The presence of some rational perceptions and decisions in this conflict (as in any) is undeniable: however, it fails to explain the degree of intensity and of emotion: the exaggeration of antagonism, decision to start a full-scale war on the ground, the rhetoric of hyperboles and philippics? It was probably inevitable to see some response from Russia to Ukraine’s association with EU, but why was it so violent and irreversible, if for example the NATO accession of Baltic states in 2004, which for the first time placed the NATO on the ground borders of Russia, was encountered in Russia only by some very mild diplomatic protest? Moreover, even if the rational choice is present in the actions of Russia, it’s a strange, very risky and distant-looking rational choice. The military action in Eastern Ukraine, unlike the takeover of Crimea, does not just look like a cold move in a chess party. Rather, it is a mixture of a coldly conceived “hybrid war” and an emotional hysteria that is cultivated in the Russian media, in the speeches of Russian diplomats (who are astonishingly rude!) in the consciousness of fighters. This emotion is helpful militarily to some extent, but, as any emotion in politics, it may also be counterproductive, since it ties up the hands of decision-makers and limits their capacity of freely maneuvering and manipulating the war effort according to their needs.
Russian/Eurasian Studies Program, Human Rights Project, and Human Rights Program Present
Artemy Magun: “Hysteria in Politics”
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
Olin Humanities, Room 102
Sponsored by the Human Rights Project and the Russian and Eurasian Studies program
Several attempts have recently appeared to explain the ongoing crisis in Russia and Ukraine through social science. Thus, the IR specialists who stand at the positions of “offensive realism” remind that Russia didn’t start this conflict suddenly: it followed after the long-time push of US and NATO spheres of control into the former Warsaw block and former USSR, Putin had repeatedly insisted on the strategic significance of the relations with Ukraine for Russia, and the support by the Western countries of yet another democratic revolution in the Russian neighborhood meant an obvious threat to the declared Russian national interest. Against this, others point at the defense interest, not of Russia, but of Russian elites. According to some thinkers, the drift of Ukraine towards EU would lead to the presence of a successful liberal democracy near Russia and in a country of similar cultural heritage: a seductive example for the Russian population and a destabilizing factor for the elites (of course, a counter-argument would be that these elites would never represent the situation in a way so unfavorable for them). If we look at sociology, then the main explanations is the long-time conservative and xenophobic attitudes of a large part of Russian population.[3] It is also quite obvious that the efficiency of Putin’s move added the previously skeptical supporters of the extreme right (KPRF and LDPR) to his electoral support.For more information, call 215-378-2767, e-mail [email protected],
or visit http://hrp.bard.edu/event/tuesday-april-21-630pm-artemy-magun/.
Location: Olin Humanities, Room 102