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BOLSHEVISM

An Introduction to Soviet Communism

by

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did at the congress of the German Independent Socialists of Halle. Its primary purpose was to create Communist groups under the permanent control and domination of Moscow.²

Upon the Bolshevik success in Russia the name Bolshevism, which previously had been known only to students of the Russian Socialist movement, was used universally. What appeared before 1917 to be a fanatic sect, ascribing to itself the mission of realizing socialism and of destroying existing society, had now become a real world danger. After the October Revolution the Bolsheviks seriously threatened to impose Communism on many countries, even on the whole world.

From the beginning of the Bolshevik movement in 1903, critics directed much the same kind of charges against Lenin and his policies³ as were later advanced against the Soviet regime. Lenin was attacked for trying to establish "conditions of siege" in the party and an absolute personal dictatorship. Reading these accusations is like reading statements about Stalin and his almighty Politburo. Very early during the congress of 1903 the Bolsheviks made clear the anti-democratic basis of their policies. Plekhanov, later a bitter enemy of Lenin, but at that time cooperating with him, stated that the aim — the realization of socialism — would have to be attained by the use of any and all means; therefore it did not necessarily require democratic methods.⁴

A study of Bolshevism must consider both its Western and its Russian aspects. On the one hand, Bolshevism originated as a branch of a Socialist movement which had its roots in a western doctrine, Marxism; its development into Communism with all its worldwide appeal proves that it exercises a strong attraction for the world outside Russia. On the other hand, Bolshevism has been determined both in its peculiar features and also in its history by Russian environment and reality. Lenin was decisively influenced by the necessity of creating revolutionary organizations that could work under the restrictive conditions of the Tsarist regime.⁵ Furthermore there is no doubt that the exigencies of keeping and expanding the power, that was seized in Russia, have shaped not only the policies but also the theories of Bolshevism.

The first part of this book will attempt to disentangle these two aspects and at the same time to indicate how they influence each other, revealing how basic Bolshevik doctrine as developed by Lenin took over western Marxism with peculiar simplifications, accentuations and selections. These modifications empty Marxism of its sophisticated features and a refined awareness of problems; what remains is a political religion — a universal system formulated in slogans that seem to have a self-evident and logical character. This streamlined Marxism is widely accepted even outside Soviet Russia as a means of understanding complicated situations and of explaining the various intricate developments of our age (for example, world wars); it helps, too, in establishing a faith which substitutes for lost traditional beliefs, superseding — at least for a time — skepticism and nihilism. (1)

The capacity of Bolshevik doctrine to seem both a key to the understanding of the present and a guide to action is of decisive importance. What matters less are its philosophical and economic contents — dialectical materialism, the labor theory of value that claims to prove scientifically the inevitable exploitation of labor under capitalism, and so on. Bolshevik doctrines are unoriginal simplifications and popularizations of Marx's thought. Therefore, Marxism as such,⁶ though it is the historical background of Bolshevism, will not be analyzed in the present study, which is an attempt to explore the strange world created by Bolshevik theory and practice.

The second part of the book turns from the consideration of doctrine, to the Russian reality of Bolshevism, its origins and development, its rule and behavior; here typical policies and basic methods are emphasized in order to explain how the Soviet regime, despite all changes, maintained a fundamental continuity from Lenin to Stalin. (2)

The third part will attempt to show why Soviet Communism has become a world power that owes its successes not only to such material factors as the strength of the empire under its control, but also to the exploitation of social and psychological crises in western society of the twentieth century. Here the analysis will show (3)

how, despite its specific Russian features, Bolshevism continues to exercise a world influence; for it brings to full maturity seeds contained in the modern secularized world, which simultaneously it threatens to destroy. Bolshevism has not succeeded merely because of a conspiracy of ruthless men who employed systematically and dispassionately all methods useful for their aims. It has been successful because it brought to their logical conclusion tendencies and forces in our time accepted unconsciously even by many of those who sincerely believe that they are enemies of Soviet Communism. Bolshevism is a challenge to overcome the social and spiritual illness which made possible the successes of the Communist anti-religious secular religion and its power machinery. Bolshevism can be defeated only when its true nature as a world menace is understood; this means that the shortcomings and errors of the society which it opposes are frankly recognized and remedied.

CHAPTER I

BOLSHEVISM AS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
RELIGION

The Basic Attitude

To comprehend the development, the successes and the dangers of the Bolshevik-Communist movement, it must be understood as a social and political secular religion, for it is not exclusively concerned with the conquest of power and the achievement of social and political changes. It demands absolute dominance over every realm of life — spiritual as well as secular. The Soviet regime does not regard itself simply as one among many possible regimes, but as a regime based upon a specific doctrine which corresponds to a necessary development in history and society. This doctrine allegedly is the only true guide to action, one destined to bring about justice for all men and to shape, besides, all human knowledge and behavior. What believers of traditional religions ascribe to God and what Christians ascribe to Jesus Christ and the Church, the Bolsheviks ascribe to the allegedly scientific laws of social, political, and historical development, which they alone know and have formulated in the doctrine established by Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Therefore, their acceptance of these doctrinal laws and of the policies called for by what they insist is the necessary development of society towards Socialism and Communism, can be characterized as a secular religion: earthly existence and the struggle to make it perfect are the sole aims of human life and of world history.

Bolshevism has always insisted that its basic doctrine, the so-called dialectical materialism, which has been presented in its official, definitive, obligatory form by Stalin himself,⁷ alone provides the truth about the universe, men, history and society, and alone comprehends their development. The Bolsheviks regard all other doctrines and views as errors and heresies to be rejected and fought, as expressions of an outdated social order which defends the ego-

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istic domination of a single class, as the sources of prejudices in opposition to objective scientific knowledge.

To deny God's existence is basic for Bolshevism. The aim of man and mankind is a self-sufficient, perfectly organized and effective "classless society" here on earth. Only in this society will man fully realize his nature and utilize all his potentialities. In this society all religion based upon belief in God will disappear as superfluous, for religion with its acceptance of God is, according to Bolshevism, only the expression of an imperfect social order and a denial of reason.⁸ With Marx the Bolsheviks emphasize that the exploited, not yet aware of the real reasons for their exploitation, willingly escape to a dreamworld of religion and substitute for earthly justice (which is denied them and for which they are not yet willing to fight) a heavenly justice after death. The exploiters for their part use belief in God as a means to drug the masses, to keep them ignorant of the true condition of society, and so to prevent their fighting for justice here on earth. Religion is thus an opiate or, as Lenin put it, a "sivuschka" (a particularly low kind of alcohol).

1145 2-2 | The hatred which Bolshevism directs against religion — as expressed, for example, before the first World War, in the correspondence of Lenin with Gorki — shows that Bolshevism itself is a religion which deifies a purely immanentist secular development — a "religion" which replaces a transcendental God by a political and social order, the classless society. All history moves towards this society which gives meaning to all social and political development.

The Bolshevik rulers did not suppress all religious bodies at once because they believe that the fallacy and superstition of religion will disappear only with the rise of the perfect classless society. As long as society is imperfect and the aim of history is not achieved, traditional religions will necessarily exist, for they have their social roots in social and political backwardness. Bolshevik atheism is one of the various political and social religions of our time that deify various forces of history and social order.⁹ An earthly force and an earthly order are at the center of all these secular religions, which deny either openly (as Bolshevism does) all acceptance of a transcendent

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nating class) will wither away. But the state must remain strong, it cannot wither away, according to Stalin, so long as the proletariat has not conquered the whole world, so long as the Soviet Union is surrounded by capitalist powers and capitalists who utilize for their purposes reactionary forces in the world and traitors inside the U.S.S.R.¹³

The Authoritative Ancestors: Marx and Engels

All basic Bolshevist doctrines are taken from the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Bolshevism claims that it alone presents the correct interpretation and continuation of Marxism, the key to the right understanding of the universe and of history. To Bolshevism, dialectical and historical materialism are not subjective provisional formulations; instead they express the objective structure of all being and the eternal laws of all change.

