

The Secret of Mannheim's Remarkable Success

1921-1933

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Writing in 1953 about the surprisingly successful careers of many in his own cohort of German intellectual exiles in the United States, Franz L. Neumann credited "the willingness of the colleges and universities to take the risk of employing us, the friendliness with which we were received, and the almost total absence of resentment" (Neumann 1953; cp. Kettler 2001). It is safe to say that such factors were not widely available in Germany to ease the path of the self-proclaimed Hungarian exile and known Jew, Karl Mannheim, when he arrived in Heidelberg in 1921. His habilitation at Heidelberg was strenuously opposed in the Philosophical Faculty.(Demm 1999: 31-33; Kettler/Meja 1995: 90-91)¹; and his subsequent call to Frankfurt was imposed by the Prussian Minister of Education over the resistance of the Dean and Faculty of Social Sciences (Kettler/Meja 1995:119; Kluge 1972). Yet there is a sense in which Neumann's statement does apply. For a brief historical moment, a space opened up in a few universities for a number of individuals--many of whom later comprised the core of the intellectual exile celebrated by Neumann. The aim of this paper is to illuminate the Weimar opportunity, focusing on the success of Karl Mannheim.

The thesis is that two of Mannheim's own most characteristic sociological concepts

provide the key. Mannheim rose to a position of influence, first, as a member of a new, post-war generation, and, second, as a member of the cultural layer of intellectuals, some of them immigrants, many of them Jewish, and all of them outsiders to the dominant traditions in the best established university disciplines. The partial and temporary opening of some few German universities to men of exceptional talents—and they were virtually never women--distinguished by these two social attributes was a function of the special political conditions of the Weimar Republic, and their reverberations in the universities, just as the counterpart American moment, somewhat overpraised by Neumann, depended on the era of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

In both instances, moreover, the promising outcomes must often be understood as achievements of oppositional minorities within those institutions, enabled to overcome the dominant vested interests by virtue of the wider institutional disturbances of their times--the widespread New Deal mobilization against the Depression in the American case and the various localized and uncertain gestures in support of the democratic republic in the German case. Yet only unreconciled enemies of the newcomers could maintain the reductionist view that the appointments should be viewed as purely political. The talents who benefitted from the opportunities were real, and the careers that were made possible yielded major intellectual and cultural achievements.

The American and German cases are historically linked by more than the parallel. The extent to which Mannheim's generation of intellectuals constituted itself as an interdependent unit during the late Weimar years, with the help of the legitimacy some representative figures gained from their university appointments, must raise doubts about the certainty with which Neumann proclaimed in 1953, later in the passage quoted above, that the hospitable mentality in the American academy "succeeded in transforming a tragic problem into a happy solution." For

Mannheim, at least, the loss of the Weimar generation's promise was never made good in exile. Mannheim's own version of success in his second exile did not amount to a "happy end."² But our present concern is with the Weimar years..

Mannheim as Representative of his Generation

At one level, the story of Mannheim's German success appears simple. He succeeded in Germany by virtue of his remarkable sensitivity to the questions troubling the most active thinkers of his time and place, his ability to communicate provocative responses that became the unavoidable points of reference in contemporary intellectual discussions, and his capacity for gaining the loyalties of a small core of well-placed academics. In a culture grateful for personalities, he came to represent the talent and promise—or threat—of a generation.³

Yet the notion of Mannheim as representative of a generation has recently been called into question by a well-regarded student of sociology's history, and a confrontation with that challenge will clarify what is meant by the epithet, and opens the way to a clearer understanding of the match between opportunity and qualifications.

Writing in the journal of the London School of Economics in the first publication of his second exile, Mannheim had reported with satisfaction:

Among the more representative members of the younger generation of German sociologists we can discern a real striving after empirical investigation, although this empiricism is a complicated conception.(Mannheim [1934] 1993: 221)

