The New Science of Politics

An Introduction

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the success of this search. Facts are relevant in so far as their knowledge contributes to the study of essence, while methods are adequate in so far as they can be effectively used as a means for this end. Different objects require different methods. A political scientist who tries to understand the meaning of Plato’s Republic will not have much use for mathematics; a biologist who studies a cell structure will not have much use for methods of classical philology and principles of hermeneutics. This may sound trivial, but disregard for elementary verities happens to be one of the characteristics of the positivistic attitude; and hence it becomes necessary to elaborate the obvious. It is perhaps a consolation to remember that such disregard is a perennial problem in the history of science, for even Aristotle had to remind certain pests of his time that an ‘‘educated man’’ will not expect exactness of the mathematical type in a treatise on politics.

If the adequacy of a method is not measured by its usefulness to the purpose of science, if on the contrary the use of a method is made the criterion of science, then the meaning of science as a truthful account of the structure of reality, as the theoretical orientation of man in his world, and as the great instrument for man’s understanding of his own position in the universe is lost. Science starts from the prescientific existence of man, from his participation in the world with his body, soul, intellect, and spirit, from his primary grip on all the realms of being that is assured to him because his own nature is their epitome. And from this primary cognitive participation, turgid with passion, rises the arduous way, the methodos, toward the dispassionate gaze on the order of being in the theoretical attitude. The question whether in the concrete case the way was the right one, however, can be decided only by looking back from the end to the beginning. If the method has brought to essential clarity the dimly seen, then it was adequate; if it has failed to do so, or even if it has brought to es-
nomens into view. The analysis would inevitably come to a wrong start if positivism were defined as the doctrine of this or that outstanding positivistic thinker—if it were defined, for instance, in terms of the system of Comte. The special form of the perversion would obscure the principle; and related phenomena could not be recognized as such, because on the level of doctrine the adherents of different model methods are apt to oppose each other. Hence, it would be advisable to start from the impression which the Newtonian system made on Western intellectuals like Voltaire; to treat this impact as an emotional center from which the principle of perversion, as well as the special form of the model of physics, can radiate independently or in combination; and to trace the effects whatever form they may assume. This procedure recommends itself especially because a transfer of methods of mathematical physics in any strict sense of the word to the social sciences has hardly ever been attempted, for the good reason that the attempt would be too patently doomed to failure. The idea of finding a "law" of social phenomena that functionally would correspond to the law of gravitation in Newtonian physics never went beyond the stage of wild talk in the Napoleonic era. By the time of Comte the idea had already simmered down to the "law" of the three phases, that is, to a piece of fallacious speculation on the meaning of history which interpreted itself as the discovery of an empirical law. Characteristic for the early diversification of the problem is the fate of the term physique sociale. Comte wanted to use it for his positivistic speculation but was thwarted in his intention because Quetelet appropriated the term for his own statistical investigations; the area of social phenomena which are indeed amenable to quantification began to separate from the area where toying with an imitation of physics is a pastime for dilettantes in both sciences. Hence, if positivism should be construed in a strict sense as meaning the development of social science
pushing the "values" out of science into the position of unquestioned axioms or hypotheses. Under the assumption, for instance, that the "state" was a value, political history and political science would be legitimated as "objective" in so far as they explored motivations, actions, and conditions that had a bearing on creation, preservation, and extinction of states. Obviously, the principle would lead to dubious results if the legitimating value was put at the discretion of the scientist. If science was defined as exploration of facts in relation to a value, there would be as many political histories and political sciences as there were scholars with different ideas about what was valuable. The facts that are treated as relevant because they have a bearing on the values of a progressivist will not be the same facts that are considered relevant by a conservative; and the relevant facts of a liberal economist will not be the relevant facts of a Marxist. Neither the most scrupulous care in keeping the concrete work "value-free" nor the most conscientious observation of critical method in establishing facts and causal relations could prevent the sinking of historical and political sciences into a morass of relativism. As a matter of fact, the idea was advanced, and could find wide consent, that every generation would have to write history anew because the "values" which determined the selection of problems and materials had changed. If the resulting mess was not worse than it actually was, the reason must again be sought in the pressure of a civilizational tradition which held the diversification of uncritical opinion within its general frame.

3

The movement of methodology, as far as political science is concerned, ran to the end of its immanent logic in the person and work of Max Weber. A full characterization cannot be
tivity" of Weber's science, such as there was, could be derived only from the authentic principles of order as they had been discovered and elaborated in the history of mankind. Since in the intellectual situation of Weber the existence of a science of order could not be admitted, its content (or as much of it as was possible) had to be introduced by recognizing its historical expressions as facts and causal factors in history. While Weber as a methodologist of value-free science would profess to have no argument against a political intellectual who had "demonically" settled on Marxism as the "value" of his preference, he could blandly engage in a study of Protestant ethics and show that certain religious convictions rather than the class struggle played an important role in the formation of capitalism. In the preceding pages it has been repeatedly stressed that the arbitrariness of method did not degenerate into complete irrelevance of scientific production, because the pressure of theoretical traditions remained a determining factor in the selection of materials and problems. This pressure, one might say, was erected by Weber into a principle. The three volumes, for instance, of his sociology of religion threw a massive bulk of more or less clearly seen verities about human and social order into the debate about the structure of reality. By pointing to the undisputable fact that verities about order were factors in the order of reality—and not perhaps only lust for power and wealth or fear and fraud—a tentative objectivity of science could be regained, even though the principles had to be introduced by the back door of "beliefs" in competition, and in rationally insoluble conflict, with Weber's contemporary "values."

Again, Weber ignored the theoretical difficulties into which this procedure involved him. If the "objective" study of historical processes showed that, for instance, the materialistic interpretation of history was wrong, then obviously there existed a standard of objectivity in science which precluded the
pressive performance it has perhaps not been sufficiently observed that the series of these studies receives its general tone through a significant omission, that is, of pre-Reformation Christianity. The reason of the omission seems to be obvious. One can hardly engage in a serious study of medieval Christianity without discovering among its "values" the belief in a rational science of human and social order and especially of natural law. Moreover, this science was not simply a belief, but it was actually elaborated as a work of reason. Here Weber would have run into the fact of a science of order, just as he would if he had seriously occupied himself with Greek philosophy. Weber's readiness to introduce verities about order as historical facts stopped short of Greek and medieval metaphysics. In order to degrade the politics of Plato, Aristotle, or St. Thomas to the rank of "values" among others, a conscientious scholar would first have to show that their claim to be science was unfounded. And that attempt is self-defeating. By the time the would-be critic has penetrated the meaning of metaphysics with sufficient thoroughness to make his criticism weighty, he will have become a metaphysician himself. The attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with a good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge. The horizon of Weber's social science was immense; all the more does his caution in coming too close to its decisive center reveal his positivistic limitations.

Hence, the result of Weber's work was ambiguous. He had reduced the principle of a value-free science *ad absurdum*. The idea of a value-free science whose object would be constituted by "reference to a value" could be realized only under the condition that a scientist was willing to decide on a "value" for reference. If the scientist refused to decide on a "value," if he treated all "values" as equal (as Max Weber did), if, moreover, he treated them as social facts among others—then there were no "values" left which could constitute the object of
tion which later developed into the extensive study of totalitarian movements as a new "myth" or religion. The inquiry would, furthermore, lead to the general problem of a connection between types of rationality and types of religious experience. Some religious experiences would have to be classified as higher, others as lower, by the objective criterion of the degree of rationality which they admit in the interpretation of reality. The religious experiences of the Greek mystic philosophers and of Christianity would rank high because they allow the unfolding of metaphysics; the religious experiences of Comte and Marx would rank low because they prohibit the asking of metaphysical questions. Such considerations would radically upset the positivistic conception of an evolution from an early religious or theological phase of mankind to rationalism and science. Not only would the evolution go from a higher to a lower degree of rationalism, at least for the modern period, but, in addition, this decline of reason would have to be understood as the consequence of religious retrogression. An interpretation of Western history that had grown over centuries would have to be revolutionized; and a revolution of this magnitude would meet the opposition of "progressives" who all of a sudden would find themselves in the position of retrogressive irrationalists.

The possibilities of a reinterpretation of rationalism, as well as of the positivistic conception of history, were put in the subjunctive in order to indicate the hypothetical character of a restoration of political science at the turn of the century. Ideas of the suggested type were afloat; but from the certainty that something was badly wrong in the state of science to a precise understanding of the nature of the evil there was a long way; and equally long was the way from intelligent surmises about the direction in which one had to move to the attainment of the goal. A good number of conditions had to be fulfilled before the propositions in this case could be translated
in antiquity. Take, for instance, the so-called contract theory. In this case the fact is ignored that Plato has given a very thorough analysis of the contract symbol. He not only estab-
lished its nontheoretical character but also explored the type of experience that lies at its root. Moreover, he introduced the technical term doxa for the class of symbols of which the “contract theory” is an instance in order to distinguish them from the symbols of theory.² Today theorists do not use the term doxa for this purpose, nor have they developed an equiva-
ient—the distinction is lost. Instead the term “ideology” has come into vogue which in some respects is related to the Pla-
tonic doxa. But precisely this term has become a further source of confusion because under the pressure of what Mannheim has called the allgemeine Ideologieverdacht, the general suspicion of ideology, its meaning has been extended so far as to cover all types of symbols used in propositions on politics, including the symbols of theory themselves; there are numerous po-
litical scientists today who would even call the Platonic-Aristotelian episteme an ideology.

A further symptom of such confusion is certain discussion habits. More than once in a discussion of a political topic it has happened that a student—and for that matter not always a student—would ask me how I defined fascism, or socialism, or some other ism of that order. And more than once I had to surprise the questioner—who apparently as part of a college education had picked up the idea that science was a warehouse of dictionary definitions—by my assurance that I did not feel obliged to indulge in such definitions, because movements of the suggested type, together with their symbolisms, were part of reality, that only concepts could be defined but not reality, and that it was highly doubtful whether the language sym-

The ground is now prepared for approaching the topic of

² Plato Republic 358e–367c.
representation proper. The foregoing reflections will have made it clear that the task will not be quite simple if the inquiry is conducted in accordance with critical standards of a search for truth. Theoretical concepts and the symbols that are part of reality must be carefully distinguished; in the transition from reality to theory the criteria employed in the process of clarification must be well defined; and the cognitive value of the resulting concepts must be tested by placing them in larger theoretical contexts. The method thus outlined is substantially the Aristotelian procedure.

2

It will be appropriate to begin with the elemental aspects of the topic. In order to determine what is theoretically elemental, it will be well to recall the beginning of this lecture. A political society was characterized as a cosmion illuminated from within; this characterization, however, was qualified by stressing externality as one of its important components. The cosmion has its inner realm of meaning; but this realm exists tangibly in the external world in human beings who have bodies and through their bodies participate in the organic and inorganic externality of the world. A political society can dissolve not only through the disintegration of the beliefs that make it an acting unit in history; it can also be destroyed through the dispersion of its members in such a manner that communication between them becomes physically impossible or, most radically, through their physical extermination; it also can suffer serious damage, partial destruction of tradition, and prolonged paralysis through extermination or suppression of the active members who constitute the political and intellectual ruling minorities of a society. External existence of society in this sense is intended when, for reasons that will appear presently, we speak of the theoretically elemental aspect of our topic.

In political debate, in the press, and in the publicist litera-
that framework itself remains in the shadow. There exist, indeed, several countries whose institutions can be subsumed under the adumbrated type; and, if the exploration of institutions is relevant at all, this answer certainly suggests a formidable body of scientific knowledge. Moreover, this body of knowledge exists as a massive fact of science in the form of numerous monographic studies on the institutions of single countries, describing the ramifications and auxiliary institutions which are necessary for the operation of a modern representative government, as well as in the form of comparative studies which elaborate the type and its variants. There can, furthermore, be no doubt about the theoretical relevance of such studies, at least on principle, because the external existence of a political society is part of its ontological structure. Whatever their relevance may prove to be when they are placed in a larger theoretical context, the types of external realization of a society will have at least some relevance.

In the theorization of representative institutions on this level, the concepts which enter into the construction of the descriptive type refer to simple data of the external world. They refer to geographical districts, to human beings who are resident in them, to men and women, to their age, to their voting which consists in placing check marks on pieces of paper by the side of names printed on them, to operations of counting and calculation that will result in the designation of other human beings as representatives, to the behavior of representatives that will result in formal acts recognizable as such through external data, etc. Because the concepts on this level are unproblematic in terms of the internal self-interpretation of a society, this aspect of our topic may be considered elemental; and the descriptive type of representation that can be developed on this level, therefore, shall be called the elemental type.

The relevance of the elemental approach to the topic is es-
established on principle. The actual extent of its cognitive value, however, can be measured only by placing the type into the previously suggested larger theoretical context. The elemental type, as we said, casts light only on an area of institutions within an existential framework, to be taken for granted without questions. Hence, a few questions must now be raised with regard to the area that hitherto remained in shadow.

3

In raising these questions, again the Aristotelian procedure of examining symbols as they occur in reality will be followed. A suitable subject for such questioning is the representative character of the Soviet institutions. The Soviet Union has a constitution, even beautifully written, providing for institutions which, on the whole, can be subsumed under the elemental type. Nevertheless, opinion concerning its representative character is sharply divided between Western democrats and Communists. Westerners will say that the mechanism of representation alone will not do, that the voter must have a genuine choice, and that the party monopoly provided by the Soviet constitution makes a choice impossible. Communists will say that the true representative must have the interest of the people at heart, that the exclusion of parties representing special interests is necessary in order to make the institutions truly representative, and that only countries where the monopoly of representation is secured for the Communist party are genuine people's democracies. The argument, thus, hinges on the mediatory function of the party in the process of representation.

The issue is too unclear for rendering immediate judgment. The situation rather invites a little deeper stirring, and, indeed, one can easily add to the confusion by recalling that at the time of the foundation of the American Republic eminent statesmen were of the opinion that true representation was
minology of the ages—to find habitual obedience for their acts of command; and these acts must serve the existential necessities of a society, such as the defense of the realm and administration of justice—if a medieval classification of purposes will be allowed. Such societies with their internal organization for action, however, do not exist as cosmic fixtures from eternity but grow in history; this process in which human beings form themselves into a society for action shall be called the articulation of a society. As the result of political articulation we find human beings, the rulers, who can act for the society, men whose acts are not imputed to their own persons but to the society as a whole—with the consequence that, for instance, the pronouncement of a general rule regulating an area of human life will not be understood as an exercise in moral philosophy but will be experienced by the members of the society as the declaration of a rule with obligatory force for themselves. When his acts are effectively imputed in this manner, a person is the representative of a society.

If the meaning of representation in this context shall be based on effective imputation, it will be necessary, however, to distinguish representation from other types of imputation; it will be necessary to clarify the difference between an agent and a representative. By an agent, therefore, shall be understood a person who is empowered by his principal to transact a specific business under instructions, while by a representative shall be understood a person who has power to act for a society by virtue of his position in the structure of the community, without specific instructions for a specified business, and whose acts will not be effectively repudiated by the members of the society. A delegate to the United Nations, for instance, is an agent of his government acting under instructions, while the government that has delegated him is the representative of the respective political society.
sentable unit. This peculiar type of articulation does not occur everywhere; in fact, it occurs only in Western societies. It is by far not an appurtenance of the nature of man but cannot be separated from certain historical conditions which again are given only in the Occident. In the Orient, where the specific conditions are historically not present, this type of articulation does not occur at all—and the Orient is the larger part of mankind.