Lenin always believed that he was a loyal orthodox revolutionary Marxist (though he claimed that he accepted Marxism not as a dogma but as a doctrine, a guide to action, which made it possible to learn from unexpected and unforeseen experiences and historical-social changes).¹⁴ He regarded all his Socialist opponents as betrayers and falsifiers of the truth; the truth had been made accessible by the two great masters, Marx and Engels.

In his best known book, *State and Revolution* (1917), he tried to prove by quotations from Marx and, particularly, from Engels, the absolute necessity for a dictatorship of the proletariat. This dictatorship has as its aim to realize by any means, including mass terror and violence, the transformation of Capitalism into Socialism and Communism. In this book Lenin violently castigated Kautsky, the best known interpreter of Marxism before 1914, for having falsified the true revolutionary doctrines by sacrificing the dictatorship of the proletariat to his petty bourgeois belief in a peaceful democratic revolution.

True, Bolshevist propaganda today rarely mentions Marx and Engels, though they continue to be listed in bibliographies, together with Lenin and Stalin, as "classics" of Marxism. They are known to Soviet readers today almost exclusively because they are quoted

as unjust and oppressive. Lenin's anti-imperialism helped to stimulate Asiatic nationalisms, though later many Asiatic leaders turned against the Soviet Union. Lenin's theory of the unequal degree of the development of countries made it possible to use backward countries, as the weakest links in the imperialist chain, for revolutionary purposes. This theory also served to justify the Bolshevik conquest of power and the Bolshevik policy in a Russia which had not yet become a fully industrialized capitalist realm with a proletariat as the most numerous class. Lenin's anti-imperialism not only helped to portray the Bolsheviks as opponents of war — were not all wars products of imperialism? — but to defend the aggressive tactics of the Marxists in their struggle for power. It was not necessary to wait until the development Marx prescribed had reached a mature stage; by exploiting every crisis and revolutionary situation, power could be seized and even the development of backward agrarian countries could be forced in the right direction — toward the Socialist-Communist world revolution.

The Emphasis Upon Terror

In contrast to the moderate Socialists, whom they attack as opportunists and traitors because they accept a peaceful gradual development of society, the Bolsheviks emphasize the necessity of violence. Force and violence, they maintain, have been used in all periods of history to establish new social orders and are therefore needed to accelerate the emergence of Socialist and Communist societies. In the dictatorship of the proletariat force and violence are utilized, not for personal subjective reasons, but to facilitate objective social processes. The Soviet rulers are not concerned with punishing guilty people or satisfying feelings of hate and revenge; they apply force and violence to push forward an allegedly necessary and meaningful development which reached a decisive stage when the Bolshevik party seized power in Russia.

When written law was introduced in the Soviet regime, Lenin emphasized the need to remember that terror, merciless terror, against all enemies of the Soviet regime must remain the basis of

procedure, and that the crucial importance of terror must not be obliterated by legalistic formulations.¹⁷ This explains why it would be useless to judge the Soviet regime on the basis of legal or constitutional texts. Judgment on such a basis would mean falling into the trap of constitutional illusions against which Lenin himself protested in his articles of 1917.¹⁸

Acceptance of mass terrorism as an unavoidable weapon explains why the Stalin constitution of 1936, with its system of guarantees for individual rights, did not prevent the seemingly cynical disregard of those rights whenever the party leadership decided it had to supersede them. Despite all legal and constitutional limitations, terrorism remains justified if the situation and the stage of development of society require it. And terrorism means the unrestrained use of force, force determined exclusively by considerations of power and justified by the objectives towards which it is applied.

The Party

The views of the nature and the role of the Party are especially characteristic of Bolshevism. They can be regarded correctly as elaborations of some passages in the *Communist Manifesto*, written by Marx and Engels in 1848.¹⁹ There the Communists are described as the central movers, the vanguard of the proletarian movement. They know the direction this movement must take if it is to fulfill its historical mission in accordance with the laws of the development of society. The Communists are the great men of Hegel, possessed of the right historical awareness, whose actions are right because they correspond to the stage of historical and social development just reached.

It was because they differed basically about the character and the role of the party, that the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks split.²⁰ For the Mensheviks the Party was a loose community of persons sharing the same political views. Their concept of the Party was not different from that usually held in the Western liberal and democratic world, where a party does not claim total domination

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of the Marxist-Leninist theory lies in the fact that it enables the Party to find the right orientation in any situation, to understand the inner connection of current events, to foresee their course and to perceive not only how and in what direction they are developing in the present, but how and in what direction they are bound to develop in the future.”²²

Occasionally the Communist Party has been compared to a religious order. This comparison overlooks two facts: religious orders do not claim domination over all mankind, nor do they aim at the realization of a specific social and economic order here on earth. However, if the differences in the basic world outlook and aims are disregarded, and the comparison is strictly limited to the relations of members to superiors, the party and the religious order do appear to have this much in common: the members of each are obliged to obey their superiors, and this obedience is based on the idea of serving exclusively a true world outlook. But in the religious order obedience is limited by moral considerations, whereas for the Bolshevik Party such considerations do not exist — any means is proper for its aims. The goodness of the aim, and the need to fight for it in conformity with the orders of those who know everything about the correct theory and practice, warrants every means. The question of a conflict between ends and means cannot be raised in a Party whose leadership claims that it can foresee an inevitable future.

For its believers the Communist Party appears to be the instrument of an unavoidable social development, whereas critical outsiders look upon it as a group of ruthless activists cynically justifying their deeds by an “infallible” social doctrine. In all its actions the Party sees itself as executing only the laws of an objective and necessary development. The Communist Party, at least in its official views, does not accept a policy of making adventurous experiments, like the so-called “left” Communists who, as Lenin put it, intoxicate themselves with pseudo-revolutionary oratory.²³ Nor is the Party willing to become the victim of a mechanical adaptation to existing, that is unchangeable and definite, conditions. This attitude is characterized as opportunism or as a betrayal of belief in the ultimate

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the Party itself. The correct way — to make matters more complicated — is rarely a direct one: many detours are invariably necessary; and the Party must retrace its steps in order to be able to advance later, as Lenin emphasized.²⁵

This doctrine, the omniscient Party insists, is not merely a collection of abstract statements without reference to specific historical circumstance, but is definitely related to concrete situations. The Bolsheviks insist that practice and theory form an indissoluble unity; and this unity is constantly realized and renewed by the authority of the Party leadership and the obedience required from followers.

The combination of a dialectically justified, flexible power politics on the one hand, and a doctrinaire utopianism on the other, explains both the ambiguity and the cynical practice of Bolshevism in action. Old Party members suddenly are cast in the role of traitors if they do not submit to the victorious Party leadership or if their condemnation seems useful for the Party's maintenance and expansion of power. If the obligations of power demand it, retreats are permitted. At such times it is said that historical development was not yet advanced enough, that possibilities and chances were overestimated.

