

*A New  
Foreign  
Policy  
for the  
United  
States*

MORGENTHAU

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To Hansch

With love

Prof. Ingebrigtsen

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

*A New Foreign Policy  
for the United States*

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the world and to the uncommitted nations. Yet the intellectual instruments that we have brought to bear upon these new problems are still the ones we used so successfully in the late 1940s: the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In the process, the Truman Doctrine has been transformed from an ideology of military containment into a general principle of global policy, and the Marshall Plan has been transformed from a technique of economic recovery limited to Western Europe to the global principle of foreign aid. In consequence, the United States has taken upon itself global responsibilities which it cannot discharge with a chance of success and which, if it were to try to discharge them, would entail its ruin.

As I pointed out in 1951, "As a guide to political action, it [the Truman Doctrine] is the victim . . . of two congenital political weaknesses: the inability to distinguish between what is desirable and what is possible, and the inability to distinguish between what is desirable and what is essential."<sup>1</sup> The new globalism, which seeks to put the principle of the Truman Doctrine into practice by identifying revolution with Communism and trying to stop Communism everywhere, neglects these distinctions which are fundamental to a sound foreign policy. For while it would be desirable to contain Communism within its present limits through the efforts of the United States, it is essential that only that type of Communism hostile to the interests of the United States be so contained. Thus I have always regarded it as essential in view of the interests of the United States that the transformation of Cuba into a center of Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere and a military and political outpost of the Soviet Union be prevented. And on the same grounds, I find the containment of Communism in Vietnam to be desirable but not essential from the point of view of the interests of the United States, especially since this Communism is likely to be an independent national Communism after the model of Yugoslavia.

This latter position is contested by some who quote General Giap, the commander of the North Vietnamese army, to the

<sup>1</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 117.

nothing, either total involvement or total abstention. Both refuse to concern themselves with the concrete issues of foreign policy on their own merits—that is, in terms of the interests involved and the power available. While isolationism stops short of these concrete issues, globalism soars beyond them. Both assume the self-sufficiency of American power to protect and promote the American national interest either in indiscriminate abstention or indiscriminate involvement. While the isolationist used to say, "We don't need to have anything to do with the world, for we can take care of our own interests on our own terms," the globalists say, "We shall take on the whole world, but only on our own terms." In short, isolationism is a kind of introverted globalism, and globalism is a kind of isolationism turned inside out. To stigmatize a position that falls short of such indiscriminate globalism as "neo-isolationism" is a polemic misuse of terms; it derives from the globalist assumption that indiscriminate involvement is, as it were, the natural stance of American policy.

Both attitudes, in different ways oblivious of political reality, substitute for the complex and discriminating mode of political thought a simple approach, which in its simplicity is commensurate with the simplicity of their picture of the political world: the moral crusade. The isolationist's moralism is naturally negative, abstentionist, and domestically oriented; it seeks to protect the virtue of the United States from contamination by the power politics of evil nations. Wilsonian globalism endeavored to bring the virtue of American democracy to the rest of the world. Contemporary globalism tries to protect the virtue of the "free world" from contamination by Communism and to create a world order in which that virtue has a chance to flourish. The anti-Communist crusade has become both the moral principle of contemporary globalism and the rationale of our world-wide foreign policy.

The anti-Communist crusade has its origins in the Truman Doctrine, formulated in President Truman's message to Congress of March 12, 1947. His message assumed that the issue between the United States and the Soviet Union, from which arose the need for aid to Greece and Turkey, must be understood not as

hand, to his propensity for grandiose announcements and, on the other, to his innate caution and President Eisenhower's common sense. The only major practical tribute the Eisenhower administration paid to the anti-Communist crusade was alliances, such as the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, which were supposed to contain Communism in the Middle East and Asia, respectively.

Under President Kennedy, the gap between crusading pronouncements and actual policies started to narrow, because of the intellectual recognition on the part of the Kennedy administration that Communism could no longer be defined simply, as it could in 1950, as the "spearhead of Russian imperialism." Thus the crusading spirit gave way to a sober, differentiating assessment of the bearing of the newly emerged, different types of Communism on the American national interest.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF AMERICAN PARAMOUNTCY

Under President Johnson, pronouncements and policies were, for the first time since the great transformation of American policy in 1947, very nearly in harmony. What President Johnson only implied, the Secretaries of State and Defense clearly stated: We are fighting in Vietnam in order to stop Communism throughout the world. And the President stated with similar clarity that "we do not propose to sit here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the Communists set up any government in the Western Hemisphere." What in the past we had said we were doing or would do but never did, we were now in the process of putting into practice: to stop the expansion of Communism on a global scale by force of arms. We were doing this under the impact of a doctrine which asserts the temporary paramountcy of American military power. This new doctrine, underpinning the Wilsonian crusading globalism with global military power, was most cogently presented in an address to the Foreign Service Association by Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, then a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State. The doctrine, as stated by Brzezinski, opposes the common view that we have moved, since the end of the Second World War, from

American paramountcy to a bipolar and from there into a polycentric world.

I will argue instead that in fact, if we look at the last 20 years there has been a shift from a period, first of all, of polycentrism in international affairs, to a period of bipolarity, to what is today a period of U.S. paramountcy. . . . The U.S. is today the only effective global military power in the world. Moreover . . . our way of life is still the most appealing way of life to most people on earth. Most people crave the American way of life even though they may reject and condemn the United States. We are the only power with far-flung global economic investments, economic involvement and global trade, and there is no parallel to us in the role our science and technology plays throughout the world!<sup>1</sup>

By contrast, the Soviet Union is not a global power. Khrushchev acted on the assumption that it was, but the Cuban missile crisis proved that it was not. Brzezinski comments:

The Soviet leaders were forced, because of the energetic response by the United States, to the conclusion that their apocalyptic power [nuclear deterrent power] was insufficient to make the Soviet Union a global power. Faced with a showdown, the Soviet Union didn't dare to respond even in an area of its regional predominance—in Berlin. . . . It had no military capacity to fight in Cuba, or in Vietnam, or to protect its interests in the Congo.<sup>2</sup>

However, this paramountcy of American military power is not likely to last; for the Soviet Union is in the process of becoming a global power, too, by developing its long-range conventional capabilities. Once that process is consummated, "great international instability" is likely. According to Brzezinski:

This is precisely why the coming decade is a decade of opportunity and responsibility for the United States. This is truly the American decade. . . . What should be the role of the United States in this period? To use our power responsibly and constructively so that when the American paramountcy ends, the world will have been launched on a constructive pattern of development towards international stability . . . The ultimate objective ought to be the shap-

<sup>1</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, July 3, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

nists were to govern all of it. Obviously we are not called upon to establish and support any kind of stability throughout the world, but only a stability that favors our interests. If it were otherwise, we could afford to sit back and allow an unstable world to find its own stability, Communist or otherwise. What we are against is not instability per se, but an instability of which Communism, and, through it, the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba might take advantage. Thus the doctrine of stabilization reveals itself as an ideology of the status quo, opposed to social and national revolutions because of their Communist auspices or components. As Alexander I and Metternich invoked Christianity against the liberal revolutions, so the new doctrine invokes the abstraction of stability against contemporary revolutionary change. By doing this, the doctrine evades the real issue facing American foreign policy. That issue is not how to preserve stability in the face of revolution, but how to create stability out of revolution.

Furthermore, the new doctrine dangerously misjudges the nature of American military power and overestimates its effectiveness. It does so in two different respects. First, the mobile conventional power of the United States is no doubt superior to that of the Soviet Union, but it is not likely to remain so for long; for the Soviet Union has made a concerted effort to increase the mobility of its conventional forces, especially in the air and on the sea. However, even this temporarily superior conventional power has by no means proven effective in support of American policies. It has not proven so in Vietnam where an enormous superiority in conventional weapons, which in the air and on the sea amounts to a virtual monopoly, has produced nothing better than a stalemate. It has not proven effective even with regard to Cuba. As concerns the Middle East, it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that has brought its mobile conventional capabilities to bear upon the distribution of military power.

The explanation for this failure is threefold. First, the conventional military power of the United States is quantitatively limited, while the opportunities for revolutionary upheavals are numerous. This quantitative disproportion paralyzes the United States, fully committed in Vietnam, in other parts of the world.

Second, it is precisely the enormous qualitative superiority in the variety and sophistication of modern weapons that renders American conventional military power ineffective against primitive enemies. This qualitative disproportion paralyzes our military and political judgment and makes us compensate for the frustration of our military efforts with ever-renewed quantitative increases in our efforts, thereby increasing the disproportion and frustration.

Finally and most important—and here is the second fundamental military misjudgment of the new doctrine—it is an illusion, born of nationalistic blindness, to attribute the restraints and failures of the Soviet Union to its inferiority in mobile conventional power and our daring and successes to our superiority in this department. The Soviet Union has conventional superiority with regard to Berlin, and the United States has conventional superiority with regard to Cuba and Vietnam. The Soviet Union has made no use of that superiority with regard to Berlin for the same reason we have made less than full use of ours with regard to Cuba and Vietnam: because both superpowers are afraid of the escalation of conventional war into a nuclear one. The new doctrine completely misses this point. It assumes that “apocalyptic power [i.e., nuclear power] is not effectively usable power unless you allow yourself to be terrified by it. And it does not seem likely that the Americans will become terrified by it.” In other words, the doctrine assumes that it is possible to proceed with the use of conventional military power as though nuclear power did not exist because it is not “usable.” However, it does not follow that because nuclear power has not been used by the United States and the Soviet Union against each other and because such use would be utterly irrational, it could never be so used in the future. Both superpowers proceed on the assumption that under certain extreme conditions nuclear weapons might be used. This is the only assumption that can make plausible the development of defenses against nuclear attack.

One such set of extreme conditions can arise from the firm commitment of one superpower to a particular course of action pursued with conventional weapons and opposed with equal firmness by the other superpower with similar weapons. The su-

perpower that is unable to emerge victorious from this conventional confrontation and sees no chance for a compromise between the status quo and revolution must choose between retreat and resort to nuclear weapons. While it is not a foregone conclusion that it will choose the latter alternative, it is also not a foregone conclusion that it will choose the former. The decision will depend upon the importance, real or imagined, of the stakes; the character and wisdom of the rulers; and, more particularly, their ability to resist the illusion that it is possible to wage a successful or even a tolerable nuclear war.

The two superpowers have thus far been able to avoid the confrontation allowing for only these two alternatives. They have done so because they are indeed “terrified” by each other’s nuclear power. But if the United States were to follow the advice of the new doctrine and cease being so “terrified,” one of the major impediments to nuclear war would indeed have been removed. The probability of such an “apocalyptic” dénouement would become particularly acute during that period of “great international instability” which the new doctrine foresees when “the American decade” has come to an end. For then, to believe the new doctrine, the United States will confront the Soviet Union throughout the world on equal terms in so far as mobile conventional capabilities are concerned. From that confrontation there would then result a number of stalemated contests, irresolvable with conventional means. The two superpowers would then have to come to terms with the two alternatives of retreat or nuclear war. Both superpowers, for different reasons, would have an incentive to push matters to the rim of that abyss: the United States because of the false assurance that nuclear power is not “usable,” and the Soviet Union because, as we shall see, the weakness of its government’s legitimacy makes it more dependent upon success than are other governments more firmly grounded.

#### THE ANTI-COMMUNIST CRUSADE

The new doctrine, by postulating the paramountcy of American military power on behalf of prerevolutionary stability and at the

of which are likely to have a Communist component. In other words, any of these revolutionary movements risks being taken over by Communism.

In the face of this risk, we think we can choose between two different courses of action. On the one hand, we can oppose all revolutionary movements around the world. But in consequence of such opposition and in spite of our reformist intentions, we shall then transform ourselves into the antirevolutionary power per se, after the model of Metternich's Austria of 150 years ago, and we will find ourselves defending a status quo that we know to be unjust and in the long run indefensible. For we know, of course, that the rational choice open to us is not between the status quo and revolution, but between non-Communist and different types of Communist revolutions. But it is our fear of Communism that forces us into an antirevolutionary stance.

On the other hand, if we refrain from intervening against those revolutionary movements, we risk their being taken over by the Communist component. It would then be left to our skill in political manipulation to prevent a Communist take-over from coming about, or if it should come about, to prevent such a Communist revolution from becoming subservient to the Soviet Union or China. The United States would then have to compete with the Soviet Union and China in the sponsorship of revolutions, taking the risk that not all those revolutions would remain under American sponsorship.

In comparison with the moral, political, and technical demands such a policy would make, the alternative, the anti-Communist crusade, is simplicity itself. The domestic "consensus" supports it, and it makes only minimum demands on moral discrimination, intellectual subtlety, and political skill. Its implementation is in essence a problem of military logistics: how to get the requisite number of armed men quickly to the theater of revolution. That task is easy, and we have shown ourselves adept at it. Yet the achievement of that task does not solve the problem of revolution. It smothers, as it were, the fire of revolution under a military blanket; but it does not extinguish it. And when that

perceived the Communist world as a monolith dominated by a Soviet Union bent upon world revolution. Now we look at it as a conglomeration of nation-states each pursuing its separate national interests. Thus Dean Rusk could say in 1951:

We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a slavik Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese!<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, Professor Brzezinski could say in 1967: "Communism, the principal, and until recently most militant, revolutionary ideology of our day is dead. Communism is dead as an ideology in the sense that it is no longer capable of mobilizing unified global support."<sup>2</sup> However, the Communist world was never as Communist-oriented and monolithic as Dean Rusk thought it was, nor is it now as devoid of Communist aspirations and as polycentric as Professor Brzezinski appears to think it is.

#### COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL POWER

##### *The Charismatic Legitimacy of Communism*

In order to understand the subtle and intricate relations that exist between the philosophy of Communism and the foreign policy of Communist nations, taking the Soviet government as the prime example, it is necessary to understand the functions Communist philosophy performs for the exercise of political power at home and abroad.

All civilized political regimes must justify themselves in philosophic and moral terms in order to be able to govern at all; no such government can govern for any length of time by brute force alone. A political order must rest on one of three foundations of legitimacy: traditional—here the government rules in the name of a "natural order"; constitutional—here the government rules by virtue of a set of pre-established rational rules of

<sup>1</sup> *Vital Speeches XVII*, No. 17 (June 15, 1951), 515.

<sup>2</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, July 3, 1967.

conduct; charismatic—here the government rules because of a special endowment of wisdom, virtue, and power. The Soviet government belongs to the last category. Paradoxically enough, its charismatic character is a function of the scientific pretense of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

Marxism-Leninism conceives of itself not as just another political philosophy, superior to the others but not essentially different from them. Quite to the contrary, it claims to be the only science of society worthy of the name, the repository of all the truth there is to be had about man and society. In other words, it lays claims to a monopoly of truth and, through it, to a monopoly of virtue. The claim of the government to govern derives from the monopolistic access to that truth.

The truth of Marxism-Leninism must be made relevant to the concrete issues of the day; it must be interpreted, developed, and applied. This is the task of the government. Certain individuals, such as Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev, or certain elitist collectives, such as the Politburo, the Central Committee, or the party as a whole, are supposed to stand in a special relationship to that truth. Endowed with extraordinary qualities of mind and character, they are the authentic guardians, interpreters, and augmenters of the Marxist-Leninist truth. They have the same monopolistic access to that truth as priests have to the truth of revealed religion. Hence their infallibility in thought and action, hence their right to govern and the citizen's duty to obey.

From this relationship between the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism and the legitimacy of government, two interrelated consequences follow: the inevitability of the "cult of personality" and the successful exercise of power as the ultimate test of the legitimacy of government.

The "cult of personality"—that is, the singling out of individual leaders as the incarnation of Communist truth and virtue—is on the face of it incompatible with the basic Marxist conception of the proletariat as the "chosen" class which will bring salvation to mankind by putting into practice that truth, impersonal and objective, by dint of its scientific nature. The very polemic use of the term in the post-Stalinist era expresses that incompatibility

day in the voices of Marx and Lenin. Hence, they have a right to bask in the reflected glory of the founders, to share in that "cult."

The truth of Marxism-Leninism is, then, not really scientific; for it is not in the nature of tentative propositions to be tested against reality and discarded if they do not meet that empirical test. Rather, it is composed of dogmatic assertions that have passed the empirical test once and for all and, hence, must be applied to reality without any further examinations as to their correctness. Marxism-Leninism is actually a dogma, a body of pseudo-theological propositions which, in accord with the secular and scientist spirit of the times, demands acceptance in the name of science.

Since there can be only one truth, the one propounded by the official interpreters of Marxism-Leninism, dissent from the official truth is bound to be illegitimate. Since the truth has already been revealed, there can be no room in the marketplace for the dissenter to compete with the official view in the discovery of the truth. The dissenter is an outcast by definition. He is not to be argued with on rational grounds or overruled because he is pragmatically mistaken. He is to be denounced as a saboteur and traitor and ostracized as a "deviationist." Thus, as the monopolistic pretense of Marxism-Leninism is of necessity tantamount to a pseudo-theological dogmatism in theory, so this dogmatism calls forth in practice the monolithic structure of Communist society. Here, however, we must make a sharp distinction between non-Communist and Communist societies. In the former, Marxism-Leninism is monolithic in pretense only, but sectarian—i.e., pluralistic—in fact; whereas in the latter it is monolithic both in pretense and in fact. The difference results from the availability of political power to enforce the monolithic character of Communist society in one case and the absence of such political power in the other.

The history of Marxism-Leninism has from the very beginning been the story of interminable pseudo-theological controversies and squabbles about the true meaning of the doctrine. Custodians of the doctrinal truth, from Marx to Mao, have argued not so much in terms of what is feasible and therefore ought to be done

in view of concrete political circumstances, but of what is required by the truth of Communism, correctly interpreted. Where no political power has been available to enforce a particular view of the truth—that is, in non-Communist societies—unresolved conflicting claims to the monopolistic possession of the truth have called into being fanatical sects ostracizing each other. Social Democrats and independent Socialists, Socialists and Communists, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, Stalinists and Trotskyites, Khrushchevites and Maoists, each laying claim to the monopolistic possession of the truth, have fought each other, sometimes literally, to the death. Faced with the beginnings of this sectarianism, intellectually sterile and politically ineffectual, Marx was moved to write to his son-in-law, Paul Lafargue: “*Moi, je ne suis pas Marxiste.*”

Where political power is available to establish and maintain the monolithic character of Communist society by enforcing conformity with the official version of the truth, basic disagreements over policy lead on the individual level to the political purge and criminal punishment and, if they are widespread, to a crisis of the regime itself. In so far as the truth of Marxism-Leninism, as officially interpreted, is not accepted by virtue of its rational persuasiveness, political power forces its acceptance.

The periodic purge is the instrument through which the truth of Marxism-Leninism is reaffirmed and, if need be, restored and the governing elite's monopolistic possession of that truth is reasserted. However, it bespeaks the pervasive force this pretense to the monopolistic possession of the truth once had, that the doomed dissenters of the Stalinist period testifying in court did not challenge that pretense but affirmed it by “confessing” their sins against it. In other words, the dissenters did not dissent from the basic assumptions of Marxism-Leninism but remained within their framework. They dissented from the interpretation which the powers-that-be had given to one or the other of the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and that interpretation was accepted as true by all concerned since its claim to truth was supported by a monopoly of political power. Here we

are in the presence of the distinctive nature of the Communist charisma.

#### *The Peculiar Nature of the Communist Charisma*

What sets a Communist government apart from other types of government and exerts a subtle influence upon its policies, domestic and foreign, is the peculiar character of the charisma by which it rules. All types of government contain a charismatic element; for they all require an implicit belief in the superior endowment of the rulers with wisdom, virtue, and power. Thus the legitimization of government by tradition, as is the case in monarchical and aristocratic forms of government, assumes that there is something hallowed about tradition itself, bestowing those superior qualities on those who rule by virtue of it. Similarly, a type of government such as democracy, which derives its legitimacy from the rational constitutional processes by which the rulers are chosen and govern, assumes that the will of the majority is endowed with those superior qualities: *vox populi, vox Dei*.

