

THE
ARROGANCE
OF
POWER

SENATOR
J. WILLIAM
FULBRIGHT

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
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THE ARROGANCE OF POWER

by

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The precipitating cause of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, for example, was a dispute over the succession to the Spanish throne, and the ostensible "underlying" cause was French resistance to the unification of Germany. The war was followed by the completion of German unification—which probably could have been achieved without war—but it was also followed by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the humiliation of France, and the emergence of Germany as the greatest power in Europe, which could not have been achieved without war. The peace treaty, incidentally, said nothing about the Spanish throne, which everyone apparently had forgotten. One wonders to what extent the Germans were motivated simply by the desire to cut those haughty Frenchmen down to size and have a good excuse to build another monument in Berlin.

The United States went to war in 1898 for the stated purpose of liberating Cuba from Spanish tyranny, but after winning the war—a war which Spain had been willing to pay a high price to avoid—the United States brought the liberated Cubans under an American protectorate and incidentally annexed the Philippines, because, according to President McKinley, the Lord told him it was America's duty "to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died."²

Isn't it interesting that the voice was the voice of the Lord but the words were those of Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Admiral Mahan, those "imperialists of 1898" who wanted America to have an empire just because a big, powerful country like the United States *ought* to have an empire? The spirit of the times was expressed by Albert Beveridge, soon thereafter to be elected to the United States Senate, who proclaimed Americans to be "a conquering race": "We must obey our blood and occupy new markets and if necessary new lands," he said, because "In the Almighty's infinite plan . . . debased civilizations and decaying

rac^{es}" must disappear "before the higher civilization of the nobler and more virile types of man."³

In 1914 all Europe went to war, ostensibly because the heir to the Austrian throne had been assassinated at Sarajevo, but really because that murder became the symbolic focus of the incredibly delicate sensibilities of the great nations of Europe. The events of the summer of 1914 were a melodrama of abnormal psychology: Austria had to humiliate Serbia in order not to be humiliated herself but Austria's effort at recovering self-esteem was profoundly humiliating to Russia; Russia was allied to France, who had been feeling generally humiliated since 1871, and Austria in turn was allied to Germany, whose pride required that she support Austria no matter how insanely Austria behaved and who may in any case have felt that it would be fun to give the German Army another swing down the Champs-Élysées. For these ennobling reasons the world was plunged into a war which took tens of millions of lives, precipitated the Russian Revolution, and set in motion the events that led to another world war, a war which took tens of millions more lives and precipitated the worldwide revolutions of our time, revolutions whose consequences are beyond the foresight of any of us now alive.

The causes and consequences of war may have more to do with pathology than with politics, more to do with irrational pressures of pride and pain than with rational calculations of advantage and profit. There is a Washington story, perhaps apocryphal, that the military intellectuals in the Pentagon conducted an experiment in which they fed data derived from the events of the summer of 1914 into a computer and that, after weighing and digesting the evidence, the machine assured its users that there was no danger of war. What this "proves," if anything, is that computers are more rational than men; it also suggests that if there is a root cause of human conflict and of the power drive of nations, it lies not in economic aspirations, historical forces, or the workings of

the balance of power, but in the ordinary hopes and fears of the human mind.

It has been said that buried in every woman's secret soul is a drum majorette; it might also be said that in all of our souls there is a bit of the missionary. We all like telling people what to do, which is perfectly all right except that most people do not like being told what to do. I have given my wife some splendid suggestions on household management but she has been so consistently ungrateful for my advice that I have stopped offering it. The phenomenon is explained by the Canadian psychiatrist and former Director-General of the World Health Organization, Brock Chisholm, who writes:

... Man's method of dealing with difficulties in the past has always been to tell everyone else how they should behave. We've all been doing that for centuries.

It should be clear by now that this no longer does any good. Everybody has by now been told by everybody else how he should behave. . . . The criticism is not effective; it never has been, and it never is going to be. . . .⁴

Ineffective though it has been, the giving—and enforcement—of all this unsolicited advice has at least until recently been compatible with the survival of the human race. Man is now, however, for the first time, in a situation in which the survival of his species is in jeopardy. Other forms of life have been endangered and many destroyed by changes in their natural environment; man is menaced by a change of environment which he himself has wrought by the invention of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Our power to kill has become universal, creating a radically new situation which, if we are to survive, requires us to adopt some radically new attitudes about the giving and enforcement of advice and in general about human and international relations.

The enormity of the danger of extinction of our species is dulled by the frequency with which it is stated, as if a familiar threat of catastrophe were no threat at all. We seem to feel somehow that because the hydrogen bomb has not killed us

yet, it is never going to kill us. This is a dangerous assumption because it encourages the retention of traditional attitudes about world politics when our responsibility, in Dr. Chisholm's words, is nothing less than "to re-examine all of the attitudes of our ancestors and to select from those attitudes things which we, on our own authority in these present circumstances, with our knowledge, recognize as still valid in this new kind of world. . . ."⁵

The attitude above all others which I feel sure is no longer valid is the arrogance of power, the tendency of great nations to equate power with virtue and major responsibilities with a universal mission. The dilemmas involved are pre-eminently American dilemmas, not because America has weaknesses that others do not have but because America is powerful as no nation has ever been before, and the discrepancy between her power and the power of others appears to be increasing. One may hope that America, with her vast resources and democratic traditions, with her diverse and creative population, will find the wisdom to match her power; but one can hardly be confident because the wisdom required is greater wisdom than any great nation has ever shown before. It must be rooted, as Dr. Chisholm says, in the re-examination of "all of the attitudes of our ancestors."

It is a tall order. Perhaps one can begin to fill it by an attempt to assess the attitudes of Americans toward other peoples and some of the effects of America's power on small countries whom she has tried to help.

Innocents Abroad

There are signs of the arrogance of power in the way Americans act when they go to foreign countries. Foreigners frequently comment on the contrast between the behavior of Americans at home and abroad: in our own country, they

say, we are hospitable and considerate, but as soon as we get outside our own borders something seems to get into us and wherever we are we become noisy and demanding and we strut around as if we owned the place. The British used to say during the war that the trouble with the Yanks was that they were "overpaid, oversexed, and over here." During a recent vacation in Mexico, I noticed in a small-town airport two groups of students on holiday, one group Japanese, the other American. The Japanese were neatly dressed and were talking and laughing in a manner that neither annoyed anybody nor particularly called attention to themselves. The Americans, on the other hand, were disporting themselves in a conspicuous and offensive manner, stamping around the waiting room in sloppy clothes, drinking beer, and shouting to each other as if no one else were there.

This kind of scene, unfortunately, has become familiar in many parts of the world. I do not wish to exaggerate its significance, but I have the feeling that just as there was once something special about being a Roman or a Spaniard or an Englishman, there is now something about the consciousness of being an American abroad, something about the consciousness of belonging to the biggest, richest country in the world, that encourages people who are perfectly well behaved at home to become boorish when they are in somebody else's country and to treat the local citizens as if they were not really there.

One reason Americans abroad may act as though they "own the place" is that in many places they very nearly do: American companies may dominate large segments of a country's economy; American products are advertised on billboards and displayed in shop windows; American hotels and snack bars are available to protect American tourists from foreign influence; American soldiers may be stationed in the country, and even if they are not, the population are probably well aware that their very survival depends on the wisdom with which America uses her immense military power.

I think that when any American goes abroad, he carries an unconscious knowledge of all this power with him and it affects his behavior, just as it once affected the behavior of Greeks and Romans, of Spaniards, Germans, and Englishmen, in the brief high noons of their respective ascendancies. It was the arrogance of their power that led nineteenth-century Englishmen to suppose that if they shouted at a foreigner loud enough in English he was bound to understand, or that now leads Americans to behave like Mark Twain's "innocents abroad," who reported on their travels in Europe that

The people of those foreign countries are very, very ignorant. They looked curiously at the costumes we had brought from the wilds of America. They observed that we talked loudly at table sometimes. . . . In Paris they just simply opened their eyes and stared when we spoke to them, in French! We never did succeed in making these idiots understand their own language.⁶

The Fatal Impact

Reflecting on his voyages to Polynesia in the late eighteenth century, Captain Cook later wrote that "It would have been better for these people never to have known us." In a book on European explorations of the South Pacific, Alan Moorehead relates how the Tahitians and the Australian aborigines were corrupted by the white man's diseases, alcohol, firearms, laws, and concepts of morality, by what Moorehead calls "the long down-slide into Western civilization." The first missionaries to Tahiti, says Moorehead, were "determined to recreate the island in the image of lower-middle-class Protestant England. . . . They kept hammering away at the Tahitian way of life until it crumbled before them, and within two decades they had achieved precisely what they set out to do."⁷ It is said that the first missionaries to Hawaii went for the purpose of explaining to the Polynesians that it was sinful to work on

Sunday, only to discover that in those bountiful islands nobody worked on any day.

Even when acting with the best of intentions, Americans, like other Western peoples who have carried their civilizations abroad, have had something of the same "fatal impact" on smaller nations that European explorers had on the Tahitians and the native Australians. We have not harmed people because we wished to; on the contrary, more often than not we have wanted to help people and, in some very important respects, we have helped them. Americans have brought medicine and education, manufactures and modern techniques to many places in the world; but they have also brought themselves and the condescending attitudes of a people whose very success breeds disdain for other cultures. Bringing power without understanding, Americans as well as Europeans have had a devastating effect in less advanced areas of the world; without knowing they were doing it, they have shattered traditional societies, disrupted fragile economies and undermined peoples' self-confidence by the invidious example of their own power and efficiency. They have done this in many instances simply by being big and strong, by giving good advice, by intruding on people who have not wanted them but could not resist them.

The missionary instinct seems to run deep in human nature, and the bigger and stronger and richer we are, the more we feel suited to the missionary task, the more indeed we consider it our duty. Dr. Chisholm relates the story of an eminent cleric who had been proselyting the Eskimos and said: "You know, for years we couldn't do anything with those Eskimos at all; they didn't have any sin. We had to teach them sin for years before we could do anything with them."⁸ I am reminded of the three Boy Scouts who reported to their scoutmaster that as their good deed for the day they had helped an old lady to cross the street.

"That's fine," said the scoutmaster, "but why did it take three of you?"

"Well," they explained, "she didn't want to go."

The good deed above all others that Americans feel qualified to perform is the teaching of democracy. Let us consider the results of some American good deeds in various parts of the world.

Over the years since President Monroe proclaimed his doctrine, Latin Americans have had the advantages of United States tutelage in fiscal responsibility, in collective security, and in the techniques of democracy. If they have fallen short in any of these fields, the thought presents itself that the fault may lie as much with the teacher as with the pupils.

When President Theodore Roosevelt announced his "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine in 1905, he solemnly declared that he regarded the future interventions thus sanctified as a "burden" and a "responsibility" and an obligation to "international equity." Not once, so far as I know, has the United States regarded itself as intervening in a Latin American country for selfish or unworthy motives—a view not necessarily shared, however, by the beneficiaries. Whatever reassurance the purity of our motives may give must be shaken a little by the thought that probably no country in human history has ever intervened in another except for motives it regarded as excellent.

For all our noble intentions, the countries which have had most of the tutelage in democracy by United States Marines have not been particularly democratic. These include Haiti, which is under a brutal and superstitious dictatorship; the Dominican Republic, which languished under the brutal Trujillo dictatorship for thirty years and whose second elected government since the overthrow of Trujillo is threatened, like the first, by the power of a military oligarchy; and of course Cuba, which, as no one needs to be reminded, has replaced its traditional right-wing dictatorships with a communist dictatorship.

Maybe, in the light of this extraordinary record of ac-

complishment, it is time for us to reconsider our teaching methods. Maybe we are not really cut out for the job of spreading the gospel of democracy. Maybe it would profit us to concentrate on our own democracy instead of trying to inflict our particular version of it on all those ungrateful Latin Americans who stubbornly oppose their North American benefactors instead of the "real" enemies whom we have so graciously chosen for them. And maybe—just maybe—if we left our neighbors to make their own judgments and their own mistakes, and confined our assistance to matters of economics and technology instead of philosophy, maybe then they would begin to find the democracy and the dignity that have largely eluded them, and we in turn might begin to find the love and gratitude that we seem to crave.

Korea is another example. We went to war in 1950 to defend South Korea against the Russian-inspired aggression of North Korea. I think that American intervention was justified and necessary: we were defending a country that clearly wanted to be defended, whose army was willing to fight and fought well, and whose government, though dictatorial, was patriotic and commanded the support of the people. Throughout the war, however, the United States emphasized as one of its war aims the survival of the Republic of Korea as a "free society," something which it was not then and is not now. We lost 33,629 American lives in that war and have since spent \$5.61 billion on direct military and economic aid and a great deal more on indirect aid to South Korea. The country, nonetheless, remained until recently in a condition of virtual economic stagnation and political instability. Only now is economic progress being made, but the truly surprising fact is that having fought a war for three years to defend the freedom of South Korea, most Americans quickly lost interest in the state of the ward for whom they had sacrificed so much. It is doubtful that more than a handful of Americans now know or care whether South Korea is a "free society."

We are now engaged in a war to "defend freedom" in South Vietnam. Unlike the Republic of Korea, South Vietnam has an army which fights without notable success and a weak, dictatorial government which does not command the loyalty of the South Vietnamese people. The official war aims of the United States government, as I understand them, are to defeat what is regarded as North Vietnamese aggression, to demonstrate the futility of what the communists call "wars of national liberation," and to create conditions under which the South Vietnamese people will be able freely to determine their own future.

I have not the slightest doubt of the sincerity of the President and the Vice-President and the Secretaries of State and Defense in propounding these aims. What I do doubt, and doubt very much, is the ability of the United States to achieve these aims by the means being used. I do not question the power of our weapons and the efficiency of our logistics; I cannot say these things delight me as they seem to delight some of our officials, but they are certainly impressive. What I do question is the ability of the United States or any other Western nation to go into a small, alien, undeveloped Asian nation and create stability where there is chaos, the will to fight where there is defeatism, democracy where there is no tradition of it, and honest government where corruption is almost a way of life.

In the spring of 1966 demonstrators in Saigon burned American jeeps, tried to assault American soldiers, and marched through the streets shouting "Down with American imperialists," while a Buddhist leader made a speech equating the United States with the communists as a threat to South Vietnamese independence. Most Americans are understandably shocked and angered to encounter expressions of hostility from people who would long since have been under the rule of the Viet Cong but for the sacrifice of American lives and money. Why, we may ask, are they so shockingly ungrateful? Surely they must know that their very right to

parade and protest and demonstrate depends on the Americans who are defending them.

The answer, I think, is that "fatal impact" of the rich and strong on the poor and weak. Dependent on it though the Vietnamese are, American strength is a reproach to their weakness, American wealth a mockery of their poverty, American success a reminder of their failures. What they resent is the disruptive effect of our strong culture upon their fragile one, an effect which we can no more avoid having than a man can help being bigger than a child. What they fear, I think rightly, is that traditional Vietnamese society cannot survive the American economic and cultural impact.

The evidence of that "fatal impact" is seen in the daily life of Saigon. A *New York Times* correspondent reported—and his information matches that of other observers on the scene—that many Vietnamese find it necessary to put their wives or daughters to work as bar girls or to peddle them to American soldiers as mistresses; that it is not unusual to hear a report that a Vietnamese soldier has committed suicide out of shame because his wife has been working as a bar girl; that Vietnamese have trouble getting taxicabs because drivers will not stop for them, preferring to pick up American soldiers who will pay outrageous fares without complaint; that as a result of the American influx bar girls, prostitutes, pimps, bar owners, and taxi drivers have risen to the higher levels of the economic pyramid; that middle-class Vietnamese families have difficulty renting homes because Americans have driven the rents beyond their reach, and some Vietnamese families have actually been evicted from houses and apartments by landlords who prefer to rent to the affluent Americans; that Vietnamese civil servants, junior army officers, and enlisted men are unable to support their families because of the inflation generated by American spending and the purchasing power of the G.I.s. One Vietnamese explained to the *New York Times* reporter that "Any time legions of prosperous white men descend on a rudimentary Asian society, you are bound

to have trouble." Another said: "We Vietnamese are somewhat xenophobe. We don't like foreigners, any kind of foreigners, so that you shouldn't be surprised that we don't like you."⁹

Sincere though it is, the American effort to build the foundations of freedom in South Vietnam is thus having an effect quite different from the one intended. "All this struggling and striving to make the world better is a great mistake," said George Bernard Shaw, "not because it isn't a good thing to improve the world if you know how to do it, but because striving and struggling is the worst way you could set about doing anything."¹⁰

One wonders how much the American commitment to Vietnamese freedom is also a commitment to American pride—the two seem to have become part of the same package. When we talk about the freedom of South Vietnam, we may be thinking about how disagreeable it would be to accept a solution short of victory; we may be thinking about how our pride would be injured if we settled for less than we set out to achieve; we may be thinking about our reputation as a great power, fearing that a compromise settlement would shame us before the world, marking us as a second-rate people with flagging courage and determination.

Such fears are as nonsensical as their opposite, the presumption of a universal mission. They are simply unworthy of the richest, most powerful, most productive, and best educated people in the world. One can understand an uncompromising attitude on the part of such countries as China or France: both have been struck low in this century and a certain amount of arrogance may be helpful to them in recovering their pride. It is much less comprehensible on the part of the United States—a nation whose modern history has been an almost uninterrupted chronicle of success, a nation which by now should be so sure of its own power as to be capable of magnanimity, a nation which by now should be able to act on the proposition that, as George Kennan said, "there is

more respect to be won in the opinion of the world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than in the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives."¹¹

The cause of our difficulties in Southeast Asia is not a deficiency of power but an excess of the wrong kind of power, which results in a feeling of impotence when it fails to achieve its desired ends. We are still acting like Boy Scouts dragging reluctant old ladies across streets they do not want to cross. We are trying to remake Vietnamese society, a task which certainly cannot be accomplished by force and which probably cannot be accomplished by any means available to outsiders. The objective may be desirable, but it is not feasible. As Shaw said: "Religion is a great force—the only real motive force in the world; but what you fellows don't understand is that you must get at a man through his own religion and not through yours."¹²

With the best intentions in the world the United States has involved itself deeply in the affairs of developing nations in Asia and Latin America, practicing what has been called a kind of "welfare imperialism." Our honest purpose is the advancement of development and democracy, to which end it has been thought necessary to destroy ancient and unproductive modes of life. In this latter function we have been successful, perhaps more successful than we know. Bringing skills and knowledge, money and resources in amounts hitherto unknown in traditional societies, the Americans have overcome indigenous groups and interests and become the dominant force in a number of countries. Far from being bumbling, wasteful, and incompetent, as critics have charged, American government officials, technicians, and economists have been strikingly successful in breaking down the barriers to change in ancient but fragile cultures.

Here, however, our success ends. Traditional rulers, institutions, and ways of life have crumbled under the fatal impact of American wealth and power but they have not been

replaced by new institutions and new ways of life, nor has their breakdown ushered in an era of democracy and development. It has rather ushered in an era of disorder and demoralization because in the course of destroying old ways of doing things, we have also destroyed the self-confidence and self-reliance without which no society can build indigenous institutions. Inspiring as we have such great awe of our efficiency and wealth, we have reduced some of the intended beneficiaries of our generosity to a condition of dependency and self-denigration. We have done this for the most part inadvertently: with every good intention we have intruded on fragile societies, and our intrusion, though successful in uprooting traditional ways of life, has been strikingly unsuccessful in implanting the democracy and advancing the development which are the honest aims of our "welfare imperialism."

American Empire or American Example?

Despite its dangerous and unproductive consequences, the idea of being responsible for the whole world seems to be flattering to Americans and I am afraid it is turning our heads, just as the sense of universal responsibility turned the heads of ancient Romans and nineteenth-century British.

In 1965 Henry Fairlie, a British political writer for *The Spectator* and *The Daily Telegraph*, wrote what he called "A Cheer for American Imperialism."¹³ An empire, he said, "has no justification except its own existence." It must never contract; it "wastes treasure and life"; its commitments "are without rhyme or reason." Nonetheless, according to Fairlie, the "American empire" is uniquely benevolent, devoted as it is to individual liberty and the rule of law, and having performed such services as getting the author released from a Yugoslav jail simply by his threatening to involve the American Consul, a service which he describes as "sublime."

What romantic nonsense this is. And what dangerous nonsense in the age of nuclear weapons. The idea of an "American empire" might be dismissed as the arrant imagining of a British Gunga Din except that it surely strikes a responsive chord in at least a corner of the usually sensible and humane American mind. It calls to mind the slogans of the past about the shot fired at Concord being heard 'round the world, about "manifest destiny" and "making the world safe for democracy," and the demand for "unconditional surrender" in World War II. It calls to mind President McKinley taking counsel with the Supreme Being about his duty to the benighted Filipinos.

The "Blessings-of-Civilization Trust," as Mark Twain called it, may have been a "Daisy" in its day, uplifting for the soul and good for business besides, but its day is past. It is past because the great majority of the human race is demanding dignity and independence, not the honor of a supine role in an American empire. It is past because whatever claim America may make for the universal domain of her ideas and values is balanced by the communist counter-claim, armed like our own with nuclear weapons. And, most of all, it is past because it never should have begun, because we are not God's chosen saviour of mankind but only one of mankind's more successful and fortunate branches, endowed by our Creator with about the same capacity for good and evil, no more or less, than the rest of humanity.

An excessive preoccupation with foreign relations over a long period of time is more than a manifestation of arrogance; it is a drain on the power that gave rise to it, because it diverts a nation from the sources of its strength, which are in its domestic life. A nation immersed in foreign affairs is expending its capital, human as well as material; sooner or later that capital must be renewed by some diversion of creative energies from foreign to domestic pursuits. I would doubt that any nation has achieved a durable greatness by conducting a "strong" foreign policy, but many have been

ruined by expending their energies in foreign adventures while allowing their domestic bases to deteriorate. The United States emerged as a world power in the twentieth century, not because of what it had done in foreign relations but because it had spent the nineteenth century developing the North American continent; by contrast, the Austrian and Turkish empires collapsed in the twentieth century in large part because they had so long neglected their internal development and organization.

If America has a service to perform in the world—and I believe she has—it is in large part the service of her own example. In our excessive involvement in the affairs of other countries we are not only living off our assets and denying our own people the proper enjoyment of their resources, we are also denying the world the example of a free society enjoying its freedom to the fullest. This is regrettable indeed for a nation that aspires to teach democracy to other nations, because, as Edmund Burke said, "Example is the school of mankind, and they will learn at no other."^{14*}

The missionary instinct in foreign affairs may, in a curious way, reflect a deficiency rather than an excess of national self-confidence. In America's case the evidence of a lack of self-confidence is our apparent need for constant proof and reassurance, our nagging desire for popularity, our bitterness and confusion when foreigners fail to appreciate our generosity and good intentions. Lacking an appreciation of the dimensions of our own power, we fail to understand our enormous and disruptive impact on the world; we fail to understand that no matter how good our intentions—and they are, in most cases, decent enough—other nations are alarmed by the very existence of such great power, which, whatever its benevolence, cannot help but remind them of their own helplessness before it.

Those who lack self-assurance are also likely to lack magna-

* The services America can perform in the world—other than that of her own example—are discussed in Chapter 11.

nimity, because the one is the condition of the other. Only a nation at peace with itself, with its transgressions as well as its achievements, is capable of a generous understanding of others. Only when we Americans can acknowledge our own past aggressive behavior—in such instances, for example, as the Indian wars and the wars against Mexico and Spain—will we acquire some perspective on the aggressive behavior of others; only when we can understand the human implications of the chasm between American affluence and the poverty of most of the rest of mankind will we be able to understand why the American “way of life” which is so dear to us has few lessons and limited appeal to the poverty-stricken majority of the human race.

It is a curiosity of human nature that lack of self-assurance seems to breed an exaggerated sense of power and mission. When a nation is very powerful but lacking in self-confidence, it is likely to behave in a manner dangerous to itself and to others. Feeling the need to prove what is obvious to everyone else, it begins to confuse great power with unlimited power and great responsibility with total responsibility: it can admit of no error; it must win every argument, no matter how trivial. For lack of an appreciation of how truly powerful it is, the nation begins to lose wisdom and perspective and, with them, the strength and understanding that it takes to be magnanimous to smaller and weaker nations.

Gradually but unmistakably America is showing signs of that arrogance of power which has afflicted, weakened, and in some cases destroyed great nations in the past. In so doing we are not living up to our capacity and promise as a civilized example for the world. The measure of our falling short is the measure of the patriot's duty of dissent.

: Part I :

THE HIGHER PATRIOTISM

What do we mean by patriotism in the context of our times? . . . A patriotism that puts country ahead of self; a patriotism which is not short, frenzied outbursts of emotion, but the tranquil and steady dedication of a lifetime. There are words that are easy to utter, but this is a mighty assignment. For it is often easier to fight for principles than to live up to them.

ADLAI STEVENSON
New York, August 27, 1952

1

The Citizen and the University

TO CRITICIZE one's country is to do it a service and pay it a compliment. It is a service because it may spur the country to do better than it is doing; it is a compliment because it evidences a belief that the country can do better than it is doing. "This," said Albert Camus in one of his "Letters to a German Friend," is "what separated us from you; we made demands. You were satisfied to serve the power of your nation and we dreamed of giving ours her truth. . . ."¹

In a democracy dissent is an act of faith. Like medicine, the test of its value is not its taste but its effect, not how it makes people feel at the moment but how it makes them feel and moves them to act in the long run. Criticism may embarrass the country's leaders in the short run but strengthen their hand in the long run; it may destroy a consensus on policy while expressing a consensus of values. Woodrow Wilson once said that there was "such a thing as being too proud to fight"; there is also, or ought to be, such a thing as being too confident to conform, too strong to be silent in the face of apparent error. Criticism, in short, is more than a right; it is an act of patriotism, a higher form of patriotism, I believe, than the familiar rituals of national adulation. If nonetheless the critic is charged with a lack of patriotism, he can

reply with Camus, "No, I didn't love my country, if pointing out what is unjust in what we love amounts to not loving, if insisting that what we love should measure up to the finest image we have of her amounts to not loving."²

What is the finest image of America? To me it is the image of a composite, or better still a synthesis, of diverse peoples and cultures, come together in harmony but not identity, in an open, receptive, generous, and creative society. Almost two hundred years ago a Frenchman who had come to live in America posed the question "What Is an American?" His answer, in part, was the following:

Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great change in the world. Americans are the western pilgrims, who are carrying along with them that great mass of arts, sciences, vigour, and industry, which began long since in the east; they will finish the great circle. The Americans were once scattered all over Europe; here they are incorporated into one of the finest systems of population which has ever appeared, and which will hereafter become distinct by the power of the different climates they inhabit. . . . The American is a new man, who acts upon new principles; he must therefore entertain new ideas and form new opinions. From involuntary idleness, servile dependence, penury, and useless labor, he has passed to toils of a very different nature, rewarded by ample subsistence.—This is an American. . . .³

With due allowance for the author's exuberance, I think that his optimism was not far off the mark. We are an extraordinary nation, endowed with a rich and productive land, a humane and decent political tradition and a talented and energetic population. Surely a nation so favored is capable of extraordinary achievement, not only in the area of producing and enjoying great wealth, in which area our achievements have indeed been extraordinary, but also in the area of human and international relations, in which area, it seems

to me, our achievements have fallen short of our capacity and promise.