The laws of dialectics — for example, the development by sudden jumps after a long slow process and the unique character of such jumps — are utilized to justify pauses, retreats, cooperation with enemies of yesterday in order to fight the more dangerous adversaries of today, the abandonment and destruction of allies who under new situations become enemies and parasites and must be immediately liquidated. All these maneuvers and changes are not casual products of the Machiavellian mentality of Stalin or of other Bolshevik leaders. They derive necessarily from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. On the one hand, there is the belief in the Party's knowledge of the ends towards which the development of society moves necessarily. On the other hand, there is the assumption that all epochs before the rise of the classless society have a transitory-provisional character: what is progressive today becomes reactionary tomorrow. Only the Party knows the right way to the

final aim. Only the Party always makes the right distinction between reactionary and progressive forces. And only the Party knows the tactics which correspond to the conditions of the moment and must therefore be applied. The Party, unlike sufferers from the disease of radical utopianism, does not underestimate difficulties. But the Party does not overestimate them as do the opportunists who lack belief in the necessity of a constant fight for progress and confuse temporary provisional gains with definite and lasting results.

The Bolshevik Faith

The Party's claim that its decisions are always both useful and absolutely true gives the impression that the Party is simply a group of cynics anxious to maintain and increase their power at any price. But such a view underestimates important sources of Bolshevism's strength; the deterministic but at the same time ethical belief in the necessary evolution of society toward the final realization of freedom, justice and humanity justifies and requires the unlimited power of the Party. The definition of freedom, justice and humanity is based on fundamental views about the nature of man and society. Lenin in his *State and Revolution* announces that the dictatorship of the proletariat will make all work a pleasure, and thus make coercion, and therefore the state, superfluous.²⁶ Following Marx he believes that the perfection of human nature and the realization of freedom depend upon the socialization of the means of production, which is of course a purely external-organizational change. These basic errors still make a great impression on many people who are looking for clear decisions and a new "faith" to give them clear "standards" for action as well as "guaranteed" promises for the future. What is decisive for these people is the pretense of the Bolshevik-Communists to know not only the over-all development of society but also the meaning of any given present situation. The loss of certain transcendent religious beliefs results in the acceptance of pseudo-certainties in *this* world, in its history and social development.

The Bolsheviks assert that they alone really stand for true justice and freedom and that they also know how to realize them. This

claim gives new strength again and again to the demands of the Party for power and domination. For example, a favorite point in the current Bolshevik propaganda program ascribes exclusively to the Communist Soviet regime and its friends the only true opposition to aggressive war and the only sincere will to maintain peace, for they alone know not only what imperialism is but also how to liberate mankind from it.

Such propaganda is useful to confuse opponents and to strengthen fanatical obedience in the ranks of the believers in Communism. The non-Communist world is always allegedly preparing aggression, whereas the Soviet Union — in all its policies, armament development, and attempts at expansion — is always interested in its own defense, eager only to preserve and maintain peace. On the one hand, Communists declare that it is possible to maintain the peaceful co-existence of the Communist and Capitalist worlds, and that this possibility determines the actions of the Soviet Union. They claim, on the other hand, that there are constant threats of war, from Capitalist powers. These powers are necessarily opposed to a genuine peaceful development which must end with their defeat, for the Capitalist world will disintegrate. The Capitalists are necessarily obliged to talk of "crises" and "attacks" to divert attention because they are unable — according to Bolshevism — to find satisfactory solutions for the contradictions of their system. It does not matter that many facts obviously do not fit into the Communist scheme. For the scheme itself, as we have seen, determines what the facts are and how they are to be interpreted.

The basis and significance of Bolshevism can be fully understood only when we realize that it is more than a political, economic or sociological doctrine. It is also a political religion maintaining that it knows the nature of the universe and of society, both in structure and in development.

The political religions which have played such a great role in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries replace transcendent beliefs by immanent ones.²⁷ There is for them only one world, the world of political and social action: they explain away traditional religion as the expression of social imperfection and human ignorance which

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forces men to escape into a heavenly world of their own fantasies, for Marx took over from Feuerbach the thesis that God has not created man but that man has created God. Sometimes these political religions utilize religious beliefs and concepts — this is true of Nazism and Fascism — to strengthen and glorify such this-worldly realities as *the* party, the elite of the nation, or a race. The political religions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries replace the Kingdom of Heaven, the City of God, based upon union with God and the realization of an order established by God, by a purely immanentist this-worldly aim, the result of a naturalist development or the expression of a purely human-natural energy and group.²⁸ The struggle towards this aim — the Marxian classless society — or the elite or master race of Fascism and Nazism, determines the meaning and direction of the whole of human existence. Therefore, all such political-social activity has a pseudo-religious character, has its end in itself, is no longer in the service of a higher order determining and directing all human life and activity. Political-social programs assume the significance of religious creeds; membership in *the* party becomes as important as membership in the Church (or any group established by the Will of God) is for religious people.

All political and social tensions are thereby tremendously exacerbated. This explains the inclination to regard contrary political views as heretical doctrines based upon antisocial attitudes and to deal with "heretical" opponents as vicious enemies who must be annihilated and liquidated. The Church is not only replaced by the Party; the Party has become something more than the Church. For the Party not only determines the right beliefs — it also guides the attainment of the true aim of life here on earth (and there is no other aim); it dominates the creed as well as the conduct of life. The proletariat, in the eyes of Marx and Engels, is the "redeemer," the class with a unique liberating role, fulfilling every end of mankind.²⁹

But it must be noted that in practice the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik state which is the instrument of the party, has been substituted for the proletariat. This state is the necessary means for the realization of the role ascribed to the proletariat and its dictator-

CHAPTER II

THE SOVIET REALITY OF BOLSHEVISM

The expansion of Bolshevism into a world power cannot be explained exclusively by its character as a secular political religion. In order to understand its historical role, many questions about its Russian background must be raised. Why did Bolshevism originate as a political movement in Russia alone?³¹ How far has Bolshevism been influenced by the fact that in Russia it became first a political power, the master of a state and its apparatus? Has Bolshevism changed completely, having obtained control of Russia? How is it to be explained that Marxism, originating in the West, became, in its revolutionary interpretation, the doctrine in whose name domination over Russia was achieved? Through what forces and circumstances has the Soviet regime survived, whereas outside Russia, in the Soviet satellites — with the exception of Red China — the Communists have been unable to conquer and to maintain power without help from occupying Soviet armies?³²

The analysis of the relationship of Bolshevism to Russian history and environment illuminates the lasting features as well as the changes in the Soviet regime. What are the permanent elements and forces of the Bolshevik system which persist beneath all changes and adaptations to new political and social conditions?³³ Why does Bolshevism, despite its connection with Russia, retain a universal appeal to groups and movements outside the Soviet Union?

The Role of the Radical Intelligentsia

Bolshevism came into the world as a child of the Russian radical intelligentsia.³⁴ This group developed during the nineteenth century. It was the product of the contradiction between the Tsarist absolutist-bureaucratic regime on the one side, and the acceptance of the West, since the reign of Peter the Great (ruled from 1689-1725), as a standard and example for the leading and educated strata of Russian society. During the eighteenth century the rise of

by any means, and a fanatic for whom no moral restrictions existed if his power and the influence of his party were at stake.