Carsten Klingemann cleverly maintains that Mannheim's pretensions to represent his generation fail by his own criteria (Klingemann 2000: 230-233).⁴ He puts aside Mannheim's final qualifying clause with an ironic gesture, and he parades a string of witnesses, ranging from an

unidentified referee for the Rockefeller Foundation in 1931 to Dietrich Rüschemeyer (1981) writing fifty years later, and including Max Horkheimer ([1930] 1986) and Theodor Adorno ([1937] 1987)—cited as spokesmen for the Institut für Sozialforschung “die die empirische Sozialforschung als konstitutiv für das Programm des Instituts für Sozialforschung betrachteten” (Klingemann 2000: 231). All agree, he says, that Mannheim was anything but empirical in his method. Yet surely the empiricism of the Frankfurt School was no less "complicated" than the method of Mannheim's aspirations (Mathiesen [1989]: 81-83). As for the authority of the early Rockefeller Foundation evaluation, it would have been helpful for Klingemann to have noted that his source for this information cautions:

This [Rockefeller Foundation] appraisal must be seen in the context of the appraiser's conviction that "any large aid [in Frankfurt] just now would be badly received by German public opinion," although "Frankfurt is of first importance from the point of view of research." The problem is that "the atmosphere is international and Jewish" and "many Jews are on the faculty." (Kettler/Meja 1995: 134)⁵

Overall, Klingemann's identification of an interesting puzzle is cast in a surprisingly polemical manner, as if he somehow had a mission to refute, from the safe distance of 65 years, the awkward claims of a brutally displaced scholar who was struggling to legitimate himself in a foreign idiom in an alien place. In his 1934 essay, Mannheim in fact says a good deal about the complicated and contested conceptions of empiricism among the generational cohort he is introducing, certainly enough to gloss his formula about their shared empirical aspirations and to make it clear that the testimony of the witnesses Klingemann introduces cannot settle either the methodological questions that Mannheim's passage raises or the larger question about Mannheim's career that is of primary interest here.

Robert K. Merton, whose credentials as a theorist of empirical social research would not be questioned by Rüschemeyer, offered the classic appreciation and critique of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge according to the criteria of empirical sociology, far removed from all polemics (Merton [1941] 1957; [1945] 1957). Merton's reading, in turn, is taken as point of departure by the authors whose characterization of Mannheim as "representative" Klingemann criticizes; and Merton is respectfully challenged by them precisely because of differences about the "complicated conception," notably about the relevance of qualitative interpretation, history, and self-reflection to empirical method, broadly understood (Kettler 1967; Kettler/Meja 2001).

When Mannheim speaks of a "younger generation of sociologists," he must be understood to be drawing on his special conceptions of both generation and sociology. His article on the former concept notes, first, that from a sociological as distinct from a biological point of view, a generation is not simply a statistical demographic cohort (*Generationslagerung*). Next, Mannheim makes a distinction between what he calls the "*Generationszusammenhang*" and the "*Generationseinheit*" An age group counts as an *Generationszusammenhang* only insofar as its members "an der selben historisch-aktuellen Problematik orientiert [sind] ," and *Generationszusammenhänge* are subdivided into separate *Generationseinheiten* only insofar as they "in jeweils verschiedener Weise diese Erlebnisse verarbeiten" (Mannheim [1928] 1964: 544). Long before the publication of his article on generations, Mannheim's attempts at self-clarification depended on situating himself within a generation at both of these levels of analysis..

In Budapest before 1919, it was a generation that was constituted by the shared experience of the "tragedy" of bourgeois, liberal, positivist culture, and it was a generational unit that accepted the "mission" of pushing forward with the analytical, critical tools made available

by this crisis, in the hope that such faithfulness would somehow dialectically eventuate in an abrupt renewal of the human soul (Mannheim [1918]1964; Gluck 1985; Karádi/Vezér 1985). Some years later, hope played a part as well in Mannheim's specification of his own generation in contrast to that of Max Weber.

Likening Weber to the eighteenth-century legal theorist, Gustav Hugo, he finds him generationally constrained within a mentality of "Desillusionsrealismus," (Mannheim [1925] 1984: 211) in contrast to his own generation which resembled, *mutatis mutandis*, that of Friedrich von Savigny, formed and heartened by the experience of the wars of liberation. These wars, Mannheim said, had "die aus der theoretischen Diskussion reale Diskussionen machte" (Mannheim [1925] 1984: 214), using the formula that he still hopefully applied to the political effects achievable by the sociology of knowledge in the crisis of ideology afflicting the late politics of Weimar.⁶ For the early years of the Weimar Republic, however, Mannheim was convinced that his own generational unit, the younger generation of sociologists, had both the opportunity and the mission of making the republic work.

