Philosophy Program Presents
Kant's Critique of Sympathy
Tuesday, March 5, 2019
Olin Humanities, Room 102
4:45 pm – 6:15 pm EST/GMT-5
4:45 pm – 6:15 pm EST/GMT-5
Wiebke Deimling
Clark University
How does Kant evaluate sympathy? Does he take it to be supportive of morality or does he view it as an obstacle for moral action? Sympathetic feelings generally have a good reputation. We praise those who show them and we call for them as a solution to moral problems. The recent debate about moral emotions both in philosophy and psychology has introduced some push-back against a positive evaluation of sympathy. This paper shows that Kant, like the contemporary critics of sympathetic feelings and like many of his colleagues in the 18th century, shares the view that sympathy is a problematic emotion. We have gained a much better understanding of Kant’s moral philosophy through recent scholarship showing that moral emotions, and sympathy in particular, can and do play a role in his deontological framework. But disregarding Kant’s criticisms of moral emotions also leaves us with a lacking interpretation. Kant’s moral psychology of sympathy is more complex than has been appreciated. And it makes more interesting and more plausible recommendations about how we should respond to sympathetic feeling.Clark University
For more information, call 845-758-7280, or e-mail [email protected].
Time: 4:45 pm – 6:15 pm EST/GMT-5
Location: Olin Humanities, Room 102