What distinguishes the charismatic type of legitimacy from the others is the primary and determining character of the charisma. The charismatic element supports traditional and constitutional legitimacy, but it is not essential to it; tradition and law, as fountainheads of order in their own right, are capable of supporting a regime even when the charismatic element is weakened or has disappeared altogether. Conversely, tradition and law perform a similar supporting function in the charismatic type of legitimacy. Napoleon derived the legitimacy of his rule from the charismatic qualities of his person, proven in action and visible to the people; each victory confirmed the people's belief in his charismatic right to rule. But Napoleon tried to underpin the charismatic legitimacy of his rule by connecting it with both the tradition of monarchy and the rational order of legal codes and administrative organization. His rule could not survive the destruction of his charisma through defeat in war, while ironically the tradition he had revived and the legal and administrative

system he had established became the primary basis of the legitimacy of his successors.

The Napoleonic type of charismatic leader depends for the legitimacy of his rule upon continuing success. For it is in success, especially against seemingly insuperable odds, that his charisma reveals itself. In consequence, the legitimacy of his rule and, more likely than not, his rule itself cannot survive persistent failure. This was as true of Hitler and Mussolini as it was of Napoleon. In this respect the modern charismatic leader differs sharply from the premodern one, whose charisma was typically established by a religious sanction. The legitimacy of the rule of a Pope, his election by his fellow cardinals as an expression of the divine will, survives failure in this world since his charisma does not depend upon success; the same was true of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, chosen by the Electors and anointed by the Pope. Premodern charismatic legitimacy enjoys a degree of stability which is lacking in modern charismatic leadership. The former derives from an objective order, as does traditional and legal legitimacy; none of them depends exclusively, except under particularly primitive conditions, upon the personal achievement of a leader. On the other hand, Hitler's suicide and Mussolini's aimless flight into death were consistent with the nature of their rule. There was nothing for them to claim once they had failed, while a premodern charismatic leader or a traditional or constitutional ruler can go into exile and claim his throne or maintain his constitutional right to govern by invoking the objective order from which his legitimacy derives.

Communist legitimacy occupies an intermediate position between these two types. It derives from an objective order, the truth of Marxism-Leninism. But that truth, unlike the truth of revealed religion, is not to be taken on faith alone, by virtue of having been revealed. It pretends to be "scientific" truth and hence must submit to the test of experience. The Christian can wait without a time limit for the Second Coming, for it has been divinely revealed that Christ will come again. His faith will survive delay as long as he believes in the revelation itself. The Communist cannot indefinitely maintain his faith in the "wither-

ing away of the state" and the coming of the classless society or in the triumph of Communism throughout the world; for these prophecies are subject to historical verification, not at the end of time but, if not here and now, certainly tomorrow or the day after.

Thus Marxism-Leninism contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction; it becomes the victim of the self-same dialectic from which it deduced the inevitable doom of all historical phenomena. For the very scientific pretense of Marxism-Leninism makes the confrontation of the pseudoscientific dogma with empirical reality inevitable. Sophisticated arguments may stave off the confrontation for the time being, but "the science of society," in contrast to an otherworldly religion, cannot evade the empirical "moment of truth" forever.

The prophecies of Marxism-Leninism are indeed vague and contingent enough to stretch the time span within which their fulfillment can be expected. The successful Communist leaders have been able to protect their charisma by reformulating and reinterpreting the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and, more particularly, by explaining delays in the fulfillment of the Marxist-Leninist prophecies in terms of Marxism-Leninism itself. This has been the technique that Marxist-Leninists have consistently used in order to reconcile the integrity of the dogma with the deficiencies of actual performance.

The issue arose at the very beginning of the Bolshevik regime, and the pattern for its solution was set then. The Bolshevik leaders were faced with the task of making peace with Germany, and they had decided that if they could not obtain satisfactory conditions they would simply wait for the proletarian revolution to break out in Germany, which would bring the war to an end. However, the German soldiers gave no sign of making common cause with the Russian Bolsheviks against their masters. The great majority of the Bolshevik leaders, faithful to the doctrine, were in favor of rejecting the German terms and waiting for the inevitable German revolution to occur. Yet, realizing that the Soviet Union needed peace, revolution or no revolution, Lenin in January 1918 made an emendation to the doctrine.

The state of affairs with the socialist revolution in Russia must form the basis of any definition of the international task of our Soviet power. The international situation in the fourth year of the war is such that the probable moment of the outbreak of revolution and of the overthrow of any one of the European imperialist governments (including the German Government) is completely incalculable. There is no doubt that the socialist revolution in Europe is bound to happen and will happen. All our hopes of the final victory of socialism are founded on this conviction and on this scientific prediction. Our propaganda activity in general and the organization of fraternization in particular must be strengthened and developed. But it would be a mistake to build the tactics of the socialist government on attempts to determine whether the European, and in particular the German, socialist revolution will happen in the next half year (or in some such short time) or will not happen.<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, Stalin could reassure the comrades who at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 had raised the question why, after the destruction of the class enemies within the Soviet Union, the state was not withering away, as Marx, Engels, and Lenin had said it would, by asserting that Marx and Lenin did not foresee everything and that while the state was no longer needed for domestic purposes it was still essential in order to defend the "Fatherland of Socialism" against capitalistic encirclement. Or the delay in the world-wide triumph of Communism can be explained either by the revisionism of the Soviet leaders or the adventurism of the Maoists. And the diversity of polycentric Communisms, apparently challenging the monopolistic pretense of the fountainhead of Marxist-Leninist truth, can be justified in terms of "several roads to Communism," the monopolistic pretense being maintained for the end result in which the different roads inevitably will converge.

But there are obvious limits to such postponements. Sooner or later, a science of society claiming a monopoly of the truth must either make good on its claim or lose its credibility. Thus the

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1913-1923*, III (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 34.

charisma of Communism not only contains an objective element by virtue of being grounded in the science of Marxism-Leninism; but, by virtue of being so grounded, it also contains a subjective element in that it depends upon the success of those who act in its name. The charisma of a Stalin or a Khrushchev is not as exposed to the corroding influence of failure as is that of a Hitler or Mussolini, but it is not as immune from it as is the charisma of a traditional monarch or of a constitutional democracy.

The peculiar character of the Communist charisma, its relative stability because of its derivation from dogma and its relative instability because of its dependence upon political success, also accounts for the peculiarities of the succession to supreme power in Communist states. In contrast to the radical disruption of legitimacy in the case of the Napoleonic or Fascist charismatic leader, Communism has been able to maintain the continuity of its legitimacy and its institutions. That continuity corresponds to the objectivity of the dogma from which legitimacy derives and in whose name the institutions operate.

Succession has two facets: the removal of the incumbent and the choice of a successor. As concerns the former, the issue has thus far arisen in the Soviet Union only with regard to Khrushchev since Lenin and Stalin died in office. The decision to remove Khrushchev was rendered by the Central Committee in accordance with pre-established constitutional processes and was obviously the result of pragmatic considerations. Khrushchev had failed in stabilizing the European empire of the Soviet Union by challenging the Western powers in Berlin. He had failed to restore the monopoly of the Soviet Union as the fountainhead of Marxism-Leninism by coming to terms with China. His long-range strategic success in Cuba was overshadowed by the spectacular character of his tactical defeat. His agricultural policies were an unmitigated failure. And perhaps most important, by his denunciation of Stalin, he put into question, as we shall see, the legitimacy of the Soviet regime itself.

On the other hand, in contrast to the modern types of traditional and constitutional legitimacy, the determination of the person of the successor is inevitably the result of a naked struggle

charismatic leader "is for long unsuccessful, above all if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear." <sup>4</sup> It is to this risk that the Communist charisma is exposed with particular force; for, as we have seen, its claim to scientific infallibility invites continuous testing against actual experience. Communism has failed that test in three areas vital to its legitimacy. Major prophecies of Marxism-Leninism have been denied by historic experience. The validity of the Communist charisma itself has been authoritatively denied from within the Soviet Union. The claim of Marxism-Leninism to completeness, if not infallibility, as a guide to political action has been denied by the development of a plurality of Communisms, independent from, if not hostile to, the monopolistic claims of the Soviet guardians of the doctrine.

*Historic Disavowal.* The first denial Marxism-Leninism suffered at the hands of history occurred in 1914 at the outbreak of the First World War. It had been one of the basic assumptions of Marxism-Leninism, both in theory and in practice, that the solidarity of the international proletariat was stronger than the loyalty of individual proletarians and proletarian parties to their respective nations and governments. Thus before 1914 all European socialist parties as a matter of principle voted against military appropriations for their respective governments. The proletarian masses were expected to follow this example of their elected representatives and refuse to fight against their proletarian comrades on the other side of the frontier if their respective governments should declare war against each other. Rather, they would jointly rise against these governments; thus war would issue in revolution. Yet in August 1914 the proletarians of the world did not unite, but started to kill each other on behalf of their respective nations and governments.

The second denial was suffered by Marxism-Leninism at the end and in the aftermath of the First World War. According to

<sup>4</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 360.

the strict principles of the doctrine, the October Revolution of 1917 should not have occurred in Russia, a backward country which was still half feudalistic and whose early capitalist system, far from mature, had not yet produced a large industrial proletariat. When it occurred, the doctrine had to conceive it not as an isolated event but as the initial stage of world revolution. World revolution was required not only by the doctrine, but also by the security of the Soviet Union, surrounded as it was by hostile capitalistic powers. Yet Communist revolution failed everywhere, and the Soviet Union survived within "capitalistic encirclement."

Marxist-Leninist prophecies were denied a third time when decaying capitalistic systems took refuge in Fascism. Inflation, the Crash of 1929, and mass unemployment proletarianized the middle classes and drove the proletariat to despair. Out of this endemic economic crisis appeared to evolve the classic Marxist-Leninist juxtaposition between a small group of desperate monopoly capitalists and their mercenaries, on the one hand, and the proletarianized masses, on the other. According to Marxist-Leninist principles, the consciousness of the proletarianized middle classes should have reflected their economic position; they should have become Marxists. Yet something very un-Marxist happened: revolting against their proletarianization, they became Fascists. Their consciousness did not follow their material conditions but revolted against them. When this happened, in contrast to what ought to have happened according to the doctrine, Fascism was welcomed with a measure of "scientific" approval as a historic necessity: the last stage of capitalism, preparatory to, and inevitably followed by, the Communist revolution. Finally, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939, amounting to an implicit alliance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, bestowed upon the "Fascist beasts" a respectability and upon their rule an assumption of permanence, both utterly at odds with what Communists had been taught to believe.

The import of these successive blows that the Marxist-Leninist prophecies received from history could be temporarily concealed

longer has the physical power to impose its will upon a recalcitrant citizenry, but because it no longer firmly believes in the charismatic source of its own legitimacy. It can no longer maintain the monolithic character of Soviet society because it is no longer monolithic itself. It no longer purges and kills dissenters, not because it lacks the power, but because it lacks the moral conviction of its own legitimacy to overcome the new moral conviction of the dissenters in its midst. Instead of purging them, it must accommodate the dissenters. Thus Khrushchev's exposure of monolithic Stalinism has inevitably issued in a pragmatic pluralism within the Soviet government characterized by the competition among individuals and groups, all equal in legitimacy, for the determination of Soviet policies within a common Marxist-Leninist framework.

A government thus beset by doubt about its own legitimacy must govern a citizenry similarly doubtful. The pluralism from which its action springs is reflected in the nature of the action itself; typically, it will be lacking in that singleminded and ruthless decisiveness, which reflects unquestioning faith in the wisdom, virtue, and power of the actor. And it encounters among the citizens the same pluralism it had to cope with in its own midst. While the difficulties in coping with the former pluralism are in good measure hidden behind the veil of official secrecy and will be revealed only, if at all, when the controversy has faded into history, the dilemma the Soviet government faces in coming to terms with the latter is a matter of public record. On the one hand, the Soviet government is morally incapable of suppressing dissent after the fashion of Lenin and Stalin, and, on the other, it must continue to exert a considerable measure of monolithic control in order to maintain its monopoly of political power. It cannot afford morally to suppress dissent altogether, nor can it afford politically to allow dissent free reign. Thus it vacillates between the reassertion of monolithic control and "liberalization," i.e., granting a measure of freedom to express dissent. This dilemma is a function of the divorce of political power from the legitimacy that gave it birth. The monopoly of political power in the hands of the Soviet government is the political expression

of the monopolistic pretense of Marxism-Leninism. The monopoly of political power has survived the monopolistic pretense. It is power denuded of legitimacy. As such, it is uncertain of itself, indecisive in application, and of dubious durability.

By denying explicitly the legitimacy of Stalin's rule, Khrushchev had implicitly put into question the legitimacy of Soviet rule. That question was from then on to be raised explicitly not only within the Soviet Union but throughout the Communist world. The negative answer given to it within the Soviet Union resulted in the "liberalization" of the Soviet regime. The same negative answer given abroad transformed polycentrism from the isolated Yugoslav instance into a universal phenomenon.

*Polycentrism.* Yugoslavia was the first and isolated example of polycentric Communism—that is, a Communism whose character and policies are determined not by the power or example of the Soviet Union but by the peculiar national qualities and needs of the country concerned. What characterizes this type of Communism is its national orientation and its consequent independence from the Soviet Union as well as from all other extraneous Communist models. This orientation may call forth institutions and policies similar or dissimilar to those of the Soviet Union, as the case may be. What is important is that this relationship, positive or negative, is not inherent but coincidental in a particular national Communism. Soviet Communism is essentially irrelevant to national Communism. Its monopolistic claims are rejected in so far as this particular nation is concerned; but, as a matter of principle, they are left intact with regard to all other nations.

Thus polycentrism is in the nature of a defection from the universal church, but it is not an outright attack upon the claim to universality itself. It is only by implication that universality is impaired in the very existence of the defector. The impairment becomes explicit when defection is transformed from an isolated instance, an exception to the monolithic rule, into a universal phenomenon.

That development started dramatically in the fall of 1956 with the revolts in Poland and Hungary, both of which reasserted the independence of Communist nations against the monolithic con-

and defections have been qualitatively different from the isolated defection of Yugoslavia. For the assertion of national interests and independent judgments by scores of Communist governments and parties, none challenging the monopolistic claim of the Soviet Union explicitly, amounts to a collective denial of that claim. It also amounts to a collective assertion of the limits of Soviet power.

That denial and assertion were for all practical purposes formalized in the repeated refusal of a number of Communist governments and parties to consent to a World Communist Congress at which the Soviet Union would obtain confirmation for its monopolistic possession of Communist truth against China's contrary claims. Opposition to the convocation of that Congress serving this purpose is tantamount to a refusal to recognize the validity of the Soviet claim. That the number of opponents is sufficiently large and influential to have delayed and thus far prevented the convocation of such a Congress as originally intended indicates the decline of the legitimacy and of the power of the Soviet regime in the eyes of the Communist world.

The Chinese position is different from the genuine polycentric one in that it not only disregards the Soviet version of Communism as irrelevant for itself, but that it replaces it with one whose universal relevance it proclaims. In other words, China challenges explicitly the monopolistic pretense of the Soviet Union and opposes it with a monopolistic pretense of its own. Three factors enabled it to take that position.

First, like Yugoslavia, China received Communism not on the bayonets of the Red Army but through victory in a civil war that owed little to the doctrinal and material support of the Soviet Union. Quite to the contrary, by relying upon the peasants rather than the industrial proletariat, Mao deviated radically from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and disregarded the advice he received from the Soviet Union as well. Thus the Chinese Communists never recognized in practice Moscow's monopoly of the truth of Marxism-Leninism, and in consequence Stalin had good reason for declaring that the Chinese Communists were not Marxist-Leninists at all.

Secondly, while all the other Communist governments and parties are to a greater or lesser extent dependent upon the political, military, and economic support of the Soviet Union, China possesses indigenous national resources commensurate with its objectives at home and abroad. Striving to become a power of the first rank, it welcomed Soviet assistance, especially in the nuclear field. But when the Soviet Union in the late 1950s confronted it with a choice between renunciation of this national objective and permanent subordination, on the one hand, and the independent pursuit of that objective, on the other, China could afford to choose the latter alternative.

Finally, after Khrushchev had put into question the legitimacy of Moscow's monopolistic successorship to the mantle of Marx and Lenin by denigrating Stalin, Mao became by force of circumstance the natural pretender to that mantle. For he alone among the major Communist leaders was untainted by association with either Stalin's or Khrushchev's rule. Furthermore, and most important, his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism had succeeded in practice under conditions seemingly similar to those prevailing elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

By exposing Stalin as an impostor, Khrushchev had attacked the charismatic legitimacy of Soviet rule itself; that attack was rendered plausible by the consequent disintegration of monolithic Soviet rule in the form of "liberalization" at home and polycentrism abroad. Mao identified himself with, and accentuated, the negative results of Khrushchev's argument, in so far as the monopolistic pretense of the Soviet Union was concerned. But he turned it against Khrushchev by exposing him as the impostor and reasserting the legitimacy of Stalin's rule. Khrushchev, not Stalin, was accused of having deviated from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and Mao remained the sole legitimate successor to Lenin and Stalin, the defender of the true faith, the beneficiary and guardian of the Marxist-Leninist charisma.

In consequence of this competition for the monopolistic possession of the truth of Marxism-Leninism, the same fanatical sectarianism which we found to have split the Marxist parties every-

where before 1917 and after that in non-Communist states now divides Communist states as well. The same epithets, such as "revisionists," "adventurists," "social reactionaries," "traitors," which formerly only Communist factions hurled against one another, or Communist governments used against foreign Communist factions, now are used by Communist governments against each other to discredit their respective philosophies and policies.

The rivalry between two great Communist nations, each claiming a monopoly of Communist truth, resembles the rivalry among Communist factions in that there is no way of objectively testing the validity of these claims except by success—that is, power. Here, however, the similarity ends. The relative power of factions can be tested by a variety of social contrivances, such as intraparty or parliamentary elections, competition for membership, exclusions and fusions, ostracism and assassination. On the other hand, states may compete for influence and power throughout the world. Any success a state will have anywhere in the world will be interpreted as empirical proof of the validity of its monopolistic claim, and vice versa. Yet such competition is bound to be inconclusive. For as long as a state exists, pretending to be in the monopolistic possession of Communist truth, it puts into question, by its very existence, the validity of the counterclaims on the part of another Communist state. They cannot both be valid, and there is no way of proving empirically, short of a decisive war, which is. Yet, while both claims cannot be valid, they can both be spurious. And that is exactly the conclusion a drawn-out, inconclusive conflict must suggest.

Here we are in the presence of still another significant distinction between other-worldly religions and a secular religion, such as Communism, that claims to be *the science of society*. Rival claims of religious dogmas concern the correct interpretation of the divine will, especially as regards the sure road to salvation. They are in the nature of things not susceptible to empirical tests, short of the primitive one of ordeals and the working of miracles, and hence, can go on forever without impairment of their plausibility. The plausibility of a political doctrine, claiming to provide a blueprint for successful political action, cannot

survive consistent failure. It cannot avoid being weakened by the consistent inconclusiveness of empirical tests. Thus the inconclusiveness of the doctrinal rivalry between the Soviet Union and China is bound to have a debilitating effect upon the plausibility of either claim.

Between the genuine polycentrism of which Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania are the prototypes, and the rival monopolistic claims of China, the Communism of Cuba occupies an intermediate position. It is genuinely polycentric in that it aims to reflect the interests, and meet the opportunities, of individual nations. But it conceives of these interests and opportunities not as peculiar to a particular individual nation but as being typical of a number of nations similarly situated, of which Cuba is the prototype. Cuba's polycentrism, then, possesses a distinct expansionist quality; for Cuba offers itself as a model and as a fountainhead of truth and support rivaling the Soviet Union and China—not, it is true, to the whole Communist world, but to all those Communist movements which might profit from the Cuban example and support. Consequently, the impairment of the universalistic claims of the Soviet Union and China is here quantitatively greater than that caused by the polycentrism of a number of individual nations, such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, or Romania. For it is not one particular nation that puts its national interests above the Soviet or Chinese claims; but a potentially indefinite number of nations, having certain characteristics in common, imitate Cuba in choosing a road to Communism different from that of the Soviet Union and China.

This indefinite quantity of potential polycentric defections is bound to have a negative qualitative impact upon the monopolistic claims of the Soviet Union and China. For the quantitative limitation of the validity of these monopolistic claims, if it becomes large enough, deprives them of all substantive significance. It exposes the monopolistic claims as empty pretense and reduces them in practice to just another polycentric version of Communist dogma. The Communist world, which is supposed to be one world, formed by the one truth of Marxism-Leninism, then is transformed into a pluralistic universe in which at best different

polycentric Communisms live peacefully side by side or at worst struggle for predominance with each other. In any event, regardless of whether there will be rivalry for "spheres of influence" or peaceful coexistence among several polycentric Communists, such pluralism would empty the monopolistic claims of all substance.

#### THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF COMMUNISM

Thus the Communist world appears to have reverted to the traditional pluralistic pattern in which individual nations cooperate or compete with each other for the protection and promotion of their respective interests. This is the accepted meaning of polycentrism. The observation is correct as far as it goes. But it does not go far enough; for it does not take into account the fact that this polycentric world is composed of nations whose Communist character qualifies the polycentric orientation of their foreign policies. Because this polycentric world is also a Communist world, the foreign policies of its members cannot be explained by exclusive reference to their traditional national interests. Communism has introduced three new dimensions into traditional foreign policy: it has provided new instruments with which to support traditional interests; it has created new interests; and it has changed the style of foreign policy.

#### *Stalin: Communism as an Instrument of Russian Power*

The transformation of the tenets of Communism into instruments for Russia's traditional foreign policy was the great innovative contribution Stalin made to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The nature of this contribution has been widely misunderstood. The Western world has looked upon Stalin as an orthodox Bolshevik, the fanatical proponent of a "rigid theology,"<sup>6</sup> bent upon spreading the Communist gospel indiscriminately and by hook or crook to the four corners of the earth. Those who hold this view judge Stalin as though he were Trot-

<sup>6</sup> The words are those of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who, in *The New York Review of Books* VII, No. 6 (October 20, 1966), 37, reaffirmed the popular assessment of Stalin as a fanatical promoter of Communism for its own sake.

sky: They confuse Stalin's means, which, among others, indeed comprise the classic Communist methods, ruthlessly applied, with his ends, which were in the tradition of Czarist expansionism rather than of the Marxist-Leninist promotion of world revolution as an end in itself. In truth, as concerns its relations to Marxism-Leninism, Stalin's foreign policy is distinct from Lenin's and Trotsky's, on the one hand, and from that of Khrushchev and his successors, on the other.

Lenin saw in Russian Bolshevism the doctrinal and political fountainhead of the Communist world revolution and in the success of that revolution the precondition for the survival of the Bolshevik regime in Russia. Russian Bolshevism was the "base" of world revolution; that was its historic function and justification in Marxist terms, as world revolution was Russian Bolshevism's inevitable sequel and the guarantee of its success. On this doctrinal foundation, as developed in Lenin's *Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, the Soviet Union stood in its earliest years as a guide and instigator of violent revolution throughout the world. Trotsky gave an extreme characterization to this first phase of Bolshevik foreign policy when he declared on his appointment as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs: "I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the people of the world and shut up shop."<sup>7</sup>

However, in contrast to Marx and the other Marxists, Lenin used Marxism not as a blueprint to be superimposed intact upon a recalcitrant reality but as an instrument for the acquisition of power. He reversed the priority between Marxism and power, traditional with the Marxists. One could say that he loved Marx, but he loved power more; he was a practitioner of power before he was an interpreter of Marx. Thus he decided what needed to be done for the sake of power, and then he used his version of Marx to justify what he was doing. One only has to read Lenin's polemics against Kautsky in order to realize how completely Marxism has here changed its traditional function. We are no longer in the presence of a doctrinaire disputation in search of the Marxist truth for its own sake. Rather, we are witnessing a

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

phase in the conquest of power undertaken by a man who uses the doctrine with passionate fury as a hammer with which to obliterate views that, if accepted, might bar him from that conquest. What Lenin perfected for the domestic politics of the Soviet Union—the transformation of *the* science of society into an instrument for the acquisition of power—Stalin achieved for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union.

Both the consolidation of the Bolshevik regime within Russia and the collapse of the attempts at world revolution gave birth to Stalin's policy of "socialism in one country." Stalin's foreign policy in its first phase, lasting until victory in the Second World War, served the purpose of protecting the Soviet experiment from hostile outside intervention. During that period, Soviet foreign policy was haunted by the nightmare of a united front of the capitalistic powers seeking the destruction of the Soviet Union. The means Stalin employed to that end—clandestine military cooperation with Germany, temporary support of the League of Nations, the 1935 alliance with France, the implicit 1939 alliance with Germany—were in the classic tradition of power diplomacy. What was new was the additional power the Soviet Union could draw from its monolithic control of Communist parties throughout the world. The promotion of popular fronts and the Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War were the main manifestations of this new opportunity for the expansion of Soviet power.

How effective this use of world Communism for the purposes of the Russian state has been is strikingly revealed in the testimony of British and Canadian members of the Gouzenko spy ring before the Royal Commission investigating the case.<sup>8</sup> When asked why they had betrayed their own countries to the Soviet Union, almost all the members replied that they had done it for the sake of humanity, that concern for humanity supersedes loyalty to any individual nation, and that the interests of humanity and those of the Soviet Union are identical. Communist internationalism and Russian nationalism are here brought into

<sup>8</sup> *Royal Commission To Investigate Disclosures of Secret and Confidential Information to Unauthorized Persons*, (Ottawa: HMSO, 1946).

harmony. The Soviet Union appears endowed with a monopoly of truth and virtue, which sets it apart from, and above, all other nations. It may be pointed out in passing that here the Soviet Union is assigned the same privileged position among the nations that the proletariat occupies in Marxist philosophy among the classes.

From 1943 onward, with Soviet victory over Germany assured, the main purpose of Soviet foreign policy changed from security to territorial expansion. Stalin sought to expand Soviet control primarily into territories adjacent to Russia, the traditional objectives of Russian expansionism. The conquest of Eastern Europe and of part of the Balkans, the pressure on Turkey for control of the Dardanelles and its northern provinces, the attempts to gain footholds on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean and in northern Iran and to draw all of Germany into the Russian orbit, the recovery of the Russian interests in China—all these moves follow the lines of expansion traced by the Czars. The limits of Stalin's territorial ambition were the traditional limits of Russian expansionism. The former even fell short of the latter when political and military considerations appeared to make that retraction advisable. Thus Stalin honored the agreement with Great Britain of 1944, dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence, recognized explicitly on the occasion of the Greek civil war that Greece was in the British sphere, and he lived up to that recognition in the policies he pursued. As Stalin put it to Eden during the Second World War: "The trouble with Hitler is that he doesn't know where to stop. I know where to stop."

These traditional purposes of Stalin's foreign policy, as well as their misunderstanding by the West, are clearly and dramatically revealed in the confrontation at Yalta between Stalin and Roosevelt. From that confrontation Stalin emerged as the power politician who, unencumbered by considerations of ideological advantage, sought to restore and expand Russia's traditional sphere of influence, while Roosevelt defended an abstract philosophic principle, incapable of realization under the circumstances. Poland, said Stalin, is "a question . . . of life and death for the

Soviet State."<sup>9</sup> Roosevelt's philosophy was most strikingly expressed in his report on the Yalta Conference to Congress on March 1, 1945:

The Crimean Conference . . . spells the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balances of power and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries—and have failed.

We propose to substitute for all these a universal organization which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join.<sup>10</sup>

Yet it was through this "system of unilateral action . . . and all the other expedients" of traditional power politics that Stalin intended to secure Russia's predominance in Eastern Europe.

The incompatibility of these two conceptions of the postwar world came to a head in the controversy over the kind of governments to be established in the nations of Eastern Europe. Stalin insisted that these governments be "friendly." Roosevelt and Churchill conceded that they should be "friendly" to the Soviet Union, but they insisted that they should also be "democratic." Stalin clearly saw the inner contradiction of that position. "A freely elected government in any of these countries," he said, "would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow."<sup>11</sup> Stalin could not help but interpret the Western position as implacable hostility to Russian interests, while the West saw in the ruthless transformation of the nations of Eastern Europe into Russian satellites empirical proof for the unlimited ambitions of Soviet Communism.

This misunderstanding resulted from the combination of two factors: the actual Communization of Eastern Europe and the attempted Communization of much of the rest of Europe, and the use of Communist parties throughout the world on behalf of Soviet policies justified by Soviet spokesmen in terms of Marxism-

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 32.

<sup>10</sup> *Nothing To Fear: The Selected Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 1932-1945*, edited by Ben Zevin (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1946), p. 453.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Philip E. Mosely, *The Kremlin in World Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 214.

Leninism. Thus, by taking the Soviet government at its Marxist-Leninist word, one could not fail to conclude that Stalin was on his way to achieving what Lenin and Trotsky had been attempting in vain: to make the Marxist-Leninist prophecy of the Communization of the world come true. Haunted by the spectre of Communism, Western opinion found it hard to appreciate the extent to which Stalin used Communist governments and parties as instruments for the ends of Russian power. He needed governments in Eastern Europe "friendly" to the Soviet Union. He did not care about the ideological character of these governments and parties as long as they were "friendly." Thus he tried to install aristocratic German generals in Germany and to come to terms with the Romanian monarchy and a freely elected Hungarian government, and failed. On the other hand, he established a stable *modus vivendi* with a non-Communist government in Finland. Yet he realized that, save for that exception, the only people in Eastern Europe who were willing to serve the interests of the Soviet Union were Communists. In private conversations, he heaped scorn upon the fools and knaves who allowed themselves to be used by him, but he used them because there was nobody else to use. And he was as hostile to Communist nationalists as he was to non-Communist ones. He purged the Communists of Eastern Europe who refused to do his bidding, and for the same reason was at best indifferent to Chinese Communism, exorcised and tried to bring down the Communist government of Yugoslavia, and opposed the projected federation of Communist Balkan states. For him, then, Communist orthodoxy was a means to an end, and the end was the power of the Russian state traditionally defined.

It is perhaps only in retrospect—by searching for the meaning of Stalin's policies in his private statements and kept commitments rather than in his public pronouncements, by comparing what Stalin did with what he could have done but did not do, and finally by comparing Stalin's policies with those of his predecessors and successors—that one can assess correctly the nature of Stalin's foreign policy. And it is only in retrospect that one can savor the irony of the pope of Marxism-Leninism manipulating

ments of the Soviet Union as empirical proof of the truth of Marxism-Leninism. The Communist prophets from Marx to Stalin had to argue philosophically for the foreordained triumph of Communism, the Communist salvation of mankind that would inevitably occur, in however distant a future. Khrushchev could point to what was occurring in the Soviet Union as a token of the correctness of that prophecy. Thus he argued from actual and contemporary experience rather than from the sacred texts. That shift in the nature of the argument gave a new lease on life to the charisma of Marxism-Leninism, enfeebled as it was by the blows it had received from history and the exposure of Stalin's rule. From the actual achievements of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev gained the confidence, on the one hand, to challenge the foremost capitalist nation at its own game of technology and production and, on the other, to offer Communism to the other nations, especially the backward ones, as a universal principle of social organization, a model to emulate.

For Khrushchev, then, Marxism-Leninism was the embodiment of unquestioned truth, as Marxism had been for Lenin. Yet, while Lenin tried to force a resistant reality into the Marxist mold, Khrushchev thought he witnessed an existing reality that received its meaning from Marxism-Leninism and in turn bestowed plausibility upon it. Sputnik owed nothing to the teachings of Marx and Lenin, yet the Communist claim to the monopolistic possession of the truth drew sustenance from this technological success. While Lenin had worked in vain for the fulfillment of the Marxist prophecies, Khrushchev only needed to make the technological success of the Soviet Union intelligible as the partial fulfillment of these prophecies. Marx had tried to understand the world in order to change it; Lenin tried to practice what Marx had preached; and Khrushchev tried to make the changes accomplished in the name of Marxism-Leninism into a model of universal application.

#### *The Burden of a Moribund Charisma*

Khrushchev's prophecies did not fare any better at the hands of history than those of Marx. His personal charisma, like that of

olutionary movements. At the very least, it does not oppose, if it does not actually support, those Latin American Communist parties which have washed their hands of the revolutionary guerrillas whom Cuba supports. While China has sought to prevent a peaceful settlement of the "war of national liberation" in Vietnam, the Soviet Union has indicated a desire for such a settlement, if it has not actually tried to bring it about. It is again ironic that "the Fatherland of Socialism" has unobtrusively and effectively expanded its political and military influence in the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and its commercial influence throughout the world<sup>12</sup> in

<sup>12</sup> See, for instance, "The Russians Capitalize on the Suez Closure," *The Financial Times*, February 14, 1968:

As far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned, however, there is also quite a lot of commercial advantage to gain from a continuation of the Suez obstacle. The huge land mass of the Soviet Union lies across "straightline" routes from Western Europe to most of Asia, and the Russians are now beginning to exploit this fact.

Already they have developed two alternative water routes of their own to the East—the waterway system linking the Baltic Sea with the Caspian, and the Northern Sea Route from Europe through the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific. Distances by these routes are shorter than via Suez (unlike the corresponding Cape journeys) and in the event of a long closure could well capture some of the traffic permanently.

Iran's use of the Baltic-Caspian waterway has reached an advanced stage already. This route, passing from Leningrad through various lakes, rivers, and canals and thence down the Volga into the Caspian, is cutting 2,700 miles off the Suez route between Germany and Iran. Cargo times have fallen from 50 to 25 days.

Iran sent 400,000 tons of transit goods across the Soviet Union in 1966, mainly along this route. This was a big increase on the 1965 figure and 1967 is likely to show another large increase. Transport costs are claimed to be lower than via Suez. . . . Russia announced last spring that she would also be opening her previously tightly guarded Arctic shipping lane across the top of Siberia to foreign ships. Last August the Soviet cargo boat *Novovoronezh* docked in Yokohama with 2,000 tons of merchandise from Hamburg after making what was heralded as the inaugural run on a new international sea route from Europe to Japan through these icy but strategic waters in only 28 days. . . . Japanese boats, already frequent callers at Soviet ports in eastern Siberia, should especially benefit from the route's opening to foreign ships. Yokohama is about 12,500 miles from London by way of Suez; via the Northern Sea Route the distance is cut to about 8,500 miles. . . . These new developments [new

the best tradition of great power politics, while the foremost capitalistic nation has been hypnotized by the Communist aspect of the Vietnam war to such an extent as to be oblivious to this expansion of Soviet power.

This policy of promoting and supporting "wars of national liberation" and Communist revolutions (at best, very selectively), and of actually trying to prevent or abate many of them, results primarily from a pragmatic approach to foreign policy that is indifferent to the ends and means of Marxism-Leninism. But it also owes something to the overriding concern of Soviet foreign policy: the avoidance of situations that might lead to a direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the form of nuclear war. At the height of his power, Khrushchev could present his opponents with ultimatums and threaten them with atomic destruction. Although he was cautious enough to refrain from following up his threatening words with corresponding actions, one could not be absolutely sure that he would. Since his downfall, ultimatums and nuclear threats have disappeared from the vocabulary of the Soviet government, and now when the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States clash, as they did in the Middle East in the spring of 1967, both superpowers assure each other of their peaceful intentions. While Cuba would like to involve the United States in a number of simultaneous Vietnams—an involvement that would be likely to overtax America's conventional resources and thereby confront the United States with a choice between retreat and nuclear war—the Soviet Union, by the same token, has sought to end or at least limit the war in Vietnam.

On the face of it, then, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union appears to have come full circle. Communism was the end and revolution the means of Lenin's foreign policy. Stalin used Communism as a tool to serve the interests of the Russian state.

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land and air connections across the Soviet Union] all go to indicate the U.S.S.R.'s key geographical position as the great land bridge between East and West, Soviet cities like Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk and Tashkent could well become as familiar to the international jet set as Beirut, Teheran or Delhi in the near future.

Khrushchev used the power of the Russian state to further the interests of Communism. And now both ends and means of Soviet foreign policy appear to be determined by the interests and power of the Russian state. This analysis is correct as far as it goes, but it leaves one last question unanswered: How do Khrushchev's successors define the interests of the Russian state?

In order to answer this question, we must return to the point from which we started and remind ourselves of the nature of the legitimacy from which the Soviet government derives its authority. The Soviet government still governs in the name of Marxism-Leninism. It is clear that the Marxist-Leninist pretense to the monopolistic possession of scientific truth has not survived the blows the doctrine received from historic experience, from Khrushchev, and from dissident Communists. The science of society, which in its monopolistic pretense has always been nothing more than a dogma, has lost its intellectual persuasiveness for all concerned. It has been reduced to a ritual, mechanically invoked for ideological and polemic purposes. And it is so invoked by leaders who do not even pretend, as their predecessors did, to anything approaching a personal charisma.

Still, this ruin of a once imposing edifice is all the legitimacy the Soviet government has got and can afford to have. The Soviet regime is not old enough to invoke the pre-Bolshevist tradition of Russia, even though Stalin, not without reason, tried to connect his rule with that of the great Czars, being indeed himself in the tradition of both Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. Nor is the Soviet regime old enough to invoke a Bolshevik tradition, leaving aside the difficulty of fashioning a tradition spanning half a century of which three decades are identified with the deviant Stalin and one with the fumbling Khrushchev. The Soviet regime cannot invoke constitutional rationality without risking the loss of its monopoly of power. Thus it has nothing left to clothe its power with but the threadbare charismatic vestments of Marxism-Leninism. From the weakness of this legitimacy, two consequences follow for Soviet foreign policy, one concerning its substance, the other its style.

Soviet foreign policy pursues two disparate kinds of objectives:

those dictated by the traditional interests of Russia, such as friendly governments in Eastern Europe, a neutral or friendly Germany, access to the Mediterranean, the security of the Asian frontiers; and those provided by Communism, such as Vietnam, Cuba, Somalia. One is reminded of the distinction Talleyrand made in 1808 in a conversation with Alexander I: "The Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees are the conquests of France; the rest, of the Emperor; they mean nothing to France." Yet it was the Emperor who governed France, superimposing his interests upon those of France, as Communists govern the Soviet Union, adding Communist interests to those of Russia.

The Soviet Union cannot afford to shed the claim, however implausible it has become on empirical grounds, that it is not just a nation among others but the model of a nation built upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism. It cannot shed that claim without destroying the moral foundation of legitimacy, upon which its government rests. Yet, as we have seen, neither can the Soviet government effectively govern by invoking that claim. Thus, both at home and abroad, it must strike an uneasy and unstable balance between the demands of the claim and the requirements of pragmatic policies. At home, it endeavors to give a limited measure of satisfaction to popular aspirations to freedom and prosperity within the unchanged framework of monolithic rule, at the risk of either losing its monopoly of power or having to revert to its Stalinist misuse.

A similar dilemma faces the Soviet Union in its relations with other Communist governments, especially those of Eastern Europe. That dilemma appears in two different configurations. First, the Soviet Union has a traditional national interest in seeing the nations of Eastern Europe governed by friendly governments, which can only be Communist governments. The universal trend toward polycentric pluralism compels the Soviet Union to allow these governments considerable leeway in their domestic and foreign policies, provided they remain Communist (i.e., friendly). Yet the Soviet Union, by having to reconcile itself to a measure of liberalization in its relations with these governments, runs the risk of either losing control altogether or having

support for violent revolution in Latin America and has impressed upon the North Vietnamese government the need for a negotiated settlement.

Here the Soviet Union faces a dilemma which it has in common with the other great nuclear power. Both support their national interests with the threat or the use of force. But neither of them can afford to resort to nuclear force, and since 1962 they have foregone even the threat to use it. Their ability to achieve their ends, then, depends upon the use of conventional force. Consequently, they must forego success and be willing to accept failure or stalemate if the relentless pursuit of their advantage would conjure up the possibility that the losing side might want to redress its fortunes by resort to nuclear arms. In other words, the side that has the advantage must avoid confronting the other side with a choice between ignominious retreat and resort to nuclear arms. Such a policy requires restraint in the use of the conventional instruments, diplomatic and military. It must allow both sides avenues of retreat while saving face. The settlement of the Cuban crisis of 1962 is a classic example of this technique.

Such a policy is difficult for any nation to pursue; for it requires a new mode of thinking which accepts compromise as a substitute for victory and thereby exposes itself to the reproach of weakness. Such a policy is particularly difficult for the Soviet Union to pursue; for, as we have seen, the legitimacy of the Soviet regime is in a peculiar sense predicated upon its success at home and abroad. The charisma of Marxism-Leninism having been drained of its substance, the legitimacy of the Soviet government is predicated at the very least upon the appearance of success. The Soviet government cannot afford the risk of consistent failures without risking its downfall and endangering the regime itself. This being so, it is tempted, if not compelled, sooner or later to compensate for failures with a spectacular success even at risks which the rational calculation of the distribution of interests and power might find prohibitive.