To count as a sociologist, then, in Mannheim's special sense, it is not enough to be academically certified as such. Mannheim's university lectures between 1930 and 1933, identify sociologists in the fullest sense with a decisive generational unit within an actual generation. The generation is constituted by the shared experience of lacking a direct grounding in unselfconscious social norms (*Distanzierung*), as well as by the discrepancies between institutionalized social norms widely delegitimized as ideology and the orientations adequate to the actual situation of youth, women, and-above all- intellectuals. While this historical experience is common to a number of generational units, only the sociological generation can "diese Erlebnisse verarbeiten" so as to (1) develop a diagnosis of the time, (2) eschew the

reprimativization variously enacted by Fascists and orthodox Marxists, (3) provide a political education suitable for a democratic mass public, and (4) foster a flexible practical orientation for prime political actors (Mannheim 2001: 3-22; 145-168; Cp. Kettler/Meja 1995: 121-135; Loader/Kettler 2002: 71-107, 177-207).

Such sociologists are bound to be empirical in their methods, in the sense that they must adduce communicable evidence beyond the logical coherence or aesthetic appeal of their theoretical models or the experience of intuitive certainties, but the methods are as likely to be historical or phenomenological as they are to be adaptation of the "American" methods that did indeed also fascinate Mannheim as a possible tool of investigation. Above all, they must settle accounts with the power of ideology, to the greatest extent possible. Mannheim's sociologists are empirical because they aspire to realism, but they are not empiricists. There is nothing resembling the epistemologically grounded inhibitions of earlier positivism or later logical positivism in Mannheim's approach. Epistemology explains knowledge; it does not condition it. The use of empirical methods, of whatever kind, does not in itself limit the kinds of variables that may be adduced or the kinds of questions that may be asked. Using the most reliable methods available, sociologists must investigate the questions forced upon them by the widespread generational experience of profound discrepancies between the situations in which they are caught up and the public interpretations that are on offer (Mannheim [1931-1932] 2001; Kettler/Meja 2006).

On April 25, 1933, days before his flight from Germany, Mannheim wrote to his old mentor, Oscar Jászi:

It is a pity that everything is in shambles here; a progressive generation that could have channeled history within the German nation in a different direction was successfully

brought together. But it was too late. (Gabor 1996: 60).

This is the generational unit to which Mannheim referred in his 1934 article, the one he sought to represent to the English learned public, and whose younger members in exile he hoped to direct in diagnostic studies with therapeutic intent of the crisis of democratization signaled by the rise of Hitler.⁷ This initiative failed. To gain the somewhat equivocal recognition that he eventually achieved in England, he had to change directions in the late 1930s, but that story has been told elsewhere (Loader 1985). Mannheim's starting point in his second exile is relevant here primarily for the evidence it provides about his successful German career, notably about his claim to represent a new generation in sociology and the measure of acceptance that this claim received. To think critically about Mannheim as a representative figure of Weimar sociology can be deeply instructive about that intellectual enterprise, understood as the locus of a progressive generation, as it was fostered, above all, by Alfred Weber and Emil Lederer at Heidelberg .

Mannheim as Academic Intellectual

Writing in a Hungarian exile periodical in 1921, the year of his arrival in Heidelberg, Mannheim cautioned his readers that his perspective on German culture would be limited by his affinities to the "kleinen, dünnen Schicht . . . der heutigen deutschen progressiven Intellektuellen" "Mich interessiert heute . . ." he writes, "in erster Linie das Leben derer, zu denen ich gehöre. . . die wir Bücher schreiben und lesen und die beim Schreiben und Lesen einseitig nur der Geist interessiert." *Bildung* is the key: cultivation, true humanism, forms men into a new kind of stratum, cutting across the economic and other sociological classifications. Cultivation also shapes the most spontaneous forms of life and transports man into an isolated world incomprehensible to others. As both exile and stranger, reporting to other exiles, he concludes,

"Ich bin immer erstaunt, um wie viel näher ich denen stehe, die an dieser Humanität beteiligt sind, und wieviel näher sie mir stehen als ich oder sie zu ihrer Nationalität gehörenden, aber ganz anderen Menschensorte" (Mannheim [1921] 1985: 73-75).