My question is whether America can close the gap between her capacity and performance. My hope and my belief are that she can, that she has the human resources to conduct her affairs with a maturity which few if any great nations have ever achieved: to be confident but also tolerant, to be rich but also generous, to be willing to teach but also willing to learn, to be powerful but also wise.

I believe that America is capable of all of these things; I also believe she is falling short of them. If one honestly thought that America was doing the best she is capable of doing at home and abroad, then there would be no reason for criticism. But if one feels certain that she has the capacity to be doing very much better, that she is falling short of her promise for reasons that can and should be overcome, then approbation is a disservice and dissent the higher patriotism.

The Fear of Dissent

The discharge of the *duty* of dissent is handicapped in America by an unworthy tendency to fear serious criticism of our government. In the abstract we celebrate freedom of opinion as part of our patriotic liturgy; it is only when some Americans exercise it that other Americans are shocked. No one of course ever criticizes the right of dissent; it is always this particular instance of it or its exercise under these particular circumstances or at this particular time that throws people into a blue funk. I am reminded of Samuel Butler's observation that "People in general are equally horrified at hearing the Christian religion doubted, and at seeing it practiced."⁴

Intolerance of dissent is a well-noted feature of the American national character. Louis Hartz attributes it to the heri-

tage of a society which was "born free," a society which is unnerved by serious criticism because it has experienced so little of it.⁵ Alexis de Tocqueville took note of this tendency over a hundred years ago: "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America." Profound changes have occurred since *Democracy in America* first appeared and yet it may be asked whether recognition of the right of dissent has gained substantially in practice as well as in theory. The malady in Tocqueville's view was one of democracy itself: ". . . The smallest reproach irritates its sensibility and the slightest joke that has any foundation in truth renders it indignant; from the forms of its language up to the solid virtues of its character, everything must be made the subject of encomium. No writer, whatever be his eminence, can escape paying this tribute of adulation to his fellow citizens."⁶

From small-town gatherings to high-policy councils Americans are distressed when a writer or a politician or even a private citizen interrupts all this self-congratulation and expresses himself with simple, unadorned candor. The problem is worsening, among other reasons, because more and more of our citizens earn their livings by working for corporations and other large organizations, few of which are known to encourage political and other forms of heterodoxy on the part of their employees. The result is that more and more Americans face the dilemma of how, if at all, an individual can safely exercise honest individual judgment, indeed retain his capacity for it, in an environment in which the surest route to advancement is conformity with a barren and oppressive orthodoxy.

The problem is acute in the federal bureaucracy, whose congenital inhospitality to unorthodox ideas, were its dimensions only known, would allay the anxieties of the most agitated superpatriot. In most if not all government agencies originality, especially at the lower levels, is regarded as a form of insolence or worse, and the most valued, therefore the most

professionally rewarding, quality is "soundness," which has very nearly become a euphemism for pedantry and mediocrity. The State Department, for example, with which I have had some experience, has many intelligent, courageous, and independent-minded Foreign Service Officers, but I have had occasion to notice that there are also sycophants and conformists, individuals in whose minds the distinction between official policy and personal opinion has disappeared. That, I suppose, is the worst of it: the censorship of ideas after a while no longer needs to be imposed; it is internalized, and the individual who may have begun his career as an idealist, full of hopes and ideas, becomes his own censor, purging himself of "unsound" ideas before he thinks them, converting himself from dreamer to drone by the time he reaches that stage in his career at which he can expect to be entrusted with some responsibility.

This is unfortunate indeed because the most valuable public servant, like the true patriot, is one who gives a higher loyalty to his country's ideals than to its current policy and who therefore is willing to criticize as well as to comply.

Some time ago I met an American poet, Mr. Ned O'Gorman, who had just returned from a visit to Latin America sponsored by the State Department. He said, and previously had written, that he had been instructed by American Embassy officials in the countries he visited that if he were questioned, by students and intellectuals with whom he was scheduled to meet, on such "difficult" questions as the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, he was to reply that he was "unprepared." Poets, as we all know, are ungovernable people and Mr. O'Gorman proved no exception. At a meeting with some Brazilian students he finally rebelled, with the following result as he described it: ". . . the questions came, swirling, battering, bellowing from the classroom. Outside the traffic and the oily electric heat. But I loved it. I was hell bent for clarity. I knew they wanted straight answers and I gave them. I had been gorged to sickness with embassy pru-

dence. The applause was long and loud. The embassy man was furious. 'You are taking money dishonestly,' he told me. 'If the government pays you to do this tour you must defend it and not damn it.' It did no good when I explained to him that if I didn't do what I was doing, *then* I'd be taking the money dishonestly. . . ."⁷

A high degree of loyalty to the President's policy is a requirement of good order within the Department of State, but it escapes me totally why American diplomats should not be proud to have American poets and professors and politicians demonstrate their country's political and intellectual health by expressing themselves with freedom and candor. As O'Gorman put it, ". . . I spoke with equal force of the glory and the tragedy of America. And that is what terrified the Americans."⁸

Criticism and Consensus

We must learn to treat our freedom as a source of strength, as an asset to be shown to the world with confidence and pride. No one challenges the value and importance of national consensus, but consensus can be understood in two ways. If it is interpreted to mean unquestioning support of existing policies, its effects can only be pernicious and undemocratic, serving to suppress differences rather than to reconcile them. If, on the other hand, consensus is understood to mean a general agreement on goals and values but not necessarily on the best means of realizing them, then and only then does it become a lasting basis of national strength. It is consensus in this sense which has made America strong in the past. Indeed, much of our national success in combining change with continuity can be attributed to the vigorous competition of men and ideas within a context of shared values and generally accepted institutions. It is only through

this kind of vigorous competition of ideas that a consensus of values can sometimes be translated into a true consensus of policy. Or as Mark Twain plainly put it: "It were not best that we should all think alike; it is difference of opinion that makes horse races."⁹

Freedom of thought and discussion gives a democracy two concrete advantages over a dictatorship in the making of foreign policy: it diminishes the danger of an irretrievable mistake and it introduces ideas and opportunities that otherwise would not come to light.

The correction of errors in a nation's foreign policy is greatly assisted by the timely raising of voices of criticism within the nation. When the British launched their disastrous attack on Egypt, the Labour Party raised a collective voice of indignation while the military operation was still under way; refusing to be deterred by calls for national unity in a crisis, Labour began the long, painful process of recovering Great Britain's good name at the very moment when the damage was still being done. Similarly, the French intellectuals who protested France's colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria not only upheld the values of French democracy but helped pave the way for the enlightened policies of the Fifth Republic which have made France the most respected Western nation in the underdeveloped world. It has been in the hope of performing a similar service for America on a very modest scale that I criticized American intervention in the Dominican Republic and that some of my colleagues and I have raised questions about the wisdom of American military involvement in Vietnam.

The second great advantage of free discussion to democratic policy-makers is its bringing to light of new ideas and the supplanting of old myths with new realities. We Americans are much in need of this benefit because we are severely, if not uniquely, afflicted with a habit of policy-making by analogy: North Vietnam's involvement in South Vietnam, for example, is equated with Hitler's invasion of Poland and a parley with

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ently such mouths will cease to open. Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception.¹²

Past experience provides little basis for confidence that reason can prevail in an atmosphere of mounting war fever. In a contest between a hawk and dove the hawk has a great advantage, not because it is a better bird but because it is a bigger bird with lethal talons and a highly developed will to use them. Without illusions as to the prospect of success we must try nonetheless to bring reason and restraint into the emotionally charged atmosphere in which the Vietnamese war is now being discussed. Instead of trading epithets about the legitimacy of debate and about who is and is not giving "aid and comfort" to the enemy, we would do well to focus calmly and deliberately on the issue itself, recognizing that all of us make mistakes and that mistakes can be corrected only if they are acknowledged and discussed, and recognizing further that war is not its own justification, that it can and must be discussed unless we are prepared to sacrifice our traditional democratic processes to a false image of national unanimity.

In fact, the protesters against the Vietnamese war are in good historical company. On January 12, 1848, Abraham Lincoln rose in the United States House of Representatives and made a speech about the Mexican War worthy of Senator Wayne Morse. Lincoln's speech was an explanation of a vote he had recently cast in support of a resolution declaring that the war had been unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by President Polk. "When the war began," said Lincoln, "it was my opinion that all those who, because of knowing too *little*, or because of knowing too *much*, could not conscien-

by men who actively sought or freely accepted them, men who accepted not only the obligation to use power but the obligation to account for its use as well.

Protesters against the Vietnamese war have been held up to scorn on the ground that they wish to "select their wars," by which it is apparently meant that it is hypocritical to object to this particular war while not objecting to war in general. I fail to understand what is reprehensible about trying to make moral distinctions between one war and another, between, for example, resistance to Hitler and intervention in Vietnam. From the time of Grotius to the drafting of the United Nations Charter international lawyers have tried to distinguish between "just wars" and "unjust wars." It is a difficult distinction of law and an even more difficult one of morality, but it is certainly a valid problem and, far from warranting contempt, those who try to make that most pertinent distinction deserve our sympathy and respect.

There can be no solution to a problem until it is first acknowledged that there is a problem. When Mr. Bill Moyers reported with respect to the Vietnam protests the President's "surprise that any one citizen would feel toward his country in a way that is not consistent with the national interest,"¹⁵ he was denying the existence of a question as to where, in fact, the national interest lies. The answer, one must concede, is elusive, but there is indeed a question and it is a sign of the good health of this nation that the question is being widely and clearly posed.

With due respect for the honesty and patriotism of the student demonstrations, I would offer a word of caution to the young people who have organized and participated in them. As most politicians discover sooner or later, the most dramatic expression of grievances is not necessarily the most effective. That would seem to be especially true in the United States, a country easily and excessively alarmed by expressions of dissent. We are, for better or worse, an essentially conservative society; in such a society soft words are likely to carry

more weight than harsh words and the most effective dissent is dissent expressed in an orderly, which is to say a conservative manner.

For these reasons such direct action as the burning of draft cards probably does more to retard than to advance the views of those who take such action. The burning of a draft card is a symbolic act, really a form of *expression* rather than of *action*, and it is stupid and vindictive to punish it as a crime. But it is also an unwise act, unwise because it is shocking rather than persuasive to most Americans and because it exposes the individual to personal risk without political reward.

The student, like the politician, must consider not only how to say what he means but also how to say it persuasively. The answer, I think, is that to speak persuasively one must speak in the idiom of the society in which one lives. The form of protest that might be rewarding in Paris or Rome, to say nothing of Saigon or Santo Domingo, would be absolutely disastrous in Washington. Frustrating though it may be to some Americans, it is nonetheless a fact that in America the messages that get through are those that are sent through channels, through the slow, cumbersome institutional channels devised by the founding fathers in 1787.

The good order and democracy of our society therefore depend on the keeping open of these channels. As long as every tendency of opinion can get a full and respectful hearing from the elected representatives of the people, as long as the classroom from primary school to graduate school is a place where freedom of thought is welcomed and encouraged, the teach-ins and the draft-card burnings and the demonstrations are unlikely to become the principal forms of dissent in America. It is only when the Congress fails to challenge the Executive, when the opposition fails to oppose, when politicians join in a spurious consensus behind controversial policies, and when institutions of learning sacrifice traditional functions to the short-term advantages of association with the

"Sound" scholars produce "sound" disciples. In a research-oriented university, especially a government-research-oriented university, I would expect, the student who is highly valued is the one who can contribute to production. Obviously the graduate student is a more valuable research assistant than the undergraduate and the scientifically-oriented student is more valuable than the one who is interested in history or philosophy. The latter, indeed, is likely to find himself relegated to the charge of the lower echelon of the faculty, those, that is, who are condemned to teach.

In lending itself too much to the purposes of government, a university fails of its higher purposes. It is not contributing to the re-examination of the ideas of our ancestors on which human survival depends; it is not dealing with the central problems of the first generation in human history which holds the power of life and death over its progeny; it is not, in Archibald MacLeish's phrase, trying to produce "an idea that mankind can hold to."¹⁶ It is not, therefore, meeting its responsibilities to its students and to society.

How might some of these considerations guide the universities toward a constructive contribution in the current crisis of our foreign relations?

I most emphatically do not think that the universities should act like recruits called to the colors. I do not think that the humanities must now give way to military science, that civil engineering must give way to military engineering, or that history and philosophy must give way to computerized "war games."

Unless it conceives itself as nothing more than the servant of the party in power, the university has a higher function to perform. The university, it is true, cannot separate itself from the society of which it is a part, but neither can the community of scholars accept existing public policies as if they set limits on "responsible" inquiry, as if the scholar's proper function, and only proper function, were to devise the technical means of carrying these policies out. The proper func-

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discharge of these functions is not merely a prerogative of the Congress; it is a constitutional obligation, for the neglect of which the Congress can and should be called to public account.

In recent years the Congress has not been fully discharging these responsibilities in the field of foreign relations. The reduced role of the Congress and the enhanced role of the President in the making of foreign policy are not the result merely of President Johnson's ideas of consensus; they are the culmination of a trend in the constitutional relationship between President and Congress that began in 1940, which is to say, at the beginning of this age of crisis.

The cause of the change is crisis. The President has the authority and resources to make decisions and take actions in an emergency; the Congress does not. Nor, in my opinion, should it; the proper responsibilities of the Congress are those spelled out by Mill—to reflect and review, to advise and criticize, to grant or withhold consent. In the last twenty-five years American foreign policy has encountered a shattering series of crises and inevitably, or almost inevitably, the effort to cope with these has been Executive effort, while the Congress, inspired by patriotism, importuned by Presidents, and deterred by lack of information, has tended to fall in line behind the Executive. The result has been an unhinging of traditional constitutional relationships; the Senate's constitutional powers of advice and consent have atrophied into what is widely regarded as, though never asserted to be, a duty to give prompt consent with a minimum of advice.

This situation is not fundamentally the fault of individuals. It is primarily the result of events, and the problem is not one of apportioning blame but of finding a way to restore the constitutional balance, of finding ways by which the Senate can discharge its *duty* of advice and consent in an era of permanent crisis.

Presidents must act in emergencies, especially when the country is at war, and of the last five Presidents only one has

not had to wage a sizable war for at least a part of his period in office. Beset with the anxieties of a foreign crisis, no President can relish the idea of inviting opinionated and tendentious Senators into his high-policy councils. His reluctance is human but it is not in keeping with the intent of the Constitution. As representatives of the people Senators have the duty, not merely the right, to render advice, not on the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy, but on its direction and philosophy as these are shaped by major decisions. I conclude that when the President, for reasons with which we can all sympathize, does not invite us into his high-policy councils, it is our duty to infiltrate them as best we can.

A distinction, to be sure, must be made between the making and the conduct of foreign policy. In a number of speeches in recent years, I have deplored the tendency of Senators and Representatives to interfere excessively in the *conduct* of policy, by advising on and complaining about the routine activities of American diplomats, especially those below the top level, and by such practices as the use of the annual foreign-aid debate as an occasion to air extraneous grievances—extraneous, that is, to foreign aid—ranging from Ecuadoran incursions on the rights of California fishermen to proposals for the withdrawal of most-favored-nation trade treatment from Yugoslavia.

The philosophy and direction of foreign policy are a different matter altogether. It is ironic that the Congress, while steadily if erratically expanding its incursions on the day-to-day *conduct* of policy, where its influence is inappropriate and often mischievous, has just as steadily been resigning from its responsibilities in the *making* of policy. It is the latter trend which poses the more serious problems for the nation, and it is my hope, as I shall explain further, that through its extensive public hearings on Vietnam, China, and other issues, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is contributing to a revival of the Senate's traditional authority in foreign affairs and thereby to the restoration of a proper

constitutional balance between the Executive and the legislature. It is too soon, however, to judge whether the revival of debate in the Senate signals the beginning of a trend toward constitutional readjustment or is only a manifestation of widespread anxiety about the war in Vietnam.

Decline of the Senate

I have had some personal experiences which illustrate the extent to which the trend toward Executive predominance has gone and the extraordinary difficulty a Senator has in trying to discharge his responsibility to render useful advice and to grant or withhold his consent with adequate knowledge and sound judgment.

The Bay of Pigs. In the spring of 1961 I was invited to participate with President Kennedy's advisers in the deliberations preceding the Bay of Pigs expedition. The President's deference to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was inspired not by constitutional considerations but by a coincidence. A few days previously, at the time of Congress's Easter recess, the President had let me hitch a ride to Florida on his plane. During the flight I heard his advisers discussing a plan for the invasion of Cuba. I was less than completely astonished because rumors of an invasion were widespread at the time and, in fact, I had already prepared a short memorandum advising against the project. I discussed the matter with President Kennedy on the plane, giving him a copy of my memorandum; upon my return to Washington he invited me to a meeting with himself and his senior advisers at which my reasons for opposing the invasion of Cuba were given a full and fair hearing.

It was a mark of President Kennedy's magnanimity that I was not subsequently banished from the Presidential plane,

would use our endorsement with wisdom and restraint. I was also influenced by partisanship: an election campaign was in progress and I had no wish to make any difficulties for the President in his race against a Republican candidate whose election I thought would be a disaster for the country. My role in the adoption of the resolution of August 7, 1964, is a source of neither pleasure nor pride to me today.

Many Senators who accepted the Gulf of Tonkin resolution without question might well not have done so had they foreseen that it would subsequently be interpreted as a sweeping Congressional endorsement for the conduct of a large-scale war in Asia. Literally, it can be so interpreted, but it must be remembered that the resolution was adopted during an election campaign in which the President was telling the American people that it would be a mistake for the United States to become involved in a major war in Asia while criticizing his opponent for proposing just that. This may explain the perfunctory debate of August 1964 but hardly excuses the Congress for granting such sweeping authority with so little deliberation. It was a mistake which I trust will not soon be repeated.

The Asian Doctrine. With such experiences in mind as those which I have described, I think it extremely important that the Senate consider the implications of the Johnson Administration's evolving "Asian Doctrine" before it becomes an irrevocable national commitment undertaken by the Executive without the consent or even the knowledge of the Senate.

Under the emerging "Asian Doctrine" the United States is taking on the role of policeman and provider for all of non-communist Asia. Defining Asia as "the crucial arena of man's striving for independence and order," the President, without reference to the United Nations or the obligation of other countries, declared in a speech in July 1966 "the determina-

tion of the United States to meet our obligations in Asia as a Pacific power," denounced those—whoever they may be—who hold to the view that "east is east and west is west and never the twain shall meet," and laid down certain "essentials" for peace in Asia, all requiring a predominantly American effort for the shaping of a "Pacific era."³

In a television interview on April 19, 1966, Vice-President Humphrey defined the Honolulu Declaration resulting from the President's meeting with Premier Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam in February 1966 as a "Johnson Doctrine" for Asia, "a pledge to ourselves and to posterity to defeat aggression, to defeat social misery, to build viable, free political institutions, and to achieve peace. . . ." Acknowledging these to be "great commitments," the Vice-President went on to say: ". . . I think there is a tremendous new opening here for realizing the dream of the Great Society in the great area of Asia, not just here at home."

All this must come as a big surprise to Senators who have not even been informed of these sweeping commitments, much less asked for their advice and consent, but the President's close friend and biographer, Mr. William White, reported in one of his columns that the "Asian Doctrine" has been in the President's mind for five years, and Mr. White should know.⁴ To the best of my knowledge, however, it has not been in the mind of the Senate, whose consent is required for treaties, or of the Congress as a whole, which is empowered by the Constitution not only to "declare war" and to "raise and support armies" but "to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States."

The Senate as a Forum of Debate

How then can the Senate discharge its constitutional responsibilities of advice and consent in an age when the

direction and philosophy of foreign policy are largely shaped by urgent decisions made at moments of crisis? I have no definitive formula to offer but I do have some ideas as to how both the Senate as an institution and an individual Senator can meet their constitutional responsibilities.

The Senate as a whole, I think, should undertake to revive and strengthen the deliberative function which it has permitted to atrophy in the course of twenty-five years of crisis. Acting on the premise that dissent is not disloyalty, that a true consensus is shaped by airing differences rather than suppressing them, the Senate should again become, as it used to be, an institution in which the great issues of American politics are contested with thoroughness, energy, and candor. Nor should the Senate allow itself to be too easily swayed by Executive pleas for urgency and unanimity, or by allegations of "aid and comfort" to the enemies of the United States made by officials whose concern with such matters may have something to do with a distaste for criticism directed at themselves.

It is sometimes useful and occasionally necessary for Congress to express prompt and emphatic support for the President on some matter of foreign relations. It seems to me, however, that we have gone too far in this respect, to the point of confusing Presidential convenience with the national interest. It is perfectly natural for the President, pressed as he is to make decisions and take action in foreign relations, to overemphasize the desirability of promptness and unanimity. But the Senate has its own responsibilities, and however strongly feelings of patriotism may incline it to comply with the President's wishes, the higher patriotism deriving from its constitutional trust requires it to reply to the President in effect: "Mr. President, we will take your urgent request under immediate advisement; we will set aside our other legislative business and will proceed as rapidly as orderly procedure permits to hear testimony and to debate and act upon your request. We will not, however, except under conditions of national emergency, set aside the normal

procedures of committee hearings and deliberation and debate on the Senate floor. We regret any inconvenience which this may cause you, but just as we are cognizant of your obligation to act, we know that you are cognizant of our obligation to inform ourselves and deliberate in order to be able to give you our best possible advice. We know you are aware that we render this advice not only in the hope that it will be a service to your Administration but also as an obligation to our constituents—an obligation, Mr. President, which we feel bound to meet even if, for one reason or another, our doing so subjects you to certain inconveniences."

It must be admitted that vigorous debate in the Senate can be misunderstood abroad. It seems reasonable to suppose that the debate on Vietnam has given the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese, and the Chinese a distorted impression of internal divisions within the United States. I regret this effect very much, but I cannot accept the conclusion that it is necessary or proper to suspend the normal procedures of the Congress in order to give our adversaries an impression—an inaccurate impression—of American unanimity. I, as one Senator, am unwilling to acquiesce, actively or tacitly, to a policy that I judge to be unwise as the price of putting the best possible face on that policy. To do so would be to surrender the limited ability I have to bring influence to bear for what I would judge to be a wiser policy and would constitute a default on my constitutional responsibilities and on my responsibilities to the people of my state.

The major part of the burden of criticism in the Senate naturally falls to the opposition party. Under normal conditions, the duty is one which the opposition is only too glad to perform. Only occasionally does it happen that the party out of power is so feeble or so much in agreement with the President's policies or both that it fails to provide responsible and intelligent opposition. Under such unusual circumstances, when the proper opposition defaults, it seems to me that it is better to have the function performed by members

of the President's party than not to have it performed at all.

The Committee on Foreign Relations

In the winter and spring of 1966 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations engaged in an experiment in public education. The Committee made itself available as a forum for the meeting of politicians and professors and, more broadly, as a forum through which recognized experts and scholars could contribute to Congressional and public understanding of a number of aspects of the foreign relations of the United States, some short-term and specific, others long-term and general. During the second session of the 89th Congress the Committee, meeting in open session, heard testimony by specialists on Vietnam and the Vietnamese war, on China and her relations with the United States, on NATO and American relations with Western Europe; and finally, in an experiment that I believe to be unprecedented, the Committee heard testimony by distinguished psychiatrists and psychologists on some of the psychological aspects of international relations. It is my hope that these experiments have contributed to public education and also that they have made a beginning toward restoring the Senate to its proper role as adviser to the President on the great issues of foreign policy.

I believe that the public hearings on Vietnam, by bringing before the American people a variety of opinions and disagreements pertaining to the war and perhaps by helping to restore a degree of balance between the Executive and the Congress, strengthened the country rather than weakened it. The hearings were criticized on the ground that they conveyed an "image" of the United States as divided over the war. Since the country obviously *is* divided, what was conveyed was a fact rather than an image. I see no merit in the view that at the cost of suppressing the normal procedures

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of democracy, we should maintain an image of unity even though it is a false image.

The hearings on Vietnam were undertaken by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the hope of helping to shape a true consensus in the long run, even at the cost of dispelling the image of a false one in the short run. They were undertaken in the belief that the American people and their government would profit from an airing of views by forceful advocates from within and outside the government. They were undertaken in the belief that the best way to assure the prevalence of truth over falsehood is by exposing all tendencies of opinion to free competition in the market place of ideas. They were undertaken in something of the spirit of Thomas Jefferson's words:

I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion.⁵

Many times in the past the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has served as the forum for a national debate and in some instances its proceedings have had the effect of translating a consensus of values into a consensus of policy as well. One notable instance was the debate on the nuclear test ban treaty in the summer of 1963. For three weeks the Foreign Relations Committee, with members of the Armed Services and Atomic Energy Committees also attending, met in open session to hear vigorous arguments for and against the treaty by witnesses from the government, from the universities, and from other areas of private life. Each day's discussion was transmitted to the American people through the press. The result was that the Foreign Relations Committee was able to serve simultaneously as both an organ of Senate deliberation and a forum of public education. In the course of those three weeks and the Senate floor debate that followed, support for the treaty steadily grew and the treaty was finally ratified by

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sternation caused by my breach of the prevailing consensus, I made the following remarks in the Senate on October 22, 1965:

There has been a good deal of discussion as to whether it is proper for the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to make a speech critical of an Administration of his own party which he generally supports. There is something to be said on both sides of this question and it is certainly one which I considered with care before deciding to make my speech on the Dominican Republic. I concluded, after hearing the testimony of Administration witnesses in the Committee on Foreign Relations, that I could do more to encourage carefully considered policies in the future by initiating a public discussion than by acquiescing silently in a policy I believed to be mistaken. It seemed to me, therefore, that, despite any controversy and annoyance to individuals, I was performing a service to the Administration by stating my views publicly.