Articulation, thus, is the condition of representation. In order to come into existence, a society must articulate itself by producing a representative that will act for it. The clarification of these concepts can now be continued. Behind the symbol "articulation" there hides nothing less than the historical process in which political societies, the nations, the empires, rise and fall, as well as the evolutions and revolutions between the two terminal points. This process is historically not so individualized for each instance of a political society that it would be impossible to bring the manifold of varieties under a few general types. But this is a vast topic (Toynbee has already filled six volumes with its exposition), and it must be set aside. The present concern will rather be whether the implications of the concept of articulation can be differentiated still further. This can, indeed, be done, and there exist several interesting attempts at further theorization. In the nature of the case such attempts will be made when the articulation of a society has arrived at a critical juncture; the problem will attract attention when a society is about to come into existence, when it is about to disintegrate, or when it is in an epochal phase of its career. Such an epochal phase in the growth of Western societies occurred about the middle of the fifteenth century with the consolidation of the Western national realms after the Hundred Years' War. At this critical epoch one of the
finest English political thinkers, Sir John Fortescue, tried to theorize the problem of articulation. It will be worth while to examine what he had to say.

The political reality that interested Fortescue primarily was the kingdoms of England and France. His beloved England was a *dominium politicum et regale*, what today would be called a constitutional government; the bad France of Louis XI was a *dominium tantum regale*, something like a tyranny—good only for exile when the constitutional paradise became too inhospitable. It was the merit, now, of Fortescue not to have stopped at a static description of the two types of government. To be sure, he used the static analogy of the organism when he insisted that a realm must have a ruler like a body a head, but then, in a brilliant page of his *De laudibus legum Anglie*, he made the analogy dynamic by comparing the creation of a realm with the growth of the articulate body out of the embryo. A politically inarticulate social state breaks out into the articulation of the realm, *ex populo erumpit regnum*. Fortescue coined the term “eruption” as a technical term for designating the initial articulation of a society, and he coined the further term “prorruption” for designating advances of articulation, such as the transition from a merely royal to a political realm. This theory of the eruption of a people is not a theory of a state of nature from which a people through contract will emerge into order under law. Fortescue was keenly aware of the difference. In order to make his point clear, he criticized St. Augustine’s definition of the people as a multitude associated through consent to a right order and a communion of interests. Such a people, Fortescue insisted, would be *acephalus*, headless, the trunk of a body without a head; a realm will be


achieved only when a head is erected, *rex erectus est*, that will rule the body.

To have created the concepts of eruption and proruptum is no mean theoretical achievement in itself, because it allows us to distinguish the component in representation that is almost forgotten wherever the legal symbolism of the following centuries came to predominate in the interpretation of political reality. But Fortescue went even further. He understood that the organic analogy could be a scaffold for building his concept of eruption but that otherwise it was of little cognitive use. There was something about an articulated realm, an inner substance that provided the binding force of society, and this something could not be grasped by organic analogy. In order to come closer to this mysterious substance, he transferred the Christian symbol of the *corpus mysticum* to the realm. This was a momentous step in his analysis, of interest in more than one respect. In the first place, the fact that it could be taken at all was symptomatic of the decline of the Christian society, articulated into church and empire; and it was symptomatic, correspondingly, of the increasing consolidation of the national realms, of their closure as self-centered societies. The step indicated, second, that the realms had acquired a peculiar ultimacy of meaning. In the transfer of the *corpus mysticum* to the realm we can sense the evolution toward a type of political society that will succeed not only to the empire but also to the church. To be sure, these implications were not envisaged by Fortescue even vaguely; but the transfer, nevertheless, pointed toward a representative who will represent the society with regard to the whole range of human existence, including its spiritual dimension. Fortescue himself, on the contrary, was rather aware that the realm could even be called a *corpus mysticum* only analogically. The *tertium comparationis* would be the sacramental bond of the community, but the sacramental bond would be neither the Logos of Christ that lives in the members
of the Christian *corpus mysticum* nor a perverted Logos as it lives in modern totalitarian communities. Nevertheless, while he was not clear about the implications of his search for an immanent Logos of society, he found a name for it; he called it the *intencio populi*. This *intencio populi* is the center of the mystical body of the realm; again in an organic analogy he described it as the heart from which is transmitted into the head and members of the body as its nourishing blood stream the political provision for the well-being of the people. Please note the function of the organic analogy in this context; it does not serve the identification of some member of a society with a corresponding organ of the body, but, on the contrary, it strives to show that the animating center of a social body is not to be found in any of its human members. The *intencio populi* is located neither in the royal representative nor in the people as a multitude of subjects but is the intangible living center of the realm as a whole. The word “people” in this formula does not signify an external multitude of human beings but the mystical substance erupting in articulation; and the word “intention” signifies the urge or drive of this substance to erupt and to maintain itself in articulate existence as an entity which, by means of its articulation, can provide for its well-being.

When Fortescue applied his conception concretely, in *The Governance of England*, he clarified his idea of the royal representative a bit further by contrasting it with the feudal, hierarchical conception of the royal estate. In the feudal conception the king was “the highest temporal estate on the earth,” lower in rank than the ecclesiastical estate, but higher than the feudatories within the realm. Fortescue accepted the order of estates in the *Christianitas*; he was far from conceiving the idea of a sovereign closed state; but he intruded the new *corpus mysticum* into the mystical body of Christ by attributing

concrete, initial articulation. In this situation there was present what may be called a social raw material, consisting of groupings on the tribal level, homogeneous enough to articulate themselves into a larger society. There can be discerned, furthermore, a pressure of circumstances, providing the stimulus for articulation; and, finally, there were members of the group sufficiently distinguished by blood charisma and personal charisma to have become successful representatives.

But let us now follow the historian of the Lombards a bit further. Subsequent to the election of a king the victorious wars began. First the Herules were defeated and their power broken to the degree that "they no longer had a king." Then followed the war with the Gepids, the decisive event being the death of the son of the Gepid king "who had been mainly instrumental in bringing the war about." After the death of the young prince the Gepids fled, and, again, they "finally sank so deep that they no longer had a king." Similar passages could be accumulated from other historians of the migration period. Let us give just one good example: Isidorus tells how the Alans and Suebes lost the independence of their kingdom through the Goths but, oddly enough, preserved their kingship in Spain for a long time, "though they had no need for it in their undisturbed quiet." Throughout the historiography of the migration, from the fifth to the eighth centuries, the historical existence of a political society was consistently expressed in terms of acquisition, possession, or loss of the rex, of the royal representative. To be articulate for action meant to have a king; to lose the king meant to lose fitness for action; when the group did not act, it did not need a king.  

13. Ibid., p. 20.
15. For a survey of the problem see Alfred Dove, Der Wiederintritt des nationalen Prinzips in die Weltgeschichte (1890) (in Ausgewählte Schriften [1898]).
is a phenomenon of law by virtue of its basis in the institution; in so far as a power has representative authority, it can make positive law. (3) The origin of law cannot be found in legal regulations but must be sought in the decision which replaces a litigious situation by ordered power.

The theory just summarized as well as the set of propositions were pointed against certain well-known weaknesses of the Third Republic; the lesson of Hauriou's analysis may be concentrated in the thesis: In order to be representative, it is not enough for a government to be representative in the constitutional sense (our elemental type of representative institutions); it must also be representative in the existential sense of realizing the idea of the institution. And the implied warning may be explicated in the thesis: If a government is nothing but representative in the constitutional sense, a representative ruler in the existential sense will sooner or later make an end of it; and quite possibly the new existential ruler will not be too representative in the constitutional sense.

9

The analysis of representation on this level has come to its end. The summary of results can be brief.

We dealt successively with representation in the elemental and the existential sense. The transition from the one type to the other was necessary because the mere description of external realization of a political society did not touch the fundamental question of its existence. The inquiry into the conditions of existence, then, led to the problems of articulation as well as to an understanding of the close correspondence between types of articulation and representation. The result of this analysis can be expressed by the definition that a political society comes into existence when it articulates itself and produces a representative. If this definition be accepted, it follows that the elemental type of representative institutions covers
case, the problem of representation would not be exhausted by representation in the existential sense. It would then become necessary to distinguish between the representation of society by its articulated representatives and a second relation in which society itself becomes the representative of something beyond itself, of a transcendental reality. Is such a relation to be found concretely in historical societies?

As a matter of fact, this relation is to be found as far back as the recorded history of major political societies beyond the tribal level goes. All the early empires, Near Eastern as well as Far Eastern, understood themselves as representatives of a transcendental order, of the order of the cosmos; and some of them even understood this order as a "truth." Whether one turns to the earliest Chinese sources in the Shih King or to the inscriptions of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, or Persia, one uniformly finds the order of the empire interpreted as a representation of cosmic order in the medium of human society. The empire is a cosmic analogue, a little world reflecting the order of the great, comprehensive world. Rulership becomes the task of securing the order of society in harmony with cosmic order; the territory of the empire is an analogical representation of the world with its four quarters; the great ceremonies of the empire represent the rhythm of the cosmos; festivals and sacrifices are a cosmic liturgy, a symbolic participation of the cosmion in the cosmos; and the ruler himself represents the society, because on earth he represents the transcendent power which maintains cosmic order. The term "cosmion," thus, gains a new component of meaning as the representative of the cosmos.

Inevitably such an enterprise of representative order is exposed to resistance from enemies within and without; and the ruler is no more than a human being and may fail through circumstance or mismanagement, with the result of internal revolutions and external defeats. The experience of resistance,
purpose of characterizing the two social states in the development of mankind which are created by this epoch. No more than such brief hints are possible for the general orientation of the problem; we must turn to the more special form which this outbreak has assumed in the West. Only in the West, owing to specific historical circumstances that were not present in other civilizations, has the outbreak culminated in the establishment of philosophy in the Greek sense and in particular of a theory of politics.

4

You are familiar with Plato’s often-quoted phrase that a polis is man written large. This formula, one may say, is the creed of the new epoch. To be sure, it is Plato’s first word in the matter and by far not his last. But, however much this principle must be limited by the introduction of other ones, and even though concessions must be made to cosmological interpretation and to the truth which, after all, it contains, this is the dynamic core of the new theory. The wedge of this principle must be permanently driven into the idea that society represents nothing but cosmic truth, today quite as much as in the time of Plato. A political society in existence will have to be an ordered cosmos, but not at the price of man; it should be not only a microcosmos but also a macroanthropos. This principle of Plato will briefly be referred to as the anthropological principle.

Two aspects of the principle must be distinguished. Under the first aspect it is a general principle for the interpretation of society; under a second aspect it is an instrument of social critique.

As a general principle it means that in its order every society

9. Plato Republic 368c–d.
reflects the type of men of whom it is composed. One would have to say, for instance, that cosmological empires consist of a type of men who experience the truth of their existence as a harmony with the cosmos. That in itself is, of course, a heuristic principle of the first importance; whenever the theorist wants to understand a political society, it will be one of his first tasks, if not the very first, to ascertain the human type which expresses itself in the order of this concrete society. Plato used his principle under this first aspect when he described the Athenian society in which he lived as the sophist written large, explaining the peculiarities of Athenian order by referring them to the socially predominant sophistic type; he, furthermore, used it in this sense when he developed his Polis of the Idea as the paradigmatic construction of a social order in which should find expression his philosophical type of man; and he, finally, used it under this first aspect when in Republic viii–ix he interpreted the successive changes of political order as the expression of corresponding changes in the socially predominant human types.

Inseparably connected with this first aspect is the use of the principle as an instrument of social critique. That differences of social order come into view as differences of human types at all is due to the discovery of a true order of the human psyche and to the desire of expressing the true order in the social environment of the discoverer. Now, truth is never discovered in empty space; the discovery is a differentiating act in a tightly packed environment of opinion; and, if the discovery concerns the truth of human existence, it will shock the environment in its strongest convictions on a broad front. As soon as the discoverer begins to communicate, to invite acceptance, to persuade, he will inevitably run into a resistance that may prove fatal, as in the case of Socrates. Just as in the cosmological em-

This is the crucial point on which the meaning of theory depends. Theory is not just any opinion about human existence in society; it rather is an attempt at formulating the meaning of existence by explicating the content of a definite class of experiences. Its argument is not arbitrary but derives its validity from the aggregate of experiences to which it must permanently refer for empirical control. Aristotle was the first thinker to recognize this condition of theorizing about man. He coined a term for the man whose character is formed by the aggregate of experiences in question, and he called him the *spoudaios*, the mature man. 17 The *spoudaios* is the man who has maximally actualized the potentialities of human nature, who has formed his character into habitual actualization of the дианоetic and ethical virtues, the man who at the fullest of his development is capable of the *bios theoretikos*. Hence, the science of ethics in the Aristotelian sense is a type study of the *spoudaios.* 18 Moreover, Aristotle was acutely aware of the practical corollaries of such a theory of man. In the first place, theory cannot be developed under all conditions by everybody. The theorist need perhaps not be a paragon of virtue himself, but he must, at least, be capable of imaginative re-enactment of the experiences of which theory is an explication; and this faculty can be developed only under certain conditions such as inclination, an economic basis that will allow the investment of years of work into such studies, and a social environment which does not suppress a man when he engages in them. And, second, theory as an explication of certain experiences is intelligible only to those in whom the explication will stir up parallel experiences as the empirical basis for testing the truth of theory. Unless a theoretical exposition activates the cor-

17. Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1113a, 29–35.
responding experiences at least to a degree, it will create the impression of empty talk or will perhaps be rejected as an irrelevant expression of subjective opinions. A theoretical debate can be conducted only among spoudaioi in the Aristotelian sense; theory has no argument against a man who feels, or pretends to feel, unable of re-enacting the experience. Historically, as a consequence, the discovery of theoretical truth may not at all find acceptance in the surrounding society. Aristotle had no illusions on this point. To be sure, like Plato, he attempted a paradigmatic construction of a social order that would express the truth of the spoudaios, in Politics vii–viii; but he also asserted with firm regret that in none of the Hellenic poleis of his time could there be found a hundred men who were able to form the ruling nucleus of such a society; any attempt at realizing it would be utterly futile. A practical impasse seems to be the result. 19

A study of the experiences is impossible in the present context. In view of the vastness of the subject, even a lengthy sketch would be pitiable inadequate. No more than a brief catalogue can be given that will appeal to your historical knowledge. To the previously mentioned love of the sophon may now be added the variants of the Platonic Eros toward the kalon and the agathon, as well as the Platonic Dike, the virtue of right superordination and subordination of the forces in the soul, in opposition to the sophistic polypragmosyne; and, above all, there must be included the experience of Thanatos, of death, as the cathartic experience of the soul which purifies conduct by placing it into the longest of all long-range perspectives, into the perspective of death. Under the aspect of death the life of the philosophical man becomes for Plato the practice of dying; the philosophers' souls are dead souls—in the sense of the Gorgias—and, when the philosopher speaks as the representative of truth, he does it with the authority of

19. Aristotle Politics 1286b, 8–21 and 1302a, 2.
death over the shortsightedness of life. To the three fundamental forces of Thanatos, Eros, and Dike should be added, still within the Platonic range, the experiences in which the inner dimension of the soul is given in height and depth. The dimension in height is scaled through the mystical ascent, over the *via negativa*, toward the border of transcendence—the subject of the *Symposion*. The dimension in depth is probed through the anamnetic descent into the unconscious, into the depth from where are drawn up the "true logoi" of the *Timaeus* and *Critias*.