Mannheim's reflexive preoccupation with this stratum is perhaps his single most constant theme, muted only in his last years in England—and even then, as the archival records at Keele show, he continued to amass materials for a definitive historical treatment of the subject.⁸

The concept of intellectual is a contested one, with meanings ranging from the more or less official usage common in central Europe, where the status corresponded to education in the academic stream, a mark of class and political standing, to Mannheim's idea of a specially dedicated subset of this larger group. The centrality of the category of intellectual in Mannheim's best-known work, *Ideology and Utopia*, is familiar, but Mannheim's turn towards Alfred Weber and cultural sociology six years earlier was already marked by his attention to the modern—predominantly urban—social segment comprising individuals from several classes unified only by common engagement with the appropriation, production, and reproduction of cultivated culture, the social corollary of the post-Enlightenment rise of culture as an autonomous domain. This social location was the source of liberal, conservative, and other ideologies, he maintained, as well as of the perspective that made cultural sociology possible; and the puzzling conjunction of these two aspects of *Bildungskultur* formed the main theme of his habilitation and its associated studies [Mannheim [1922/24] 1980; Mannheim [1925] 1984].

Mannheim's approach to Alfred Weber as mentor of his habilitation at Heidelberg coincided with a year during which Weber occupied himself intensely with the "Straits of the Mental Worker,"⁹ with special emphasis on the economic devastation wrought by the hyperinflation of 1920-21 among individuals living on independent incomes, which he considered to

be the practical basis essential to intellectuals as a group. Like Mannheim, Weber did not include all university graduates among the intellectuals, but only those who were "kulturell produktiv," since only these "den eigentlichen Kern der Bildungsschicht." But there was a critical difference between them, inasmuch as for Weber, in the words of Eberhard Demm, "Der Geist und das Geistige steht bei ihm oft synonym mit dem Universitätsprofessor" (Demm 1999: 162-3). This is very different from Mannheim's point of departure. Yet the practical convergence between them is the crux of our story. Alfred Weber is a leading figure among the handful of scholars who sought to include Mannheim's kind of intellectual among the professors of the university, and Karl Mannheim was uniquely self-reflective among those who sought to ground such intellectuals in a university discipline, which would in turn enable them to fulfill the mission he imputed to the intellectuals.

Mannheim begins with a gulf between the worlds of the university and the intellectual's own distinctive sphere. Speaking about the social historian, Ernst Troeltsch, in an article closely associated with his Habilitation inaugural address, Mannheim writes:

Er scheint die soziologisch bedingte geistige Spaltung der Gegenwart zwischen einem geistreichen, oft sehr tiefen freien Gelehrten- und Ästheten, das aber häufig in seiner äußeren und inneren Ungebundenheit ins Unkontrollierbare sich verläuft, einerseits, und einem an ein Lehramt gebundenen, den Stoff beherrschenden, aber dem lebendigen Zentrum der Gegenwart fernen Gelehrtentum, andererseits in sich wieder vereinigen zu wollen. (Mannheim [1924] 1964: 263).

Although Mannheim questions whether Troeltsch achieved such a synthesis, he did not doubt that it "an und für sich nötig ist." Mannheim introduced the conception of the intellectual as (relatively) socially unattached, not in *Ideology and Utopia*, where the social type is examined

primarily from its potential for leading the way to politics as a science by way of sociology of knowledge, but in his earlier study of conservatism. "Diese freischwebenden Intellektuellen, " he writes there, "sind die typischen Rechtfertigungsdenker, 'Ideologen,' die jedes politische Wollen, in dessen Dienst sie sich stellen, zu unter- und zu hintergründen verstehen"(Mannheim [1925] 1984: 146). This mentality is only a part of Mannheim's later explanations of the troubling affinities between groups of intellectuals and fascism, the least intellectual of the ideologies. Fascism also arises when intellectuals presume to claim power without reference to the historically grounded social actors of civil society (Mannheim [1932] 1993). To become the constructive intellectual of *Ideology and Utopia*, the prime contributor to the synthesis capable of transforming the impasse of ideological distrust into an open process of realistic political negotiations, intellectuals must learn to encounter themselves by critically exploring the attitude ever more explicitly articulated in the new university discipline of sociology. The university in general and sociology in particular must conversely open themselves to the experimental mentality of the intellectuals, their dissent from philosophical and pedagogical system (Mannheim [1930] 2000: 102-107). Mannheim calls for a mutually beneficial settlement between the universities and the intellectuals.