I do not like taking a public position criticizing a Democratic Administration which in most respects I strongly support; I do not like it at all. Neither do I like being told, as I have been told, that my statement was "irresponsible" or that it has given "aid and comfort" to the enemies of the United States. I am quite prepared to examine evidence suggesting that my statement contained errors of fact or judgment; I am not prepared to accept the charge that a statement following upon many hours of listening to testimony in the Foreign Relations Committee and many more hours of examining and evaluating relevant documents was "irresponsible." Nor do I take kindly to the charge that I gave "aid and comfort" to the enemies of the United States. If that accusation is to be pressed—and I should hope it would not be—an interesting discussion could be developed as to whether it is my criticisms of United States policy in the Dominican Republic or the policy itself which has given "aid and comfort" to our enemies.

A Senator has a duty to support his President and his

: *Part II* :

REVOLUTION ABROAD

What characterizes our time . . . is the way the masses and their wretched condition have burst upon contemporary sensibilities. We now know that they exist, whereas we once had a tendency to forget them. And if we are more aware, it is not because our aristocracy . . . has become better—no, have no fear—it is because the masses have become stronger and keep people from forgetting them.

ALBERT CAMUS
"Create Dangerously,"
December 1957

3

America and Revolution

IN MANY PARTS of the world revolutions are being made and in many still-quiet places they are in the making, not by the silent and demoralized poor but by a new generation of powerful and charismatic leaders who are arousing the masses from their inertia, inspiring them with anger and hope, and giving them the discipline that turns numbers into strength. Some of these new revolutionaries are democrats but most of them are not. Their principal purpose in any case is to modernize rather than democratize and they are more interested in material results than in abstract ideas. Whatever ideology they begin with or profess, they soon enough discover that the success of their revolutions turns on social and economic achievement and that political ideals are of relevance only insofar as they advance or obstruct the struggle to modernize.

The question therefore remains whether the future course of revolution will be peaceful or violent, democratic or totalitarian. Present prospects, I think, are for more upheavals that are violent and undemocratic, because recent experiments in peaceful revolution have been disappointing and authoritarian methods seem to promise greater and faster results. (In making this observation, I would empha-

size that I am anticipating violence, not welcoming it.) With few exceptions the nations that have tried to carry out social revolution by democratic means have faltered in their efforts, and there seems to be a growing conviction that the task of modernization is too large and too socially disruptive to be accomplished by democratic methods, a growing conviction that in a society in revolt, as in an army at war, there is no place for democracy except as a distant dream.

Events of the last two decades suggest that Americans have been overly sanguine about the possibilities of social revolution by peaceful means. The reconstruction of a traditional society requires great discipline and enormous human sacrifices: not only must the rich be persuaded to give up privileges which they regard as their birthright, but the poor, who have practically nothing, must be persuaded for a time to do with even less in order to provide investment capital. From what we know of history and human nature there is little reason indeed to expect people to make these sacrifices voluntarily; there is, on the contrary, a great deal of reason to expect the privileged classes of the emerging countries to use every available means to defend their privileges.

Revolution by peaceful means is an historical rarity. In the West, England, some of her colonial heirs, and a few of the smaller European countries made the transition from autocracy to democracy and from feudalism to modernism by more or less peaceful means, but these were countries, by and large, which enjoyed extraordinary advantages of wealth, location, or tradition. The other great European nations—notably France, Italy, Germany, and Russia—came to be what they are today only after violent internal upheavals; nor did any of these countries, it is interesting to note, escape some reversion to dictatorship after an initial experiment in democracy.

It requires the optimism of Dr. Pangloss to expect Asian and Latin American nations, beset as they are with problems of poverty and population unknown in Western

Europe and North America, to achieve by peaceful means what nations with vastly greater advantages were able to achieve only by violent revolution. History does not repeat itself and there is probably no such thing as an inevitability, but the past does suggest certain limits of probability and certain likelihoods. The likelihood that it suggests for the "third world" of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is not a smooth transition to democracy but an extended time of troubles, not a rapidly improving life for the ordinary man, but, for some societies, a period of intermittent progress under more or less democratic leadership, for others, continued stagnation or deterioration and, for still others, a period of painful sacrifices enforced by authoritarian leaders though mitigated in the better-run societies by some equity in the sharing of the sacrifices.

These prospects are probable rather than inevitable; they are anything but desirable. We must continue to do what we can—more indeed by far than we are doing now—to improve the chances of peaceful and democratic social revolution in the underdeveloped world. We would do well, however, to stop deluding ourselves about the likelihood of success. We would do well, for example, to stop proclaiming the triumph of the Alliance for Progress because five hundred thousand units of housing were built in Latin America in 1965—of which, in fact, only sixty thousand were attributable to the Alliance for Progress—when the more pertinent fact is that the number of families needing housing increased by one and a half million. We must stop fooling ourselves about economic progress in many of the countries that receive American aid and acknowledge that the magnitude of the problem is vastly disproportionate to what is being done or is now likely to be done to overcome it; we must face the fact that democratic methods are more often failing than succeeding in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and that as rapidly growing populations continue to press on slowly growing economies, violent upheavals are not only possible but very likely indeed.

Unrevolutionary America

In confrontations with social revolution we Americans are emotionally and intellectually handicapped in three respects: first, by the fact that we ourselves are an unrevolutionary society; second, by the absence of a genuine feeling of empathy for revolutionary movements—which is the result not of hard-heartedness but of our own lack of experience with social revolution; and third, by a national mythology, cultivated in Fourth of July speeches and slick publications, which holds that we *are* a revolutionary society, that ours indeed was the “true” revolution which ought to be an inspiration for every revolutionary movement in the world.

We are never going to have much understanding of revolutions until we become clear on exactly what constitutes a revolution and what does not. Part of the problem is the imprecision of language. Just as the word “morality” can be used to describe attitudes of both tolerant humanitarianism and self-righteous puritanism, the word “revolutionary” can be applied to phenomena ranging from Robespierre’s Terror to a newly marketed laundry soap. For purposes of clarity, therefore, I suggest the following distinction: true revolution is almost always violent and usually it is extremely violent; its essence is the destruction of the social fabric and institutions of a society and an attempt, not necessarily successful, to create a new society with a new social fabric and new institutions. The English reform acts of the nineteenth century, the American New Deal, and the Great Society were not revolutions; they were rather antidotes to revolution, timely measures of reform that met rising popular demands sufficiently to head off revolutionary pressures.

I do not know why some Americans take it so hard when it is suggested that their society is an unrevolutionary one. It seems to me that our essential conservatism is the result and the reward for one of the world’s most strikingly suc-

identities but similarities of phase and development. The study of these similarities can help Americans to understand phenomena that are outside their own experience. An examination of past revolutions—such as the English, French, or Mexican Revolutions—may also suggest that much of what we find shocking and barbarous in present-day China or Cuba, or Russia in the twenties and thirties, may have more to do with a particular stage of revolution than with communist ideology.

Great revolutions pass through more or less similar and identifiable stages. Eric Hoffer suggests that revolutions are prepared by “men of words”—intellectuals, that is, such as Rousseau, Mazzini, and Marx—carried to fulfillment by “fanatics”—such as Robespierre, Lenin, and Trotsky—and finally brought back to earth by “practical men of action”—men like Cromwell, Bonaparte, and Stalin.³ In Crane Brinton’s analysis, there is a tendency for great revolutions to be preceded by the demoralization of traditional ruling classes and thereafter to be characterized, first by the rule of moderates, whose very moderation makes them unable to cope with the violence which they themselves may have unleashed, then by the rule of extremists, whose extremism degenerates into terror and who then are displaced by more practical men who bring the society back to normalcy and routine, to the stage known in the French Revolution as “Thermidor.”

The acute phase of any revolution is the rule of the extremists. They are brought to power by the dynamism of violent change, which, once begun, feeds upon itself, breeding fanaticism. As Brinton puts it, “The normal social roles of realism and idealism are reversed in the acute phases of a revolution.”⁴

The extremists of great revolutions—English, French, Russian, Chinese, or Cuban—have demonstrated certain common characteristics, regardless of the ideology they have professed. First and foremost, whatever their beliefs, they have professed them with fanatical intolerance and a ruth-

less idealism that is used to justify acts of extreme cruelty against opponents. In addition, they all have practiced many of the same techniques of revolutionary action, including propagandizing, parading, street fighting, terrorism, non-violence, guerrilla warfare, and other techniques in varying combinations.

Once in power, the extremists tend to abandon or betray whatever previous interest they had in liberties and legalities and they proceed to carry out their programs, or try to, in an authoritarian manner. To some degree dictatorship is inherent in the revolutionary process—quite apart from the aims and ideology of the revolution—because revolution breaks down the laws and customs of a society and force becomes necessary to prevent anarchy. Robespierre described this particular phenomenon as the despotism of liberty against tyranny; Marx called it the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The extremists also tend to be ascetic and puritanical. When the Bolsheviks first came to power in Russia, people in the West predicted the reign of license and debauchery, but just like the Chinese today, the Bolsheviks turned out to be as prudish and aggressively virtuous as seventeenth-century Calvinists. Even today Russia is surely one of the world’s most puritanical societies.

It is the effort to remake human nature, to force the soup steaming hot down the ordinary citizen’s throat, that generates the terror in a revolution but ends with the moderation of Thermidor when it becomes clear that human nature will simply not allow itself to be instantaneously remade. The period of terror represents an overshooting of the revolutionary mark, a foredoomed effort to close the gap between human nature and human aspirations. The ordinary man is pushed to the limits of endurance; he longs for a return to routine; he becomes fed up with the steady diet of virtue and self-sacrifice and longs to be left alone with his ordinary pleasures and vices. Societies like individuals can endure only a limited dose of virtue and high ideals,

only so much of the effort to bring heaven to earth. When they have had their fill, the revolution abates and the terror gives way to the Thermidorean reaction.

Thermidor does not mean the undoing of the revolution; it is rather a coming back to earth, an abatement of fanaticism, a reassertion of human nature and a return to everyday living. As Brinton wrote, "there is no eternal fanaticism or, at any rate, there has not yet been an eternal fanaticism. Christian and Moslem have not come to understand one another, but they have come to abstain from holy wars against one another. The odds are that even with Lenin and Stalin as its prophets, communism will prove a less intractable faith than Islam."⁵

Nationalism and Communism in the American View of Revolution

In Latin America and in Asia, where great revolutions have taken place and others may still occur, American policy has been weakened by a seeming inability to believe in the tractability of communism or the abatement of its fanaticism and by a permeating inability to understand why the peoples of these continents cannot remake their societies by the same orderly processes that have worked so well in the United States. The result is that despite our genuine sympathy for those who cry out against poverty and social injustice, and despite the material support which we give to many of the poor nations of the world, our sympathy dissolves into hostility when reform becomes revolution; and when communism is involved, as it often is, our hostility takes the form of unseemly panic.

On the basis of past and present American policies toward China and Vietnam, toward Cuba and the Dominican Republic, we seem to be narrowing our criteria of what constitute "legitimate" and "acceptable" social revolutions

to include only those which meet the all but impossible tests of being peaceful, orderly, and voluntary—of being, that is, in what we regard as our own shining image. At the same time, owing no doubt to a view of communism as the fulcrum of a revolutionary process that will not be satiated until it dominates the world, our abhorrence for violence from the left has been matched by no such sensibilities when the violence comes from the right. Thus it has come about that our sympathy for social revolution in principle is increasingly belied by hostility in practice.

The American view of revolution is thus shaped by a simple but so far insuperable dilemma: we are simultaneously hostile to communism and sympathetic to nationalism, and when the two become closely associated, we become agitated, frustrated, angry, precipitate, and inconstant. Or, to make the point by simple metaphor: loving corn and hating lima beans, we simply cannot make up our minds about succotash.

The resulting ambivalence has weakened American foreign policy since the end of World War II. Insofar as communism and nationalism have confronted us as separate forces, United States policy has been largely successful. In such instances as the Soviet threat to Western Europe in the late forties and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the danger was clearly one of Soviet power and the United States had little difficulty in deciding on effective counter-action. In the case of the colonial revolution in most of Asia and Africa the United States took a strong lead in supporting national independence movements. Only in such instances as the Cuban Revolution and the war in Vietnam, in each of which communism and nationalism became closely associated with each other, or the Dominican Revolution, in which communism was feared but never proven to be a dominant influence, has the United States encountered cruel dilemmas in the shaping of policy and signal failures in its execution.

For complex reasons, deriving in large part from our early

postwar experience with Soviet communist imperialism, we have tended—and now more than ever are tending—to give our opposition to communism priority over our support for nationalism. The result has been that, with certain exceptions, we have strongly, and for the most part unsuccessfully, opposed those genuinely nationalist movements which have been controlled or influenced by communists. The most notable—and rewarding—exception has been Yugoslavia, whose national independence we have supported since 1948 with the result that it has posed a powerful barrier to Soviet aspirations in southeastern Europe—a more powerful barrier, it should be noted, than many non-communist governments have been able to erect.

Whatever wisdom or lack of it our emphasis on communism has had in the past, the realities of the present require a reversal of priorities as between opposing communism and supporting nationalism. The basis of the criticisms of American policy in Latin America and Southeast Asia to be set forth in succeeding chapters is my belief that American interests are better served by supporting nationalism than by opposing communism, and that when the two are encountered in close association it is in our interest to accept a communist government rather than to undertake the cruel and all but impossible task of suppressing a genuinely national movement.

Many Americans, probably including the highest officials in our government, are likely to be shocked by the contention that we can or should “accept” the establishment of a communist government anywhere in the world under any conceivable circumstances. One’s attitude in this respect must depend on one’s view of communism as a revolutionary ideology, on whether one views it as an implacable and unalterable design for world conquest or rather as something more subtle, flexible, and varying—varying according to a country’s size, resources, and national character, the stage of its economic development and the stage of its revolution.

the universal dominion of our own version of democracy.

I do not believe that this is an accurate view of communism, nor do I believe that it is accurate to equate communism with Nazism. Nazism was a psychotic aberration, a violent and degenerate romanticism; communism, for all its distortions in practice and for all the crimes committed in its name, is a doctrine of social justice and a product of Western civilization, philosophically rooted in humanitarian protest against the injustices of nineteenth-century capitalism. In the words of the religious journal *Christianity and Crisis*: "What is at stake in the case of communism is different from what was at stake in the case of national socialism. Stalinism had many of the worst features of Hitlerism, but it proved to be a passing phase of Soviet communism. It showed itself more open-ended than we had supposed, capable of varying degrees of humanization if not democratization. It is not monolithic, nor is it permanent slavery; and, in its later phases, cooperative as well as competitive coexistence becomes politically and morally possible. We doubt if such coexistence would have become possible with nazism."⁷

A very critical distinction must be made between communist philosophy and the fervor with which it is practiced. It is the latter which rightly offends us, and despite the fact that the doctrine itself has universal pretensions, messianism in practice is not so much a product of communism as it is a stage of revolution, a stage comparable to the period of terror in the French Revolution, a stage which the experience of past revolutions suggests is just about certain to be followed by a conservative reaction. The stage of revolutionary extremism actually has already passed in a number of communist countries, including the Soviet Union, whose commitment to world revolution is now more liturgical than political, so much so, in fact, that Russia can now properly be regarded as a conservative power in international relations, as a nation whose stake in the status quo is a far more important determinant of her international behavior than

her philosophical commitment to world revolution.

Far from being unified in a design for world conquest, the communist countries are deeply divided among themselves, with widely varying foreign policies and widely varying concepts of their own national interests. Unless, therefore, we accept the view that communist ideology in itself constitutes a threat to the free nations, we are bound to regard communist countries as menacing or not, depending on whether their foreign policies are aggressive or benign. If we accept the premise that it is aggression rather than communism which endangers us, then it follows that the existence of a strong communist state which poses a barrier to expansion by an aggressive communist power may be more desirable from the viewpoint of American interests than a weak non-communist state whose very weakness forms a vacuum which invites conquest or subversion.

The point that I wish to make is not that communism is not a harsh and, to us, a repugnant system of organizing society, but that its doctrine has redeeming tenets of humanitarianism; that the worst thing about it is not its philosophy but its fanaticism; that history suggests the probability of an abatement of revolutionary fervor; that in practice fanaticism *has* abated in a number of countries including the Soviet Union; that some countries are probably better off under communist rule than they were under preceding regimes; that some people may even want to live under communism; that in general the United States has more to gain from the success of nationalism than from the destruction of communism; and finally—to anticipate the theme of the next several chapters—that it is neither the duty nor the right of the United States to sort out all these problems for the revolutionary and potentially revolutionary societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Revolution in Latin America

NOWHERE has the ambivalence in the American attitude toward revolution been more apparent and more troublesome than in the relations of the United States with Latin America. In Latin America as in Asia the United States, a profoundly unrevolutionary nation, is required to make choices between accepting revolution and trying to suppress it.

Caught between genuine sympathy for social reform on the one hand and an intense fear of revolution on the Cuban model on the other, we have thus far been unwilling, or unable, to follow a consistent course. On the one hand, we have made ourselves the friend of certain progressive democratic governments and have joined with Latin America in the Alliance for Progress, the purpose of which is social revolution by peaceful means. On the other hand, we have allowed our fear of communism to drive us into supporting a number of governments whose policies, to put it charitably, are inconsistent with the aims of the Alliance, and on three occasions—Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, and the Dominican Republic in 1965—we resorted to force, illegally, unwisely, and inasmuch as each of these interventions almost certainly strengthened the appeal of commu-

nism to the younger generation of educated Latin Americans, unsuccessfully as well.

The United States thus pursues two largely incompatible policies in Latin America—discriminating support for social reform and an undiscriminating anti-communism that often makes us the friend of military dictatorships and reactionary oligarchies. Anti-communism is increasingly being given precedence over support for reform. American policy-makers clearly prefer reformist democratic governments to economic oligarchies and military juntas as long as the former are aggressively anti-communist; but the slightest suspicion of communist support seems to be enough to discredit a reform movement in North American eyes and to drive United States policy-makers into the stifling embrace of the generals and the oligarchs.

Guided by a reflex bred into them by Fidel Castro, American policy-makers have developed a tendency to identify revolution with communism, assuming, because they have something to do with each other, as indeed they do, that they are one and the same thing, as indeed they are not. The pervading suspicion of social revolutionary movements on the part of United States policy-makers is unfortunate indeed because there is the strong possibility of more explosions in Latin America and, insofar as the United States makes itself the enemy of revolutionary movements, communism is enabled to make itself their friend. The anti-revolutionary bias in United States policy, which is rooted in the fear of communism on the Cuban model, can only have the effect of strengthening communism.

The Dominican Intervention

The Alliance for Progress encouraged the hope in Latin America that the United States would not only tolerate but actively support domestic social revolution. The Dominican

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ernment in the Dominican Republic as a vindication of the intervention is like regarding the reconstruction of a burned-out house as a vindication of the fire. The effects of the Dominican intervention abroad have been described by a good friend of the United States, the former President of Colombia, Alberto Lleras Camargo, who was touring Europe at the time and who later wrote: ". . . The general feeling was that a new and openly imperialistic policy in the style of Theodore Roosevelt had been adopted by the White House and that, if there was intervention with Marines in the Hemisphere, against unequivocal standards of law, one could only expect—in Asia, in Africa, and in wherever—new acts of force and, perhaps, the escalation of the cold war to the hot in a very short time. . . ."1

The central fact about the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic was that we had closed our minds to the causes and to the essential legitimacy of revolution in a country in which democratic procedures had failed. The involvement of an undetermined number of communists in the Dominican Revolution was judged to discredit the entire reformist movement, like poison in a well, and rather than use our considerable resources to compete with the communists for influence with the democratic forces who actively solicited our support, we intervened militarily on the side of a corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy. We thus lent credence to the idea that the United States is the enemy of social revolution, and therefore the enemy of social justice, in Latin America.

The evidence is incontrovertible that American forces landed in Santo Domingo on April 28, 1965, not, as was and is officially contended, for the primary purpose of saving American lives but for the primary if not the sole purpose of defeating the revolution, which, on the basis of fragmentary evidence and exaggerated estimates of communist influence, was judged to be either communist-dominated or certain to become so. It is not my purpose here to review the complicated series of events surrounding the interven-

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26, the Embassy did persuade the military to stop air attacks for a limited time.

This was the first crucial point in the crisis. If the United States thought that Reid was giving the Dominican Republic the best government it had had or was likely to get, why did the United States not react more vigorously to support him? On the other hand, if the Reid government was thought to be beyond salvation, why did the United States not offer positive encouragement to the moderate forces involved in the coup, if not by providing the "United States presence" requested by the PRD, then at least by letting it be known that the United States was not opposed to the prospective change of regimes or by encouraging the return of Juan Bosch to the Dominican Republic? In fact, according to available evidence, the United States government made no effort to contact Bosch in the initial days of the crisis.

The United States was thus at the outset unwilling to support Reid and unwilling to support if not positively opposed to Bosch. Events of the days following April 24 demonstrated that Reid had so little popular support that it can reasonably be argued that there was nothing the United States could have done, short of armed intervention, to save his regime. The more interesting question is why the United States was so reluctant to see Bosch returned to power. This is part of the larger question of why United States attitudes had changed so much since 1963 when Bosch, then in power, was warmly and repeatedly embraced and supported as few if any Latin American Presidents have ever been supported by the United States.

The next crucial point in the Dominican story came on Tuesday, April 27, when rebel leaders, including Molina Urena and the rebel military leader, Francisco Caamaño Deñó, called at the United States Embassy seeking mediation and negotiations. At that time the military situation looked very bad for the rebel, or constitutionalist, forces. The United States Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, who had

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fragmentary at best, that the rebel movement was dominated by communists. A related and perhaps equally important reason for the United States Embassy's refusal to mediate on April 27 was the desire for and, at that point, the expectation of an anti-rebel victory. The United States officials on the scene therefore passed up an important opportunity to reduce or even eliminate communist influence by encouraging the moderate elements among the rebels and mediating for a democratic solution.

Owing to a degree of disorganization and timidity on the part of the anti-rebel forces anticipated by no one, including the United States Embassy and the rebels themselves, the rebels were still fighting on the morning of Wednesday, April 28. Ambassador Bennett thereupon urgently recommended that the anti-rebels under Air Force General de los Santos Cespedes be furnished fifty walkie-talkies from United States Defense Department stocks in Puerto Rico. Repeating this recommendation later in the day, Bennett said that the issue was one between Castroism and its opponents. The anti-rebels themselves asked for armed United States intervention on their side; this request was refused at that time.

During the day, however, the situation deteriorated rapidly, from the point of view of public order in general and of the anti-rebels in particular. In mid-afternoon of April 28 Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again, this time in writing, for United States troops on the ground that intervention was the only way to prevent a communist takeover; no mention was made of the junta's inability to protect American lives. This request was denied in Washington and Benoit was thereupon told that the United States would not intervene *unless he said he could not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic*. Benoit was thus told in effect that if he said American lives were in danger, the United States would intervene. And that is precisely what happened.

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There is little doubt that they had influence within the revolutionary movement, but the degree of that influence remains a matter of speculation.

The United States government, however, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was communist-dominated, or would certainly become so, and that nothing short of forcible opposition could prevent a communist takeover. In their panic lest the Dominican Republic become "another Cuba," some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some communist support, that there is an important difference between communist support and communist control of a political movement, that it is quite possible to *compete* with the communists for influence in a reform movement rather than abandon it to them, and, most important of all, that economic development and social justice are themselves the primary and most reliable security against communist subversion. The point I am making is not—most emphatically not—that there was no communist participation in the Dominican crisis, but simply that the Administration acted on the premise that the revolution was *controlled* by communists—a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has not established since.

Intervention on the basis of communist participation as distinguished from control of the Dominican Revolution was a mistake of panic and timidity which also reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics. Communists are present in all Latin American countries, and they are going to inject themselves into almost any Latin American revolution and try to seize control of it. If any group or any movement with which the communists associate themselves is going to be automatically condemned in the eyes of the United States, then we have indeed given up all hope of influencing even to a marginal degree the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America. Worse, if that is our view, then we have made

ourselves the prisoners of the Latin American oligarchs who are engaged in a vain attempt to preserve the status quo—reactionaries who habitually use the term “communist” very loosely, in part out of emotional predilection and in part in a calculated effort to scare the United States into supporting their selfish and discredited aims.

The movement of the future in Latin America is social révolution. The question is whether it is to be communist or democratic revolution and the choice which the Latin Americans make will depend in part on how the United States uses its great influence. It should be very clear that the choice is not between social revolution and conservative oligarchy but whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-communist left, or, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro in Cuba.

We simply cannot have it both ways; we must choose between the objectives of the Alliance for Progress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the status quo in Latin America. The choice which we are to make is the principal unanswered question arising out of the unhappy events in the Dominican Republic and, indeed, the principal unanswered question for the future of our relations with Latin America.

Law and Revolution

Because the law is by its very nature a buttress of the status quo, it is rational for revolutionaries to try to overthrow it and for conservatives to try to uphold it. It is not rational for conservatives to play fast and loose with the law in a seizure of anti-revolutionary zeal. When they do, it is rather like the defenders of a besieged fort firing their artillery *through* the protecting walls instead of over them:

they may blow up some of the attackers on the other side but in the process they are making a nice opening through which the enemy can pour into the fort in their next attack. That is exactly what the United States did when it intervened unilaterally in the Dominican Republic.

Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States says that “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.” Article 17 states that “The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever.”

These clauses are not ambiguous. They mean that, with one exception to be noted, all forms of forcible intervention are absolutely prohibited among the American states. It may be that the United States was unwise to accept this commitment at Bogotá in 1948; it is obvious from all the talk one hears these days about the “obsolescence” of the principle of non-intervention that some United States officials regret our commitment to it. The fact remains that we are committed to it, not partially or temporarily or insofar as we find it compatible with our vital interests but almost absolutely. It represents our word and our bond and our willingness to honor the solemn commitments embodied in a treaty which was ratified by the Senate on August 28, 1950.

