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XENOPHON

MEMORABILIA AND OECONOMICUS

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MEMORABILIA AND OECONOMICUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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ΞΕΝΟΦΩΝΤΟΣ ΑΠΟΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΜΑΤΑ

Α

I. Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα, τίσι ποτὲ λόγοις Ἀθηναίους ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτην, ὡς ἄξιος εἶη θανάτου τῇ πόλει. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφή κατ' αὐτοῦ τοιαύδε τις ἦν· Ἄδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἄδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

- 2 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς, ποίῳ ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γὰρ φανερός ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ¹ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν καὶ μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανής ἦν· διετεθρύλητο γὰρ, ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. ὁ δ' οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὗτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντενομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ

¹ καὶ A : Sauppe omits.

ἡ πόλις
 νομίζει θεοὺς
 οὐ νομίζων
 3
 εἰσφέρειν
 2
 175

πραγματικα: all right in human sense
αδελφα: schon zus. röhne im Haus d. d. d.

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- 4 σημαίνειν, κακείνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλείστοί φασιν ὑπὸ τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι. Σωκράτης δ' ὡσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος. καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ
- 5 πειθομένοις μετέμελε. καίτοι τίς οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν αὐτὸν βούλεσθαι μὴτ' ἠλίθιον μὴτ' ἀλαζόνα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς συνοῦσιν; ἐδόκει δ' ἂν ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα, εἰ προαγορεύων ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ φαινόμενα ψευδόμενος ἐφαίνετο. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν προέλεγεν, εἰ μὴ ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύσειν. ταῦτα δὲ τίς ἂν ἄλλῳ πιστεύσειεν ἢ θεῷ; πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς πῶς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν;
- 6 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τάδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν, ὡς νομίζοιεν ἄριστ' ἂν πραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσομένους
- 7 ἔπεμπεν, εἰ ποιητέα· καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ λογιστικὸν ἢ οἰκονομικὸν ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη αἰρετὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι·
- 8 τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. οὔτε γὰρ τοι τῷ καλῶς ἀγρὸν φυτευσάμενῳ δῆλον, ὅστις καρπώσεται, οὔτε

- τῷ καλῶς οἰκίαν οἰκοδομησαμένῳ δῆλον, ὅστις ἐνοικήσει, οὔτε τῷ στρατηγικῷ δῆλον, εἰ συμφέρει στρατηγεῖν, οὔτε τῷ πολιτικῷ δῆλον, εἰ συμφέρει τῆς πόλεως προστατεῖν, οὔτε τῷ καλὴν γήμαντι, ἵν' εὐφραίνηται, δῆλον, εἰ διὰ ταύτην ἀνιάσεται, οὔτε τῷ δυνατοῦς ἐν τῇ πόλει κηδεστὰς λαβόντι δῆλον, εἰ διὰ τούτους στερήσεται τῆς πόλεως.
- 9 τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης δαιμονῶν ἔφη δαιμονῶν δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντευομένους ἂ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν, οἷον εἴ τις ἐπερωτῶη, πότερον ἐπιστάμενον ἢ νιοχεῖν ἐπὶ ζευγος λαβεῖν κρεῖττον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον ἢ πότερον ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν κρεῖττον λαβεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον ἢ ἂ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας ἢ μετρήσαντας ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι, τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθανομένους ἀθέμιτα ποιεῖν ἠγείτο. ἔφη δὲ δεῖν ἂ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μανθάνειν, ἂ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ὧσιν ἴλεω σημαίνειν.
- 10 Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνός γε αἰεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερώ· πρῶι τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦει καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν αἰεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλου συνέσεσθαι· καὶ ἔλεγε μὲν ὡς τὸ πολὺ, τοῖς δὲ βου-

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 6.

φύσις - λόγος
Being - speech

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- 11 λομένοις ἐξῆν ἀκούειν. οὐδεὶς δὲ πρόποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πρᾶπτοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ἤπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι διελέγετο σκοπῶν, ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφθυ καὶ τίσις ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας
- 12 τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες ἰκανῶς ἤδη τὰνθρώπινα εἶδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων φροντίζειν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες ἠγοῦνται τὰ προσή-
- 13 κοντα πρᾶπτειν. ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατὸν ἐστίν ἀνθρώποις εὐρεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονούντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων λέγειν οὐ ταῦτα δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς
- 14 ἀλλήλους. τῶν τε γὰρ μαινομένων τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ τὰ δεινὰ δεδιέναι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὐδ' ἐν ὄχλῳ δοκεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν, τοῖς δὲ οὐδ' ἐξιτητέον εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δοκεῖν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν οὐθ' ἱερὸν οὔτε βωμὸν οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν θείων οὐδὲν τιμᾶν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα καὶ θηρία σέβεσθαι· τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως μεριμνώντων τοῖς μὲν δοκεῖν ἐν μόνον τὸ ὄν εἶναι, τοῖς δ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ πάντα κινεῖσθαι, τοῖς δ' οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε κινήθῃναι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πάντα γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῖς δὲ οὔτ' ἄν γενέσθαι ποτὲ
- 15 οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀπολέσθαι.¹ ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τάδε, ἄρ' ὥσπερ οἱ τὰνθρώπεια μαυθάνοντες

ἡγοῦνται τοῦθ' ὅ τι ἂν μάθωσιν ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτ' ἂν βούλωνται ποιήσειν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ τὰ θεῖα ζητοῦντες νομίζουσιν, ἐπειδὴν γινώσκιν, αἷς ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται, ποιήσειν, ὅταν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀέμους καὶ ὕδατα καὶ ὥρας καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου δέωνται τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ τοιοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐλπίζουσιν, ἀρκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς γινῶναι μόνον, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεται.

16 *of Arist* Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ταῦτα πραγματευομένων τοιαῦτα ἔλεγεν· αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων αἰεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἀδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγείτο καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλήσθαι.

- 17 "Ὅσα μὲν οὖν μὴ φανερὸς ἦν ὅπως ἐγίνωσκεν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ὑπὲρ τούτων περὶ αὐτοῦ παραγινῶναι τοὺς δικαστάς· ὅσα δὲ πάντες ᾔδουσαν, οὐ
18 θαυμαστὸν εἰ μὴ τούτων ἐνεθυμήθησαν; βουλευσας γάρ ποτε καὶ τὸν βουλευτικὸν ὄρκον ὁμόσας, ἐν ᾧ ἦν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλευέσθαι, ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννεὰ στρατηγούς μὴ ψήφω τοὺς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον καὶ Ἐρασινίδην ἀποκτείναι πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσειν, ὀργιζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων· ἀλλὰ περὶ πλείονος ἐποιήσατο

said, think that they will apply their knowledge in due course for the good of themselves and any others they choose. Do those who pry into heavenly phenomena imagine that, once they have discovered the laws by which these are produced, they will create at their will winds, waters, seasons and such things to their need? Or have they no such expectation, and are they satisfied with knowing the causes of these various phenomena?

Such, then, was his criticism of those who meddle 16 with these matters. His own conversation was ever of human things. The problems he discussed were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a governor;—these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a "gentleman," in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of "slavishness."

So, in pronouncing on opinions of his that were 17 unknown to them it is not surprising that the jury erred: but is it not astonishing that they should have ignored matters of common knowledge? For 18 instance, when he was on the Council and had taken the counsellor's oath by which he bound himself to give counsel in accordance with the laws, it fell to his lot to preside in the Assembly when the people wanted to condemn Thrasylus and Erasinides and their colleagues to death by a single vote. That was illegal, and he refused the motion in spite of popular rancour and the threats of many powerful persons. It was more to him that he should keep his oath than that he should humour

γενεσθαι

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19 εὐορκεῖν ἢ χαρίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον
καὶ φυλάσσειν τοὺς ἀπειλοῦντας. καὶ γὰρ
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ὄν
τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν. οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ
οἴονται τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ μὲν εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' οὐκ
εἰδέναι. Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἠγείτο θεοὺς
εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ
σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ
σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων
πάντων.

20 Θαυμάζω οὖν, ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπέισθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι
Σωκράτην περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν, τὸν
ἀσεβὲς μὲν οὐδὲν ποτε περὶ θεοῦ οὐτ' εἰπόντα
οὔτε πράξαντα, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ λέγοντα καὶ
πράττοντα [περὶ θεῶν], οἷά τις ἂν καὶ λέγων καὶ
πράττων εἴη τε καὶ νομίζοιτο εὐσεβέστατος.

II. Θαυμαστὸν δὲ φαίνεται μοι καὶ τὸ πεισθῆ-
ναί τινας, ὡς Σωκράτης τοὺς νέους διέφθειρεν, ὃς
πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις πρῶτον μὲν ἀφροδισίων καὶ
γαστρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγκρατέστατος ἦν,
εἶτα πρὸς χειμῶνα καὶ θέρος καὶ πάντας πόνους
καρτερικώτατος, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι
πεπαιδευμένος οὕτως, ὥστε πᾶν μικρὰ κεκτημένος
2 πᾶν ῥαδίως ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα. πῶς οὖν αὐτὸς ὦν
τοιούτος ἄλλους ἂν ἢ ἀσεβεῖς ἢ παρανόμους ἢ
λίχνους ἢ ἀφροδισίων ἀκρατεῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸ πονεῖν
μαλακοὺς ἐποίησεν; ἀλλ' ἔπαυσε μὲν τούτων
πολλοὺς, ἀρετῆς ποιήσας ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ἐλπίδας
παρασχών, ἂν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελῶνται, καλοὺς
3 κάγαθοὺς ἔσσειν. καίτοι γε οὐδεπώποτε
ἵπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῷ
φανερὸς εἶναι τοιούτος ὦν ἐλπίζειν ἐποίει τοὺς

MEMORABILIA, I. 1. 18-11. 3

the people in an unjust demand and shield himself
from threats. For, like most men, indeed, he be- 19
lieved that the gods are heedful of mankind, but
with an important difference; for whereas they do
not believe in the omniscience of the gods, Socrates
thought that they know all things, our words and X X
deeds and secret purposes; that they are present
everywhere, and grant signs to men of all that
concerns man.¹

I wonder, then, how the Athenians can have been 20
persuaded that Socrates was a freethinker, when he
never said or did anything contrary to sound religion,
and his utterances about the gods and his behaviour
towards them were the words and actions of a
man who is truly religious and deserves to be
thought so.

II. No less wonderful is it to me that some believed
the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting
the youth. In the first place, apart from what I have
said, in control of his own passions and appetites he
was the strictest of men; further, in endurance of
cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most
resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to
moderation that having very little he was yet very
content. Such was his own character: how then 2
can he have led others into impiety, crime, gluttony,
lust, or sloth? On the contrary, he cured these
vices in many, by putting into them a desire for
goodness, and by giving them confidence that self-
discipline would make them gentlemen. To be sure 3
he never professed to teach this; but, by letting his
own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that

¹ IV. iii, 2; *Cyropædia*, I. vi. 46.

συνδιατρίβοντας ἑαυτῷ μιμουμένους ἐκείνον τοιού-
 4 τους γενήσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ σώματος
 αὐτός τε οὐκ ἠμέλει τοὺς τ' ἀμελοῦντας οὐκ
 ἐπὶναι. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερσεθίοντα ὑπερπονεῖν
 ἀπεδοκίμαζε, τὸ δὲ ὅσα γ' ἠδέως ἡ ψυχὴ δέχεται,
 ταῦτα ἱκανῶς ἐκπονεῖν ἐδοκίμαζε. ταύτην γὰρ
 5 τὴν ἕξιν ὑγιεινὴν τε ἱκανῶς εἶναι καὶ τὴν τῆς
 ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη. ἀλλ' οὐ
 μὴν θρυπτικός γε οὐδὲ ἀλαζονικός ἦν οὔτ'
 ἀμπεχόνη οὔθ' ὑποδέσει οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ διαίτῃ.
 οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐρασιχρημάτους γε τοὺς συνόντας
 ἐποίει. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔπανε,
 τοὺς δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντας οὐκ ἐπράττετο
 6 χρήματα. τοῦτου δ' ἀπεχόμενος ἐνόμιζεν ἐλευ-
 θερίας ἐπιμελείσθαι. τοὺς δὲ λαμβάνοντας τῆς
 ὀμιλίας μισθὸν ἀνδραποδιστὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκάλει
 7 διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς εἶναι διαλέγεσθαι παρ'
 ὧν λάβοιεν τὸν μισθόν. ἐθαύμαζε δ', εἰ τις
 ἀρετὴν ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἀργύριον πρᾶττοιτο καὶ
 μὴ νομίζοι τὸ μέγιστον κέρδος ἕξιν φίλον ἀγαθὸν
 κτησάμενος, ἀλλὰ φοβοῖτο, μὴ ὁ γενόμενος καλὸς
 κἀγαθὸς τῷ τὰ μέγιστα εὐεργετήσαντι μὴ τὴν
 8 μεγίστην χάριν ἕξοι. Σωκράτης δὲ ἐπηγγείλατο
 μὲν οὐδενὶ πώποτε τοιοῦτον οὐδέν, ἐπίστευε δὲ
 τῶν συνόντων ἑαυτῷ τοὺς ἀποδεξαμένους ἅπερ
 αὐτὸς ἐδοκίμαζεν εἰς τὸν πάντα βίον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ
 ἀλλήλοις φίλους ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι. πῶς ἂν οὖν
 ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ διαφθεῖρι τοὺς νέους; εἰ μὴ ἄρα
 ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστιν.
 9 Ἄλλὰ νῆ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει
 τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας λέγων, ὡς
 μᾶλλον εἶη τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ

they through imitation of him would attain to such
 excellence. Furthermore, he himself never neg- 4
 lected the body, and reproved such neglect in others.
 Thus over-eating followed by over-exertion he dis-
 approved. But he approved of taking as much
 hard exercise as is agreeable to the soul¹; for the
 habit not only insured good health, but did not
 hamper the care of the soul. On the other hand, 5
 he disliked foppery and pretentiousness in the
 fashion of clothes or shoes or in behaviour. Nor,
 again, did he encourage love of money in his com-
 panions. For while he checked their other desires,
 he would not make money himself out of their
 desire for his companionship. He held that this 6
 self-denying ordinance insured his liberty. Those
 who charged a fee for their society he denounced
 for selling themselves into bondage; since they were
 bound to converse with all from whom they took the
 fee. He marvelled that anyone should make money 7
 by the profession of virtue, and should not reflect
 that his highest reward would be the gain of a good
 friend; as though he who became a true gentleman
 could fail to feel deep gratitude for a benefit so
 great. Socrates indeed never promised any such 8
 boon to anyone; but he was confident that those of
 his companions who adopted his principles of con-
 duct would throughout life be good friends to him
 and to one another. How, then, should such a man
 "corrupt the youth"? Unless, perchance, it be
 corruption to foster virtue.

But, said his accuser, he taught his companions to 9
 despise the established laws by insisting on the
 folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 17.

βικ: βραυιθη αυτου
βικ - υειδεν πεπεινι μορος

βικ: ισχνυ κρευνη μ35 σκρεν

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κνάμου καθιστάναι, κυβερνήτη δὲ μηδένα ἐθέλειν
χρησθαι κυμαευτῷ μηδὲ τέκτονι μηδ' αὐλητῇ μηδ'
ἐπ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ἃ πολλῶ ἐλάττονας βλάβας
ἀμαρτανόμενα ποιεῖ τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀμαρτα-
νομένων· τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη
τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστῶσης πολιτείας
10 καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους. ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι τοὺς φρόνησιν
ἀσκοῦντας καὶ νομίζοντας ἱκανοὺς ἔσσεσθαι¹ τὰ
συμφέροντα διδάσκειν τοὺς πολίτας ἥκιστα
γίγνεσθαι βιαίους, εἰδότας, ὅτι τῇ μὲν βίᾳ
πρόσεισιν ἔχθραι καὶ κίνδυνοι, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πείθειν
ἀκινδύνως τε καὶ μετὰ φιλίας ταῦτα γίγνεται.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ βιασθέντες ὡς ἀφαιρεθέντες μισοῦσιν,
οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες ὡς κεχαρισμένοι φιλοῦσιν.
οὐκ οὖν τῶν φρόνησιν ἀσκούντων τὸ βιάζεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰσχνῶν ἀνευ γνώμης ἐχόντων [τὰ τοιαῦτα
11 πράττειν] ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ συμμάχων ὁ μὲν
βιάζεσθαι τολμῶν δεοῖτ' ἂν οὐκ ὀλίγων, ὁ δὲ
πείθειν δυνάμενος οὐδενός· καὶ γὰρ μόνος ἡγούτ'
ἂν δύνασθαι πείθειν, καὶ φονεύειν δὲ τοῖς τοιού-
τοις ἥκιστα συμβαίνει· τίς γὰρ ἀποκτείνει τινα
βούλοισι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι πειθομένῳ χρησθαι;
12 Ἄλλ' ἔφη γε ὁ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὀμιλητᾶ
γενομένῳ Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα
κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποίησάτην. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ
τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων κλεπτίστατος τε
καὶ βιαιότατος καὶ φονικώτατος ἐγένετο, Ἀλκι-
βιάδης δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντων ἀκρα-
τέστατος τε καὶ ὑβριστότατος καὶ βιαιότατος.
13 ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν τι κακὸν ἐκείνῳ τὴν πόλιν
ἐποίησάτην, οὐκ ἀπολογησομαι· τὴν δὲ πρὸς

MEMORABILIA, I. II. 9-13

would choose a pilot or builder or flautist by lot, nor any other craftsman for work in which mistakes are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft. Such sayings, he argued, led the young to despise the established constitution and made them violent. But I hold¹ that they who cultivate wisdom and 10 think they will be able to guide the people in prudent policy never lapse into violence: they know that enmities and dangers are inseparable from violence, but persuasion produces the same results safely and amicably. For violence, by making its victims sensible of loss, rouses their hatred: but persuasion, by seeming to confer a favour, wins goodwill. It is not, then, cultivation of wisdom that leads to violent methods, but the possession of power without prudence. Besides, many sup- 11 porters are necessary to him who ventures to use force: but he who can persuade needs no confederate, having confidence in his own unaided power of persuasion. And such a man has no occasion to shed blood; for who would rather take a man's life than have a live and willing follower?

But his accuser argued thus. Among the 12 associates of Socrates were Critias and Alcibiades; and none wrought so many evils to the state. For Critias in the days of the oligarchy bore the palm for greed and violence: Alcibiades, for his part, exceeded all in licentiousness and insolence under the democracy. Now I have no intention of excusing 13 the wrong these two men wrought the state; but I

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. iv. 21.

¹ ἔσσεσθαι MSS. : εἶναι Sauppe.

- Σωκράτην συνουσίαν αὐτοῖν ὡς ἐγένετο διηγή-
 14 σομαι. ἐγενέσθην μὲν γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἄνδρῳ τούτῳ
 φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτῳ πάντων Ἀθηναίων βουλομένῳ
 τε πάντα δι' ἑαυτῶν πράττεσθαι καὶ πάντων
 ὀνομαστοτάτῳ γενέσθαι. ἤδεσαν δὲ Σωκράτην
 ἀπ' ἐλαχίστων μὲν χρημάτων αὐταρκέστατα
 ζῶντα, τῶν ἡδονῶν δὲ πασῶν ἐγκρατέστατον ὄντα,
 τοῖς δὲ διαλεγομένοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς
 15 λόγοις ὅπως βούλοιο. ταῦτα δὲ ὁρῶντε καὶ ὄντε
 οἷω προεῖρησθον, πότερόν τις αὐτῷ φῆ τοῦ βίου
 τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπιθυμήσαντε καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης,
 ἢν ἐκεῖνος εἶχεν, ὀρέξασθαι τῆς ὀμιλίας αὐτοῦ ἢ
 νομίσαντε, εἰ ὀμιλησαίτην ἐκεῖνω, γενέσθαι ἂν
 16 ἱκανωτάτῳ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ
 ἠγοῦμαι, θεοῦ δίδόντος αὐτοῖς ἢ ζῆν ὅλον τὸν βίον
 ὥσπερ ζῶντα Σωκράτην ἐώρων ἢ τεθνάναι, ἐλέσθαι
 ἂν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον τεθνάναι. δῆλῳ δ' ἐγενέσθην ἐξ
 ὧν ἐπραξάτην. ὡς γὰρ τάχιστα κρείττονε τῶν
 συγγιγνομένων ἠγησάσθην εἶναι, εὐθύς ἀποπηδή-
 σαντε Σωκράτους ἐπραττέτην τὰ πολιτικά, ὧν περ
 ἕνεκα Σωκράτους ὠρεχθήτην.
- 17 Ἴσως οὖν εἶποι τις ἂν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐχρῆν
 τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικά διδάσκειν
 τοὺς συνόντας ἢ σωφρονεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο
 μὲν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω πάντας δὲ τοὺς διδάσκοντας
 ὁρῶ αὐτοὺς δεικνύντας τε τοῖς μαθηταῖσιν, ἢ περ
 αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἢ διδάσκουσι, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ προσ-
 18 βιβάζοντας. οἶδα δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην δεικνύντα τοῖς
 συνοῦσιν ἑαυτὸν καλὸν καγαθὸν ὄντα καὶ διαλεγό-
 μενον κάλλιστα περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀνθρωπίνων. οἶδα δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνω σωφρονεῖν, ἔστε
 Σωκράτει συνήστην, οὐ φοβουμένῳ, μὴ ζημιῶντο

will explain how they came to be with Socrates. Ambition was the very life-blood of both: no 14 Athenian was ever like them. They were eager to get control of everything and to outstrip every rival in notoriety. They knew that Socrates was living on very little, and yet was wholly independent; that he was strictly moderate in all his pleasures; and that in argument he could do what he liked with any disputant. Sharing this knowledge and the principles 15 I have indicated, is it to be supposed that these two men wanted to adopt the simple life of Socrates, and with this object in view sought his society? Did they not rather think that by associating with him they would attain the utmost 16 proficiency in speech and action? For my part I believe that, had heaven granted them the choice between the life they saw Socrates leading and death, they would have chosen rather to die. Their conduct betrayed their purpose; for as soon as they thought themselves superior to their fellow-disciples they sprang away from Socrates and took to politics; it was for political ends that they had wanted Socrates.

