmenides offers some help. In Fragment VIII he gives a clearer statement as to how we should think the "Being" to which voeiv belongs. Instead of εὐφ, Parmenides now says ἐόν, "being" [das Seiend], which enunciates the ambiguity of the duality of Being and beings. But voeiv calls to mind νόημα: what has been taken heed of by an attentive apprehending.

'Εόν is explicitly identified as that οὖνειν ἐότι νόημα for the sake of which thankful thought comes to presence. (Concerning thinking and thanking see What Is Called Thinking?* Part 2, Lecture 3, pp. 138 ff.)

Thinking comes to presence because of the still unspoken duality. The presencing of thinking is on the way to the duality of Being and beings. The duality presences in taking-heed-of. According to Fragment VI, taking-heed-of is already gathered to the duality by virtue of a prior λέγειν, a prior letting-stand-before. How does this come about?

times must be a silence. Every utterance and every silence is already something said, though the reverse does not always hold.

In what does the difference between something said and something uttered consist? For what reason does something said, though the reverse does not always hold. This word is correctly translated in dictionaries as "utterance." But how are we to experience an uttering which gets its name from φωνη ειναι and φωναι? Does "utterance" here merely stand for the vocalization (φωνη) of what a word or sentence signifies (σημαινειν)? Is speaking out, uttering, to be grasped here as the expression of something interior (something psychical), and so divided into two component parts—the phonetic and the semantic? There is no trace of this to be found in the experience of speaking as φωναι, the experience of speech as φωνη, Φωνη ειναι implies "to invoke," "to name with praise," "to call upon," "all of which depend upon the fact that the verb has its essence in letting something appear. Φωνη is the shining of the stars and of the moon, it is their way of coming forward into view and of self-concealing. Φωνη ειναι means "phases." The changing forms of the moon's shining are its phases. Φωνη ειναι is the saying; to say means to bring forward into view. Φωνη, "I say," has the same (though not identical) essence as λέγειν: to bring what is present in its presencing forward into shining appearance, into lying-before.

Parmenides thus wishes to discuss where νοειν belongs. For only where it belongs and is at home can we find it; only there can we experience through our findings how far thinking belongs with Being. If Parmenides experiences νοειν as νοεινομενον, this does not mean that he experiences it as an "utterance" which is to be discovered in spoken conversation or in written characters, i.e. in some sort of sensibly perceptible entities. We would miss the mark entirely, putting the greatest possible distance between ourselves and Greek thinking, if we accepted this notion, and if we further desired to represent both speaking and what is spoken as "conscious experiences," and to establish thinking within the confines of these experiences as an act of consciousness. Νοειν, taking-heed-of, and what it takes up, are something said, something brought forward into view. But where? Parmenides says: εν τω εστιν, in εστιν, in the duality of presencing and what is present. This gives us food for thought and thoroughly frees us from the hasty presupposition that thinking is something expressed in an utterance: there is nowhere any suggestion of that.

To what extent can and must νοειν, thinking, come to light in the duality? To what extent that the unfolding in the duality of presencing and present beings invokes λέγειν, letting-lying-before, and with the released letting-lying of what lies before us, grants νοειν something it can take heed of and thus preserve. But Parmenides does not yet think the duality as such; he does not at all think through the unfolding of the twofold. He does, however, say (Frag. VIII, 35 ff.): ου γαρ δευν τω οντω... ευρησεις το νοειν. "For you cannot find thinking apart from the duality." Why not? Because thinking belongs with εστιν in the gathering that εστιν calls for; and because thinking itself, resting in the λέγειν, completes the gathering called for, thus responding to its belonging to εστιν as a belonging which εστιν uses. For νοειν takes up, not just anything at random, but only that One designated in Fragment VI: εστιν εμελεναι,* whatever is present in its presencing.

Insofar as what is thought-provoking, though not yet thought, is announced in Parmenides' exposition, so far does the fundamental requirement clearly come to light for proper reflection upon Parmenides' statement that thinking belongs to Being. We have to learn to think the essence of language from the saying, and to think saying as letting-lying-before (λογος) and as bringing-forward-into-view (φωνη). To satisfy this demand remains a difficult task because that first illumination of the essence of language as saying disappears immediately into a veiling darkness and yields ascendancy to a characterization of language which relentlessly represents it in terms of φωνη, vocalization—a system of signs and significations, and ultimately of data and information.