There are those who might concede the point of law but who would also argue that such considerations have to do with our ideals rather than our interests and are therefore of secondary importance. I do not believe that is true. We are currently fighting a war in Vietnam, largely, we are told, because it would be a disaster if the United States failed to honor its word and its commitment; the matter, we are told, is one of vital national interest. I do not see—I completely fail to see—why it is any less a matter of vital interest to honor a clear and explicit treaty obligation in

the Americas than it is to honor the much more ambiguous and less formal promises we have made to the South Vietnamese.

The sole exception to the prohibitions of Articles 15 and 17 is spelled out in Article 19 of the OAS Charter, which states that "Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17." Article 6 of the Rio Treaty states that "If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."

The United States thus had legal recourse when the Dominican crisis broke on April 24, 1965. We could have called an urgent session of the Council of the OAS for the purpose of invoking Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. But we did not do so. The Administration has argued that there was no time to consult the OAS, although there was time to "consult"—or inform—the Congressional leadership. The United States thus intervened in the Dominican Republic unilaterally—and illegally.

Advising the Latin American countries of our action after the fact did not constitute compliance with the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty; nor, indeed, would *advising* them before the fact have constituted compliance. One does not comply with the law by notifying interested parties in advance of one's intent to violate it. Inter-American law requires consultation for the purpose of shaping a *collective decision*. Only on the basis of advance consultation and agreement

could we have undertaken a legal intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Whatever lingering doubts Latin Americans may have held about the willingness of the United States to violate the OAS Charter after the Dominican intervention were soon resolved by the United States House of Representatives. On September 20, 1965, with the tacit consent of the Executive branch, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution calling for the unilateral use of force against any threat of communism in the hemisphere, which is to say, in clear and open violation of the OAS Charter. The United States was promptly rewarded for the House of Representatives' action by unanimous expressions of outrage in Latin America, including resolutions of condemnation adopted by the Congresses of Colombia and Peru and by the Latin American Parliament representing fourteen countries. The Colombian Congress by unanimous vote adopted a resolution calling the action of the United States House of Representatives "openly regressive and contrary to the juridical and political system of Latin America."

It is possible, had we consulted with our Latin American partners about the Dominican Revolution in the manner prescribed by the Rio Treaty, that they would have delayed a decision; it is possible that they would have refused to authorize collective intervention. My own feeling is that the situation in any case did not justify military intervention except for the limited purpose of evacuating United States citizens and other foreigners, but even if it seemed to us that it did, we should not have undertaken it without the advance consent of our Latin American allies. We should not have done so because the word and the honor of the United States were at stake just as much—at least as much—in the Dominican crisis as they are in Vietnam and Korea and Berlin and all the places around the globe which we have committed ourselves to defend.

There is a more general reason, already referred to, for compliance with the law. The United States is a conserva-

tive power in the world in the sense that most of its vital interests are served by stability and order. Law is the essential foundation of stability and order both within societies and in international relations. As a conservative power the United States has a vital interest in upholding and expanding the reign of law in international relations. Insofar as international law is observed, it provides us with stability and order and with a means of predicting the behavior of those with whom we have reciprocal legal obligations. When we violate the law ourselves, whatever short-term advantage may be gained, we are obviously encouraging others to violate the law; we thus encourage disorder and instability and thereby do incalculable damage to our own long-term interests.

There are those who defend United States unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic on the ground that the principle of non-intervention as spelled out in the OAS Charter is obsolete. The argument is unfortunate on two grounds. First, the contention of obsolescence justifies an effort to bring about changes in the OAS Charter by due process of law, but it does not justify violation of the Charter. Second, the view that the principle of non-intervention is obsolete is one held by certain United States officials; most Latin Americans would argue that, far from being obsolete, the principle of non-intervention was and remains the heart and core of the inter-American system. Insofar as it is honored, it provides them with something that many in the United States find it hard to believe they could suppose they need: protection from the United States.

Many North Americans seem to believe that, while the United States does indeed "participate" in Latin American affairs from time to time, sometimes by force, it is done with the best of intentions, usually indeed to protect the Latin Americans from intervention by somebody else, and therefore cannot really be considered "intervention." The trouble with this point of view is that it is not shared by our neighbors to the south. Most of them do think they need

protection from the United States and the history of the Monroe Doctrine and the "Roosevelt Corollary" suggest that their fears are not entirely without foundation. "Good intentions" are not a very sound basis for judging the fulfillment of contractual obligations. Just about everybody, including the communists, believes in his own "good intentions." It is a highly subjective criterion of national behavior and has no more than a chance relationship to good results. With whatever justice or lack of it, many Latin Americans are afraid of the United States; however much it may hurt our feelings, they prefer to have their security based on some more objective standard than the good intentions of the United States.

The standard on which they rely most heavily is the principle of non-intervention; however obsolete it may seem to certain United States officials, it remains vital and pertinent in Latin America. When we violate it, we are not overriding the mere "letter of the law"; we are violating what to Latin Americans is its vital heart and core.

Two Revolutions: Cuba and Mexico

The dominant force in Latin America is the aspiration of increasing numbers of people to personal and national dignity. In the minds of the rising generation there are two principle threats to that aspiration: reaction at home and domination from abroad. As a result of its actions in the Dominican Republic, its ready accommodation to the rule of conservative oligarchies and military dictators and its active support for such regimes through military assistance,* the United States has allowed itself to become associated with both. We have thereby offended the dignity and self-respect of young and idealistic Latin Americans, many of

* Military assistance is discussed in Chapter 11.

whom may wonder whether the United States will not one day intervene against social revolutions in their own countries, whether they will not one day find themselves facing United States Marines across barricades in their own home towns.

There are two available models—two prototypes—for the struggle against reaction and foreign domination in Latin America: the Cuban and the Mexican. Which of the two will commend itself to the new generation of active, articulate, reformist Latin Americans will depend to an important degree on the attitude of the United States toward future revolutionary movements. I think, therefore, that there is something to be learned from a re-examination of the Cuban and Mexican Revolutions.

Both Cuba and Mexico had thoroughgoing social revolutions in this century. Both were violent; both inflicted suffering and injustice on great numbers of innocent people; both, in their initial stages, provoked unsuccessful military intervention by the United States. The Cuban Revolution, in Crane Brinton's frame of reference, is still under the rule of extremists, although their extremism may be abating. Mexico, long past its Thermidor and now a one-party democracy, maintains friendly and dignified relations with the United States despite the fact—I rather think *because* of the fact—that it is freer of United States influence than most Latin American countries.

However impure the Marxism of the Cuban Revolution, it is unquestionably Cuban. Chairman Khrushchev is said to have told President Kennedy at Vienna that he did not consider Fidel Castro to be a "real" communist; no one has persuasively suggested that he is not a "real" Cuban nationalist, albeit a violent, undemocratic, and anti-American Cuban nationalist.

Castro, according to American and European visitors, is highly popular with the Cuban people. Mr. C. K. McClatchy of the *Sacramento Bee* visited Cuba in the summer of 1965 and reported that Fidel, as he is generally called, is a

national hero. He is admired because he can cut sugar cane faster than any other Cuban, because he can hit a baseball like Mickey Mantle, because he can talk longer and more eloquently than any man alive. He is admired, said McClatchy, because he "personifies the revolution."³

How can it be that a government which suppresses individual liberties, a government which immediately upon winning power executed its enemies after kangaroo trials held in a stadium, a government which held the courageous men of the Bay of Pigs for ransom by the United States, can be anything but feared and detested by its own people? The answer, I think, lies in such facts as the following, as reported by McClatchy:

Before the revolution there was only one small strip of public beach among the twenty-two miles of beaches surrounding Havana; now all beaches are open to the public and they are enjoyed by thousands of Cubans who did not have access to them before.

Education has been drastically revamped. Illiteracy has been greatly reduced and there are twice as many schools now as before the revolution. A Havana University student told Mr. McClatchy: "Before only the children of the rich could come. Now everyone who is qualified is admitted."

Formerly landless peasants now work on cooperatives or have been given small plots of expropriated land. State workers receive housing, medical care, and a wage.

Almost everybody above school age has a job; before the revolution the level of unemployment was about 20 percent, one of the highest in the world.

Most important of all is the sense of dignity and national pride associated with the revolution. After six decades of being an economic colony of the United States, Cubans, despite economic failures and severe shortages of certain consumer goods, are immensely proud of Castro's successful defiance of the North American giant. The continuing hostility of the United States undoubtedly strengthens Castro's aura of courageous independence.

Perhaps there never was a chance for peaceful democratic revolution in Cuba. Explaining in an interview with Herbert Matthews on October 29, 1963, how and why he became a Marxist-Leninist, Castro said that he had entered college imbued with the ideas of his birth and upbringing as the son of a landowner educated by Jesuits. He read Marxist literature while a student and then in 1953, at his trial for participating in the student attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago, he outlined what he called "a very radical revolution," but, as he told Matthews, "I thought that it could be done under the Constitution of 1940 and within a democratic system." His conversion, Castro said, was "a gradual process, a dynamic process in which the pressure of events forced me to accept Marxism as the answer to what I was seeking." Castro said that the American reaction to his "agrarian reform" of May 1959 "made me realize that there was no chance to reach an accommodation with the United States." "So," said Castro, "as events developed, I gradually moved into a Marxist-Leninist position. I cannot tell you just when, the process was so gradual and natural."⁴

The Cuban Revolution shows some signs that it may be emerging from extremism into its period of Thermidor. The process, as pointed out in Chapter 3, is one that other great revolutions have gone through: the French Revolution was finally institutionalized by the Third Republic, the Russian Revolution by Stalin and perhaps more even by Khrushchev. In each case the transition was characterized not by the abandonment of revolutionary ideology but by its gradual transformation from practical policy to patriotic liturgy.

A more relevant example for Latin America is the Mexican Revolution, which broke out in 1910 but began to be institutionalized only after a decade of extreme violence marked by lootings, burnings, and anti-religious atrocities. The Mexican Revolution was a class war in which landlords were murdered and foreign properties expropriated. In the first years of the revolution the United States invaded Mexico twice, once by sea at Veracruz to avenge an insult to

the flag, once by land in fruitless pursuit of the bandit Pancho Villa.

The United States was diverted from Mexico by its involvement in the First World War, but after the war there was mounting agitation to occupy Mexico and suppress the revolution. President Coolidge, a man endowed with the virtue of humility, avoided intervention and sent to Mexico City an emissary, Dwight Morrow, who successfully negotiated the issue of expropriated American oil and mineral rights. Then, in a flourish of good will, Morrow persuaded Charles A. Lindbergh to fly his plane to Mexico City.

Mexico is now politically stable and its economy is developing at an impressive rate. Mexico disagreed with the United States over the Dominican intervention and, prior to that, over the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States; in addition, the Mexicans maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba and operate an airline between Mexico City and Havana. Mexico is also on better terms with the United States than most of the countries of Latin America, not, I think, in spite of its independence but *because* of its independence. It was this independence, I feel sure, that made it possible and natural for the Mexican people to receive President Johnson with friendliness and enthusiasm; and it was the fact that he cannot be suspected of being an American puppet that made it possible and natural for President Diaz Ordaz to join his people in that warm welcome. The relations of the two countries are characterized by mutual respect and self-respect, and it all began when the United States came to terms with the Mexican Revolution forty years ago.

I am not so incautious as to predict that relations between the United States and the Cuban Revolution will come to the same happy outcome, but neither would I rule it out. The point that I wish to make, however, is that the United States has already come to terms with one great social revolution in Latin America, with highly rewarding results for

ing. Belgium has always been uncomfortable about Germany and France; Ireland has never been able to work up much affection for Great Britain. And in recent years some of the Eastern European governments have demonstrated that despite the communist ideology which they share with the Soviet Union, they still wish to free themselves as much as they can and as much as they dare from the overbearing power of Russia. It is natural and inevitable that Latin American countries should have some of the same feelings toward the United States.

Perhaps, then, the foremost immediate requirement for a new and more friendly relationship between Latin America and the United States in the long run is not closer ties and new institutional bonds but a loosening of existing ties and institutional bonds. It is an established psychological principle—or, for that matter, just common sense—that the strongest and most viable personal bonds are those which are voluntary, a voluntary bond being, by definition, an arrangement which one is free to enter or not to enter. I do not see why the same principle should not operate in relations between nations. If it does, it would follow that the first step toward stronger ties between Latin America and the United States would be the creation of a situation in which Latin American countries would be free, and would feel free, to maintain or sever existing ties as they see fit and, perhaps more important, to establish new arrangements, both among themselves and with nations outside the hemisphere, in which the United States would not participate.

I think further that it would be a fine thing if Latin American countries were to undertake a program of their own for "building bridges" to the world beyond the Western Hemisphere—to Europe and Asia and Africa, and to the communist countries if they wish. Such relationships, to be sure, would involve a loosening of ties to the United States in the immediate future, but in the long run, I feel sure, they would make for both happier and stronger bonds with the United States—happier because they would be free,

stronger because they would be dignified and self-respecting as they never had been before.

Underlying these recommendations—for a coming to terms with social revolution and for a loosening of the tight bonds between the United States and Latin America—is the hope that by wise and timely action the United States can influence revolutionary forces in a constructive direction. Many Latin Americans, including an impressive number of the younger Catholic clergy, are striving to make a reality of the "revolution in freedom" proclaimed by President Frei of Chile. There is a chance that with our sympathy and help they will succeed, although neither the historical odds nor the scale of the effort being made under the Alliance for Progress provide much basis for optimism.

The hard fact of the matter is that conditions are deteriorating in Latin America at a pace and on a scale that outweigh all current efforts to reverse the tide. As the pressures of uncontrolled population growth mount, more and more Latin Americans are likely to adopt the attitude of a despairing young father in the Lima slums—he could as well have been living in Rio or Recife, in a Haitian village or the mountains of Bolivia—who told an American writer: "I would rather grab a gun and impose my kind of justice than see my children starve."⁵

Somewhere in the mountains of Colombia there lies in an unmarked grave the body of a young priest who had been shot down at the head of a communist guerrilla band. His name was Camilo Torres and he was a member of one of Colombia's most aristocratic families. Having asked to be relieved of his clerical duties, he went into the hills in November 1965, because, he said, "Every sincere revolutionary must recognize the way of arms as the only way that remains." One may hope that Father Torres was wrong but he may have been right. The day after he died placards appeared on the walls of the university in Bogotá. They said:

CAMILO! WE SHALL NOT WEEP FOR YOU.
WE SHALL AVENGE YOU.

5

The Vietnamese Revolution

WHILE THE Alliance for Progress falters, American soldiers are fighting and dying in another revolution—or, more exactly, in an Asian civil war which has been expanded into a conflict between the United States and Asian communism.

The war in Vietnam has divided and troubled the American people as has no other war of the twentieth century. Many of our people, perhaps a majority, regard the war as necessary and just but many others are doubtful and troubled: some are unconvinced that the Saigon government is worth saving; some fear that the United States has inadvertently taken over the role of the old European colonial powers; some simply cannot understand what vital interests are served by sending American soldiers to fight and die in a civil war almost ten thousand miles away from their own country.

Why are Americans fighting in Vietnam? For much the same reason, I think, that we intervened militarily in Guatemala in 1954, in Cuba in 1961, and in the Dominican Republic in 1965. In Asia as in Latin America we have given our opposition to communism priority over our sympathy for nationalism because we have regarded communism as a kind of absolute evil, as a totally pernicious doctrine which de-

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prives the people subjected to it of freedom, dignity, happiness, and the hope of ever acquiring them. I think that this view of communism is implicit in much of American foreign policy; I think it is the principal reason for our involvement in Vietnam and for the emergence of an "Asian Doctrine" under which the United States is moving toward the role of policeman for all of Southeast Asia.

It is said that we are fighting against North Vietnam's aggression rather than its ideology and that the "other side" has only to "stop doing what it is doing" in order to restore peace. But what are the North Vietnamese doing, except participating in a civil war, not in a foreign country but on the other side of a demarcation line between two sectors of the same country, a civil war in which Americans from ten thousand miles across the ocean are also participating? What are they doing that is different from what the American North did to the American South a hundred years ago, with results that few of my fellow Southerners now regret?

What exactly is their crime? They are harsh in their treatment of their own people and cruel in their conduct of the war, but these attributes hardly distinguish them from the South Vietnamese for whom we are fighting. The crime of the North Vietnamese that makes them America's enemy is that they are communists, practitioners of a philosophy we regard as evil. When all the official rhetoric about aggression and the defense of freedom and the sanctity of our word has been cited and recited, we are still left with two essential reasons for our involvement in Vietnam: the view of communism as an evil philosophy and the view of ourselves as God's avenging angels, whose sacred duty it is to combat evil philosophies.

The view of communism as an evil philosophy is a distorting prism through which we see projections of our own minds rather than what is actually there. Looking through the prism, we see the Viet Cong who cut the throats of village chiefs as savage murderers but American flyers who incinerate

unseen women and children with napalm as valiant fighters for freedom; we see Viet Cong defections as the rejection of communism but the much greater number of defections from the Saigon Army as expressions of a simple desire to return to the farm; we see the puritan discipline of life in Hanoi as enslavement but the chaos and corruption of life in Saigon as liberty; we see Ho Chi Minh as a hated tyrant but Nguyen Cao Ky as the defender of freedom; we see the Viet Cong as Hanoi's puppet and Hanoi as China's puppet but we see the Saigon government as America's stalwart ally; and finally, we see China, with no troops in South Vietnam, as the real aggressor while we, with hundreds of thousands of men, are resisting foreign intervention.

These perceptions are not patently wrong but they are distorted and exaggerated. It is true that whatever the fault may be on our side, the greater fault is with the communists, who have indeed betrayed agreements, subverted unoffending governments, and generally done a great deal to provoke our hostility. It is *our* shortcoming, however, that we have the power to overcome and, in so doing, to set a constructive example for our adversaries. As the more powerful belligerent by far, we are better able to take the initiative in showing some magnanimity, but we are not doing so. Instead we are treading a strident and dangerous course, a course that is all but unprecedented in American history.

The Asian Doctrine

Except for the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has traditionally rejected policies of unilateral responsibility for entire regions and continents. In the nineteenth century the United States played almost no part in European politics and only a marginal role in Asia, preferring to regard itself as an example of progress and democracy which others might imi-

tate or not as they saw fit. In the twentieth century events beyond our control brought us into two world wars and imposed upon us responsibilities far beyond our borders. Until quite recently, however, our policies for meeting those commitments have been guided by two extremely important qualifying principles: first, that these responsibilities were limited to certain countries and certain purposes; second, that they would be discharged collectively either under the United Nations or in cooperation with our allies.

The emerging "Asian Doctrine" represents a radical departure in American foreign policy in that it is unilateral and virtually unlimited in its objectives. Without reference to the United Nations and with only perfunctory reference to the non-functioning Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the United States on its own has undertaken to win a victory for its protégés in the Vietnamese civil war and thereupon to build a "Great Society" in Asia, whatever that might turn out to mean.*

American policy in Europe after World War II consisted of collective measures for the containment of Soviet power. Though financed by the United States, the Marshall Plan was shaped and largely executed as a cooperative program for European economic recovery. Although American military power was pre-eminent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created as and has remained a system for the collective defense of Europe and the North Atlantic. We did not talk in those days of a "New Deal" or a "Fair Deal" for Europe; we were satisfied to support economic reconstruction and to restrain Soviet power.

The Korean War was fought under the auspices of the United Nations for an ultimately limited purpose. The United States provided most of the forces from the outside, but a great many other members of the United Nations sent

* Statements of the President and the Vice-President defining an "Asian Doctrine" are cited in Chapter 2, pp. 52-53.

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stable, and democratic government in Saigon and then to protect it indefinitely; to maintain massive American military power in Southeast Asia in order to provide permanent protection against attack or subversion for all of the non-communist countries of the region; and finally, to provide enormous amounts of economic aid in order to bring the dream of the "Great Society" to hundreds of millions of Asians.

It is ironic that at the same time that the vestiges of the Monroe Doctrine are being fitfully liquidated the United States should be formulating a similar doctrine of pre-eminent American responsibility for Asia. One wonders whether the "Asian Doctrine" will reap for the United States as rich a harvest of affection and democracy as has the Monroe Doctrine. One wonders whether China will accept American hegemony as gracefully as Cuba and the Dominican Republic have accepted it. And one wonders whether anyone ever thought of asking the Asians if they really want to join the Great Society.

The occasion for this potentially massive American involvement in Asia is of course the war in Vietnam, but its genesis is the priority of anti-communism over sympathy for nationalism in American policy and the terrible difficulties we encounter when confronted with a communist party which is also an indigenous nationalist party. It seems pertinent, therefore, to review the national origins of Vietnamese communism and to consider what these may imply for the United States.

National Communism in Vietnam

At the heart of the Vietnam tragedy is the fact that the most powerful nationalist movement in that country is one

which is also communist. Ho Chi Minh is not a mere agent of Communist China, much less of the "international communist conspiracy" that we used to hear so much about. He is a bona-fide nationalist revolutionary, the leader of his country's rebellion against French colonialism. He is also a communist, and that is the essential reason why since at least 1950 he has been regarded as an enemy by the United States.

It was during the chaotic final months of World War II that Ho Chi Minh emerged as the leader of the Vietnamese nationalist movement. Ho had traveled far and done many things since leaving Vietnam as a kitchen boy on a French ship in 1912. He had been to France and England, to Africa and America. He had tried without success to promote the cause of Vietnamese nationalism at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and in 1920 he had been a founding member of the French Communist Party. Since then he has been a dedicated communist but always a Vietnamese communist. "This means," as Bernard Fall wrote, "that Ho is probably equipped with an instinctive Vietnamese fear of Chinese domination (no matter what its color) just as most observers agree that to Khrushchev any Germany might be slightly suspect."¹

Ho Chi Minh spent the twenties and the thirties attending Communist Party schools in the Soviet Union, working with the communist army in China, and agitating against French rule in Indochina. In 1941 Ho organized the Viet Minh as a communist-dominated Vietnamese nationalist movement. Although it engaged in no major warfare against the Japanese, the Viet Minh engaged in espionage and guerrilla activities under a program of fighting both Japan and Vichy and working for the independence of Vietnam. The Chiang Kai-shek government arrested Ho and imprisoned him for a year but released him in 1943 because he was found to be the only Vietnamese leader with effective contacts throughout Vietnam for espionage work. The Viet Minh thereafter was subsidized and supported by the Chinese Nationalist govern-

most important fact—the merger of nationalism and communism in Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. It is not meaningful to speak of the Viet Minh as more nationalist than communist or as more communist than nationalist; it is both. The merger is a misfortune from the viewpoint of American interests and preferences, but it is also a fact, a fact with which we can and should come to terms. Even today, after all that America has done to sustain the South Vietnamese government, there is only one politician whose name is known to peasants all over Vietnam: Ho Chi Minh.

It is important to be very clear about what is meant by "nationalism." It has been best described by Hans Kohn as a "state of mind" which regards the nation as "the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well being."² Understood in this way, nationalism is not necessarily humane or democratic, socially constructive or responsive to individual needs. It is merely powerful—powerful in a sense of being able to mobilize the loyalty and active support of vast numbers of ordinary people. When one describes Ho Chi Minh or the Viet Minh or the Viet Cong as "nationalist," it is not to be inferred that they are regarded as saints. Far from it: they have demonstrated again and again that they are fanatical and cruel, but they have also shown that they are patriots, that they have identified themselves with the nation and its mystique, with that "state of mind" which more than any other in our time inspires ordinary people to acts of loyalty, bravery, and self-sacrifice.

For our purposes, the significance of Ho Chi Minh's nationalism is that it is associated with what Bernard Fall has called "the 2,000-year-old distrust in Vietnam of everything Chinese."³ Vietnamese communism is therefore a potential bulwark—perhaps the only potential bulwark—against Chinese domination of Vietnam. It is for this reason that I believe that we should try, if it is not yet too late, to come to terms

with North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. I shall suggest in Chapter 9 how it seems to me this might be done.

America in Vietnam

How did it happen that America, the foremost advocate of colonial liberation after World War II, who set an example by liberating its own Philippine colony in 1946, allowed itself to be drawn into a colonial war and then a civil war in Indochina?

President Roosevelt's attitude toward Indochina during the war years was one of traditional American anti-colonialism. In a memorandum sent to Cordell Hull in January 1944, Roosevelt wrote: "France has had the country—thirty million inhabitants—for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning. . . . France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that."⁴

In the postwar years American enthusiasm for Vietnamese nationalism declined as rapidly as American concern with communism grew, which is to say very rapidly indeed. To an indeterminate but undoubtedly significant degree, the initial American involvement in Vietnam was influenced by two extraneous factors: Korea and McCarthy. After North Korea invaded South Korea in a direct and unambiguous act of aggression, the United States, understandably but inaccurately, came to regard the French war in Indochina as analogous to the war in Korea, overlooking extremely important considerations of nationalism and anti-colonialism. This view of the Indochinese war was reinforced by the McCarthy hysteria at home, which fostered indiscriminating attitudes of fear and hostility toward communism in all its forms. Not only were Americans disinclined in the late forties and early fifties to make distinctions among communist movements

(with the notable exception of Yugoslavia), but at that time the communist world looked very much more like a monolith than it did a few years later. It was under these circumstances that the United States began indirect military assistance to the French in Indochina at the end of 1950. In September 1951 the United States signed an agreement for direct economic assistance to Vietnam and in October 1952 the two hundredth American ship carrying military aid arrived in Saigon.

The Eisenhower Administration went to the brink in 1954 but then decided against United States military intervention. The decision against intervention was taken largely on the advice of General Matthew Ridgway, then Army Chief of Staff. In his memoirs published in 1956 General Ridgway relates how he concluded, on the basis of a report by a team of Army experts, that it would be disastrous for the United States to intervene with ground forces in Indochina. General Ridgway wrote: "We could have fought in Indochina. We could have won, if we had been willing to pay the tremendous cost in men and money that such intervention would have required—a cost that in my opinion would have eventually been as great as, or greater than, that we paid in Korea. In Korea, we had learned that air and naval power alone cannot win a war and that inadequate ground forces cannot win one either. It was incredible to me that we had forgotten that bitter lesson so soon—that we were on the verge of making that same tragic error. That error, thank God, was not repeated."⁵

The Geneva Agreements were signed in July 1954. They explicitly prohibited the introduction into Vietnam of additional military forces and explicitly provided that general elections would be held in Vietnam by July 1956. They also explicitly stated that the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam at the 17th Parallel was "provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary," a fact which is overlooked by

those who maintain that North Vietnam is engaged in aggression against a *foreign* country rather than supporting a domestic insurrection. In its unilateral statement of July 21, 1954, the United States indicated, with respect to the Accords, that it would "refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them," and further stated that the United States would "continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the U.N. to insure that they are conducted fairly."