But it may be answered: Socrates should have 17 taught his companions prudence before politics. I do not deny it; but I find that all teachers show their disciples how they themselves practise what they teach, and lead them on by argument. And I know that it was so with Socrates: he showed his companions that he was a gentleman himself, and talked most excellently of goodness and of all things that concern man. I know further that even those 18 two were prudent so long as they were with Socrates,

yielding to temptation were added corruption and long separation from Socrates, what wonder if they grew overbearing? For their wrongdoing, then, 26 is Socrates to be called to account by his accuser? And does he deserve no word of praise for having controlled them in the days of their youth, when they would naturally be most reckless and licentious? Other cases, at least, are not so judged. For what 27 teacher of flute, lyre, or anything else, after making his pupils proficient, is held to blame if they leave him for another master, and then turn out incompetent? What father, whose son bears a good character so long as he is with one master, but goes wrong after he has attached himself to another, throws the blame on the earlier teacher? Is it not true that the worse the boy turns out with the second, the higher is his father's praise of the first? Nay, fathers themselves, living with their sons, are not held responsible for their boys' wrongdoing if they are themselves prudent men. This is the test 28 which should have been applied to Socrates too. If there was anything base in his own life, he might fairly have been thought vicious. But, if his own conduct was always prudent, how can he be fairly held to blame for the evil that was not in him?

Nevertheless, although he was himself free from 29 vice, if he saw and approved of base conduct in them, he would be open to censure. Well, when he found that Critias loved Euthydemus¹ and wanted to lead him astray, he tried to restrain him by saying that it was mean and unbecoming in a gentleman to sue like a beggar to the object of his affection, whose

¹ iv. ii. 1.

λογισμὸν ἔχει

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ὥσπερ τοὺς πτωχοὺς ἰκετεύοντα καὶ δεόμενον
30 προσδοῦναι, καὶ ταῦτα μηδενὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τοῦ δὲ
Κριτίου τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐχ ὑπακούοντος οὐδὲ
ἀποτρεπομένου, λέγεται τὸν Σωκράτην ἄλλων τε
πολλῶν παρόντων καὶ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου εἰπεῖν, ὅτι
ἕκαστον αὐτῷ δοκοῖ πάσχειν ὁ Κριτίας ἐπιθυμῶν
Εὐθυδήμῳ προσκνήσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ ὕδια τοῖς
31 λίθοις. ἐξ ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐμίσει τὸν Σωκράτην ὁ
Κριτίας, ὥστε καὶ ὅτε τῶν τριάκοντα ὧν νομοθέτης
μετὰ Χαρικλέους ἐγένετο, ἀπεμνημόνευσεν αὐτῷ
καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε λόγων τέχνην μὴ
διδάσκειν, ἐπηρεάζων ἐκείνῳ καὶ οὐκ ἔχον ὅπῃ
ἐπιλάβοιτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ
τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων αὐτῷ καὶ
διαβάλλων πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε
οὔτ' αὐτὸς τοῦτο πώποτε Σωκράτους ἤκουσα
οὔτ' ἄλλου του φάσκοντος ἀκηκοέναι ἡσθόμην.
32 ἐδήλωσε δὲ· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ τριάκοντα πολλοὺς μὲν
τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ οὐ τοὺς χειρίστους ἀπέκτεινον,
πολλοὺς δὲ προετρέποντο ἀδικεῖν, εἶπέ που ὁ
Σωκράτης, ὅτι θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκοῖ εἶναι, εἴ τις
γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς
ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὁμολογίῃ
κακὸς βουκόλος εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἴ
τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς
πολίτας ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους μὴ αἰσχύνεται
μηδ' οἶεται κακὸς εἶναι προστάτης τῆς πόλεως.
33 ἀπαγγελθέντος δὲ αὐτοῖς τούτου, καλέσαντε ὁ τε
Κριτίας καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς τὸν Σωκράτην τὸν τε

26

MEMORABILIA, I. II. 29-33

good opinion he coveted, stooping to ask a favour
that it was wrong to grant. As Critias paid no heed 30
whatever to this protest, Socrates, it is said,
exclaimed in the presence of Euthydemus and many
others, "Critias seems to have the feelings of a pig:
he can no more keep away from Euthydemus than
pigs can help rubbing themselves against stones."
Now Critias bore a grudge against Socrates for this; 31
and when he was one of the Thirty and was drafting
laws with Charicles, he bore it in mind. He inserted
a clause which made it illegal "to teach the art of
words." It was a calculated insult to Socrates, whom
he saw no means of attacking, except by imputing
to him the practice constantly attributed to philoso-
phers,¹ and so making him unpopular. For I myself
never heard Socrates indulge in the practice, nor
knew of anyone who professed to have heard him do
so. The truth came out. When the Thirty were 32
putting to death many citizens of the highest
respectability and were encouraging many in
crime, Socrates had remarked: "It seems strange
enough to me that a herdsman² who lets his cattle
decrease and go to the bad should not admit that he
is a poor cowherd; but stranger still that a states-
man when he causes the citizens to decrease and go
to the bad, should feel no shame nor think himself a
poor statesman." This remark was reported to 33
Critias and Charicles, who sent for Socrates, showed

¹ *i. e.* the practice of "making the worse appear the better argument." In Plato, *Apol.* 19b, Socrates makes Aristophanes (*Clouds*) author of this charge against him. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (B 24, 11) associates the practice with the name of Protagoras: *cp. Diog. Laert.* ix. 51.

² *Cyropaedia*, VIII. ii. 14.

27

XENOPHON

Ναὶ τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς.
 37 Ὁ δὲ Κριτίας, Ἄλλὰ τῶνδέ τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι
 ἔφη, δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν
 τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων· καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὺς
 ἤδη κατατετριφθαι διαθρυλουμένους ὑπὸ σοῦ.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων
 τούτοις τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων;

Ναὶ μὰ Δῖ, ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκό-
 λων γε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, φυλάττου, ὅπως μὴ καὶ σὺ
 38 ἐλάττους τὰς βοῦς ποιήσης.

Ἔνθα καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἀπαγγελθέντος
 αὐτοῖς τοῦ περὶ τῶν βοῶν λόγου ὠργίζοντο τῷ
 Σωκράτει.

Οἷα μὲν οὖν ἡ συνουσία ἐγεγόνει Κριτία πρὸς
 Σωκράτην καὶ ὡς εἶχον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, εἴρηται.
 39 φαίην δ' ἂν ἔγωγε μηδεὶν μηδεμίαν εἶναι παιδευσιν
 παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀρέσκοντος. Κριτίας δὲ καὶ Ἀλκι-
 βιάδης οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους ὠμιλη-
 σάτην ὃν χρόνον ὠμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' εὐθύς ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς ὠρμηκότε προεστάνει τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι
 γὰρ Σωκράτει συνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μάλλον
 ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα πράττουσι
 40 τὰ πολιτικά. λέγεται γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδην, πρὶν
 εἴκοσιν ἔτων εἶναι, Περικλεῖ, ἐπιτρόπῳ μὲν ὄντι
 ἑαυτοῦ, προστάτῃ δὲ τῆς πόλεως, τοιάδε δια-
 λεχθῆναι περὶ νόμων.

41 Εἰπέ μοι, φάναι, ὦ Περικλεῖς, ἔχouis ἂν με
 διδάξαι, τί ἐστι νόμος;

Πάντως δήπου, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα.

Δίδαξον δὴ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκι-
 βιάδην· ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούων τινῶν ἐπαινουμένων, ὅτι

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νόμιμοι ἄνδρες εἰσίν, οἶμαι μὴ ἂν δικαίως τούτου τυχεῖν τοῦ ἐπαίνου τὸν μὴ εἰδότα, τί ἐστὶ νόμος.

- 42 Ἄλλ' οὐδέν τι χαλεποῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμεῖς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, βουλόμενος γνῶναι, τί ἐστὶ νόμος· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἅ μὴ.

Πότερον δὲ τὰγαθὰ νομίσαν δεῖν ποιεῖν ἢ τὰ κακά ;

Τὰγαθὰ νῆ Δία, φάναι, ὦ μειράκιον, τὰ δὲ κακά οὐ.

- 43 Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὄπου ὀλιγαρχία ἐστίν, ὀλίγοι συνελθόντες γράψωσιν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν, ταῦτα τί ἐστὶ ;

Πάντα, φάναι, ὅσα ἂν τὸ κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον ἅ χρὴ ποιεῖν γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται.

Καὶ ἂν τύραννος οὖν κρατῶν τῆς πόλεως γράψῃ τοῖς πολίταις ἅ χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος ἐστί ;

Καὶ ὅσα τύραννος ἄρχων, φάναι, γράφει, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος καλεῖται.

- 44 Βία δέ, φάναι, καὶ ἀνομία τί ἐστίν, ὦ Περικλείς ; ἄρ' οὐχ ὅταν ὁ κρείττων τὸν ἥττω μὴ πείσας, ἀλλὰ βιασάμενος ἀναγκάσῃ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ ;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα.

Καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τύραννος μὴ πείσας τοὺς πολίτας ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν γράφων, ἀνομία ἐστί ;

Δοκεῖ μοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα· ἀνατίθεμαι γὰρ τὸ ὅσα τύραννος μὴ πείσας γράφει νόμον εἶναι.

45 "Όσα δὲ οἱ ὀλίγοι τοὺς πολλοὺς μὴ πείσαντες, ἀλλὰ κρατοῦντες γράφουσι, πότερον βίαν φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι ;

Πάντα μοι δοκεῖ, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὅσα τις μὴ πείσας ἀναγκάζει τινα ποιεῖν, εἴτε γράφων εἴτε μὴ, βία μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος εἶναι.

Καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τὸ πᾶν πλήθος κρατοῦν τῶν τὰ χρήματα ἐχόντων γράφει μὴ πείσαν, βία μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος ἂν εἴη ;

46 Μάλα τοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ἡμεῖς τηλικούτοι ὄντες δεινοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἤμεν· τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἐμελετώμεν καὶ ἐσοφίζομεθα, οἷάπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς μελετᾶν.

Τὸν δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδην φάναι· Εἶθε σοι, ὦ Περικλείς, τότε συνεγενόμην, ὅτε δεινότατος 47 σαυτοῦ ταῦτα ἦσθα. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκέτι προσήεσαν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν εἶτε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἔπραττον, ὧνπερ ἕνεκεν καὶ Σωκράτει προσήλθον.

48 Ἀλλὰ Κρίτων τε Σωκράτους ἦν ὀμιλητὴς καὶ Χαιρεφῶν καὶ Χαιρεκράτης καὶ Ἑρμογένης καὶ Σιμμίας καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδας καὶ ἄλλοι, οἳ ἐκείνῳ συνῆσαν οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοὶ γένοιντο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοὶ τε κάγαθοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ οἴκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιτο καλῶς χρῆσθαι. καὶ τούτων οὐδεὶς οὔτε νεώτερος οὔτε πρεσβύτερος ὧν οὐτ' ἐποίησε κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτ' αἰτίαν ἔσχεν.

"And when the minority passes enactments, not 45 by persuading the majority, but through using its power, are we to call that force or not?"

"Everything, I think, that men constrain others to do 'without persuasion,' whether by enactment or not, is not law, but force."

"It follows then, that whatever the assembled majority, through using its power over the owners of property, enacts without persuasion is not law, but force?"

"Alcibiades," said Pericles, "at your age, I may 46 tell you, we, too, were very clever at this sort of thing. For the puzzles we thought about and exercised our wits on were just such as you seem to think about now."

"Ah, Pericles," cried Alcibiades, "if only I had known you intimately when you were at your cleverest in these things!"

So soon, then, as they presumed themselves to be 47 the superiors of the politicians, they no longer came near Socrates. For apart from their general want of sympathy with him, they resented being cross-examined about their errors when they came. Politics had brought them to Socrates, and for politics they left him. But Criton was a true asso- 48 ciate of Socrates, as were Chaerophon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas, and others who consorted with him not that they might shine in the courts or the assembly, but that they might become gentlemen, and be able to do their duty by house and household, and relatives and friends, and city and citizens. Of these not one, in his youth or old age, did evil or incurred censure.

- 49 Ἄλλὰ Σωκράτης γ', ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε, πείθων μὲν τοὺς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανοίας ἐλόντι καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι, τεκμηρίῳ τούτῳ χρώμενος, ὡς τὸν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ
- 50 σοφωτέρου νόμιμον εἶη δεδέσθαι. Σωκράτης δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀμαθίας ἕνεκα δεσμεύοντα δικαίως ἂν καὶ αὐτὸν ᾤετο δεδέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπισταμένων ἂ μὴ αὐτὸς ἐπίσταται· καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα πολλάκις ἐσκόπει, τί διαφέρει μανίας ἀμαθίας· καὶ τοὺς μὲν μαινομένους ᾤετο συμφερόντως ἂν δεδέσθαι καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς φίλοις, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένους τὰ δέοντα δικαίως ἂν μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων.
- 51 Ἄλλὰ Σωκράτης γε, ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, οὐ μόνον τοὺς πατέρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς ἑαυτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων, ὡς οὔτε τοὺς κάμνοντας οὔτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὠφελούσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ
- 52 ἰατροί, τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι. ἔφη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εὔνου εἶναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνήσονται· μόνους δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι δυναμένους· ἀναπαίθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτόν, ὡς αὐτὸς εἶη σοφώτατός τε καὶ ἄλλους ἰκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας, ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς
- 53 αὐτόν. ἐγὼ δ' αὐτὸν οἶδα μὲν καὶ περὶ πατέρων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν καὶ περὶ φίλων ταῦτα λέγοντα· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε δῆ, ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς

"But," said his accuser, "Socrates taught sons to 49 treat their fathers with contempt: he persuaded them that he made his companions wiser than their fathers: he said that the law allowed a son to put his father in prison if he convinced a jury that he was insane; and this was a proof that it was lawful for the wiser to keep the more ignorant in gaol." In reality Socrates held that, if you clap fetters on 50 a man for his ignorance, you deserve to be kept in gaol yourself by those whose knowledge is greater than your own: and such reasoning led him frequently to consider the difference between Madness and Ignorance. That madmen should be kept in prison was expedient, he thought, both for themselves and for their friends: but those who are ignorant of what they ought to know deserve to learn from those who know it.

"But," said his accuser, "Socrates caused his 51 companions to dishonour not only their fathers, but their other relations as well, by saying that invalids and litigants get benefit not from their relations, but from their doctor or their counsel. Of friends 52 too he said that their goodwill was worthless, unless they could combine with it some power to help one: only those deserved honour who knew what was the right thing to do, and could explain it. Thus by leading the young to think that he excelled in wisdom and in ability to make others wise, he had such an effect on his companions that no one counted for anything in their estimation in comparison with him." Now I know that he did use 53 this language about fathers, relations and friends. And, what is more, he would say that so soon as

ἐξελθούσης, ἐν ἣ ἴσθηται φρόνησις, τὸ σῶμα
 τοῦ οἰκειοτάτου ἀνθρώπου τὴν ταχίστην ἐξεπέ-
 54 καντες ἀφανίζουσι. ἔλεγε δέ, ὅτι καὶ ζῶν ἕκαστος
 ἑαυτοῦ, ὃ πάντων μάλιστα φιλεῖ, τοῦ σώματος
 ὅ,τι ἂν ἀχρεῖον ἢ καὶ ἀνωφελές, αὐτὸς τε ἀφαιρεῖ
 καὶ ἄλλῳ παρέχει. αὐτοὶ τέ γε αὐτῶν ὄνυχάς τε
 καὶ τρίχας καὶ τύλους ἀφαιροῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς
 παρέχουσι μετὰ πόνων τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ
 ἀποτέμνειν καὶ ἀποκάειν καὶ τούτου χάριν οἴονται
 δεῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ μισθὸν τίνειν· καὶ τὸ σάλον ἐκ
 τοῦ στόματος ἀποπτύουσιν ὡς δύνανται πορρω-
 55 τάτω, διότι ὠφελεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐνόν, βλάπτει
 δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον. ταῦτ' οὖν ἔλεγεν οὐ τὸν μὲν
 πατέρα ζῶντα κατορύττειν διδάσκων, ἑαυτὸν δὲ
 κατατέμνειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύων, ὅτι τὸ ἄφρον
 ἄτιμόν ἐστι, παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς
 φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἔάν
 τε ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἔάν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἔάν τε ὑπ'
 ἄλλου τινὸς βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκείῳ
 εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμελῆ, ἀλλὰ πειράται ὑφ' ὧν ἂν
 βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τούτοις ὠφέλιμος εἶναι.

56 Ἐφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων
 ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ πονηρότατα καὶ τούτοις
 μαρτυρίαις χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας
 κακούργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικούς, Ἡσιόδου
 μὲν τὸ

Ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος·

τοῦτο δὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς κελεύει μη-
 δεὶς ἔργου μήτ' ἀδίκου μήτ' αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι,
 57 ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει. Σωκράτης
 δ' ἐπεὶ διομολογήσαιτο τὸ μὲν ἐργάτην εἶναι

the soul, the only seat of intelligence, is gone out of
 a man, even though he be our nearest and dearest,
 we carry out his body and hide it in the tomb. Moreover, a man's dearest friend is himself: yet, 54
 even in his lifetime he removes or lets another
 remove from his body whatever is useless and
 unprofitable. He removes his own nails, hair, corns:
 he lets the surgeon cut and cauterize him, and, aches
 and pains notwithstanding, feels bound to thank
 and fee him for it. He spits out the saliva from
 his mouth as far away as he can, because to retain
 it doesn't help him, but harms him rather.

Now in saying all this, he was not giving a lesson 55
 on "the duty of burying one's father alive, or
 making mincemeat of one's body": he meant to
 show that unreason is unworth, and was urging the
 necessity of cultivating sound sense and usefulness,
 in order that he who would fain be valued by father
 or by brother or by anyone else may not rely on the
 bond of familiarity and neglect him, but may try to
 be useful to all those by whom he would be valued.

Again, his accuser alleged that he selected 56
 from the most famous poets the most immoral
 passages, and used them as evidence in teaching
 his companions to be tyrants and malefactors: for
 example, Hesiod's line:

"No work is a disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace."¹

He was charged with explaining this line as an
 injunction to refrain from no work, dishonest or
 disgraceful, but to do anything for gain. Now, 57
 though Socrates would fully agree that it is a

¹ *Works and Days*, 309.

deprived of good or involved in ill. None of these 64 crimes was ever so much as imputed to him. How then could he be guilty of the charges? For so far was he from "rejecting the gods," as charged in the indictment, that no man was more conspicuous for his devotion to the service of the gods: so far from "corrupting the youth," as his accuser actually charged against him, that if any among his companions had evil desires, he openly tried to reform them and exhorted them to desire the fairest and noblest virtue, by which men prosper in public life and in their homes. By this conduct did he not deserve high honour from the State?

III. In order to support my opinion that he benefited his companions, alike by actions that revealed his own character and by his conversation, I will set down what I recollect of these.

First, then, for his attitude towards religion; his deeds and words were clearly in harmony with the answer given by the Priestess at Delphi to such questions as "What is my duty about sacrifice?" or about "cult of ancestors." For the answer of the Priestess is, "Follow the custom of the State: that is the way to act piously." And so Socrates acted himself and counselled others to act. To take any other course he considered presumption and folly.

And again, when he prayed he asked simply for 2 good gifts,¹ "for the gods know best what things are good." To pray for gold or silver or sovereignty or any other such thing, was just like praying for a gamble or a fight or anything of which the result is obviously uncertain.