The discovery and exploration of these experiences started centuries before Plato and continued after him. The Platonic descent into the depth of the soul, for instance, differentiated experiences that were explored by Heraclitus and Aeschylus. And the name of Heraclitus reminds us that the Ephesian had already discovered the triad of love, hope, and faith which reappeared in the experiential triad of St. Paul. For the *via negativa* Plato could draw on the mysteries as well as on the description of the way toward truth that Parmenides had given in his didactic poem. And there should be mentioned, as close to the Platonic range, the Aristotelian *philia*, the experiential nucleus of true community between mature men; and again the Aristotelian love of the noetic self is hearkening back to the Heraclitean followership of the common Logos of mankind.

Brief and incomplete as these hints are, they should be sufficient to evoke the class of experiences which form the basis of theory in the Platonic-Aristotelian sense. It must now be ascertained why they should become the carriers of a truth about human existence in rivalry with the truth of the older myth, and why the theorist, as the representative of this truth, should be able to pit his authority against the authority of society.
The answer to this question must be sought in the nature of the experience under discussion. The discovery of the new truth is not an advancement of psychological knowledge in the immanentist sense; one would rather have to say that the psyche itself is found as a new center in man at which he experiences himself as open toward transcendental reality. Moreover, this center is not found as if it were an object that had been present all the time and only escaped notice. The psyche as the region in which transcendence is experienced must be differentiated out of a more compact structure of the soul; it must be developed and named. With due regard for the problem of compactness and differentiation, one might almost say that before the discovery of the psyche man had no soul. Hence, it is a discovery which produces its experiential material along with its explication; the openness of the soul is experienced through the opening of the soul itself. This opening, which is as much action as it is passion, we owe to the genius of the mystic philosophers. 

These experiences become the source of a new authority. Through the opening of the soul the philosopher finds himself in a new relation with God; he not only discovers his own psyche as the instrument for experiencing transcendence but at the same time discovers the divinity in its radically nonhuman transcendence. Hence, the differentiation of the psyche is inseparable from a new truth about God. The true order of the soul can become the standard for measuring both human types and types of social order because it represents the truth about human existence on the border of transcendence. The meaning of the anthropological principle must, therefore, be qualified by the understanding that not an arbitrary idea of man as a world-immanent being becomes the instrument of social...

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critique but the idea of a man who has found his true nature through finding his true relation to God. The new measure that is found for the critique of society is, indeed, not man himself but man in so far as through the differentiation of his psyche he has become the representative of divine truth.

The anthropological principle, thus, must be supplemented by a second principle for the theoretical interpretation of society. Plato expressed it when he created his formula, "God is the Measure," in opposition to the Protagorean, "Man is the Measure." In formulating this principle, Plato drew the sum of a long development. His ancestor Solon already had been in search of the truth that could be imposed with authority on the factions of Athens, and with a sigh he admitted: "It is very hard to know the unseen measure of right judgment; and yet it alone contains the right boundaries of all things." As a statesman he lived in the tension between the unseen measure and the necessity of incarnating it in the eunomia of society; on the one hand: "The mind of the immortals is all unseen to men"; and, on the other hand: "At the behest of the gods have I done what I did." Heraclitus, then, who always looms as the great shadow behind the ideas of Plato, went deeper into the experiences leading toward the invisible measure. He recognized its overruling validity: "The invisible harmony is better (or: greater, more powerful) than the visible." But this invisible harmony is difficult to find, and it will not be found at all unless the soul be animated by an anticipating urge in the right direction: "If you do not hope you will not find the unhoped-for, since it is hard to be found and the way

23. Ibid., Solon 17.
24. Ibid., Solon 34, vs. 6.
is all but impassable," and: "Through lack of faith (apistic) the divine (?) escapes being known." And, finally, Plato has absorbed the Xenophanic critique of unseemly symbolization of the gods. As long as men create gods in their image, is the argument of Xenophanes, the true nature of the one God who is "greatest among gods and men, not like mortals in body or thought," must remain hidden; and only when the one God is understood in his formless transcendence as the same God for every man will the nature of every man be understood as the same by virtue of the sameness of his relation to the transcendent divinity. Of all the early Greek thinkers, Xenophanes had perhaps the clearest insight into the constitution of a universal idea of man through the experience of universal transcendence.

The truth of man and the truth of God are inseparably one. Man will be in the truth of his existence when he has opened his psyche to the truth of God; and the truth of God will become manifest in history when it has formed the psyche of man into receptivity for the unseen measure. This is the great subject of the Republic; at the center of the dialogue Plato placed the Parable of the Cave, with its description of the periajoge, the conversion, the turning-around from the untruth of human existence as it prevailed in the Athenian sophistic society to the truth of the Idea. Moreover, Plato understood that the best way of securing the truth of existence was proper education from early childhood; for that reason, in Republic ii, he wanted to remove unseemly symbolizations of the gods, as they were to be found in the poets, from the education of the young and have them replaced by seemly symbols.

occasion he developed the technical vocabulary for dealing with such problems. In order to speak of the various types of symbolization, he coined the term "theology" and called them types of theology, typoï peri theologias. On the same occasion Plato, furthermore, distinguished the gnoseological component of the problem. If the soul is exposed in its youth to the wrong type of theology, it will be warped at its decisive center where it knows about the nature of God; it will fall a prey to the "arch-lie," the aithos pseudos, of misconception about the gods. This lie is not an ordinary lie in daily life for which there may be extenuating circumstances; it is the supreme lie of "ignorance, of agnoia, within the soul." If now the Platonic terminology be adopted, one may say, therefore, that the anthropological principle in a theoretical interpretation of society requires the theological principle as its correlate. The validity of the standards developed by Plato and Aristotle depends on the conception of a man who can be the measure of society because God is the measure of his soul.

The theorist is the representative of a new truth in rivalry with the truth represented by society. So much is secured. But there seems to be left the difficulty of the impasse that the new truth has little chance of becoming socially effective, of forming a society in its image.

This impasse, in fact, did never exist. Its appearance was created through Plato's disappointment with Athens. The polis of his time was indeed no longer capable of a great spiritual reform—but the polis had not always been so sterile as it looks when attention is focused on its resistance to Socrates and Plato. The Platonic-Aristotelian elaboration of the new truth marked the end of a long history; it was the work of Athenian thinkers who hardly could have accomplished their

32. Ibid. 379a. 33. Ibid. 382a. 34. Ibid. 382b.
III

THE STRUGGLE FOR REPRESENTATION IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE

1

The preceding lecture has shown that the problems of representation were not exhausted by internal articulation of a society in historical existence. Society as a whole proved to represent a transcendent truth; and, hence, the concept of representation in the existential sense had to be supplemented by a concept of transcendent representation. And on this new level of the problem, then, arose a further complication through the development of theory as a truth about man in rivalry with the truth represented by society. Even this complication, however, is not the last one. The field of competitive types of truth is historically broadened by the appearance of Christianity. All three of these types enter into the great struggle for the monopoly of existential representation in the Roman Empire. This struggle will form the subject matter of the present lecture; but, before approaching the subject itself, a few terminological and general theoretical points must be clarified. This procedure of bracketing out the general issues will avoid awkward digressions and explanations which otherwise would have to interrupt the political study proper when the questions become acute.

Terminologically, it will be necessary to distinguish between three types of truth. The first of these types is the truth represented by the early empires; it shall be designated as "cosmological truth." The second type of truth appears in the
political culture of Athens and specifically in tragedy; it shall be called "anthropological truth"—with the understanding that the term covers the whole range of problems connected with the psyche as the sensorium of transcendence. The third type of truth that appears with Christianity shall be called "soteriological truth."

The terminological differentiation between the second and third types is theoretically necessary because the Platonic-Aristotelian complex of experiences was enlarged by Christianity in a decisive point. This point of difference can be established perhaps best by reflecting for a moment on the Aristotelian conception of *philia politike*, of political friendship.¹ Such friendship is for Aristotle the substance of political society; it consists in *homonôia*, in spiritual agreement between men; and it is possible between men only in so far as these men live in agreement with the nous, that is, the divinest part in themselves. All men participate in the nous, though in varying degrees of intenseness; and, hence, the love of men for their own noetic self will make the nous the common bond between them.² Only in so far as men are equal through the love of their noetic self is friendship possible; the social bond between unequals will be weak. On this occasion, now, Aristotle formulated his thesis that friendship was impossible between God and man because of their radical inequality.³

The impossibility of *philia* between God and man may be considered typical for the whole range of anthropological truth. The experiences that were explicated into a theory of man by the mystic philosophers had in common the accent on the human side of the orientation of the soul toward divinity. The soul orients itself toward a God who rests in his immovable transcendence; it reaches out toward divine reality, but it

does not meet an answering movement from beyond. The Christian bending of God in grace toward the soul does not come within the range of these experiences—though, to be sure, in reading Plato one has the feeling of moving continuously on the verge of a breakthrough into this new dimension. The experience of mutuality in the relation with God, of the amicitia in the Thomistic sense, of the grace which imposes a supernatural form on the nature of man, is the specific difference of Christian truth.\textsuperscript{4} The revelation of this grace in history, through the incarnation of the Logos in Christ, intelligibly fulfilled the adventitious movement of the spirit in the mystic philosophers. The critical authority over the older truth of society which the soul had gained through its opening and its orientation toward the unseen measure was now confirmed through the revelation of the measure itself. In this sense, then, it may be said that the fact of revelation is its content.\textsuperscript{5}

In speaking in such terms about the experiences of the mystic philosophers and their fulfilment through Christianity, an assumption concerning history is implied that must be explicated. It is the assumption that the substance of history consists in the experiences in which man gains the understanding of his humanity and together with it the understanding of its limits. Philosophy and Christianity have endowed man with the stature that enables him, with historical effectiveness, to play the role of rational contemplator and pragmatic master of a nature which has lost its demonic terrors. With equal historical effectiveness, however, limits were placed on human grandeur; for Christianity has concentrated demonism into the permanent danger of a fall from the spirit—that is man’s only

\textsuperscript{4} Thomas Aquinas \textit{Contra Gentiles} iii. 91.

\textsuperscript{5} This conception of revelation as well as of its function in a philosophy of history is more fully elaborated in H. Richard Niebuhr, \textit{The Meaning of Revelation} (New York, 1946), esp. pp. 93, 109 ff.
by the grace of God—into the autonomy of his own self, from the *amor Dei* into the *amor sui*. The insight that man in his mere humanity, without the *fides caritate formata*, is demonic nothingness has been brought by Christianity to the ultimate border of clarity which by tradition is called revelation.

This assumption about the substance of history, now, entails consequences for a theory of human existence in society which, under the pressure of a secularized civilization, even philosophers of rank sometimes hesitate to accept without reservation. You have seen, for instance, that Karl Jaspers considered the age of the mystic philosophers the axis time of mankind, in preference to the Christian epoch, disregarding the ultimate clarity concerning the *conditio humana* that was brought by Christianity. And Henri Bergson had hesitations on the same issue—though in his last conversations, published posthumously by Sertillanges, he seemed inclined to accept the consequence of his own philosophy of history. This consequence can be formulated as the principle that a theory of human existence in society must operate within the medium of experiences which have differentiated historically. There is a strict correlation between the theory of human existence and the historical differentiation of experiences in which this existence has gained its self-understanding. Neither is the theorist permitted to disregard any part of this experience for one reason or another; nor can he take his position at an Archimedean point outside the substance of history. Theory is bound by history in the sense of the differentiating experiences. Since the maximum of differentiation was achieved through Greek philosophy and Christianity, this means concretely that theory is bound to move within the historical horizon of classic and Christian experiences. To recede from the maximum of differentiation is theoretical retrogression; it will result in the various types of derailment which Plato has characterized as

prior to the painting, and the architect prior to the building, so are the cities prior to the institutions of the cities." This Varronic conception that the gods were instituted by political society aroused the incomprehending irritation of St. Augustine. On the contrary, he insisted, "true religion is not instituted by some terrestrial city," but the true God, the inspirator of true religion, "has instituted the celestial city." Varro's attitude seemed particularly reprehensible because the things human to which he gave priority were not even universally human but just Roman. Moreover, St. Augustine suspected him of deception because Varro admitted that he would have put the things divine first if he had intended to treat of the nature of the gods exhaustively, and because he, furthermore, suggested that in matters of religion much is true that the people ought not to know and much false that the people ought not to suspect.

What St. Augustine could not understand was the compactness of Roman experience, the inseparable community of gods and men in the historically concrete civitas, the simultaneousness of human and divine institution of a social order. For him the order of human existence had already separated into the civitas terrena of profane history and the civitas coelestis of divine institution. Nor was the understanding facilitated by the apparently somewhat primitive formulations of the encyclopedist Varro. The more supple Cicero voiced the same convictions as his friend with more conceptual refinement through the figures of his De natura deorum, especially through the princeps civis and pontifex Cotta. In the debate about the existence of the gods there stand against each other the opinions of the philosopher and of the Roman social leader. Subtly Cicero suggests the different sources of authority when he opposes

33. Ibid. 4.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. iv. 31; vi. 4.
37. Ibid. iv. 31.
the *princeps philosophiae* Socrates\(^{38}\) to the *princeps civis* Cotta,\(^{39}\) the *auctoritas philosophi* clashes with the *auctoritas majorum*.\(^{40}\)

The dignitary of the Roman cult is not inclined to doubt the immortal gods and their worship whatever anybody may say. In matters of religion he will follow the pontiffs who preceded him in the office and no Greek philosophers. The auspices of Romulus and the rites of Numa laid the foundations of the state which never could have achieved its greatness without the ritual conciliation of the immortals in its favor.\(^{41}\) He accepts the gods on the authority of the forebears, but he is willing to listen to the opinion of others; and not without irony he invites Balbus to give the reasons, *rationem*, for his religious beliefs which as a philosopher he ought to have, while he the pontiff is compelled to believe the forebears without reason.\(^{42}\)

The Varronic and Ciceronian expositions are precious documents for the theorist. The Roman thinkers live firmly in their political myth but at the same time have been made aware of the fact through contact with Greek philosophy; the contact has not affected the solidity of their sentiments but only equipped them with the means of elucidating their position. The conventional treatment of Cicero is apt to overlook that in his work something considerably more interesting is to be found than a variant of Stoicism—something that no Greek source can give us, that is, the archaic experience of social order before its dissolution through the experience of the mystic philosophers. In the Greek sources this archaic stratum never can really be touched, because the earliest literary documents, the poems of Homer and Hesiod, are already magnificently free reorganizations of mythical material—in the case of Hesiod even with the conscious opposition of a truth found

\(^{38}\) Cicero *De natura deorum* ii. 167.