Mannheim's first, somewhat indirect argument for such a pact appeared in 1922, in the immediate context of his negotiations with Weber. He picks up a theme already widely discussed on the eve of the First World War, what Sigfried Kracauer had referred to as "the hatred of science' rampant among the best of today's academic youth."¹⁰ Mannheim traces the problem to the rigid indifference displayed by academic scientific disciplines, operating on their own momentum, to the concerns that students bring with them to university and to the rich spiritual experiences that many have had before arriving. More precisely, he argues that a

dramatic redirection of the educational function is itself indispensable to rejuvenating sciences that are in danger of sclerosis. The academic disciplines must teach in a way that lets them learn from the youth. He tells three stories to identify the critical problem, sketches of students who arrive in the university inspired by burning questions generated by their prior commitments to the movements of the times and who are stopped short by a disciplinary course of studies that requires them to forget their questions and to subordinate themselves to the present questions and methods of their respective sciences. The first student comes from the activist political movement, he reports, the second, from a religious-mystical community, and the third, from a intimate involvement in art—and all three thus arrive in the university with profound experiences and insights. What they are required to do in the faculties of social science, philosophy, and art history, however, ignores or disparages what they bring. Mannheim finds this a cruel waste, but he is, nevertheless, not satisfied with a romantic gesture on behalf of youth and its supposed vital rootedness in fellowships devoted to ultimate mysteries and missions. He is in fact ambivalent about such external, extra-scientific formations. Their ideas, after all, may be nothing more than faded shadows of obsolete notions, he cautions, and they are in any case bound to be vague and unfocused. Besides, youth is destined to mature beyond the attitudes appropriate to these intense involvements. The universities are quite right to initiate the students in the sciences, he concludes, but they must also open the sciences to the urgencies of youth. Teaching should be a source of regeneration for scientific work (Mannheim [1922] 2004).

Mannheim's development of this implicit program can be followed, first, in his didactic lectures to his classes (Mannheim [1930] 2000; [1931-2] 2001), and then, in a more professional formulation, in his 1932 address to sociologists on "Die Gegenwartsaufgaben der Soziologie" (1932). The crux of the matter is to conjoin *Aktualität und Kontrollierbarkeit*. This dual

criterion brings together the link to the problem constellation current among intellectuals and the question of finding appropriate empirical methods to provide reality-testing without restricting inquiry to a syllabus of questions systematized in the Lehrbetrieb. Beyond Mannheim's programmatic statements, his unfinished design can best be understood by reviewing the research program, which he initiated in Frankfurt and which was abruptly ended by the violent end of the Weimar era.

The Rockefeller Foundation judgment in 1931 quoted by Klingemann reversed the initial favorable reaction to a grant application by Mannheim, in which he listed among the prime activities of his sociological seminar not only an ambitious project to create an international cross-disciplinary bibliography of research on key problems, but also "inductive research" into "the mechanism for selecting leaders in political parties, in trade unions, and the Catholic Church," as well as "women in politics, the sociology of the immigrant, and the "influence of education on social position." (Rockefeller 1931).¹¹ In the same year, Mannheim replied to a questionnaire circulated by Ferdinand Tönnies about "sociographic" research conducted in his program. The studies he cites include participant observer research of elections, a dissertation on *Weltanschauung* and press, the consequences of experiences as strangers on foreign students, the effects of new institutes for upward mobility on those who take part, including adult education. Finally, he cites comparative studies of political emigration by Nina Rubinstein and of housework by Margarethe Freudenthal (Tönnies 1931; see Honegger [1989], Rubinstein 2000; Matthiesen [1989]; Kettler/Meja 1993; Kettler/Meja 1995: 132-135). Since Mannheim's reports were doubtless somewhat influenced by tactical considerations, it is important also to look at the dissertation projects Mannheim actually encouraged his students to undertake.