Though his sacrifices were humble, according to 3

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 5.

his means, he thought himself not a whit inferior to those who made frequent and magnificent sacrifices out of great possessions. The gods (he said) could not well delight more in great offerings than in small—for in that case must the gifts of the wicked often have found more favour in their sight than the gifts of the upright—and man would not find life worth having, if the gifts of the wicked were received with more favour by the gods than the gifts of the upright. No, the greater the piety of the giver, the greater (he thought) was the delight of the gods in the gift. He would quote with approval the line:

“According to thy power render sacrifice to the immortal gods,”¹

and he would add that in our treatment of friends and strangers, and in all our behaviour, it is a noble principle to *render according to our power*. If ever any warning seemed to be given him from heaven, he would more easily have been persuaded to choose a blind guide who did not know the road in preference to one who could see and knew the way, than to disregard the admonition. All men, in fact, who flouted the warnings of the gods in their anxiety to avoid the censure of men, he denounced for their foolishness. He himself despised all human opinions in comparison with counsel given by the gods.

He schooled his body and soul by following a system which, in all human calculation, would give him a life of confidence and security, and would make it easy to meet his expenses. For he was so

frugal that it is hardly possible to imagine a man doing so little work as not to earn enough to satisfy the needs of Socrates. He ate just sufficient food to make eating a pleasure, and he was so ready for his food that he found appetite the best sauce¹: and any kind of drink he found pleasant, because he drank only when he was thirsty. Whenever 6 he accepted an invitation to dinner, he resisted without difficulty the common temptation to exceed the limit of satiety; and he advised those who could not do likewise to avoid appetizers that encouraged them to eat and drink what they did not want: for such trash was the ruin of stomach and brain and soul. "I believe," he said in jest, 7 "it was by providing a feast of such things that Circe made swine; and it was partly by the prompting of Hermes,² partly through his own self-restraint and avoidance of excessive indulgence in such things, that Odysseus was not turned into a pig." This was 8 how he would talk on the subject, half joking, half in earnest.

Of sensual passion he would say: "Avoid it resolutely: it is not easy to control yourself once you meddle with that sort of thing." Thus, on hearing that Critobulus had kissed Alcibiades' pretty boy, he put this question to Xenophon before Critobulus: "Tell me, Xenophon, did you not 9 suppose Critobulus to be a sober person, and by no means rash; prudent, and not thoughtless or adventurous?"

"Certainly," said Xenophon.

"Then you are to look on him henceforth as

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. v. 12.

² In *Odyssey*, x. 281 f.

drop of all the water, and that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose, just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due, forsooth, to a sort of absurdity?"

"Yes; for I don't see the master hand, whereas I 9 see the makers of things in this world."

"Neither do you see your own soul,¹ which has the mastery of the body; so that, as far as that goes, you may say that you do nothing by design, but everything by chance."

Here Aristodemus exclaimed: "Really, Socrates, 10 I don't despise the godhead. But I think it is too great to need my service."

"Then the greater the power that deigns to serve you, the more honour it demands of you."

"I assure you, that if I believed that the gods pay 11 any heed to man, I would not neglect them."

"Then do you think them unheeding? In the first place, man is the only living creature that they have caused to stand upright; and the upright position gives him a wider range of vision in front and a better view of things above, and exposes him less to injury. Secondly, to grovelling creatures they have given feet that afford only the power of moving, whereas they have endowed man with hands, which are the instruments to which we chiefly owe our greater happiness. Again, though all creatures have 12 a tongue, the tongue of man alone has been formed by them to be capable of contact with different parts

¹ *Cyropaedia*, VIII. vii. 17.

of the mouth, so as to enable us to articulate the voice and express all our wants to one another. Once more, for all other creatures they have prescribed a fixed season of sexual indulgence; in our case the only time limit they have set is old age.

“Nor was the deity content to care for man’s body. 13
 What is of yet higher moment, he has implanted in him the noblest type of soul. For in the first place what other creature’s soul has apprehended the existence of gods who set in order the universe, greatest and fairest of things? And what race of living things other than man worships gods? And what soul is more apt than man’s to make provision against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to relieve sickness and promote health, to acquire knowledge by toil, and to remember accurately all that is heard, seen, or learned? For is it not obvious to you that, in com- 14
 parison with the other animals, men live like gods, by nature peerless both in body and in soul? For with a man’s reason and the body of an ox we could not carry out our wishes, and the possession of hands without reason is of little worth. Do you, then, having received the two most precious gifts, yet think that the gods take no care of you? What are they to do, to make you believe that they are heedful of you?”

“I will believe when they send counsellors, as you 15
 declare they do, saying, ‘Do this, avoid that.’”

“But when the Athenians inquire of them by divination and they reply, do you not suppose that

- αὐτοὺς; οὐδ' ὅταν τοῖς Ἑλλησι τέρατα πέμποντες
προσημαίνωσιν, οὐδ' ὅταν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ
μόνον σὲ ἐξαιροῦντες ἐν ἀμελείᾳ κατατίθενται;
16 οἷε δ' ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν
ἐμφῦσαι, ὡς ἱκανοὶ εἰσιν εὐ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν,
εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπα-
τωμένους τὸν πάντα χρόνον οὐδέ ποτ' ἂν αἰσθέ-
σθαι; οὐχ ὄρας, ὅτι τὰ πολυχροنیωτάτα καὶ
σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη,
θεοσεβέστατά ἐστι καὶ αἱ φρονιμώταται ἡλικία
17 θεῶν ἐπιμελέσται; ὠγαθέ, ἔφη, κατάμαθε, ὅτι
καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται
μεταχειρίζεται. οἶεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ
παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ἦ,
οὕτω τίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι
ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ
ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὄραν, μηδὲ
τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι
φροντίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἱκανὴν
18 εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ἦν μέντοι
ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύων γινώσκεις τοὺς
ἀντιθεραπεύειν ἐθέλοντας καὶ χαριζόμενος τοὺς
ἀντιχαριζόμενους καὶ συμβουλευόμενος καταμαν-
θάνεις τοὺς φρονίμους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν θεῶν πείραν
λαμβάνης θεραπεύων, εἰ τί σοι θελήσουσι περὶ
τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνθρώποις συμβουλεύειν, γνώση τὸ
θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὥσθ' ἅμα
πάντα ὄραν καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν καὶ πανταχοῦ
παρεῖναι καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.
19 Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων οὐ μόνον τοὺς συν-
όντας ἐδόκει ποιεῖν, ὁπότε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων

to you, too, the answer is given? Or when they send portents for warning to the Greeks, or to all the world? Are you their one exception, the only one consigned to neglect? Or do you suppose that 16 the gods would have put into man a belief in their ability to help and harm, if they had not that power; and that man throughout the ages would never have detected the fraud? Do you not see that the wisest and most enduring of human institutions, cities and nations, are most god-fearing, and that the most thoughtful period of life is the most religious? Be 17 well assured, my good friend, that the mind within you directs your body according to its will; and equally you must think that Thought indwelling in the Universal disposes all things according to its pleasure. For think not that your eye can travel over many furlongs and yet god's eye cannot see the the whole world at once; that your soul can ponder on things in Egypt and in Sicily, and god's thought is not sufficient to pay heed to the whole world at once. Nay, but just as by serving men you find out 18 who is willing to serve you in return, by being kind who will be kind to you in return, and by taking counsel, discover the masters of thought, so try the gods by serving them, and see whether they will vouchsafe to counsel you in matters hidden from man. Then you will know that such is the greatness and such the nature of the deity that he sees all things¹ and hears all things alike, and is present in all places and heedful of all things."

To me at least it seemed that by these sayings he 19 kept his companions from impiety, injustice, and

¹ *Cyropaedia*, VIII. vii. 22.

XENOPHON

ὀρῶντο, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχροῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποτε ἐν ἐρημίᾳ εἶεν, ἐπεὶπερ ἡγήσαιντο μηδὲν ἄν ποτε ὦν πράττοιεν θεοὺς διαλαθεῖν.

V. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὶ κτῆμά ἐστιν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι προὔβιβαζε λέγων εἰς ταύτην τοιάδε·

ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ πολέμου ἡμῖν γενομένου βουλοίμεθα ἐλέσθαι ἄνδρα, ὑφ' οὗ μάλιστα ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν σωζοίμεθα, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους χειροίμεθα, ἄρ' ὄντιν' αἰσθανοίμεθα ἥττω γαστρὸς ἢ οἴνου ἢ ἀφροδισίων¹ ἢ ὕπνου, τοῦτον ἂν αἰροίμεθα; καὶ πῶς ἂν οἰηθείημεν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἢ ἡμᾶς σώσειν ἢ

2 τοὺς πολεμίους κρατήσειν; εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου γενόμενοι βουλοίμεθά τῳ ἐπιτρέψαι ἢ παῖδας ἄρρενας παιδεῦσαι ἢ θυγατέρας παρθένους διαφυλάξαι ἢ χρήματα διασῶσαι, ἄρ' ἀξιόπιστον εἰς ταῦτα ἡγησόμεθα τὸν ἀκρατῆ; δούλω δ' ἀκρατεῖ ἐπιτρέψαιμεν ἂν ἢ βοσκήματα ἢ ταμεία ἢ ἔργων ἐπιστασίαν; διάκονον δὲ καὶ ἀγοραστήν

3 τοιοῦτον ἐθειλήσαιμεν ἂν προῖκα λαβεῖν; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε μηδὲ δούλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν, πῶς οὐκ ἀξιὸν αὐτόν γε φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; καὶ γὰρ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πλεονέκται τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιρούμενοι χρήματα ἑαυτοὺς δοκοῦσι πλουτίζειν, οὕτως ὁ ἀκρατῆς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις βλαβερὸς, ἑαυτῷ δ' ὠφέλιμος, ἀλλὰ κακοῦργος μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πολὺ κακοουργότερος, εἴ γε

4 κακοουργότατόν ἐστι μὴ μόνον τὸν οἶκον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φθείρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἐν συνουσίᾳ δὲ τίς ἂν ἡσθεῖη τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὃν εἰδείη τῷ ὄψῳ τε καὶ τῷ οἴνῳ

χαίροντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τὰς πόρνας ἀγαπῶντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἑταίρους; ἀρά γε οὐ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα ἡγησάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπίδα ταύτην πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
 5 κατασκευάσασθαι; τίς γὰρ ἄνευ ταύτης ἢ μάθοι τι ἂν ἀγαθὸν ἢ μελετήσειεν ἀξιολόγως; ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δουλεύων αἰσχροῦς διατεθείη καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ νῆ τὴν Ἦραν ἐλευθέρω μὲν ἀνδρὶ εὐκτὸν εἶναι μὴ τυχεῖν δούλου τοιοῦτου, δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἰκετεύειν τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν μόνως ὁ τοιοῦτος σωθείη.

6 Τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγων ἔτι ἐγκρατέστερον τοῖς ἔργοις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις ἑαυτὸν ἐπεδείκνυεν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν ἐκράτει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς διὰ τῶν χρημάτων, νομίζων τὸν παρὰ τοῦ τυχόντος χρήματα λαμβάνοντα δεσπότην ἑαυτοῦ καθιστάναι καὶ δουλεύειν δουλείαν οὐδεμιᾶς ἡττον αἰσχροῦν.

VI. "Ἄξιον δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἂ πρὸς Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστὴν διελέχθη μὴ παραλιπεῖν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀντιφῶν ποτε βουλόμενος τοὺς συνουσιαστὰς αὐτοῦ παρελῆσθαι προσελθὼν τῷ Σωκράτει παρόντων αὐτῶν ἔλεξε τάδε·

2 ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν ὤμην τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίγνεσθαι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τᾶναντία τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολελανκέσαι. ζῆς γοῦν οὕτως, ὡς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς δούλος ὑπὸ δεσπότην διαιτώμενος μένειε· σιτὰ τε σιτῇ καὶ ποτὰ πίνειι τὰ φαυλότατα καὶ ἱμάτιον ἡμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος,
 3 ἀνυπόδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων διατελεῖς. καὶ μὴν

he prefers your sauces and your wines to your friends, and likes the women¹ better than the company? Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? For who without
 5 this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike? From my heart I declare that every free man should pray not to have such a man among his slaves; and every man who is a slave to such pleasures should entreat the gods to give him good masters: thus, and only thus, may he find salvation."

Such were his words; but his own self-control
 6 was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his words. For he kept in subjection not only the pleasures of the body, but those too that money brings, in the belief that he who takes money from any casual giver puts himself under a master and endures the basest form of slavery.

VI. It is due to him that a conversation he had with Antiphon the Sophist should not go unrecorded. Antiphon came to Socrates with the intention of drawing his companions away from him, and spoke thus in their presence.

"Socrates, I supposed that philosophy must add
 2 to one's store of happiness. But the fruits you have reaped from philosophy are apparently very different. For example, you are living a life that would drive even a slave to desert his master. Your meat and drink are of the poorest: the cloak you wear is not only a poor thing, but is never changed summer or winter; and you never wear shoes or tunic. Besides
 3

¹ Employed to entertain the guests at the banquet.

σώματι μελετήσαντες τῶν ἰσχυροτάτων ἀμελη-
 σάντων κρείττους τε γίνονται πρὸς ἂν μελετῶσι
 καὶ ῥᾶον αὐτὰ φέρουσιν; ἐμὲ δὲ ἄρα οὐκ οἶε τῷ
 σώματι αἰετὰ συντυγχάνοντα μελετώντα καρτε-
 8 ρεῖν πάντα ῥᾶον φέρειν σοῦ μὴ μελετῶντος; τοῦ
 δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρὶ μηδ' ὑπνῷ καὶ λαγνείᾳ
 οἶε τι ἄλλο αἰτιώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὸ ἕτερα ἔχειν
 τούτων ἡδῶν, ἃ οὐ μόνον ἐν χρεΐᾳ ὄντα εὐφραίνει,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλπίδας παρέχοντα ὠφελήσειν αἰεὶ; καὶ
 μὴν τοῦτό γε οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι μηδὲν εὖ
 πράττειν οὐκ εὐφραίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἡγούμενοι καλῶς
 προχωρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς ἢ γεωργίαν ἢ ναυκληρίαν ἢ
 ἄλλ., ὅτι ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ὡς εὖ
 9 πράττοντες εὐφραίνονται. οἶε οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων
 τούτων τῶσάντην ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅσην ἀπὸ τοῦ
 ἑαυτὸν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι καὶ φίλους
 ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι; ἐγὼ τοίνυν διατελῶ ταῦτα
 νομίζων.¹

Ἐὰν δὲ δὴ φίλους ἢ πόλιν ὠφελεῖν δέη, ποτέρῳ
 ἢ πλείων σχολῇ τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῷ ὡς ἐγὼ
 νῦν ἢ τῷ ὡς σὺ μακαρίζεις διαιτωμένῳ; στρα-
 τεύοιτο δὲ πότερος ἂν ῥᾶον, ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνευ
 πολυτελοῦς διαίτης ζῆν ἢ ᾧ τὸ παρὸν ἀρκούη;
 ἐκπολιορκηθείη δὲ πότερος ἂν θάπτον, ὁ τῶν
 χαλεπωτάτων εὐρεῖν δεόμενος ἢ ὁ τοῖς ῥάστοις
 ἐντυγχάνειν ἀρκούντως χρώμενος;
 10 Ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ
 τρυφήν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ
 μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ελαχίστων

¹ § 9 ἐγὼ . . . νομίζων is bracketed by Sauppe as spurious.

weakling comes to be better at any form of exercise
 he practises, and gets more staying power, than the
 muscular prodigy who neglects to train? Seeing
 then that I am always training my body to answer
 any and every call on its powers, do you not think
 that I can stand every strain better than you can
 without training? For avoiding slavery to the belly 8
 or to sleep and incontinence, is there, think you,
 any more effective specific than the possession of
 other and greater pleasures, which are delightful not
 only to enjoy, but also because they arouse hopes of
 lasting benefit? And again, you surely know that
 while he who supposes that nothing goes well with
 him is unhappy, he who believes that he is successful
 in farming or a shipping concern or any other
 business he is engaged in is happy in the thought of
 his prosperity. Do you think then that out of all 9
 this thinking there comes anything so pleasant as
 the thought: 'I am growing in goodness and I am
 making better friends?' And that, I may say, is
 my constant thought.

"Further, if help is wanted by friends or city,
 which of the two has more leisure to supply their
 needs, he who lives as I am living or he whose life
 you call happy? Which will find soldiering the
 easier task, he who cannot exist without expensive
 food or he who is content with what he can get?
 Which when besieged will surrender first, he who
 wants what is very hard to come by or he who can
 make shift with whatever is at hand?

"You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness 10
 consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief
 is that to have no wants is divine; ¹ to have as few as

¹ *Cyropaedia*, VIII. iii. 40.

possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme."

In another conversation with Socrates Antiphon 11 said:

"Socrates, I for my part believe you to be a just, but by no means a wise man. And I think you realise it yourself. Anyhow, you decline to take money for your society. Yet if you believed your cloak or house or anything you possess to be worth money, you would not part with it for nothing or even for less than its value. Clearly, then, if you 12 set any value on your society, you would insist on getting the proper price for that too. It may well be that you are a just man because you do not cheat people through avarice; but wise you cannot be, since your knowledge is not worth anything."

To this Socrates replied:

"Antiphon, it is common opinion among us in regard to beauty and wisdom that there is an honourable and a shameful way of bestowing them. For to offer one's beauty for money to all comers is called prostitution; but we think it virtuous to become friendly with a lover who is known to be a man of honour. So is it with wisdom. Those who offer it to all comers for money are known as sophists, prostitutes of wisdom, but we think that he who makes a friend of one whom he knows to be gifted by nature, and teaches him all the good he can, fulfils the duty of a citizen and a gentleman. That is my 14 own view, Antiphon. Others have a fancy for a good horse or dog or bird: my fancy, stronger even

¹ ἕσπερ πόρνους is bracketed by Sauppe after Ruhnken.

μᾶλλον ἤδομαι φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἂν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι, παρ' ὧν ἂν ἠγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαι τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν. καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίσσω κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, καὶ ἂν τι ὀρώμεν ἀγαθόν, ἐκλεγόμεθα καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἂν ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι γιγνώμεθα. ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούοντι ἐδόκει αὐτὸς τε μακάριος εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ καλοκἀγαθίαν ἄγειν.

15 Καὶ πάλιν ποτὲ τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ἐρομένου αὐτόν, πῶς ἄλλους μὲν ἠγοῖτο πολιτικούς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ πράττει τὰ πολιτικά, εἴπερ ἐπίσταιτο. Ποτέρως δ' ἂν, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, μᾶλλον τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττοιμι, εἰ μόνος αὐτὰ πράττοιμι ἢ εἰ ἐπιμελοίμην τοῦ ὡς πλείστους ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πράττειν αὐτά;

VII. Ἐπισκεψόμεθα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἀποτρέπων τοὺς συνόντας ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελείσθαι προέτρεπεν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔλεγεν, ὡς οὐκ εἴη καλλίων ὁδὸς ἐπ' εὐδοξίαν ἢ δι' ἧς ἂν τις ἀγαθὸς τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὃ καὶ δοκεῖν βούλοιο.

2 "Ὅτι δ' ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν, ὡδ' ἐδίδασκεν. Ἐνθυμώμεθα γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ τις μὴ ὧν ἀγαθὸς αὐλητῆς δοκεῖν βούλοιο, τί ἂν αὐτῷ ποιητέον εἴη. ἂρ' οὐ τὰ ἔξω τῆς τέχνης μιμητέον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς; καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι σκευὴν τε καλὴν κέκτηνται καὶ ἀκούουθους πολλοὺς περιάγονται, καὶ τούτῳ ταῦτα ποιητέον· ἔπειτα ὅτι ἐκεῖνους πολλοὶ ἐπαινοῦσι, καὶ τούτῳ πολλοὺς ἐπαινέτας παρασκευαστέον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔργον γε

than theirs, is for good friends. And I teach them all the good I can, and recommend them to others from whom I think they will get some moral benefit. And the treasures that the wise men of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends. If we come on any good thing, we extract it, and we set much store on being useful to one another."

For my part, when I heard these words fall from his lips, I judged him to be a happy man himself and to be putting his hearers in the way of being gentlemen.

On yet another occasion Antiphon asked him: 15 "How can you suppose that you make politicians of others, when you yourself avoid politics even if you understand them?"

"How now, Antiphon?" he retorted, "should I play a more important part in politics by engaging in them alone or by taking pains to turn out as many competent politicians as possible?"

VII. Let us next consider whether by discouraging imposture he encouraged his companions to cultivate virtue.¹ For he always said that the best road to glory is the way that makes a man as good as he wishes to be thought. And this was how he demonstrated the truth of this saying:

"Suppose a bad flute-player wants to be thought 2 a good one, let us note what he must do. Must he not imitate good players in the accessories of the art? First, as they wear fine clothes and travel with many attendants, he must do the same. Further, seeing that they win the applause of crowds, he must provide himself with a large *claque*. But, of

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 22.

course, he must never accept an engagement, or he will promptly expose himself to ridicule as an incompetent player and an impostor to boot. And so, what with incurring heavy expense and gaining nothing, and bringing disgrace on himself as well, he will make his life burdensome, unprofitable and ridiculous. So too if a man who is not a general or 3 a pilot wanted to be thought a good one, let us imagine what would happen to him. If his efforts to seem proficient in these duties failed to carry conviction, would not his failure be galling to him? if they succeeded, would not his success be still more disastrous? for it is certain that if a man who knew nothing about piloting a ship or commanding an army were appointed to such work, he would lose those whom he least wanted to lose and would bring ruin and disgrace on himself."