\(^{39}\) Ibid. 168.

\(^{40}\) Ibid. iii. 5.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) Ibid. 6.
by him as an individual to the lie, the *pseudos*, of the older myth. It was perhaps the unsetlement in the wake of the Doric invasion that broke the compactness of Greek social existence so much earlier, a type of shock that never disturbed Rome. Anyway, Rome was an archaic survival in the Hellenistic civilization of the Mediterranean and still more so with its advancing Christianization; one might compare the situation with the role of Japan in a civilizational environment that is dominated by Western ideas.

Romans like Cicero understood the problem quite well. In his *De re publica*, for instance, he deliberately opposed the Roman style of dealing with matters of political order to the Greek style. In the debate about the best political order (*status civitatis*), again a *princeps civis*, Scipio, takes his stand against Socrates. Scipio refuses to discuss the best order in the manner of the Platonic Socrates; he will not build up a "fictitious" order before his audience but will rather give an account of the origins of Rome.\(^43\) The order of Rome is superior to any other —this dogma is heavily put down as the condition of debate.\(^44\) The discussion itself may freely range through all topics of Greek learning, but this learning will have meaning only in so far as it can be brought usefully to bear on problems of Roman order. The highest rank, to be sure, is held by the man who can add the "foreign learning" to his ancestral customs; but, if a choice must be made between the two ways of life, the *vita civilis* of the statesman is preferable to the *vita quieta* of the sage.\(^45\)

The thinker who can speak of philosophy as a "foreign learning," to be respected but nevertheless to be considered as a spice that will add perfection to superiority, has, one may safely say, understood neither the nature of the spiritual revolution that found its expression in philosophy nor the nature

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43. Cicero *De re publica* ii. 3.  
44. *Ibid.* i. 70; ii. 2.  
dom the edict ordered the Christians to pray for the emperor, the public weal, and their own.\(^{64}\) This was no conversion to Christianity but rather an inclusion of the Christian God into the imperial system of divinity.\(^{65}\) The Edict of Licinius, of 313, stated that the former anti-Christian policy had been revised “so that all that is of *divinitas* in the celestial habitat be profitous to us and all who are under our rule.”\(^{66}\) The curious term *divinitas* was reconcilable with official polytheism and the recognition of the *Summus Deus* of the empire religion, and at the same time it sounded monotheistic enough to make Christians happy. The suspense of meaning was probably intended—one feels in it the left hand of the Constantine, who later, in the christological debate, insisted on the sublimely meaningless *homo-ousios*.

The problems of imperial theology, however, could not be solved by a linguistic compromise. The Christians were persecuted for a good reason; there was a revolutionary substance in Christianity that made it incompatible with paganism. The new alliance was bound to increase the social effectiveness of this revolutionary substance. What made Christianity so dangerous was its uncompromising, radical de-divinization of the world. The problem had been formulated perhaps most clearly by Celsus in his *True Discourse*, of ca. A.D. 180, the most competent pagan critique of Christianity. The Christians, he complained, reject polytheism with the argument that one cannot serve two masters.\(^{67}\) This was for Celsus the “language of sedition

\(^{64}\) Lactantius, *op. cit.*, xxxiv in fine.

\(^{65}\) A similar interpretation is to be found in Joseph Vogt, *Constantin der Große und sein Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1949), pp. 154 ff.


\(^{67}\) Origenes *Contra Celsum* vii. 68.
The belief that Christianity could be used for bolstering the political theology of the Empire, either alone or in combination with the pagan conception of a *Summus Deus*, was destined to experience a quick disappointment. Nevertheless, the belief could be entertained with reason because it found support from a Christian tendency of interpreting the one God of Christianity in the direction of a metaphysical monotheism. To indulge in this experiment was an understandable temptation in the path of Eastern religions when they found themselves in the Hellenistic environment and began to express themselves in the language of Greek speculation. In fact, the Christian development in this direction was not original but followed the example of Philo Judaeus; and Philo had at his disposition already the preparatory peripatetic speculations of the first century B.C. In his *Metaphysics* Aristotle had formulated the principle: "The world does not have the will to be ruled badly; the rule of many is not good, one be the Lord." In the peripatetic literature immediately preceding the time of Philo, of which the representative extant example is the pseudo-Aristotelian *De mundo*, this principle was elaborated into the great parallel constructions of imperial monarchy and divine world monarchy. The divine monarchical ruler of the cosmos governs the world through his lesser messengers in the same manner in which the Persian great king governs his empire through the satraps in the provinces. Philo adapted the

76. On metaphysical monotheism and its function in the political theology of the Roman Empire see Erik Peterson, *Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum* (Leipzig, 1935). Our own analysis follows Peterson’s closely.

77. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1076a.

78. The *De mundo* is to be dated in the first century A.D. Whether it still falls in the lifetime of Philo does not matter for our purpose, because we are interested only in its typical contents.

than like a serious suggestion; and it was perhaps inevitable that in the course of events the second and third persons of the imperial trinity got their noses cut off.

The other brilliant idea of Eusebius, the idea of recognizing in the pax Romana the fulfilment of eschatological prophecies (an idea strongly reminiscent of Cicero's inclination to see the perfect order of the philosophers realized through Rome), fell to pieces under the pressure of a troubled age. Nevertheless, the commentary of St. Augustine on the prophecy of Ps. 45:10 may serve as a specific assertion of the orthodox counterposition. The text is: 'He maketh wars to cease unto the end of the earth.' St. Augustine comments: 'That we see not yet accomplished; hitherto we have wars. Between the nations there are the wars for domination. And there are also wars between the sects, between Jews, Pagans, Christians and heretics, and these wars even increase; one side fighting for truth, the other side for falsehood. In no way is there fulfilled the 'ceasing of the wars to the end of the earth'; but perhaps, we hope, it will be fulfilled.'

This is the end of political theology in orthodox Christianity. The spiritual destiny of man in the Christian sense cannot be represented on earth by the power organization of a political society; it can be represented only by the church. The sphere of power is radically de-divinized; it has become temporal. The double representation of man in society through church and empire lasted through the Middle Ages. The specifically modern problems of representation are connected with the re-divinization of society. The subsequent three lectures will deal with these problems.

this Easter poem the Trinity is seen figured on earth by Valentinian I and his co-emperors Valens and Gratianus (Auranus ['Loeb Classical Library'], I, 34 ff.).

Christian communities was experientially not fixed but oscillated between the eschatological expectation of the Parousia that would bring the Kingdom of God and the understanding of the church as the apocalypse of Christ in history. Since the Parousia did not occur, the church actually evolved from the eschatology of the realm in history toward the eschatology of transhistorical, supernatural perfection. In this evolution the specific essence of Christianity separated from its historical origin. 1 This separation began within the life of Jesus itself, 2 and it was on principle completed with the Pentecostal descent of the Spirit. Nevertheless, the expectation of an imminent coming of the realm was stirred to white heat again and again by the suffering of the persecutions; and the most grandiose expression of eschatological pathos, the Revelation of St. John, was included in the canon in spite of misgivings about its compatibility with the idea of the church. The inclusion had fateful consequences, for with the Revelation was accepted the revolutionary annunciation of the millennium in which Christ would reign with his saints on this earth. 3 Not only did the inclusion sanction the permanent effectiveness within Christianity of the broad mass of Jewish apocalyptic literature but it also raised the immediate question how chiliasm could be reconciled with idea and existence of the church. If Christianity consisted in the burning desire for deliverance from the world, if Christians lived in expectation of the end of unredeemed history, if their destiny could be fulfilled only by the realm in the sense of chapter 20 of Revelation, the church was

1. On the transition from eschatological to apocalyptic Christianity see Alois Dempf, Sacrum Imperium (Munich and Berlin, 1929), pp. 71 ff.
3. On the tension in early Christianity, the reception of Revelation, and its subsequent role in Western revolutionary eschatology see Jakob Taubes, Abendlandische Eschatologie (Bern, 1947), esp. pp. 69 ff.
Joachim broke with the Augustinian conception of a Christian society when he applied the symbol of the Trinity to the course of history. In his speculation the history of mankind had three periods corresponding to the three persons of the Trinity. The first period of the world was the age of the Father; with the appearance of Christ began the age of the Son. But the age of the Son will not be the last one; it will be followed by a third age of the Spirit. The three ages were characterized as intelligible increases of spiritual fulfilment. The first age unfolded the life of the layman; the second age brought the active contemplative life of the priest; the third age would bring the perfect spiritual life of the monk. Moreover, the ages had comparable internal structures and a calculable length. From the comparison of structures it appeared that each age opened with a trinity of leading figures, that is, with two precursors, followed by the leader of the age himself; and from the calculation of length it followed that the age of the Son would reach its end in 1260. The leader of the first age was Abraham; the leader of the second age was Christ; and Joachim predicted that by 1260 there would appear the Dux e Babylone, the leader of the third age.8

In his trinitarian eschatology Joachim created the aggregate of symbols which govern the self-interpretation of modern political society to this day.

The first of these symbols is the conception of history as a sequence of three ages, of which the third age is intelligibly the final Third Realm. As variations of this symbol are recognizable the humanistic and encyclopedist periodization of history into ancient, medieval, and modern history; Turgot’s and Comte’s theory of a sequence of theological, metaphysical,

8. On Joachim of Flora see Herbert Grundmann, Studien über Joachim von Floris (Leipzig, 1927); Dempf, op. cit., pp. 269 ff.; Ernesto Buonaiuti, Gioacchino da Fiore (Rome, 1931); the same author’s “Introduction” to Joachim’s Tractatus super quattuor evangelia (Rome, 1930); and the chapters on Joachim in Jakob Taubes’ Abendlandische Eschatologie and Karl Löwith’s Meaning in History (Chicago, 1949).
men without administration of sacraments. While Joachim himself conceived the new age concretely as an order of monks, the idea of a community of the spiritually perfect who can live together without institutional authority was formulated on principle. The idea was capable of infinite variations. It can be traced in various degrees of purity in medieval and Renaissance sects, as well as in the Puritan churches of the saints; in its secularized form it has become a formidable component in the contemporary democratic creed; and it is the dynamic core in the Marxian mysticism of the realm of freedom and the withering-away of the state.

The National Socialist Third Realm is a special case. To be sure, Hitler’s millennial prophecy authentically derives from Joachitic speculation, mediated in Germany through the Anabaptist wing of the Reformation and through the J ohannine Christianity of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling. Nevertheless, the concrete application of the trinitarian schema to the first German Reich that ended in 1806, the Bismarck Reich that ended in 1918, and the Dritte Reich of the National Socialist movement sounds flat and provincial if compared with the world-historical speculation of the German idealists, of Comte, or of Marx. This nationalist, accidental touch is due to the fact that the symbol of the Dritte Reich did not stem from the speculative effort of a philosopher of rank but rather from dubious literary transfers. The National Socialist propagandists picked it up from Moeller van den Bruck’s tract of that name. And Moeller, who had no National Socialist intentions, had found it as a convenient symbol in the course of his work on the German edition of Dostoevski. The Russian

10. Moeller van den Bruck, D as Dritte Reich (Hamburg, 1923). See also the chapter on “Das Dritte Reich und die Jungen Völker” in Moeller van den Bruck, Die politischen Kräfte (Breslau, 1933). The symbol gained acceptance slowly. The second edition of the Dritte Reich appeared only in 1930, five years after the author’s death through suicide; see the “Introduction” by Mary Agnes Hamilton to the English edition, Germany’s Third Empire (London, 1934).
Russia was not even seen; and certainly, if the possibility for an evolution in this direction ever existed, it was finished with the Dekabrist revolt of 1825. Immediately afterward, with Khomyakov, began the Slavophilic, anti-Western philosophy of history which enhanced the apocalypse of the Third Rome, with broad effectiveness in the intelligentsia of the middle nobility, into the messianic, eschatological mission of Russia for mankind. In Dostoevski this superimposition of messianism crystallized in the curiously ambivalent vision of an autocratic, orthodox Russia that somehow would conquer the world and in this conquest blossom out into the free society of all Christians in the true faith. It is the ambivalent vision which, in its secularized form, inspires a Russian dictatorship of the proletariat that in its conquest of the world will blossom out into the Marxian realm of freedom. The tentative Western articulation of Russian society under the liberal czars has become an episode of the past with the revolution of 1917. The people as a whole have become again the servants of the czar in the old Muscovite sense, with the cadres of the Communist party as its service nobility; the oprichnina which Ivan the Terrible had established on the basis of an agricultural economy was re-established with a vengeance on the basis of an industrial economy.

From the exposition of Joachitic symbols, from the cursory survey of their later variants, and from their blending with the political apocalypse of the Third Rome, it will have become clear that the new eschatology decisively affects the structure of modern politics. It has produced a well-circum-

19. For this view of Dostoevski see Dmitri Merezhkovski, Die religiöse Revolution (printed as Introduction to Dostoevski's Politische Schriften [Munich, 1920]), and Bernhard Schultze, Russisches Denken (Wien, 1950), pp. 125 ff.

scribed symbolism by means of which Western political societies interpret the meaning of their existence; and the adherents of one or the other of the variants determine the articulation of society domestically as well as on the world scene. Up to this point, however, the symbolism has been accepted on the level of self-interpretation and described as a historical phenomenon. It must now be submitted to critical analysis of its principal aspects, and the foundation for this analysis must be laid through a formulation of the theoretically relevant issue.

The Joachitic eschatology is, by its subject matter, a speculation on the meaning of history. In order to determine its specific difference, it must be set off against the Christian philosophy of history that was traditional at the time, that is, against Augustinian speculation. Into the traditional speculation had entered the Jewish-Christian idea of an end of history in the sense of an intelligible state of perfection. History no longer moved in cycles, as it did with Plato and Aristotle, but acquired direction and destination. Beyond Jewish messianism in the strict sense the specifically Christian conception of history had, then, advanced toward the understanding of the end as a transcendental fulfilment. In his elaboration of this theoretical insight St. Augustine distinguished between a profane sphere of history in which empires rise and fall and a sacred history which culminates in the appearance of Christ and the establishment of the church. He, furthermore, imbedded sacred history in a transcendental history of the civitas Dei which includes the events in the angelic sphere as well as the transcendental eternal sabbath. Only transcendental history, including the earthly pilgrimage of the church, has direction toward its eschatological fulfilment. Profane history, on the other hand, has no such direction; it is a waiting for the end; its present mode of being is that of a saeculum senescens, of an age that grows old. 21

21. For an account of the Augustinian conception of history see Löwith, op. cit.
By the time of Joachim, Western civilization was strongly growing; and an age that began to feel its muscles would not easily bear the Augustinian defeatism with regard to the mundane sphere of existence. The Joachitic speculation was an attempt to endow the immanent course of history with a meaning that was not provided in the Augustinian conception. And for this purpose Joachim used what he had at hand, that is, the meaning of transcendent history. In this first Western attempt at an immanentization of meaning the connection with Christianity was not lost. The new age of Joachim would bring an increase of fulfilment within history, but the increase would not be due to an immanent eruption; it would come through a new transcendent irruption of the spirit. The idea of a radically immanent fulfilment grew rather slowly, in a long process that roughly may be called “from humanism to enlightenment”; only in the eighteenth century, with the idea of progress, had the increase of meaning in history become a completely intramundane phenomenon, without transcendent irruptions. This second phase of immanentization shall be called “secularization.”