The Type of Professional Revolutionary

Along with the radical intellectuals, professional revolutionaries became important in the Bolshevik party. It may even be said that the history of the party can be characterized as a constant decrease of the role played by the intellectuals, who loved discussions, and the increase of the role of the revolutionaries, who loved clear, final decisions and action. These professional revolutionaries simply accepted the authority of Lenin and the party. They worked until 1917 in the underground as organizers, executing orders and minor tasks, without much interest in the eternal discussions of the emigres. Finally, under Stalin's leadership, they drove the intellectuals from all positions of influence and took over power completely. Though Lenin himself was an emigré, compelled to the busy production of doctrinal decisions and to the demolition of his opponents in endless polemics, he hated discussions without practical results. He tired of listening to the uninterrupted talks of Martov, even before this friend of his early years on the *Iskra* became, as one of the leading Mensheviks, his political enemy. Thought and analysis (particularly by writing programmatic resolutions) were for Lenin a means of carrying out political actions.

But it must be emphasized that the type of professional revolutionary organizer for whom ideas and theories became schemes and formulas, shared the basic attitude of the revolutionary intelligentsia. For these men the whole content and meaning of life was reduced to political systems and political actions. This attitude formed the basis of their cynical, ruthless conquest, maintenance, and expansion of power.⁴⁵ They believed, as did the intellectuals, that their political ideas were always right; that everything depended upon the realization of their political creed; that all adversaries were absolutely wrong and were, therefore, the most vicious, most dangerous of men. Hence, the true revolutionaries had the right and the obligation to use all possible means in order to destroy them. But this destruction required power; before they had con-

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or destroyed later, after the Soviets had firmly established their own power.

It was because of Lenin's example that the Bolsheviks were the only revolutionary intellectuals who succeeded in making a ruthless activism the predominant attitude of their party. Lenin was at the same time an intellectual and a professional revolutionary organizer. He was a doctrinaire as well as a man of action. In this sense he could aver that he united theory and practice. The Bolshevik secular religion gave to him and to his party's action both unity and flexibility. He could claim to learn from the same revolution which he thought was accomplishing an objectively necessary development towards a utopian aim — the classless society, a society without coercion, a society of men with perfect social attitudes, able to organize and run a perfectly functioning life in which private and public interests would simply coincide.⁴⁶

Lenin and World War I

Until 1917 Lenin himself seemed to be only an intolerant fanatic engaged in incessant polemics against those who did not accept his interpretation of Marxism and his political tactics.

After a brief stay in Russia during the Revolution of 1905 he lived abroad, but, although an emigré, he remained leader of the party. From Western Galicia, which at this time belonged to Austria, he determined the policies of the Bolshevik deputies in the Duma of 1912 and directed the editors of the Bolshevik party organ, *Pravda*. This behavior is typical of Bolshevism down to our time. Public representatives act as agents and mouthpieces of the party leadership (even when they apply the prescribed "general line" according to the circumstances). The instructions and orders from above remain final. After the outbreak of World War I Lenin moved into Switzerland. The leader of the Austrian Socialists, Victor Adler, obtained permission for him to leave Austria, whose police suspected this citizen of hostile Russia. From the beginning Lenin was uncompromisingly opposed to World War I. He regarded it as a fight between imperialists who utilized and

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the one side, it grew out of a Duma committee under the leadership of such liberals as Miliukov; and, on the other, it was approved by a Soviet (Council of Workers) composed of moderate Socialists. Nor did the Bolsheviks play a great role, even after Stalin's return from his Siberian exile. They continued to form a group opposing the provisional government without much energy and influence.

Conquest of Power

After he heard about the end of Tsarism, Lenin developed his program: "All power to the Soviets"—which, of course, he believed would be dominated by his party—and no confidence in the imperialist-capitalist Provisional Government. Lenin succeeded, despite all the difficulties created by the Allies, in returning to Russia; along with other radical socialists he obtained permission from Imperial Germany to cross her territory. Lenin and the Russian socialists such as the Menshevik Martov, who opposed the war, were regarded by the German General Staff as useful instruments with which to undermine the Russian army.⁵⁰ After his arrival in the Russian capital Lenin imposed his program, the so-called April theses, on the Bolshevik party. Stalin himself has confessed that he saw the light only after the issuance of these theses.⁵¹ Under Lenin's leadership the Bolshevik party exploited the rising anarchial moods of the masses.⁵² As the soldiers became more and more tired of war, the Bolshevik propaganda against the imperialist war became increasingly successful among them. They refused to take orders from their officers; they preferred their pleasant, comfortable, and secure stay in Petrograd to risking their lives at the front. For the workers and peasants Revolution meant a change in property conditions. The peasants became unwilling to postpone the demand for a radical agrarian reform until a national constitutional assembly was elected and convened. This was not scheduled to occur until after the war. Therefore the masses were impressed by the Bolshevik slogan: loot what has been looted! Democratic liberties like the freedom of press and assembly introduced by the provisional government did not impress the masses—they wanted the land of big

estate owners to be distributed among them. Also national groups — like the Ukrainians — were dissatisfied with the Provisional Government's attempt to maintain centralism, despite a few concessions to federalist views; they regarded this policy as aiming at the maintenance of domination by the Great Russians.⁵³ Furthermore, the moderate socialist parties, then in control of the Soviets, were quarrelling among themselves and had little trust in the provisional government; they organized demonstrations in May 1917 which forced the abdication of Foreign Minister Miliukov who had developed an annexationist program. (He was called in the Bolshevik propaganda Miliukov Dardanelski because in 1917 he put forward demands for the control of the Dardanelles similar to those made by Stalin's Soviet government after World War II.)

The Provisional Government was very weak. A constant reshuffling took place. The situation did not improve even after Kerensky, the moderate agrarian socialist, replaced the weak liberal Lwow as prime minister, and after leaders of moderate socialist groups such as the Menshevik Tseretelli and the Socialist Revolutionary Tchernov joined the Cabinet. The dissolution of the army was hastened by the unsuccessful attempt to start an offensive in Galicia.

True, a first attempt of the Bolsheviks to come to power in July 1917 by means of street demonstrations in Petrograd failed. Lenin went into hiding. Trotsky, who had joined Lenin's party, was arrested. In August, General Kornilov, the commander-in-chief of the army, tried to put an end to anarchy by moving troops against Petrograd. He intended to form a national government and offered Kerensky a post.⁵⁴ But this attempt failed completely. Kerensky opposed it, and radical workers were given arms by the defenders of the Provisional Government; the Bolsheviks were also used to defeat the threat by Kornilov. The control of the Soviets in Moscow and Petrograd shifted now from the moderate socialists to the Bolsheviks. Trotsky, released from prison, obtained the key position as chairman of the Soviet in Petrograd. Kerensky and his Provisional Government, despite their apparent victory over the military putsch, lost all authority. They tried vainly to regain it by organ-

izing bodies of representatives appointed by the several parties and social groups.

During these weeks Lenin appealed incessantly to the central committee of his party to take over power by force.⁵⁵ The Bolshevik party leadership hesitated; Zinoviev and Kamenev, two particularly close collaborators of Lenin, publicly protested against the planned seizure of power. Finally, the Bolshevik overthrow of the Provisional Government was scheduled by the Central Committee to coincide with the opening of the Second Russian Soviet Congress. So anarchic were the prevailing conditions that the October revolution, which ended Kerensky's rule and opened the Soviet regime, was accomplished by comparatively small armed groups: only a battalion of women was willing to defend the Winter Palace, the seat of the Provisional Government. The majority of the Soviet Congress acclaimed the new cabinet, which was named the Council of People's Commissars. Lenin was the chairman; Trotsky took over the commissariat of foreign affairs and Stalin of nationalities. An attempt by Kerensky to reconquer Petrograd failed miserably; the Cossacks, led by the ultra-conservative General Krasnov, were considering his extradition to the Bolsheviks just as he fled. Resistance against the new regime was only sporadic; it was most serious in Moscow.