By similar reasoning he would show how un- 4 profitable is a reputation for wealth or courage or strength when it is undeserved. "Tasks beyond their powers," he would say, "are laid on the incompetent, and no mercy is shown to them when they disappoint the expectation formed of their capability. The man who persuades you to lend 5 him money or goods and then keeps them is without doubt a rogue; but much the greatest rogue of all is the man who has gulled his city into the belief that he is fit to direct it."

For my part I thought that such talks did discourage imposture among his companions.

quarters, knowing that by committing adultery he is in danger of incurring the penalties threatened by the law, and that he may be trapped, caught and ill-treated. When such misery and disgrace hang over the adulterer's head, and there are many remedies to relieve him of his carnal desire without risk, is it not sheer lunacy to plunge headlong into danger?"

"Yes, I think it is."

"And considering that the great majority of essential occupations, warfare, agriculture and very many others, are carried on in the open air, don't you think it gross negligence that so many men are untrained to withstand cold and heat?" 6

He agreed again.

"Don't you think then, that one who is going to rule must adapt himself to bear them lightly?"

"Certainly."

"If then we classify those who control themselves in all these matters as 'fit to rule,' shall we not classify those who cannot behave so as men with no claim to be rulers?" 7

He agreed again.

"Well now, as you know the category to which each of these species belongs, have you ever considered in which category you ought to put yourself?"

"I have; and I do not for a moment put myself in the category of those who want to be rulers.¹ For considering how hard a matter it is to provide for one's own needs, I think it absurd not to be content to do that, but to shoulder the burden of supplying the wants of the community as well. That 8

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 7; VII. ii, 26 f.

deeds, and I shall be yet more highly honoured and more illustrious for the blessings I bestow. But I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will rather tell you truly the things that are, as the gods have ordained them. For of all things good and fair, 28 the gods give nothing to man without toil and effort. If you want the favour of the gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do good to your friends: if you covet honour from a city, you must aid that city: if you are fain to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do good to Hellas: if you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must cultivate that land: if you are resolved to get wealth from flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you essay to grow great through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practise their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat.'

"And Vice, as Prodicus tells, answered and said: 29 'Heracles, mark you how hard and long is that road to joy, of which this woman tells? but I will lead you by a short and easy road to happiness.'

"And Virtue said: 'What good thing is thine, 30 poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do nought to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before

thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day. Immortal art thou, 31 yet the outcast of the gods, the scorn of good men. Praise, sweetest of all things to hear, thou hearest not: the sweetest of all sights thou beholdest not, for never yet hast thou beheld a good work wrought by thyself. Who will believe what thou dost say? who will grant what thou dost ask? Or what sane man will dare join thy throng? While thy votaries are young their bodies are weak, when they wax old, their souls are without sense; idle and sleek they thrive in youth, withered and weary they journey through old age, and their past deeds bring them shame, their present deeds distress. Pleasure they ran through in their youth: hardship they laid up for their old age. But I company with gods and 32 good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. I am first in honour among the gods and among men that are akin to me: to craftsmen a beloved fellow-worker, to masters a faithful

¹ Sauppe read *καὶ τὰς κλίνας καὶ* with the MSS.

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children, when the streets and the stews are full of means to satisfy that? We obviously select for wives the women who will bear us the best children, and then marry them to raise a family. The man ⁵ supports the woman who is to share with him the duty of parentage and provides for the expected children whatever he thinks will contribute to their benefit in life, and accumulates as much of it as he can. The woman conceives and bears her burden in travail, risking her life, and giving of her own food; and, with much labour, having endured to the end and brought forth her child, she rears and cares for it, although she has not received any good thing, and the babe neither recognises its benefactress nor can make its wants known to her: still she guesses what is good for it and what it likes, and seeks to supply these things, and rears it for a long season, enduring toil day and night, nothing knowing what return she will get.

“Nor are the parents content just to supply food, ⁶ but so soon as their children seem capable of learning they teach them what they can for their good, and if they think that another is more competent to teach them anything, they send them to him at a cost, and strive their utmost that the children may turn out as well as possible.”

To this the young man replied: “Nay, but even ⁷ if she has done all this and far more than this, no one could put up with her vile temper.”

“Obviously I should first entertain him when he came to Athens. Yes, and if I wanted him to show himself eager in forwarding the business on which I had come, it is obvious that I should first have to do the same by him.”

“It seems that you have long concealed a know- 14
ledge of all spells that were ever discovered. Or is it that you hesitate to make a beginning, for fear of disgracing yourself by first showing kindness to your brother? Yet it is generally thought worthy of the highest praise to anticipate the malevolence of an enemy and the benevolence of a friend. So if I thought Chaerophon more capable than you of showing the way to this friendship, I would try to persuade him to take the first step towards an understanding with you. But as things are, I think the enterprise more likely to succeed under your direction.”

“Strange sentiments, these, Socrates! It’s quite 15
unlike you to urge me, the junior, to lead the way! And surely all hold the contrary opinion, that the senior, I mean, should always act and speak first?”

“How so?” said Socrates. “Is it not the general 16
opinion that a young man should make way for an older when they meet,¹ offer his seat to him, give him a comfortable bed, let him have the first word? My good friend, don’t hesitate, but take up the task of pacifying your man, and in no time he will respond to your overtures. Don’t you see how keen and frank he is? Low fellows, it is true, yield most readily to gifts, but kindness is the weapon most likely to prevail with a gentleman.”

¹ *Cyropaedia*, VIII. vii. 10.

ing to their friends, and thinking their friend's good things to be their own. Surely, then, it is likely 24 that true gentlemen will share public honours too not only without harm to one another, but to their common benefit? For those who desire to win honour and to bear rule in their cities that they may have power to embezzle, to treat others with violence, to live in luxury, are bound to be unjust, unscrupulous, incapable of unity. But if a man 25 seeks to be honoured in a state that he may not be the victim of injustice himself and may help his friends in a just cause, and when he takes office may try to do some good to his country, why should he be incapable of union with one like himself? Will his connexion with other gentlemen render him less capable of serving his friends? Will he be less able to benefit his city with the help of other gentlemen? Even in the public games it is clear that, if the 26 strongest competitors were allowed to join forces against the weaker, they would win all the events, they would carry off all the prizes. True, that is not permitted in the games; but in politics, where the gentlemen are the strongest, nobody prevents anyone from forming any combination he may choose for the benefit of the state; surely, then, in public life it is a gain to make friends with the best, and to see in them partners and fellow-workers in a common cause, and not rivals. But, again, it is equally clear 27 that anyone who goes to war will need allies, and more of them if he is to fight an army of gentlemen. Moreover, those who are willing to fight at your side must be well treated that they may be willing to exert themselves; and it is a far sounder plan to

show kindness to the best, who are fewer in number, than to the worst, who are the greater company; for the bad want many more kindnesses than the good. Courage, Critobulus; try to be good, and 28 when you have achieved that, set about catching your gentleman. Maybe, I myself, as an adept in love, can lend you a hand in the pursuit of gentlemen. For when I want to catch anyone it's surprising how I strain every nerve to have my love returned, my longing reciprocated by him, in my eagerness that he shall want me as much as I want him. I see that you too will feel this need when 29 you want to form a friendship. So do not hide from me the names of those whom you wish to make your friends; for I am careful to please him who pleases me, and so, I think, I am not without experience in the pursuit of men."

"Well, Socrates," said Critobulus in reply, "these 30 are the lessons I have long wished to learn, especially if the same skill will serve to win a good soul and a fair face."

"Ah no, Critobulus," said Socrates, "it belongs 31 not to my skill to lay hands on the fair and force them to submit. I am convinced that the reason why men fled from Scylla was that she laid hands on them; but the Sirens laid hands on no man; from far away they sang to all, and therefore, we are told, all submitted, and hearing were enchanted."¹

"I am not going to put a hand on anyone," said 32

¹ *Odyssey* xii. 39 f., adapted.

good as in your own, and never weary of contriving it for your friend's; and you have made up your mind that a man's virtue consists in outdoing his friends in kindness and his enemies in mischief; then I think you will find me a useful companion in the quest of good friends."

"Now why do you say this to me? as if you were 36 not free to say what you choose about me."

"Not so indeed: I can quote Aspasia against you. She once told me that good matchmakers are successful in making marriages only when the good reports they carry to and fro are true; false reports she would not recommend, for the victims of deception hate one another and the matchmaker too. I am convinced that this is sound, and so I think it is not open to me to say anything in your praise that I can't say truthfully."

"It appears, Socrates, that you are the sort of 37 friend to help me if I am in any way qualified to make friends: but if not, you won't make up a story to help me."

"How do you think I shall help you best, Critobulus, by false praise, or by urging you to try to be a good man? If you don't yet see clearly, 38 take the following cases as illustrations. Suppose that I wanted to get a shipmaster to make you his friend, and as a recommendation told him that you are a good skipper, which is untrue; and suppose that he believed me and put you in charge of his ship in spite of your not knowing how to steer it: have you any reason to hope that you would not lose the ship and your life as well? Or suppose that I falsely represented to the Assembly that you

are a born general, jurist and statesman in one, and so persuaded the state to commit her fortunes to you, what do you suppose would happen to the state and to yourself under your guidance? Or again, suppose that I falsely described you to certain citizens in private as a thrifty, careful person, and persuaded them to place their affairs in your hands, wouldn't you do them harm and look ridiculous when you came to the test? Nay, Critobulus, if you want to be thought good at anything, you must try to be so; that is the quickest, the surest, the best way.¹ You will find on reflection that every kind of virtue named among men is increased by study and practice. Such is the view I take of our duty, Critobulus. If you have anything to say against it, tell me."

"Why, Socrates," said Critobulus, "I should be ashamed to contradict you, for I should be saying what is neither honourable nor true."

VII. To pass to another subject. The distresses of his friends that arose from ignorance he tried to cure by advice, those that were due to want by telling them how to help one another according to their power. On this subject too I will state what I know about him.

One day, noticing that Aristarchus looked glum, he said: "Aristarchus, you seem to have a burden on your mind. You should let your friends share it; possibly we may do something to ease you."

"Ah yes, Socrates," replied Aristarchus, "I am 2

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 22.

"What is an artisan? one who knows how to 5
produce something useful?"

"Certainly."

"Are groats useful?"

"Yes, very."

"And bread?"

"No less so."

"What about men's and women's cloaks, shirts,
capas, smocks?"

"Yes, all these things too are very useful."

"Then don't the members of your household
know how to make any of these?"

"I believe they can make all of them."

"Don't you know, then, that by manufacturing 6
one of these commodities, namely groats, Nausicydes
keeps not only himself and his family, but large
herds of swine and cattle as well, and has so much
to spare that he often undertakes costly public
duties; that Cyrebus feeds his whole family well
and lives in luxury by baking bread, Demeas of
Collytus by making capas, Menon by making cloaks;
and most of the Megarians make a good living out
of smocks?"

"Yes, of course; for they buy foreign slaves
and can force them to make what is convenient,
but my household is made up of gentlefolk and
relations."

"And so, just because they are gentlefolk and 7
related to you, you think they should do nothing
but eat and sleep? Do you find that other gentle-
folk who live this sort of life are better off and

"But surely those who control their cities and take charge of public affairs are thought more respectable, not more slavish on that account."

"Briefly, Socrates, I have no inclination to expose 5 myself to any man's censure."

"But, you see, Eutherus, it is by no means easy to find a post in which one is not liable to censure. Whatever one does, it is difficult to avoid mistakes, and it is difficult to escape unfair criticism even if one makes no mistakes. I wonder if you find it easy to avoid complaints entirely even from your present employers. You should try, therefore, to 6 have no truck with grumblers and to attach yourself to considerate masters; to undertake such duties as you can perform and beware of any that are too much for you, and, whatever you do, to give of your best and put your heart into the business. In this way, I think, you are most likely to escape censure, find relief from your difficulties, live in ease and security, and obtain an ample competence for old age."

IX. I remember that he once heard Criton say that life at Athens was difficult for a man who wanted to mind his own business. "At this moment," Criton added, "actions are pending against me not because I have done the plaintiffs an injury, but because they think that I would sooner pay than have trouble."

"Tell me, Criton," said Socrates, "do you keep 2 dogs to fend the wolves from your sheep?"

"Certainly," replied Criton, "because it pays me better to keep them."

"Then why not keep a man who may be able

nor distinguished himself in the cavalry and understands nothing but money-making."

"Isn't that a recommendation," said Socrates, 2 "supposing he proves capable of supplying the men's needs?"

"Why," retorted Nicomachides, "merchants too are capable of making money, but that doesn't make them fit to command an army."

"But," cried Socrates, "Antisthenes also is eager 3 for victory, and that is a good point in a general.¹ Whenever he has been choragus, you know, his choir has always won."

"No doubt," said Nicomachides, "but there is no analogy between the handling of a choir and of an army."

"But, you see," said Socrates, "though Antis- 4 thenes knows nothing about music or choir training, he showed himself capable of finding the best experts in these."

"In the army too, then," said Nicomachides, "he will find others to command for him, and others to do the fighting."

"And therefore," said Socrates, "if he finds out 5 and prefers the best men in warfare as in choir training it is likely that he will be victorious in that too; and probably he will be more ready to spend on winning a battle with the whole state than on winning a choral competition with his tribe."

"Do you mean to say, Socrates, that the man 6 who succeeds with a chorus will also succeed with an army?"

"I mean that, whatever a man controls, if he

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 18.

MEMORABILIA, III. iv. 6-9

knows what he wants and can get it he will be a good controller, whether he control a chorus, an estate, a city or an army."

"Really, Socrates," cried Nicomachides, "I should 7 never have thought to hear you say that a good business man would make a good general."

"Come then, let us review the duties of each that we may know whether they are the same or different."

"By all means."

"Is it not the duty of both to make their sub- 8 ordinates willing and obedient?"

"Decidedly."

"And to put the right man in the right place?"¹

"That is so."

"I suppose, moreover, that both should punish the bad and reward the good."

"Yes, certainly."

"Of course both will do well to win the goodwill 9 of those under them?"

"That is so."

"Do you think that it is to the interest of both to attract allies and helpers?"

"Yes, certainly."

"And should not both be able to keep what they have got?"

"They should indeed."

"And should not both be strenuous and industrious in their own work?"²

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 20.

² *Ibid.*, 8.

MEMORABILIA, III. VII. 1-6

"I should think him a poltroon and a coward, of course."

"Then if a man were to shrink from state business though capable of discharging it with advantage to the state and honour to himself, wouldn't it be reasonable to think him a coward?"

"Perhaps; but why ask me that?"

"Because I fancy that you shrink from work that is within your powers, work in which it is your duty as a citizen to take a hand."

"What makes you think so? In what sort of work have you discovered my powers?"

"In your intercourse with public men. Whenever they take counsel with you, I find that you give excellent advice, and whenever they make a mistake, your criticism is sound."

"A private conversation is a very different thing from a crowded debate, Socrates."

"But, you know, a man who is good at figures counts as well in a crowd as in solitude; and those who play the harp best in private excel no less in a crowd."

"But surely you see that bashfulness and timidity come natural to a man, and affect him far more powerfully in the presence of a multitude than in private society?"

"Yes, and I mean to give you a lesson. The wisest do not make you bashful, and the strongest do not make you timid; yet you are ashamed to address an audience of mere dunces and weaklings. Who are they that make you ashamed? The fullers or the cobblers or the builders or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants, or the traffickers in the market-place who think of nothing but buying cheap

ἴνα εἴ τι εἴποι τῶν τοιούτων, οἶον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτόν
ἢ χρήματα ἢ ὑγίειαν ἢ ῥόμην ἢ τόλμαν, δεικνύοι
δὴ τοῦτο κακὸν ἐνίοτε οὖν. ὁ δὲ εἰδώς, ὅτι ἐάν τι
ἐνοχλῇ ἡμᾶς, δεόμεθα τοῦ παύσοντος, ἀπεκρίνατο
3 ἦπερ καὶ ποιεῖν κράτιστον. Ἐὰρ γε, ἔφη, ἐρωτᾷς
με, εἴ τι οἶδα πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν;

Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' ὀφθαλμίας;

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Ἄλλὰ λιμοῦ;

Οὐδὲ λιμοῦ.

Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γ' ἐρωτᾷς με, εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν
οἶδα ὃ μηδενὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, οὐτ' οἶδα, ἔφη, οὔτε
δέομαι.

4 Πάλιν δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἐρωτῶντος αὐτόν,
εἴ τι εἰδέη καλόν, Καὶ πολλά, ἔφη.

Ἐὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντα ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις;

Ὡς οἶόν τε μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀνομοιότατα ἐνια.

Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ τῷ καλῷ ἀνόμοιον καλὸν ἀν
εἶν;

Ὅτι νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ἐστὶ μὲν τῷ καλῷ πρὸς δρόμον
ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλος ἀνόμοιος καλὸς πρὸς πάλην, ἐστὶ
δὲ ἀσπίς καλὴ πρὸς τὸ προβάλλεσθαι ὡς ἐνὶ
ἀνομοιότητι τῷ ἀκοντίῳ καλῷ πρὸς τὸ σφόδρα
τε καὶ ταχὺ φέρεσθαι.

5 Οὐδὲν διαφερόντως, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνη μοι ἢ ὅτε
σε ἠρώτησα, εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἰδέης.

Σὺ δ' οἶει, ἔφη, ἄλλο μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ
καλὸν εἶναι; οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι πρὸς ταῦτά πάντα
καλά τε καὶ κατὰ ἐστὶ; πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἀρετὴ
οὐ πρὸς ἄλλα μὲν ἀγαθόν, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ καλόν
ἐστίν· ἔπειτα οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ αὐτὸ τε καὶ πρὸς

order that if Socrates mentioned some good thing,
such as food, drink, money, health, strength, or
daring, he might show that it is sometimes bad.
But he, knowing that when anything troubles us we
need what will put an end to the trouble, gave the
best answer: "Are you asking me," he said, 3
"whether I know of anything good for a fever?"

"No, not that."

"For ophthalmia?"

"No, nor that."

"For hunger?"

"No, not for hunger either."

"Well, but if you are asking me whether I know
of anything good in relation to nothing, I neither
know nor want to know."

Again Aristippus asked him whether he knew of 4
anything beautiful: "Yes, many things," he replied.

"All like one another?"

"On the contrary, some are as unlike as they can
be."

"How then can that which is unlike the beautiful
be beautiful?"

"The reason, of course, is that a beautiful wrestler
is unlike a beautiful runner, a shield beautiful for
defence is utterly unlike a javelin beautiful for swift
and powerful hurling."

"That is the same answer as you gave to my 5
question whether you knew of anything good."

"You think, do you, that good is one thing and
beautiful another? Don't you know that all things
are both beautiful and good in relation to the same
things? In the first place, Virtue is not a good
thing in relation to some things and a beautiful
thing in relation to others. Men, again, are called

τὰ αὐτὰ καλοὶ τε κάγαθοι λέγονται· πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καλά τε κάγαθὰ φαίνεται, πρὸς ταῦτὰ δὲ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, οἷς ἄνθρωποι χρώνται, καλά τε κάγαθὰ νομίζεται, πρὸς ἅπερ ἂν εὐχρηστα ᾗ.

6 Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ κόφινος κοπροφόρος καλὸν ἔστι;

Νῆ Δί', ἔφη, καὶ χρυσῆ γε ἀσπίς αἰσχρόν, ἐὰν πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ὁ μὲν καλῶς πεποιημένος ᾗ, ἡ δὲ κακῶς.

Λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, καλά τε καὶ αἰσχρὰ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι;

7 Καὶ νῆ Δί' ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ κακὰ· πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ τε λιμοῦ ἀγαθὸν πυρετοῦ κακὸν ἔστι καὶ τὸ πυρετοῦ ἀγαθὸν λιμοῦ κακὸν ἔστι· πολλάκις δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον καλὸν πρὸς πάλην αἰσχρόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην καλὸν πρὸς δρόμον αἰσχρόν· πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ μὲν καὶ καλά ἔστι πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχη, κακὰ δὲ καὶ αἰσχρὰ πρὸς ἃ ἂν κακῶς.

8 Καὶ οἰκίας δὲ λέγων τὰς αὐτὰς καλὰς τε εἶναι καὶ χρησίμους παιδεύειν ἕμοιγ' ἐδόκει, οἷας χρὴ οἰκοδομείσθαι.

Ἐπεσκόπει δὲ ὧδε· Ἄρά γε τὸν μέλλοντα οἰκίαν οἷαν χρὴ ἔχειν τοῦτο δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἡδίστη τε ἐνδιατᾶσθαι καὶ χρησιμωτάτη ἔσται;

9 Τοῦτου δὲ ὁμολογουμένου, Οὐκοῦν ἡδὺ μὲν θέρους ψυχεινὴν ἔχειν, ἡδὺ δὲ χειμῶνος ἀλεινὴν;

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμφαίειν, Οὐκοῦν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς μεσημβρίαν βλέπουσαις οἰκίαις τοῦ μὲν

'beautiful and good' in the same respect and in relation to the same things: it is in relation to the same things that men's bodies look beautiful and good and that all other things men use are thought beautiful and good, namely, in relation to those things for which they are useful."

"Is a dung basket beautiful then?"