From the Joachitic immanentization a theoretical problem arises which occurs neither in classic antiquity nor in orthodox Christianity, that is, the problem of an eidos of history. In Hellenic speculation, to be sure, we also have a problem of essence in politics; the polis has an eidos both for Plato and for Aristotle. But the actualization of this essence is governed by the rhythm of growth and decay, and the rhythmical embodiment and disembodiment of essence in political reality is the mystery of existence; it is not an additional eidos. The soteriological truth of Christianity, then, breaks with the rhythm of existence; beyond temporal successes and reverses lies the supernatural destiny of man, the perfection through grace in the beyond. Man and mankind now have fulfilment,

but it lies beyond nature. Again there is no eidōs of history, because the eschatological supernature is not a nature in the philosophical, immanent sense. The problem of an eidōs in history, hence, arises only when Christian transcendental fulfilment becomes immanentized. Such an immanentist hypostasis of the eschaton, however, is a theoretical fallacy. Things are not things, nor do they have essences, by arbitrary declaration. The course of history as a whole is no object of experience; history has no eidōs, because the course of history extends into the unknown future. The meaning of history, thus, is an illusion; and this illusionary eidōs is created by treating a symbol of faith as if it were a proposition concerning an object of immanent experience.

The fallacious character of an eidōs of history has been shown on principle—but the analysis can and must be carried one step further into certain details. The Christian symbolism of supernatural destination has in itself a theoretical structure, and this structure is continued into the variants of immanentization. The pilgrim’s progress, the sanctification of life, is a movement toward a telos, a goal; and this goal, the beatific vision, is a state of perfection. Hence, in the Christian symbolism one can distinguish the movement as its teleological component, from a state of highest value as the axiological component. The two components reappear in the variants of immanentization; and they can accordingly be classified as variants which either accentuate the teleological or the axiological component or combine them both in their symbolism. In the first case, when the accent lies strongly on movement, without clarity about final perfection, the result will be the progressivist interpretation of history. The aim need not be clarified because progressivist thinkers, men like

23. For the distinction of the two components (which was introduced by Troeltsch) and the ensuing theological debate see Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Prometheus* (Heidelberg, 1947), pp. 12 ff.
Diderot or D’Alembert, assume a selection of desirable factors as the standard and interpret progress as qualitative and quantitative increase of the present good—the “bigger and better” of our simplifying slogan. This is a conservative attitude, and it may become reactionary unless the original standard be adjusted to the changing historical situation. In the second case, when the accent lies strongly on the state of perfection, without clarity about the means that are required for its realization, the result will be utopianism. It may assume the form of an axiological dream world, as in the utopia of More, when the thinker is still aware that and why the dream is unrealizable; or, with increasing theoretical illiteracy, it may assume the form of various social idealisms, such as the abolition of war, of unequal distribution of property, of fear and want. And, finally, immanentization may extend to the complete Christian symbol. The result will then be the active mysticism of a state of perfection, to be achieved through a revolutionary transfiguration of the nature of man, as, for instance, in Marxism.

The analysis can now be resumed on the level of principle. The attempt at constructing an eidos of history will lead into the fallacious immanentization of the Christian eschaton. The understanding of the attempt as fallacious, however, raises baffling questions with regard to the type of man who will indulge in it. The fallacy looks rather elemental. Can it be assumed that the thinkers who indulged in it were not intelligent enough to penetrate it? Or that they penetrated it but propagated it nevertheless for some obscure evil reason? The mere asking of such questions carries their negation. Obviously one cannot explain seven centuries of intellectual history by stupidity and dishonesty. A drive must rather be assumed in the souls of these men which blinded them to the fallacy.
The nature of this drive cannot be discovered by submitting the structure of the fallacy to an even closer analysis. The attention must rather concentrate on what the thinkers achieved by their fallacious construction. On this point there is no doubt. They achieved a certainty about the meaning of history, and about their own place in it, which otherwise they would not have had. Certainties, now, are in demand for the purpose of overcoming uncertainties with their accompaniment of anxiety; and the next question then would be: What specific uncertainty was so disturbing that it had to be overcome by the dubious means of fallacious immanentization? One does not have to look far afield for an answer. Uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity. The feeling of security in a "world full of gods" is lost with the gods themselves; when the world is de-divinized, communication with the world-transcendent God is reduced to the tenuous bond of faith, in the sense of Heb. 11:1, as the substance of things hoped for and the proof of things unseen. Ontologically, the substance of things hoped for is nowhere to be found but in faith itself; and, epistemologically, there is no proof for things unseen but again this very faith.\(^24\) The bond is tenuous, indeed, and it may snap easily. The life of the soul in openness toward God, the waiting, the periods of aridity and dulness, guilt and despondency, contrition and repentance, forsakenness and hope against hope, the silent stirrings of love and grace, trembling on the verge of a certainty which if gained is loss—the very lightness of this fabric may prove too heavy a burden for men who lust for massively possessive experience. The danger of a breakdown of faith to a socially relevant degree, now, will increase in the measure in which Christianity is a worldly success, that is, it will grow when Christianity penetrates a

\(^24\) Our reflections on the uncertainty of faith must be understood as a psychology of experience. For the theology of the definition of faith in Heb. 11:1, which is presupposed in our analysis, see Thomas Aquinas *Summa theologica* ii–ii. Q. 4, Art. 1.
ences were at hand in the gnosis which had accompanied Christianity from its very beginnings.\textsuperscript{25}

The economy of this lecture does not allow a description of the gnosis of antiquity or of the history of its transmission into the Western Middle Ages; enough to say that at the time gnosis was a living religious culture on which men could fall back. The attempt at immanentizing the meaning of existence is fundamentally an attempt at bringing our knowledge of transcendence into a firmer grip than the cogitio fidei, the cognition of faith, will afford; and Gnostic experiences offer this firmer grip in so far as they are an expansion of the soul to the point where God is drawn into the existence of man. This expansion will engage the various human faculties; and, hence, it is possible to distinguish a range of Gnostic varieties according to the faculty which predominates in the operation of getting this grip on God. Gnosis may be primarily intellectual and assume the form of speculative penetration of the mystery of creation and existence, as, for instance, in the contemplative gnosis of Hegel or Schelling. Or it may be primarily emotional and assume the form of an indwelling of divine substance in the human soul, as, for instance, in paracletic sectarian leaders. Or it may be primarily volitional and assume the form of activist redemption of man and society, as in the instance of revolutionary activists like Comte, Marx, or Hitler. These Gnostic experiences, in the amplitude of their variety, are the core of the redivinization of society, for the men who fall into these experiences divinize themselves by substituting more massive modes of participation in divinity for faith in the Christian sense.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} The exploration of gnosis is so rapidly advancing that only a study of the principal works of the last generation will mediate an understanding of its dimensions. Of special value are Eugène de Faye, Gnostiques et gnosticisme (2d ed.; Paris, 1925); Hans Jonas, Gnosis und spätantiker Geist (Göttingen, 1934); Simone Pètement, Le Dualisme chez Platon, les Gnostiques et les Manichéens (Paris, 1947); and Hans Söderberg, La Religion des Cathares (Uppsala, 1949).

\textsuperscript{26} For a general suggestion concerning the range of Gnostic phenomena in the modern world see Balthasar, Prometheus, p. 6.
A clear understanding of these experiences as the active core of immanentist eschatology is necessary, because otherwise the inner logic of the Western political development from medieval immanentism through humanism, enlightenment, progressivism, liberalism, positivism, into Marxism will be obscured. The intellectual symbols developed by the various types of immanentists will frequently be in conflict with one another, and the various types of Gnostics will oppose one another. One can easily imagine how indignant a humanistic liberal will be when he is told that his particular type of immanentism is one step on the road to Marxism. It will not be superfluous, therefore, to recall the principle that the substance of history is to be found on the level of experiences, not on the level of ideas. Secularism could be defined as a radicalization of the earlier forms of paracletic immanentism, because the experiential divinization of man is more radical in the secularist case. Feuerbach and Marx, for instance, interpreted the transcendent God as the projection of what is best in man into a hypostatic beyond; for them the great turning point of history, therefore, would come when man draws his projection back into himself, when he becomes conscious that he himself is God, when as a consequence man is transfigured into superman. 27 This Marxian transfiguration does, indeed, carry to its extreme a less radical medieval experience which draws the spirit of God into man, while leaving God himself in his transcendence. The superman marks the end of a road on which we find such figures as the "godded man" of English Reformation mystics. 28 These considerations, moreover, will explain and justify the earlier warning against characterizing modern political movements as neopagan. Gnostic experiences


28. The "godded man" is a term of Henry Nicholas (see Rufus M. Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion [London, 1936], p. 434).
determine a structure of political reality that is *sui generis*. A line of gradual transformation connects medieval with contemporary gnosticism. And the transformation is so gradual, indeed, that it would be difficult to decide whether contemporary phenomena should be classified as Christian because they are intelligibly an outgrowth of Christian heresies of the Middle Ages or whether medieval phenomena should be classified as anti-Christian because they are intelligibly the origin of modern anti-Christianism. The best course will be to drop such questions and to recognize the essence of modernity as the growth of gnosticism.

Gnosis was an accompaniment of Christianity from its very beginnings; its traces are to be found in St. Paul and St. John.29 Gnostic heresy was the great opponent of Christianity in the early centuries; and Irenaeus surveyed and criticized the manifold of its variants in his *Adversus Haereses* (ca. 180)—a standard treatise on the subject that still will be consulted with profit by the student who wants to understand modern political ideas and movements. Moreover, besides the Christian there also existed a Jewish, a pagan, and an Islamic gnosis; and quite possibly the common origin of all these branches of gnosis will have to be sought in the basic experiential type that prevailed in the pre-Christian area of Syriac civilization. Nowhere, however, has gnosis assumed the form of speculation on the meaning of immanent history as it did in the high Middle Ages; gnosis does not by inner necessity lead to the fallacious construction of history which characterizes modernity since Joachim. Hence, in the drive for certainty there must be contained a further component which bends gnosis specifically toward historical speculation. This further component is the civilizational expansiveness of Western society in the high Middle Ages. It is a coming-of-age in search of its

29. On gnosis in early Christianity see Rudolf Bultmann, *Das Urfchristentum im Rahmen der antiken Religionen* (Zürich, 1949).
vironment, in the increase of population, of the standard of living, of health and comfort, of mass education, of social consciousness and responsibility; and again, whatever misgivings one may entertain with regard to this or that item on the list, one cannot deny that the progressivists have a case, too. This conflict of interpretations leaves in its wake the adumbrated thorny question, that is, the question how a civilization can advance and decline at the same time. A consideration of this question suggests itself, because it seems possible that the analysis of modern gnosticism will furnish at least a partial solution of the problem.

Gnostic speculation overcame the uncertainty of faith by receding from transcendence and endowing man and his intra-mundane range of action with the meaning of eschatological fulfilment. In the measure in which this immanentization progressed experientially, civilizational activity became a mystical work of self-salvation. The spiritual strength of the soul which in Christianity was devoted to the sanctification of life could now be diverted into the more appealing, more tangible, and, above all, so much easier creation of the terrestrial paradise. Civilizational action became a divertissement, in the sense of Pascal, but a divertissement which demonically absorbed into itself the eternal destiny of man and substituted for the life of the spirit. Nietzsche most tersely expressed the nature of this demonic diversion when he raised the question why anyone should live in the embarrassing condition of a being in need of the love and grace of God. "Love yourself through grace—was his solution—then you are no longer in need of your God, and you can act the whole drama of Fall and Redemption to its end in yourself." 32 And how can this miracle be achieved, this miracle of self-salvation, and how this redemption by extending grace to yourself? The great historical answer was given by the successive types of Gnostic action that have made

modern civilization what it is. The miracle was worked successively through the literary and artistic achievement which secured the immortality of fame for the humanistic intellectual, through the discipline and economic success which certified salvation to the Puritan saint, through the civilizational contributions of the liberals and progressives, and, finally, through the revolutionary action that will establish the Communist or some other Gnostic millennium. Gnosticism, thus, most effectively released human forces for the building of a civilization because on their fervent application to intramundane activity was put the premium of salvation. The historical result was stupendous. The resources of man that came to light under such pressure were in themselves a revelation, and their application to civilizational work produced the truly magnificent spectacle of Western progressive society. However fatuous the surface arguments may be, the widespread belief that modern civilization is Civilization in a pre-eminent sense is experientially justified; the endowment with the meaning of salvation has made the rise of the West, indeed, an apocalypse of civilization.

On this apocalyptic spectacle, however, falls a shadow; for the brilliant expansion is accompanied by a danger that grows apace with progress. The nature of this danger became apparent in the form which the idea of immanent salvation assumed in the gnosticism of Comte. The founder of positivism institutionalized the premium on civilizational contributions in so far as he guaranteed immortality through preservation of the contributor and his deeds in the memory of mankind. There were provided honorific degrees of such immortality, and the highest honor would be the reception of the meritorious contributor into the calendar of positivistic saints. But what should in this order of things become of men who would rather follow God than the new Augustus Comte? Such miscreants who were not inclined to make their social contribu-
tions according to Comtean standards would simply be committed to the hell of social oblivion. The idea deserves attention. Here is a Gnostic paraclete setting himself up as the world-immanent Last Judgment of mankind, deciding on immortality or annihilation for every human being. The material civilization of the West, to be sure, is still advancing; but on this rising plane of civilization the progressive symbolism of contributions, commemoration, and oblivion draws the contours of those "holes of oblivion" into which the divine redeemers of the Gnostic empires drop their victims with a bullet in the neck. This end of progress was not contemplated in the halcyon days of Gnostic exuberance. Milton released Adam and Eve with "a paradise within them, happier far" than the Paradise lost; when they went forth, "the world was all before them"; and they were cheered "with meditation on the happy end." But when historically man goes forth, with the Gnostic "Paradise within him," and when he penetrates into the world before him, there is little cheer in meditation on the not so happy end.

The death of the spirit is the price of progress. Nietzsche revealed this mystery of the Western apocalypse when he announced that God was dead and that He had been murdered. This Gnostic murder is constantly committed by the men who sacrifice God to civilization. The more fervently all human energies are thrown into the great enterprise of salvation through world-immanent action, the farther the human beings who engage in this enterprise move away from the life of the spirit. And since the life of the spirit is the source of order in man and society, the very success of a Gnostic civilization is the cause of its decline.