The very feebleness of Soviet legitimacy makes for its vulnerability to failure. A regime secure in its legitimacy is not only

able to absorb failures but may even emerge strengthened from them; the personal charisma of de Gaulle was confirmed by his ability to liquidate the Algerian war. But for the Soviet government, which has nothing left to go on except success, every failure puts a question mark behind its claim to legitimacy. It must demonstrate, even at considerable risks, its ability to govern successfully in order to be able to govern at all.

#### THE MEANING OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

When the military forces of the Soviet Union and of four other members of the Warsaw Pact occupied Czechoslovakia, in August 1968, the weakness of the Soviet Union as the fountainhead of international Communism and both its weakness and strength as the predominant military power in Eastern Europe were clearly revealed. All Communist governments of Eastern Europe are in a dual sense beholden to the Soviet Union. There would be no Communist governments anywhere in Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union had not established them in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and sustained them military, economically, and politically ever since. Secondly, whatever legitimacy these governments possess is derived from that of the Soviet government. These governments govern in the name of the same philosophic and political principles which are most eminently represented by the Soviet Union.

Czechoslovakia defaulted this dual indebtedness to the Soviet Union in 1968 by attempting to liberalize its domestic regime to a degree unprecedented in the Communist world. That liberalization, had it been consummated, could have brought into being a pluralistic society, challenging the Communist monopoly of political power. That challenge would have been tantamount to a challenge to the political, economic, and military orientation of Czechoslovakia toward the Soviet Union. Thus Czechoslovakia might have been able to do through a gradual process of domestic liberalization what Hungary did for a fleeting moment in 1956 through a single revolutionary act: to drop out of the Soviet

United States, ushered in a new and formidable crisis of the American purpose abroad.

The crisis proceeded in three distinct stages. The first was a period of adaptation, of restoration, of creation, culminating in the "fifteen weeks" of the spring of 1947 during which a whole new system of American foreign policy was devised from a radically new conception of the American purpose abroad. The first stage came to an end with the conclusion of the armistice in the Korean War in 1953. The second stage differed sharply from the first one. Rather than being a crisis of restoration and of achievement, as in the first stage, it was a crisis of perplexity, of seeming inability to continue the process of adaptation, restoration, and creation, so auspiciously begun. The novel problems of the immediate postwar world were at first successfully met in one great creative effort, and now the nation settled down to meeting the novel problems of the 1950s with the remedies of yesterday, many of which had outlived their usefulness, and transformed yesterday's creative effort into today's routines.

This period seemed to come to an end in 1961 when the Kennedy Administration embarked upon an intellectual effort at laying the groundwork for a new foreign policy appropriate to new political conditions. But while these efforts were translated into eloquent political rhetoric, they hardly influenced the actual conduct of American foreign policy. After this brief and inconsequential interlude, the routines of the 1950s were continued with renewed vigor. They were now put at the service of a revived globalistic conception of America's role in the world: to bring the blessings of the Great Society to the developing third of the world. The conception is Wilsonian in content, but it is underpinned by a new conception of American power. It is this marriage between Wilsonian globalism and the belief in the paramountcy of American power that characterizes the third postwar period of American foreign policy. While that marriage was consummated under the Johnson Administration, the psychological longings and political forces that gave it life continue to exert a powerful influence upon America's conception of its relations to the developing world.

*The Great Society and the American Mission Abroad*

The projection of the Great Society onto the international scene is clearly in line of succession to Wilson's and Roosevelt's conception of America's mission abroad. It is missionary in theory and crusading in practice. The theory was formulated in general terms in Ambassador Arthur Goldberg's speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 23, 1965:

In my own country we are embarked under the leadership of President Lyndon B. Johnson in a search for a "Great Society."

This vision of a just democratic order is based on consent of the governed and due process of law, on individual dignity, on economic diversity and on the just satisfaction of political, economic and social aspirations.

We in the United States reject reactionary philosophies of all extremes. We seek to build instead on what we regard the most enlightened and progressive philosophy in human history, that the aim of government is the maximum self-fulfillment of its citizens and that the good life should be within the reach of all, rather than a monopoly of the few. Both domestically and in international affairs there can be no island of poverty in seas of affluence.

We espouse equality not only as a principle. We seek equal opportunity for all as an accomplished reality. And we are resolved to enrich the life of our society by developing human, as well as natural, resources. And we are determined not merely to increase material production but to assure such equality to guarantee genuine social and economic justice, to eliminate poverty and also to realize qualitative improvements in the life of our citizens—in more attractive and functional cities, in a more beautiful countryside and through learning and the arts.

And this is not the program of any one group or one class or one political party in our country. Nor is the vision it proclaims exclusively American. It is a vision common to all mankind. It fell to my lot for twenty-five years to represent the great labor movement of our country. And one of the great labor leaders with whom I was long associated, Philip Murray, when I asked, what was the aim of the labor movement, to which he dedicated his life, paused and thought and said the aim of the labor movement is a society in which each man shall have a rug on the floor, a picture on the wall, and music in the home. And I think that is a good goal for all of mankind.

to control population growth, by increasing our research—and we will earmark funds to help their efforts.

In the next year, from our foreign aid sources, we propose to dedicate one billion dollars to these efforts, and we call on all who have the means to join us in this work in the world.

The philosophic roots of this program for the global Great Society were discussed in a report by *Time* magazine of September 3, 1965, concerning the influence of Barbara Ward's *The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations*<sup>9</sup> upon the President's thinking. *Time* referred to this book as "the LBJ selection of the century" and "Baedeker to the great Global Society." It quoted the President as having said: "I read it like I do the Bible," and that the book "excites and inspires me." Miss Ward was quoted as returning the compliment by saying: "His profound and compassionate understanding of the roots of poverty gives a unique dimension to the leadership he offers the world." *Time* characterized the book as "messianic materialism" and found its influence in the President's speeches.

Reading Miss Ward's book with one's expectations thus aroused, one is bound to be disappointed. None of the great moral and intellectual issues, to which the relations between the rich and poor nations give rise, is explicitly posed and validly discussed. The moral and intellectual foundation of the book's thesis—that the rich nations must help the poor nations to overcome their poverty—is taken for granted. Thus the very conception of the relations between rich and poor nations as being nothing more than a quantitative extension of the relations between rich and poor individuals within the same society is posited as self-evident. So is the moral conclusion that the rich nations are obligated to help the poor nations. So is the practical expectation that the quantitative extension of foreign aid is actually capable of eliminating poverty on a world scale. There is no awareness of the cultural conditions from which stems the persistent poverty of many new nations, nor is there any awareness of the political issues to be settled before foreign aid can become effective in countries whose governments have a political

<sup>9</sup> New York: W. W. Norton, 1962.

originally intended to give him only 100,000, but the amount was increased after it had become known that he had received from Prussia a snuffbox worth 66,000 francs as well as 100,000 francs in cash. The Prussian Ambassador in Paris summed up well the main rule of this game when he reported to his government in 1802: "Experience has taught everybody who is here on diplomatic business that one ought never to give anything before the deal is definitely closed, but it has only proved that the allurements of gain will often work wonders."

Much of what goes by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature of bribes. The transfer of money and services from one government to another performs here the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered by the recipient. These bribes differ from the traditional examples given above in two respects: They are justified primarily in terms of foreign aid for economic development, and money and services are transferred through elaborate machinery fashioned for genuine economic aid. In consequence, these bribes are a less effective means for the purpose of purchasing political favors than were the traditional ones.

The compulsion to substitute for the traditional business-like transmission of bribes the pretense and elaborate machinery of foreign aid for economic development results from a climate of opinion which accepts as universally valid the proposition that the highly developed industrial nations have an obligation to transfer money and services to underdeveloped nations to foster economic development. Thus, aside from humanitarian and military foreign aid, the only kind of transfer of money and services that seems to be legitimate is the one made for the purpose of economic development. Economic development has become an ideology by which the transfer of money and services from one government to another is rationalized and justified.

However, the present climate of opinion assumes not only that affluent industrial nations have an obligation to extend foreign aid for economic development to nations of the third world. It also assumes as a universally valid proposition that economic development can actually be promoted through such transfer of

money and services. Thus economic development as an ideology requires machinery that makes plausible the assumption of the efficacy of the transfer of money and services for the purpose of economic growth. In contrast to most political ideologies, which operate only on the verbal level and whose effects remain within the realm of ideas, this ideology, in order to be plausible, requires an elaborate apparatus serving as an instrument for a policy of make-believe. The government of nation *A*, trying to buy political advantage from the government of Nation *B* for, say, the price of \$20 million, not only must pretend, but also must act out in elaborate fashion the pretense, that what it is actually doing is giving aid for economic development to the government of nation *B*.

The practice of giving bribes as though they were contributions to economic development necessarily creates expectations, in the donor and the recipient, which are bound to be disappointed. Old-fashioned bribery is a straightforward transaction: Services are to be rendered at a price, and both sides know what to expect. Bribery disguised as foreign aid for economic development makes of donor and recipient actors in a play which in the end they can no longer distinguish from reality. In consequence, both expect results in economic development which, in the nature of things, could not have been forthcoming. Thus both are bound to be disappointed, the donor blaming the recipient for his inefficiency and the recipient accusing the donor of stinginess. The ideology, taken for reality, gets in the way of the original purpose of the transaction, and neither side believes that it has received what it is entitled to.

Foreign aid for military purposes is a traditional means for nations to buttress their alliances. Rome used to receive tribute from its allies for the military protection it provided. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the classic period of military subsidies, by which especially Great Britain endeavored to increase the military strength of her continental allies. Glancing through the treaties of alliance of that period, one is struck by the meticulous precision with which obligations to furnish troops, equipment, logistic support, food, money, and the like

were defined. This traditional military aid can be understood as a division of labor between two allies who pool their resources, one supplying money, material, and training, the other providing primarily manpower.

In contrast to traditional practice, military aid is today extended not only to allies but also to certain uncommitted nations. The purpose here is not so much military as political, for political advantage is sought in exchange for military aid. This kind of aid obligates the recipient to the donor. The latter expects the former to abstain from a political course that might put in jeopardy the continuation of military aid, which is thus really in the nature of a bribe.

What appears as military aid may also be actually in the nature of prestige aid, to be discussed below. The provision of jet fighters and other modern weapons for certain underdeveloped nations can obviously perform no genuine military function. It increases the prestige of the recipient nation both at home and abroad. Being in the possession of some of the more spectacular instruments of modern warfare, a nation can at least enjoy the illusion that it has become a modern military power.

As bribery appears today in the guise of aid for economic development, so does aid for economic development appear in the guise of military assistance. In the session of 1967, Congress, for instance, appropriated \$600 million for economic aid to strategic areas, and it is likely that in the total appropriations for military aid in excess of \$1 billion other items of economic aid were hidden. This mode of operation results from the reluctance of Congress to vote large amounts for economic aid in contrast to its readiness to vote virtually any amount requested for military purposes. Yet the purposes of aid for economic development are likely to suffer when they are disguised as military assistance, as we saw the purposes of bribery suffer when disguised as aid for economic development. The military context within which such aid is bound to operate, even though its direct administration may be in the hands of the civilian authorities, is likely to deflect such aid from its genuine purposes. More particularly, it

strengthens the ever-present tendency to subordinate the requirements of aid for economic development to military considerations.

Prestige aid has in common with modern bribes that its true purpose, too, is concealed by the ostensible purpose of economic development. The unprofitable or idle steel mill, the highway without traffic and leading nowhere, the airline operating with foreign personnel and at a loss but under the flag of the recipient country—they ostensibly serve the purposes of economic development and under different circumstances could do so. Actually, however, they perform no positive economic function. They owe their existence to the penchant, prevalent in many underdeveloped nations, for what might be called “conspicuous industrialization,” an industrialization that produces symbols of, and monuments to, industrial advancement rather than satisfying the objective economic needs of the country. This tendency sheds an illuminating light upon the nature of what is generally referred to as the “revolution of rising expectations.”

We are inclined to assume that the “revolution of rising expectations”—that is, a people’s urgent desire to improve their lot by means of modern technology and industry—is a well-nigh universal trend in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Actually, however, it is universal only in the sense that virtually all underdeveloped nations want the appearance of having achieved industrialization, while only a fraction of the population, and frequently only small elite groups within it, in fact seek the social and economic benefits of industrialization and are willing to take the measures necessary to achieve them. For many of the underdeveloped nations the steel mill, the highway, the airline, the modern weapons perform a function that is not primarily economic or military but psychological and political. They are sought as symbols and monuments of modernity and power. They perform a function similar to that which the cathedral performed for the medieval city and the feudal castle or the monarch’s palace for the absolute state. Nehru is reported to have said, when he showed Chou En-lai a new dam: “It is in these temples that I worship.” And the more underdeveloped

and less viable a nation is, the greater will generally be its urge to prove to itself and to the world through the results of prestige aid that it, too, has arrived.

The advantage for the donor of prestige aid is threefold. He may receive specific political advantages in return for the provision of aid, very much after the model of the advantage received in return for a bribe. The spectacular character of prestige aid establishes a patent relationship between the generosity of the giver and the increased prestige of the recipient; the donor's prestige is enhanced, as it were, by the increase of the recipient's prestige. Finally, prestige aid comes relatively cheap. A limited commitment of resources in the form of a spectacular but economically useless symbol of, or monument to, modernity may bring disproportionate political dividends.

The donor of foreign aid must perform the task of distinguishing between prestige aid and aid for economic development. It is in the nature of prestige aid that it is justified by the prospective recipient in terms of genuine economic development. The prospective donor, unaware of the distinction, is likely to fall into one of two errors. By mistaking prestige aid for aid for economic development, he will either waste human and material resources in support of the latter, while the purpose of prestige aid could have been achieved much more simply and cheaply. Or else he will reject out of hand a request for prestige aid because it cannot be justified in terms of economic development, and may thereby forego political advantages he could have gained from the provision of the aid requested. The classic example of this error is the American rejection of the Afghan request for the paving of the streets of Kabul as economically unsound. It may be noted in passing that the Soviet Union, pursuing a politically oriented policy of foreign aid, paved the streets of Kabul, even though that measure had no bearing upon the economic development of Afghanistan.

#### *Foreign Aid for Economic Development in Particular*

None of the types of foreign aid discussed thus far poses theoretical questions of the first magnitude; rather they raise issues for

integral a part of our economic thought and action that it is hard for us to realize that there are hundreds of millions of people in the underdeveloped areas of the world who are oblivious to this mode of operation, indispensable to economic development. We have come to consider the productive enterprise as a continuum in which the individual owner or manager has a personal stake. Yet in many underdeveloped areas the productive enterprise is regarded primarily as an object for financial exploitation, to be discarded when it has performed its function of bringing the temporary owner a large financial return in the shortest possible time. Foreign aid poured into such a precapitalistic and even prerational mold is not likely to transform the mold, but rather it will be forced by it into channels serving the interests of a precapitalistic or prerational society.

The economic interests that stand in the way of foreign aid being used for economic development are typically tied in with the distribution of political power in underdeveloped societies. The ruling groups in these societies derive their political power in good measure from the economic status quo. The ownership and control of arable land, in particular, is in many of the underdeveloped societies the foundation of political power. Land reform and industrialization are therefore an attack upon the political status quo. In the measure that they are successful, they are bound to affect drastically the distribution of economic and political power. Yet the beneficiaries of both the economic and political status quo are the typical recipients of foreign aid given for the purpose of changing the status quo! Their use of foreign aid for this purpose requires a readiness for self-sacrifice and a sense of social responsibility that few ruling groups have shown throughout history. Foreign aid proffered under such circumstances is likely to fail in its purpose of economic development and, as a bribe to the ruling group, rather will strengthen the economic and political status quo. It is likely to accentuate unsolved social and political problems rather than bring them closer to solution. A team of efficiency experts and public accountants might well have improved the operations of the AI

Capone gang; yet, by doing so, it would have aggravated the social and political evils that the operations of that gang brought forth.

Given this likely resistance of the ruling group to economic development, foreign aid requires drastic political change as a precondition for its success. Foreign aid must go hand in hand with political change, either voluntarily induced from within or brought about through pressure from without. The latter alternative faces the donor nation with a dual dilemma. On the one hand, to give foreign aid for economic development without stipulating conditions that maximize the chances for success maximizes the chances for failure. On the other hand, to give aid "with strings" arouses xenophobic suspicions and nationalistic resentments, to be exploited both by the defenders of the status quo and by the promoters of Communist revolution.

Furthermore, once it has been decided to bring about political change in opposition to the ruling group, the alternative group must be identified as the instrument of this change. Sometimes, it may be a choice among different alternative groups that are equally unattractive. Sometimes, and not infrequently, the absence of any alternative group leaves no choice.

Finally, the promotion of drastic social change on the part of the donor nation creates the precondition for economic development, but it also conjures up the specter of uncontrollable revolution. In many of the underdeveloped nations, peace and order are maintained only through the ruthless use of the monopoly of violence by the ruling group. Determined and skillful foreign intervention may not find it hard to weaken the power of the ruling group or to remove it from power altogether. While it may be able to control events up to this point—that is, to instigate drastic reform and revolution—it may well be unable to control the course of the revolution itself. More particularly, a democratic nation such as the United States is greatly handicapped in competing with Communists in the control of the revolution. The revolution may start, as did the Cuban, under the democratic auspices of the unorganized masses dedicated to social reform and supported by the United States, and may in the course of its

development be taken over by the highly organized and disciplined Communist minority, the only organized and disciplined revolutionary group available.

Successful foreign aid for economic development may have similarly unsettling political results. Economic development, especially by way of industrialization, is likely to disrupt the social fabric of the underdeveloped nation. By creating an urban industrial proletariat, it loosens and destroys the social nexus of family, village, and tribe, in which the individual had found himself secure. And it will not be able, at least not right away, to provide a substitute for this lost social world. The vacuum thus created will be filled by social unrest and political agitation. Furthermore, it is not the downtrodden masses living in a static world of unrelieved misery who are the likely protagonists of revolution, but rather those groups that have begun to rise in the social and economic scale but not enough to satisfy their aroused expectations. Thus, economic development is bound to disturb not only the economic status quo but, through it, the political status quo as well. If the change is drastic enough, the social and political effects of economic development may well amount to a prerevolutionary or revolutionary situation. And while the United States may have started the revolutionary process, it will again be uncertain under whose auspices it will be ended.

The United States faces a number of formidable handicaps in the task of controlling social and political change in the underdeveloped nations either as a prerequisite for, or a result of, foreign aid for economic development. First of all, the United States is a Western capitalistic nation. It appears to the underdeveloped nations as a conservative power both domestically and internationally. In both its civilization and its social and economic structure, it belongs to that complex of nations which until recently were able to hold Africa, Latin America, and most of Asia in a condition of colonial or semicolonial dependency. It is tied by military alliances to some of these nations, and while it has generally shunned and even opposed outright colonial policies, it has actively and successfully participated in the semicolonial exploitation of backward nations. Thus the resentment

tions, only economically advanced nations are capable of waging modern war. We did not consider the Soviet Union a military threat as long as it was economically underdeveloped; it became such a threat at the very moment its economic development had transformed it into a modern industrial power. Similarly, Communist China today is only a potential military threat by virtue of its economic potential, both waiting to be activated by economic development.

Foreign aid for economic development, then, has a very much smaller range of potentially successful operation than is generally believed, and its success depends in good measure not so much upon its soundness in strictly economic terms as upon intellectual, moral, and political preconditions, which are not susceptible to economic manipulation, if they are susceptible to manipulation from the outside at all. Furthermore, the political results of successful foreign aid for economic development may be either unpredictable or counterproductive in terms of the goals of the donor nation. In any event, they are in large measure uncontrollable. Foreign aid proffered and accepted for purposes of economic development may turn out to be something different from what it was intended to be, if it is not oriented toward the political conditions within which it must operate. Most likely, it will turn out to be a bribe or prestige aid, or else a total waste. To do too much may here be as great a risk as to do little, and "masterly inactivity" may sometimes be the better part of wisdom.

#### *Conclusions for Policy*

The major conclusions for policy to be drawn from this analysis are three: the requirement of identifying each concrete situation in the light of the six different types of foreign aid and of choosing the quantity and quality of foreign aid appropriate to the situation; the requirement of attuning, within the same situation, different types of foreign aid to each other in view of the over-all goals of foreign policy; and the requirement of dealing with foreign aid as an integral part of political policy.