Tactics After the Seizure of Power

Lenin came to power, first, because he had made his party into a disciplined and comparatively well-organized group; secondly, because the other parties — particularly the agrarian socialists, the so-called Socialist Revolutionaries, who had more followers than the Bolsheviks — had no strong leaders and no concrete practical program; and thirdly, because Lenin and his collaborators succeeded by propaganda and other tactics in giving the impression that they would achieve the wishes of the masses. The peasants, for example, were satisfied by a decree giving them practically all the land of the estate owners.⁵⁶ The enemies of Lenin's regime, and therefore of the land decree, were suspected of willingness to restore the hated

property distribution of the past. It did not matter that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were (correctly) accused of copying their land decree from the un-Marxian socialist-revolutionaries. This fact proves that from the beginning of their rule the Bolsheviks subordinated doctrinal claims to power considerations. They believed that the over-all development would justify the doctrine, but that the methods to be used in a particular moment had to be adapted to experience. When, in November 1917, Lenin published his book on *State and Revolution*, he wrote in a postscript that it is much more important to participate in the Revolution, that is, to learn from practical experience, than to write about it or merely to develop theories.

The longing of the masses for an end to the war was satisfied by an appeal to all belligerents to start armistice negotiations. This appeal was not accepted by the Allies, but it did lead to an armistice with Germany. The result of peace negotiations with the Central Powers was the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This separate peace was very unfavorable for Russia.⁵⁷ She lost all the territories occupied by Germany and her allies; the Ukraine became a nominally independent state under German occupation. A civil war in Finland ended, with German aid, in a victory for the white anti-Red forces.

Lenin had great difficulty in persuading his party to accept the treaty with the Central Powers.⁵⁸ He warned that the Germans, if their conditions were not accepted, would simply order their armies to march into Russia and end the Soviet regime. Lenin's assertion proved to be correct. For, after Trotsky, the chief of the Soviet delegation, refused to accept the German proposals and broke off negotiations, declaring that there would be neither peace nor war, the German military forces did advance against Russia. The final conditions, which the Soviets had to accept in order to survive, were harder than those offered to Trotsky. Lenin's fight for the acceptance of the peace of Brest-Litovsk by the ruling party is a classic example of the typical Bolshevik combination of doctrinaire utopianism and flexible power politics. Lenin insisted that revolu-

tionary propaganda leaflets could not stop Russia's enemies; in his polemics against the left-Communists under Bukharin, Radek, and others, who had formed a faction opposing him, he pointed out that it is the duty of genuine revolutionaries to take into consideration existing power conditions and not to fall victim to high-sounding pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric: a temporary retreat may be necessary in order to make possible a new advance in the future.⁵⁹ Such an advance could take place when the collapse of Imperial Germany in November 1918 made the annulment of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk possible.

The first months of the regime were notably influenced by propagandistic considerations. It was necessary through a radical break with the past to prove the revolutionary character of the Soviet regime. Reactionary institutions were abolished by decrees; they were designed to show that the socialist government could accomplish quickly an antifederal revolution which the bourgeoisie alone could only have accomplished much more slowly, if at all. The break-up of the old army and bureaucracy was facilitated through a strike started by civil servants who believed that the new regime was illegal because it was created by the use of force. A separation between Church and State was introduced with the intent of weakening religious groups, particularly the Orthodox Church, which had been accustomed to support by public authorities. The constitutional-democratic party (Cadets) of Miliukov was outlawed as counterrevolutionary. The Che-Ka, the extraordinary commission, invested with unlimited power, was created to fight counterrevolution, speculation, and sabotage, with the firm help and participation of Lenin, who emphasized that it was necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat to use force and violence.⁶⁰ The seizure of the larger bank accounts and the opening of bank deposit boxes was intended to prove the anticapitalist character of the Soviet rule.

The basic democratic practice of free elections, whereby majorities could change, was abandoned. The national constitutional assembly was closed down in January, 1918, after its first session and was not permitted to meet again,⁶¹ because the elections which

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stroying the old regime and its heritage to a policy of building up the instruments of power for the new regime. His acceptance of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk and his emphasis upon order and discipline prove that Lenin realized the necessity of taking existing conditions into account. There was some hesitation before socialization of industrial enterprises occurred;⁶³ for Lenin and the party had believed that it would be sufficient for the workers to control and direct the bourgeois capitalists. But this control proved unworkable and the regime was forced to seize the enterprises.

However, even Lenin himself, despite his basic realism, sometimes inclined toward utopian projects, such as that aiming at a quick transformation of society with the help of a universal labor service and the abolition of money payment.⁶⁴ At the same time, he realized the necessity for educating the masses as well as the representatives of the new regime. The role of non-Bolshevik specialists was stressed, as was the necessity for learning from the technical experiences of the past.

The first period, which combined utopian experiments and decrees with attempts at a realistic approach, prepared the organization of a strong political power and the imposition of discipline on the masses; soon it developed into the period of civil war and so-called War Communism (1918-1920). During this second period Communist policy was dominated by the need to crush the various White armies.⁶⁵ These armies received support, first from some German military circles, who in 1918 opposed the policy of the German Foreign Office and aided the efforts to destroy the revolutionary Red regime. After the disappearance of Imperial Germany, the Allies aided the White Russian armies. Despite the collapse of the original hopes that the confiscatory policies of this period would achieve the quick construction of a socialist-communist society, these policies did make it possible for the Communists to conduct and win the civil war. For, though production had decreased to a minimum, confiscation proved a sufficient means of obtaining supplies for the Red army.

The defeat in the war against Poland (1920), the well-known

uprising in Kronstadt (the naval port of Petrograd), and the lesser known peasants' revolts in Central Russia, caused Lenin to call for a retreat after the Red victory in the civil war. The White armies had suffered annihilating defeats; they had been unable to coordinate their operations because they were weakened by conflicts between democratic and moderate-socialistic politicians on the one side, and the conservative military leadership on the other; they did not receive, despite many promises, enough support from abroad; and they often incensed the masses of the people — workers in industrial areas and peasants, particularly in Siberia — by seeming to favor the return to an outdated prerevolutionary social order.

On the other hand, Lenin realized that the exhausted and tired masses needed a return to normal conditions after their sacrifices and sufferings during the civil war. He realized, too, that a quick transformation of World War I into a world revolution would not take place. The collapse of Imperial Germany and of the Hapsburg Dual Monarchy did not result in the rise of Communist regimes; the Soviet regimes in Bavaria and Hungary were of brief duration. The Soviets were unable to reconquer the Baltic States and to impose a Communist government upon Poland, though they did succeed in establishing a Ukrainian Soviet Republic and, later, in conquering the Menshevik Republic of Georgia.