*In the Ionian dialect and in epic usage the verb ειναι (to be) may appear either as εμελεναι or εμελεαναι. In his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Simplicius, for no apparent reason, ascribes both forms to Parmenides. The first variant appears at 144, 29 (Diels-Kranz VIII, 38), the second at 117, 2 (Diels-Kranz VI, 1). Heidegger reproduces the second variant (εμελεαναι, DK VI, 1) throughout. With a shift of accent to the penult this second form becomes εμελαναι, an Attic isomorph—used also by Herodotus, however—which means to dwell in or abide by; or of things, to remain fixed, stand fast.—Th.
of the name appear to maintain itself "alongside" and "apart from" ἐὸν, but also what the name names. This appearance is no mere illusion. For λέγειν and νοεῖν let what is present lie before us in the light of presencing. Accordingly, they themselves lie opposite presencing, though certainly not as two independently existing objects. The conjunction of λέγειν and νοεῖν (according to Fragment VI) liberates the ἐὸν ἐμευκαὶ, presencing in its appearance, for perception, and therefore does in a certain sense hold itself apart from ἐὸν. In one respect thinking is outside the duality toward which it makes its way, required by and responding to it. In another respect, this very "making its way toward . . ." remains within the duality, which is never simply an indifferently represented distinction between Being and beings, but rather comes to presence from the revealing unfolding. It is this unfolding that, as Ἀλήθεια, bestows on every presencing the light in which something present can appear.

But disclosure, while it bestows the lighting of presencing, at the same time needs a letting-lie-before and a taking-up-into-perception if what is present is to appear, and by this need binds thinking to its belonging-together with the duality. Therefore by no means is there somewhere and somehow something present outside the duality.

This entire discussion would be something arbitrarily spun out in thought and insinuated by hindsight had not Parmenides himself explained why anything outside of presencing, anything besides the ἐὸν, is impossible.

VI

Considered grammatically, what the thinker says here about the ἐὸν stands in a subordinate clause. Anyone who has only minimal experience in hearing what great thinkers say will probably pause to ponder the strange fact that they say what is to be thought in a casually attached dependent clause and let it go at that. The play of the calling, brightening, expanding light is not actually visible. It shines imperceptibly, like morning light upon the quiet splendor of lilies in a field or roses in a garden.

Parmenides' subordinate clause—in reality his "sentence of sentences"—runs (VIII, 37 ff.):

... ἐπεὶ τὸ γε Μοῖρα ἐπέδοσεν οὐλὸν ἀκύπτων τὸ ἐμευκαὶ:

... since Moira bound it (being) to be a whole and immovable.

(W. Kranz)

Parmenides speaks of ἐὸν, of the presencing (of what is present), and of duality, and in no sense of "beings." He names the Μοῖρα, the apportionment, which allots by bestowing and so unfolds the twofold. The apportionment dispenses [beschickt], (provides and presents) through the duality. Apportionment is the dispensation of presencing, as the presencing of what is present, which is gathered in itself and therefore unfolds of itself. Μοῖρα is the destining of "Being," in the sense of ἐὸν. Μοῖρα has dispensed the destiny of Being, τὸ γε, into the duality, and thus has bound it to totality and immobility, from which and in which the presencing of what is present comes to pass.

In the destining of duality, however, only presencing attains a shining, and only what is present attains appearance. Destiny altogether conceals both the duality as such and its unfolding. The essence of Ἀλήθεια remains veiled. The visibility it bestows allows the presencing of what is present to arise as outer appearance [Ausschen], (eioevru) and aspect [Gesicht], (Ioèa). Consequently the perceptual relation to the presencing of what is present is defined as "seeing" (eioevra). Stamped with this character of viste, knowledge and the evidence of knowledge cannot renounce their essential derivation from luminous disclosure, even where truth has been transformed into the certainty of self-consciousness. Lumen naturale, natural light, i.e. the illumination of reason, already presupposes the disclosure of the duality. The same holds true of the Augustinian and medieval views of light—not to mention their Platonic origins—which could only develop under the tutelage of an Ἀλήθεια already reigning in the destiny of the duality.

If we wish to speak of the history of Being we must first have
considered that Being says: presencing of what is present: duality. Only on the basis of Being, so considered, can we first ask with adequate thoughtfulness what "history" might mean here. History is the destining of the duality. It is the revealing, unfolding bestowal of luminous presencing in which what is present appears. The history of Being is never a sequence of events which Being traverses for itself. It is certainly not an "object" which might offer new possibilities of historical representation, willing to put itself in the place of prior observations of the history of metaphysics with the presumption of knowing better than they.

What Parmenides in his inconspicuous subordinate clause says about Moira, into whose grasp ἐόν has been released as the duality, reveals to the thinker the breadth of vision fatefully reserved for the path he treads. For in this expanse appears that in which the presencing (of what is present) manifests itself: τὰ σήματα τοῦ ἐόντος. There are many (πολλὰ) of these σήματα. They are not signposts for something else. They are the manifold shining of presencing itself, out of the unfolded duality.