33. On the "murder of God" passages in Nietzsche, prehistory of the idea, and literary debate see Lubac, op. cit., pp. 40 ff. For the most comprehensive exposition of the idea in Nietzsche's work see Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens (Berlin and Leipzig, 1936), under the references in the register.
Biondo treated the millennium from the fall of Rome in 410 to the year 1410 as a closed age of the past, the symbol of a new, modern age has been used by the successive waves of humanistic, Protestant, and enlightened intellectuals for expressing their consciousness of being the representatives of a new truth. Precisely, however, because the world, under the guidance of the Gnostics, is being renewed at frequent intervals, it is impossible to arrive at a critically justified periodization while listening to their claims. By the immanent logic of its own theological symbolism each of the Gnostic waves has as good a claim to consider itself the great wave of the future as any other. There is no reason why a modern period should begin with humanism rather than with the Reformation, or with Enlightenment rather than with Marxism. Hence, the problem cannot be solved on the level of Gnostic symbolism. We must descend to the level of existential representation in order to find a motive for periodization; for an epoch would be marked indeed if, in the struggle for existential representation, there existed a decisive revolutionary victory of gnosticism over the forces of Western tradition. If the question is stated in such terms, the conventional periodization becomes meaningful. While none of the movements deserves preference by the content of its truth, a clear epoch in Western history is marked by the Reformation, understood as the successful invasion of Western institutions by Gnostic movements. The movements which hitherto existed in a socially marginal position—tolerated, suppressed, or underground—erupted in the Reformation with unexpected strength on a broad front, with the result of splitting the universal church and embarking on their gradual conquest of the political institutions in the national states.

The revolutionary eruption of the Gnostic movements affected existential representation throughout Western society. The event is so vast in dimensions that no survey even of its
general characteristics can be attempted in the present lectures. In order to convey an understanding of at least some of the more important traits of the Gnostic revolution, it will be best to concentrate the analysis on a specific national area and on a specific phase within it. Certain aspects of the Puritan impact on the English public order will be the most suitable subject for a brief study. Moreover, this selection suggests itself because the English sixteenth century had the rare good fortune of a brilliant observer of the Gnostic movement in the person of the "judicious Hooker." In the Preface of his *Ecclesiastical Polity* Hooker gave an astute type study of the Puritan, as well as of the psychological mechanism by which Gnostic mass movements operate. These pages are an invaluable asset for the student of the Gnostic revolution; the present analysis will, therefore, properly begin with a summary of Hooker’s portrait of the Puritan.

2

In order to start a movement moving, there must in the first place be somebody who has a "cause." From the context in Hooker it appears that the term "cause" was of recent usage in politics and that probably the Puritans had invented this formidable weapon of the Gnostic revolutionaries. In order to advance his "cause," the man who has it will, "in the hearing of the multitude," indulge in severe criticisms of social evils and in particular of the conduct of the upper classes. Frequent repetition of the performance will induce the opinion among the hearers that the speakers must be men of singular integrity, zeal, and holiness, for only men who are singularly good can be so deeply offended by evil. The next step will be the concentration of popular ill-will on the established government. This task can be psychologically performed by attributing all fault and corruption, as it exists in the world because of human frailty, to the action or inaction of the government. By such imputation of evil to a specific institution the speak-
of a guide to the right reading of Scripture and of an authentic formulation of truth that would make recourse to earlier literature unnecessary. For the designation of this genus of Gnostic literature a technical term is needed; since the study of Gnostic phenomena is too recent to have developed one, the Arabic term koran will have to do for the present. The work of Calvin, thus, may be called the first deliberately created Gnostic koran. A man who can write such a koran, a man who can break with the intellectual tradition of mankind because he lives in the faith that a new truth and a new world begin with him, must be in a peculiar pneumopathological state. Hooker, who was supremely conscious of tradition, had a fine sensitivity for this twist of mind. In his cautiously subdued characterization of Calvin he opened with the sober statement: "His bringing up was in the study of civil law"; he then built up with some malice: "Divine knowledge he gathered, not by hearing or reading so much, as by teaching others"; and he concluded on the devastating sentence: "For, though thousands were debtors to him, as touching knowledge in that kind; yet he (was debtor) to none but only to God, the author of the most blessed fountain, the Book of Life, and of the admirable dexterity of wit."

The work of Calvin was the first but not the last of its kind; moreover, the genus had a prehistory. In the early phases of Western Gnostic sectarianism, the place of a koran was taken by the works of Scotus Eriugena and Dionysius Areopagita; and in the Joachitic movement the works of Joachim of Flora played this role under the title of Evangelium aeternum. In later Western history, in the period of secularization, new korans were produced with every wave of the movement. In the eighteenth century, Diderot and D'Alembert claimed koranic function for the Encyclopédie française as the comprehensive presentation of all human knowledge worth preserving.

2. ibid., pp. 127 ff.
cording to their conception, nobody would have to use any work antedating the *Encyclopédie*, and all future sciences would assume the form of supplements to the great collection of knowledge. In the nineteenth century, Auguste Comte created his own work as the koran for the positivistic future of mankind but generously supplemented it by his list of the one hundred great books—an idea which still has retained its appeal. In the Communist movement, finally, the works of Karl Marx have become the koran of the faithful, supplemented by the patristic literature of Leninism-Stalinism.

The second device for preventing embarrassing criticism is a necessary supplement to the first one. The Gnostic koran is the codification of truth and as such the spiritual and intellectual nourishment of the faithful. From contemporary experience with totalitarian movements it is well known that the device is fairly foolproof because it can reckon with the voluntary censorship of the adherents; the faithful member of a movement will not touch literature that is apt to argue against, or show disrespect for, his cherished beliefs. Nevertheless, the number of faithful may remain small, and expansion and political success will be seriously hampered, if the truth of the Gnostic movement is permanently exposed to effective criticism from various quarters. This handicap can be reduced, and practically eliminated, by putting a taboo on the instruments of critique; a person who uses the tabooed instruments will be socially boycotted and, if possible, exposed to political defamation. The taboo on the instruments of critique was used, indeed, with superb effectiveness by the Gnostic movements wherever they reached a measure of political success. Concretely, in the wake of the Reformation, the taboo had to fall on classic philosophy and scholastic theology; and, since under these two heads came the major and certainly the de-

gnostic revolution—the puritan case

...cise part of Western intellectual culture, this culture was ruined to the extent to which the taboo became effective. In fact, the destruction went so deep that Western society has never completely recovered from the blow. An incident from Hooker's life will illustrate the situation. The anonymous Christian Letter of 1599, addressed to Hooker, complained bitterly: "In all your books, although we finde manie trueths and fine points bravely handled, yet in all your discourse, for the most parte, Aristotle the patriarche of philosophers (with divers other humane writers) and the ingenuous schoolemen, almost in all points have some finger: reason is highlie sett up against Holy Scripture, and reading against preaching." Such complaints about violations of the taboo were not innocuous expressions of opinion. In 1585, in the affair with Travers, Hooker had been the target of similar charges; and they closed on the denunciatory tone that such "absurdities...have not been heard in public places within this land since Queen Mary's day." In his answer to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Hooker very apologetically had to express his hope that he "committed no unlawful thing" when indulging in some theoretical distinctions and excursions in his sermons.5

Since gnosticism lives by the theoretical fallacies that were discussed in the preceding lecture, the taboo on theory in the classic sense is the ineluctable condition of its social expansion and survival. This has a serious consequence with regard to the possibility of public debate in societies where Gnostic movements have achieved social influence sufficient to control the means of communication, educational institutions, etc. To the degree to which such control is effective, theoretical debate concerning issues which involve the truth of human existence is impossible in public because the use of theoretical argument is prohibited. However well the constitutional freedoms of speech and press may be protected, however well theo-

retical debate may flourish in small circles, and however well it may be carried on in the practically private publications of a handful of scholars, debate in the politically relevant public sphere will be in substance the game with loaded dice which it has become in contemporary progressive societies—to say nothing of the quality of debate in totalitarian empires. Theoretical debate can be protected by constitutional guaranties, but it can be established only by the willingness to use and accept theoretical argument. When this willingness does not exist, a society cannot rely for its functioning on argument and persuasion where the truth of human existence is involved; other means will have to be considered.

This was the position of Hooker. Debate with his Puritan opponents was impossible because they would not accept argument. The ideas which he entertained in this predicament may be gathered from the notes jotted down shortly before his death on a copy of the previously quoted Christian Letter. Among the quotations from various authorities, there is a passage from Averroës:

Discourse (sermo) about the knowledge which God in His glory has of Himself and the world is prohibited. And even more so is it prohibited to put it in writing. For, the understanding of the vulgar does not reach such profundities; and when it becomes the subject of their discussions, the divinity will be destroyed with them. Hence, discussion of this knowledge is prohibited to them; and it is sufficient for their felicity if they understand what they can perceive by their intelligence. The law (that is: the Koran), whose primary intention it was to teach the vulgar, did not fail in intelligible communication about this subject because it is inaccessible to man; but we do not possess the human instruments that could assimilate God for intelligible communication about Him. As it is said: "His left hand founded the earth, but His right hand measured the Heaven." Hence, this question is reserved for the sage whom God dedicated to truth.6

6. For the Latin text of the passage see ibid., I, cxix.
then . . . the world shall be theirs . . . Not only heaven shall be your kingdom, but this world bodily."

All this has nothing to do with Christianity. The scriptural camouflage cannot veil the drawing of God into man. The Saint is a Gnostic who will not leave the transfiguration of the world to the grace of God beyond history but will do the work of God himself, right here and now, in history. To be sure, the author of the pamphlet knows that not ordinary human powers will establish the realm but that human efforts will be subsidiary to the action of God. The Omnipotent God will come to the aid of the Saints and "shall do these things, by that power, whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself. Mountains shall be made plain, and he shall come skipping over mountains and over difficulties. Nothing shall hinder him." But in this God who comes skipping over the mountains we recognize the dialectics of history that comes skipping over thesis and antithesis, until it lands its believers in the plain of the Communist synthesis.

The second point to be considered will be the program of the revolutionaries for the organization of society after the old world has been made new by their efforts. As a rule, Gnostics are not very explicit on this point. The new, transfigured world is supposed to be free of the evils of the old world; and the description will, therefore, ordinarily indulge in negations of the present grievances. The "glimpse" of Zion's glory is a category of Gnostic description rather than the title of a random pamphlet. The "glimpse" will typically reveal a state of prosperity and abundance, a minimum of work, and the abolition of governmental compulsion; and as an entertainment of rather common appeal there may be thrown in some maltreatment of members of the former upper class. Beyond such glimpses the description usually peters out; and the better thinkers among Gnostic revolutionaries, as, for instance, Marx and Engels, justify their reticence with the argument
eliminated for "what right or claim have mere natural and worldly men to rule and government, that want a sanctified claim to the least outward blessings?" And even more pointedly: "How can the kingdom be the Saints' when the ungodly are electors, and elected to govern?" The attitude is uncompromising. If we expect new heavens and a new earth, "how then can it be lawful to patch up the old worldly government?" The only righteous course will be the one that results in "suppressing the enemies of godliness for ever."

No elaborate interpretation is necessary. A few modernizations of language are sufficient to bring out the meaning of these suggestions. The historical order of the people is broken by the rise of a movement which does not belong to "this world." Social evils cannot be reformed by legislation; defects of governmental machinery cannot be repaired by changes in the constitution; differences of opinion cannot be settled by compromise. "This world" is darkness that must give way to the new light. Hence, coalition governments are impossible. The political figures of the old order cannot be re-elected in the new world; and the men who are not members of the movement will be deprived of their right to vote in the new order. All these changes will arrive substantially through the "Spirit" or, as Gnostics would say today, through the dialectics of history; but in political procedure the saintly comrades will take a hand, and the hand will be well armed. If the personnel of the old order should not disappear with a smile, the enemies of godliness will be suppressed or, in contemporary language, will be purged. In the Quotations the realization of the new world has reached the stage at which, in the Russian Revolution, Lenin wrote his reflections under the coquetish title, "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" They will, indeed; and nobody will share it with them.

The new kingdom will be universal in substance as well as universal in its claim to dominion; it will extend "to all per-
sons and things universally." The revolution of the Gnostics has for its aim the monopoly of existential representation. The Saints can foresee that the universalism of their claim will not be accepted without a struggle by the world of darkness but that it will produce an equally universal alliance of the world against them. The Saints, therefore, will have to combine "against the Antichristian powers of the world"; and the Antichristian powers in their turn will "combine against them universally." The two worlds which are supposed to follow each other chronologically will, thus, become in historical reality two universal armed camps engaged in a death struggle against each other. From the Gnostic mysticism of the two worlds emerges the pattern of the universal wars that has come to dominate the twentieth century. The universalism of the Gnostic revolutionary produces the universal alliance against him. The real danger of contemporary wars does not lie in the technologically determined global extent of the theater of war; their true fatality stems from their character as Gnostic wars, that is, of wars between worlds that are bent on mutual destruction.

The selection of materials which are meant to illustrate nature and direction of the Gnostic revolution may seem unfair. A critic might object that Puritanism as a whole cannot be identified with its left wing. Such criticism would be justified if it had been the intention to give a historical account of Puritanism. The present analysis, however, is concerned with the structure of Gnostic experiences and ideas; and this structure is also to be found where the consequences are toned down to the respectability of Calvin's Institutes or of Presbyterian covenantism. The amplitude from right to left within every wave of the movement, the struggle between the two wings on occasion of the acute outbreaks in the several national areas, as well as the temporary stabilizations of a viable order, are phenomena within the Gnostic revolution that will re-
ceive further attention in the last of these lectures. These phenomena, the dynamics of the revolution, however, do not affect its nature; and the nature can, indeed, be studied best in its radical expressions where it is not obscured by compromises with the exigencies of political success. Moreover, this is not a mere matter of convenience but a methodological necessity. The Gnostic revolution has for its purpose a change in the nature of man and the establishment of a transfigured society. Since this program cannot be carried out in historical reality, Gnostic revolutionaries must inevitably institutionalize their partial or total success in the existential struggle by a compromise with reality; and whatever emerges from this compromise—it will not be the transfigured world envisaged by Gnostic symbolism. If, therefore, the theorist would study the Gnostic revolution at the level of its temporary stabilizations, of its political tactics, or of the moderate programs which already envisage the compromise, the nature of gnosticism, the driving force of Western revolution, could never come into view. The compromise would be taken for the essence, and the essential unity of the variegated Gnostic phenomena would disappear.

The English revolution made it clear that the struggle of Gnostic revolutionaries for existential representation could destroy the public order of a great nation—if such proof was needed after the eight civil wars in France and the Thirty Years’ War in Germany. The problem of public order was overdue for theoretical restatement, and in Thomas Hobbes this task found a thinker who was equal to it. The new theory of representation which Hobbes developed in the *Leviathan*, to be sure, purchased its impressive consistency at the price of a simplification which itself belongs in the class of Gnostic misdeeds; but, when a fierce and relentless thinker simplifies,
have covenanted to submit to a common sovereign, has the law of
nature actually become the law of a society in historical existence. "The law of nature, and the civil law, therefore, contain each other, and are of equal extent."  

Existential and transcendental representation, thus, meet in
the articulation of a society into ordered existence. By com-
bining into a political society under a representative, the
covenanting members actualize the divine order of being in the
human sphere.  