The doctoral dissertations generally credited to Mannheim's influence, although in

several cases completed only after his dismissal by National Socialist decree, define themselves as exercises in sociological analysis—to use a term present in several of the titles--blending concepts derived from Mannheim’s cultural sociology with elements taken from one or both Weber brothers and applying them to materials from modern or contemporary history. Where they focus on intellectual productions, they subject them to an “extrinsic” rather than “immanent” interpretation, focusing on genealogies and functions rather than on substantive claims by the authors(Mannheim [1926] 1964), yet to the extent that they frame their subject matter as ideology, they do not limit themselves to applying the restrictive model of the ideological field and its social correlatives laid out in Mannheim’s *Ideologie und Utopie*. They may take key questions from Mannheim, but they look for answers in their actual research findings.

Wilhelm Carlé (1931), for example, made good a striking omission in Mannheim by expanding the range of the contemporaneous ideological field to include Protestant nationalist and Catholic conservative patterns, when in his dissertation he followed the treatments of two stories—the political assassination of Walther Rathenau and a sex-and-murder scandal among adolescents—in ten newspapers, in order to distinguish ideological differences, which he then sought to interrelate with the contrasting world views of the newspapers’ respective social constituencies. In Käthe Truhel’s study of relations between (women) social workers and (male) bureaucrats (1934; Kettler 2007), similarly, the women’s practical perspectives are elucidated with the help of novel ideological constructs, in this case, feminist—but also social Catholic—models of mütterliche Vorsorge, which do not come into view under Mannheim’s scheme, while cleavages within bureaucratic conservatism are linked to functional departures unanticipated in Mannheim’s more ideal-typical treatment. Jacob Katz (1935; Kettler/Meja 2004) studied the

unique ideology of the first assimilated Jews; Nina Rubinstein ([1933] 2000; Kettler 2003) investigated the ideological articulations of political émigrés after the French Revolution; Natalie Halperin (1935) sought to account for a women's literary genre in the eighteenth century; and Margarethe Freudenthal ([1934] 1986) offered a comparative study of household management, which uncovered historical differences and class variations in the understanding of women's roles. Only Mannheim's most devoted follower, Hans Gerth, attempted to parallel one of Mannheim's own studies, with a project on Liberalism ([1935] 1976) patterned on Mannheim's earlier work on Conservatism. Like several of the others, this work arose in a "working group" on Liberalism that Mannheim conducted with a number of colleagues, including Paul Tillich and Adolph Löwe (Kettler/Meja 2004: 331-2, 337).

This ad hoc (and non-curricular) "working group," whose meetings also attracted advanced students like Hannah Arendt and Guenther Stern, gave institutional expression to the conjunction of *Aktualität* and *Kontrollierbarkeit*, which also characterizes the studies grounded in discrepancies between dominant myths about the press or the status of women. Löwe and Tillich were among Mannheim's chosen associates in the pursuit of intellectuals' discussions, notably concerning questions of religion that he systematically avoided in his purely academic work. It seems clear that notwithstanding its historical topic of "early Liberalism," the "working group" represented in specially clear form Mannheim's attempt to overcome the gap between the urgencies of intellectual life, as they moved both students and teachers, and the resources of scientific study. Throughout, the point is above all the interplay between the kinds of thinking characteristic of the two antagonistic types, their complementarity. The synthesis is not a fusion between intellectuals and scientists within the university-or indeed within the inwardly complex individual able to coexist in both worlds--, but a bargaining structure, characterized by distance

as well as collaboration.

This was the point on which Alfred Weber and Karl Mannheim had earlier struck the deal that opened Mannheim's way to the university and that laid the foundation for his remarkable academic rise. Weber's reasons are complex, rooted in his disdain for the moribund mandarin academic style and his openness to the new departure in German politics, as well as to his affinity for lively, contentious minds. His strategy at the Heidelberg Institute for Social Research has been the subject of two important recent studies and does not have to be reviewed in this brief chapter.¹² A brief pointed comparison between Max and Alfred Weber may stand in for much detail. Max Weber was of course no less drawn to intellectuals than Alfred, and the Circle presided over by Marianne Weber was a home to adventurous thinking and thinkers throughout its two phases of existence. But when Georg Lukács, a brilliant and much praised younger member of this group, approached Max Weber with a request for support with his plans for habilitation, Weber was unambiguous: Lukács would have to stop writing essays. He would have to write a proper treatise. When Mannheim came to Alfred Weber with a similar request six years later—admitted to easy intimacy not least because of his own past intimacy with Lukács and similarly frustrated by Heinrich Rickert—Alfred Weber had his doubts about Mannheim's grand ambitions and loose methods but told him that he should consider his work already accepted, since he was a mature man who clearly knew what he was doing. Alfred Weber had a genuine taste for diversity as well as the instincts of an institution-building American Dean rather than a school-building German professor. He knew quality, and he was prepared to put up with the difficulties of conducting or managing the attendant conflicts.