But we have not yet exhaustively recounted what it is that Moira in its dispensing metes out. Therefore an essential feature of the nature of its governance still remains unthought. What is the significance of the fact that destiny releases the presencing of what is present into the duality, and so binds it to wholeness and rest?

To take proper measure of what Parmenides says about this problem in the lines that follow his subordinate clause (VIII, 30 ff.), it is necessary to recollect something previously mentioned (III). The unfolding of the twofold reings as ἔδον, saying as bringing-forward-into-view. The duality conceals within itself both voiciv and its thought (νοημα) as something said. What is taken up in thinking, however, is the presencing of what is present. The thoughtful saying that corresponds to the duality is the λέγειν, the letting-lie-before of presencing. It occurs, and occurs only, on the thought-path of the thinker who has been called by Ἄληθεια.

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Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)

But what becomes of the ἔδον (saying) reigning in revealing destiny if this destiny should abandon what is unfolded in the twofold to the everyday perception of mortals? Mortals accept (διέκθεσαν, δόξα) whatever is immediately, abruptly, and first of all offered to them. They never concern themselves about preparing a path of thought. They never really hear the call of the disclosure of the duality. They keep to what is unfolded in the twofold, and only to that aspect which immediately makes a claim upon mortals; that is, they keep to what is present without considering presencing. They relinquish all their affairs to what is commonly assumed, τὰ δοκοῦντα (Frag. I, 31). They take this to be what is unconcealed, διάθη (VIII, 39), for it really does appear to them and is thus something revealed. But what becomes of their speech if it is not capable of being a λέγειν, a letting-lie-before? The ordinary speech of mortals, insofar as they do not consider presencing, that is, insofar as they do not think, ends up as a speaking of names in which vocalization and the immediately perceptible form of the word, as spoken or written, are stressed.

The unequivocal restriction of speech (of letting-lie-before) to word-signs shatters the gathering taking-heed-of. The latter now becomes καταγιθέοι (VIII, 39), establishing, which simply secures this or that as a hasty opinion. Everything so secured remains ἄνωμα. Parmenides is in no way saying that what is ordinarily assumed becomes a "mere" name. But what is thus assumed is given over to a speaking entirely guided by current terms which, rashly spoken, say everything about everything and wander aimlessly in the "... as well as..."

Perception of what is present (of ἔδοντα) also names ἔλεοι and knows presencing, although it knows nonpresencing just as fleetingly; of course, it does not know this in the same way as does thinking, which for its part is concerned with what is withheld from the duality (the μῆτ ἐόν). Ordinary opinion knows only ἔλεοι τε καὶ οὐχὶ (VIII, 40), presencing as well as nonpresencing. The stress in this knowing falls on the τε-καί, the "as well as." And where ordinary perception, speaking in words, encounters rise and fall, it is satisfied with the "as well as" of coming-to-be, γίγνεσθαι [Entstehen], and passing away, ἀλλοθεῖα [Vergehen]. It never perceives place, τόμος, as an abode, as what the
EARLY GREEK THINKING

twofold offers as a home to the presencing of what is present. In the “as well as,” the ordinary opinion of mortals merely follows the “here and there” (dallósoiv, VIII, 41) of particular “places.” Ordinary perception certainly moves within the lightedness of what is present and sees what is shining out, φωνή (VIII, 41), in color; but is dazzled by changes of color, ψηφείω, and pays no attention to the still light of the lighting that emanates from duality and is Φῶς: the bringing-forward-into-view—the way the word speaks, not the way in which terms as mere names speak.

Τὸ πᾶν Ὀνα ἔσται (VIII, 38): thereby will everything (that is present) become present in a merely presumed disclosure which permits the predominance of terms. How does this happen? Through Moira, through the destining of the disclosure of the duality. How are we to understand this? In the unfolding of the twofold what is present comes to appear with the shining of presencing. What is present is itself also something said, but said in name-words, in whose speaking the ordinary speech of mortals moves. The destining of the disclosure of the duality (of ἐόν) yields what is present (τὸ ἐόντα) to the everyday perception of mortals.

How does this fateful yielding occur? Already only insofar as the twofold as such, and therefore its unfolding, remain hidden. But then does self-concealment reign at the heart of disclosure? A bold thought. Heraclitus thought it. Parmenides unwittingly experienced this thought insofar as he heard the call of Ἄνθρωποι and contemplated the Moira of ἐόν, the destining of the duality, with a view to what is present and also to presencing.