Lenin's foreign policy, like his domestic policy, had a dual character from the beginning. The Third International, founded in Moscow in 1919, aimed to prepare and organize revolution outside Russia by unifying the various pro-Communist groups and directing the development of the various Communist parties.⁶⁶ The Comintern imposed 21 points upon parties wishing to join; it kept authority in its own hands and excluded socialist leaders it regarded as untrustworthy. But at the same time treaties were concluded by the Soviet regime with capitalist governments, the independence of the Baltic States was recognized, for the Soviet government realized that its attempt to impose communist government upon these states, after the German collapse of 1918, had failed. Poland received territorial concessions by the treaty of Riga, after the Soviet armies

were routed at Warsaw. The treaty of Rapallo established friendly relations with Germany and permitted the utilization of German military experience by the Red Army. The treaty was concluded in 1922 with the Weimar Republic,⁶⁷ though this regime had originated from a defeat imposed upon German pro-Communists. The realistic policy of Rapallo did not end revolutionary expectations and policies; the Soviet leaders tried — though without success — to establish Communist domination in Germany, while the Weimar Republic was weakened by the Ruhr conflict of 1923. This realistic foreign policy, however, was based not only upon calculations of Russian national interest, but also took into consideration the limits of Soviet strength as well as the decline of revolutionary enthusiasm and fluidity in the world after 1920. However, despite their realism, Soviet leaders did not give up hope for a world revolution in the long run.

They simply shifted their emphasis from the aim of rapid world revolution starting in Western countries to the aim of increasing and enhancing the power of the existing Soviet regime. During the Brest-Litovsk crisis Lenin stressed the importance of the fact that the Soviet regime was in being — the healthy first-born child of the world revolution. Work for the world revolution became more and more identified with a foreign policy that guaranteed the security of the Soviet Union and strengthened its power. This foreign policy with its maneuvers and shifts was the product of the delay in the coming of the world revolution. While waiting for this revolution the Soviet regime had to be strengthened; it had to learn from the experiences and technical achievements of other powers and nations. As Lenin has put it: "We must utilize Capitalism in order to build Socialism." Soviet leaders recognized the usefulness of economic relations with capitalist states just as they accepted as a fact the power of Imperial Germany in the Brest-Litovsk period. The Soviet leaders recognized the temporary necessity for the co-existence of the Soviet and the capitalist world; they expected that as the Soviet world would progress and grow stronger, the capitalist world would decay and grow weaker. The weak links

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Russian and Ukrainian were the most important ones — was held together by the solidarity and unity of the Communists; it was replaced in 1922 by the Soviet Union. The USSR was nominally a federation, but in reality, despite the explicit statement of its constitution about the right of secession, it continued to concentrate power in Moscow. True, this tendency towards centralization was camouflaged by a policy which opposed the remnants of Tsarist Great Russian chauvinism. In the Ukrainian Soviet Republic a policy of Ukrainization was favored. Former Ukrainian nationalist leaders, like the historian Hrushevsky, were permitted to participate in public life. But also in the period of apparent concessions to non-Russian nationalism the authority of the leadership in the party was strengthened. The tenth party congress, on Lenin's initiative, forbade factional groupings inside the party.⁶⁹ Lenin had tired of opposition groups, like the so-called worker opposition, which protested against increasing bureaucratization of the party and of public life. But Lenin could afford some controversial discussions inside the party. His authority had become so undisputed that he could successfully utilize at the same time men like Stalin and Trotsky even though they were estranged by their bitter quarrels during the civil war.

During Lenin's illness (he was incapacitated in 1922 and died in 1924), an internal struggle about who was to succeed him developed within the party leadership. Upon Zinoviev's suggestion Stalin had been made secretary general of the party in 1922. He used this office to bring the party machine, step by step, under his control. Together with Kamenev and Zinoviev, two typical Bolshevik intellectuals, he prevented Trotsky from becoming Lenin's heir and helped reduce his influence in the party. Then Stalin turned against his allies of the first hour and in their turn deprived them of power. Now they joined with Trotsky, opposing Stalin in a bloc. But it was too late. Stalin could use the party machine against the opposition; the party voted always in Stalin's favor and did not listen to the arguments of the opposition. Of course, all competitors in the fight for power cited Lenin as the highest infallible authority. Zinoviev had coined the expression "Leninism"

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to death. The execution of other leading Bolsheviks, like Karakhan and Enukidse, was made known by brief notices; leading military men, such as Marshall Tukhatchevsky and General Yakir, were executed after secret trials; others, like Marshals Jegorov and Bluecher, simply disappeared. Jagoda, who for many years had been the head of the political police and had prepared the first great trial of the purge, admitted abjectly and publicly the most heinous crimes; the peak of this period was named 'Ezhovschina' after Jagoda's successor, Ezhov, who ruthlessly performed countless liquidations and arrests until he, too, finally vanished from public life.

The great purge from 1936 to 1938 definitely established Stalin's absolute control over the Party. Those Communists who had known and opposed him as one of Lenin's lieutenants disappeared. Intellectuals like the former emigres, inclined to discussion and skepticism, were now replaced by "apparatchiki" (men of the apparatus) who carried out orders without any hesitation. Party doctrine for them consisted in formulas applied in accordance with the interpretation and meaning determined by the highest authorities.

The great purge stabilized definitively a totalitarian rule by an omnipotent Soviet leadership. Perpetuating itself by controlling everything with the help of a subservient bureaucracy, it pretended (and still pretends) to fulfill and interpret authoritatively an absolutely true doctrine. But, as we have seen, this development was not a break with Lenin's principles; Stalin's extension of terroristic methods to the party was only an application of these principles. Stalin had instruments for establishing the regime which Lenin, fighting for a conquest of power, obviously did not yet have. Stalin had an additional motive for using these instruments, for despite all the adulation bestowed upon him after 1929, he did not have the unquestioned authority in the party enjoyed by Lenin. Stalin realized after the assassination of his lieutenant Kirov that the opposition against him in the party had only been driven underground, and that continued terror would be required to make his position secure.

Soviet foreign policy was, on the whole, rather on the defensive

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have been designed to continue and to augment absolute control by Stalinist leadership. The role of the party is again stressed — the party under Stalin's direction has won the war — whereas the role of the generals is played down. The emphasis upon the "hegemonial people" (Stalin), that is, the Great Russians, serves to focus the power of the regime and present it as a universal model to be imitated everywhere. The disappearance of the Comintern — only partially replaced by the Cominform — indicates that the Soviet Union possesses directly and immediately the leadership of the Communist movement in the world.⁸¹ The doctrinal claim to dominate and define all fields is now systematically exercised in such vastly different fields as literature, philosophy, music, botany, and philology, where the party directives and orders must be accepted.⁸² Unreliable elements are purged, often after the most humiliating public confessions. Confidence in the achievements of the Soviet regime is also expressed in the fight against cosmopolitanism and all foreign influences. The Soviet regime does not need any outside help. Created by the Russian people, it manifests the superiority of the Russian people, whose creativity and inventiveness are signposts to the whole world. The fact that Bolshevism-Communism succeeded in getting and maintaining power in Russia is responsible for the nationalization of the doctrine. Bolshevism assumes increasingly today the features of intense Russian nationalism. 1122

The Totalitarian State

The Bolshevik regime construes itself to have started as a dictatorship founded upon an alliance between the proletariat and the poor peasants.⁸³ It pretends to have been an alliance in which the proletariat is the leading group, with policies determined by its avant-garde, the disciplined, well-organized "monolithic" Bolshevik party. Today the official doctrine explains that socialism is realized in the Soviet Union: the economy is entirely socialized; private ownership of the means of production (and therefore the division of society into classes) has been abolished; all-out planning, extending to agriculture, has been introduced. True, a Communism in which everybody will be rewarded according to his needs, has not

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of its own members.⁹² Therefore Stalin's method of reaching power consisted first in controlling the delegates and then in gaining the support of the majority of the so-called plenum of the Central Committee when it was called together. The party statute is not strictly observed. Although there is a prescription for a party congress every two years, the last party congress met in 1939.