It is not useful to try to assign degrees of guilt to each side for violations of the Geneva Accords. It suffices to note that there have been violations by all concerned, including the United States, which, in violation of its commitment of 1954, supported President Ngo Dinh Diem in his refusal to hold the elections provided for in the Geneva Accords, presumably because he feared that the communists would win. Whatever short-term advantages the many violations of the Geneva Agreements by both sides have brought their perpetrators, their cumulative effect has been the destruction of each side's trust in the word of the other, greatly complicating present prospects for a new agreement. Hanoi's stubborn and puzzling refusal to negotiate may therefore reflect neither a preference for war nor confidence in victory but simply an unwillingness to believe that a negotiated settlement would be honored.

Through a series of small steps, none extremely important or irrevocable in itself, the United States gradually took over the French commitment in South Vietnam after the French withdrawal. The United States Military Assistance Advisory Group took over the training of the South Vietnamese Army in 1955 and thereafter the United States became increasingly committed to the Diem regime by means of economic and military support and public statements. In 1960 President Eisenhower increased the number of American military advisers from 327 to 685. Further increases followed and by February 1962 the number of United States military personnel in South Vietnam had reached four thousand. Step by step,

as it became increasingly clear that the South Vietnamese Army was being defeated, the American commitment increased. The result has been that through a series of limited escalations, each one of which has been more or less compatible with the view that the war was not our war and would have to be won or lost by the South Vietnamese themselves, the war has indeed become our war. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, the commitment to support the South Vietnamese in a war which it was said *they* must either win or lose was supplanted by a commitment, as Secretary McNamara has put it, "to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory."⁶

The United States is now involved in a sizable and "open-ended" war against communism in the only country in the world which won freedom from colonial rule under communist leadership. In South Vietnam as in North Vietnam, the communists remain today the only solidly organized political force. That fact is both the measure of our failure and the key to its possible redemption.

So-called "wars of national liberation" are political wars, whose outcomes depend on a combination of political and military factors. The communist guerrillas in Malaya could not have been beaten without hard fighting, but neither, in all probability, could they have been beaten had Malaya not been given its independence. The Hukbalahaps were defeated in the Philippines primarily because of the political isolation imposed on them by the reforms of President Ramon Magsaysay. The major reason for the success of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam has not been aid from the North but the absence of a cohesive alternative nationalist movement in the South. Both the success of the communists in South Vietnam and their failure in India, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines strongly suggest that "wars of national liberation" depend for their success more on the weakness of the regime under attack than on the strength of support from outside.

Our search for a solution to the Vietnamese war must begin with the general fact that nationalism is the strongest single political force in the world today and the specific fact, arising from the history to which I have referred, that in Vietnam the most effective nationalist movement is communist-controlled. We are compelled, therefore, once again to choose between opposition to communism and support of nationalism. I strongly recommend that for once we give priority to the latter. The dilemma is a cruel one, and one which we must hope to avoid in the future by timely and unstinting support of non-communist nationalist movements, but it is too late for that in Vietnam. I strongly recommend, therefore, that we seek to come to terms with both Hanoi and the Viet Cong, not, to be sure, by "turning tail and running," as the saying goes, but by conceding the Viet Cong a part in the government of South Vietnam along the lines to be spelled out in Chapter 9.

Present realities require a revision of priorities in American policy. The basis of my criticisms of American policy in Southeast Asia and Latin America is a belief that American interests are better served by supporting nationalism than by opposing communism, and that when the two are encountered in the same political movement it is in our interest to accept a communist role in the government of the country concerned rather than to undertake the cruel and all but impossible task of suppressing a genuinely nationalist revolution. In Vietnam we have allowed our fear of communism to make us once again the enemy of a nationalist revolution, and in that role we have wrought havoc.

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that America considered itself to be at war not merely with some Vietnamese rebels but with communism in general, and that America, therefore, must be considered hostile to all communists, including himself, and all communist countries, including his own.

Soviet diplomats not only admit but are at pains to volunteer the view that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are "frozen." One Soviet diplomat, asked what was being done to prevent a deterioration of Soviet-American relations while the war continued, scornfully replied, "What relations? in ballet?"¹

I think these comments fairly well express the fallout effect of the Vietnamese war on American relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As has happened all too many times in the past, ideology is intruding upon interest, acting as a conduit of hostility from one part of the world to another. It is a mark of relative maturity on both sides that the impulses of conflict thus conveyed have been fairly weak so far, that neither we nor the Russians have been willing to expand the Vietnamese war into a general revival of the cold war, but we are certainly moving in that direction. The ideological aspect of the Vietnamese war is slowly undermining good relations between the United States and Eastern Europe; the *détente*, whose progress was generating such optimism before the expansion of the Vietnamese war, has been arrested and a slow, steady erosion has set in. How far it will go, and with what unfortunate results, will be determined by the future course and scale of the war in Vietnam.

One of the principal reasons why things are not a lot worse than they are is the restraint shown by the Russians with respect to the war. They are providing the North Vietnamese with a steady flow of supplies, including the ground-to-air missiles used against American aircraft, but they show no inclination, thus far, to participate directly in the war, and even their anti-American propaganda is comparatively mild. If positions were reversed, if the Russians were conducting

daily bombing raids against an American ally, it is just about inconceivable that we would confine ourselves to providing equipment to the country under attack. If we did, one can well imagine the field day the superpatriots would have charging our government with cowardice and treason. My feeling about the matter is that the Russians are frightened of us, not only because of our enormous power but also because of our erratic behavior in such places as Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, which may make our policies seem, from their viewpoint, dangerously unpredictable.

What is wrong with that? it may be asked. Isn't it a fine thing to keep the Russians guessing? What is wrong with it is that it puts Soviet-American relations on an exceedingly unstable basis. Though not as powerful as the United States, Russia is a very great power and she is unlikely to be restrained indefinitely by fear of the United States. As long as the Vietnamese war is fought on its present scale, the Russians may remain essentially outside of the conflict, although that is by no means certain. But if the war is significantly expanded, the Russians will be increasingly goaded by the Chinese for standing aside while the Americans devastate a Soviet ally. With their prestige thus impaired, fear could give way to anger and the Russians might then take the enormous risk of direct intervention in the war.

For the present the main fallout effect of the war on East-West relations is the loss of the opportunities associated with the American policy of building bridges to the East. The significance of that loss is great indeed; it amounts to the suspension of significant progress toward normal relations between the two great nations which hold the power of life and death over all of humanity. One may hope that a positive evolution of Soviet-American relations will be resumed, but it certainly cannot be counted upon.

Soviet-American cooperation in bringing about the cease-fire in the India-Pakistan war in September 1965 is one example of the kind of beneficial collaboration that the Vietnamese

instead of a healthy profit for Firestone, a solid gain for our balance of payments, and a positive step forward in the building of bridges to the East, the United States will have earned a harvest of ill will and a reputation for being quite incapable of executing policies decided upon by the President and the Department of State." Several months after the Firestone fiasco, a group of American tobacco companies were brought under similar right-wing attacks for their purchases of tobacco from Eastern European communist countries. On that occasion the State Department gave prompt, public support, as it had not done for Firestone, and the tobacco companies were able to fend off their right-wing attackers.²

Other proposals for improved relations between the United States and communist countries have been put on ice. A legislative proposal by President Johnson for liberalized and expanded trade with the communist countries lies pigeon-holed in a Congressional committee which refuses even to hold hearings on it. Outer Mongolia, a Soviet-oriented country with which the United States has had virtually no contact, felt constrained to reject an American gift of \$25,000 for flood relief, which may have been an American gesture toward the establishment of the diplomatic relations hitherto desired by Outer Mongolia. On the other hand, an agreement for the opening of direct air service between New York and Moscow has been reached, and there is some hope for a ban on underground nuclear tests and even more for a treaty which would limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

On balance, however, the Vietnamese war thus far has had three major "fallout" effects on East-West relations: first, it has generated a degree of mistrust and antagonism toward the United States on the part of Eastern European nations which otherwise are most anxious to expand economic, cultural and even political relations with the West; second, it has weakened the drive of the Eastern European countries toward greater independence of the Soviet Union; third, it has put a severe strain on the Soviet-American *détente*—if

indeed one can still speak of a *détente*—reducing whatever hope there may have been for substantive agreements in many fields. Relations, if not overtly hostile, have indeed, as the Russians say, become “frozen”—frozen in the direction of active hostility.

East-West relations now hinge on the war in Vietnam. If it goes on indefinitely, or if it is greatly escalated, it will destroy prospects for accommodation on issues ranging from trade to the future of Germany, and eventually it may bring the Russians, to say nothing of the Chinese, into direct conflict with the United States. If these things happen, then the fallout from Vietnam will indeed be far more destructive than the war itself.

The fact that Soviet-American relations are not worse than they are, and that some limited accommodations seem possible, is almost certainly attributable to China, whose hostility seems to have caused the Russians to despair of reconciliation and to turn, therefore, slightly toward the West. As long as the Vietnam war continues, that process cannot go very far, but if there were no war, it might go very far indeed—farther perhaps than anyone can now anticipate.

The Fallout in the West

Vietnam has become the key factor in America's relations with both allies and neutrals. American officials are in many instances more concerned with what a country's leaders say or think about American policy in Vietnam than with more relevant matters such as the particular country's internal development or contribution to the security of its own region. “Realists” that we are, proud and often boastful of the universality of our commitments—to the extent indeed that in testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on August 25, 1966, the Secretary of State has declared that the United States would use force against any aggressor even in the absence of a defense treaty, an American military

presence, or any form of Congressional approval—we have become nonetheless a one-issue participant in world affairs, hungering after a kind word or some token of support, for either of which we are more than willing to pay a handsome reward.

Nevertheless, our major allies are not supporting us in Vietnam. A few countries do have strong words of encouragement for us; they see America doing its “duty” as leader of the free world and, while their own young men go to school, get jobs, and raise families, they are quite reconciled to having American boys fight and die in the jungles of Southeast Asia, because if Americans were not fighting and dying in Vietnam, they tell us, America's friends in other parts of the world—they themselves, for example—might lose “confidence” in her. We are very grateful for this support. Other countries, dependent on the United States for their defense or for monetary support, for economic aid or for export markets, have found silence to be the better part of discretion; occasionally they have some mild praise for us, which makes us feel happy, and occasionally they have a mild reproach, which makes us feel angry and injured. Still others, who by reason of economic self-sufficiency, strong leadership, or a highly developed sense of national dignity do not feel the need to please the United States, are openly critical of American policy in Vietnam; the leaders of these countries, who do not understand that they are supposed to feel “secure” because Americans are fighting in Vietnam, are regarded as “senile” or “eccentric” by American officials, who profess “sadness” and “puzzlement” but never—heaven forbid—anger in the face of such ingratitude and apostasy.

There are three possible explanations for the refusal of almost all of America's friends to participate in the war, each of which, if valid, suggests that there is something wrong with American policy. First, they may believe that it simply does not matter, from the viewpoint of their own security, who wins the Vietnamese war. Or, second, they may believe that

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withdrawn some troops from Germany, without consulting the Germans.

I suspect that the American involvement in Vietnam has something to do with the current crisis in NATO. President de Gaulle has said as much, for example, in his press conference of February 21, 1966, in which he cited as one reason for his decision to withdraw French forces from NATO what he perceives to be a danger that the United States may drag its European partners into non-European wars. One detects in Europe a growing uneasiness about American policy, a feeling that the United States is becoming unreliable and that it may be better—safer, that is—to keep the Americans at a distance. One detects in the French withdrawal from NATO a great deal more than General de Gaulle's idiosyncrasies; the French action may be representative of a widespread loss of European confidence in American policy and judgment.

It is difficult for an American to look at his country as a foreigner may see it. I would guess that many a European or Asian or African or Latin American looking at America today feels overawed rather than reassured by our tremendous power—by the power of our nuclear weapons and rockets and the power of the world's greatest and possibly fastest growing economy. In an irrational but human way they may be more appalled than impressed by the existence of such great power, even though they are dependent on it for their own security. And, far from being reassured by the uses of American military power in Vietnam, by the spectacle of American bombs falling on Vietnamese jungles and villages in a volume equal to that of the bombing of Germany's great industrial cities at the height of World War II, our friends abroad may be puzzled both by the destructiveness of American power and its apparent ineffectiveness. It is possible that the violence and inconclusiveness of the war have raised doubts in many minds abroad as to whether it is not worse to be saved than to be abandoned by the United States. They may even be

thinking in terms of the pungent Chinese proverb: "In shallow waters dragons become the sport of shrimps."

I am inclined to wonder too if the current reluctance of our allies to accept responsibilities outside of their own regions is not indirectly related to the American military involvement in Southeast Asia. Insofar as that involvement implies a willingness on the part of the United States to act as a global policeman, even though it must do so with no more than token support from a few allies, others may be encouraged to believe that, even if their interests are involved in crises like the war in Vietnam, there is really no need to get involved because the Americans will take care of it anyway. Why not, therefore, concentrate on more agreeable matters at home and let the Americans sacrifice the lives and pay the costs since apparently they are willing to do it?

This suspicion may be unkind, but I do not think it is unfounded. It is perfectly natural for a nation, like an individual, to let someone else do a hard job or bear some disagreeable burden. What is not perfectly natural—what is in fact a very puzzling question indeed—is why the other party is *willing* to do it.

The reason, I think, is an excess of pride born of power. Power has a way of undermining judgment, of planting delusions of grandeur in the minds of otherwise sensible people and otherwise sensible nations. As I have said earlier, the idea of being responsible for the whole world seems to have dazzled us, giving rise to what I call the arrogance of power, or what the French, perhaps more aptly, call "le vertige de puissance," by which they mean a kind of dizziness or giddiness inspired by the possession of great power. If then, as I suspect, there is a relationship between the self-absorption of some of our allies and the American military involvement in Vietnam, it may have more to do with American vanity than with our friends' complacency. Thus, by taking on foreign responsibilities for which it is ill-equipped, America not only strains her resources but encourages other nations to neglect their

responsibilities, which neglect of course can only lead to added burdens for the United States. With this thought in mind, I turn now to what may be the most fateful of all of the fallout effects of the Vietnamese war: its effects on the American people and nation.

The Fallout at Home

The war in Southeast Asia has affected the internal life of the United States in two important ways: it has diverted our energies from the Great Society program which began so promisingly, and it has generated the beginnings of a war fever in the minds of the American people and their leaders.

Despite brave talk about having both "guns and butter," the Vietnamese war has already had a destructive effect on the Great Society. The 89th Congress, which enacted so much important domestic legislation in 1965, enacted much less in 1966, partly, it is true, because of the unusual productivity of its first session but more because the Congress as a whole lost interest in the Great Society and became, politically and psychologically, a "war Congress."

There is a kind of Gresham's Law of public policy: fear drives out hope, security precedes welfare, and it is only to the extent that a country is successful in the prevention of bad things that it is set free to concentrate on those pursuits which renew the nation's strength and bring happiness into the lives of its people. For twenty years beginning in 1940 America was greatly preoccupied with external dangers and accordingly neglectful of those aspects of domestic life which require organized public programs and sizable public expenditures. The reason for this, of course, was the exacting demands of two world wars and an intractable cold war, which required the massive diversion of resources from community life to national security. We felt ourselves compelled to turn

away from our hopes in order to concentrate on our fears and the public happiness became a luxury to be postponed to some distant day when the dangers besetting us would have disappeared.

In the early 1960s a trend and an event coincided which seemed to create the opportunity for a revision of priorities on our national agenda. The trend—after if not before the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—was one toward relative stability in international relations, based on a fragile, tacit agreement between the great powers to live together in peaceful, or competitive, coexistence. The event was the coming to office in the United States of a creative new Administration, eager to arrange a *détente* with the Russians and eager as well to use a respite from international crisis to devise imaginative new programs for the betterment of American life. During the three years of his Administration, President Kennedy put forward imaginative and well-conceived plans for the improvement of health and education, for the conquest of poverty, pollution, and blight, and for the spiritual enrichment of American life.

President Johnson embraced and expanded upon these innovations. Elected in 1964 by a great popular majority and supported by a great Congressional majority, President Johnson used his extraordinary talent for leadership to make the first session of the 89th Congress the most productive in a generation. With a degree of partisan harmony that would have seemed inconceivable a few years before, the Congress in 1965 adopted sweeping legislation to expand education, to provide health care to the aged, to combat urban and rural poverty, to renew our cities and purify our streams, and to meet many other long-neglected problems. It seemed that the United States might be about to undergo something of a social revolution.

Then came Vietnam. The war had been going on for many years but before 1965 it had been a small and distant war and, as our leaders repeatedly assured us, a war which would be

won or lost by the Vietnamese themselves. Then, in the first months of 1965 if not earlier, it became clear that the Saigon government was about to lose the war and we intervened with a large army, changing our role from adviser to principal belligerent. As a result of this radical change in American policy in Southeast Asia, we have had, after so brief an interlude, to turn back once again from our hopes to our fears, from the renewal of national resources to the avoidance of international disaster.

Vigorously executed and adequately funded, the legislation adopted by the 89th Congress can open the way to an era of abundance and opportunity for all Americans, but for the present at least the inspiration and commitment of the Great Society have disappeared. They have disappeared in the face of our deepening involvement in Vietnam, and although it may be contended that the United States has the material resources to rebuild its society at home while waging war abroad, it is already being demonstrated that we do not have the mental and spiritual resources for such a double effort. Politicians, like other people, have only one brain apiece, and it stands to reason that if they spend all their time thinking about one thing they are not going to be thinking about something else. The President simply cannot think about implementing the Great Society at home while he is supervising bombing missions over North Vietnam; nor is the Congress particularly inclined to debate, much less finance, expanded domestic programs when it is involved in debating, and paying for, an expanding war; nor can the American people be expected to think very hard or do very much about improving their schools and communities when they are worried about casualty lists and the danger of a wider war.

My own view is that there is a kind of madness in the facile assumption that we can raise the many billions of dollars necessary to rebuild our schools and cities and public transport and eliminate the pollution of air and water while also spending tens of billions to finance an "open-ended" war in

Asia. But even if the material resources can somehow be drawn from an expanding economy, I do not think that the spiritual resources will long be forthcoming from an angry and disappointed people.

As I have already suggested,* the effectiveness of foreign policy depends on the strength of the nation and the strength of the nation depends less on its actions abroad than on the development, use, and renewal of its own resources, both material and human. The education of our children, the rehabilitation of our cities and the making available of jobs for all who want to work have everything to do with the strength of our country and everything to do, therefore, with the success of our foreign policy. To argue, as was done in the forties and fifties and is now being done again, that the postponement of these things is the necessary price of national security is exactly the same as saying that the price of security is the slow erosion of the foundations of security—clearly an untenable position. Foreign and domestic policy are in fact inseparable; in the long run an effective policy abroad depends upon a healthy society at home.

There is something unseemly about a nation conducting a foreign policy that involves it in the affairs of most of the nations in the world while its own domestic needs are neglected or postponed, just as there is something unseemly about an individual carrying all the burdens of the Community Chest and the PTA while his own children run wild and his household is in disarray. There is something fishy about this kind of behavior, something hidden and unhealthy. I do not think that a man can be genuinely responsible in one area of his life and neglectful in another. I am more inclined to believe that the man who makes the best contribution to his community is the one who begins by meeting his responsibilities to himself and to his own family. By analogy, it seems to me unnatural and unhealthy for a nation to be engaged

See Introduction, pp. 20-21.

in global crusades for some principle or ideal while neglecting the needs of its own people; indeed, it seems far more likely that the nation that does most to benefit humanity in the long run is the nation that begins by meeting the needs of that portion of humanity which resides within its own frontiers.

It should be very clear that what is called for is not a wholesale renunciation by the United States of its global responsibilities. That would be impossible even if it were desirable. What is needed is a redress in the heavy imbalance on the side of foreign commitment that has prevailed for the last twenty years—a redress of the kind so hopefully begun by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson but now suspended as America once again turns her energies to making war.

The turning away from constructive pursuits after so brief an interlude is the first and at present more conspicuous fallout effect of the war on American life. The second, no less damaging, is the stirring up of a war fever in the minds of our people and leaders. It is only just now getting under way, but as the war goes on, as the casualty lists grow longer and affect more and more American homes, the fever will rise and the patience of the American people will give way to mounting demands for an expanded war, for a lightning blow that will get it over with at a stroke. The American people have already registered their approval, if the polls are to be believed, of the bombing of oil installations in Hanoi and Haiphong, not, I think, out of bellicosity but in the vain hope that these air strikes would shorten the war. If the war continues for a long time, the demand for expanded hostilities will rise, first perhaps for a blockade of the North Vietnamese ports; then, if that does not work, for an all-out attack on the North Vietnamese air bases; then, if the North Vietnamese withdraw their planes to Chinese bases, for a strike against China; and then we will have a general Asian war if not a global nuclear war.

There has already been a marked change in the kinds of thoughts we think about and talk about in America and there

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Nobody could tell whether he lived or died. The Marines chasing him went no further than the ridge top.⁴

The dehumanizing of the enemy is a characteristic of all wars. What Mr. Galloway described in his dispatch was the killing not of a man but of something abstract or something subhuman, a "communist," and it was "like watching a ball game from the upper deck of Yankee Stadium." The possibility that *he* may have regarded himself as a patriot fighting to free his country from foreign invaders would never of course have occurred to anyone in the "cheering section."

On April 20, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify on the foreign-aid bill. With respect to Vietnam he said he thought "we should be proud of what we are doing." The Secretary is proud of the large number of aircraft and helicopters we have deployed, of our ability to transport and supply an army of hundreds of thousands of men ten thousand miles from home. It is an impressive achievement, I admit, but what is forgotten in all this pride, in this treating of a war machine as an end in itself, is the *purpose* of our army and its equipment, which is to kill people and destroy whole villages as well as the bridges and roads of North Vietnam.

Under normal circumstances most people would immediately and instinctively say "no" if asked whether they were proud of their country's ability to kill and destroy. But in a war all that changes, and in the course of dehumanizing an enemy—and this is the ultimate fallout from any war—a man dehumanizes himself. It is not just the naturally bellicose, the thwarted or the twisted personalities, that become dehumanized in a war. It is everyman: the good and decent citizen who looks after his children, who is considerate of his neighbors and kind to animals. It is he who ultimately prays the obscene "War Prayer" of Mark Twain:

. . . O Lord our God, help us to tear their soldiers to

a "reward." The Chinese failed to see the equity of this claim but were brought around when the Germans landed troops. China was thereupon forced to lease the port and bay of Kiaochow to Germany for ninety-nine years and was also forced to yield commercial privileges on the Shantung Peninsula.

The other powers also sought "rewards." Russia demanded and received the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the right to build a railroad across Manchuria. France, which had forced China to recognize French authority in Indochina in the 1880s, demanded and received in 1898 an extensive sphere of influence in South China, including the lease of Kwangchow Bay for ninety-nine years. The British, not to be outdone, now demanded and acquired control of the Chinese maritime customs, lease of a naval station at Weihaiwei, and the extension of the lease of Kowloon to ninety-nine years.

China had become a virtual colony with many masters. "Yet," said Sun Yat-sen, then a rising revolutionary, in a truly memorable historical understatement, "none of the masters feels responsible for its welfare."

The Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists, better known as the Boxers, was a secret organization composed largely of poverty-stricken peasants. Their grievances might well have been directed against the Manchu rulers of China, but government officials had no great difficulty in persuading the Boxers that the foreigners were the cause of the misery of the people. With great savagery, the Boxers fell upon foreigners and their Chinese cohorts in 1900; they were especially merciless toward missionaries and their Chinese converts. The Boxers went on a rampage against the foreigners in Peking, besieging the foreign legations.

An international rescue force made up of Japanese, Russians, British, Germans, French, and Americans was sent to relieve the legations. The commander of the allied force, Field Marshal Count Von Waldersee, was under instructions from the Kaiser "to give no quarter and to take no pris-

Hankow; the first class was for Europeans only, and there was no other steamer. Marguerite leaned her arms on the railings and stared at the river. She was in first class, with our son. I went second class. I had insisted it should be so. "It is too hot for you here below."⁵

Some years earlier as a student in Shanghai the young man had written to his brother about his inability to understand the Europeans:

They always bewilder me. At once most ruthless in the pursuit of their interests, caring nothing for the wholesale misery they bring, at the same time their papers are full of verbiage of their nobility, rightness and the good they do. They become indignant at our public executions, and our cruelty to dogs. Yet the record of their lootings and killings in our country shows no such correct compassion. . . . They are illogical and incomprehensible, my brother. . . . They never know what they want, except that they always want more. Unbelievably rapacious, they yet weep tears when they give money to beggars. . . .⁶

China in Revolution

The Chinese revolutions of the twentieth century were in great part spawned by the ravages of the West. Finding themselves militarily inferior to the West but unshaken in their faith in the superiority of their own civilization, the Chinese undertook, first through the unsuccessful democratic revolution of Sun Yat-sen, then through the successful communist revolution of Mao Tse-tung, to acquire those Western techniques of science and technology, of political organization and military power, which would make it possible to expel the West from China. It is ironic and

significant that the Western political doctrine which China finally adopted was one which the West itself had rejected.

China is still in the full tide of the longest and possibly the most complete revolution of the twentieth century. From 1911 until 1949 the country was in constant war and chaos. Before order was restored by the communists virtually all of China's ancient institutions and values had been shattered: the Imperial Dynasty, the classical system of education, Confucian ideas about the family and society.

The republic failed but the Russian Revolution had a profound impact on a demoralized China as an apparent model for converting a feudal society into a powerful modern nation almost overnight. The Kuomintang made some progress toward unifying the country in the twenties and thirties and, but for the Japanese war, the Nationalists might have established their authority as a viable government of China. The communists, on the other hand, as Professor Benjamin Schwartz of Harvard has pointed out, built up a strong base in the countryside and won patriotic support, especially from young intellectuals, by actively fighting the Japanese while the Kuomintang remained passive, waiting for the Americans to overwhelm Japan.⁷ Greatly assisted by the incompetence and demoralization of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists emerged from the Second World War as the proponents of a genuine Chinese nationalism.