Parmenides would not have been a thinker at the earliest dawn of that thinking which is sent into the destiny of the duality if he had not thought within the area of the riddle which is silently contained in the enigmatic key word τὸ σαμαί, the Same. Herein is concealed what is thought-worthy, what in the very predominance of what is present (τὸ ἐόντα, τὸ ὁμογενές) gives us food for thought: as the relation of thinking to Being, as the truth of Being in the sense of the disclosure of the duality, and as withholding from the twofold (μὴ ἐόν).

The dialogue with Parmenides never comes to an end, not only because so much in the preserved fragments of his “Didactic Poem” still remains obscure, but also because what is said there continually deserves more thought. This unending dialogue is no failing. It is a sign of the boundlessness which, in and for remembrance, nourishes the possibility of a transformation of destiny.

But anyone who only expects thinking to give assurances, and awaits the day when we can go beyond it as unnecessary, is demanding that thought annihilate itself. That demand appears in a strange light if we consider that the essence of mortals calls upon them to heed a call which beckons them toward death. As the outermost possibility of mortal Dasein, death is not the end of the possible but the highest keeping (the gathering sheltering) of the mystery of calling disclosure.

Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)
He is called “the Obscure,” ὁ Σκοτεινός. Heraclitus had this reputation even when his writings were preserved intact. Today we know only fragments of his work. Later thinkers—Plato and Aristotle; subsequent authors and philosophical scholars—Theophrastus, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch; even Church Fathers—Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen—all cite passages from Heraclitus here and there in their own works. Thanks to research in philology and history of philosophy, these quotations have been collected as fragments. Sometimes the fragments comprise several sentences, sometimes only one sentence, and occasionally they consist of mere phrases or isolated words.

The train of thought of these later thinkers and writers determines their selection and arrangement of Heraclitus’ words. This in turn delimits the space available for any interpretation of them. Thus a closer examination of their place of origin in the writings of subsequent authors yields only the context into which the quotation has been placed, not the Heraclitean context from which it was taken. The quotations and the sources, taken together, still do not yield what is essential: the definitive, all-articulating unity of the inner structure of Heraclitus’ writing. Only a constantly advancing insight into this structure will reveal the point from which the individual fragments are speaking, and in what sense each of them, as a saying, must be heard. Because we can scarcely surmise what the well-spring is that gives the writing of Heraclitus its unity, and because we find this source so difficult to think, we are justified in calling this thinker “the Obscure.” Even the inherent meaning of what this epithet says to us remains obscure.

Heraclitus is called “the Obscure.” But he is the Lucid. For he tells of the lighting whose shining he attempts to call forth into the language of thinking. Insofar as it illuminates, the lighting endures. We call its illumination the lighting [die Lichtung]. What belongs to it, and how and where it takes place, still remain to be considered. The word “light” means lustrous, beaming, brightening. Lighting bestows the shining, opens what shines to an appearance. The open is the realm of unconcealment and is governed by disclosure. What belongs to the latter, and whether and to what extent disclosing and lighting are the Same, remain to be asked.

An appeal to the meaning of ἀληθεία accomplishes nothing, and will never produce anything useful.* Further, we must ask whether what is entertained under the rubrics “truth,” “certainty,” “objectivity,” and “reality” has the slightest bearing upon the direction in which revealing and lighting point thought. Presumably, the thinking that goes in such a direction has more at stake than a securing of objective truth—in the sense of valid propositions. Why is it that we are ever and again so quick to forget the subjectivity that belongs to every objectivity? How does it happen that even when we do note that they belong together, we still try to explain each from the standpoint of the other, or introduce some third element which is supposed to embrace both subject and object? Why is it that we stubbornly resist considering even once whether the belonging-together of subject and object does not arise from something that first imparts their nature to both the object and its objectivity, and the subject and its subjectivity, and hence is prior to the realm of their reciprocity? That our thinking finds it so toilsome to be in this bestowal, or even on the lookout for it, cannot be blamed on a narrowness of contemporary intellect or resis-

*Although Heidegger positively discourages us from doing so, we offer the following philological information: ἀληθεία is a substantive form constructed from ἀλήθες (−ēs), an adjectival form of ἀλήθες. T. Gaisford’s Etymologicum Magnum (Oxford, 1848), pp. 62, 51, discusses it as follows: ἀλήθες = ἀλεθές = ἀλήθες τῆς μὴ ἁθύη ἀλήθες. Λόγος is a collateral form of λόγος, I escape notice, am hidden, unseen or forgotten by others. Gaisford describes ἀλήθες as that which does not sink into θάνατος, the source of oblivion. Liddell-Scott translate ἀλήθες as “unconcealed.” Hence ἀληθεία might be rendered as “unconcealment.”—T.