6 "Of course, and a golden shield is ugly, if the one is well made for its special work and the other badly."

"Do you mean that the same things are both beautiful and ugly?"

7 "Of course—and both good and bad. For what is good for hunger is often bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; what is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling, and what is beautiful for wrestling ugly for running. For all things are good and beautiful in relation to those purposes for which they are well adapted, bad and ugly in relation to those for which they are ill adapted."

8 Again his dictum about houses, that the same house is both beautiful and useful, was a lesson in the art of building houses as they ought to be.

He approached the problem thus:

"When one means to have the right sort of house, must he contrive to make it as pleasant to live in and as useful as can be?"

9 And this being admitted, "Is it pleasant," he asked, "to have it cool in summer and warm in winter?"

And when they agreed with this also, "Now in houses with a south aspect, the sun's rays penetrate

δηλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι πάντας χρῆ καὶ τοὺς εὐφροστέ-
ρους καὶ τοὺς ἀμβλυτέρους τὴν φύσιν ἐν οἷς
ἂν ἀξιόλογοι βούλωνται γενέσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ
μανθάνειν καὶ μελετᾶν.

4 Σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ
τῶν¹ τὰ μὲν καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γινώσκοντα
χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλα-
βεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε. προσε-
ρωτώμενος δέ, εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἂ δει
πράττειν, ποιούντας δὲ τὰναντία σοφούς τε καὶ
ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζει, Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη,
ἢ ἀσοφούς τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι
προαἰρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἂ οἴονται
συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν.
νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὔτε
5 σοφούς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι. ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν
δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν
εἶναι. τὰ τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα, ὅσα ἀρετῇ
πράττεται, καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὐτ'
ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν
προελέσθαι οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι
πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν.
οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφούς
πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφούς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ τε
δίκαια καὶ τᾶλλα καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ πάντα
ἀρετῇ πράττεται, δηλόν εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνη
6 καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστὶ. μανίαν
γε μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφία, οὐ μέντοι
γε τὴν ἀνεπισημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζε. τὸ δὲ
ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἂ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ

it is clear that all men, whatever their natural gifts,
the talented and the dullards alike, must learn and
practise what they want to excel in."

Between Wisdom and Prudence he drew no dis- 4
tinction; but if a man knows and practises what is
beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base,¹
that man he judged to be both wise and prudent.
When asked further whether he thought that those
who know what they ought to do and yet do the
opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered:
"No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious.
For I think that all men have a choice between
various courses, and choose and follow the one which
they think conduces most to their advantage.
Therefore I hold that those who follow the wrong
course are neither wise nor prudent."

He said that Justice and every other form of 5
Virtue is Wisdom. "For just actions and all forms
of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who
knows the beautiful and good will never choose any-
thing else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do
them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the
wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise
cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just
actions and all other forms of beautiful and good
activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice
and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom."

Madness, again, according to him, was the opposite 6
of Wisdom. Nevertheless he did not identify Ignor-
ance with Madness; but not to know yourself, and

¹ The Greek text is corrupt, but the sense is clear.

¹ The MSS. vary between τὸ and τὸν here and in the
words following. Sauppe prints τῶ twice after Heindorf.

to assume and think that you know what you do not, he put next to Madness. "Most men, however," he declared, "do not call those mad who err in matters that lie outside the knowledge of ordinary people: madness is the name they give to errors in matters of common knowledge. For instance, if a 7 man imagines himself to be so tall as to stoop when he goes through the gateways in the Wall, or so strong as to try to lift houses or to perform any other feat that everybody knows to be impossible, they say he's mad. They don't think a slight error implies madness, but just as they call strong desire love, so they name a great delusion madness." ¹

Considering the nature of Envy, he found it to be 8 a kind of pain, not, however, at a friend's misfortune, nor at an enemy's good fortune, but the envious are those only who are annoyed at their friends' successes. Some expressed surprise that anyone who loves another should be pained at his success, but he reminded them that many stand in this relation towards others, that they cannot disregard them in time of trouble, but aid them in their misfortune, and yet they are pained to see them prospering. This, however, could not happen to a man of sense, but it is always the case with fools.

Considering the nature of Leisure, he said his 9 conclusion was that almost all men do something. Even draught-players and jesters do something, but all these are at leisure, for they might ² go and

elucidation of popular nomenclature. But it comes very awkwardly here.

² Or, if with Stobaeus we omit *ἐξείναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς*, "have leisure to go"

If anyone said that a despot can kill a loyal 13 subject, "Do you think," he retorted, "that he who kills the best of his allies suffers no loss, or that his loss is trifling? Do you think that this conduct brings him safety, or rather swift destruction?"

When someone asked him what seemed to him 14 the best pursuit for a man, he answered: "Doing well." Questioned further, whether he thought good luck a pursuit, he said: "On the contrary, I think luck and doing are opposite poles. To hit on something right by luck without search I call good luck, to do something well after study and practice I call doing well; and those who pursue 15 this seem to me to do well. And the best men and dearest to the gods," he added, "are those who do their work well; if it is farming, as good farmers; if medicine, as good doctors; if politics, as good politicians. He who does nothing well is neither useful in any way nor dear to the gods."

X. Then again, whenever he talked with artists who followed their art as a business, he was as useful to them as to others.

Thus, on entering the house of Parrhasius the painter one day, he asked in the course of a conversation with him: "Is painting a representation of things seen, Parrhasius? Anyhow, you painters with your colours represent and reproduce figures high and low, in light and in shadow, hard and soft, rough and smooth, young and old."

“True.”

“Then these, too, can be imitated, can they not?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Now which do you think the more pleasing sight, one whose features and bearing reflect a beautiful and good and lovable character, or one who is the embodiment of what is ugly and depraved and hateful?”

“No doubt there is a great difference, Socrates.”

On another occasion he visited Cleiton the sculptor, and while conversing with him said: “Cleiton, that your statues of runners, wrestlers, boxers and fighters are beautiful I see and know. But how do you produce in them that illusion of life which is their most alluring charm to the beholder?”

As Cleiton was puzzled and did not reply at once, 7
“Is it,” he added, “by faithfully representing the form of living beings that you make your statues look as if they lived?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Then is it not by accurately representing the different parts of the body as they are affected by the pose—the flesh wrinkled or tense, the limbs compressed or outstretched, the muscles taut or loose—that you make them look more like real members and more convincing?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“Does not the exact imitation of the feelings that 8
affect bodies in action also produce a sense of satisfaction in the spectator?”

"Oh yes, presumably."

"Then must not the threatening look in the eyes of fighters be accurately represented, and the triumphant expression on the face of conquerors be imitated?"

"Most certainly."

"It follows, then, that the sculptor must represent in his figures the activities of the soul."

On visiting Pistias the armourer, who showed him 9 some well-made breastplates, Socrates exclaimed: "Upon my word, Pistias, it's a beautiful invention, for the breastplate covers the parts that need protection without impeding the use of the hands. But 10 tell me, Pistias," he added, "why do you charge more for your breastplates than any other maker, though they are no stronger and cost no more to make?"

"Because the proportions of mine are better, Socrates."

"And how do you show their proportions when you ask a higher price—by weight or measure? For I presume you don't make them all of the same weight or the same size, that is, if you make them to fit."

"Fit? Why, of course! a breastplate is of no use without that!"

"Then are not some human bodies well, others 11 ill proportioned?"

"Certainly."

"Then if a breastplate is to fit an ill-proportioned body, how do you make it well-proportioned?"

"By making it fit; for if it is a good fit it is well-proportioned."

"Apparently you mean well-proportioned not 12

absolutely, but in relation to the wearer, as you might call a shield well-proportioned for the man whom it fits, or a military cape—and this seems to apply to everything according to you. And perhaps there is another important advantage in a good fit.” 13

“Tell it me, if you know, Socrates.”

“The good fit is less heavy to wear than the misfit, though both are of the same weight. For the misfit, hanging entirely from the shoulders, or pressing on some other part of the body, proves uncomfortable and irksome; but the good fit, with its weight distributed over the collar-bone and shoulder-blades, the shoulders, chest, back and belly, may almost be called an accessory rather than an encumbrance.”

“The advantage you speak of is the very one 14 which I think makes my work worth a big price. Some, however, prefer to buy the ornamented and the gold-plated breastplates.”

“Still, if the consequence is that they buy misfits, it seems to me they buy ornamented and gold-plated trash. However, as the body is not rigid, but 15 now bent, now straight, how can tight breastplates fit?”

“They can't.”

“You mean that the good fits are not the tight ones, but those that don't chafe the wearer?”

“That is your own meaning, Socrates, and you have hit the right nail on the head.”

XI. At one time there was in Athens a beautiful

woman named Theodoté, who was ready to keep company with anyone who pleased her. One of the bystanders mentioned her name, declaring that words failed him to describe the lady's beauty, and adding that artists visited her to paint her portrait, and she showed them as much as decency allowed. "We had better go and see her," cried Socrates; "of course what beggars description can't very well be learned by hearsay."

"Come with me at once," returned his informant. 2
So off they went to Theodoté's house, where they found her posing before a painter, and looked on.

When the painter had finished, Socrates said: "My friends, ought we to be more grateful to Theodoté for showing us her beauty, or she to us for looking at it? Does the obligation rest with her, if she profits more by showing it, but with us, if we profit more by looking?"

When someone answered that this was a fair way 3 of putting it, "Well now," he went on, "she already has our praise to her credit, and when we spread the news, she will profit yet more; whereas we already long to touch what we have seen, and we shall go away excited and shall miss her when we are gone. The natural consequence is that we become her adorers, she the adored."

"Then, if that is so," exclaimed Theodoté, "of course I ought to be grateful to you for looking."

At this point Socrates noticed that she was sump- 4
tuously dressed, and that her mother at her side was wearing fine clothes and jewellery; and she had

MEMORABILIA, IV. I. 3-5

the natural gifts, the greater is the need of education ; pointing out that thoroughbreds by their spirit and mettle develop into serviceable and splendid creatures, if they are broken in as colts, but if unbroken, prove intractable and sorry jades ; and high-bred puppies, keen workers and good tacklers of game, make first-rate hounds and useful dogs, if well trained, but, if untrained, turn out stupid, crazy, disobedient brutes. It is the same with human beings. The most highly gifted, the youths of ardent soul, capable of doing whatever they attempt, if educated and taught their duty grow into excellent and useful men ; for manifold and great are their good deeds. But untrained and untaught, these same become utterly evil and mischievous ; for without knowledge to discern their duty, they often put their hand to vile deeds, and through the very grandeur and vehemence of their nature, they are uncontrollable and intractable : therefore manifold and great are their evil deeds.¹

Those who prided themselves on riches and thought they had no need of education, supposing that their wealth would suffice them for gaining the objects of their wishes and winning honour among men, he admonished thus. "Only a fool," he said, "can think it possible to distinguish between things useful and things harmful without learning : only a fool can think that without distinguishing these he will get all he wants by means of his wealth and be

¹ Is Alcibiades in his mind ?

MEMORABILIA, IV, II. 3-5

Some time afterwards, meeting Euthydemus again, 3 he saw that he was reluctant to join the circle and anxious not to betray any admiration for the wisdom of Socrates: "Well, gentlemen," said he, "when our friend Euthydemus has attained his full powers, and some question of policy is before the Assembly, he won't be backward in offering advice: that is obvious from his behaviour. I fancy he has prepared a noble exordium to his addresses, with due care not to give the impression that he is indebted to anyone for his knowledge. No doubt he will begin his speech with this introduction:

"Men of Athens, I have never yet learnt any- 4 thing from anyone, nor when I have been told of any man's ability in speech and in action, have I sought to meet him, nor have I been at pains to find a teacher among the men who know. On the contrary, I have constantly avoided learning anything of anyone, and even the appearance of it. Nevertheless I shall recommend to your consideration anything that comes into my head."

"This exordium might be adapted so as to suit 5 candidates for the office of public physician. They might begin their speeches in this strain:

"Men of Athens, I have never yet studied medicine, nor sought to find a teacher among our physicians; for I have constantly avoided learning anything from the physicians, and even the appearance of having studied their art. Nevertheless I ask you to appoint me to the office of a physician, and I will endeavour to learn by experimenting on you."

The exordium set all the company laughing.

"By Hera," retorted Socrates,¹ "I do admire you 9 for valuing the treasures of wisdom above gold and silver. For you are evidently of opinion that, while gold and silver cannot make men better, the thoughts of the wise enrich their possessors with virtue."

Now Euthydemus was glad to hear this, for he guessed that in the opinion of Socrates he was on the road to wisdom. But Socrates, aware that he 10 was pleased with his approbation, went on to say: "Tell me, Euthydemus, what kind of goodness do you want to get by collecting these books?"

And as Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer to give, "Possibly you want to be a doctor?" he guessed: "Medical treatises alone make a large collection."

"Oh no, not at all."

"But perhaps you wish to be an architect? One needs a well-stored mind for that too."

"No, indeed I don't."

"Well, perhaps you want to be a good mathematician, like Theodorus?"²

"No, not that either."

"Well, perhaps you want to be an astronomer?"

And as he again said no, "Perhaps a rhapsodist, then? They tell me you have a complete copy of Homer."

"Oh no, not at all; for your rhapsodists, I know, are consummate as reciters, but they are very silly fellows themselves."

¹ *νῆ τῆν Ἡραν*, a favourite oath of Socrates, is not rendered literally elsewhere; but here it seems to be intended to cap *νῆ τὸν Δία*.

² Theodorus of Cyrene, who is one of the characters in the *Theaetetus* of Plato.

MEMORABILIA, IV. II. 11-13

Then Socrates exclaimed: "Surely, Euthydemus, 11
you don't covet the kind of excellence that makes
good statesmen and managers, competent rulers and
benefactors of themselves and mankind in general?"

"Yes, I do, Socrates," answered Euthydemus,
"that kind of excellence I greatly desire."

"Why," cried Socrates, "it is the noblest kind
of excellence, the greatest of arts that you covet,
for it belongs to kings and is dubbed 'kingly.'
However," he added, "have you reflected whether
it be possible to excel in these matters without being
a just man?"

"Yes, certainly; and it is, in fact, impossible to
be a good citizen without justice."

"Then tell me, have you got that?" 12

"Yes, Socrates, I think I can show myself to
be as just as any man."

"And have just men, like carpenters, their
works?"

"Yes, they have."

"And as carpenters can point out their works,
should just men be able to rehearse theirs?"

"Do you suppose," retorted Euthydemus, "that
I am unable to rehearse the works of justice? Of
course I can,—and the works of injustice too, since
there are many opportunities of seeing and hearing
of them every day."

"I propose, then, that we write J in this column 13
and I in that, and then proceed to place under these
letters, J and I, what we take to be the works of
justice and injustice respectively."

more unjust deception in that case, the intentional or unintentional?"

"Nay, Socrates, I have lost all confidence in my answers; for all the opinions that I expressed before seem now to have taken an entirely different form. Still I venture to say that the intentional deception is more unjust than the unintentional."

"Do you think there is a doctrine and science of 20 the just, as there is of letters?"

"Yes."

"Which, in your judgment, is the more literate, the man who intentionally blunders in writing and reading, or the man who blunders unintentionally?"

"The one who blunders intentionally, I presume; for he can always be accurate when he chooses."

"May we not say, then, that the intentional blunderer is literate and the unintentional is illiterate?"

"Indeed we must."

"And which knows what is just, the intentional liar and deceiver, or the unintentional?"

"The intentional, clearly."

"You say, then, as I understand, that he who knows letters is more literate than he who is ignorant of them?"

"Yes."

"And he who knows what is just is more just than he who does not know?"

"Apparently; but here again I don't feel sure of my own meaning."

"Now come, what do you think of the man who 21 wants to tell the truth, but never sticks to what he says; when he shows you the way, tells you first

24 Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, εἰς Δελφοὺς δὲ ἤδη πώποτε ἀφίκου;

Καὶ δὶς γε νῆ Δί, ἔφη.

Κατέμαθες οὖν πρὸς τῷ ναῷ που γεγραμμένον τὸ Γνώθι σαυτὸν;

Ἔγωγε.

Πότερον οὖν οὐδέν σοι τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν ἢ προσέσχες τε καὶ ἐπεχείρησας σαυτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν, ὅστις εἴης;

Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. καὶ γὰρ δὴ πάνυ τοῦτό γε ὤμην εἰδέναί· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τι ἤδειν, εἴ γε μῆδ' ἐμαυτὸν ἐγίγνωσκον.

25 Πότερα δέ σοι δοκεῖ γινώσκειν ἑαυτὸν ὅστις τοῦνομα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον οἶδεν ἢ ὅστις, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς ἵππους ὠνούμενοι οὐ πρότερον οἶονται γινώσκειν ὃν ἂν βούλωνται γινῶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωνται, πότερον εὐπειθῆς ἐστὶν ἢ δυσπειθῆς καὶ πότερον ἰσχυρὸς ἐστὶν ἢ ἀσθενὴς καὶ πότερον ταχὺς ἢ βραδὺς καὶ τὰλλα τὰ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἵππου χρείαν ἐπιτήδειά τε καὶ ἀνεπιτήδεια ὅπως ἔχει, οὕτως ὁ ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν, ἔγνωκε τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν;

Οὕτως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν.

26 Ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ φανερόν, ἔφη, ὅτι διὰ μὲν τὸ εἰδέναί ἑαυτοὺς πλείστα ἀγαθὰ πάσχουσιν ἄνθρωποι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐψεῦσθαι ἑαυτῶν πλείστα κακά; οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰδότες ἑαυτοὺς τὰ τε ἐπιτήδεια ἑαυτοῖς ἴσασι καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσιν ἅ τε δύνανται καὶ ἅ μὴ· καὶ ἅ μὲν ἐπίστανται πράττοντες πορίζονται τε ὧν δέονται καὶ εὖ πράττουσιν, ὧν δὲ

Hereupon Socrates exclaimed: "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?"

"Yes, certainly; twice."

"Then did you notice somewhere on the temple the inscription 'Know thyself'?"

"I did."

"And did you pay no heed to the inscription, or did you attend to it and try to consider who you were?"

"Indeed I did not; because I felt sure that I knew that already; for I could hardly know anything else if I did not even know myself."

"And what do you suppose a man must know to 25 know himself, his own name merely? Or must he consider what sort of a creature he is for human use and get to know his own powers; just as those who buy horses don't think that they know the beast they want to know until they have considered whether he is docile or stubborn, strong or weak, fast or slow, and generally how he stands in all that makes a useful or a useless horse?"

"That leads me to think that he who does not know his own powers is ignorant of himself."

"Is it not clear too that through self-knowledge 26 men come to much good, and through self-deception to much harm? For those who know themselves, know what things are expedient for themselves and discern their own powers and limitations. And by doing what they understand, they get what they want and prosper: by refraining from attempting

XENOPHON

ἄρξασθαι ἐπισκοπεῖν ἑαυτόν, τοῦτο πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπω εἴ μοι ἐθελήσῃς ἂν ἐξηγήσασθαι.

- 31 Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὁποῖά ἐστι, πάντως που γινώσκεις.

Νῆ Δί', ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ταῦτα οἶδα, καὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων φαυλότερος ἂν εἶην.

Ἴθι δὴ, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐξηγήσαι αὐτά.

Ἄλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, ἔφη· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζω, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν κακόν, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ αἷτια ἑκατέρου αὐτῶν καὶ ποτὰ καὶ βρωτὰ καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν φέροντα ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ νοσεῖν κακὰ.

- 32 Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, ὅταν μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἷτια γίγνηται, ἀγαθὰ ἂν εἶη, ὅταν δὲ κακοῦ, κακὰ.

Πότε δ' ἂν, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν ὑγιαίνειν κακοῦ αἷτιον γένοιτο, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν ἀγαθοῦ;

Ὅταν νῆ Δί', ἔφη, στρατείας τε αἰσχροῦς καὶ ναυτιλίας βλαβερᾶς καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τοιούτων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετασχόντες ἀπόλωνται, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν ἀπολειφθέντες σωθῶσιν.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλ' ὁρᾶς, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὠφελίμων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετέχουσιν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν ἀπολείπονται.

Ταῦτα οὖν, ἔφη, ποτὲ μὲν ὠφελούντα, ποτὲ δὲ βλάπτοντα μᾶλλον ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ἐστίν;

Οὐδὲν μὰ Δία φαίνεται κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

- 33 Ἄλλ' ἢ γέ τοι σοφία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν· ποῖον γὰρ ἂν τις πρᾶγμα οὐ βέλτιον πράττοι σοφὸς ὢν ἢ ἀμαθής;

Τί δαί ; τὸν Δαίδαλον, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι ληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μίνω διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἠναγκάζεται ἐκείνῳ δουλεύειν καὶ τῆς τε πατρίδος ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστερήθη καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδιδράσκειν μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν τε παῖδα ἀπώλεσε καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠδυνήθη σωθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀπενεχθεὶς εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους πάλιν ἐκεῖ ἐδούλευε ;

Λέγεται νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ταῦτα.

Τὰ δὲ Παλαμῆδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας πάθῃ ; τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύως ἀπόλλυται.

Λέγεται καὶ ταῦτα, ἔφη.