It is generally agreed by experts on China that the communist regime has rooted itself in solid foundations of nationalism. Professor C. P. Fitzgerald explains that Mao Tse-tung in effect has made Marxist ideas Chinese. These ideas are radically transforming Chinese society but have had much less significance for China's relations with the outside world than was once expected. Fitzgerald writes:

The Chinese view of the world has not fundamentally changed: it has been adjusted to take account of the modern world, but only so far as to permit China to occupy, still, the central place in the picture. To do

this it was necessary to accept from the West a new doctrine to replace the inadequate Confucian teaching, which was too limited. After a long struggle China found that the doctrine which suited her was the one which the West had repudiated: and it may well be that this in itself was a reason for making communism, the outcast of Western origin, welcome in China. . . .⁸

China has thus had two simultaneous revolutions in this century: one a domestic revolution which is almost totally reconstructing Chinese life and society, albeit within a familiar context of authoritarianism, the other a revolution against foreigners which is not so much revising China's relations with the outside world as trying to *restore* them to something resembling their character in the days of imperial greatness. While revolutionizing her society at home, China seems to be retaining, or more accurately to be reviving, her traditional view of her role in the world.

As between China's foreign and domestic revolutions, the emphasis, according to experts, has been and remains on the latter. Communist China's leaders, according to Professor John Lindbeck of Harvard University, are specialists in domestic affairs but amateurs in international relations. Although they regard developments in China as "part of a larger transnational historic movement," the fundamental task which they have set for themselves, the one which absorbs by far the greater part of their resources and their attention, is the industrialization and social transformation of China.⁹ In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Professor Morton Halperin made the same point. The Chinese leaders, he believes, "are anxious to turn in and focus their efforts even more than they have in the past on the domestic concerns of the Chinese revolution. . . . I believe that if the Chinese can become convinced that they do not face imminent threat of an American nuclear attack, they are likely to withdraw even more from the world while continuing to issue revolutionary proclamations and concentrate on their internal difficulties and opportunities."¹⁰

protection of the United States. Burma, for example, though weak and non-aligned, remains independent and, so far as one can tell, untroubled by her Chinese neighbor. North Vietnam, despite its dependency on China for economic and logistical support for the prosecution of the war, remains substantially in command of its own affairs; and it seems logical to suppose that if there were no war, if there were normal relations with the United States, North Vietnam would be even more independent of China. The experience of North Korea is particularly interesting: during and after the Korean War the North was occupied by hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops; then in 1958, despite the fact that there was no outside pressure to compel them to do so, the Chinese withdrew from North Korea, whereupon the North Koreans purged many pro-Chinese officials from their government and acquired substantial freedom of action in their relations with both China and the Soviet Union. In August 1966 the North Korean government publicly proclaimed its intention to build communism neither in the Russian nor the Chinese way but in its own "Korean" way, and since then the North Koreans have given strong indications of aligning themselves with Russia in the Sino-Soviet dispute. One does not know, of course, but the thought that the Chinese, despite their colorful language, may actually not wish physically to subjugate their neighbors may be less "unthinkable" on examination than at first glance it appears to be.

Once again, there appears to be a discrepancy between myth and reality, between the American perception and a situation as it actually exists. Once again, it seems to me, the source of the distortion is the ideological prism through which America looks at the world. China is considered to be aggressive not on the basis of what her leaders do but rather on the basis of what they say or on the basis of their presumed intentions. China is not judged to be aggressive because of her actions; she is *presumed* to be aggressive because she is communist.

America and China

Between America, perhaps the most unrevolutionary country in the world, and China, the most revolutionary, there lies a chasm of ignorance and misunderstanding. On February 10, 1966, there was a discussion of China in the British House of Lords. In a most interesting speech Lord Kennet said: "Those two countries understand each other so little. America speaks all of peace, but bombs China's neighbor. China watches her actions, and ignores her words. China speaks all of war, but there is not a single Chinese soldier outside China. America listens to her words, and ignores her actions. It is historically determined."¹¹

I hope that the failures of communication between China and the United States are not "historically determined," or at least not historically unalterable. In a modest way the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been trying, through a series of public hearings, to establish some basis for communication between China and the United States.* Some pertinent questions have been raised and partially answered by experts who have testified before the Committee, such questions, for example, as the following: What kind of people are the Chinese? To what extent are they motivated by national feeling? To what extent by ideology? Why are the Chinese Communist leaders so hostile to the United States and why do they advocate violent revolution against most of the world's governments? To what extent is their view of the world distorted by isolation and the memory of ancient grievances? To what extent, and with what effect on their government, do the Chinese people share with Americans and with all other peoples what Aldous Huxley has called the "simple human preference for life and peace?"

We must seek answers to these questions if we are to

* See Chapter 2, pp. 56-57.

—has an obligation of magnanimity toward a nation just emerging from a century of crisis and humiliation. It is small-minded and unworthy when American officials reply to proposals for initiatives toward China by citing the number of futile encounters in Warsaw or by demanding to know "what they have offered us." "Magnanimity in politics," said Edmund Burke, "is not seldom the truest wisdom; and a great empire and little minds go ill together."¹²

If we can bring ourselves to act toward China with understanding and generosity, we will be on the way to a solution of the great problems that beset us in Eastern Asia. The prospects for an honorable and lasting peace in Vietnam have everything to do with China and her relations with the outside world, because China is the paramount power of Asia. Nothing that we say or do can make her otherwise.

unrestrained competitive instinct and his hope of survival at this first moment in human history when the means of violence at man's disposal have become sufficient to destroy his species. Unlike other forms of life which have faced the danger of extinction, we have had some choice in the matter, having ourselves invented the instruments that threaten us with extinction. This fact, to be sure, tells at least as much about man's folly as it does about his creative genius, but it also suggests that having created the conditions for our own collective death, we at least retain some choice about whether it is actually going to happen. Clearly, a radical change in traditional behavior is required. The question of our age is whether a change radical enough to close the gap between traditional political behavior and the requirements of survival is possible *within the limits* imposed by human nature.

It is hard to believe in the destruction of the human race. Because we have managed to avoid a holocaust since the invention of nuclear weapons only a little more than twenty years ago, the danger of its occurrence now seems remote, like Judgment Day, and references to it have become so frequent and familiar as to lose their meaning; the prospect of our disappearance from the earth has become a cliché, even something of a bore. It is a fine thing of course that the hydrogen bomb has not reduced us all to nervous wrecks, but it is not a fine thing that finding the threat incredible, we act as though it did not exist and go on conducting international relations in the traditional manner, which is to say, in a manner that does little if anything to reduce the possibility of a catastrophe.

Neither the government nor the universities are making the best possible use of their intellectual resources to deal with the problems of war and peace in the nuclear age. Both seem by and large to have accepted the idea that the avoidance of nuclear war is a matter of skillful "crisis management," as though the techniques of diplomacy and deterrence which have gotten us through the last twenty

years have only to be improved upon to get us through the next twenty or a hundred or a thousand years.

The law of averages has already been more than kind to us and we have had some very close calls, notably in October 1962. We escaped a nuclear war at the time of the Cuban missile affair because of President Kennedy's skillful "crisis management" and Premier Khrushchev's prudent response to it; surely we cannot count on the indefinite survival of the human race if it must depend on an indefinite number of repetitions of that sort of encounter. Sooner or later the law of averages will turn against us; an extremist or incompetent will come to power in one major country or another, or a misjudgment will be made by some perfectly competent official, or things will just get out of hand without anyone being precisely responsible as happened in 1914. None of us, however,—professors, bureaucrats, or politicians—has yet undertaken a serious and concerted effort to put the survival of our species on some more solid foundation than an unending series of narrow escapes.

We have got somehow to try to grasp the idea of universal destruction—by some means other than actually experiencing it. We have got somehow to grasp the idea that man's competitive instinct, unalterable an element of human nature though it may be, must nonetheless be restrained, regulated or redirected in such a way that it no longer threatens to explode into universal, final violence.

The first step toward control of the competitive instinct is to acknowledge it. It is no use to declare it immoral or obsolete and to decree its abolition because, like sex, hunger, death, and taxes, it just won't go away. Nor does it make sense to accept unrestrained competitiveness as an unalterable fact of life, to resign ourselves to the game of nuclear politics as insane but inevitable and to focus our efforts on computerized war games aimed at making sure that we "get there first with the most," because even if our adversary "gets there" second and with much less, it is likely to be enough to wipe us out.

We can neither abolish nor totally accept national rivalries; we have got, somehow, to put them under some restraints, just as we have brought the rivalries of business and other groups within our own society under restraints in order to protect the community and, indeed, in order to perpetuate *competition*, which under conditions of unregulated rivalry would soon enough be ended with the elimination of the small and weak groups by the big and strong ones. In foreign politics as in domestic economics, competitive instincts are natural and, within limits, creative; but so prone are they to break out of those limits and to wreak havoc when they do that we must seek some means to confine them to their proper sphere, as the servant and not the master of civilization.

It may be that some idea as to where that sphere begins and where it ends, as to where the possibilities of human nature begin to conflict with the needs of human survival and as to whether and how the two can be reconciled, can be gotten from the study of psychology. If it be granted that the ultimate source of war and peace is human nature, then it follows that the study of politics is the study of man and that if politics is ever to acquire a new character, the change will not be wrought either in computers or in revival meetings but through a better understanding of the needs and fears of the human individual. It is a curious thing that in an era when interdisciplinary studies are favored in the universities, little has been done to apply the insights of individual and social psychology to the study of international relations.

Psychology, Ideology, and Political Behavior

Man's beliefs about how societies should be organized and related to each other are called ideologies. An understanding of the psychological roots of ideology would provide us with

connect our lives to some larger purpose and also helps to "organize the world for us," giving us a picture, though not necessarily an accurate picture, of reality. A person's world-view, or ideology, is said to filter the signals that come to him, giving meaning and pattern to otherwise odd bits of information. Thus, for example, when a Chinese and an American put radically different interpretations on the Vietnamese war, it is not necessarily because one or the other has chosen to propound a wicked lie but rather because each has filtered information from the real world through his ideological world-view, selecting the parts that fit, rejecting the parts that do not, and coming out with two radically different interpretations of the same events.

Ideology influences perception, perception shapes expectation, and expectation shapes behavior, making for what is called the self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, for example, China, fearing the United States but lacking power, threatens and blusters, confirming the United States in its fears of China and causing it to arm against her, which in turn heightens Chinese fears of the United States. Professor Gordon Allport of Harvard made the point some years ago that ". . . while most people deplore war, they nonetheless *expect* it to continue. And what *people expect determines their behavior*. . . . The indispensable condition of war," wrote Professor Allport, "is that people must *expect* war and must prepare for war, before, under war-minded leadership, they make war. It is in this sense that 'wars begin in the minds of men.'"¹

Another striking psychological phenomenon is the tendency of antagonists to dehumanize each other. To most Americans China is a strange, distant, and dangerous nation, not a society made up of more than seven hundred million individual human beings but a kind of menacing abstraction. When Chinese soldiers are described, for example, as "hordes of Chinese coolies," it is clear that they are being thought of not as people but as something terrifying and abstract, or as something inanimate, like the flow of lava

from a volcano. Both China and America seem to think of each other as abstractions: to the Chinese we are not a society of individual people but the embodiment of an evil idea, the idea of "imperialist capitalism"; and to most of us China represents not people but an evil and frightening idea, the idea of "aggressive communism."

Obviously, this dehumanizing tendency helps to explain the savagery of war. Man's capacity for decent behavior seems to vary directly with his perception of others as individual humans with human motives and feelings, whereas his capacity for barbarous behavior seems to increase with his perception of an adversary in abstract terms. This is the only explanation I can think of for the fact that the very same good and decent citizens who would never fail to feed a hungry child or comfort a sick friend or drop a coin in the church collection basket can celebrate the number of Viet Cong killed in a particular week or battle, talk of "making a desert" of North Vietnam or of "bombing it back into the Stone Age" despite the fact that most, almost all, of the victims would be innocent peasants and workers, and can contemplate with equanimity, or even advocate, the use of nuclear weapons against the "hordes of Chinese coolies." I feel sure that this apparent insensitivity to the incineration of thousands of millions of our fellow human beings is not the result of feelings of savage inhumanity toward foreigners; it is the result of not thinking of them as humans at all but rather as the embodiment of doctrines that we consider evil.

There is a "strain toward consistency" which leads a country, once it has decided that another country is good or bad, peaceful or aggressive, to interpret every bit of information to fit that preconception, so much so that even a genuine concession offered by one is likely to be viewed by the other as a trick to gain some illicit advantage. A possible manifestation of this tendency is the North Vietnamese view of American proposals to negotiate peace as fraudulent plots. Having been betrayed after previous negotiations—by the French in 1946 and by Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955 when, with

advice of Pope Paul VI, who said in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on October 4, 1965:

Your vocation is to make brothers not only of some, but of all peoples, a difficult undertaking, indeed; but this it is, your most noble undertaking. . . . We will go further, and say: strive to bring back among you any who have separated themselves, and study the right method of uniting to your pact of brotherhood, in honor and loyalty, those who do not yet share in it.

Paranoid fears are not entirely false fears; certainly, China's fear of American hostility, though distorted and exaggerated, is not pure invention. In dealing with paranoid individuals, Dr. Frank suggests, it is generally desirable to listen respectfully without agreeing but also without trying to break down or attack the patient's system of beliefs. It is also important not to get overfriendly lest the patient interpret effusive overtures as a hostile plot. Dr. Frank also suggests that the paranoid patient is certain to rebuff overtures of friendship many times before beginning to respond. Applying these principles to China, perhaps the best thing we can do for the time being is to reduce expressions of hostility, put forth only such limited proposals for friendship as might be credible, and otherwise leave her strictly alone.

Before China can accept the hand of Western friendship, she must first recover pride. She must recover that sense of herself as a great civilization which was so badly battered in the nineteenth century and with it the strength to open her door to the outside world. Having been all but destroyed as a nation by the forced intrusions of the West, China must first know that she has the strength to reject unwanted foreign influences before she can be expected to seek or accept friendly foreign associations. Or, to make the same point from the side of the United States, before we can extend the hand of friendship to China with any expectation of its being accepted, we must first persuade

her that we respect her right to take what we offer or leave it as she thinks best. There is no better way to convey this message to China than by leaving her alone.

If we can give our imaginations a good "run," we are likely to learn that the "way of life" which we so eagerly commend to the world has little pertinence either to China's past experience or to her future needs. China, as John Fairbank points out, is a society in which the concept of "individualism" which we cherish is held in low esteem because it connotes a chaotic selfishness, the opposite of the commitment to the collective good which is highly valued by the Chinese. Similarly, the very word for "freedom" (*tzu-yu*) is said to connote a lack of discipline, even license, the very opposite of the Chinese ideal of disciplined cooperation. Even such basic Western ideas as "loyal opposition" and "self-determination," Professor Fairbank points out, are alien to the Chinese. The cultural gap is further illustrated by the difference in attitudes toward philanthropy: to Americans it is a Christian virtue; to the Chinese it is, unless reciprocal, insulting and degrading—something that we might keep in mind if relations ever thaw enough to make conceivable American economic aid or, more plausibly, disaster relief in the event of some natural calamity such as flood or famine.⁵

There are, I think, some limited positive steps which the United States might take toward improved relations with China. It would do the United States no harm in the short run and perhaps considerable good in the long run to end its embargo on trade in non-strategic items, to recognize the Peking Government *de facto*, to offer to establish formal diplomatic relations whenever the Chinese Communists care to reciprocate, and to end American opposition to the seating of Communist China in the United Nations while defending the right of the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan to a seat of its own in the United Nations. The United States has already proposed visits by scholars and newspapermen between China and the United States and,

although these proposals have been rejected by the Chinese, it might be well, though not too often and not too eagerly, to remind them of the offer from time to time. In proposing such initiatives to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as major components in a policy of "containment without isolation," Professor A. Doak Barnett made the point that "In taking these steps, we will have to do so in full recognition of the fact that Peking's initial reaction is almost certain to be negative and hostile and that any changes in our posture will create some new problems. But we should take them nevertheless, because initiatives on our part are clearly required if we are to work, however slowly, toward the long-term goal of a more stable, less explosive situation in Asia and to explore the possibilities of trying to moderate Peking's policies."⁶

The point of such a new approach to China, writes Professor Fairbank, is psychological: "Peking is, to say the least, maladjusted, rebellious against the whole world, Russia as well as America. We are Peking's principal enemy because we happen now to be the biggest outside power trying to foster world stability. But do we have to play Mao's game? Must we carry the whole burden of resisting Peking's pretensions? Why not let others in on the job? A Communist China seated in the UN," Fairbank continues, "could no longer pose as a martyr excluded by 'American imperialism.' She would have to face the self-interest of other countries, and learn to act as a full member of international society for the first time in history. This is the only way for China to grow up and eventually accept restraints on her revolutionary ardor."⁷

The most difficult and dangerous of issues between the United States and China is the confrontation of their power in Southeast Asia, an issue which, because of its explosive possibilities, cannot be consigned to the healing effects of time. The danger of war is real. It is real because an "open-ended" war in Vietnam can bring the two great powers into conflict with each other, by accident or by design, at almost

any time. Some of our military experts are confident that China will not enter the war in Vietnam; their confidence would be more reassuring if it did not bring to mind the predictions of military experts in 1950 that China would not enter the Korean War, as well as more recent predictions about an early victory in Vietnam. In fact, it is the view of certain China experts in our government that the Chinese leaders themselves *expect* war with the United States, and some of our own officials also seem to expect a war with China.

How can we alter those fatal expectations, which, as we have noted, tend to influence behavior so as to make it likely that they will come true? Long-term efforts to break through hostile prejudices based on mutual ignorance will be valuable as a means of promoting the ultimate reconciliation of China and the West, but they are not likely to result in an early end to the war in Vietnam or to resolve the dangerous confrontation of Chinese and American power in Southeast Asia. These call for more urgent remedies, and in the next chapter I shall suggest what seems to me a responsible program for peace in Southeast Asia.

Perception and Perspective

We know so very much more about things than we do about people, so very much more about the workings of jet planes and nuclear missiles than about our own inner needs. We are exploring the mysteries of outer space while we remain puzzled and ignorant about the mysteries of our own minds. Far more than supersonic airplanes or rockets to the moon, we need objective perceptions of our own fears and hopes and a broader perspective about our own society, our relations with others and our place in the world.

Civilization is still a young and fragile thing on this earth.

Man has lived in some kind of civilized condition for no more than five thousand years; for hundreds of thousands of years before that he lived and fought and hunted for food in a manner not much superior to that of the other animals. The civilizing process is not only very recent; it has also been strikingly uneven. Until about two centuries ago there was no great disparity between progress in technology and progress in human relations, between man's understanding of *things* and his understanding of *himself*; both were progressing very slowly indeed. Then, with the Industrial Revolution, man achieved a gigantic breakthrough in his technology, a breakthrough which was followed by rapid and accelerating progress to which no end is yet in sight. There has been no comparable breakthrough in human relations; in the last two centuries our understanding of ourselves has progressed somewhat, perhaps a bit more rapidly than before, but not nearly as fast as our understanding of the physical world. The result of this disparity has been the development of an enormous gap between our facility with tools and our facility with ideas, between our control of the physical world and control of ourselves.

The acknowledgment of this disparity is the first step toward perception and perspective. Of and by itself, it will not give us complete understanding, but it may acquaint us with the limits of our understanding; it may help us to see that our judgments about ourselves and about others may be defective, that even our physical senses may deceive us. Applied to international relations, an awareness of the gap between technology and human relations must commend to us the advisability of skepticism in our judgments, restraint in our actions, and an effort to try to see the world as others may see it.

It is a curious thing, when you think of it, that people in different societies, in China and the United States say, would have minor differences if any at all on such matters as how to pave a road or build a tractor or a jet plane, but when it

comes to such questions as how to organize a government or farm or factory, Chinese and Americans are not only unable to agree, they are not even able to credit each other with anything but the most dangerous and malicious intentions. Obviously, there are some problems of perception on one side or the other, or on both sides.

Erich Fromm writes: "The lack of objectivity, as far as foreign nations are concerned, is notorious. From one day to another, another nation is made out to be utterly depraved and fiendish, while one's own nation stands for everything that is good and noble. Every action of the enemy is judged by one standard—every action of oneself by another. Even good deeds by the enemy are considered a sign of particular devilishness, meant to deceive us and the world, while our bad deeds are necessary and justified by our noble goals which they serve. Indeed, if one examines the relationship between nations, as well as between individuals, one comes to the conclusion that objectivity is the exception, and a greater or lesser degree of narcissistic distortion is the rule."⁸

In 1955 a revered American commented on Soviet-American relations as follows: "The present tensions with their threat of national annihilation are kept alive by two great illusions. The one, a complete belief on the part of the Soviet world that the capitalist countries are preparing to attack it; that sooner or later we intend to strike. And the other, a complete belief on the part of the capitalist countries that the Soviets are preparing to attack us; that sooner or later they intend to strike. Both are wrong. Each side, so far as the masses are concerned, is equally desirous of peace. For either side, war with the other would mean nothing but disaster. Both equally dread it. But the constant acceleration of preparation may well, without specific intent, ultimately produce a spontaneous combustion."⁹

The speaker was General Douglas MacArthur, and his audience was made up of members of the American Legion. The point General MacArthur was making is one that has

been made many times by psychologists and psychiatrists: people in different societies look at the same facts and "see" different things, that what they see, or think they see, is largely determined by what they *expect* to see.

The point is illustrated by an experiment in which a psychologist had two groups of schoolteachers, one Mexican, the other American, look into a device that simultaneously showed a picture of a bullfighter to one eye and a picture of a baseball player to the other. When asked what they had seen, most of the Mexicans said they had seen a bullfighter and most of the Americans said that they had seen a baseball player. Obviously, what each individual saw had a great deal to do with whether he was a Mexican or an American.

One day in the spring of 1966 both the Secretary of State of the United States and the Secretary-General of the United Nations made speeches about the war in Vietnam. Both are men of intelligence and high ideals. Both looked at the same situation but each saw a different picture. Dean Rusk saw the war as one of democracy versus communism, as a struggle for "the achievement of a peaceful world order that is safe for freedom." U Thant, on the other hand, saw a war of "national survival" for Vietnam, a war in which it had become "illusory" and "irrelevant" to refer to a contest between democracy and communism. Who is right and who is wrong? Who can say? The only thing that is very clear is that one Secretary's ballplayer is another's bullfighter.

We need to acquire some perspective on these matters which have so much to do with determining whether we will live or die in the nuclear age. We need to become cognizant of the varieties of human perception, of the gap between our understanding of the physical world and our understanding of ourselves and of the gap between our behavior and our needs. If we can do that, we will have taken an encouraging first step toward closing those gaps, because the acknowledgment of ignorance is the beginning of wisdom.

The development of some perspective about man and his

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have any pride at all—and they appear to have a great deal—the North Vietnamese must regard such offers as contemptuously insulting. Nor do I think we ought to make effusive offers of friendship to the Chinese if only they will stop supporting wars of “national liberation” and promise to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter. After a long period of conflict nations, like individuals, are not only hostile; they are heartily sick of each other’s company and what they most need is a long period of leaving each other strictly alone.

Applying these thoughts to the Vietnamese war and to the relations of the United States and China, it seems to me that the key to peace is mutual disengagement through political arrangements for the *neutralization* of Southeast Asia. I shall attempt in this chapter, as specifically as possible, to outline a possible plan for peace in Asia, a plan, I believe, which is sound in both psychological and traditional political terms and which could serve as a workable alternative to the current war policy of the United States.

Why Is an Alternative Needed?

I do not accept the view that criticism of the Vietnamese war is illegitimate in the absence of a foolproof plan for ending it; nor do I accept the view that because we are already deeply involved in Vietnam it is “academic” to debate the wisdom of that involvement. It is true that one cannot undo the past, but the assessment of past errors is absolutely indispensable to efforts to correct them and to avoiding their repetition. Far from being academic, the question of whether the United States should or should not have taken over the Vietnamese war in the first place is of the greatest pertinence in deciding whether we should now sustain the war indefinitely on its present scale, expand it, or try to bring it to an

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insurgency," the conflict is gradually expanding in scale and intensity, raising two exceedingly distasteful possibilities: either that it will remain a protracted endurance contest in which American lives are sacrificed in small but unlimited installments while China and Russia stand aside, or that it will explode into an all-out war with China and possibly the Soviet Union as well.

Fourth, insofar as it is based on strategic as distinguished from ideological considerations, the war is based on a misconceived strategy for the containment of China. South Vietnam, as Donald Zagoria, a leading China expert, has pointed out, is not the first of a series of "dominoes" before a Chinese tide; the success of the Viet Cong is closely related to the fact that communists have dominated the Vietnamese nationalist movement since World War II, a circumstance which does not obtain in other Southeast Asian countries. The successes of the Viet Cong, Dr. Zagoria points out, should not "obscure the more fundamental fact that the communists have been unable to seize control of a nationalist movement anywhere else in Asia, Africa or Latin America since the start of World War II."¹

Fifth, as discussed in Chapter 6, the Vietnamese war is having a destructive "fallout" effect on American policy both at home and throughout the world. It has distracted both money and leadership from the Great Society program; it has damaged our relations with allies and neutrals; and it has put a virtual end to the "building of bridges" to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

There is no alternative policy for Vietnam which is good and desirable in any positive sense because our choices are greatly limited by what has already been done. In retrospect it is clear that we should not have supported France's colonial war in Indochina from 1950 to 1954; we should not have supported Ngo Dinh Diem in his violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954; we should not have built up the unpopular Diem regime as our military and political protégé in the late

fifties and early sixties; we should not have sent increasing numbers of military advisers to bolster the flagging South Vietnamese Army; and above all we should not have sent a large American army to take over the war when the South Vietnamese Army was on the verge of collapse in early 1965. All that is water over the dam; we cannot undo the past but we can hope to learn something from it, and perhaps also to retrieve something from it.