The task of identifying specific situations in terms of the ap-

propriate foreign aid requires concrete answers to specific questions. Can a prospective recipient country not survive without foreign aid? Is its government likely to exchange political advantages for economic favors? Would our military interests be served by strengthening this nation's military forces? Does this country provide the noneconomic preconditions for economic development to be supported by foreign aid? Are our political interests likely to be served by giving this nation foreign aid for purposes of prestige? Can a case be made for foreign aid in order to alleviate human suffering? What kind and quantity of foreign aid is necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired result?

To answer these questions correctly demands first of all a thorough and intimate knowledge and understanding of the total situation in a particular country. But it also requires political and economic judgment of a very high order, and in two different areas. On the one hand, it is necessary to anticipate the susceptibility of the country to different kinds of foreign aid and their effects upon the country. On the other hand, when this task has been performed, it is then necessary to select from a great number of possible measures of foreign aid those most appropriate to the situation and hence most likely to succeed.

In most situations, however, the task is not that simple. Typically, an underdeveloped country will present a number of situations calling for different types of foreign aid to be given simultaneously. One type of foreign aid given without regard for the effects it may have upon another type risks getting in the way of the latter. One of the most conspicuous weaknesses of our past foreign-aid policies has been the disregard of the effect different types of foreign aid have upon each other. Bribes given to the ruling group, for instance, are bound to strengthen the political and economic status quo. Military aid is bound to have an impact upon the distribution of political power within the receiving country; it can also have a deleterious effect upon the economic system, for instance, by increasing inflationary pressures. Similarly, subsistence foreign aid is bound to strengthen the status quo in all its aspects. In so far as the donor nation desires the foregoing effects or can afford to be indifferent to

majority of the people. The attempt to remedy these deficiencies from the outside is tantamount to an attack upon the political status quo, to be resisted by the powers-that-be. The frustrations of the Alliance for Progress and of much of foreign aid in general can be traced to this political factor. The cultural and political receptivity of the nation being aided sets a limit to the American mission.

Secondly, the achievements of America as an example to the world were rendered possible by a natural environment—a politically empty, rich and fertile continent isolated from the centers of international strife—singularly conducive to the development of an open society, horizontally and vertically mobile. Furthermore, these gifts of nature required a people endowed with the moral and rational qualities to take advantage of them. Few nations throughout history have been so favored by nature, and few nations have been morally and rationally equipped for the task nature presented to them. It has been the besetting weakness of America's conception of its global mission from Wilson to Johnson that it has endeavored to separate the American achievements from its uniquely American roots and to erect it into a principle of universal applicability. Wilson and his epigones lifted the American purpose up to the skies, divorced from the concrete conditions of American existence. Yet, while they could divorce the American experiment from the American experience, they could not divorce it from the experience of the world. From the former they took it, to the latter they sought to apply it. And in this Wilson failed, as his successors are bound to fail.

Thirdly, the very universalization of the Great Society impairs its plausibility as an example to the world. The plausibility of the American experiment and the possibility of its achievement were from the beginning dependent upon the objective conditions of American existence which drew out certain qualities of the people and rewarded them with success. This unique concatenation of objective and subjective conditions, bringing forth unique results, could plausibly be held up as a model for others to emulate only if conditions elsewhere were not totally different from those prevailing in the United States. Even in

conditions not completely dissimilar American principles could apply only as ideal guideposts, not as blueprints to be imitated to the letter. The failure of the attempt to demonstrate in action that what had proved possible in America was possible elsewhere, given good will and material resources, cast doubt upon the suitability of the American experiment to serve as a model under any conditions.

This impairment of the plausibility of the American experiment through its universalization is aggravated when the experiment itself lacks intrinsic plausibility. This is indeed the case of the Great Society. Its qualitative substance remains undefined and its realization is dubious even within the American context. How can so vague and uncertain an experiment serve as a model for other nations to emulate, let alone as a vehicle for a universal mission?

Finally, the plausibility of the Great Society for other nations is altogether destroyed by its involvement in wars on the soil of developing nations. The conception of a national experiment as a model for the world to emulate has the tendency to transform itself into a missionary endeavor to persuade and help other nations to emulate the example, and such a missionary enterprise tends to transform itself into a crusade that will force laggard and benighted nations for their own good to emulate the example. Thus the New Freedom issued in the Fourteen Points, giving meaning to the First World War; the New Deal, in the Four Freedoms and the United Nations, giving purpose to the Second World War. Thus the Great Society issues in the anti-Communist crusade seeking to preserve the freedom of nations, threatened by Communism, to choose the Great Society if they so wish, thereby giving meaning to the intervention in the Dominican Republic and the war in Vietnam.

However, the contemporary crusade differs significantly from those that preceded it. The latter were carried forward by a victorious army, whose victory seemed to provide empirical proof for the validity of the crusading principles in whose name it was fought. The former must compete, and fight against, a rival conception of the Great Society, more relevant to the experiences

vention. The sweeping character of these exceptions is indicated by one that gained general acceptance and was formulated by one of the most eminent authorities on international law in the nineteenth century, Professor William Edward Hall, in these terms: "If a government is too weak to prevent actual attacks upon a neighbor by its subjects, if it foments revolution abroad, or if it threatens hostilities which may be averted by its overthrow, a menaced state may adopt such measures as are necessary to obtain substantial guarantees for its own security."<sup>1</sup> According to another more recent authority, Professor Percy H. Winfield, "Intervention is justifiable if its aim is to check or to undo the effects of an illegal intervention on the part of another state."<sup>2</sup>

The pervasive contrast between the principle of nonintervention in the abstract and other principles negating it in practice is nowhere more strikingly and also more naïvely revealed than in the essay John Stuart Mill wrote in 1859 with the title "A Few Words on Non-Intervention." Referring of course to Great Britain, Mill starts by saying:

There is a country in Europe, equal to the greatest in extent of dominion, far exceeding any other in wealth, and in the power that wealth bestows, the declared principle of whose foreign policy is to let other nations alone. . . . It will hold its own, it will not submit to encroachment, but if other nations do not meddle with it, it will not meddle with them. Any attempt it makes to exert influence over them, even by persuasion, is rather in the service of others, than of itself: to mediate in the quarrels which break out between foreign States, to arrest obstinate civil wars, to reconcile belligerents, to intercede for mild treatment of the vanquished, or finally to procure the abandonment of some national crime and scandal to humanity, such as the slave-trade. . . . If the aggressions of barbarians force it to a successful war, and its victorious arms put it in a position to command liberty of trade, whatever it demands for itself it demands for all mankind. The cost of war is its own;

<sup>1</sup> William Edward Hall, *A Treatise on International Law* (7th ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1917), p. 295.

<sup>2</sup> Percy H. Winfield, "The Grounds of Intervention in International Law," *British Yearbook of International Law* (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 154.

the fruits it shares in fraternal equality with the whole human race.

This argument, which is obviously in support not so much of nonintervention as of selfless intervention, is virtually invalidated by two sweeping qualifications. On the one hand, Mill stipulates the right to intervene "when England's safety is threatened, or any of her interests hostilely or unfairly endangered." On the other hand, searching for "some rule or criterion whereby the justifiableness of intervening in the affairs of other countries, and (what is sometimes fully as questionable) the justifiableness of refraining from intervention, may be brought to a definite test," Mill argues that "there is a great difference (for example) between the case in which the nations concerned are of the same, or something like the same, degree of civilization, and that in which one of the parties to the situation is of a high, and the other of a very low grade of social improvement. To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error." This is so for two reasons. "In the first place, the rules of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians will not reciprocate. . . . In the next place, nations which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners. . . . The sacred duties which civilized nations owe to the independence and nationality of each other, are not binding toward those to whom nationality and independence are either a certain evil, or at best a questionable good." Hence intervention is here justified, and Mill points to the Roman Empire, the French in Algeria, and the British in India in support of his case.

Thirdly, Mill considers the case of a "protracted civil war, in which the contending parties are so equally balanced that there is no probability of a speedy issue; or if there is, the victorious side cannot hope to keep down the vanquished but by severities repugnant to humanity and injurious to the permanent welfare of the country. In this exceptional case it seems now to be an

admitted doctrine, that the neighboring nations, or one powerful neighbor with the acquiescence of the rest, are warranted in demanding that the contest shall cease, and a reconciliation take place on equitable terms of compromise."

Finally, Mill considers the case of a people fighting for its freedom against an oppressive government. He finds intervention here justified on two grounds. On the one hand, if England, "on account of its freedom . . . should find itself menaced with attack by a coalition of Continental despots, it ought to consider the popular party in every nation of the Continent as its natural ally: the Liberals should be to it what the Protestants of Europe were to the Government of Queen Elizabeth." On the other hand, intervention is justified on behalf of "a people struggling against a foreign yoke or against a native tyranny upheld by foreign arms. . . . The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free States. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right. Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent."

Having started by praising England for its policy of nonintervention, Mill ends by imploring England to embark upon a policy of intervention on behalf of freedom:

The first nation which, being powerful enough to make its voice effectual, has the spirit and courage to say that not a gun shall be fired in Europe by the soldiers of one Power against the revolted subjects of another, will be the idol of the friends of freedom throughout Europe. That declaration alone will ensure the almost immediate emancipation of every people which desires liberty sufficiently to be capable of maintaining it: and the nation which gives the word will soon find itself at the head of an alliance of free peoples, so strong as to defy the efforts of any number of confederated despots to bring it down. The prize is too glorious not to be snatched sooner or later by some free country; and the time may not be distant when England, if she does not take this heroic part because of its heroism, will be compelled to take it from consideration for her own safety."

I have dwelt upon John Stuart Mill's arguments at some length because they appear to show conclusively the impossibility of developing a coherent doctrine of nonintervention. If one of the noblest and most brilliant minds of modern times, in the attempt to square his country's foreign policies with certain abstract principles, can entangle himself unknowingly in such blatant contradictions, it stands to reason that there must be something incurably wrong with the attempt itself. For a century and a half, statesmen, lawyers, and political writers have tried in vain to formulate objective criteria by which to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate intervention. They have only succeeded in clothing the interests and policies of their respective nations with the appearance of legitimacy. For from the time of the ancient Greeks to this day, some states have found it advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf of their own interests. And other states, in view of their interests, have opposed such interventions and have intervened on behalf of theirs. Yet it was only concomitant with the rise of the modern nation-state that an explicit doctrine of nonintervention was developed. Its purpose was to protect the new nation-states from interference by the traditional monarchies of Europe. After the Napoleonic Wars, these monarchies established the Holy Alliance, whose purpose it was to protect the conservative status quo against the rising national and liberal movements. The main instrument of the Holy Alliance, openly proclaimed in the treaty establishing it, was intervention. Thus, to give only two examples among many, Russia tried to intervene in Spain in 1820, and actually intervened in Hungary in 1848, in order to oppose liberal revolutions. Great Britain opposed these interventions because it was opposed to the expansion of Russian power. Yet it intervened on behalf of nationalism in Greece and on behalf of the conservative status quo in Portugal because its interests seemed to require it.

#### CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE

What we have witnessed since the end of the Second World War appears, then, as a mere continuation of a tradition that was well

established in the nineteenth century. There appears to be nothing new either in the contemporary confusion of doctrine or in the pragmatic use of intervention on behalf of the interests of individual nations. What Great Britain and Russia were doing in the nineteenth century, the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be doing today. Thus, to cite again two spectacular examples among many, the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary in 1956 as Russia had done in 1848, and the United States intervened in Cuba at the beginning of the 1960s as it had done in the first decades of the century. Yet there are fundamental differences between the interventions of the past and those of the present. Five such differences exert an important influence upon the techniques of contemporary intervention as well as upon the peace and order of the world.

First, the process of decolonization, which started after the Second World War and is now almost completed, has more than doubled the number of sovereign nations. Many, if not most of these new nations are not viable political, military, and economic entities; they are lacking in some, if not all of the prerequisites of nationhood. Their governments need regular outside support. Thus France subsidizes its former colonies in Africa; all the major industrial nations extend economic and financial aid to the new ones, and the United States, the Soviet Union, and China do so on a competitive basis.

What makes this aid a lever for intervention is the fact that in most cases it is not just an advantage the new nations can afford to take or leave, but a condition for their survival. The Indian economy, for example, would collapse without outside support and in consequence the Indian state itself would probably disintegrate. Large masses of Egyptians would starve without the outside supply of food. What is true of these two ancient and relatively well-developed nations is of course true of most of the new nations, which are nations within their present boundaries only by virtue of the accidents of colonial policy: The supplier of foreign aid holds the power of life and death over them. If a foreign nation supplies aid, it intervenes; if it does not supply aid, it also intervenes. In the measure that the government must

depend on foreign aid for its own and its nation's survival, it is inevitably exposed to political pressures from the supplying government. Many of the recipient governments have been able to minimize or even neutralize these political pressures by keeping open alternative sources of foreign aid and by playing one supplying government against the other. Some nations have developed this technique into a fine and highly successful art.

Second, our age resembles the period of history after the Napoleonic Wars, when the theory of nonintervention and the practice of intervention flourished, in that it is a revolutionary age. Many nations, new and old, are threatened by revolution or are at one time or other in the throes of it. A successful revolution frequently portends a new orientation in the country's foreign policy, as it did in the Congo, Cuba, and Indonesia. Thus the great powers, expecting gains or fearing disadvantages from the revolution, are tempted to intervene on the side of the faction favoring them. The temptation is particularly acute when the revolution is committed to a Communist or anti-Communist position. Thus the United States and the Soviet Union often oppose each other surreptitiously through the intermediary of governments and political movements. It is at this point that the third new factor comes into play.

Of all the revolutionary changes that have occurred in world politics since the end of the Second World War, none has exerted a greater influence upon the conduct of foreign policy than the recognition on the part of the two superpowers, armed with a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, that a direct confrontation between them would entail unacceptable risks, for it could lead to their mutual destruction. Thus they have decided that they must avoid such a confrontation. This is the real political and military meaning of the slogan "peaceful coexistence."

Instead of confronting each other openly and directly, the United States and the Soviet Union have chosen to oppose and compete with each other through third parties. The internal weakness of most new and emerging nations, requiring foreign support, and the revolutionary situation in many of them give them the opportunity of doing so. Thus, aside from competing for

influence upon a particular government in the traditional ways, the United States and the Soviet Union have interjected their power into the domestic conflicts of weak nations, supporting the government or the opposition as the case may be. While one might think that on ideological grounds the United States, a status-quo power, would always intervene on the side of the government and the Soviet Union, a revolutionary power, on the side of the opposition, it is characteristic for the interplay between ideology and power politics (to which we turn in a moment) that this has not always been so. Thus the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary in 1956 on the side of the government, and the United States has been intervening in Cuba on the side of the opposition. The Soviet slogan of support for "wars of national liberation" is in truth an ideological justification of Soviet support for that side in a civil conflict in which the Soviet Union happens to have an interest. In the Congo, the United States and the Soviet Union have switched their support from the government to the opposition and back again according to the fortunes of a succession of civil wars.

While contemporary interventions, serving national power interests, have sometimes been masked by the ideologies of Communism and anti-Communism, these ideologies have been an independent motivating force. This is the fourth factor we must consider. The United States and the Soviet Union face each other not only as two great powers competing for the advantage in the traditional ways. They face each other also as the fountainheads of two hostile and incompatible ideologies, systems of government, and ways of life, trying to expand the reach of their respective political values and institutions and to prevent the expansion of the other's. Thus the Cold War has been a conflict not only between two world powers but also between two secular religions. And like the religious wars of the seventeenth century, the war between Communism and democracy does not respect national boundaries. It finds enemies and allies in all countries, opposing the one and supporting the other regardless of the niceties of international law. Here is the dynamic force that has led the two superpowers to intervene all over the globe,

struggle for the world. This softening of the Soviet ideological position has become one of the points of contention in the ideological dispute between the Soviet Union and China. In a statement of June 14, 1963, the Chinese Communist Party declared that "the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of revolutionary struggles" in the "vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America" that are today the "storm centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism." Conforming to this doctrine, China has almost indiscriminately intervened throughout the world on behalf of subversive movements, very much in the manner in which the Bolshevik government under Lenin and Trotsky tried to promote world revolution. In their reply of July 14th of the same year, the Soviet leaders opposed the "'new theory' according to which the decisive force in the struggle against imperialism . . . is not the world system of socialism, not the struggle of the international working class, but . . . the national liberation movement." The Soviet Union's recent practice of restraint in fomenting and supporting revolution has matched this theoretical position. This ideological "revisionism" has of course not prevented the Soviet Union from intervening—as in Egypt, Somalia, and Czechoslovakia—when its national interest appeared to require intervention.

One factor that cannot have failed to influence the Soviet Union in toning down its ideological commitment to intervention has been the relative failure of ideological intervention. The United States, China, and Cuba have joined the Soviet Union in the experience of that failure. The uncommitted nations have been eager to reap the benefits of intervention, but have also been very anxious not to be tied with ideological strings to the intervening nation. After making great efforts, expending considerable resources, and running serious risks, the participants in this world-wide ideological competition are still approximately at the point from which they started: Measured against their ambitions and expectations, the uncommitted third of the world is still by and large an ideological no man's land.

This experience of failure is particularly painful, and ought to

be particularly instructive, for the United States. For since the end of the Second World War we have intervened in the political, military, and economic affairs of other countries at a cost far in excess of \$100 billion, and we have for some time been involved in a costly, risky war in order to build a nation in South Vietnam. Only the enemies of the United States will question the generosity of these efforts, which have no parallel in history. But have these efforts been wise? Have the commitments made and risks taken been commensurate with the results to be expected and actually achieved? The answer must be in the negative. Our economic aid has been successful in supporting economies that were already in the process of development; it has been by and large unsuccessful in creating economic development where none existed before because the moral and national preconditions for such development were lacking. Learning from this failure, we have established the principle of giving aid only to the few nations who can use it rather than to the many who need it. While this principle of selectivity is sound in theory, its consistent practical application has been thwarted by the harsh political and military realities that sometimes make it necessary to give aid when it is not economically justified, as well as by political and military considerations derived from the ideological concerns discussed above.

This principle of selectivity must be extended to the political and military sphere as well. We have come to overrate enormously what a nation can do for another nation by intervening in its affairs even with the latter's consent. This overestimation of our power to intervene is only a counterfoil to our ideological commitment, which by its very nature has no limit. Committed to intervening against Communist aggression and subversion anywhere, we have come to assume that we have the power to do so successfully. But in truth, both the need for intervention and the chances for successful intervention are much more limited than we have been led to believe. Intervene we must where our national interest requires it and where our power gives us a chance to succeed. The choice of these occasions will be determined not by sweeping ideological commitments or by blind

reliance upon American power, but by a careful calculation of the interests involved and the power available. If the United States applies this standard, it will intervene less and succeed more.

#### THE INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

The policies the United States is pursuing in Vietnam are open to criticism on three grounds: They do not serve the interests of the United States, they even run counter to these interests, and the objectives we have set ourselves are not attainable, if they are attainable at all, without unreasonable moral liabilities and military risks.

In order to understand the rationale underlying our involvement in Southeast Asia, one must again revert to the year 1947, when the postwar policies of the United States in the form of the policy of containment, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan were formulated and put into practice. These policies pursued one single aim by different means: the containment of Communism. That aim derived from two assumptions: the unlimited expansionism of the Soviet Union as a revolutionary power and the monolithic direction and control the Soviet Union exerted over the world Communist movement. These assumptions, in turn, were based upon the empirical evidence of the policies pursued by the Soviet Union during the last phase and the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The Red Army had advanced to a distance of a hundred miles east of the Rhine, and behind that line of military demarcation the Soviet Union had reduced the nations of Eastern Europe to the status of satellites. Nothing by way of material power stood in the path of the Red Army if it was intent upon taking over the nations of Western Europe, all of which had been drastically weakened by the war and in some of which, such as France and Italy, large Communist parties were ready to make common cause with the "liberators" from the East.

It was against this essentially traditional military threat that the policy of containment was devised. Thus it partook of the rationale that, since the beginning of the Republic, has formed

the policies of the United States with regard to Europe: the maintenance or, if need be, the restoration of the balance of power. It was for this reason that we intervened in two world wars on the seemingly weaker side, and it was for the same reason that we embarked upon the policy of containing the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine, itself originally applied to a specific, geographically limited emergency concerning Greece and Turkey, erected this traditional and geographically limited commitment into a general principle of universal application by stipulating that the United States would come to the assistance of any nation threatened by Communist aggression or subversion.