Peter Nettl, writing in 1970, speaks of the institutionalization of "structures of dissent" in connection with the relations between intellectuals and scientists, focusing, like Mannheim, on

the contrasting ways and objects of thinking, as well as on the interdependence between them-- and the strains that their coexistence puts on disciplinary structures and universities.¹³

Mannheim spoke of scepticism and distance rather than dissent, but the latter term captures the crucial point that to reflect on the rationales for schematic disciplines is itself a type of dissent and generates strong and conflicting reactions. And among themselves, dissenters are notoriously contentious, even when they are not suffering from a horrific defeat and its aftermath. Mannheim was not only a star of Weimar social thought; he was also controversial and embattled. There was, of course, no other way of being representative of the Weimar generation of intellectuals.

ENDNOTES

¹Demm details the political and chauvinistic (especially anti-Semitic) factors in the hostility to Mannheim at Heidelberg. In an attempt to block Mannheim's naturalization, a condition for his habilitation, the competent state official of Württemberg undoubtedly speaks for many when he writes: "Ich erblicke vielmehr in der weitherzigen Enbürgerung einer immer größeren Zahl fremdstämmiger Ostausländer, wie sie vielfach zu beobachten ist, eine ernste Gefährdung deutscher Belange und zwar in vermehrten Maße, wenn eine Durchfremdung von Berufen zu befürchten ist, deren Deutscherhaltung –wie insbesondere bei den Hochschullehrern—besonders wichtig erscheinen muß." The Bavarians raise similar objections. "Gesuch des Dr. Karl Mannheim um Einbürgerung," 25. März 1929. Badisches Staatsministerium Nr. 3207. *Badisches Generalarchiv Karlsruhe*. Kettler/Meja 1995 translates and contextualizes additional texts: 90-91.

² The ambiguities of Mannheim's English "success" are discussed in Kettler/Meja 1987 and further developed in Kettler/Meja 1995: 193-246, 281-286, 314-319. Conflicting evidence about Neumann himself is introduced in Kettler 2002.

³ Ulf Matthiesen ([1989]) has written the finest brief statement of the case, regrettably in a publication that has had little circulation. A newer work in depth is Laube 2000.

⁴ Klingemann aims his criticisms at a passage in Kettler/Meja/Stehr 1990.

⁵ The Rockefeller evaluator was A.W. Fehling. Secretary of the Fellowship Advisory Committee of the Rockefeller Foundation for the Social Sciences in Germany. RF/1.1/717/20/186 and RF RGB-1932/717/77/617. For the Rockefeller Foundation's post-war skepticism about the claims of the Horkheimer/Adorno Institut für Sozialforschung, in turn, to be devoted to American empirical methods, see the conflicting opinions in the 1950-1951 correspondence collected in RF1.2/717/115/155. In the end, a grant was awarded. Some Foundation officers harbored an old distrust of Horkheimer. Cp. Memo of Bryce Wood's interview with Horkheimer and Franz L. Neumann on 8 January 1948:RF/ (RG2-1948/717/428/2888) **Error! Main Document Only.** 8 Jan 48

⁶ This generational divide must be understood to qualify Mannheim's blanket endorsement in "German Sociology" of Max Weber as "the man on whose work the younger generation could fall back most safely" for a "representative" manner of casting questions and approaching empirical study (Mannheim [1934] 1953: 218). At issue is Max Weber's contested legacy, where Mannheim does battle with von Wiese and others. Cp. Loader/Kettler 2002: 71-107.