Ἄλλους δὲ πόσους οἶε διὰ σοφίαν ἀνασπάστους πρὸς βασιλέα γεγονέναι καὶ ἐκεῖ δουλεύειν ;

34 Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀναμφιλογώτατον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

Εἴ γε μή τις αὐτό, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐξ ἀμφιλόγων ἀγαθῶν συντιθείη.

Τί δ' ἄν, ἔφη, τῶν εὐδαιμονικῶν ἀμφίλογον εἶη ;

Οὐδέν, ἔφη, εἴ γε μὴ προσθήσομεν αὐτῷ κάλλος ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ δόξαν ἢ καὶ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων.

Ἄλλὰ νῆ Δία προσθήσομεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἄνευ τούτων εὐδαιμονοίη ;

35 Νῆ Δί', ἔφη, προσθήσομεν ἄρα, ἐξ ὧν πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ κάλλος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὠραίοις παρακεκινηκότων διαφθείρονται, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν μείζουσιν ἔργοις ἐπιχειροῦντες οὐ μικροῖς κακοῖς περιπίπτουσι, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον διαθρυπτόμενοί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλευόμενοι

ἀπόλλυνται, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ δόξαν καὶ πολιτικὴν δύναμιν μεγάλα κακὰ πεπόνθασιν.

- 36 Ἄλλα μὴν, ἔφη, εἴ γε μηδὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπαινῶν ὀρθῶς λέγω, ὁμολογῶ μηδ' ὅ τι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐχεσθαι χρὴ εἶδέναι.

Ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἶδέναι οὐδ' ἔσκεψαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης παρασκευάζῃ προεστάναι, δῆλον ὅτι δημοκρατίαν γε οἶσθα τί ἐστι.

Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη.

- 37 Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι δυνατὸν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν εἶδέναι μὴ εἰδότα δῆμον;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Καὶ δῆμον ἄρ' οἶσθα τί ἐστιν;

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Καὶ τί νομίζεις δῆμον εἶναι;

Τοὺς πένητας τῶν πολιτῶν ἔγωγε.

Καὶ τοὺς πένητας ἄρα οἶσθα;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους οἶσθα;

Οὐδέν γε ἦττον ἢ καὶ τοὺς πένητας.

Ποίους δὲ πένητας καὶ ποίους πλουσίους καλεῖς;

Τοὺς μὲν, οἶμαι, μὴ ἱκανὰ ἔχοντας εἰς ἃ δεῖ τελεῖν πένητας, τοὺς δὲ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν πλουσίους.

- 38 Καταμεμάθηκας οὖν, ὅτι ἐνίοις μὲν πάνυ ὀλίγα ἔχουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀρκεῖ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ περιποιοῦνται ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ οὐχ ἱκανά ἐστι;

Καὶ νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὀρθῶς γάρ με

ἀναμνήσκεις, οἶδα¹ καὶ τυράννους τινάς, οἷ δι' ἔνδειαν ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι ἀναγκάζονται ἀδικεῖν.

39 Οὐκ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν τυράννους εἰς τὸν δῆμον θήσομεν, τοὺς δὲ ὀλίγα κεκτημένους, ἂν οἰκονομικοὶ ᾦσιν, εἰς τοὺς πλουσίους.

Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἔφη· Ἀναγκάζει με καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ἢ ἐμὴ φαυλότης· καὶ φροντίζω, μὴ κράτιστον ἢ μοι σιγᾶν κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν εἶδέναι. καὶ πάνν ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε καὶ καταφρονήσας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι.

40 Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσήεσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακότερους ἐνόμιζεν· ὁ δὲ Εὐθύδημος ὑπέλαβεν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀνὴρ ἀξιόλογος γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ὅτι μάλιστα Σωκράτει συνείη· καὶ οὐκ ἀπελείπετο ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον εἴη· ἔνια δὲ καὶ ἐμμεῖτο ὧν ἐκεῖνος ἐπετήδευεν. ὁ δ' ὡς ἔγνω αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἥκιστα μὲν διετάραπτεν, ἀπλοῦστατα δὲ καὶ σαφέστατα ἐξηγεῖτο ἅ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἶδέναι δεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν κράτιστα εἶναι.

III. Τὸ μὲν οὖν λεκτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς καὶ μηχανικὸς γίνεσθαι τοὺς συνόντας οὐκ ἔσπευδεν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον τούτων ᾗετο χρῆναι σωφροσύνην αὐτοῖς ἐγγενέσθαι. τοὺς γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ταῦτα δυναμένους ἀδικωτέροις τε καὶ δυνατωτέροις κακουργεῖν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.

2 Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοῦ ἐπειρᾶτο σώφρονας ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας. ἄλλοι μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ πρὸς

know, in fact, of some despots even who are driven to crime by poverty, just like paupers."

"Therefore, if that is so, we will include despots 39 in the people, and men of small means, if they are thrifty, in the rich."

"I am forced to agree once more," cried Euthydemus, "evidently by my stupidity. I am inclined to think I had better hold my tongue, or I shall know nothing at all presently." And so he went away very dejected, disgusted with himself and convinced that he was indeed a slave.

Now many of those who were brought to this pass 40 by Socrates, never went near him again and were regarded by him as mere blockheads. But Euthydemus guessed that he would never be of much account unless he spent as much time as possible with Socrates. Henceforward, unless obliged to absent himself, he never left him, and even began to adopt some of his practices. Socrates, for his part, seeing how it was with him, avoided worrying him, and began to expound very plainly and clearly the knowledge that he thought most needful and the practices that he held to be most excellent.

III. Skill in speaking and efficiency in affairs, therefore, and ingenuity, were not the qualities that he was eager to foster in his companions. He held that they needed first to acquire prudence. For he believed that those faculties, unless accompanied by prudence, increased in their possessors injustice and power for mischief.

In the first place, then, he tried to make his com- 2 panions prudent towards the gods. Accordingly he

¹ οἶδα Stobaeus: οἶδα γὰρ Sauppe with MSS.

ἥς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδίδομέν τε ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν καὶ νόμους τιθέμεθα καὶ πολιτευόμεθα ;

Παντάσιν εὐόκασιν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, οἱ θεοὶ πολλὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιείσθαι.

Τὸ δὲ καὶ εἰ ἀδυνατοῦμεν τὰ συμφέροντα προνοεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων, ἡμῖν αὐτοὺς συνεργεῖν διὰ μαντικῆς τοῖς πυνθανομένοις φράζοντας τὰ ἀποβησόμενα καὶ διδάσκοντας, ἧ ἂν ἄριστα γίγνοιτο ;

Σοὶ δ', ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, εὐόκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, εἰ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρῆ ποιεῖν καὶ ἄ μή.

13 "Ὅτι δὲ ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένης, ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῆ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρᾶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς. ἐννόει δέ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ θεοὶ οὕτως ὑποδεικνύουσιν· οἷ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι ἡμῖν τάγαθὰ δίδόντες οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τοῦμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόασιν καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, καὶ αἰεὶ μὲν χρωμένοις ἀτριβῆ τε καὶ ὑγιᾶ καὶ ἀγήρατα παρέχων, θάπτο" δὲ νοήματος ὑπηρετοῦντα ἀναμαρτήτως, οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πρᾶττων ὁρᾶται, τάδε δὲ οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν

14 ἐστίν. ἐννόει δ', ὅτι καὶ ὁ πᾶσι φανερός δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῆ θεᾶσθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται. καὶ τοὺς ὑπερήτας δὲ τῶν θεῶν εὐρήσεις ἀφανεῖς ὄντας· κεραυνὸς τε γὰρ ὅτι μὲν ἀνωθεν ἀφίεται δῆλον

of expression, which enables us to impart to one another all good things by teaching and to take our share of them, to enact laws and to administer states."

"Truly, Socrates, it does appear that the gods devote much care to man."

"Yet again, in so far as we are powerless of ourselves to foresee what is expedient for the future,¹ the gods lend us their aid, revealing the issues by divination to inquirers, and teaching them how to obtain the best results."

"With you, Socrates, they seem to deal even more friendly than with other men, if it is true that, even unasked, they warn you by signs what to do and what not to do."

"Yes, and you will realise the truth of what I say ¹³ if, instead of waiting for the gods to appear to you in bodily presence, you are content to praise and worship them because you see their works. Mark that the gods themselves give the reason for doing so; for when they bestow on us their good gifts, not one of them ever appears before us gift in hand; and especially he who co-ordinates and holds together the universe, wherein all things are fair and good, and presents them ever unimpaired and sound and ageless for our use,² and quicker than thought to serve us unerringly, is manifest in his supreme works, and yet is unseen by us in the ordering of them. Mark that ¹⁴ even the sun, who seems to reveal himself to all, permits not man to behold him closely, but if any attempts to gaze recklessly upon him, blinds their eyes. And the gods' ministers too you will find to be invisible. That the thunderbolt is hurled from

¹ *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 46.

² *Ibid.*, VIII. vii. 22.

καὶ ὅτι οἷς ἂν ἐντύχη πάντων κρατεῖ· ὁράται δ' οὐτ' ἐπιόν οὔτε κατασκίψας οὔτε ἀπιών· καὶ ἄνεμοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐχ ὁρώνται, ἃ δὲ ποιοῦσι φανερά ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ προσιόντων αὐτῶν αἰσθανόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχῆ, ἢ εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν φανερόν, ὁράται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτή.

Ἄ χρῆ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον.

15 Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἀμελήσω τοῦ δαιμονίου, σαφῶς οἶδα· ἐκείνο δὲ ἀθυμῶ, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὰς τῶν θεῶν εὐεργεσίας οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ποτὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀξίαις χάρισιν ἀμείβεσθαι.

16 Ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀθύμει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημ· ὁρᾷς γάρ, ὅτι ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεός, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν ἐπερωτᾷ, πῶς ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς χαρίζοιτο, ἀποκρίνεται Νόμῳ πόλεως. νόμος δὲ δήπου πανταγῶ ἐστὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ἱεροῖς θεοῖς ἀρέσκεσθαι.

Πῶς οὖν ἂν τις κάλλιον καὶ εὐσεβέστερον τιμῆθαι θεοῦ ἢ ὡς αὐτοὶ κελεύουσιν, οὕτω ποιῶν; ἀλλὰ χρῆ τῆς μὲν δυναμέως μηδὲν ὑφίστασθαι· ὅταν γάρ τις τοῦτο ποιῆ, φανερὸς δήπου ἐστὶ τότε οὐ τιμῶν θεοῦ. χρῆ οὖν μηδὲν ἐλλείποντα κατὰ δύναμιν τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς θαρρεῖν τε καὶ ἐλπίζειν τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ· οὐ γὰρ παρ' ἄλλων γ' ἂν τις μείζω ἐλπίζων σωφρονοῖη ἢ παρὰ τῶν τὰ μέγιστα ὀφελεῖν δυναμένων οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλως μάλλον ἢ εἰ

heaven, and that he overwhelms all on whom he falls, is evident, but he is seen neither coming nor striking nor going. And the winds are themselves invisible, yet their deeds are manifest to us, and we perceive their approach. Moreover, the soul of man, which more than all else that is human partakes of the divine, reigns manifestly within us, and yet is itself unseen.

"For these reasons it behoves us not to despise the things that are unseen, but, realising their power in their manifestations, to honour the godhead."

"Socrates," replied Euthydemus, "that I will in 15 no wise be heedless of the godhead I know of a surety. But my heart fails me when I think that no man can ever render due thanks to the gods for their benefits."

"Nay, be not down-hearted, Euthydemus; for you 16 know that to the inquiry, 'How am I to please the gods?' the Delphic god replies, 'Follow the custom of the state'; and everywhere, I suppose, it is the custom that men propitiate the gods with sacrifices according to their power. How then can a man honour the gods more excellently and more devoutly than by doing as they themselves ordain? Only he 17 must fall no whit short of his power. For when he does that, it is surely plain that he is not then honouring the gods. Therefore it is by coming no whit short of his power in honouring the gods that he is to look with confidence for the greatest blessings.¹ For there are none from whom a man of prudence would hope for greater things than those who can confer the greatest benefits, nor can he show his prudence more clearly than by pleasing them.

¹ Cyropaedia, I. vi. 4.

τούτοις ἀρέσκοι. ἀρέσκοι δὲ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ
ὡς μάλιστα πείθοιτο αὐτοῖς ;

- 8 Τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ λέγων τε καὶ αὐτὸς ποιῶν
εὐσεβεστεροῦς τε καὶ σωφρονεστεροῦς τοὺς συνόν-
τας παρεσκεύαζεν.

- IV. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου γε οὐκ
i. e. not doing ἀπεκρύπτετο ἣν εἶχε γνώμην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργῳ
ἀπεδείκνυτο, ἰδία τε πᾶσι νομίμως τε καὶ ὠφελί-
μως χρώμενος καὶ κοινῇ ἀρχουσί τε ἃ οἱ νόμοι
προστάττειεν πειθόμενος καὶ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ ἐν
2 ταῖς στρατείαις οὕτως, ὥστε διάδηλος εἶναι παρὰ
τοὺς ἄλλους εὐτακτῶν, καὶ ὅτε ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις
ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ
τοὺς νόμους ψηφίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις
ἠναντιώθη τοιαύτη ὀρμῇ τοῦ δήμου, ἣν οὐκ ἂν
3 οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπου ὑπομείναι· καὶ ὅτε
οἱ τριάκοντα προσέταπτον αὐτῷ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους
τι, οὐκ ἐπέιθετο· τοῖς τε γὰρ νέοις ἀπαγορευόν-
των αὐτῶν μὴ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ προσταξάντων
ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀγαγεῖν
τινα ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, μόνος οὐκ ἐπέισθη διὰ τὸ παρὰ
4 τοὺς νόμους αὐτῷ προστάττεσθαι· καὶ ὅτε τὴν
ὑπὸ Μελήτου γραφὴν ἔφευγε, τῶν ἄλλων εἰωθό-
των ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις πρὸς χάριν τε τοῖς
δικασταῖς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ κολακεύειν καὶ δεῖσθαι
παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν
πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν ἀφιεμένων, ἐκεῖνος
οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ
παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ῥαδίως ἂν ἀφε-
θεῖς ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων
ἐποίησε, προείλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων
ἀποθανεῖν ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν.

5 Καὶ ἔλεγε δὲ οὕτως καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους μὲν πολ-
λάκις,¹ οἶδα δὲ ποτὲ αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Ἱππίαν τὸν
Ἡλείου περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τοιαύδε διαλεχθέντα.
διὰ χρόνου γὰρ ἀφικόμενος ὁ Ἱππίας Ἀθήναζε
παρεγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει λέγοντι πρὸς τινας, ὡς
θαυμαστὸν εἶη τὸ εἰ μὲν τις βούλοιο σκυτεὰ
διδάξασθαι τινα ἢ τέκτονα ἢ χαλκέα ἢ ἵππεία, μὴ
ἀπορεῖν, ὅποι ἂν πέμψας τούτου τύχοι. [φασὶ δὲ
τινες, καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίους
ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδασκόντων.]
ἔαν δὲ τις βούληται ἢ αὐτὸς μαθεῖν τὸ δικαίου ἢ
υἷον ἢ οἰκέτην διδάξασθαι, μὴ εἰδέναι ὅποι ἂν
ἐλθὼν τύχοι τούτου.

6 Καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἱππίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπι-
σκώπτων αὐτόν, "Ἐτι γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἐκεῖνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτέ σου
ἤκουσα ;

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, "Ὁ δέ γε τούτου δεινότερον,
ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ μόνον αἰεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ
καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν σὺ δ' ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυ-
μαθῆς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ
λέγεις.

Ἀμέλει, ἔφη, πειρῶμαι καινόν τι λέγειν αἰεὶ.

7 Πότερον, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπίστασαι, οἷον
περὶ γραμμάτων ἔάν τις ἔρηται σε, πόσα καὶ ποῖα
Σωκράτους ἐστίν, ἄλλα μὲν πρότερον, ἄλλα δὲ νῦν
πειρᾶ λέγειν ; ἢ περὶ ἀριθμῶν τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν, εἰ
τα δὲ πέντε δέκα ἐστίν, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ νῦν ἢ καὶ
πρότερον ἀποκρίνη ;

Περὶ μὲν τούτων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ
σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ αἰεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω· περὶ μέντοι τοῦ

Such views frequently found expression in his 5
conversations with different persons ; I recollect the
substance of one that he had with Hippias of Elis
concerning Justice. Hippias, who had not been in
Athens for a considerable time, found Socrates
talking : he was saying that if you want to have a
man taught cobbling or building or smithing or riding,
you know where to send him to learn the craft : some
indeed declare that if you want to train up a horse or
an ox in the way he should go, teachers abound. And
yet, strangely enough, if you want to learn Justice
yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it,
you know not where to go for a teacher.

When Hippias heard this, "How now?" he cried 6
in a tone of raillery, "still the same old sentiments,
Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?"

"Yes, Hippias," he replied, "always the same,
and—what is more astonishing—on the same topics
too! You are so learned that I daresay you never say
the same thing on the same subjects."

"I certainly try to say something fresh every
time."

"Do you mean, about what you know? For 7
example, in answer to the question, 'How many
letters are there in "Socrates"' and how do you spell
it?' do you try to say something different now from
what you said before? Or take figures : suppose you
are asked if twice five are ten, don't you give the same
answer now as you gave before?"

"About letters and figures, Socrates, I always say
the same thing, just like you. As for Justice, I feel

¹ Ch. IV. § 1-5, ἄλλους μὲν πολλάκις, are bracketed by
Sauppe, and many others as spurious ; but see the analysis
in the Introduction.

then it would be the same with justice
as with numbers

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δικαίου πάνν οἶμαι νῦν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, πρὸς ἃ οὔτε
σύ οὔτ' ἂν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς δύναται ἀντειπεῖν.

8 Νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη, μέγα λέγεις ἀγαθὸν εὐρη-
κέναι, εἰ παύσονται μὲν οἱ δικασταὶ δίχα ψηφίζο-
μενοι, παύσονται δὲ οἱ πολῖται περὶ τῶν δικαίων
ἀντιλέγοντές τε καὶ ἀντιδικούντες καὶ στασιάζ-
οντες, παύσονται δὲ αἱ πόλεις διαφερόμεναι περὶ
τῶν δικαίων καὶ πολεμοῦσαι. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ
οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν ἀπολειφθείην σου πρὸ τοῦ ἀκούσαι
τηλικούτου ἀγαθὸν εὐρηκότος.

9 Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκούσῃ, πρὶν γ' ἂν
αὐτὸς ἀποφῆνῃ, ὃ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.
ἄρκει γάρ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελάς ἐρωτῶν μὲν
καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δ' οὐδενὶ θέλων
ὑπέχειν λόγον οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ
οὐδενός.

10 Τί δέ; ὦ Ἱππία, ἔφη, οὐκ ἤσθησαι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἂν
δοκεῖ μοι δίκαια εἶναι οὐδὲν παύομαι ἀποδεικνύ-
μενος;

Καὶ ποῖος δὴ σοι, ἔφη, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν;

Εἰ δὲ μὴ λόγῳ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ ἀποδείκνυμαι.
ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον τοῦ λόγου το
ἔργον εἶναι;

Πολύ γε νῆ Δί', ἔφη, δίκαια μὲν γὰρ λέγοντες
πολλοὶ ἄδικα ποιοῦσι, δίκαια δὲ πράττων οὐδ' ἂν
εἰς ἄδικος εἶη.

11 Ἦίσθησαι οὖν πρόποτέ μου ἢ ψευδομαρτυροῦν-
τος ἢ συκοφαντοῦντος ἢ φίλους ἢ πόλιν εἰς
στάσιον ἐμβάλλοντος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἄδικον πράττω-
τος;

Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπέχεσθαι οὐ δίκαιον ἡγή;

This is begging the question:

MEMORABILIA, IV. IV 7-11

confident that I can now say that which neither you
nor anyone else can contradict."

"Upon my word, you mean to say that you have 8
made a great discovery, if jurymen are to cease from
voting different ways, citizens from disputing and
litigation, and wrangling about the justice of their
claims, cities from quarrelling about their rights and
making war; and for my part, I don't see how to tear
myself away from you till I have heard about your
great discovery."

"But I vow you shall not hear unless you first 9
declare your own opinion about the nature of Justice;
for it's enough that you mock at others, questioning
and examining everybody, and never willing to
render an account yourself or to state an opinion
about anything."

"Indeed, Hippias! Haven't you noticed that I 10
never cease to declare my notions of what is just?"

"And how can you call that an account?"

"I declare them by my deeds, anyhow, if not by
my words. Don't you think that deeds are better
evidence than words?"

"Yes, much better, of course; for many say what
is just and do what is unjust; but no one who does
what is just can be unjust."

"Then have you ever found me dealing in perjury 11
or calumny, or stirring up strife between friends or
fellow-citizens, or doing any other unjust act?"

"I have not."

"To abstain from what is unjust is just, don't you
think?"

Δήλος εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ νῦν διαφεύγειν ἐγχειρῶν τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι γνώμην, ὃ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἂ πράττουσιν οἱ δίκαιοι, ἀλλ' ἂ μὴ πράττουσι, ταῦτα λέγεις.