Mistakes are not liquidated without a price being paid. No responsible critic of the war—certainly no member of the Senate—advocates a disorderly withdrawal of American forces and the abandonment of South Vietnam to the Viet Cong, but many of us have pointed to the need for a peace short of victory, for a peace involving significant concessions by the United States. A concession, however, is not a humiliation and may indeed be turned to one's own advantage, as General de Gaulle demonstrated by giving independence to Algeria and as Khrushchev demonstrated by proclaiming himself a peacemaker while yielding to the American ultimatum in the Cuban missile crisis. The concessions we must make are necessary as an act of common sense in a tragic situation; as Walter Lippmann has written, "a display of common sense by a proud and imperious nation would be a good moral investment for the future."²

Accommodation and Neutralization in History

History seldom if ever tells us exactly what we must do in specific situations, but it does provide guidance as to the kinds of policies that are likely to succeed and the kinds that are likely to fail. The experience of nations in the last hundred and fifty years leaves one in no doubt that, more often than not, peace settlements based on accommodation

thing might be gained, by introducing the idea of general neutralization in Southeast Asia at an international conference on Vietnam.

(8) *If for any reason an agreement ending the Vietnamese war cannot be reached, the United States should consolidate its forces in highly fortified defensible areas in South Vietnam and keep them there indefinitely.*

Such action, in the wake of an unsuccessful effort to end the war, would represent an accommodation to two fundamental realities: first, that the United States, as the nation with principal, though not exclusive, responsibility for world peace and stability, cannot accept defeat or a disorderly withdrawal from South Vietnam; second, that it now seems likely that a complete military victory can be accomplished only by sacrifices disproportionate to American security interests in South Vietnam and by raising the level of violence to a degree that would impose greatly increased suffering on South Vietnamese civilians and would also greatly increase the danger of war with China.

As long as the United States is expending increasing numbers of lives and increasing sums of money on the Vietnamese war, China, North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front can logically, if erroneously, hope that the American people will sooner or later find the effort intolerable and force the withdrawal of United States forces from Southeast Asia. They may believe that the drain on American lives and resources in Southeast Asia will sap the will and ability of the United States successfully to oppose future wars of national liberation. Powerful evidence that the Chinese subscribe exactly to this view is contained in an editorial which appeared in the *People's Daily* of Peking on August 30, 1966, which stated:

. . . To be quite frank, if United States imperialism kept its forces in Europe and America, the Asian people would have no way of wiping them out. Now, as it is so obliging as to deliver its goods to the customer's door, the Asian

people cannot but express welcome. The more forces United States imperialism throws into Asia, the more will it be bogged down there and the deeper will be the grave it digs for itself.

. . . The tying down of large numbers of United States troops by the Asian people creates a favorable condition for the further growth of the anti-United States struggle of the people in other parts of the world. With all the people rising to attack it, one hitting at its head and the other at its feet, United States imperialism can be nibbled up bit by bit.³

If instead of committing more and more men and resources to the Vietnamese war, we were to reduce our commitment to a level which our enemies knew we could sustain indefinitely at moderate cost, we would then be confronting them with the perfectly credible prospect of permanent American military bases on their borders—a prospect which China has shown herself to fear greatly. Knowing that we could remain in these bases indefinitely, the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese would have a powerful inducement to negotiate peace and China would have a powerful inducement to enter an agreement for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. At the very least, such a policy would convert a situation in which our enemies believe themselves to be wearing us down to one in which we, at supportable cost, would be wearing them down.

On Greatness and Magnanimity

In her relations with Asian nations, as indeed in her relations with all of the revolutionary or potentially revolutionary societies of the world, America has an opportunity to perform services of which no great nation has ever before been capable. To do so we must acquire wisdom to match our power and humility to match our pride. Perhaps the

single word above all others that expresses America's need is "empathy," which Webster defines as the "imaginative projection of one's own consciousness into another being."

Should it be possible to end the Vietnamese war on the basis of an agreement for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, it would then be possible to concentrate with real hope of success on the long and difficult task of introducing some trust into relations between China and the West, of repairing history's ravages, and bringing the great Chinese nation into its proper role as a respected member of the international community. In time it might even be possible for the Chinese and Taiwanese on their own to work out some arrangement for Taiwan that would not do too much damage either to the concept of self-determination or to the Chinese concept of China's cultural indivisibility—perhaps some sort of an arrangement for Taiwanese self-government under nominal Chinese suzerainty. But that would be for them to decide.

All this is not, as has been suggested, a matter of "being kind to China." It is a matter of altering that fatal expectancy which is leading two great nations toward a tragic and unnecessary war. If it involves "being kind to China," those who are repelled by that thought may take some small comfort in the fact that it also involves "being kind to America."

America is a great and powerful and fundamentally decent nation; we know it—or ought to—and the world knows it. At times, however, we act as though we did not believe in our own greatness; we act as though our prestige as a great nation were constantly at issue, constantly in danger of being irretrievably lost, as if our greatness were something that had endlessly to be repurchased, requiring unending exertions to prove to the world that we are indeed an important and powerful nation.

We have been told that we must beat the Russians to the moon, that we cannot relent in our pressures against Castro, that we had no choice but to intervene against the Dominican Revolution, not primarily because these actions were consid-

ered of and by themselves to be essential but because if we did not do these things, our prestige, which is to say, our reputation for greatness, would be hopelessly compromised. In the case of Vietnam, we have been told that our massive military commitment is essential less because of the strategic importance of Vietnam itself than for the purpose of proving to the communists that America is not a "paper tiger" and proving to the world that America cannot be pushed around. Again and again, in many parts of the world, we have engaged in enormous exertions at enormous cost, not so much for the sake of our greatness as for its shadow.

I do not think that America's greatness is questioned in the world, and I certainly do not think that strident behavior is the best way for a nation to prove its greatness. Indeed, in nations as in individuals bellicosity is a mark of weakness and self-doubt rather than of strength and self-assurance. There is something appropriate and admirable about a small country standing up defiantly to a big country; such behavior confers upon the small country a strength and a dignity that it would not otherwise possess. The same behavior on the part of a big nation is grotesque, marking it as a bully. The true mark of greatness is not stridency but magnanimity.

It is precisely because of America's enormous strength and prestige that we can afford to be magnanimous in Vietnam. If the Viet Cong or North Vietnam were to take the initiative in offering substantive concessions, they could plausibly be regarded as having been intimidated by American power. If the United States were to take the lead in suggesting peace terms involving significant concessions to the Viet Cong, many people would suppose that the American people had grown weary of the war—which is probably true; but no one could seriously believe that the United States had been frightened into submission by a small undeveloped country in Southeast Asia.

On September 1, 1966, President de Gaulle of France made a speech in Cambodia. Speaking of America and of the prob-

world. Communism has ceased to be the monolith it seemed to be in Stalin's time; its practice is increasingly being nationalized to fit the conditions of particular countries. What is more important, the communism of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is slowly but steadily being humanized. The terror of Stalin's time has largely disappeared from Russia; the Hungarian government now tolerates a degree of individual liberty; Rumania practices a defiantly independent national communism; Yugoslavia seems slowly and hesitatingly to be coming to accept the legitimacy of open expressions of doubt about communism itself.

The architect, or executor, of these extraordinary developments was Nikita Khrushchev. Whether Khrushchev actually intended to preside over the liquidation of Stalin's empire may well be questioned, but that has clearly been the major result of his ten years of leadership. Starting with his famous secret speech of February 1956 in which he denounced Stalin, Khrushchev initiated a process which is beginning to undermine the bases of communist totalitarianism. Heretofore the judgments and the words of Soviet dictators had been deemed infallible; by denouncing his predecessor, Khrushchev admitted the fallibility of Soviet communism and set an enormously important precedent for future doubts, future questions and future criticism, in Russia, in other communist societies, and insofar as there can still be said to be one, in the international communist movement.

The most striking results of this new ferment in the communist world have been in the countries of Eastern Europe, but important changes have taken place and continue to take place in the Soviet Union itself. The very manner of Khrushchev's removal from power is illustrative of the new atmosphere in the Soviet Union. By Western standards it was crudely done, to be sure, but by previous Soviet standards the removal of Khrushchev and his subsequent reappearance as a private citizen were notable steps forward toward the development of civilized political methods.

only as the occasion for recrimination, but the necessity of working together for some common purpose had the effect of dissolving animosities and generating friendliness between members of the two groups.

The reconciliation of East and West is primarily a psychological problem, having to do with the cultivation of cooperative attitudes and of a sense of having practical common objectives. A grand design for ending the cold war in a single stroke of statesmanship is not even remotely feasible. What is feasible in East-West relations is the advancement of a great many projects of practical cooperation, projects which, taken by themselves, may be of little importance, but which, taken together, may have the effect of shaping revolutionary new attitudes in the world.

The shaping of such attitudes is, or ought to be, the primary objective of our foreign policy. It is not simply a question of learning to value peace over war. Virtually everybody wants peace but most nations want something else even more, be it conquest or glory or prestige or some objective or other that is taken to be essential for their honor. The problem, then, is not merely to persuade people to want peace but to persuade them to want it more than all those other things for which they are usually ready to sacrifice it. If there is any key to survival and security in the nuclear age, it probably does not lie in new and improved international peace-keeping organizations, nor in elaborate schemes for disarmament, which has proven historically to be one of the most intractable of international problems, but in the personal attitudes of peoples and their leaders, in their willingness to place at least some of the common requirements of humanity over the conflicting aspirations of nations and ideologies.

If attitudes rather than formal arrangements are the critical factor in international relations, then a somewhat different set of priorities is indicated for foreign policy from those which we generally profess. Formal East-West security arrange-

development, foreign aid has potential value as an instrument of East-West cooperation. For twenty years we have thought of foreign aid as a weapon in the cold war—a humane and intelligent one for the most part but nonetheless a weapon in a global struggle against communism. Looking beyond the Vietnamese war to the time when one hopes the Western and communist nations will have resumed the building of bridges, it may be that we shall find it possible to convert assistance to the underdeveloped countries from an instrument of rivalry to an instrument of reconciliation.

We are coming to discover that all Soviet aid programs are not detrimental to our interests, that some, indeed, may advance objectives, such as the development of India, that we ourselves favor. Why then could not the United States propose to the Soviet Union that the two countries cooperate, under the auspices of an international agency, in a particular development project that both favor—such as the construction of a canal or fertilizer plant in India or another country? If a project could be found that both countries considered to be in their interests—and I am sure a specific project could be found—a modest gain for economic development and a considerable gain for world peace could be achieved by a joint Soviet-American venture or, better still, by a joint venture involving several communist countries and several Western countries.

Cooperation, like conflict, tends to feed on itself. An initial, tentative venture in East-West cooperation in economic aid could lead to another, bolder venture and to a genuine broadening of the area of common interests, which in turn might lead to Soviet membership in the international lending agencies and a general multilateralization, indeed internationalization, of aid along the lines to be developed in the next chapter.

It is through such enterprises as the foregoing, some bigger, some smaller, but none very sweeping or decisive in themselves, that bridges can be built across the chasm of ideology.

All have the advantage that they can contribute to the shaping of new attitudes and new expectations. As we have noted, men tend to act on their expectations, and prophecies, firmly believed, have a way of fulfilling themselves. Perhaps the best that we can do in this imperfect world is to work hard and patiently, in our daily lives and in all the diverse pursuits of men and nations, to cultivate new and more hopeful expectations on which to act and prophecies whose fulfillment will benefit the human race.

Reuniting Europe

In Europe the tide of change in relations within and between the two blocs has profoundly altered the meaning of the cold war. Each side is now convinced—although neither is likely to admit it—that the other is in secure possession of the territories under its control. One hears little indeed these days of communist subversion in Western Europe or of the forcible liberation of Eastern Europe. Europe remains unnaturally divided but no serious observer expects war and it is now generally agreed on both sides that if the two Europes are to come together it can only be through a process of gradual change and accommodation.

I do not believe reunification of Eastern and Western Europe requires the severance of the latter's bonds with the United States. Both America and the Soviet Union, as the leaders of the two coalitions, should play leading roles in the task of reconciliation. Much of the hope for an improvement of relations leading to the ultimate reunification of Europe derives from the approximate balance of power between the two sides. Were Western Europe to be detached from America, an imbalance would come into existence, one which might tempt the Russians once again with the possibility of dominating Western Europe. As Raymond Aron has pointed out, "The reunification of Eastern and Western Europe requires a détente between the two blocs rather than

tant one, of which we must take due cognizance in the shaping of our own policy.

In the fall of 1964, when the proposed multilateral force was under active discussion, I visited Yugoslavia. Virtually every Yugoslav to whom I spoke raised the question, expressing alarm and fear at the possibility of a German role, however circumscribed, in the disposition of nuclear weapons. I explained repeatedly, and I am sure vainly, that under the proposed multilateral force arrangement Germany would have no independent authority whatever to dispose of nuclear weapons, that, indeed, Germany would be so firmly locked into a multilateral system as to preclude the possibility of a German national nuclear force in the future. As these discussions progressed, I became equally convinced of the logic of my position and of the impossibility of making it persuasive to the Yugoslavs.

The Eastern European fear of Germany is irrational and exaggerated but wholly understandable. It is the product of tragic and shocking experience, and only the healing effects of time, a great deal of time, will alleviate it. No matter what safeguards surrounded a German role in a Western nuclear deterrent system, neither the Russians nor any other people in Eastern Europe would feel safe with them. Their fear of Germany is an unalterable fact of our time; it exists—and must be taken due account of—despite the fact, which is evident to a fair-minded observer, that the German Federal Republic has become a decent, democratic, and peaceful society.

The Eastern Europeans have not understood, and perhaps cannot be expected to understand, the extent of the changes which have taken place in the new Germany. One may hope, however, that the coming of age of a new generation and continuing evidences of the decency and democracy of the Federal Republic will ultimately dispel Eastern Europe's fear of Germany. I am convinced that nothing we can do in the meantime will dispel that fear.

Rebuilding Bridges

Putting Our Own House in Order

We spoke in Chapter 6 of the disruptive effect of the Vietnamese war on the internal life of the United States; I return now to that theme in order to suggest that there is one more bridge waiting to be rebuilt, at least as important as those to the communist world and to our allies, the bridge between the American people and their government which is absolutely critical for the strength and health of our society.

The human and material resources that make a great society are produced at home, not abroad. An ambitious foreign policy built on a deteriorating domestic base is possible only for a limited time; like the light cast by an extinct star, it is predestined to come to an end. Such, approximately, was the experience of France before the war of 1870 and of Austria before the war of 1914. America is nowhere near that extremity but she will come to it eventually if we do not stop to put our own house in order or, more exactly, if we do not resume the work of educating our children, combating poverty, renewing our cities, and purifying our physical environment begun so hopefully by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

There has been a great deal of talk about "neo-isolationism." It is true that a growing number of Americans—I am one of them—are expressing concern with what they regard as the overinvolvement of the United States in certain parts of the world with the consequent neglect of important problems here at home. It is not true that this concern indicates a willingness to abandon vital American interests abroad and to let the world go its way while we retreat into an illusory isolationism.

The charge of "neo-isolationism" is defective on at least two counts. First, it is based on the premise that the United States has a vital interest in just about every country in the world, when in fact many things happen in many places that

Space is one of the few areas in which, by enormous concentration of resources, the Russians have been able to surpass us in certain respects and this success, hopefully, will ease their feeling of inferiority.

The United States, on the other hand, is the richest, most powerful, and generally most successful nation in the world, and everyone knows it. It is simply not necessary for us to go around forever proclaiming: "I am the greatest!" The more one does that sort of thing, in fact, the more people doubt it, and if the world is not persuaded of our pre-eminence now it probably never will be. Would it not be more dignified, more sensible, and more realistic if we responded to Soviet space achievements by offering our own sincere congratulations while continuing to go about our business in a way that meets our own needs and our own national priorities? I think it would be a heartening sign that America has truly come of age if we could take the attitude that the Russians are free to concentrate their resources on going to the moon if that is what they think they most need and we wish them well, but that, as for ourselves, the moon is only one of our aspirations, a distant one at that, and in the meantime we have children to educate and cities to rebuild.

A concluding point, which political "realists" may consider extraneous, is that, insofar as the satisfactions of life have anything to do with politics at all, they have to do with domestic not foreign politics, with projects of education, culture, employment, renewal, and beautification rather than with foreign wars and alliances, to say nothing of crash projects for going to the moon and the development, at immense cost, of airplanes that will fly two thousand miles an hour—which is much faster than anybody needs to go. As Thomas Huxley said of the inventions of the nineteenth century—the dynamos, the open-hearth furnaces, and the locomotives—"The great issue about which hangs a true sublimity and the terror of overhanging fate is, what are you going to do with all these things?"⁵

rich to the poor clearly encompasses an obligation on the part of rich nations to poor nations. Indeed, it is no more than common sense to recognize that, among nations as within them, the security of the rich is best assured by providing hope and opportunity for the poor.

Neither we nor any other nation, however, has yet accepted an obligation to the poor nations in any way analogous to that which we accept toward the individual poor and the poorer states and regions within our own country. In America and other democratic societies higher income people provide the bulk of the tax money to finance public services of which the poor are the principal beneficiaries; the redistribution of wealth has become a normal and accepted function of democratic government. The rich pay not as a private act of *noblesse oblige* but in fulfillment of a social responsibility; the poor receive benefits not as a lucky gratuity but as the right of citizens. The effect of the great social reforms in our country from the time of Theodore Roosevelt to the Great Society has been the virtual displacement of private philanthropy by public responsibility. The Salvation Army has just about been put out of business by social security and, with due respect for the humanity and kindness of the Salvation Army, who can deny that unemployment compensation is a major improvement?

With no less respect for the competence and dedication of our Agency for International Development, I suggest that we begin to replace bilateral foreign aid, which is analogous to private philanthropy, with an internationalized program based on the same principle of public responsibility which underlies progressive taxation and the social services we provide for our own people. I suggest that we extend the frontiers of our loyalty and compassion in order to transform our aid to the world's poorer nations from something resembling a private gratuity to a community responsibility.

It is with such thoughts in mind that I have decided, after almost twenty years of American foreign aid, that I for one

can no longer actively support an aid program that is primarily bilateral. I would, however, support and do all within my power to secure an expanded program of economic aid—a greatly expanded program of economic aid—provided that it were conducted as a community enterprise, that is, through such international channels as the United Nations, the International Development Association of the World Bank, and the regional development banks.

The Consequences of Bilateralism

The crucial difference between bilateral and international aid is the basic incompatibility of bilateralism with individual and national dignity. Charity corrodes both the rich and the poor, breeding an exaggerated sense of authority on the part of the donor and a destructive loss of self-esteem on the part of the recipient. Whatever the material benefits of our aid—and they have been considerable in some countries—I am increasingly inclined to the view that they have been purchased at an excessive political and psychological cost to both lenders and borrowers. The critical question is whether the transfer of wealth between nations can be made compatible with human dignity as has been done within our own country.

Difficult as the effort might be, it would be salutary for Americans to try to imagine exactly how they might feel as recipients of economic aid—and all that goes with it—from foreign countries.

How, for example, would the management and employees of the New Haven Railroad feel if they were placed under the tutelage of a mission of, say, German transportation experts—not just transportation experts but *German* experts, who, for all they might do to show us how to run a railroad, would also be living purveyors of a message to the effect that

A New Concept of Foreign Aid

Former Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith believes that American military aid to Pakistan actually *caused* the war between India and Pakistan in 1965, simply because, quite apart from the merits of the Kashmir dispute, if the United States had not provided the arms, Pakistan would not have been able to seek a military solution.

These arms of course were meant to be used for defense against China and the Soviet Union, not against India. The trouble was that Pakistan did not and does not share the American view of Kashmir as a secondary issue and therefore regards India, not China or Russia, as her principal enemy. American military assistance had been provided on the condition and in the expectation that it would be used only against communist aggression, but as might have been expected these pledges were cast aside in the summer of 1965.

Should this have come as a great surprise? I do not think so. President Ayub Khan said with perfect candor in 1961 that the United States should be "mindful of the fact that if our territory was violated, we would spend our time dealing with the enemy rather than putting the American weapons in cotton wool."³

The mistake the United States made was the common one of assuming that its preoccupations were everybody's preoccupations. It seemed to us perfectly obvious that the only real threats in South Asia were the Soviet Union and Communist China and that it was absurd for India and Pakistan to be in conflict with each other over a secondary issue like Kashmir. It seemed to us that anyone with sense would share our view that there was only one truly crucial issue in world affairs, the threat of communism, be it in India or Vietnam, in Cuba or the Dominican Republic. The crowning irony of the affair was that this war, which could not have been fought without American military aid, was settled primarily through the mediation of the Soviet Union, one of the two countries against which American arms were meant to be directed.

Administration witnesses tell the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee every year that military assistance to the countries bordering on the Soviet Union and China is vital to America's "forward strategy," sustaining some three and a half million men under arms at far lower cost than would be required to sustain comparable American forces. This of course is an example of the ancient and sound practice of great military powers, developed by the Romans, of maintaining foreign mercenaries to do their peripheral fighting while keeping their own main forces as strategic reserves.

The variation introduced by the Americans is that our mercenaries usually remain neutral while *we* fight brushfire wars with our own soldiers. Among the countries bordering on Russia and China which receive American military assistance are Greece, Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Laos, Taiwan, and Korea. Of these only the Koreans have men fighting in Vietnam and they are receiving a handsome subsidy for their effort. The Greeks and the Turks are too busy menacing Russia with their military power, to say nothing of each other, while we do not dare to use Chiang Kai-shek's large and well-financed force lest it bring the Chinese Communist Army swarming into Vietnam. The result is that we are sustaining over three million non-fighting men along the borders of Russia and China who do guard duty while American soldiers fight in Vietnam. One wonders whether some of the countries which maintain these forces would not be more stable and secure today if much of the money spent on armaments over the years had been used instead for development and social reform.

America's modest military aid in Latin America is decidedly more effective than its mercenary forces in Europe and Asia, not, however, in holding back communists but in holding *up* military oligarchies.

Mr. John Duncan Powell, a political scientist who had studied the impact of American military assistance in Latin America, has pointed out that the smallness of the sums involved is deceptive, and that, measured in terms of their

effect on the ability of military forces to apply violence against civilian groups, American arms are very significant indeed.⁴ In countries where per-capita income is low, where political institutions are fragile, where great numbers of people are uneducated, unorganized, and often demoralized, even a small amount of military equipment and training, say \$10 worth, can give a soldier an overwhelming advantage over a civilian in a conflict situation. Taking AID figures on cumulative United States military assistance per soldier as of 1962 and matching these against per-capita income, Mr. Powell points out that as of 1962 each member of Nicaragua's armed forces represented \$930 worth of United States arms and training available for use in possible street fighting against students and workers with a total annual per-capita income of only \$205, while each member of Guatemala's armed forces represented \$538 worth of United States arms and training as against students and workers with a per-capita income of only \$185.

Viewed in the physical and economic context of a poor country in Central America, United States military assistance no longer appears small and innocent; it contributes in an important way to the perpetuation of military oligarchies. It is not a large program but, as Mercutio said of his fatal wound, "No, 'tis not so deep as a well, nor so wide as a church door, but 'tis enough, 'twill serve."⁵

Mr. Powell concludes that, small as it is, the American military assistance program is "a contributory cause of militarism in Latin America" and that "the shift in emphasis from hemispheric security to internal security capabilities will make the Latin American military better trained and equipped than ever to intervene in the political systems of their nations." "This," says Powell, "may be the hidden price tag on the anti-communist security which the United States seeks in the western hemisphere through the military assistance program." Events in Brazil and Argentina have certainly borne him out.

On an evening in the summer of 1966 an American journalist's interview with rebels in the Guatemalan jungle was shown on television. A young rebel leader said he was a Marxist because Marxism, as he understood it, called for giving the land to the peasants; he thought of the United States as an enemy, because, he thought, American arms and power were always placed at the disposal of the oppressors of his people. This view of America is not unknown in other parts of the world; it is one of the rewards of the "forward strategy" of American military assistance.

Foreign Aid and American Overcommitment

At the same time as it has had disruptive effects on its recipients, bilateral American military and economic assistance has also had some unforeseen effects on the United States: it has become a vehicle toward commitments which exceed both American interests and American material and intellectual resources.

Foreign aid is not in a literal sense the cause of or the reason for American military involvement in Vietnam. It was, however, an important factor contributing to the *state of mind* of policy-makers who committed the United States to a major land war in Asia after having stated forcefully, repeatedly and, to many of us, quite convincingly that that was exactly what they intended not to do. The relationship between American aid and the Vietnamese war is no less significant for being psychological rather than juridical; indeed it is probably more significant.

The idea of foreign aid as a source of American military involvement is certainly not my own; on the contrary, such a connection never even occurred to me or, I daresay, to other members of the Foreign Relations Committee until Adminis-

tration officials began referring to the aid program as cause and evidence of what they judged to be an American military obligation in Vietnam. Nor, I think, can the connection between aid and military involvement be dismissed as mere excess of rhetoric by partisans of the Vietnamese war.

Although he has now disavowed aid as a source of military obligations, the Secretary of State on no fewer than three occasions referred to Congressional approval of aid programs as a basis of authority for the American military involvement in Vietnam. He did so at a Senate hearing in August 1964. He did so again in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 28, 1966, when, after citing the SEATO Treaty as authorizing American military action in Vietnam, he went on to say:

In addition to that, we have bilateral assistance agreements to [*sic*] South Vietnam. We have had several actions of the Congress. We have had the annual aid appropriations in which the purposes of the aid have been fully set out before the Congress. . . .⁶

The Secretary made the same point most explicitly in a speech in Las Vegas on February 16, 1966. He said:

We are committed to assist South Vietnam resist aggression by the SEATO Treaty, which was approved by the Senate with only one dissenting vote; by the pledges of three successive Presidents; by the aid approved by bipartisan majorities in Congress over a period of twelve years; by joint declarations with our allies in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific; and by the Resolution which Congress adopted in August 1964, with only two dissenting votes [*emphasis added*].⁷

I very much doubt that any member of the Senate ever supposed that by voting for foreign aid, the Senate was authorizing or committing the United States to use its armed forces to sustain the ruling government of any recipient country against foreign attack, much less against internal insur-

rection. I rather doubt, too, that those who later cited such a connection thought of it *before* the United States took over the Vietnamese war.