The Marshall Plan served the purpose of the policy of containment in that it tried to make the nations of Western Europe immune from Communist subversion and strong enough collectively to withstand Soviet aggression by restoring them to economic health. The spectacular success of the Marshall Plan had intellectual and political consequences similar to those of the policy of containment. The rationale underlying the Marshall Plan also was transformed into a general principle of American statecraft to be applied anywhere in the form of foreign aid.

It is against this background that one must consider the involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia. For the modes of thought and action growing from the specific European experiences of the postwar period still dominate today the foreign policies of the United States, paradoxically enough not so much in Europe as elsewhere throughout the world. The Administration has consistently justified its Asian policies by analogy with our European experiences. We think of Asia in the late 1960s as we thought of Europe in 1947, and the successes of our European policies have become the curse of the policies we have been pursuing in Asia. For the problems we are facing in Asia are utterly different from those we successfully dealt with in Europe two decades ago, and the political world we were facing in Europe two decades ago has been radically transformed.

The active involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia is a response to the Korean War. That war was interpreted by our government as the opening shot in a military campaign

for world conquest under the auspices of the Soviet Union. In view of this interpretation, it was consistent for the United States to defend South Korea against the North Korean Communists, as it would have defended Western Europe had the Red Army stepped over the line of demarcation of 1945. Similarly, it was consistent for the United States to support with massive financial and material aid the French military effort to defeat the Vietnamese Communists. When in 1954 France was threatened with defeat, it was also consistent for Secretary of State Dulles and Admiral Radford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to recommend to President Eisenhower intervention with American airpower on the side of France. Finally, after the partition of 1954, it was a logical application of this policy of containing Communism in Asia to establish and support an anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam. When the disintegration of this regime became acute, roughly from 1960 onward, we continued the policy of containment as though the nature of world Communism had not changed since 1950 and as though the political disintegration of South Vietnam posed for us an issue similar to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. It was at this point that our policy went astray.

While it was plausible, even though it has proven to be historically incorrect, to attribute the outbreak of the Korean War to a world-wide Communist conspiracy, there is no historic evidence whatsoever to interpret what has happened in Vietnam since 1960 in that manner. The period of history since Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956 has been characterized by the disintegration of the Communist bloc into its national components, pursuing to a greater or lesser degree their own particular national policies within a common framework of Communist ideology and institutions. The influence that the Soviet Union and China still are able to exert over Communist governments and movements is not the automatic result of their common Communist character, but of the convergence of national interests and of particular power relations. This has always been true of the Vietnamese Communists. Many of them were nationalists before they became Communists, and it was partly in response to

the indifference or hostility of the West that they embraced Communism as the only alternative. Even under the most unfavorable conditions of war with the United States, the government of North Vietnam has been able to retain a considerable measure of independence vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and China by playing one off against the other. The Vietnamese Communists are not mere agents of either the Soviet Union or China. Both the sources of their strength and their aims are indigenous and must be judged on their own merits.

This being the case, our professed war aim to "Stop Communism" in South Vietnam reveals itself as an empty slogan. It must be made concrete by raising such questions as what kind of Communism it is that we are trying to stop in South Vietnam and what bearing that Communism has upon the interest of the United States in containing the Soviet Union and China. The answers to these questions reveal the unsoundness of our policy. Communism in South Vietnam is irrelevant to the containment of Soviet or Chinese Communism since Vietnamese Communism is not controlled by either of them. Our fight against the South Vietnamese Communists is relevant only to our relations with South Vietnam, which, even if it were governed by Communists, is unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia.

Not only does the containment of Vietnamese Communism not further the interests of the United States; but, paradoxical as it may sound, it is even detrimental to them. We have a legitimate interest in the containment of China, and our involvement in Vietnam is frequently justified by this interest. But Vietnamese nationalism has been for a millennium a barrier to the expansion of Chinese power into Southeast Asia. There is no patriotic Vietnamese, North or South, Communist or non-Communist, Buddhist or Catholic, who does not regard China as the hereditary enemy of Vietnam. Yet, in the measure that we have weakened Vietnam as a national entity through the destruction of its human and material resources, we have created a political military, and social vacuum into which either we must move or the Soviet Union or China will move.

The instruments we have been using to achieve our aim in

Vietnam are three: "counterinsurgency" and "nation-building" in the South and the bombing of the North. These instruments have failed, as they were bound to fail.

It can be held as an axiom, derived from the experience of many such situations, that a guerrilla war supported or at least not actively opposed by the indigenous population cannot be won, short of the physical destruction of that population. In the nature of things, the guerrilla is indistinguishable from the rest of the population, and in truth the very distinction is tenuous in a situation where the guerrilla is an organic element of the social and political structure. In such a situation, everyone is in a sense a potential guerrilla. The whole population is composed of full-time guerrillas, part-time guerrillas, auxiliaries who feed, clothe, and hide the combatants, make arms, build hide-outs, and carry ammunition, and only a minority is permanently passive or surreptitiously hostile. What we have been facing in South Vietnam is a primitive nation-in-arms, the war of a total population which can be won only by incapacitating the total population.

It is for this reason that "pacification," repeated time and again for almost a decade under different names and auspices, has been a consistent failure. For it is based upon the misconception that the guerrillas are an alien element within the indigenous population, as we thought the Nazis were among the German people, who therefore could be separated from the population by an appropriate technique. Many a Vietnamese village is pacified only when all the men capable of bearing arms are either dead or driven away and prevented from returning. The last condition is impossible to achieve. Thus many villages have been "pacified" time and again, only to fall back under guerrilla control when the military occupation was relaxed.

What makes "counterinsurgency" so futile an undertaking is the difference between the motivation of the guerrillas and that of the professional army fighting them. No professional army could have withstood the punishment inflicted upon the South Vietnamese guerrillas since the beginning of 1965. It is for this reason that our military leaders have assured us time and again that the Viet Cong were at the verge of collapse, as they would have been

if they were professional soldiers. But they are, like the Spanish and Tyrolean guerrillas fighting the armies of Napoleon, fanatical protagonists of an ideal—social revolution or national survival or both—and they would rather die than admit defeat. Against them fights a professional army that does its duty efficiently and courageously and uses “counterinsurgency” as a mechanical contrivance, a particular kind of military tactic with which to fight an “unorthodox” war. However, guerrilla war is not just “unorthodox” in the technical, tactical sense, but different in quality from traditional war, and hence it cannot be “won” in the traditional sense.

Our government has recognized implicitly the truth of that analysis when it has maintained that we were fighting two wars in South Vietnam, a military and a political one—and that victory in the latter would be decisive. In order to win the political war, we have embarked upon a massive program for the political, social, and economic reconstruction of South Vietnam. The purpose of the program is to establish the government of South Vietnam as a new focus that will attract the loyalties of the large mass of South Vietnamese who are indifferent to either side, as well as the disenchanting supporters of the Viet Cong. This program is up against three obstacles which, in the aggregate, appear to be insurmountable.

First, the government of South Vietnam is a military government and has remained so in spite of the democratic gloss which carefully circumscribed and managed elections have tried to put on it. The foundation of the government's power is the army, in terms of both the administrative structure and what there is of loyal support. Yet the army is regarded by large masses of the population not as the expression of the popular will but as their enemy; for the army oppresses the peasants and, more particularly, there is reportedly no officer in the South Vietnamese army above the rank of lieutenant colonel who did not take the side of the French against his own people.

Second, this impression of an army fighting against its own people is reinforced by the massive presence of foreign armed forces without whose support neither the army nor the govern-

ment based on it could survive. Regardless of our professed and actual intentions, our military presence, with its destructive economic, social, and moral results for South Vietnam, appears to an ever increasing number of South Vietnamese as an evil to be removed at any price. Thus our massive visible support for the government of South Vietnam, largely because it is indispensable, discredits that government in the eyes of the people of South Vietnam.

Finally, the radical change in political loyalties we are striving for requires radical social, economic, and political reforms, especially with regard to the distribution of land. The achievement of such reforms has indeed earned the Viet Cong the allegiance of large masses of peasants. What the government of South Vietnam represents, both in its composition and policies, is the interests of a small group of absentee land owners and members of the urban upper middle class who would lose their economic, social, and political privileges were that government really trying to counter the social revolution of the Viet Cong with radical social reforms of its own. We are facing here the same dilemma which has frustrated our foreign-aid policies throughout the world (e.g., the Alliance for Progress): We are trying to achieve radical social reforms through the instrumentality of governments that have a vital interest in the preservation of the status quo.

The universally recognized weaknesses of the government of South Vietnam—corruption, inefficiency, apathy, lack of public spirit, low military performance, a staggering military desertion rate—result irremediably from the nature of that government. They are not to be remedied by American appeals to the South Vietnamese government to do more for the country or to let the South Vietnamese army take over a large share of the fighting and of pacification. A government imposed upon an unwilling or at best indifferent people by a foreign power in order to defend the status quo against a national and social revolution is by its very nature precluded from doing what we expect it to do. That nature dooms our efforts at politically effective reconstruction.

The third policy we have been pursuing in Vietnam, the bombing of the North, has had two major goals: to win the war

sustained depredations and terrorist activity. If they were determined to carry on the war, if their morale did not collapse at this disaster in the North, they could conceivably remain in action for the next ten years, or the next twenty years, and we might still be tied down by this vast guerrilla force.<sup>3</sup>

The situation would be no different if the government of North Vietnam were suddenly to sign our peace terms on the dotted line. Who would impose these terms on the Viet Cong, who have not been defeated in the field and continue to draw upon the support or at least the indifference of large masses of the indigenous population?

Precisely because we have been unable to win the war in the South, we continued to assume that the source of the war was in the North and that it could be won by bombing the North. However, most targets that appeared to be worth bombing were bombed and the war in the South was still not being won. From the assumption that the war could be won through action against the North, it followed logically to advocate the invasion of North Vietnam; for if North Vietnam was responsible for the war, then the conquest of North Vietnam could make an end to the war. That logical step was not taken because it would have conjured up the likelihood of a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union or China or both. The Soviet Union assured us that it would not stand idly by while we destroyed the government of North Vietnam, and China made it clear that it would intervene, as it did in the Korean War, if a hostile army approached its frontiers.

However, if the war in the South were to last long enough, we would have a good chance of winning it. We were not likely to win it in the traditional way by breaking the enemy's will to resist, but rather by killing so many of the enemy that there is nobody left to resist. Killing in war has traditionally been a means to a psychological end. Here killing becomes an end in itself. The physical elimination of the enemy and victory become synonymous. Hence, the "body count," however fictitious in itself, was the sole measure of our success.

<sup>3</sup> Maxwell D. Taylor, *Responsibility and Response* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 38.

opinion—political, expert, and lay—for years supports such a mistaken course of action. When a nation allows itself to be misgoverned in such a flagrant fashion, there must be something essentially wrong in its intellectual, moral, and political constitution. To lay bare what is wrong is not an idle exercise in *ex-post-facto* fault-finding. Rather it is an act of public purification and rectification. If it is not performed and accepted by government and people alike, faults undiscovered and uncorrected are bound to call forth new disasters—perhaps different from the one we have experienced in Vietnam, but just as detrimental to the interests of the nation.

What accounts for the failure of a nation so amply endowed with human and material resources? The roots of our failure in Vietnam are to be looked for in three areas: intellectual understanding, political judgment, and moral standards.

Failures of intellectual understanding have led us into four far-reaching errors: the mechanistic approach to politics, reasoning by historic analogy, belief in the transferability of Western political institutions to Asia, and confidence in the unlimited perfectibility of governments.

I have argued elsewhere at length against the pseudo science of politics which endeavors to reduce the political sphere to an interplay of quantitative factors and which ends up by banishing politics altogether. The new theories, in so far as they are new in more than terminology, are in truth not so much theories as dogmas. They do not so much try to reflect reality as it actually is, as to superimpose upon a recalcitrant reality a theoretical scheme that satisfies the desire for thorough rationalization. Their practicality is specious since it substitutes what is desirable for what is possible.

What characterizes the most spectacular contemporary theories of politics is the attempt to use the tools of modern economic analysis in a modified form in order to understand their subject matter. Their mainstay is quantification. The use of terms such as "systems analysis," "feedback," "input," and "output" (to mention only a few common and easily accessible ones) is revealing; for these concepts were first developed by economic theory.

sciences, which appears to be free of these blemishes that stand in the way of the thorough rationalization of politics. I tried to show more than twenty years ago that this model of the natural sciences harks back to a Newtonian universe that the contemporary natural sciences have left far behind. This rational model is a Utopia that reflects the desires of theoreticians but not the real physical world, dominated as that world is by the principle of indeterminacy, and predictable as it is, at least as microcosmos, only by way of statistical probability.

I have also tried to show that politics, domestic and international, is susceptible to a radically different kind of understanding from that which is appropriate to the world of nature. When we try to understand politics, we are dealing, it is true, with men in the aggregate, but with men per se—that is, as spiritual and moral beings—whose actions and reactions can be rationalized and quantitatively understood only on the lowest level of their existence. Thus what the contemporary theories of politics endeavor to exorcise as deficiencies in view of an ideal, pervasively rational theory are in truth only the ineradicable qualities of the subject matter itself. A theory that does not take them into account transforms itself into a dogma, a kind of metaphysics, regardless in what empirical or mathematical garb it is clothed.

This dogmatic outlook of modern political science has greatly contributed to our failure in Vietnam. It has prevented us from understanding the true nature of the issues we were facing and, more particularly, their complexity and imponderable qualities. Thus we reduced what was actually a national and social revolution dominated by a national Communism to the simplicity of foreign aggression under the auspices of Chinese Communism. Success or failure in resisting foreign aggression can easily be ascertained by the standard of the relative geographic position of the contesting armies; thus we resisted foreign aggression in Korea by holding the 38th parallel. No such standard is available when one is engaged in a counterrevolution, as we have been in Vietnam, against a genuine popular revolution. Success in such a case is to be achieved by a combination of military and political measures, culminating in giving satisfaction to the revolutionary

culture postulates an objective order from the compliance with which the government derives its legitimacy. That order allows the citizen no choice among political competitors but demands his obedience to the legitimate government, which can claim that obedience as long as it governs in accord with the objective order. When it visibly ceases to do so, having lost the "mandate of heaven," the citizen is absolved of the duty to obey and can and must transfer his allegiance to another government representative of the objective order.

It ought to be obvious that in such a cultural context national elections—in contrast to those on the village level where personal choice may come into play—perform a function utterly different from that performed in a relativistic and individualistic society of the West. In a country such as Vietnam, elections are in the nature of a plebiscite in support of the government rather than a choice among several competitors for the powers of the government. This is obviously the case in North Vietnam and in the part of South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong. But it is also so in the part of South Vietnam controlled by the Saigon government; for the freedom of choice among different parties and individuals which obviously exists there is strictly limited to parties and individuals who have essentially the same outlook and agree on basic policies.

Considering the present situation in Vietnam in which two governments are controlling different parts of the country, both claiming legitimacy for the whole, elections are likely to confirm the status quo without resolving the conflict. That is to say, people will vote for the government that happens to control them, for both philosophic and practical reasons. For an individual living under the control of the Saigon government who voted for the Viet Cong, and an individual controlled by the Viet Cong who voted for the Saigon government, would each take very considerable risks for his livelihood, freedom, and life. Thus elections are not likely to settle the fundamental issue over which the war is being fought: whether South Vietnam is to be governed by a Communist or non-Communist government. That issue can be decided only by a political settlement that reflects the actual

ernment thus constituted be expected to stamp out corruption, which in a country such as South Vietnam is not a deviation from the norm but is bound to be the norm itself? For a government so precariously and in all likelihood temporarily placed as that of South Vietnam can have only two main incentives: to ensure the survival of its members and to draw as much material gain as possible from an advantageous situation which is not likely to last. For such a government, corruption is not a vice but a necessity. To expect such a government to rid itself of corruption is tantamount to expecting it to act against its very nature.

Errors in the way of thinking about foreign policy lead of necessity to wrong political judgments. There are, however, wrong political judgments which are not so occasioned but can result from a variety of intellectual errors. Three such misjudgments have had a deleterious effect upon policies in Vietnam. They concern the nature of Communism, of revolution, and of limited war.

It is one of the great ironies of history that we have tended to take Communism more seriously as a political ideology than have the major Communist governments. For Stalin and his successors in particular, Communism was first of all an ideological means to the traditional ends of imperial Russia. By contrast, we have tended to take the Communist postulates and prophecies at their face value and in consequence have been unable to divorce our political judgments from the assumption of the monolithic, conspiratorial character of Communism. Thus we have been unable to judge Vietnamese Communism on its own national merits, as an indigenous phenomenon resulting from the peculiar circumstances of time and place. Instead, Vietnamese Communism has appeared to us as a special instance of a general phenomenon which is not by accident the same regardless of time and place; for it has been created by a world-wide conspiracy whose headquarters are assumed to be in Moscow or Peking or both, and whose aim is to Communize the world. In this view, what happens in Vietnam is just an episode in that international struggle between Communism and the "free world," and consequently the outcome of the Vietnamese War has world-wide significance.

The misjudgment of revolution fits organically into this largely fictitious picture of the political world. Revolution, too, must not be understood on its own terms but must be traced to a conspiracy of foreign origin imposed upon an unwilling people. That concept of revolution is in good measure responsible for the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. We thought of Castro as a dictator imposed by the Communist conspiracy of Moscow upon the unwilling Cubans, who, at the sight of a thousand anti-Castro refugees, would rise *en masse* against their oppressor. Similarly, the revolution in South Vietnam must be traced to a foreign conspiracy located in Hanoi and, at one remove, in Moscow and Peking. What looks like revolution, then, is really foreign aggression, and the revolution can be suppressed by thwarting that aggression.

What is inadmissible to us is the recognition that in large parts of the world there exists today an objective revolutionary situation. This revolutionary situation would exist even if Communism had never been heard of, and is in good measure a response to the Western teachings and examples of national self-determination and radical social reform. That these national and social revolutions are largely identified with Communism is primarily the result of the West's failure to identify with them morally and to support them materially. The Vietnamese revolution is a case in point. In Vietnam as elsewhere, particularly in Latin America, the Communist and anti-American orientation of revolutionary movements is directly related to the American misunderstanding of the nature both of Communism and of revolution.

While our misjudgments of Communism and revolution are organically related, our reliance upon limited war to combat them is a spectacular *non sequitur*. For if we are combating in Vietnam foreign aggression inspired and supported by the centers of world Communism, particularly Peking, and if we are serious about getting rid of the trouble, then we must strike at the source and not only at one of its outward manifestations. But for perfectly good reasons we shy away from a direct military confrontation with China, let alone the Soviet Union. Thus the means we have been employing in Vietnam are divorced from

opposing policies which he deems to be detrimental to the national interest, he risks jeopardizing his public career. By supporting and executing such a foreign policy, he will remain a team worker in good standing at the sacrifice of his convictions and of the national interest.

As the government faced with a choice between a sound foreign policy and popular support is likely to sacrifice the former for the sake of the latter, so the public official having to choose between his career and his convictions is likely to choose the former over the latter. Human nature being what it is, powerfully supported by the specific intensity of America's conformism, these choices are not surprising. What is disquieting is the virtual absence of an exception to the rule of conformity. In talking to high government officials, I have time and again been startled, and sometimes confounded, by the contrast between their public positions and private convictions. This contrast, I should add, concerned not only subjective estimates of the political and military situation but hard facts and figures ascertainable by objective calculations.

While many high-ranking officials who are opposed to our policies in Vietnam have resigned their positions since 1965, not one of them has justified his resignation with his opposition to these policies. If some of the more illustrious of them had made their opposition a matter of public record, they might well have rendered a great service to the national interest. But they would have risked the premature termination of their public careers, and none of them was evidently willing to face that dire prospect. As in the case of government policy as a collective enterprise discussed above, the issue of a moral choice does not even seem to have arisen. Here again, the issue was settled before it could have been raised, and it was settled in favor of private concerns and to the detriment of the national interest. And here again, what is ominous is not so much that moral judgment has been corrupted as that it has disappeared.

As bureaucratic conformism supports the government's substitution of popular support for sound foreign policies, so academic conformism creates a climate of expert opinion favorable to both.