- 12 Ἄλλ' ὥμην ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ μὴ θέλειν ἀδικεῖν ἱκανὸν δικαιοσύνης ἐπίδειγμα εἶναι. εἰ δέ σοι μὴ δοκεῖ, σκέψαι, ἂν τότε σοι μᾶλλον ἀρέσκη· φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι.

Ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι;

- 13 Ἐγωγε, ἔφη.
Οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνομαί σου, ὅποιον νόμιμον ἢ ποῖον δίκαιον λέγεις.

Νόμους δὲ πόλεως, ἔφη, γινώσκεις;

Ἐγωγε, ἔφη.

Καὶ τίνας τούτους νομίζεις;

Ἄ οἱ πολῖται, ἔφη, συνθέμενοι ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι ἐγράψαντο.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, νόμιμος μὲν ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ ταῦτα πολιτευόμενος, ἄνομος δὲ ὁ ταῦτα παραβαίνων;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ δίκαια μὲν ἂν πράττοι ὁ τούτοις πειθόμενος, ἄδικα δ' ὁ τούτοις ἀπειθῶν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τὰ δίκαια πράττων δίκαιος, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικος;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ὁ μὲν ἄρα νόμιμος δίκαιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ ἄνομος ἄδικος.

- 14 Καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Νόμους δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,

¹ Cyropaedia, i. iii. 17.

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πὼς ἂν τις ἠγγήσαιτο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὓς γε πολλάκις αὐτοὶ οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται ;

Καὶ γὰρ πόλεμον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πολλάκις ἀράμεναι αἱ πόλεις πάλιν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Διάφορον οὖν τι οἶε ποιεῖν, ἔφη, τοὺς τοῖς νόμοις πειθομένους φανλίζων, ὅτι καταλυθεῖεν ἂν οἱ νόμοι, ἢ εἰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις εὐτακτοῦντας ψέγοις, ὅτι γένοιτ' ἂν εἰρήνη ; ἢ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ταῖς πατρίσι προθύμως βοηθοῦντας μέμφη ;

15 Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Λυκουργον δὲ τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καταμεμάθηκας ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τὴν Σπάρτην ἐποίησεν, εἰ μὴ τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις μάλιστα ἐνεργάσατο αὐτῇ ; τῶν δὲ ἀρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οἵτινες ἂν τοῖς πολίταις αἰτιώτατοι ᾧσι τοῦ τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι, οὗτοι ἄριστοὶ εἰσι καὶ πόλις, ἐν ἣ μάλιστα οἱ πολῖται τοῖς νόμοις πείθονται, ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε ἄριστα διάγει καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀνυπόστατος ἐστίν ; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστόν τε

16 ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι καὶ πλειστάκις ἐν αὐταῖς αἱ τε γερουσίαι καὶ οἱ ἄριστοι ἄνδρες παρακελεύονται τοῖς πολίταις ὁμονοεῖν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι νόμος κεῖται τοὺς πολίτας ὁμνύναι ὁμονοήσειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ὁμνύουσι τὸν ὄρκον τοῦτον· οἶμαι δ' ἐγὼ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς χοροὺς κρίνωσιν οἱ πολῖται οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀλητὰς ἐπαινώσιν οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιητὰς αἰρῶνται οὐδ' ἵνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς

- ἡδωνται, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται. τουτοῖς γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμμενόντων, αἱ πόλεις ἰσχυρόταται τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέσταται γίνονται· ἄνευ δὲ ὁμοιοείας οὐτ' ἂν πόλις εὖ πολιτευθεῖη οὐτ' οἶκος
- 17 καλῶς οἰκηθεῖη. ἰδίᾳ δὲ πῶς μὲν ἂν τις ἦττον ὑπὸ πόλεως ζημιότο, πῶς δ' ἂν μᾶλλον τιμῶτο ἢ εἰ τοῖς νόμοις πείθοιτο; πῶς δ' ἂν ἦττον ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἠτῶτο ἢ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον νικῶη; τίνοι δ' ἂν τις μᾶλλον πιστεύσειε παρακαταθέσθαι ἢ χρήματα ἢ υἱοὺς ἢ θυγατέρας; τίνα δ' ἂν ἡ πόλις ὅλη ἀξιοπιστότερον ἠγήσαιτο τοῦ νομίμου; παρὰ τίνος δ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῶν δικαίων τύχοιεν ἢ γονεῖς ἢ οἰκέοι ἢ οἰκέται ἢ φίλοι ἢ πολῖται ἢ ξένοι; τίνοι δ' ἂν μᾶλλον πολέμοιο πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἀνοχὰς ἢ σπονδὰς ἢ συνθήκας περὶ εἰρήνης; τίνοι δ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶ νομίμῳ σύμμαχοι ἐθέλοιεν γίνεσθαι; τῶ δ' ἂν μᾶλλον οἱ σύμμαχοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἡγεμονίαν ἢ φρουραρχίαν ἢ πόλεις; τίνα δ' ἂν τις εὐεργετήσας ὑπολάβοι χάριν κομείσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν νόμιμον; ἢ τίνα μᾶλλον ἂν τις εὐεργετήσειεν ἢ παρ' οὗ χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι νομίζει; τῶ δ' ἂν τις βούλοιο μᾶλλον φίλος εἶναι ἢ τῶ τοιούτῳ ἢ τῶ ἦττον ἐχθρὸς; τῶ δ' ἂν τις ἦττον πολεμήσειεν ἢ ᾧ μάλιστα μὲν φίλος εἶναι βούλοιο, ἢκιστα δ' ἐχθρὸς καὶ ᾧ πλείστοι μὲν φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι βούλοιντο εἶναι, ἐλάχιστοι δ' ἐχθροὶ καὶ πολέμοιο;
- 18 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ᾧ Ἰππία, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποδείκνυμαι νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· σὺ δ' εἰ τὰναντία γιγνώσκεις, δίδασκε.

Καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Ἄλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, οὐ μοι δοκῶ τὰναντία γιγνώσκειν οἷς εἴρηκας περὶ τοῦ δικαίου.

Ἀγράφους δέ τινας οἴσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Ἴππία, νόμους ;

Τοὺς γ' ἐν πάσῃ, ἔφη, χώρα κατὰ ταῦτὰ νομιζομένους.

Ἐχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὺς ἔθεντο ;

Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, οἷ γε οὔτε συνελθεῖν ἅπαντες ἂν δυνηθεῖεν οὔτε ὁμόφωνοί εἴσι ;

Τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις τεθεικέναι τοὺς νόμους τούτους ;

Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, θεοὺς οἶμαι τοὺς νόμους τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θείναι· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρῶτον νομίζεται θεοὺς σέβειν.

20 Οὐκοῦν καὶ γονέας τιμᾶν πανταχοῦ νομίζεται ;
Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ μήτε γονέας παισὶ μίγνυσθαι μήτε παῖδας γονεῦσιν ;

Οὐκέτι μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος θεοῦ νόμος εἶναι.

Τί δὴ ; ἔφη.

Ὅτι, ἔφη, αἰσθάνομαί τινας παραβαίνοντας αὐτόν.

21 Καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα πολλά, ἔφη, παρανομοῦσιν ἄλλὰ δίκην γέ τοι διδᾶσιν οἱ παραβαίνοντες τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν κειμένους νόμους, ἦν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ διαφυγεῖν, ὥσπερ τοὺς ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κειμένους νόμους ἔνιοι παραβαίνοντες διαφεύγουσι τὸ δίκην δίδοναι, οἱ μὲν λανθάνοντες, οἱ δὲ βιαζόμενοι.

22 Καὶ ποῖαν, ἔφη, δίκην, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ δύνανται διαφεύγειν γονεῖς τε παισὶ καὶ παῖδες γονεῦσι μινύμενοι ;

“Do you know what is meant by ‘unwritten laws,’ 19 Hippias?”

“Yes, those that are uniformly observed in every country.”

“Could you say that men made them?”

“Nay, how could that be, seeing that they cannot all meet together and do not speak the same language?”

“Then by whom have these laws been made, do you suppose?”

“I think that the gods made these laws for men. For among all men the first law is to fear the gods.”

“Is not the duty of honouring parents another 20 universal law?”

“Yes, that is another.”

“And that parents shall not have sexual intercourse with their children nor children with their parents?”¹

“No, I don’t think that is a law of God.”

“Why so?”

“Because I notice that some transgress it.”

“Yes, and they do many other things contrary to 21 the laws. But surely the transgressors of the laws ordained by the gods pay a penalty that a man can in no wise escape, as some, when they transgress the laws ordained by man, escape punishment, either by concealment or by violence.”

“And pray what sort of penalty is it, Socrates, 22 that may not be avoided by parents and children who have intercourse with one another?”

¹ *Cyropaedia*, v. i. 10.

Τὴν μεγίστην νῆ Δί, ἔφη· τί γὰρ ἂν μείζον πάθειεν ἄνθρωποι τεκνοποιοῦμενοι τοῦ κακῶς τεκνοποιεῖσθαι ;

- 23 Πῶς εὔν, ἔφη, κακῶς οὗτοι τεκνοποιοῦνται, οὓς γε οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀγαθοὺς αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἐξ ἀγαθῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι ;

“Ὅτι νῆ Δί, ἔφη, οὐ μόνον ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ τοὺς ἐξ ἀλλήλων παιδοποιουμένους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμάζοντας τοῖς σώμασιν· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ὅμοια τὰ σπέρματα εἶναι τὰ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων τοῖς τῶν μήπω ἀκμαζόντων ἢ τῶν παρηκμακότων ;

Ἄλλὰ μὰ Δί, ἔφη, οὐκ εἰκὸς ὅμοια εἶναι.

Πότερα οὖν, ἔφη, βελτίω ;

Δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, τὰ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων.

Τὰ τῶν μὴ ἀκμαζόντων ἄρα οὐ σπουδαῖα ;

Οὐκ εἰκὸς μὰ Δί, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν οὕτω γε οὐ δεῖ παιδοποιεῖσθαι ;

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν οἱ γε οὕτω παιδοποιοῦμενοι ὡς οὐ δεῖ παιδοποιοῦνται ;

Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

Τίνες οὖν ἄλλοι, ἔφη, κακῶς ἂν παιδοποιοῖντο, εἴ γε μὴ οὗτοι ;

Ὅμογνωμονῶ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο.

- 24 Τί δέ ; τοὺς εὖ ποιοῦντας ἀντευεργετεῖν οὐ πανταχοῦ νόμιμόν ἐστι ;

Νόμιμον, ἔφη· παραβαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ τοῦτο παραβαίνοντες δίκην διδῶσι φίλων μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἔρημοι γιγνόμενοι, τοὺς δὲ μισοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς ἀναγκαζόμενοι διώκειν· ἢ οὐχ οἱ μὲν εὖ ποιοῦντες τοὺς χρωμένους ἑαυτοῖς

ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι εἰσὶν, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀντευεργετοῦντες τοὺς τοιούτους διὰ μὲν τὴν ἀχαριστίαν μισοῦνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν, διὰ δὲ τὸ μάλιστα λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι τούτους μάλιστα διώκουσι;

Νῆ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θεοῖς ταῦτα πάντα ἔοικε· τὸ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὰς τιμωρίας ἔχειν βελτίονος ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον νομοθέτου δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι.

25 Πότερον οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγή τὰ δίκαια νομοθετεῖν ἢ ἄλλα τῶν δικαίων;

Οὐκ ἄλλα μὰ Δί', ἔφη· σχολῆ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος γέ τις τὰ δίκαια νομοθετήσκειν εἰ μὴ θεός.

Καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ νόμιμον εἶναι ἀρέσκει.

Τοιαῦτα λέγων τε καὶ πράττων δικαιότερους ἐποίει τοὺς πλησιάζοντας.

V. Ὡς δὲ καὶ πρακτικότερους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ, νῦν αὖ τοῦτο λέξω. νομίζων γὰρ ἐγκράτειαν ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ μέλλοντι καλόν τι πράξειν, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς φανερός ἦν τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἡσκηκῶς αὐτὸν μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἔπειτα διαλεγόμενος προετρέπετο πάντων μάλιστα τοὺς συνόντας πρὸς 2 ἐγκράτειαν. αἰεὶ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χρησίμων αὐτὸς τε διετέλει μεμνημένος καὶ τοὺς συνόντας πάντας ὑπομιμνήσκων· οἶδα δὲ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Εὐθύδημον περὶ ἐγκρατείας τοιαύδε διαλεχθέντα·

Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἄρα καλὸν καὶ μεγαλείον νομίζεις εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ πόλει κτῆμα ἐλευθερίαν;

acquaintance are good friends to him, he is hated by them for his ingratitude, if he makes no return, and then, because it is most profitable to enjoy the acquaintance of such men, he hunts them most assiduously?"

"Assuredly, Socrates, all this does suggest the work of the gods. For laws that involve in themselves punishment meet for those who break them, must, I think, be framed by a better legislator than man."

"Then, Hippias, do you think that the gods 25 ordain what is just or what is otherwise?"

"Not what is otherwise—of course not; for if a god ordains not that which is just, surely no other legislator can do so."

"Consequently, Hippias, the gods too accept the identification of just and lawful."

By such words and actions he encouraged Justice in those who resorted to his company.

V. He did also try to make his companions efficient in affairs, as I will now show. For holding that it is good for anyone who means to do honourable work to have self-control, he made it clear to his companions, in the first place, that he had been assiduous in self-discipline;¹ moreover, in his conversation he exhorted his companions to cultivate self-control above all things. Thus he bore in mind 2 continually the aids to virtue, and put all his companions in mind of them. I recall in particular the substance of a conversation that he once had with Euthydemus on self-control.

"Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "do you think that freedom is a noble and splendid possession both for individuals and for communities?"

¹ *Cyropaedia*, VIII. i. 32.

- Ὡς οἶόν τε γε μάλιστα, ἔφη.
- 3 "Ὅστις οὖν ἄρχεται ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ διὰ ταύτας μὴ δύναται πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, νομίζεις τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι ;
"Ἦκιστα, ἔφη.
"Ἴσως γὰρ ἐλευθέριον φαίνεται σοι τὸ πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτα τὸ ἔχειν τοὺς κωλύοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν ἀνελεύθερον νομίζεις ;
Παντάπασι γ', ἔφη.
- 4 Παντάπασι ἄρα σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀνελεύθεροι εἶναι ;
Νῆ τὸν Δ' εἰκότως.
Πότερα δέ σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς κωλύεσθαι μόνον τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν ἢ καὶ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τὰ αἰσχίστα ποιεῖν ;
Οὐδέν ἦττον ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, δοκοῦσι ταῦτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ ἐκεῖνα κωλύεσθαι.
- 5 Ποίους δέ τινας δεσπότας ἡγήη τοὺς τὰ μὲν ἄριστα κωλύοντας, τὰ δὲ κακίστα ἀναγκάζοντας ;
Ὡς δυνατὸν νῆ Δί', ἔφη, κακίστους.
Δουλείαν δὲ ποίαν κακίστην νομίζεις εἶναι ;
Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, τὴν παρὰ τοῖς κακίστοις δεσπότηταις.
Τὴν κακίστην ἄρα δουλείαν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς δουλεύουσιν ;
Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.
- 6 Σοφίαν δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀπείργουσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀκρασία εἰς τούναντίον αὐτοὺς ἐμβάλλειν ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι προσέχειν τε τοῖς ὠφελούσι καὶ καταμανθάνειν αὐτὰ κωλύειν ἀφέλκουσα ἐπὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ πολλὰκίς αἰσθανομένους τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ τῶν κακῶν

- "Yes, I think it is, in the highest degree."
"Then do you think that the man is free who is 3 ruled by bodily pleasures and is unable to do what is best because of them?"
"By no means."
"Possibly, in fact, to do what is best appears to you to be freedom, and so you think that to have masters who will prevent such activity is bondage?"
"I am sure of it."
"You feel sure then that the incontinent are bond 4 slaves?"
"Of course, naturally."
"And do you think that the incontinent are merely prevented from doing what is most honourable, or are also forced to do what is most dishonourable?"
"I think that they are forced to do that just as much as they are prevented from doing the other."
"What sort of masters are they, in your opinion, 5 who prevent the best and enforce the worst?"
"The worst possible, of course."
"And what sort of slavery do you believe to be the worst?"
"Slavery to the worst masters, I think."
"The worst slavery, therefore, is the slavery endured by the incontinent?"
"I think so."
"As for Wisdom, the greatest blessing, does not 6 incontinence exclude it and drive men to the opposite? Or don't you think that incontinence prevents them from attending to useful things and understanding them, by drawing them away to things pleasant, and often so stuns their perception

MEMORABILIA, IV. v. 9-11

“How so?”

“Incontinence will not let them endure hunger or thirst or desire or lack of sleep, which are the sole causes of pleasure in eating and drinking and sexual indulgence, and in resting and sleeping, after a time of waiting and resistance until the moment comes when these will give the greatest possible satisfaction; and thus she prevents them from experiencing any pleasure worthy to be mentioned in the most elementary and recurrent forms of enjoyment. But self-control alone causes them to endure the sufferings I have named, and therefore she alone causes them to experience any pleasure worth mentioning in such enjoyments.”

“What you say is entirely true.”

“Moreover, the delights of learning something 10 good and excellent, and of studying some of the means whereby a man knows how to regulate his body well and manage his household successfully, to be useful to his friends and city and to defeat his enemies—knowledge that yields not only very great benefits but very great pleasures—these are the delights of the self-controlled; but the incontinent have no part in them. For who, should we say, has less concern with these than he who has no power of cultivating them because all his serious purposes are centred in the pleasures that lie nearest?”

“Socrates,” said Euthydemus, “I think you mean 11 that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with virtue in any form.”

“Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent man be any better than the dullest beast? How can he who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things

τρόπου ζητεῖ ποιεῖν, τί ἂν διαφέρῃ τῶν ἀφρονε-
στάτων βοσκημάτων; ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις
ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ
λογῶ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ μὲν
ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι.

12 Καὶ οὕτως ἔφη ἀρίστους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεστά-
τους ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτά-
τους. ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι
ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι διαλέγοντας
κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. δεῖν οὖν πειράσθαι ὅτι
μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἑαυτὸν ἔτοιμον παρασκευά-
ζειν καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ἐκ τούτου
γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικω-
τάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.

VI. Ὡς δὲ καὶ διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς
συνιόντας, πειράσομαι καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. Σωκρά-
της γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας, τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν
ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι
δύνασθαι. τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμασ-
τὸν εἶναι αὐτούς τε σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους
σφάλλειν. ἂν ἔνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι,
τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτε ἔληγε.

Πάντα μὲν οὖν ἢ διωρίζετο πολὺ ἔργον ἂν εἶη
διεξελθεῖν. ἐν ὅσοις δὲ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως
δηλώσειν οἶμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.

2 Πρῶτον δὲ περὶ εὐσεβείας ᾧ δέ πως ἐσκόπει.
Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ποῖόν τι νομίζεις
εὐσεβίαν εἶναι;

Καὶ ὅς, Κάλλιστον νῆ Δί', ἔφη.

Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὁποῖός τις ὁ εὐσεβής ἐστιν;

Ἔμοι μὲν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῶν.

that are most pleasant, be better than the stupidest
of creatures? No, only the self-controlled have
power to consider the things that matter most, and,
sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed
alike to prefer the good and reject the evil."

And thus, he said, men become supremely good 12
and happy and skilled in discussion. The very word
"discussion," according to him, owes its name to the
practice of meeting together for common deliberation,
*sorting, discussing*¹ things after their kind: and there-
fore one should be ready and prepared for this
and be zealous for it; for it makes for excellence,
leadership and skill in discussion.

VI. I will try also to show how he encouraged
his companions to become skilled in discussion.
Socrates held that those who know what any given
thing is can also expound it to others; on the other
hand, those who do not know are misled themselves
and mislead others. For this reason he never gave
up considering with his companions what any given
thing is.

To go through all his definitions would be an
arduous task. I will say only enough to indicate his
method of analysis.

His analysis of Piety—to take that first—was 2
more or less as follows:

"Tell me, Euthydemus, what sort of thing is
Piety, in your opinion?"

"A very excellent thing, to be sure," he replied.

"Can you say what sort of man is pious?"

"He who worships the gods, I think."

¹ The etymological point, *διαλέγω*, "classify," implying
διαλέγομαι, "discuss," is lost in the English.

"Εμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

7 Σοφίαν δὲ τί ἂν φῆσαιμεν εἶναι; εἶπε μοι, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ ἐπίστανται, ταῦτα σοφοὶ εἶναι ἢ εἰσὶ τινες ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται σοφοί;

"Ἄ ἐπίστανται δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις ἅ γε μὴ ἐπίσταιτο, ταῦτα σοφὸς εἴη;

"Ἄρ' οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ ἐπιστήμη σοφοὶ εἰσι;

Τίνοι γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, ἄλλω τις εἴη σοφὸς εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμη;

"Ἄλλο δέ τι σοφίαν οἶε εἶναι ἢ ᾧ σοφοὶ εἰσιν;

Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

"Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν;

"Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.

"Ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὰ ὅλα πάντα ἐπίστασθαι;

Οὐδὲ μὰ Δί' ἔμοιγε πολλοστὸν μέρος αὐτῶν.