What seems to have happened is that large-scale military and economic aid, along with our gradual assumption of the French role in Indochina and the adoption of Ngo Dinh Diem as an American protégé, created a *state of mind* among American policy-makers under which it was felt that the United States had a proprietary investment in Vietnam—an investment of prestige and money which those responsible were naturally unwilling to see go down the drain. A gambler is always tempted, once he has begun to lose, to keep raising the stakes in the hope of recouping his losses; since early 1965 American policy-makers have been steadily raising the stakes of a gamble which began in part with aid and which until the dispatch of a large American army to Vietnam in the first months of 1965 could have been liquidated with a fairly small loss. Once the stakes became high, however, explanations were called for and, apparently without awareness of the implications of what they were saying, our policy-makers began referring to foreign aid as one of the factors that committed the United States to war in Vietnam.

Explicit references to foreign aid as a legal basis for an American military obligation seem, therefore, to have been *ex post facto*; policy-makers who came to feel that the United States was obligated to take over the Vietnamese war, in part because aid programs authorized with no such intention had contributed to the sense of an American investment, later referred back to foreign-aid legislation as justifying and authorizing the American military commitment. Subsequent disavowals of aid as a source of military obligation cannot undo its prior contribution to that state of mind which made military involvement seem essential.

It is a little late to be locking the barn door after your prize herd has galloped off into the distance. Nonetheless, in order to disabuse the Administration of the view that the

Congress, by adopting aid legislation, is authorizing the President to go to war in defense of the beneficiaries, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee added language to the policy statement of the foreign-aid bill in 1966 stating that the authorization of military and economic aid "shall not be construed as creating a new commitment or as affecting any existing commitment to use armed forces of the United States for the defense of any foreign country."

Alerted by the experience of Vietnam, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee undertook a brief inquiry in the fall of 1966 into the implications of American military and economic assistance as well as other aspects of American policy toward Thailand. The inquiry was undertaken as a normal exercise of the Senate's advisory responsibility in foreign relations. Before it began, however, Mr. Joseph Alsop, in an obviously overexcited condition caused no doubt by the war, denounced it as a "plan for giving aid and comfort to the enemy."⁸

Until the purposes of foreign aid are clarified, I am disinclined to support long-term authorizations or other legislative provisions that would give the Executive greater latitude than it already has in the conduct of foreign aid. I would strongly favor the long-term authorization of an *internationalized* foreign-aid program; should the Congress ever be asked to approve such a program, I for one would not only support the principle of long-term authorization but would do all that I could to secure its adoption. In the meantime, I must state quite frankly that my attitude is influenced by a lack of confidence in the purposes for which bilateral aid is likely to be used. I have been particularly disturbed by the implications of the "Asian Doctrine," discussed in Chapter 2, under which the United States would accept unilateral responsibility for maintaining order and extending the Great Society to non-communist Asia. Until confidence in the uses to which our aid is likely to be put is restored—and I would hope although I do not really expect that it will be in the near future—I think it prudent for the Congress to retain its

full authority to review the authorization as well as the appropriation of funds for foreign aid.

Many programs are justified by the Agency for International Development on the ground that they will maintain an "American presence." These programs are too small to have much effect on economic development but big enough to involve the United States in the affairs of the countries concerned. The underlying assumption of these programs is that the presence of some American aid officials is a blessing which no developing country, except for the benighted communist ones, should be denied.

I think this view of aid is a manifestation of the arrogance of power. Its basis, if not messianism, is certainly egotism. It assumes that the size, wealth, and power of the United States are evidence of wisdom and virtue as well; it assumes that just as the right-thinking, hard-working laborer in a Horatio Alger novel might have counted it a privilege to take counsel with the local tycoon, every right-thinking, hard-working underdeveloped country must consider it a privilege to have some resident Americans around to tell its leaders how to run their affairs.

It is a flattering idea but unfortunately it is an inaccurate idea. Experience has shown—and not just in our case but in that of other big countries as well—that affection is more likely to be won by an American "absence" than by a conspicuous American presence. In fact, the countries that are fondest of us often seem to be those who have had the Russians around for a long time, and I think the Russians have profited in the same way from some of our involvements. This is not because we lack good intentions but simply because people like to make their own decisions and their own mistakes in their own way, and our "presence" tells them that we do not think them qualified to do so. We can give them all the money and all the technique in the world, but what is their use if the very act of giving robs the recipients of dignity?

Bilateral foreign aid, like some of the other "instruments" of American foreign policy, has become a vehicle toward the involvement of the United States in matters lying far beyond its proper concern. Though by no means the sole cause, or even the major cause, of the developing role of the United States as ideological policeman for the world, bilateral aid has been a factor in that development. It has become a factor in a general tendency to go it alone, a tendency reflected in our neglect of the United Nations, in our neglect of the views and sensibilities of allies and other countries, and in the diversion of money and effort from those promising and essential domestic reforms which until recently bade fair to make the United States an example of progress and social justice for the world.

Foreign aid does not have to contribute to such results. It can indeed be a powerful means toward the renewal of strained partnerships, toward the reconciliation of national animosities, and above all toward the economic growth of the world's poor countries under conditions that foster dignity as well as development. To accomplish these ends we will have greatly to increase our aid program and to transform it from an instrument of national policy to a community program for international development.

The New Concept

I propose, therefore, the internationalization and expansion of foreign aid. I propose its conversion from an instrument of national foreign policy to an international program for the limited transfer of wealth from rich countries to poor countries in accordance with the same principle of community responsibility that in our own country underlies progressive taxation, social-welfare programs, and the effective transfer of wealth from the rich states to the poor states

through programs of federal assistance. The time has come to start thinking of foreign aid as part of a limited international fiscal system through which the wealthy members of a world community would act sensibly and in their own interests to meet an obligation toward the poor members of the community.

So great a transformation in the character and conduct of aid cannot be made all at once. A significant advance would be achieved by a favorable American response to the request of Mr. George Woods, President of the World Bank, for greatly increased contributions to the International Development Association, the affiliate of the Bank which provides long-term loans at very low interest rates. At present, however, only slight progress is being made toward the internationalization of aid. Prior to 1966 the Congress repeatedly approved a modest amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act authorizing the President to channel 15 percent of the development-loan fund through the World Bank and its affiliated agencies, but in each instance the subsequent appropriations measure prohibited the use of foreign-aid funds for this purpose. In 1966 Congress adopted an amendment *requiring* the diversion of 10 percent of the development-loan fund to the international lending agencies; the appropriations bill altered this to give the President *permissive* authority to channel these funds through international agencies.

What steps can be taken toward the development of an international system for the limited redistribution of income between rich countries and poor countries? First, the aid-providing countries of the world should terminate bilateral programs and channel their development lending through the World Bank and its affiliated agencies, especially the International Development Association. Secondly, the Bank and its affiliates should be authorized to dispense the increased development funds that would be at their disposal as they now dispense limited amounts, that is, according to social needs and strict economic principles. Third, the Bank

and its affiliates should execute aid programs through an expanded corps of highly trained international civil servants, encouraging objectivity by the assignment of field personnel, so far as possible, to countries and regions other than their own. Fourth, the Bank and its affiliates should be authorized to recommend amounts to be contributed each year by member countries to an international development pool; contributions should be progressive, with the main burden falling on the rich countries but, in keeping with the principle of a community responsibility, with even the poorest countries making token contributions.⁹

An internationalized system would provide a framework within which the great powers could convert their aid programs from cold war instruments of competition to cooperative ventures that would benefit their own relations as well as the economic needs of the developing countries. It would be a great thing indeed if the United States and the Soviet Union, the world's two most economically powerful nations, would join in endorsing the principle of an international fiscal system. In this connection, it would be highly desirable for the Soviet Union to join the World Bank, of which Yugoslavia at present is the only communist member. Perhaps the United States government could take the initiative of suggesting to the Russians that they join and of offering, if necessary, to sponsor amendments to the Bank's charter that might make membership more attractive to the Soviet Union.

There are many possibilities for Soviet-American cooperation through development aid. The advantages of joint development projects were cited in Chapter 10 (See pp. 209-10). Beyond these, it would be a boon to their own relations and a splendid example for other countries if the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divert equivalent sums of money from armaments to the international development pool. Under an internationalized development program, one can envision Russian and American engineers and economists working together in many parts of the world

as members of an international corps of civil servants. The internationalization of aid, by creating a framework for cooperation between the great powers, could thus provide a powerful impetus for world peace as well as for economic development.

The transformation of economic aid from a national charity, and an instrument of cold war competition, to an international responsibility would put an end to the peculiar and corrosive tyranny which donor and recipient seem to exercise over each other in bilateral relationships. Aid would be converted to a community responsibility characterized by continuity, predictability, and dignity for all parties. The economic development of the poor nations of the world would be treated for the first time as an end in itself, insulated from international political rivalries and internal political pressures. Instead of being a weapon in the ancient and discredited game of power politics, aid could become, like educational exchange, a means for changing the nature of the game, for civilizing it and for adapting it to the requirements of survival in the nuclear age.

It may be contended that such a program is unrealistic, that there are insuperable obstacles to its realization. There are indeed obstacles and they are formidable, but they are not insuperable; they are not natural obstacles, like man's inability to fly by flapping his arms, or technological, like his momentary inability to fly a rocket ship to Mars, but psychological. If the program I recommend is unrealistic, it is unrealistic because, and only because, people *think* it is unrealistic.

As with most important adjustments in human affairs, the first and most important requirement toward the formation of an international fiscal system is a change in our *thinking*. We must learn to think of the world as a community in which the privileged accept certain responsibilities toward the underprivileged just as they do in our own country. We must develop a new idea of generosity, one which purports

to help people without humiliating them, one which accepts the general advancement of the community rather than cloying expressions of gratitude as its just and proper reward.

Much will be required to accomplish such a transformation in the meaning and purpose of foreign aid. For my own part, whenever the Administration is prepared to ask for legislation authorizing the United States to participate in a program of aid to developing countries involving significantly increased amounts of money, softer lending terms, and international management, I pledge to use all my resources as a Senator and as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee to secure its enactment.

THERE ARE TWO AMERICAS. One is the America of Lincoln and Adlai Stevenson; the other is the America of Teddy Roosevelt and the modern superpatriots. One is generous and humane, the other narrowly egotistical; one is self-critical, the other self-righteous; one is sensible, the other romantic; one is good-humored, the other solemn; one is inquiring, the other pontificating; one is moderate, the other filled with passionate intensity; one is judicious and the other arrogant in the use of great power.

We have tended in the years of our great power to puzzle the world by presenting to it now the one face of America, now the other, and sometimes both at once. Many people all over the world have come to regard America as being capable of magnanimity and farsightedness but no less capable of pettiness and spite. The result is an inability to anticipate American actions which in turn makes for apprehension and a lack of confidence in American aims.

The inconstancy of American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of two distinct sides of the American character. Both are characterized by a kind of moralism, but one is the morality of decent instincts tempered by the knowledge of human imperfection and the other is the morality of

absolute self-assurance fired by the crusading spirit. The one is exemplified by Lincoln, who found it strange, in the words of his second Inaugural Address, "that any man should dare to ask for a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces," but then added: "let us judge not, that we be not judged." The other is exemplified by Theodore Roosevelt, who in his December 6, 1904, Annual Message to Congress, without question or doubt as to his own and his country's capacity to judge right and wrong, proclaimed the duty of the United States to exercise an "internal police power" in the hemisphere on the ground that "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America . . . ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation. . . ." Roosevelt of course never questioned that the "wrongdoing" would be done by our Latin neighbors and we of course were the "civilized nation" with the duty to set things right.

After twenty-five years of world power the United States must decide which of the two sides of its national character is to predominate—the humanism of Lincoln or the arrogance of those who would make America the world's policeman. One or the other will help shape the spirit of the age—unless of course we refuse to choose, in which case America may come to play a less important role in the world, leaving the great decisions to others.

The current tendency is toward a more strident and aggressive American foreign policy, which is to say, toward a policy closer to the spirit of Theodore Roosevelt than of Lincoln. We are still trying to build bridges to the communist countries and we are still, in a small way, helping the poorer nations to make a better life for their people; but we are also involved in a growing war against Asian communism, a war which began and might have ended as a civil war if American intervention had not turned it into a contest of ideologies, a war whose fallout is disrupting our internal life and complicating our relations with most of the world.

Our national vocabulary has changed with our policies. A few years ago we were talking of détente and building bridges, of five-year plans in India and Pakistan, or agricultural cooperatives in the Dominican Republic, and land and tax reform all over Latin America. Today these subjects are still discussed in a half-hearted and desultory way but the focus of power and interest has shifted to the politics of war. Diplomacy has become largely image-making, and instead of emphasizing plans for social change, the policy-planners and political scientists are conjuring up "scenarios" of escalation and nuclear confrontation and "models" of insurgency and counter-insurgency.

The change in words and values is no less important than the change in policy, because words *are* deeds and style *is* substance insofar as they influence men's minds and behavior. What seems to be happening, as Archibald MacLeish has put it, is that "the feel of America in the world's mind" has begun to change and faith in "the idea of America" has been shaken for the world and, what is more important, for our own people. MacLeish is suggesting—and I think he is right—that much of the idealism and inspiration is disappearing from American policy, but he also points out that they are not yet gone and by no means are they irretrievable:

. . . if you look closely and listen well, there is a human warmth, a human meaning which nothing has killed in almost twenty years and which nothing is likely to kill. . . . What has always held this country together is an idea—a dream if you will—a large and abstract thought of the sort the realistic and the sophisticated may reject but mankind can hold to.¹

The foremost need of American foreign policy is a renewal of dedication to an "idea that mankind can hold to"—not a missionary idea full of pretensions about being the world's policemen but a Lincolnian idea expressing that powerful strand of decency and humanity which is the true source of America's greatness.

Humanism and Puritanism

I am not prepared to argue that mankind is suffering from an excess of virtue but I think the world has endured about all it can of the crusades of high-minded men bent on the regeneration of the human race. Since the beginning of history men have been set upon by zealots and crusaders, who, far from wishing them harm, have wanted sincerely and fervently to raise them from benightedness to blessedness. The difficulty about all this doing of noble deeds has not been in its motives but in the perverseness of human nature, in the regrettable fact that most men are loutish and ungrateful when it comes to improving their souls and more often than not have to be forced into their own salvation. The result has been a great deal of bloodshed and violence committed not in malice but for the purest of motives. The victims may not always have appreciated the fact that their tormentors had noble motives but the fact remains that it was not wickedness that did them in but, in Thackeray's phrase, "the mischief which the very virtuous do."

Who are the self-appointed emissaries of God who have wrought so much violence in the world? They are men with doctrines, men of faith and idealism, men who confuse power with virtue, men who believe in some cause without doubt and practice their beliefs without scruple, men who cease to be human beings with normal preferences for work and fun and family and become instead living, breathing embodiments of some faith or ideology. From the religious wars to the two world wars they have been responsible for much or most of the violence in the world. From Robespierre to Stalin and Mao Tse-tung they have been the extreme practitioners of the arrogance of power—extreme, indeed, in a way that has never been known and, hopefully, never will be known in America.

There are elements of this kind of fanaticism in Western

societies but the essential strength of democracy and capitalism as they are practiced in the West is that they are relatively free of doctrine and dogma and largely free of illusions about man and his nature. Of all the intellectual achievements of Western civilization, the one, I think, that is most truly civilized is that by and large we have learned to deal with man as he is or, at most, as he seems capable of becoming, but not as we suppose in the abstract he ought to be. Our economy is geared to human acquisitiveness and our politics to human ambition. Accepting these qualities as part of human character, we have been able in substantial measure both to satisfy them and to civilize them. We have been able to civilize them because we have understood that a man's own satisfaction is more nearly a condition of than an obstacle to his decent behavior toward others. This realism about man may prove in the long run to be our greatest asset over communism, which can deny and denounce but, with all the "Red Guards" of China, cannot remake human nature.

Acceptance of his own nature would seem to be the most natural thing in the world for a man, but experience shows that it is not. Only at an advanced state of civilization do men become tolerant of human shortcomings. Only at an advanced level of civilization, it seems, do men acquire the wisdom and humility to acknowledge that they are not really cut out to play God. At all previous levels of culture men seem to be more interested in the enforced improvement of others than in voluntary fulfillment for themselves, more interested in forcing their fellow creatures to be virtuous than in helping them to be happy. Only under the conditions of material affluence and political democracy that prevail in much of the modern West have whole societies been able and willing to renounce the harsh asceticism of their own past, which still prevails in much of the East, and to embrace the philosophy that life after all is short and it is no sin to try to enjoy it.

Our hold on this philosophy is tenuous. There is a strand

in our history and in our national character which is all too congenial to the spirit of crusading ideology. The Puritans who came to New England in the seventeenth century did not establish their faith as a major religion in America but the Puritan way of thought—harsh, ascetic, intolerant, promising salvation for the few but damnation for the many—became a major intellectual force in American life. It introduced a discordant element into a society bred in the English heritage of tolerance, moderation, and experimentalism.

Throughout our history two strands have coexisted uneasily—a dominant strand of democratic humanism and a lesser but durable strand of intolerant puritanism. There has been a tendency through the years for reason and moderation to prevail as long as things are going tolerably well or as long as our problems seem clear and finite and manageable. But when things have gone badly for any length of time, or when the reasons for adversity have seemed obscure, or simply when some event or leader of opinion has aroused the people to a state of high emotion, our puritan spirit has tended to break through, leading us to look at the world through the distorting prism of a harsh and angry moralism.

Communism has aroused our latent puritanism as has no other movement in our history, causing us to see principles where there are only interests and conspiracy where there is only misfortune. And when this view of things prevails, conflicts become crusades and morality becomes delusion and hypocrisy. Thus, for example, when young hoodlums—the so-called “Red Guards”—terrorize and humiliate Chinese citizens who are suspected of a lack of fervor for the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, we may feel reconfirmed in our judgment that communism is a barbarous philosophy utterly devoid of redeeming features of humanity, but before going into transports of moral outrage over the offenses of the “Red Guards,” we might recall that no fewer than two hundred thousand, and possibly half a million, people were murdered in the

anti-communist terror that swept Indonesia in 1966 and scarcely a voice of protest was heard in America—from our leaders, from the press, or from the general public. One can only conclude that it is not man's inhumanity to man but communist manifestations of it that arouse the American conscience.

One of the most outrageous effects of the puritan spirit in America is the existence of that tyranny over what it is respectable to say and think of which we spoke in Part I. Those who try to look at the country with some objectivity are often the objects of scorn and abuse by professional patriots who believe that there is something illegitimate about national self-criticism, or who equate loyalty to our fighting men in Vietnam with loyalty to the policy that put them there.

Puritanism, fortunately, has not been the dominant strand in American thought. It had nothing to do with the intelligent and subtle diplomacy of the period of the American Revolution. It had nothing to do with the wise policy of remaining aloof from the conflicts of Europe, as long as we were permitted to do so, while we settled and developed the North American continent. It had nothing to do with the restraint shown by the United States at moments of supreme crisis in the cold war—at the time of the Korean War, for example, in the first Indochina war in which President Eisenhower wisely refused to intervene in 1954, and in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. And it has had absolutely nothing to do with the gradual relaxation of tensions associated with the test ban treaty and the subsequent improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. I am reminded of “Mr. Dooley's” words about the observance of Thanksgiving: “'Twas founded by th' Puritans to give thanks f'r bein' presarved fr'm th' Indynans, an' . . . we keep it to give thanks we are presarved fr'm th' Puritans.”²

The crusading puritan spirit has had a great deal to do with some of the regrettable and tragic events of American

history. It led us into needless and costly adventures and victories that crumbled in our hands.

The Civil War is an example. Had the Abolitionists of the North and the hotheads of the South been less influential, the war might have been avoided and slavery would certainly have been abolished anyway, peacefully and probably within a generation after emancipation actually occurred. Had the peace been made by Lincoln rather than the Radical Republicans, it could have been a peace of reconciliation rather than the wrathful Reconstruction which deepened the division of the country, cruelly set back the cause of the Negro, and left a legacy of bitterness for which we are still paying a heavy price.

The puritan spirit was one of the important factors in the brief, unhappy adventure in imperialism that began with the war of 1898. Starting with stirring slogans about "manifest destiny" and a natural sense of moral outrage about atrocities in Cuba—which was fed by a spirited competition for circulation between the Hearst and Pulitzer newspapers—America forced on Spain a war that it was willing to pay almost any price short of complete humiliation to avoid. The war was undertaken to liberate the Cuban people and ended with Cuba being put under an American protectorate, which in turn inaugurated a half century of American intervention in Cuba's internal affairs. American interference was motivated, no doubt, by a sincere desire to bring freedom to the Cuban people but it ended, nonetheless, with their getting Batista and Castro instead.

The crusading spirit of America in its modern form, and the contrast between the crusading spirit and the spirit of tolerance and accommodation, are illustrated in two speeches made by Woodrow Wilson, one preceding, the other following, America's entry into World War I. In early 1917, with the United States still neutral, he declined to make a clear moral distinction between the belligerents, and called on them to compromise their differences and negotiate a "peace

without victory." In the spring of 1918, when the United States had been at war for a year, Wilson perceived only one possible response to the challenge of Germany in the war: "Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust."³

Even Franklin Roosevelt, who was the most pragmatic of politicians, was not immune from the crusading spirit. So overcome was he, as were all Americans, by the treachery of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that one of America's historic principles, the freedom of the seas, for which we had gone to war in 1812 and 1917, was now immediately forgotten, along with the explicit commitment under the London Naval Treaty of 1930 not to sink merchant vessels without first placing passengers, crews, and ships' papers in a place of safety. Within seven hours of the Japanese attack the order went out to all American ships and planes in the Pacific: "Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan." Between 1941 and 1945 American submarines sank 1,750 Japanese merchant ships and took the lives of 105,000 Japanese civilians. So much for the "freedom of the seas."

In January 1943, while meeting with Churchill at Casablanca, President Roosevelt announced that the Allies would fight on until the "unconditional surrender" of their enemies. Roosevelt later said that the phrase just "popped into his mind" but I think it was dredged up from the depths of a puritan soul. Its premise was that our side was all virtue and our enemies were all evil who in justice could expect nothing after their fall but the righteous retribution of Virtue triumphant.

"Unconditional surrender" was an unwise doctrine. Aside from its negativism as a war aim and the fact that it may have prolonged the war, we did not really mean to carry out its implications. As soon as our enemies delivered themselves into our hands we began to treat them with kindness

and moderation, and within a very few years we were treating them as valued friends and allies.

The West has won two "total victories" in this century and it has barely survived them. America, especially, fought the two world wars in the spirit of a righteous crusade. We acted as if we had come to the end of history, as if we had only to destroy our enemies and then the world would enter a golden age of peace and human happiness. Some of the problems that spawned the great wars were in fact solved by our victories; others were simply forgotten. But to our shock and dismay we found after 1945 that history had not come to an end, that our triumph had produced at least as many problems as it had solved, and that it was by no means clear that the new problems were preferable to the old ones.

I do not raise these events of the American past for purposes of national flagellation but to illustrate that the problem of excessive ideological zeal is our problem as well as the communists'. I think also that when we respond to communist dogmatism with a dogmatism of our own we are not merely responding by the necessity, as we are told, of "fighting fire with fire." I think we are responding in a way that is more natural and congenial to us than we care to admit.

The great challenge in our foreign relations is to make certain that the major strand in our heritage, the strand of humanism, tolerance, and accommodation, remains the dominant one. I do not accept the excuse, so often offered, that communist zealotry and intransigence justify our own. I do not accept the view that because they have engaged in subversion, intervention, and ideological warfare, so must we and to the same degree. There is far more promise in efforts to encourage communist imitation of our own more sensible attitudes than in ourselves imitating the least attractive forms of communist behavior. It is of course reasonable to ask why *we* must take the lead in conciliation; the answer is that we, being the most powerful of nations, can afford as no

one else can to be magnanimous. Or, to put it another way, disposing as we do of the greater physical power, we are properly called upon to display the greater moral power as well.

The kind of foreign policy I have been talking about is, in the true sense of the term, a *conservative* policy. It is intended quite literally to conserve the world—a world whose civilizations can be destroyed at any time if either of the great powers should choose or feel driven to do so. It is an approach that accepts the world as it is, with all its existing nations and ideologies, with all its existing qualities and shortcomings. It is an approach that purports to change things in ways that are compatible with the continuity of history and within the limits imposed by a fragile human nature. I think that if the great conservatives of the past, such as Burke and Metternich and Castlereagh, were alive today, they would not be true believers or relentless crusaders against communism. They would wish to come to terms with the world as it is, not because our world would be pleasing to them—almost certainly it would not be—but because they believed in the preservation of indissoluble links between the past and the future, because they profoundly mistrusted abstract ideas, and because they did not think themselves or any other men qualified to play God.

The last, I think, is the central point. I believe that a man's principal business, in foreign policy as in domestic policy and in his daily life, is to keep his own house in order, to make life a little more civilized, a little more satisfying, and a little more serene in the brief time that is allotted him. I think that man is qualified to contemplate metaphysics but not to practice it. The practice of metaphysics is God's work.

An Idea Mankind Can Hold To

Favored as it is, by history, by wealth, and by the vitality and basic decency of its diverse population, it is conceivable,

The Two Americas

or less normal states with whom we can have more or less normal relations, or are we to regard them indiscriminately as purveyors of an evil ideology with whom we can never reconcile? And finally, are we to regard ourselves as a friend, counselor, and example for those around the world who seek freedom and who also want our help, or are we to play the role of God's avenging angel, the appointed missionary of freedom in a benighted world?

The answers to these questions depend on which of the two Americas is speaking. There are no inevitable or predetermined answers because our past has prepared us to be either tolerant or puritanical, generous or selfish, sensible or romantic, humanly concerned or morally obsessed, in our relations with the outside world.

For my own part, I prefer the America of Lincoln and Adlai Stevenson. I prefer to have my country the friend rather than the enemy of demands for social justice; I prefer to have the communists treated as human beings, with all the human capacity for good and bad, for wisdom and folly, rather than as embodiments of an evil abstraction; and I prefer to see my country in the role of sympathetic friend to humanity rather than its stern and prideful schoolmaster.

There are many respects in which America, if she can bring herself to act with the magnanimity and the empathy which are appropriate to her size and power, can be an intelligent example to the world. We have the opportunity to set an example of generous understanding in our relations with China, of practical cooperation for peace in our relations with Russia, of reliable and respectful partnership in our relations with Western Europe, of material helpfulness without moral presumption in our relations with developing nations, of abstention from the temptations of hegemony in our relations with Latin America, and of the all-around advantages of minding one's own business in our relations with everybody. Most of all, we have the opportunity to serve as an example of democracy to the world by the way in which we run our