Into this somewhat empty vessel of a political society, now,
Hobbes pours the Western-Christian civilizational content by
letting it pass through the bottleneck of sanction by the sov-
ereign representative. The society may well be a Christian
commonwealth because the Word of God revealed in Scripture
is not at variance with natural law. Nevertheless, the canon
of Scripture to be received, the doctrinal and ritual inter-
pretations put on it, as well as the form of clerical organiza-
tion, will derive their authority not from revelation but from
the enactment by the sovereign as the law of the land. There
will be no freedom of debate concerning the truth of human
existence in society; public expression of opinion and doctrine
must be under regulation and permanent supervision of the
government. "For the actions of men proceed from their opin-
ions; and in the well-governing of opinions, consisteth the
well-governing of men's actions, in order to their peace, and
concord." Hence, the sovereign has to decide who will be al-
lowed to speak in public to an audience, on what subject and
in what tendency; there will be necessary, furthermore, a pre-
ventive censorship of books. For the rest, there will be free-
dom for the peaceable, civilizational pursuits of the citizens,
theologiae and their conflict in the Roman Empire. You will remember that St. Ambrose and St. Augustine were oddly insensitive to the fact that a Christian on the throne would, under their guidance, treat pagans in the same manner in which pagan emperors had formerly treated Christians. They understood Christianity as a truth of the soul superior to polytheism but did not recognize that the Roman gods symbolized the truth of Roman society; that with the cult a culture was destroyed, as Celsus had discerned; that an existential victory of Christianity was not a conversion of individual human beings to a higher truth but the forceful imposition of a new theologia civilis on a society. In the case of Hobbes the situation is reversed. When he treats Christianity under the aspect of its substantial identity with the dictate of reason and derives its authority from governmental sanction, he shows himself as oddly insensitive to its meaning as a truth of the soul as were the Patres to the meaning of the Roman gods as a truth of society. In order to reach the root of these oddities, it will be necessary to reconsider the epochal event of the opening of the soul and to add a theoretical distinction.

The opening of the soul was an epochal event in the history of mankind because, with the differentiation of the soul as the sensorium of transcendence, the critical, theoretical standards for the interpretation of human existence in society, as well as the source of their authority, came into view. When the soul opened toward transcendent reality, it found a source of order superior in rank to the established order of society as well as a truth in critical opposition to the truth at which society had arrived through the symbolism of its self-interpretation. Moreover, the idea of a universal God as the measure of the open soul had as its logical correlate the idea of a universal community of mankind, beyond civil society, through the participation of all men in the common measure, be it understood as the Aristotelian nous, the Stoic or the Christian logos. The im-
pact of such discoveries might well obscure the fact that the
new clarity about the structure of reality had not changed this
structure itself. The opening of the soul, indeed, marked an
ePOCH through its advancement from compactness to differen-
tiation of experience, from dimness to clarity of insight; but
the tension between a truth of society and a truth of the soul
had existed before this epoch, and the new understanding of
transcendence could sharpen the consciousness of the tension
but not remove it from the constitution of being. The idea of a
universal God, for instance, achieved its specific purity through
the mystic philosophers, but its existence, imbedded in a com-
pact cosmological myth, is attested by Egyptian inscriptions
for about 3000 B.C.; and since, even at this early date, the
idea appeared in the course of a polemical, critical speculation
on hierarchy and function of gods, there must have existed the
tension between a truth as understood by the speculating
thinker and the truth of the received myth. The Stoic under-
standing of the cosmopolis to which men belong by virtue of
their participation in the Logos, on the other hand, did not
abolish the existence of man in finite historical societies.
Hence, we must distinguish between the opening of the soul as
an epoch in experiential differentiation and the structure of
reality which remains unchanged.

From the distinction it follows for the present problem that
the tension between a differentiated truth of the soul and the
truth of society cannot be eliminated from historical reality
by throwing out the one or the other. Human existence in
natural societies remains what it was before its orientation
toward a destiny beyond nature. Faith is the anticipation of a
supernatural perfection of man; it is not this perfection itself.
The realm of God is not of this world; and the representative

24. William F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and the His-
torical Process (Baltimore, 1946), pp. 132 ff.; Hermann Junker, Pyramidenzeit: Das Wesen
der altägyptischen Religion (Zürich, 1949), pp. 18 ff.
of the *civitas Dei* in history, the church, is not a substitute for civil society. The result of the epochal differentiation is not the replacement of the closed society by an open society—if we may use the Bergsonian terms—but a complication of symbolism which corresponds to the differentiation of experiences. Both types of truth will from now on exist together; and the tension between the two, in various degrees of consciousness, will be a permanent structure of civilization. This insight had been gained already by Plato; in his work it is reflected in the evolution from the *Republic* to the *Laws*. In the *Republic* he constructed a polis that would incarnate the truth of the soul under the immediate rule of mystic philosophers; it was an attempt to dissolve the tension by making the order of the soul the order of society. In the *Laws* he removed the truth of the soul into the distance of its revelation in the *Republic*; the polis of the *Laws* relied on institutions that mirrored the order of the cosmos, while the truth of the soul was mediated by administrators who received it as dogma. Plato himself, the potential philosopher-king of the *Republic*, became the Athenian Stranger of the *Laws* who assisted in devising institutions that embodied as much of the spirit as was compatible with the continued natural existence of society.

The Christian Fathers did not display the perspicacity of Plato when the same problem was forced upon them by historical circumstance. Apparently they did not understand that Christianity could supersede polytheism but not abolish the need of a civil theology. When the truth of the soul had prevailed, the vacuum was left that Plato had tried to fill with his construction of the polis as a cosmic analogue. The filling of this vacuum became a major problem wherever Christianity dissolved the pre-Christian truth of the closed society as a living force; wherever, as a consequence, the church achieved existential representation by the side of the civil ruler and now had to provide transcendental legitimation for the order of
society, in addition to its representation of the supranatural destiny of man. The one great solution was Byzantine caesaropapism, with its tendency toward transforming the church into a civil institution. Against this tendency, at the end of the fifth century, Gelasius wrote his letters and tracts which formulated the other great solution, that of the two balancing powers. This balance functioned in the West as long as the work of civilizational expansion and consolidation provided parallel interests for ecclesiastic and civil organizations. But the tension between the two types of truth became noticeable as soon as a certain degree of civilizational saturation was reached. When the church, in the wake of the Cluniac reform, reasserted its spiritual substance and tried to disengage itself from its civil entanglements, the investiture struggle was the consequence. On the other hand, when the Gnostic sectarian movements gained momentum in the twelfth century, the church co-operated, through the Inquisition, with the civil power in the persecution of heretics; it leaned strongly toward its function as the agent of the theologia civilis and thereby became untrue to its essence as the representative of the civitas Dei in history. The tension, finally, reached the breaking point when a plurality of schismatic churches and Gnostic movements entered into violent competition for existential representation. The vacuum now became manifest in the religious civil wars.

Hobbes saw that public order was impossible without a civil theology beyond debate; it is the great and permanent achievement of the Leviathan to have clarified this point. Less fortunate was his hand when he tried to fill the vacuum by establishing Christianity as the English civil theology. He could entertain this idea because he assumed Christianity, if properly interpreted, to be identical with the truth of society which he had developed in the first two parts of the Leviathan. He denied the existence of a tension between the
truth of the soul and the truth of society; the content of Scripture, in his opinion, coincided in substance with the truth of Hobbes. On the basis of this assumption, he could indulge in the idea of solving a crisis of world-historical proportions by tendering his expert advice to any sovereign who was willing to take it. "I recover some hope," he said, "that one time or other, this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign, who will consider it himself, (for it is short, and I think clear), without the help of any interested, or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of practice." He saw himself in the role of a Plato, in quest of a king who would adopt the new truth and indoctrinate the people with it. The education of the people was an essential part of his program. Hobbes did not rely on governmental force for suppressing religious movements; he knew that public order was genuine only if the people accepted it freely and that free acceptance was possible only if the people understood obedience to the public representative as their duty under eternal law. If the people were ignorant of this law, they would consider punishment for rebellion an "act of hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of hostility, to avoid." He, therefore, declared it the duty of the sovereign to repair the ignorance of the people by appropriate information. If that were done, there might be hope that his principles would "make their constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting." With this idea, however, of abolishing the tensions of history by the spreading of a new truth, Hobbes reveals his own Gnostic intentions; the attempt at freezing history into an everlasting constitution is an instance of the general class of Gnostic


attempts at freezing history into an everlasting final realm on this earth.

The idea of solving the troubles of history through the invention of the everlasting constitution made sense only under the condition that the source of these troubles, that is, the truth of the soul, would cease to agitate man. Hobbes, indeed, simplified the structure of politics by throwing out anthropological and soteriological truth. This is an understandable desire in a man who wants his peace; things, to be sure, would be so much simpler without philosophy and Christianity. But how can one dispose of them without abolishing the experiences of transcendence which belong to the nature of man? Hobbes was quite able to solve this problem, too; he improved on the man of God's creation by creating a man without such experiences. At this point, however, we are entering the higher regions of the Gnostic dream world. This further Hobbesian enterprise must be placed in the larger context of the Western crisis; and that will be a task for the last of these lectures.
VI

THE END OF MODERNITY

1

HOBBS had discerned the lack of a *theologia civilis* as the source of difficulties that plagued the state of England in the Puritan crisis. The various groups engaged in the civil war were so heaven-bent on having the public order represent the right variety of transcendent truth that the existential order of society was in danger of floundering in the melee. It certainly was an occasion to rediscover the discovery of Plato that a society must exist as an ordered cosmos, as a representative of cosmic order, before it can indulge in the luxury of also representing a truth of the soul. To represent the truth of the soul in the Christian sense is the function of the church, not of civil society. If a plurality of churches and sects starts fighting for control of the public order, and none of them is strong enough to gain an unequivocal victory, the logical result can only be that, by the existential authority of the public representative, the whole lot will be relegated to the position of private associations within the society. This problem of existence was touched on several occasions in these lectures; it now requires a summary elucidation before the Hobbesian idea of man can be presented and evaluated. The analysis will suitably start from the points that have already been secured.

Christianity had left in its wake the vacuum of a de-divinized natural sphere of political existence. In the concrete situation of the late Roman Empire and the early Western political foundations, this vacuum did not become a major source of troubles as long as the myth of the empire was not seriously
disturbed by the consolidation of national realms and as long as the church was the predominant civilizing factor in the evolution of Western society, so that Christianity in fact could function as a civil theology. As soon, however, as a certain point of civilizational saturation was reached, when centers of lay culture formed at the courts and in the cities, when competent lay personnel increased in royal administrations and city governments, it became abundantly clear that the problems of a society in historical existence were not exhausted by waiting for the end of the world. The rise of gnosticism at this critical juncture now appears in a new light as the incipient formation of a Western civil theology. The immanentization of the Christian eschaton made it possible to endow society in its natural existence with a meaning which Christianity denied to it. And the totalitarianism of our time must be understood as journey's end of the Gnostic search for a civil theology.

The Gnostic experiment in civil theology, however, was fraught with dangers, flowing from its hybrid character as a Christian derivative. The first of these dangers has been discussed already. It was the tendency of gnosticism not to supplement but to supplant the truth of the soul. Gnostic movements were not satisfied with filling the vacuum of civil theology; they tended to abolish Christianity. In the earlier phases of the movement the attack was still disguised as Christian "spiritualization" or "reform"; in the later phases, with the more radical immanentization of the eschaton, it became openly anti-Christian. As a consequence, wherever Gnostic movements spread they destroyed the truth of the open soul; a whole area of differentiated reality that had been gained by philosophy and Christianity was ruined. And again it is necessary to remember that the advance of gnosticism is not a return to paganism. In the pre-Christian civilizations the truth which differentiated with the opening of the soul was
present in the form of compact experiences; in Gnostic civilizations the truth of the soul does not return to compactness but is repressed altogether. This repression of the authoritative source of order in the soul is the cause of the bleak atrocity of totalitarian governments in their dealings with individual human beings.

The peculiar, repressive result of the growth of gnosticism in Western society suggests the conception of a civilizational cycle of world-historic proportions. There emerge the contours of a giant cycle, transcending the cycles of the single civilizations. The acme of this cycle would be marked by the appearance of Christ; the pre-Christian high civilizations would form its ascending branch; modern, Gnostic civilization would form its descending branch. The pre-Christian high civilizations advanced from the compactness of experience to the differentiation of the soul as the sensorium of transcendence; and, in the Mediterranean civilizational area, this evolution culminated in the maximum of differentiation, through the revelation of the Logos in history. In so far as the pre-Christian civilizations advance toward this maximum of the advent, their dynamics may be called "adventitious." Modern Gnostic civilization reverses the tendency toward differentiation; and, in so far as it recedes from the maximum, its dynamics may be called "recessive." While Western society has its own cycle of growth, flowering, and decline, it must be considered—because of the growth of gnosticism in its course—as the declining branch of the larger advent-recession cycle.

These reflections open a perspective on the future dynamics of civilization. Modern gnosticism has by far not spent its drive. On the contrary, in the variant of Marxism it is expanding its area of influence prodigiously in Asia, while other variants of gnosticism, such as progressivism, positivism, and scientism, are penetrating into other areas under the title of "Westernization" and development of backward countries.
And one may say that in Western society itself the drive is not spent but that our own "Westernization" is still on the increase. In the face of this world-wide expansion it is necessary to state the obvious: that human nature does not change. The closure of the soul in modern gnosticism can repress the truth of the soul, as well as the experiences which manifest themselves in philosophy and Christianity, but it cannot remove the soul and its transcendence from the structure of reality. Hence the question imposes itself: How long can such a repression last? And what will happen when prolonged and severe repression will lead to an explosion? It is legitimate to ask such questions concerning the dynamics of the future because they spring from a methodically correct application of theory to an empirically observed component of contemporary civilization. It would not be legitimate, however, to indulge in speculations about the form which the explosion will assume, beyond the reasonable assumption that the reaction against gnosticism will be as world-wide as its expansion. The number of complicating factors is so large that predictions seem futile. Even for our own Western society one can hardly do more than point to the fact that gnosticism, in spite of its noisy ascendancy, does by far not have the field for itself; that the classic and Christian tradition of Western society is rather alive; that the building-up of spiritual and intellectual resistance against gnosticism in all its variants is a notable factor in our society; that the reconstruction of a science of man and society is one of the remarkable events of the last half-century and, in retrospect from a future vantage point, will perhaps appear as the most important event in our time. Still less can be said, for obvious reasons, about the probable reaction of a living Christian tradition against gnosticism in the Soviet empire. And nothing at all about the manner in which Chinese, Hindu, Islamic, and primitive civilizations will react to a prolonged exposure to Gnostic devastation and
repression. Only on one point at least a reasonable surmise is possible, that is, on the date of the explosion. The date in objective time, of course, is quite unpredictable; but gnosticism contains a self-defeating factor, and this factor makes it at least probable that the date is less distant than one would assume under the impression of Gnostic power of the moment. This self-defeating factor is the second danger of gnosticism as a civil theology.