Πάντα μὲν ἄρα σοφὸν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀνθρώπου εἶναι;

Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.

"Ὅ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος, τοῦτο καὶ σοφός ἐστιν;

"Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.

8 "Ἄρ' οὖν, ᾧ Εὐθύδημε, καὶ τὰγαθὸν οὕτω ζητητέον ἐστί;

Πῶς; ἔφη.

Δοκεῖ σοι τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Τί δέ; τὸ ἄλλω ὠφέλιμον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἐνίοτε ἄλλω βλαβερόν εἶναι;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

"Ἄλλο δ' ἂν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον;

"I think so."

"And what of Wisdom? How shall we describe it? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise about what they know, or are some wise about what they do not know?"

"About what they know, obviously; for how can a man be wise about the things he doesn't know?"

"The wise, then, are wise by knowledge?"

"How else can a man be wise if not by knowledge?"

"Do you think that wisdom is anything but that by which men are wise?"

"No."

"It follows that Wisdom is Knowledge?"

"I think so."

"Then do you think it possible for a man to know all things?"

"Of course not—nor even a fraction of them."

"So an all-wise man is an impossibility?"

"Of course, of course."

"Consequently everyone is wise just in so far as he knows?"

"I think so."

"Now to seek the Good, Euthydemus: is this the way?"

"What do you mean?"

"Does it seem to you that the same thing is useful to everyone?"

"No."

"In fact, what is useful to one may sometimes be hurtful to another, don't you think?"

"Assuredly."

"Should you call anything good except what is useful?"

XENOPHON

Τί δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ μὴ δεινὰ δεδοικότες ;

"Ἐτι γε νῆ Δία, ἔφη, ἦπτον.

"Ἄρ' οὖν τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα ὄντας ἀνδρείους ἡγή εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς δειλοὺς ;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

11 "Ἀγαθοὺς δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα νομίζεις ἄλλους τιναὺς ἢ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτοῖς καλῶς χρῆσθαι ;

Οὐκ ἄλλὰ τούτους, ἔφη.

Κακοὺς δὲ ἄρα τοὺς οἴους τούτοις κακῶς χρῆσθαι ;

Τίνας γὰρ ἄλλους ; ἔφη.

"Ἄρ' οὖν ἕκαστοι χρώνται ὡς οἴονται δεῖν ;

Πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως ; ἔφη.

"Ἄρ' οὖν οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἴσασι, ὡς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ;

Οὐ δήπου γε, ἔφη.

Οἱ ἄρα εἰδότες, ὡς δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οὗτοι καὶ δύνανται ;

Μόνοι γ', ἔφη.

Τί δὲ οἱ μὴ διημαρτηκότες, ἄρα κακῶς χρώνται τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ;

Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη.

Οἱ ἄρα κακῶς χρώμενοι διημαρτήκασι ;

Εἰκόσ γ', ἔφη.

Οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρείοι εἰσι, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί ;

"Ἐμοιγε δοκοῦσι, ἔφη.

12 Βασιλείαν δὲ καὶ τυραννίδα ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀμφοτέρως ἡγήετο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε.

MEMORABILIA, IV. vi. 10-12

"What of those who are afraid when there is no ground for fear?"

"Still less, of course."

"Then do you think that those who are good in the presence of terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who are bad are cowards?"

"Certainly."

"And do you think that any are good in the 11 presence of such things, except those who can deal with them well?"

"None but these."

"And bad, except such as deal badly with them?"

"These and none others."

"Then do both classes behave as they think they must?"

"How can they behave otherwise?"

"Then do those who cannot behave well know how they must behave?"

"Surely not."

"So those who know how they must behave are just those who can?"

"Yes, only they."

"Well now, do those who are not utterly mistaken deal badly with such things?"

"I think not."

"So those who behave badly are utterly mistaken?"

"Presumably."

"It follows that those who know how to deal well with terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who utterly mistake the way are cowards?"

"That is my opinion."

Kingship and despotism, in his judgment, were 12 both forms of government, but he held that they

τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο, τὴν δὲ ἀκόντων τε καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁ ἀρχῶν βούλοιο, τυραννίδα. καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελούντων αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ταύτην μὲν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὅπου δ' ἐκ τιμημάτων, πλουτοκρατίαν, ὅπου δ' ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν.

13 Εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ἢν αὐτὸς λέγοι ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειότερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὡδέ πως·

14 Φῆς σὺ ἀμείνω πολίτην εἶναι ἢν σὺ ἐπαινεῖς ἢ ἢν ἐγώ;

Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.

Τί οὖν οὐκ ἐκείνῳ πρῶτον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, τί ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου;

Ποιῶμεν τοῦτο.

Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν χρημάτων διοικήσει κρατοῖη ἢν ὁ χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν ποιῶν;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἐν δέ γε πολέμῳ ὁ καθυπερτέραν τῶν ἀντιπάλων;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ἐν δὲ πρεσβείᾳ ἀρ' ὃς ἂν φίλους ἀντὶ πολεμίων παρασκευάζῃ;

Εἰκός γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ ὁ στάσεις τε παύων καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιῶν;

Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

differed. For government of men with their consent and in accordance with the laws of the state was kingship; while government of unwilling subjects and not controlled by laws, but imposed by the will of the ruler, was despotism. And where the officials are chosen among those who fulfil the requirements of the laws, the constitution is an aristocracy: where rateable property is the qualification for office, you have a plutocracy: where all are eligible, a democracy.

Whenever anyone argued with him on any point 13 without being able to make himself clear, asserting but not proving, that so and so was wiser or an abler politician or braver or what not, he would lead the whole discussion back to the definition required, much in this way:

"Do you say that your man is a better citizen 14 than mine?"

"I do indeed."

"Then why didn't we first consider what is the function of a good citizen?"

"Let us do so."

"In financial administration, then, is not the better man he who makes the city wealthier?"

"Certainly."

"And in war he who makes her stronger than her rivals?"

"Of course."

"And on an embassy he who turns enemies into friends?"

"Presumably."

"And in debate he who puts down strife and produces harmony?"

"I think so."

καὶ οὕτως ἀναφέρει δ. ἀφ. ἢ περιμένει
if not revealing his own progress

XENOPHON

Οὕτω δὲ τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων καὶ τοῖς
ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτοῖς φανερόν ἐγίγνετο τάληθές.
15 ὅποτε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίει, διὰ τῶν
μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύ-
την ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου. τοιγαροῦν πολὺ
μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας
ὁμολογοῦντας παρέιχε. ἔφη δὲ καὶ Ὁμηρῶν τῷ
Ἄδυσσει ἀναθεῖναι τὸ ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα εἶναι,
ὡς ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους.

VII. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην
ἀπεφαίνετο Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ὁμιλοῦντας
αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων εἶναι
ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοῦ¹ αὐτάρκεις ἐν ταῖς προσηκούσαις
πράξεσιν αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπεμελείτο, νῦν τοῦτο
λέξω. πάντων μὲν γὰρ ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα μάλιστα
ἔμελεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῶν
συνόντων αὐτῷ· ὧν δὲ προσήκει ἀνδρὶ καλῷ
καγαθῷ εἰδέναι, ὅ τι μὲν αὐτὸς εἰδείη, πάντων
προθυμώτατα ἐδίδασκεν· ὅτου δὲ αὐτὸς ἀπειρό-
τερος εἴη, πρὸς τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἤγεν αὐτούς.
2 ἐδίδασκε δὲ καὶ μέχρι ὅτου δέοι ἔμπειρον εἶναι
ἐκάστου πράγματος τὸν ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένον.

Αὐτίκα γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μὲν τούτου ἔφη δεῖν
μανθάνειν, ἕως ἱκανὸς τις γένοιτο, εἴ ποτε δεήσει,
γῆν μέτρῳ ὀρθῶς ἢ παραλαβεῖν ἢ παραδοῦναι ἢ
διανείμειν ἢ ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι. οὕτω δὲ τοῦτο
ῥᾶδιον εἶναι μαθεῖν, ὥστε τὸν προσέχοντα τὸν
νοῦν τῇ μετρήσει ἅμα τὴν τε γῆν ὀπόση ἐστὶν
3 εἰδέναι καὶ ὡς μετρεῖται ἐπιστάμενον ἀπιέναι. τὸ

¹ τοῦ B: Sauppe omits.

MEMORABILIA, IV. VI. 14-VII. 3

By this process of leading back the argument even
his adversary came to see the truth clearly. When- 15
ever he himself argued out a question, he advanced
by steps that gained general assent, holding this to
be the only sure method. Accordingly, whenever he
argued, he gained a greater measure of assent from
his hearers than any man I have known. He said
that Homer gave Odysseus the credit of being "a
safe speaker"¹ because he had a way of leading
the discussion from one acknowledged truth to
another.

VII. I think that I have said enough to show that
Socrates stated his own opinion plainly to those who
consorted with him: I will now show that he also
took pains to make them independent in doing the
work that they were fitted for. For I never knew
a man who was so careful to discover what each of
his companions knew. Whatever it befits a gentle-
man to know he taught most zealously, so far as his
own knowledge extended; if he was not entirely
familiar with a subject, he took them to those who
knew. He also taught them how far a well-educated 2
man should make himself familiar with any given
subject.

For instance, he said that the study of geometry
should be pursued until the student was competent
to measure a parcel of land accurately in case he
wanted to take over, convey or divide it, or to compute
the yield; and this knowledge was so easy to acquire,
that anyone who gave his mind to mensuration knew
the size of the piece and carried away a knowledge
of the principles of land measurement. He was 3

¹ *Odyssey*, viii. 171.

δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μαθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν. ὅ τι μὲν γὰρ ὠφελοῖη ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔφη ὄραν· καίτοι οὐκ ἄπειρος γε αὐτῶν ἦν. ἔφη δὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου βίον κατατρίβειν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τε καὶ ὠφελίμων μαθημάτων ἀποκωλύειν.

⁴ Ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γινώσκειν ἕνεκα τοῦ¹ πορείας τε καὶ πλοῦ καὶ φυλακῆς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἢ νυκτός ἢ μηνὸς ἢ ἐνιαυτοῦ πράττεται, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἔχειν τεκμηρίους χρῆσθαι τὰς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντας. καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ῥᾶδια εἶναι μαθεῖν παρά τε νυκτοθηρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ⁵ ταῦτα εἰδέναι. τὸ δὲ μέχρι τούτου ἀστρονομίαν μαθάνειν, μέχρι τοῦ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ ὄντα καὶ τοὺς πλάνητάς τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους ἀστέρας γινῶναι καὶ τὰς ἀποστάσεις αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τὰς περιόδους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ζητοῦντας κατατρίβεσθαι, ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν. ὠφέλειαν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἔφη ὄραν· καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν· ἔφη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι κατατρίβειν ἀνθρώπου βίον καὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων ἀποκωλύειν.

⁶ "Ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ἧ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὐρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἠγείτο τὸν ζητοῦντα ἂ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. κινδυνεῦσαι δ' ἂν

¹ τοῦ B: Sauppe omits.

against carrying the study of geometry so far as to include the more complicated figures, on the ground that he could not see the use of them. Not that he was himself unfamiliar with them, but he said that they were enough to occupy a lifetime, to the complete exclusion of many other useful studies.

Similarly he recommended them to make themselves familiar with astronomy, but only so far as to be able to find the time of night, month and year, in order to use reliable evidence when planning a journey by land or sea, or setting the watch, and in all other affairs that are done in the night or month or year, by distinguishing the times and seasons aforesaid. This knowledge, again, was easily to be had from night hunters and pilots and others who made it their business to know such things. But he ⁵ strongly deprecated studying astronomy so far as to include the knowledge of bodies revolving in different courses, and of planets and comets, and wearing oneself out with the calculation of their distance from the earth, their periods of revolution and the causes of these. Of such researches, again he said that he could not see what useful purpose they served. He had indeed attended lectures on these subjects too; but these again, he said, were enough to occupy a lifetime to the complete exclusion of many useful studies.

In general, with regard to the phenomena of the ⁶ heavens, he deprecated curiosity to learn how the deity contrives them: he held that their secrets could not be discovered by man, and believed that any attempt to search out what the gods had not chosen to reveal must be displeasing to them. He

ἔφη καὶ παραφρονησαὶ τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδὲν ἤττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν ὁ μέγιστος φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῶ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.

7 Ἐκεῖνος γὰρ λέγων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον ἡγνῶει, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πῦρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ῥαδίως καθορῶσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου καταλαμπόμενοι τὰ χρώματα μελάντερα ἔχουσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς οὐ ἡγνῶει δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων ἀνευ μὲν ἡλίου αὐγῆς οὐδὲν δύναται καλῶς αὔξεσθαι, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς θερμαινόμενα πάντα ἀπόλλυται· φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο ἡγνῶει, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὧν οὔτε λάμπει οὔτε πολὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος τὸν πάντα χρόνον πάντων λαμπρότατος ὧν διαμένει.

8 Ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ λογισμοὺς μανθάνειν· καὶ τούτων δὲ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκέλευε φυλάττεσθαι τὴν μάταιον πραγματείαν, μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεξήκει τοῖς συνοῦσι.

9 Προέτρεπε δὲ σφόδρα καὶ ὑγιείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς συνόντας παρά τε τῶν εἰδόντων μανθάνοντας ὅποσα ἐνδέχοιτο καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον προσέχοντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, τί βρῶμα ἢ τί πῶμα ἢ ποῖος πόνος συμφέροι αὐτῷ καὶ πῶς τούτοις χρώμενος ὑγιεινότηατ' ἂν διάγοι. τοῦ γὰρ οὕτω προσέχοντος ἑαυτῷ ἔργον ἔφη εἶναι εὐρεῖν ἰατρὸν τὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν συμφέροντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον διαγιγνώσκοντα.

10 Εἰ δέ τις μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην

said that he who meddles with these matters runs the risk of losing his sanity as completely as Anaxagoras, who took an insane pride in his explanation of the divine machinery.

For that sage, in declaring the sun to be fire, 7 ignored the facts than men can look at fire without inconvenience, but cannot gaze steadily at the sun; that their skin is blackened by the sun's rays, but not by fire. Further, he ignored the fact that sunlight is essential to the health of all vegetation, whereas if anything is heated by fire it withers. Again, when he pronounced the sun to be a red-hot stone, he ignored the fact that a stone in fire neither glows nor can resist it long, whereas the sun shines with unequalled brilliance for ever.

He also recommended the study of arithmetic. 8 But in this case as in the others he recommended avoidance of vain application; and invariably, whether theories or ascertained facts formed the subject of his conversation, he limited it to what was useful.

He also strongly urged his companions to take 9 care of their health. "You should find out all you can," he said, "from those who know. Everyone should watch himself throughout his life, and notice what sort of meat and drink and what form of exercise suit his constitution, and how he should regulate them in order to enjoy good health. For by such attention to yourselves you can discover better than any doctor what suits your constitution."

When anyone was in need of help that human 10

σοφίαν ὠφελείσθαι βούλοιο, συνεβούλευε μαντικῆς ἐπιμελείσθαι. τὸν γὰρ εἰδότα, δι' ὧν οἱ θεοὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σημαίνουσι, οὐδέποτε ἔρημον ἔφη γίνεσθαι συμβουλῆς θεῶν.

VIII. Εἰ δέ τις, ὅτι φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἅ τε δέοι καὶ ἅ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος, οἶεται αὐτὸν ἐλέγχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου ψευδόμενον, ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι οὕτως ἤδη τότε πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἦν, ὥστ' εἰ καὶ μὴ τότε, οὐκ ἂν πολλῶ ὕστερον τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον· εἶτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀχθεινότετον τοῦ βίου καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντες τὴν διάνοιαν μειοῦνται ἀπέλιπεν, ἀντὶ δὲ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ῥώμην ἐπιδειξάμενος εὐκλείαν προσεκτίσατο τὴν τε δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιοτάτα εἰπῶν καὶ τὴν κατάγνωσιν τοῦ θανάτου πρῶτα καὶ ἀνδρωδέστατα ἐνεγκῶν. ὁμολογεῖται γὰρ οὐδένα πω τῶν μνημονευομένων ἀνθρώπων κάλλιον θάνατον ἐνεγκεῖν. ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βιώναι διὰ τὸ Δῆλια μὲν ἐκείνου τοῦ μηνὸς εἶναι, τὸν δὲ νόμον μηδένα ἂν δημοσία ἀποθνήσκειν, ἕως ἂν ἡ θεωρία ἐκ Δήλου ἐπανέλθῃ, καὶ τὸν χρόνον τούτον ἅπασι τοῖς συνήθεσι φανερὸς ἐγένετο οὐδὲν ἄλλοιότερον διαβιοῦς ἢ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον· καίτοι τὸν ἔμπροσθεν γε πάντων ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα ἐθαυμάζετο ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμῳ τε καὶ εὐκόλῳ ζῆν. καὶ πῶς ἂν τις κάλλιον ἢ οὕτως ἀποθάνοι; ἢ ποῖος ἂν εἴη θάνατος καλλίων ἢ ὃν κάλλιστα τις ἀποθάνοι;

wisdom was unable to give he advised him to resort to divination; for he who knew the means whereby the gods give guidance to men concerning their affairs never lacked divine counsel.

VIII. As for his claim that he was forewarned by "the deity" what he ought to do and what not to do, some may think that it must have been a delusion because he was condemned to death. But they should remember two facts. First, he had already reached such an age, that had he not died then, death must have come to him soon after. Secondly, he escaped the most irksome stage of life and the inevitable diminution of mental powers, and instead won glory by the moral strength revealed in the wonderful honesty and frankness and probity of his defence, and in the equanimity and manliness with which he bore the sentence of death.

In fact it is admitted that there is no record of 2 death more nobly borne. For he was forced to live for thirty days after the verdict was given, because it was the month of the Dēlia,¹ and the law did not allow any public execution to take place until the sacred embassy had returned from Delos. During this interval, as all his intimate acquaintances could see, he continued to live exactly as before; and, in truth, before that time he had been admired above all men for his cheerfulness and serenity. How, 3 then, could man die more nobly? Or what death could be nobler than the death most nobly faced?

¹ See Plato, *Phaedo*, p. 58 b. The festival was held in the month Thargelion, our May.

ποῖος δ' ἂν γένοιτο θάνατος εὐδαιμονέστερος τοῦ καλλίστου; ἢ ποῖος θεοφιλέστερος τοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου;¹

4 Λέξω δὲ καὶ ἃ Ἐρμογένους τοῦ Ἴππονίκου ἤκουσα περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἔφη γάρ, ἤδη Μελέτου γεγραμμένου αὐτὸν τὴν γραφὴν, αὐτὸς ἀκούων αὐτοῦ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῆς δίκης διαλεγόμενου λέγειν αὐτῷ, ὡς χρὴ σκοπεῖν, ὅ τι ἀπολογησεται. τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν. Οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι τοῦτο μελετᾶν διαβεβιωκέναι; ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἤρετο, ὅπως, εἰπεῖν αὐτόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιῶν διαγεγνήηται ἢ διασκοπᾶν μὲν τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκαια, πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπεχόμενος, ἦν περ νομίζοι καλλίστην
5 μελέτην ἀπολογίας εἶναι. αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν εἰπεῖν. Οὐχ ὀρᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἱ Ἀθηῆνσι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη μηδὲν ἀδικούντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδικούντας ἀπέλυσαν; Ἀλλὰ νῆ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἐρμογένες, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἤνταντίωθ' τὸ δαιμόνιον. καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν. Θαυμαστὰ λέγεις.
6 τὸν δέ, Θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευταῖον τὸν βίον ἤδη; οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἐγὼ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἂν οὔτε βέλτιον οὔθ' ἥδιον ἐμοῦ βεβιωκέναι; ἄριστα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ζῆν τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δὲ τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους, ὅτι
7 βελτίους γίγνονται. ἃ ἐγὼ μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἡσθανόμην ἐμαντῷ συμβαίοντα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους

What death more blessed than the noblest? Or what dearer to the gods than the most blessed?

I will repeat what Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, 4 told me about him. "When Meletus had actually formulated his indictment," he said, "Socrates talked freely in my presence, but made no reference to the case. I told him that he ought to be thinking about his defence. His first remark was, 'Don't you think that I have been preparing for it all my life?' And when I asked him how, he said that he had been constantly occupied in the consideration of right and wrong, and in doing what was right and avoiding what was wrong, which he regarded as the best preparation for a defence. Then I said, 'Don't 5 you see, Socrates, that the juries in our courts are apt to be misled by argument, so that they often put the innocent to death, and acquit the guilty?' 'Ah, yes, Hermogenes,' he answered, 'but when I did try to think out my defence to the jury, the deity at once resisted.' 'Strange words,' said I; and he, 6 'Do you think it strange, if it seems better to God that I should die now? Don't you see that to this day I never would acknowledge that any man had lived a better or a pleasanter life than I? For they live best, I think, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the pleasantest life is theirs who are conscious that they are growing in goodness. And to this day that has been my experience; and 7 mixing with others and closely comparing myself

¹ § 3 is regarded as spurious by Sauppe.