The conclusive power of the leaders is camouflaged by the slogan "democratic centralism," which would give the impression that obedience is due to elected leaders. But the real power in the party is not determined by the vote of party delegates or by the party congress, but by the fact that between the party congresses the elected organs can change their own composition. Therefore, whoever controls them controls all party elections. In Lenin's time the domination of the leading organs over the party was not yet fully developed and streamlined, although under Lenin, in the party congress of 1921, the formation of factions among Communists was forbidden — a measure which became the basis for the fight against any criticism of the party leadership. But owing to his extraordinary authority, acquired not only as the party founder but as the man who had successfully led the party into power, Lenin was always able to master oppositions, only rarely resorting to such means as arrest. At the beginning of the regime there was obviously no machinery available to organize bloody purges. This situation changed as Stalin acquired power, although the extension of the use of violence and pressure (applied to the world outside the party) to the party and its members did not become a practice until years after Stalin had taken over control of the Bolshevik party.

Stalin achieved his position as the master only after prolonged struggles and complicated maneuvers that played one group against the other.⁹³ As long as Lenin was able to participate in political life (down to 1922) Stalin was only one under-leader among many, though he was used as a kind of trouble shooter. Other collaborators of Lenin — particularly Trotsky — were much better known than Stalin; and regardless of a few cliques supporting Stalin, Trotsky had the control of the army. Stalin's rise to power began in 1922 when upon the proposal of Zinoviev he was appointed

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politico-social regime — a totalitarian regime without independent groups but with a maximum concentration of power, unity of political and economic control, appeals to the masses, hostility towards inherited power positions (like the white race in Asia), and a skillful manipulation of mass emotions ranging from dislike of war to a primitive supernaturalism.

The Soviet regime is the regime of totalitarian power politics adapted to conditions deriving from Russian history. But the Soviet masters pretend that they want to realize the will of the masses everywhere. Their simplifications, their claims to have the key to all situations of history and society in the past, present, and future, appeal also to the non-Russian world tired of over-complicated problems and longing for clear-cut decisions. This world is impressed by the fact that Soviet claims are backed by fierce power and an apparent doctrinal consistency which is flexible but untainted by skepticism and relativist doubts. Despairing over its own vacillations, the non-Russian world is stunned by the boldness of the Soviet faith. It recognizes that Leninism-Stalinism is based upon root-principles of the modern secularized era like scientism, belief in evolution, inevitable perfection, and the limitless successes of technical social engineering. The devotion of the Soviet regime to the needs of Russian reality has not decreased its global appeal.

CHAPTER III

BOLSHEVISM AS WORLD POWER

The discrepancy between the promises of Bolshevism and the Soviet reality is not to be explained by some casual misfortune like the success of Stalin; Stalin, it is said, a bad-willed man of devious cunning, became heir to the allegedly humanitarian Lenin; his rise to power also was facilitated by the clumsiness of his adversaries who, like Trotsky, were unable to build a political machine and who underrated, to their own ruin, the inconspicuous secretary-general.

The contradiction between the theory and the reality of Bolshevism — a contradiction between a propagandized declared freedom and its present practical destruction — originates in the very essence of Bolshevism as a political secular pseudo-religion, and its wrong ideas of man and society. External changes, socialization of means of production, and constant pressures are believed to be capable of changing the nature of men, of turning man into a being who will be able without guidance, owing to his perfect social education and experience, to perform all functions in the community. With this perfection achieved, no authority will be necessary, for all decisions will deal with purely technical-administrative problems within everyone's competence. Rule by those who, as Communists, know the line of development, will wipe out all evil influences of the past and its representatives, and will teach the masses not only to be perfect citizens but to be expert in all fields. Specialist-groups, a bureaucracy as well as an army separated from the people, will disappear along with the state. The unrestricted use of force will be necessary during the period of transition — terror is employed by the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to abolish the necessity of coercion.¹²¹

But this transitional period becomes a permanent one; the promises of the future serve only to justify the present system of all-engulfing domination. The ruling elite gathers more and more

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traditions, into the world of modern civilization. Before 1917 it was obviously impossible to represent the existing Russian regime as an exemplar or as a center of experiments leading to the coming progressive society. On the contrary, Tsarism appeared as the bulwark of negative and evil reaction. After the October Revolution an adulatory interest in Soviet rule could and did develop. The Soviet regime, with all its shortcomings, stood as the heir of socialist movements, trying seriously to fulfill their aspirations. This Soviet mythology, presenting programs and promises as accomplished facts, was born and grew to exercise great influence regardless of the many disappointments provoked by Soviet policies. It does not matter that many ex-Communists and friends of the Soviet Union are converted into energetic antagonists of their former faith of the "God that failed."¹²⁷ Though the Soviet Union has abolished many reforms praised as a proof of its progressive character,¹²⁸ the Soviet mythology continues to thrive. The disappointed victims of the past are constantly replaced by new victims. They admit — if they admit anything — that backward Russia must catch up in great haste and that the Soviet regime, surrounded by a world of merciless enemies, must neglect for the time being its progressive reforms.

Since the beginning of the Soviet regime, the same central objections have been made against it, but they have not destroyed its mythical fascination. It has been repeatedly said that the Soviet Union is the dictatorship of a small minority skilled in manipulating the masses, that it has imposed upon the workers the strictest discipline demanded by the process of industrialization, that it has required extraordinary sacrifices from consumers, that it has inaugurated agrarian policies making victims of millions, that all its apparent relaxations of power have been made solely for the continuation of a policy aiming at progressively tighter and more perfect totalitarian controls. The revelations about Soviet reality made by former Communists, and in many European countries by ex-prisoners of the Soviet armies, have diminished the prestige of Soviet Communism,¹²⁹ but the foundations of this prestige have not been shaken. Numerous intellectuals still look upon Soviet policies as policies of peace. Peoples and nations, dissatisfied with existing con-

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ing to the orders and interests of Moscow,¹³⁵ the assertion is made and upheld that the Soviet regime is anti-imperialistic. This claim is justified by the following dialectical artifice: imperialism means the exploitation of colonial territories in the interest of one class, the ruling class in the imperialist country; therefore, the policy of the Soviet Union cannot be imperialist, for there are no classes in the socialist Soviet Union, and all policies of the Soviet Union are policies of liberation from imperialist subjugation. It is not reality that determines the political concepts, but the concepts that determine reality. Therefore, Soviet imperialism, like the exploitation of satellite economies, appears as anti-imperialism, and the Soviet "anti-imperialism" becomes an important weapon against the influence of the West, including the United States. That this "anti-imperialism" is only a weapon of Soviet expansionism and imperialism (struggling to win powerful allies like the Chinese Communist People's Republic, or to undermine adversaries in the cold war — particularly by peace-talk) has not destroyed its propaganda value. The Soviet attack upon imperialism continues to attract many and to make Stalin's regime look like the greatest possible helper in the fight against European-American influence and controls, notably in Asia and the Middle East.

Bolshevism, Fascism, Nazism

The experiences and methods of Bolshevism have been used by anti-communist movements in the twentieth century. The conquest and maintenance of power by the Bolshevik minority has impressed and influenced anti-democratic and anti-liberal groups throughout Europe. A totalitarian regime — whose most striking features consist in the conquest and organization of unlimited controls by a strictly disciplined group with a secular political religion and claiming to express the will of the masses — proved realizable for the first time in the victory of Bolshevism.