The fact that most academic experts in international relations and Asian politics either actively supported the government policies in Vietnam or cast no public judgment on them greatly contributed to giving these policies at least a temporary respectability. Rereading the transcripts of the televised Washington teach-in of May 15, 1965, of *Meet the Press* of May 16, 1965, and of the confrontation on CBS on June 21, 1965, I have been struck by the almost comic effect of the statements made by eminent scholars in defense of government policy and in disparagement of its critics. Hardly any of these statements were correct then or were proven to be correct by subsequent events.

This subservience of scholars to the government performs the same sociological function as does the conformity of the bureaucracy. Many of these scholars were, or expect to be again, members of the bureaucracy, or part-time members of it, or to entertain contractual relations with it. The same psychological pressures that keep the bureaucracy in line operate in generally attenuated form on the scholars. As an eminent academic put it in private after he had given a public lecture defending the government policy: "We are approaching a catastrophe in Vietnam, but I cannot say so in public without losing my connections with the government."

This sector of the academic community thus transforms itself into a mere extension of the government bureaucracy, defending and implementing government policies regardless of their objective merits. While performing this function, it maintains its claim that its judgments are arrived at through a detached search for the objective truth. The result of this contrast between the function actually performed and the function claimed is moral ambiguity. When does a scholar speak as scholar, and when as servant of the government? When does he search for the truth regardless of what it may be, and when does he try to validate government policies by investing them with the appearance of objective truth? These distinctions, vital for the autonomy and validity of scholarship, are blurred, and in the end even the scholar concerned is incapable of making them. This outcome is no doubt advantageous to the government of the day, but it is

also destructive of the long-term function political scholarship ought to perform for the nation, the government included.

There are only three ways in which a government can be induced to change wrong policies: through the brutal language of the facts indicating failure, through the erosion of political support, and through the rational demonstration of error. It is that last function which political scholarship is called upon to perform. By speaking truth to power, it serves not only truth but also power. For it provides the powers-that-be as well as the public at large with the intellectual standards with which to distinguish between success and failure. If it is taken seriously, it shortens the interval necessary for the correction of unsound policies.

Scholarship has not been able to perform that vital function because it has not taken itself seriously, nor has it been taken seriously by the government, except as the provider of ideological rationalizations and justifications of the government's policies. It has been only too eager to accept that ideological function assigned to it by the government and has thereby disqualified itself to perform its vital role for the government and society at large: to provide a corrective to the errors of government, born of a disinterested search for the truth. By investing the errors of government with the appearance of truth, it has encouraged the continuation of error.

This moral collapse of a large section of the academic community would not have been possible without its encouragement and the concomitant disparagement of academic dissent by the government. The last question we must raise, then, concerns the government's motives for the a priori rejection of responsible dissent. Here we are not dealing with a typical failure of moral sensitivity, but with personality traits in the highest policy-makers which, in such extreme manifestations at least, are unique. We are referring to the sin of pride.

All men naturally identify themselves with their work, and a maker of policy has a personal stake in the soundness and success of that policy. He will not easily admit that it is unsound and doomed to failure. This universal human tendency, however, differs from the stubborn pursuit of a wrong course of action in

the face of all the evidence and all the arguments pointing to its unsoundness and the inevitability of failure. This persistence in error does not stem from a man's pride in his work but from a man's awareness of his insufficiency and his fear lest patent failure might give him away. Mr. Johnson's statement to Mr. Lodge, then our Ambassador to South Vietnam, immediately after President Kennedy's death that he was not going to be the first American president to lose a war expresses something of that mood.

Policies here are less related to objective reality than to the impression of the policy-maker's manly qualities they convey, and objective reality is replaced by an artificial one which is attuned to the policy. Thus policy moves in a wonderland of the policy-maker's creation, and the invulnerability of that creation is vitally important to the policy-maker's ego and the policy reflecting it. Thus the dissenter who opposes the real world to the fictitious one of the policy-maker constitutes a mortal threat not only to the policy but to the person of the policy-maker. He does not limit himself to suggesting a different policy from the official one, but threatens to expose the fictitious character of the reality from which the policy is derived and upon which it is intended to act.

The policy-maker might tolerate the former function, since he must be prepared to consider different policy proposals; he cannot countenance the latter, which threatens with destruction the very world within which he moves and puts into doubt his competence to understand and act upon it. Thus it is the very extremity of the defects responsible for our failure in Vietnam which in the last analysis accounts for the unwillingness of the policy-makers to change their course of action. To do so would be an admission not only of the failure of a particular policy but of the invalidity of the perception of reality and of the intellectual, political, and moral standards of the persons who have initiated and sustained the policy. Only great men, who are sure of themselves and think they are sure of their place in history, are capable of such an admission.

## 6

*The United States and Europe*

## THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Throughout its history, the United States has consistently pursued three interconnected interests with regard to Europe: not to get involved in the conflicts of European powers; to prevent European powers from interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere; and to maintain or, if need be, to restore the balance of power in Europe. These three interests serve the most elemental of the national interests of the United States: the security of the United States in the Western Hemisphere through the preservation of its unique position as a hegemonial power without rival.

It was obvious from the outset that the privileged position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere could not be effectively challenged from within the Hemisphere. It could only be so challenged from the outside—that is, if a European power were to make common cause with an American one or to acquire territory in the Americas. Hence, the United States had to deprive the powers of Europe of both the incentive and the opportunity to challenge the United States in the Western Hemi-

sphere. The Monroe Doctrine and the policies implementing it have served both purposes.

Of the policies implementing the Monroe Doctrine, the support of the European balance of power has been the one requiring an active American foreign policy beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere. It has been the purpose of that policy to prevent conditions in Europe from arising which would provide incentives for a European power to intervene in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere or to contemplate a direct attack upon the United States. Such conditions would be most likely to arise if a European power, its predominance unchallenged within Europe, looked across the ocean for new conquests without needing to fear a challenge at the center of its power—that is, in Europe itself.

It is for this reason that the United States has consistently—the War of 1812 is the sole major exception—pursued policies aimed at the maintenance or, if need be, the restoration of the balance of power in Europe. It has opposed any European nation—be it Great Britain, France, Germany, or Russia—that seemed likely to gain ascendancy over its European competitors and thereby jeopardize the hemispheric predominance and eventually the very security of the United States. Conversely, it has supported whatever European nation appeared capable of restoring the balance of power by offering successful resistance to the would-be conqueror. While it is hard to imagine a greater contrast in ways of thinking about matters political than that between Alexander Hamilton and Woodrow Wilson, in their concern for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe—for whatever different reasons—they were one. It is with this concern that the United States has intervened in both World Wars on the side of the initially weaker coalition and has pursued European policies largely paralleling those of Great Britain.

There is an apparent contradiction between the isolationism of Washington's Farewell Address and the abstentionism of the Monroe Doctrine, on the one hand, and the interventionism of our balance-of-power policies, on the other. This contradiction is logically resolved by the qualification implicit in the policies of

the war and emerging from it with hegemonial power. Since Spain was too weak to contain the United States without Anglo-French support, the United States also had an interest in gaining advantages at the expense of Spain as long as the war lasted. Thus it supported Russia against Great Britain and France, and it took advantage of the military preoccupation of the latter powers and the resulting isolation of Spain by exerting pressure upon Spain. As a contemporary writer, Francis I. Grund, put it:

If the map of Europe is to be changed—if Turkey is to be divided, and the nations to Europe are to extend their power and influence into Asia, we may consider how far this great historical movement of the people of the old world may affect the conditions of the new; and what steps it may be prudent for us to take, to balance the account. . . .

If it be contended that we must remain indifferent to the affairs of Europe—that the changes wrought in the institutions and mutual relations of European governments do not merit our consideration and challenge our watchfulness, then, assuredly, our neutrality doctrine would amount to an injunction on ourselves, and condemn us, in our foreign relations, to absolute political inaction. It would insure all other nations against harm from our growing energy and power; while it would not protect us from *their* intermeddling with *our* affairs.<sup>5</sup>

The American intervention in the two World Wars made explicit in terms of policy what throughout American history had been recognized in theory and, however inconspicuously, translated into practice: the vital interest of the United States in the European balance of power. The official documents have made clear that Wilson was moved to intervene not only by his concern for the rights of neutrals but also by the anticipation of the consequences of a German victory, as foreshadowed by the German policies immediately preceding the American declaration of war. Wilson's subsequent policy of "peace without victory" was similarly inspired by the rationale of the balance of power. Wilson went to war in order to prevent a German hegemony; while

<sup>5</sup> Francis I. Grund, *Thoughts and Reflections on the Present Position of Europe* (Philadelphia: Childs & Peterson, 1860), pp. 225, 233.

the White Paper: "The bombers also give Britain the ability to involve the United States in a nuclear war for which the Americans have no stomach, the argument being that the Russians would be led to loose off an attack on the United States if any foreign nuclear bombs went off on their territory, since they would not have time to see the Union Jack painted on its war-head." In other words, proliferation combined with traditional alliance commitments turns the obsolescence of the Western Alliance, as presently constituted, against the survival of the United States. Allies of the United States armed with nuclear weapons could virtually decide whether the United States shall live or die.

To escape this danger and at the same time restore the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires of the United States an effort at creative statesmanship, the like of which it has not achieved since 1947, when it created a new American foreign policy through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the policy of containment. Any rational and constructive consideration of the future course of American policy must start with the recognition that the crisis of the Atlantic Alliance is political and not military in nature. The crisis goes to the very core of the political life of its members. It has been said of politics that it is concerned with "who gets what, when, how," which is undoubtedly an accurate description of the politics of bargaining and spoils in established political communities. Yet where the very existence and nature of a political community are in question, the fundamental issue is who shall die for what on whose orders. It is the measure of the inevitability and gravity of the crisis of the Atlantic Alliance that this is the issue rending it asunder. Soothing official statements about the essential unity of purpose of the Alliance, about interdependence, nuclear "partnership," and nuclear "sharing" may obscure this issue. Clever technical devices, such as the MLF, may divert attention from it. Belligerent statements addressed to the Soviet Union may create a temporary euphoria suggesting that the issue no longer exists. But the issue of life and death, arising from the objective conditions in which the members of the Alliance exist, will not be stilled by inattention.

resources even of a world power fall short of its interests. Furthermore, while military strength and political power are the preconditions for lasting national greatness, the substance of that greatness springs from the hidden sources of intellect and morale, from ideas and values, which we call civilization. Nobody can say what would happen to American civilization if it were suddenly cut off from its European source, the latter being destroyed by a blow that would also be a blow against the former. But one can and must say that America has a vital interest in the survival of Europe as a center of Western civilization.

#### THE AMERICAN POLICIES

Any consideration of the policies to be pursued by the United States in Europe must start from the assumption that the issue which led the United States in 1947 to intervene in the affairs of Europe poses itself today in novel terms, but that it has not disappeared. The Soviet Union is still today, as it was two decades ago, the potential hegemonial power on the continent of Europe. Regardless of the policies the Soviet Union is pursuing now in contrast to those it pursued then, this is so by virtue of the objective distribution of power on the European continent. Concretely, the issue of Europe continues to center upon the issue of Germany. Shall the line of division between the two Europes continue to run where it does now, dividing Germany, or shall it run at the Eastern or Western boundaries of Germany, or shall it stop running at all?

To say, then, that the Cold War has come to an end is to indulge in imprecise and overly sanguine language. The question over which the Cold War arose—Who shall control Germany and, through it, Europe?—remains unanswered, or, at best, the answer remains provisional, subject to change by the policies of the major interested parties. In truth, therefore, the Cold War has not come to an end but has only lost its intensity which in the past has threatened an armed conflagration on the occasion of every major crisis. What a Polish scholar, Dr. Longin Pastusiak, said recently of the policies of West Germany applies to the policies of all interested parties: "The main aims of this policy

much of the explicit political relations as of the psychological outlook of the parties concerned.

These new relationships point toward political normalization in terms of the implicit or explicit recognition of the territorial status quo. As concerns East Germany, an entirely new element has entered the picture. In the past, it was taken for granted by all concerned—by Moscow and Washington, Pankow and Bonn—that unification would of necessity mean the absorption of East Germany by a more powerful, economically more attractive, and politically healthier West. For the first time, voices can be heard in Bonn which no longer take this for granted. In the measure that, on the one hand, East Germany becomes the other great industrial power on the European continent, continues to improve its standard of living, and mitigates its totalitarian rule, and, on the other, the prestige of the Bonn regime continues to falter, West Germans might ask themselves, so it is feared, what the ideological fuss about the lack of legitimacy of the East German regime was all about.

Third, the French example of a new nationalistic foreign policy has had a stimulating effect upon hitherto dormant tendencies of a similar kind in West Germany. To the extent that this trend feeds upon the example of French nationalism, its strength will depend upon the success of the new French foreign policies as well as upon the support these policies can lend to the foreign policies of West Germany. The deeper and more widespread the recognition of the failure of the Adenauer policy of reunification becomes, the stronger will be the temptation for West Germany to strike out on its own.

This temptation is held in check by the ideal of a unified Europe as a "third force," comprising all the nations of Western Europe under common political leadership and with integrated military forces and equally independent of the Soviet Union and the United States. But this fourth alternative policy, embodied in the political goals of the European Common Market, is in turn relegated to the status of a mere ideal by the nationalistic policies which France has pursued within the Common Market and outside it.

We have seen that the two West German schools of thought, the Atlantic and the "Gaullist," try to avoid a clear-cut choice between the two orientations. We can strengthen this position, which conforms to our own interests and policies as outlined above, by blunting the sharp edges of that choice. West Germany will lose its ability to choose in the measure that our relations with France lose their bipolar character and approach that of a common front, of which West Germany forms a part.

These short-term policies, unspectacular in themselves, serve the long-range purposes the United States pursues in Europe: political stability and the avoidance of nuclear war. These purposes are put in jeopardy by the revival of nationalism in Western Europe and the concomitant trend toward nuclear proliferation. The revival of nationalism presents a paradox in an age whose technological conditions require political, military, and economic institutions transcending the nation-state. But that revival is a universal fact which, however paradoxical it may appear to our rational judgment, must form the empirical starting point for long-range planning. The trend toward nuclear proliferation is a mere symptom of that universal tendency.

Nuclear proliferation expresses the desire of the major European nations to decide for themselves the issue of life and death. The policy of proliferation is likely to be futile and dangerous for the nations pursuing it. But it is equally futile to oppose it dogmatically, however much one may deplore the fact of proliferation on rational grounds. What is necessary is to create political conditions likely to minimize the risk of proliferation and in the end to deprive the members of the Western Alliance of any motive for proliferation. These political conditions were presented in a vague, idealized form by the grand design of Atlantic Partnership which John F. Kennedy formulated on July 4, 1962, in his "Declaration of Interdependence." That design has remained in the realm of political rhetoric, but it contains a political concept that alone promises to combine Western unity with nuclear power. In order to understand the concept's import, we must first remind ourselves again of the political character of the crisis of the Western Alliance.

quences are counterbalanced by the politically unified use of proliferated nuclear weapons. As long as political union is unobtainable and since traditional Alliance commitments joined with nuclear proliferation, as pointed out above, are intolerable, the United States must strive for three goals: to mitigate the consequences of proliferation by limiting the number of independent nuclear deterrents, to bring its Alliance commitments for the time being into harmony with the interests it has actually or potentially in common with its allies, and in the end to render proliferation innocuous or obsolete through unified political control.

The first goal requires of the United States active support of the political unification of Europe. For since proliferation is an accomplished fact and Atlantic Union is in the short run unattainable, a European nuclear deterrent controlled by a European political authority is the best attainable alternative. The issue of nuclear proliferation adds to the conventional balance-of-power arguments referred to above yet another reason for American support of European unification. Such support implies a radical change in our present policies, which, by trying to isolate France, have stood in the way of the political unification of Europe and have sought in vain to restore the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance on foundations that no longer exist.

The second goal, similarly, requires a radical change from the dogmatic insistence upon the restoration of an unrestorable status quo to the pragmatic adaptation to circumstances which for the time being are not subject to our control. What we have seen to be true of our relations with France is true in general: we must narrow the gap between our comprehensive legal commitments and the limited sphere within which our interests and policies still coincide with those of our allies. Otherwise we shall run a risk to which improvident great powers (e.g., Germany in 1914) have succumbed in the past—that is, getting involved in a war not of our making and on behalf of interests not our own.

The legal basis for such an adaptation of our commitments to changing circumstances is to be found in Article V of the NATO Treaty, which requires each signatory to take "such action as it

regard to the offshore islands and Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, Tibet, and India follow a consistent pattern: restoration of the territorial boundaries and influence the Chinese empire possessed before its modern decline. These boundaries are likely to include Taiwan and the offshore islands, Outer Mongolia, and the Asian territories claimed by China and annexed by the Soviet Union during the nineteenth century. Physically, in view of the distribution of power in South and Southeast Asia, China could go much farther—in fact, virtually as far as it wants to. But it has never done so in the past, and is not likely to do so in the future. The reasons are to be found, aside from the possible military reaction on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union, in the peculiar Chinese outlook upon the world.

According to Professor C. P. FitzGerald, "Rather more than a thousand years ago, the T'ang dynasty thus fixed the geographic limits in which the Chinese people were to live until modern times."<sup>1</sup> Instead of conquering neighboring states, which it could have done without undue risk, China has been traditionally satisfied with the establishment of governments at her southern and southwestern borders whose political identity was left intact and whose friendliness was assured and symbolized through tributary relationships of different kinds and degrees.

These subtle and indirect relationships are the result of the traditional Chinese conception of China as the center of the political universe, the only sovereign power worthy of the name, to which all other nations owe tribute. This extreme ethnocentrism goes hand in hand with contempt for, and ignorance of, the outside world, which from the Chinese point of view really does not need to be understood and dealt with on terms of equality with China. As the present relations between China, on the one hand, and Cambodia and Burma, on the other, can be regarded as a modern version of the tributary relations of old, so the present ignorance of the Chinese leaders of the outside world,

<sup>1</sup> C. P. FitzGerald, *The Chinese View of Their Place in the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 19. See also John K. Fairbank, *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 8.

their verbal assaults upon it, and their ineffective policies with regard to it can be understood as a modern version of China's traditional ethnocentrism.

#### *China as a Communist Power*

The quandary the United States faces in its relations with China is created by the addition to these traditional elements of Chinese foreign policy of a new and unprecedented one: the sponsorship of a militant world Communism. That quandary, as we have seen, is similar to the one the United States dealt with successfully in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War when it had to distinguish between the great-power and the world-revolutionary aspirations of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union modified and mitigated its world revolutionary fervor when it began to realize, starting in the 1920s, that the risks it ran for its own survival on behalf of world revolution were out of all proportion to the chances of achieving that revolution. It is at least possible, if not likely, that China will undergo a similar process of adapting its world-revolutionary aims to political and military realities. The chances for such a development exist, provided China has a rational government, and they are enhanced by the nature of the foreign policies China has pursued in Asia since 1949. These policies are characterized by two main inter-related qualities; caution and limitation to the traditional national objectives of China—qualities that stand in stark contrast to the militant rhetoric of the Chinese leaders, which reveal an ethnocentric disregard for the realities, and contempt for the interests, of the outside world.

Minister of National Defense Lin Piao's famous manifesto of September 3, 1965, provides a particularly impressive but by no means unique example of this ethnocentrism, which is intellectually absurd and politically impractical. Lin Piao tries to apply the lessons of the Communist revolution in China to the world scene. Just as the Communists conquered the countryside, isolating, surrounding, and finally conquering the cities, so, he suggests, the Communists will conquer the rural areas of the world, and then isolate and finally conquer the cities of the world, by

which he means the capitalist nations of the West. To consider these geopolitical metaphors as a program for political and military action, as many observers in the United States do, is to fail to understand their ethnocentric source. Lin Piao's manifesto is not the Chinese equivalent of *Mein Kampf*, for the simple reason that even a Chinese Hitler would be incapable of putting it into practice. Completely lacking in even the most elementary understanding of the outside world, it rather reminds one, if one needs a historic analogy, of the eccentricities of German geopolitics.

#### *The Future Policies of China*

Provided China has a rational government, it can thus be expected that both the present and the coming generation of Chinese leaders will continue to learn from experience and adapt their policies to the real world. Under the same proviso, it is also conceivable that the coming generation will be less given to militant Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and to the instigation and support of subversion throughout the world. But it would be futile to expect that the new generation will be more accommodating than is the old one when it comes to the restoration of China's traditional domain in Asia. In this respect, Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek see eye to eye, and so must Mao Tse-tung and his successor, whoever he may be.