⁷ Mannheim asked the Rockefeller Foundation for \$50,000 (five times as much as was considered appropriate for three years of Alfred Weber's major team-project study of European economies) to study "The Sociological Causes of the Cultural Crisis in the Era of Mass-Democracies and Autarchies," expressly citing among his reasons the need to preserve the core of the younger generation of German sociologists. Among the collaborators he proposed to the foundation were Theodor Reik, Alfred von Martin, Sigmund Neumann, Franz L. Neumann, Ernest K. Bramsted, Norbert Elias, W. Falk, Hans Gerth, Svend Riemer, and Albert Salomon. Except for Reik and Franz L. Neumann (who may have known Mannheim in Frankfurt but who first studied with him in London) the others were close to Alfred Weber, Ernst Lederer and/or Karl Mannheim himself. Mannheim also mentions a possible job in a letter to Siegfried Kracauer. For a detailed review of the archival record see Kettler/Meja 1995: 178-182. See also Mannheim's letters to Louis Wirth (26 July 1933) and Tracy Kittredge (25 September 33) in Gabor 1996: 64-67 and 72-73.

⁸ Prefacing his outline for this project--and explaining his turn from the topic as vital center of his thinking--is the following memorandum, in German, on London stationery: "On the intellectual [die Intelligenz] in England. 1) England prevented the emergence of the abandoned intellectual emerging out of social decline (therefore no radical[ly] systematic thought). 2) By means of the professions, England prevented the emergence of the socially unattached intellectual. 3) To begin with, England educated a socially and territorially homogenous core." The unfinished project would presumably have accounted for the marginalization of sociology of knowledge in Mannheim's exilic intellectual design, as well as his attempted reconceptualization of reflexive sociology. See Karl Mannheim, "In Defense of

Functional Reason," [Correspondence with Eduard Heimann] pp. 175-194 in Kettler/Loader 2001 and cp. "The Intellectualism Dispute," [Protocol of Joint Seminar with Alfred Weber] op. cit. 109-131.

⁹ Alfred Weber, "Die Not der geistigen Arbeiter," Pp. 165-184 and 254-259 in *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik* 163 (1922)

¹⁰ Kracauer, *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays*, 213-214, cit., Loader/Kettler 2002: 48-49. Georg Simmel wrote: "Wer Jahrzehnte lang in der akademischen Sphäre wirkt und das Vertrauen der Jugend genießt, weiß, wie oft gerade die innerlich lebendigsten und idealistischsten jungen Männer sich nach wenigen Semestern enttäuscht von Dem abwenden, was die Universität Ihnen an allgemeiner Kultur, an Befriedigung ihrer innersten Bedürfnisse bietet. Denn sie wollen, außer all den vortrefflichen Belehrungen spezialistischer und exakter Art, noch etwas Allgemeineres oder, wenn man will, Persönlicheres, das freilich auch die Behandlung der Geschichte, der Kunst, der Philologie geben kann, das aber die Philosophie am Reinsten und Vollsten, trotz ihrer sachlichen Fragwürdigkeiten, zu bieten vermag. Nenne man Dies ein bloßes Nebenprodukt der Wissenschaft oder auch der Philosophie als Wissenschaft; aber wo es der Jugend nicht mehr geboten wird, wenden sich gerade ihre besten Elemente anderen Quellen zu, die jene tiefsten Bedürfnisse zu speisen versprechen: die Mystik oder Dem, was sie 'das Leben' nennen, der Sozialdemokratie oder der Literatur im Allgemeinen, einem falsch verstandenen Nietzsche oder einem skeptisch gefärbten Materialismus. Täuschen wir uns nicht darüber: die deutschen Universitäten haben die innerliche Führung der Jugend in weitem Umfang an Mächte dieser Art abgegeben." . Georg Simmel, "An Herrn Professor Karl Lamprecht," *Die Zukunft*, 83 (1913): 230-234: 233, cit. Lichtblau 1996: 407-408.

¹¹ The memorandum from the Paris Office of the Foundation, which supports Mannheim's request, at least in part, also includes a positive assessment of the Institut für Sozialforschung, which has made a "promising start . . . in inductive research as opposed to philosophical speculation" since the arrival of Max Horkheimer.

¹² Above all, Demm 1999. See also the frequently stimulating collection of studies by Reinhard Blomert (1999),

¹³ J.P. Nettl, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent," Pp. 57-134 in Philip Reiff, ed., *On Intellectuals*. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970). The neglect of this substantial as well as brilliant essay by a social scientist who died far too young is a shame. Notwithstanding its somewhat outdated closing remarks on the conflicts in the universities of the late 1960s, which served as occasion for the anthology in which it appeared, its theoretical insights and focused historical cases remain exemplary.

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