2

The first danger was the destruction of the truth of the soul. The second danger is intimately connected with the first one. The truth of gnosticism is vitiated, as you will remember, by the fallacious immanentization of the Christian eschaton. This fallacy is not simply a theoretical mistake concerning the meaning of the eschaton, committed by this or that thinker, perhaps an affair of the schools. On the basis of this fallacy, Gnostic thinkers, leaders, and their followers interpret a concrete society and its order as an eschaton; and, in so far as they apply their fallacious construction to concrete social problems, they misrepresent the structure of immanent reality. The eschatological interpretation of history results in a false picture of reality; and errors with regard to the structure of reality have practical consequences when the false conception is made the basis of political action. Specifically, the Gnostic fallacy destroys the oldest wisdom of mankind concerning the rhythm of growth and decay which is the fate of all things under the sun. The Kohelet says:

   To every thing there is a season,
   And a time to every purpose under heaven:
   A time to be born and a time to die.

And then, reflecting on the finiteness of human knowledge, the Kohelet continues to say that the mind of man cannot fathom “the work that God maketh from the beginning to
the end."\(^1\) What comes into being will have an end, and the mystery of this stream of being is impenetrable. These are the two great principles governing existence. The Gnostic speculation on the eidos of history, however, not only ignores these principles but perverts them into their opposite. The idea of the final realm assumes a society that will come into being but have no end, and the mystery of the stream is solved through the speculative knowledge of its goal. Gnosticism, thus, has produced something like the counterprinciples to the principles of existence; and, in so far as these principles determine an image of reality for the masses of the faithful, it has created a dream world which itself is a social force of the first importance in motivating attitudes and actions of Gnostic masses and their representatives.

The phenomenon of a dream world, based on definite principles, requires some explanation. It could hardly be possible as a historical mass phenomenon unless it were rooted in a fundamental experiential drive. Gnosticism as a counterexistential dream world can perhaps be made intelligible as the extreme expression of an experience which is universally human, that is, of a horror of existence and a desire to escape from it. Specifically, the problem can be stated in the following terms: A society, when it exists, will interpret its order as part of the transcendent order of being. This self-interpretation of society as a mirror of cosmic order, however, is part of social reality itself. The ordered society, together with its self-understanding, remains a wave in the stream of being; the Aeschylean polis with its ordering Dike is an island in a sea of demonic disorder, precariously maintaining itself in existence. Only the order of an existing society is intelligible; its existence itself is unintelligible. The successful articulation of a society is a fact that has become possible under favorable circumstances; and this fact may be annulled by unfavorable circumstances, as,

1. Eccles. 3:1–2 and 3:11.
for instance, by the appearance of a stronger, conquering power. The *fortuna secunda et adversa* is the smiling and terrible goddess who rules over this realm of existence. This hazard of existence without right or reason is a demonic horror; it is hard to bear even for the stronghearted; and it is hardly bearable for tender souls who cannot live without believing they deserve to live. It is a reasonable assumption, therefore, that in every society there is present, in varying degrees of intense-ness, the inclination to extend the meaning of its order to the fact of its existence. Especially, when a society has a long and glorious history, its existence will be taken for granted as part of the order of things. It has become unimaginable that the society could simply cease to exist; and when a great symbolic blow falls, as, for instance, when Rome was conquered in 410, a groan went through the *orbis terrarum* that now the end of the world had come.

In every society, thus, is present an inclination to extend the meaning of order to the fact of existence, but in predominantly Gnostic societies this extension is erected into a principle of self-interpretation. This shift from a mood, from a lassitude to take existence for granted, to a principle determines a new pattern of conduct. In the first case, one can speak of an inclination to disregard the structure of reality, of relaxing into the sweetness of existence, of a decline of civic morality, of a blindness to obvious dangers, and a reluctance to meet them with all seriousness. It is the mood of late, disintegrating societies that no longer are willing to fight for their existence. In the second, the Gnostic case, the psychological situation is entirely different. In gnosticism the nonrecognition of reality is a matter of principle; in this case, one would have rather to speak of an inclination to remain aware of the hazard of existence in spite of the fact that it is not admitted as a problem in the Gnostic dream world; nor does the dream impair civic responsibility or the readiness to fight valiantly
chorus wailing its moral indignation at such barbarian and reactionary doings in a progressive world—without however raising a finger to repress the rising force by a minor political effort in proper time. The prehistory of the second World War raises the serious question whether the Gnostic dream has not corroded Western society so deeply that rational politics has become impossible, and war is the only instrument left for adjusting disturbances in the balance of existential forces.

The conduct of the war and its aftermath unfortunately are apt to confirm this fear rather than to assuage it. If a war has a purpose at all, it is the restoration of a balance of forces and not the aggravation of disturbance; it is the reduction of the unbalancing excess of force, not the destruction of force to the point of creating a new unbalancing power vacuum. Instead the Gnostic politicians have put the Soviet army on the Elbe, surrendered China to the Communists, at the same time demilitarized Germany and Japan, and in addition demobilized our own army. The facts are trite, and yet it is perhaps not sufficiently realized that never before in the history of mankind has a world power used a victory deliberately for the purpose of creating a power vacuum to its own disadvantage. And again, as in previous contexts, it is necessary to warn that phenomena of this magnitude cannot be explained by ignorance and stupidity. These policies were pursued as a matter of principle, on the basis of Gnostic dream assumptions about the nature of man, about a mysterious evolution of mankind toward peace and world order, about the possibility of establishing an international order in the abstract without relation to the structure of the field of existential forces, about armies being the cause of war and not the forces and constellations which build them and set them into motion, etc. The enumerated series of actions, as well as the dream assumptions on which they are based, seem to show that the contact with reality is at least badly damaged and that the pathological substitution of the dream world is fairly effective.
portant part, however, it will be determined by their relation to the civilizational environment in which the Gnostic revolution takes place. For it must never be forgotten that Western society is not all modern but that modernity is a growth within it, in opposition to the classic and Christian tradition. If there were nothing in Western society but gnosticism, the movement toward the left would be irresistible because it lies in the logic of immanentization, and it would have been consummated long ago. In fact, however, the great Western revolutions of the past, after their logical swing to the left, settled down to a public order which reflected the balance of the social forces of the moment, together with their economic interests and civilizational traditions. The apprehension or hope, as the case may be, that the "partial" revolutions of the past will be followed by the "radical" revolution and the establishment of the final realm rests on the assumption that the traditions of Western society are now sufficiently ruined and that the famous masses are ready for the kill.  

The dynamics of gnosticism, thus, moves along two lines. In the dimension of historical depth, gnosticism moves from the partial immanentization of the high Middle Ages to the radical immanentization of the present. And with every wave and revolutionary outburst it moves in the amplitude of right and left. The thesis, however, that these two lines of dynamics must now meet according to their inner logic, that Western society is ripe to fall for communism, that the course of Western history is determined by the logic of its modernity and nothing else, is an impertinent piece of Gnostic propaganda at both its silliest and most vicious and certainly has nothing to do with a critical study of politics. Against this thesis must be held a number of facts which today are obscured because the

5. The concepts of "partial" and "radical" revolution were developed by Karl Marx in *Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*, Einleitung (1843), Vol. I: Gesamtausgabe, p. 617.
English national society seemed in danger of being destroyed by Gnostic revolutionaries, as today on a larger scale the same danger seems to threaten the existence of Western society as a whole. Hobbes tried to meet the danger by devising a civil theology which made the order of a society in existence the truth which it represented—and by the side of this truth no other should be held. This was an eminently sensible idea in so far as it put the whole weight on existence that had been so badly neglected by the Gnostics. The practical value of the idea, however, rested on the assumption that the transcendent truth which men tried to represent in their societies, after mankind had gone through the experiences of philosophy and Christianity, could be neglected in its turn. Against the Gnostics who did not want society to exist unless its order represented a specific type of truth, Hobbes insisted that any order would do if it secured the existence of society. In order to make this conception valid, he had to create his new idea of man. Human nature would have to find fulfilment in existence itself; a purpose of man beyond existence would have to be denied. Hobbes countered the Gnostic immanentization of the eschaton which endangered existence by a radical immanence of existence which denied the eschaton.

The result of this effort was ambivalent. In order to maintain his position against the fighting churches and sects, Hobbes had to deny that their zeal was inspired, however misguided, by a search for truth. Their struggle had to be interpreted, in terms of immanent existence, as an unfettered expression of their lust for power; and their professed religious concern had to be revealed as a mask for their existential lust. In carrying out this analysis, Hobbes proved to be one of the greatest psychologists of all times; his achievements in unmasking the libido dominandi behind the pretense of religious zeal and reforming idealism are as solid today as they were at the time when he wrote. This magnificent psychological
achievement, however, was purchased at a heavy price. Hobbes rightly diagnosed the corruptive element of passion in the religiousness of the Puritan Gnostics. He did not, however, interpret passion as the source of corruption in the life of the spirit, but rather the life of the spirit as the extreme of existential passion. Hence, he could not interpret the nature of man from the vantage point of the maximum of differentiation through the experiences of transcendence so that passion, and especially the fundamental passion, *superbia*, could be discerned as the permanently present danger of the fall from true nature; but he had, on the contrary, to interpret the life of passion as the nature of man so that the phenomena of spiritual life appeared as extremes of *superbia*.

According to this conception, the generic nature of man must be studied in terms of human passions; the objects of the passions are no legitimate object of inquiry. This is the fundamental counterposition to classic and Christian moral philosophy. Aristotelian ethics starts from the purposes of action and explores the order of human life in terms of the ordination of all actions toward a highest purpose, the *sumnum bonum*; Hobbes, on the contrary, insists that there is no *sumnum bonum*, "as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers." With the *sumnum bonum*, however, disappears the source of order from human life; and not only from the life of individual man but also from life in society; for, as you will remember, the order of the life in community depends on *homoynoria*, in the Aristotelian and Christian sense, that is, on the participation in the common nous. Hobbes, therefore, is faced with the problem of constructing an order of society out of isolated individuals who are not oriented toward a common purpose but only motivated by their individual passions.

The details of the construction are well known. It will be

Since Hobbes does not recognize sources of order in the soul, inspiration can be exorcised only by a passion that is even stronger than the pride to be a paraclete, and that is the fear of death. Death is the greatest evil; and if life cannot be ordered through orientation of the soul toward a *summum bonum*, order will have to be motivated by fear of the *summum malum*. Out of mutual fear is born the willingness to submit to government by contract. When the contracting parties agree to have a government, they “confer all their power and strength upon one man, or assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will.”

The acumen of Hobbes shows itself at its best in his understanding that the contractual symbolism which he uses, in accordance with the conventions of the seventeenth century, is not the essence of the matter. The combining into a commonwealth under a sovereign may express itself in legal form, but essentially it is a psychological transformation of the combining persons. The Hobbesian conception of the process in which a political society comes into existence is rather close to Fortescue’s conception of the creation of a new *corpus mysticum* through the eruption of a people. The covenants do not create a government that would represent them as single individuals; in the contracting act they cease to be self-governing persons and merge their power drives into a new person, the commonwealth, and the carrier of this new person, its representative, is the sovereign.

This construction required a few distinctions concerning the meaning of the term “person.” “A person, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words and actions of another man, or of any other thing.” When he represents himself, he is a natural person; when he


The style of the construction is magnificent. If human nature is assumed to be nothing but passionate existence, devoid of ordering resources of the soul, the horror of annihilation will, indeed, be the overriding passion that compels submission to order. If pride cannot bow to Dike, or be redeemed through grace, it must be broken by the Leviathan who “is king of all the children of pride.” 20 If the souls cannot participate in the Logos, then the sovereign who strikes terror into the souls will be “the essence of the commonwealth.” 21 The “King of the Proud” must break the amor sui that cannot be relieved by the amor Dei. 22

5

Joachim of Flora had created an aggregate of symbols which dominated the self-interpretation of modern political movements in general; Hobbes created a comparable aggregate which expressed the component of radical immanence in modern politics.

The first of these symbols may be called the new psychology. Its nature can be defined best by relating it to the Augustinian psychology from which it derives. St. Augustine distinguished between the amor sui and the amor Dei as the organizing volitional centers of the soul. Hobbes threw out the amor Dei and relied for his psychology on the amor sui, in his language the self-conceit or pride of the individual, alone. In this elimination of the amor Dei from the interpretation of the psyche a development was consummated that can be traced back at least to the twelfth century. With the appearance of the self-reliant individual on the social scene, the new type and its striving for public success beyond its status attracted attention. In fact, John of Salisbury described it in his Poli-

20. Ibid., chap. xxvii, p. 209.
21. Ibid., chap. xvii, p. 112.
22. Ibid., chap. xxviii, p. 209.
craticus in terms closely resembling those of Hobbes. In the wake of the institutional upheavals of the late Middle Ages and the Reformation, then, the type became so common that it appeared as the "normal" type of man and became a matter of general concern. The psychological work of Hobbes was paralleled in his own time by the psychology of Pascal, though Pascal preserved the Christian tradition and described the man who was guided by his passions alone as the man who had fallen a prey to one or the other type of libido. And also contemporaneously, with La Rochefoucauld, began the psychology of the man of the "world" who was motivated by his amour-propre (the Augustinian amor sui). The national ramifications into the French psychology of the moralistes and novelists, the English psychology of pleasure-pain, associationism and self-interest, the German enrichments through the psychology of the unconscious of the Romantics and the psychology of Nietzsche, may be recalled in order to suggest the pervasiveness of the phenomenon. A specifically "modern" psychology developed as the empirical psychology of "modern" man, that is, of the man who was intellectually and spiritually disoriented and hence motivated primarily by his

23. John of Salisbury, Politicatus: Sive De augis curialium, et vestigiiis philosophorum libri octo, ed. Clement C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1909). The following passages are quoted in the translation of The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury, translated into English with an Introduction by John Dickinson (New York, 1927). Man, ignorant of his true status and the obedience which he owes to God, "aspires to a kind of fictitious liberty, vainly imagining that he can live without fear and can do with impunity whatsoever pleases him, and somehow be straightway like unto God" (viii. 17). "Though it is not given to all men to seize princely or royal power, yet the man who is wholly untainted by tyranny is rare or non-existent. In common speech the tyrant is one who oppresses a whole people by rulership based on force; and yet it is not over a people as a whole that a man can play the tyrant, but he can do so if he will even in the meanest station. For if not over the whole body of the people, still each man will lord it as far as his power extends" (vii. 17). Even the Hobbesian metaphor of the race can be found in John: "And so all contend in the race, and when the goal is reached, that one among them receives the prize who emerges swifter than the rest in the race of ambition, and outruns Peter or any of the disciples of Christ" (vii. 19).
Imst. Pegnitz (Resg. = truete) — Sam. 1 — Trier 
(= Freiburg)

in Brief: 3. 4. deshalb des Problem der Kreatur
(= the unseen number for judging the visible), der per definitionem mit der Dasein
Welt sich Kämm, und aus ihm die Dasein
Welt Flammen zudee rollen.

(V.)

V., im Zusammen zu my n. a. tenplos, trying to find in the “experimental” realm of
man the fundamentals of politics — the idea
sulla g. on it to recognize an an human
man experimental field between (as against
in) me.

V. 172 ff. really believes that the men is first the
result of a few fundamentally strong comph,
not “real” properly speaking.