To mention only the most crucial issue where the traditional Chinese national interest is at stake: Both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek consider Taiwan to be an integral part of China. They disagree only as to who shall rule China. Regardless of its ideological commitment, no patriotic government of China can be expected to give up this claim to Taiwan, and any Chinese government that believes it has the power will try to recover the island. The issue of Taiwan has indeed proven the main stumbling block in the Geneva and Warsaw negotiations between the United States and China, and it is bound to do so in the future. That it has proven to be no more is due to China's temporary military weakness. If and when China has realized its military potential through the acquisition of the modern tech-

function could be performed by only one power, the United States itself.

The policies through which the United States has implemented this function have been decisively determined by the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Before that intervention, the United States moved toward recognition of the Communist government of China and away from complete military and political identification with Chiang Kai-shek's regime on Taiwan. The policy the United States then intended to pursue vis-à-vis China was clearly formulated in the famous and often misquoted speech that Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave at the National Press Club in Washington on January 12, 1950. Acheson's speech did not envisage a unilateral military commitment of the United States on the mainland of Asia, but identified the island chain adjacent to the Asian mainland from Japan to the Philippines as the outer limits of America's military presence.

China's intervention in the Korean War radically transformed the Asian policies of the United States. The United States responded to that intervention with two policies: the policy of isolating China and the policy of peripheral military containment.

#### *The Policy of Isolating China*

The policy of isolating China sought the downfall of the Communist government. It was intimately connected with the recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government as the legitimate government of China and anticipated that government's return to the mainland. By maintaining close relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government and none with the Communist government, a policy in which the United States expected its allies to participate, this country tried to destroy the legitimacy of the Communist government. By interdicting all personal and commercial relations with mainland China, the United States expected to make it impossible for the Communist regime to govern. This policy has obviously failed. Chiang Kai-shek will not return to the mainland, and his government survives only by

virtue of the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Strait of Taiwan. The Communist government of China enjoys diplomatic, cultural, and commercial relations with many nations, including numerous allies of the United States, and it is the United States rather than Communist China which has been isolated in consequence of its policy of isolation. In so far as China is isolated, as it is particularly in the Communist world, that isolation is in good measure self-inflicted, and our policy has had little to do with it.

This failure of the policy of isolating China has been particularly striking in the field of trade. That policy is sound in its rationale; but it has failed in application. Communist governments have consistently laid the greatest stress upon the expansion of foreign trade. They have evoked memories of Cobden and Bright, the leaders of the Manchester liberals of a century ago, as well as of our own former Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, with their emphasis on what foreign trade could do for private profits and international peace. They have consistently shown a particular interest in whole industrial plants rather than manufactured goods. But the Communist leaders are not Manchester liberals. They have wanted foreign trade not for the commercial purposes our businessmen want it for, but in order to gain the political strength necessary to achieve the universal triumph of Communism. As Lenin put it: "We welcomed Genoa [the International Economic Conference at Genoa in April 1922], we understood perfectly well, and did not conceal it that we were going there as merchants because trade with capitalistic countries is absolutely essential for us (so long as they have not yet collapsed)." Khrushchev was even more explicit when he said in 1957: "We declare war upon you . . . in the peaceful field of peaceful production. We are relentless in this, and it will prove the superiority of our system." And in 1952, Stalin also voiced his confidence in the profit motive of Western businessmen as an instrument through which the Soviet Union would be made strong enough for its final triumph.

I am not arguing here against Western trade with Communist nations per se. I am only arguing in favor of the proposition that

foreign trade has a different meaning for Communist nations than it has for us. Trade with Communist nations is a political act which has political consequences. It is folly to trade, or for that matter to refuse to trade, with Communist nations without concern for these political consequences. There is no reason to object to our selling a Communist country goods it needs in exchange for goods we need. There is no reason to object to trading with Communist countries like Yugoslavia, if such trade promises economic gains and political results favorable to our interests. But it is a folly, comparable to the sale of scrap iron to Japan in the 1930s, to equip the Soviet Union and China with industrial plants and transportation systems which will then be used as weapons in the political, military, and economic offensives of Communism against the West.

That folly is compounded in the case of trade with China. The Soviet Union terminated its economic relations with China at the beginning of the 1960s because it did not find it in its interest to supply the economic foundations for the power of a hostile China. An industrially developed China, whose population might then approach a billion, would be the most powerful nation on earth, more powerful than either the Soviet Union or the United States. It is extremely doubtful that China, in view of the numbers and poverty of its population, could find within its own borders the resources for such industrial development if it were not supplied with capital and goods from abroad. China would then remain for the foreseeable future a weak and fragile giant, a threat to its immediate neighbors but not to the two super-powers.

The Soviet Union has understood this prospect and has left China to its own economic devices. Yet Western governments and businessmen have been rushing into the gap left by the Russian withdrawal, replacing the Soviet Union as a source of capital and goods for China. But is China less hostile, and will it be less dangerous, to the West if and when it has become an advanced industrial nation, than it is, and will be, to the Soviet Union? Obviously, the West has at least as good reason as the Soviet Union to fear a powerful China. If it is in the interest of the

longer an important issue, and hence no favorable response can be expected from China if the United States should give up this policy. However, even in the absence of a favorable Chinese response, a new American policy of establishing contacts with China through trade, cultural exchanges, and China's admission to the United Nations would at least be in tune with the policies pursued by most other nations and would thereby relieve the United States of its present isolation. To avail itself of the opportunities thus presented, even without giving up its hostility to the United States, China might learn a great deal about the outside world and thereby overcome its own isolation from, and hostility to, that world.

Yet, aside from these secondary and imponderable considerations, the real issue is not isolation but containment. This is the crucial point at which the traditional national interests of China and the policy of the United States clash. The slogan "containment without isolation" obscures that crucial issue. It is a formula for continuing the policy of military containment at the periphery of China by making it appear that the abandonment of the policy of isolation portends a significant change in American policy. It tends to make the policy of peripheral military containment palatable by tying it to an apparently real and benevolent change in our China policy. It also carries a suggestion of condescension—"We are going to be nice to you from now on"—which is not likely to impress a China that is mindful of its humiliations, past and present.

Similar considerations apply to the proposal to end the isolation of China by engaging in trade with it. Trade relations between the United States and China, which might possibly have the secondary and imponderable effects mentioned above, would be irrelevant to the basic political and military issues that divide the two nations. Furthermore, to engage in indiscriminate trade with China, apart from an over-all political settlement, would be self-defeating; for such trade would strengthen China politically and militarily without giving an equivalent political or military advantage to the other partner.

Finally, the seating of the Communist government as the rep-

the measure that China develops its nuclear capability, it also becomes vulnerable to nuclear retaliation; for if and when China has developed into a modern nation with a high technological capability, it will also have developed a large number of vital industrial and population centers and will then have become as vulnerable to nuclear attack as are the United States and the Soviet Union today. Assuming a modicum of rationality in the government which will then govern China, fear of nuclear retaliation must be assumed to have the same restraining influence upon Chinese policies as it has had upon the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union since the beginning of the nuclear age. Thus the nuclear arms race, at least as long as it is carried on among a few great powers, carries within itself its own corrective, however tenuous: Nuclear power and nuclear vulnerability go hand in hand, and so does the rational requirement of self-restraint.

#### *The World-wide Containment of China*

The peripheral military containment of China is, however, being justified not only in local terms but also, and to an ever greater extent, in world-wide terms. We are told that by containing China in South Vietnam we are containing it everywhere, and that by frustrating a "war of national liberation" in Southeast Asia, we frustrate all "wars of national liberation." This argument has the virtue of simplicity, but it is supported by no historical evidence. It brings to mind the statement William Graham Sumner made at the beginning of the century: "The amount of superstition is not much changed, but it now attaches to politics, not to religion."

The so-called domino theory is indeed an echo of the Marxist dogma of historic inevitability, which asserts that Communism will inevitably spread from country to country until in the end it will engulf the world. Nothing of the kind has actually happened. After World War II, the nations of Eastern Europe went Communist, but Finland to this day has not. After the collapse of French rule in Indochina in 1954, North Vietnam went Com-

ality of using conventional force in a nuclear context, provided adequate precautions are taken to insulate the use of such force from the nuclear context. The Korean War is a case in point.

However, this rational relationship that existed from the beginning of history to 1945 between force as a means and the ends of foreign policy does not apply to nuclear weapons. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so enormous that it overwhelms all possible objectives of a rational foreign policy. If they were used as instruments of national policy, nuclear weapons would destroy the tangible objective of the policy and the belligerents as well. In consequence, they are not susceptible to rational use as instruments of national policy. Yet their availability makes it impossible for foreign policy to be conducted in a rational manner as though they did not exist. Their very existence compels us to rethink the basic issues of foreign policy. But we continue in large measure to think and act as though 1945 did not mark one of the great watersheds of history where a new age began, as distinct from the age that preceded it as the modern age has been from the Middle Ages or the Middle Ages have been from Antiquity.

A rational foreign policy in the nuclear age would have to move on two different and separate levels: the conventional and the nuclear. It would have to insist upon the radically distinct character of the nuclear sphere and upon the vital importance of its strict separation from the conventional one. Instead, we have been trying to apply conventional modes of thought and action to the nuclear sphere. Instead of emphasizing the distinctness of nuclear weapons, we have been trying to assimilate them to conventional ones. Instead of maintaining and strengthening the separation of the two spheres, we have endeavored to integrate nuclear weapons into our conventional armory.

This contradiction between our modes of thought and action, belonging to an age that has passed, and the objective to conditions of our existence has engendered four paradoxes in our nuclear strategy: the commitment to the use of force, nuclear or otherwise, paralyzed by the fear of having to use it; the search for a nuclear strategy that would avoid the predictable consequences

stands in the way of the use of conventional force in so far as the latter might prepare resort to the former.

The immensity of the military force which the nuclear age has generated goes hand in hand with the devaluation of its practical use. The more endowed a nation is with military force, the less it is able to use it. Non-nuclear nations have shown themselves to be much less inhibited in the use of military force than nuclear powers; for the risk of escalation presented by the intervention of one of the nuclear powers with nuclear weapons is likely to be remote. The nuclear powers are inhibited in the use of force not only in relation to each other, but also in their relations to non-nuclear powers, because of the ever present risk that another nuclear power may use force on behalf of the other side.

Great Britain and France derive no substantive political or military advantage from their possession of nuclear weapons. These weapons add nothing to their ability to protect and promote their respective interests. The fact that the United States has a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying all human life on this planet in a matter of hours has been irrelevant to its military posture vis-à-vis Vietnam. If the United States had no nuclear weapons at all, its usable military power would not thereby have been diminished. Quite to the contrary, it can be plausibly argued that its usable power would thereby have been increased because the fear of nuclear escalation would then not have exerted its restraining influence upon the use of conventional military power. Thus while the discrepancy between the strong and the weak is today much more pronounced than it has ever been in history, it is exactly this disproportion which renders the powerful impotent in the fullness of their power.

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MILITARY CONVENTIONS

The second paradox arising from the operation of traditional policy in the nuclear age is presented by the idea of limited nuclear war. This idea has appeared in different manifestations

in different periods, such as the "clean" H-bomb, which produces no significant fallout, tactical nuclear war, graduated deterrence with "firebreaks" between the stages, counterforce strategy. All these manifestations have one quality in common: the desire to reconcile the use of nuclear weapons with the admitted irrationality of all-out nuclear war and the attempt, inspired by this desire, to discover a rational way to use them. Each of these attempts has been supported by a vast body of learned and sophisticated literature dedicated to the demonstration of its rationality and feasibility, and each has been discarded after a while to be replaced by a new one. What has remained constant is the urge to reconcile the irreconcilable and to find a way of waging nuclear war without incurring one's destruction. Thus we have been in search of a method of waging nuclear war in the conventional manner so that nuclear war may produce conventional, that is, rational and tolerable, consequences.

However, the enormous destructiveness natural to nuclear weapons, upon which the dynamics of warfare is brought to bear, makes the rationalization of nuclear war, however attempted, a hopeless undertaking. Hardly anything needs to be said of the "clean" bomb, now deservedly half-forgotten, which merely introduces a modification into the over-all destructiveness of nuclear weapons, without affecting the destructiveness itself.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 435 ff., published under the joint auspices of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, has written the epitaph to this piece of science fiction:

The terms "clean" and "dirty" are often used to describe the amount of radioactivity produced by a fusion weapon (or hydrogen bomb) relative to that from what might be described as a "normal" weapon. The latter may be defined as one in which no special effort has been made either to increase or to decrease the amount of radioactivity produced for the given explosion yield. A "clean" weapon would then be one which is designed to yield significantly less radioactivity than an equivalent normal weapon. It should be noted, however, that a clean fusion weapon would inevitably produce some radioactive species. Even if a pure fusion weapon, with no fission, should be developed, its explosion in air would still result in the formation of carbon-14 and possibly other neutron-induced activities. If special steps were taken in the design of a

or at least after a relatively few firings is inherent in the nature of nuclear weaponry.

By virtue of this peculiarity of nuclear weapons, *A* gains a military advantage if it can compel *B* to expend unilaterally a fraction of its invulnerable deterrent. Let us suppose, to take an oversimplified but illustrative example, that *A* and *B* each possess ten Polaris submarines and that after *A*'s first strike with land-based missiles *B* commits six of its submarines to counterforce retaliation. If *A* were to start the second nuclear exchange by committing four of its Polaris submarines to a selective countercity strategy and if *B* were to retaliate in kind with its remaining Polaris submarines, the quantitative relationship between *A* and *B* in terms of Polaris submarines at the end of the second round would be six to zero. In other words, the unilateral commitment of *B*'s invulnerable deterrent would have resulted in a clear nuclear superiority for *A*. It would be irrelevant to this argument that *B* might have a nuclear stockpile quantitatively and qualitatively the equal or even superior of that of *A*. What is decisive is the destructive power of nuclear weapons deliverable at a particular moment. It is here that *A*'s advantage lies, regardless of what *B* might be able to deliver a week or a month hence.

Since *A* and *B* must be aware of the advantage of a first strike before the war starts, both have an incentive to be the first to strike. Countercity strategy would allow *A* and *B* to wait for the other side to make the first move, secure in their possession of an invulnerable nuclear deterrent and their knowledge of the unacceptable damage it could inflict upon the other side. This countercity strategy, through the mechanics of mutual deterrence, minimizes the possibility of nuclear war. Countercity strategy, as it were, expresses the inner logic of nuclear war. On the other hand, counterforce strategy, by presuming to superimpose upon the dynamics of nuclear war a pattern appropriate to conventional war, increases the likelihood of nuclear war. For it puts a premium upon preventive war and thus stimulates not the desire to prevent a nuclear war but rather competition for starting one.

However, even if *A* did not have the advantage after its first

of what the opponent might do, and the United States has been particularly emphatic in claiming that it could do so many times over. But since the destruction of the enemy's society, primarily by destroying its industrial and population centers, is the maximum damage to be inflicted by force of arms, quantitative and qualitative improvements in those arms can at best alter the modalities of the damage, but cannot enlarge the ability to inflict that damage itself.  $X$ , regardless of how much superior it is to  $y$ , here equals  $y$ . Once a nation possesses a delivery system capable of surviving a first strike and carrying nuclear warheads to all possible targets, it has reached the rational limits of nuclear armaments. There is no rational justification for continuing the nuclear armaments race after both sides have reached that limit.

But the nuclear armaments race continues, both quantitatively and qualitatively—and here is the first element of the paradox—as though the same rules of competition applied to conventional and nuclear weapons alike. The habits of thought and action which experience has taught us from the beginning of history to the end of the Second World War are being carried over into an age for which they are no longer relevant.<sup>3</sup> Their continuing application is being justified on two main grounds: counterforce strategy and the prospect of technological innovations.

Indeed, the continuation of the nuclear armaments race follows logically from the commitment to a counterforce strategy. The conventional conception of nuclear war presented by counterforce strategy demands a correspondingly conventional approach to competitive armaments. Under the assumptions of that

<sup>3</sup> It is of interest to note that these habits of thought and action had already become obsolescent before the First World War:

From 1872 to 1913, this rigorous competition in the building up of armies went on, every government spending as much money as it could persuade its people to pay or the national economy would support . . . without, however, any corresponding increase in security being felt. In fact, the proportionate strength of the various armies was not greatly different in 1914 from what it had been in 1872, but the feeling of insecurity was much greater than it had been forty years earlier.

(Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "The Origins of the First World War," in W. N. Medlicott [ed.], *From Metternich to Hitler* [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963], pp. 186-87.)

matic blunder or a military miscalculation. In either event, it would as a rule risk, at worst, defeat in war with the consequent loss of an army or of territory.

The availability of nuclear weapons has radically transformed these traditional relations among allies and the risks attending them. Nuclear nation *A* which enters into an alliance with nation *B*, nuclear or non-nuclear, runs a double risk different in kind from the risks facing a member of a traditional alliance. In honoring the alliance, it might have to fight a nuclear war against nuclear power *C*, thereby forfeiting its own existence. Or ally *B* may provoke a war with nuclear power *C* on behalf of interests other than those contemplated by the alliance and thereby force *A*'s hand, involving it in a nuclear war on behalf of interests other than its own. That latter risk is magnified if *B* is also a nuclear power, of however small dimensions. If *B* were to threaten or attack *C* with nuclear weapons, *C* might, rightly or wrongly, consider *B*'s military power as a mere extension of *A*'s and anticipate and partly prevent the commitment of *A* through a first strike against *A*. Or *A*, anticipating *C*'s reaction against itself or seeking to save *B* through nuclear deterrence, will commit its own nuclear arsenal against *C*. In either case, *B*, however weak as a nuclear power, has the ability to act as a trigger for a general nuclear war.

*B*, on the other hand, faces a double risk, too. It may forfeit its existence in a nuclear war fought by *A* on behalf of its interests. Or it may find itself abandoned by *A*, which refuses to run the risk of its own destruction on behalf of the interests of *B*.

This radical difference from the risks taken by allies in the pre-nuclear and nuclear age has led to a radical difference in the reliability of alliances. In the pre-nuclear age, ally *A* could have been expected with a very high degree of certainty to come to the aid of ally *B* at the risk of defeat in war. In the nuclear age, ally *A* cannot be expected with the same degree of certainty to come to the aid of ally *B* at the risk of its own destruction. Here we contemplate the reverse side of the mechanics of deterrence. The very same doubt that deters *C* disheartens *B*. *C* cannot be certain that *A* will not actually forfeit its existence by resorting to nu-

a nuclear power of the first rank and those the latter could address to France. France could inflict serious damage on a first-rate nuclear power without being capable, at least in the foreseeable future, of destroying it utterly; but a nuclear power of the first rank, using only a small fraction of its nuclear arsenal, could wipe France off the face of the globe. France could threaten a major nuclear power, and vice versa, but if action were to follow these threats, France could not escape death while its enemy would have the option of minimizing damage to itself through a first strike. Thus an independent national nuclear deterrent gives a major nuclear power another incentive, in addition to those mentioned above, for a first strike, while it still further diminishes the credibility of the nuclear threat emanating from a second-rank nuclear power.

However, de Gaulle's design to use nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy increases the risk not only of local nuclear war but of general war as well. For erected into a general principle of statecraft to be followed by any number of nations, it would issue in the indiscriminate proliferation of nuclear weapons and thereby destroy the very mechanics of mutual deterrence. These mechanics repose upon the bipolarity of nuclear power. Detection systems, such as radar and sonar, are capable of identifying nuclear delivery systems in action, but they cannot identify their national identity, except in a limited way through the calculation of the projectory of land-based missiles. In consequence, retaliation requires the a priori determination of national identity, which bipolarity provides. Thus an anonymous explosion, caused by a seaborne delivery vehicle and destroying parts of the East coast of the United States, would automatically be attributed to the Soviet Union, calling forth nuclear retaliation. If a multiplicity of nations possessed such devices and the United States had tense relations with only two of them, such an anonymous explosion could with certainty be attributed to no one nation, however much suspicion might point to a particular one. And a new nuclear diplomacy would try its best to deflect suspicion and retaliation from the guilty to an innocent nation.

Of the three courses of action open to a nuclear power—retali-