Bolshevist methods could be taken over and imitated without accepting the contents of Marxism-Leninism. Totalitarian techniques of gaining and exercising power, totalitarian pressure and propa-

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of the promised aim is more and more delayed, or postponed to a future farther and farther away.

Bolshevik effort is based upon the assumption of a limitless perfectibility of man, his capacity to know the over-all character of coming history and society and to use this knowledge for the construction of the future era. It brings about a present reality in which man and society are only means and material for the social engineer. Utopia, resting on a rationalist-scientific knowledge proffering absolute liberty by a collectivist system, creates a totalitarian control by the party directing the present collectivist experiment. This control summons to itself modern technical means and methods of domination and can, therefore, become more omnipotent and more engulfing than any previous tyranny. Utopia becomes an ideology, serving only to warrant the actions of the totalitarian masters and absolutely unconnected with the brutal nature of reality.

This ideology has great influence: first, because it is backed by the experience of the successful conquest of a great empire; second, because it justifies the shifting of the means to accord with the power situation (only centralizing tendencies and the will to exercise a constant totalitarian control remain unchanged); and finally, because this ideology is grasped by many not in its effects but only in its promises. These promises make the existing conditions look darker than they really are; and the myth of Bolshevism is compared with the imperfect reality, which causes longing as well as suffering. Such a myth expresses basic tendencies in a secularized world. For its elements are these: belief in necessary development towards a perfect order here on earth which will function without a specific directing group;¹⁴³ belief in the unlimited effects of education and alterations in economics and social organization; belief in complete mastery of society by men who know the laws of social structure and development; and belief that mysteries can be eliminated from public life, since they are only proofs of an insufficient knowledge which can be overcome. These tendencies are expressed by Bolshevism in a very simple system which explains, at the same time, the means by which the perfect society can and will be reached. The system, despite its drastic action

CONCLUSION

Bolshevism has one of its roots in the West. The starting point and basis of its doctrine, Marxism, has been described by one of its two creators, Friedrich Engels, as the offspring of German philosophy, English economics and French sociology (utopian socialism). Marxism became Bolshevism — a movement to change the world — in Russia owing to the activities of Lenin. He embraced Marxism as a belief. He took it seriously as a guide to action, as a tool to effectuate a total, permanent revolution, and not merely, like the Western or Westernized moderate socialists, as a justification for social and political reforms which would be steps in a slow process of peaceful humanitarian evolution.

Lenin was the product and the nemesis of the Russian radical intelligentsia. He shared its belief that Western socialist and progressive doctrines were absolute truth and a secular religion regulating all of life; but he overcame its unfitness for continuous and systematic practical action. After accumulating experience in methods of organization and struggle for power as leader of a socialist group, the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic party, he exploited boldly the unexpected breakdown of Tsarism. His party took over, established the Soviet regime, and, by building up its totalitarian power, "the socialism in one country" of Stalin, became identified with the world revolution. The disciples of the West grew to despise the West, which, in its decadence, did not dare to make socialism into a reality. They exploited, without hesitation or pity, the tears, sweat and longing of the Soviet masses, deceiving them and flattering them, to construct a new world without capitalists. This red empire is dominated by a leadership monopolizing all political, economic, cultural, and ideological controls. These imitators of the West, whose faith had come from the West, became, because of successful power politics, men sitting in judgment upon the West, asking its submission to Soviet policies and methods, while threatening it with conquest and destruction. They face a world often uncertain about its own traditions, longing for security at any price and exhausted by internal conflicts.

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In this tired world beliefs have often become ideologies reflecting and justifying egoistic power and enervated traditions. Too much brutality shrewdly implemented is opposed by too much sophistication inclined to despair about itself, though it has not yet completely lost the memories of its great origins and the will to survive. This power conflict would have been settled in favor of the paralyzing Soviet strength, exploiting the prostration that followed World War II, if the European West had not the support of the United States. The technical, industrial, and economic means at the disposal of Washington forced Moscow to be cautious in the use of revolutionary situations and to replace open conquest by the methods of cold war. There is every reason to expect that world conquest by the fatherland of world revolution, the Soviet Communism, will not happen, despite the success of its ally in China. There is even reason for hope that this containment may be achieved without an atomic world war.

Bolshevism is surely a political and military problem, but at the same time much more than that: it is an accusation against the imperfections and errors of its opponents; it thrives on these errors and imperfections. It brings into the open and develops to fullest size an immanentist secularism (viewing the attainment of a perfectly-functioning society with maximum satisfactions available to everyone through social engineering as the aim of the very existence of men and their society). All mysteries — it is promised by Bolshevism — will disappear. They will be reduced to socially useful forces: adoration of God replaced by relentless and enthusiastic work towards the classless society; contemplation replaced by meaningful labor — with, of course, organized hours of rest and leisure; and all experience lowered to the level of problems of social science, management, organization, and administration.

Against a tired and skeptical immanentism Bolshevism sets up an appeal to an all-embracing, self-confident and courageous one. Bolshevism raises not only political economic and military issues but also moral and religious ones. Therefore, power is necessary to overcome this danger, but its use alone is not sufficient. Even after the downfall of its Soviet form it could survive, since totalitarianism is

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according to the dictates of Bolshevism. The prison built by the Bolshevik belief in the self-sufficiency of society in this world must be demolished. The real world of human imperfections must be discovered again. True freedom consists not in the necessity of a coming classless society, but in the capacity to produce an infinite variety of men and human groups embodying history and society, expressing and emphasizing the manifold aspects of human nature. Common to all kinds of historical life is recognition by human endeavor of an order which cannot be exhausted in a particular form arising in time; only such recognition can be the basis of human freedom. It is the negative merit of Bolshevism to have challenged this conception of human nature; and its challenge can only be answered by our becoming aware of its fundamentals.

For Bolshevism, the aim of historical development is to remove all mystery, to make men total masters of society. This conception is opposed to the view that the aim of history cannot be itself an historical form. The Christian will add that the center and aim of history is the Cross and the City of God, not the prolongation of human time but its fulfillment, transformation and elevation.

All rejections of the basic faith and doctrine of Bolshevism do not save us from the question: Why did this error, this misconception of man and society, this utopian evolutionism, appear attractive to so many? Here is a concrete challenge—the challenge to complacency about the existing order. Surely Bolshevism has replaced or would replace it by a much worse order—by a totalitarian tyranny fostering lies, corruption, cruelty, and inhumanity. There would be no chance left to fight for improvement and for more social justice; instead every opportunity for vicious and evil action would be tremendously increased. Nevertheless, Bolshevism, its rise and its successes, ought to stir us to meditate about what is unsatisfactory in the present world and about what has caused many, erroneously, of course, to accept Bolshevism as the answer to our demands for the better realization of social justice and human rights. That Bolshevism could develop into a world danger is surely an accusation against the non-Bolshevist world.

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teachings of the bourgeois philosophers with their "new" reversions to old and rotten idealism.

Deepening and developing philosophical materialism, Marx completed it, extended its knowledge of nature to the knowledge of human society. Marx's historical materialism was one of the greatest achievements of scientific thought. The chaos and arbitrariness that had previously reigned in the views on history and politics gave way to a strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory, which shows how, in consequence of the growth of productive forces, out of one system of social life another and higher system develops — how capitalism, for instance, grows out of feudalism.

Just as man's knowledge reflects nature (i.e., developing matter), which exists independently of him, so man's knowledge (i.e., the various views and doctrines — philosophical, religious, political and so forth) reflects the economic system of society. Political institutions are a superstructure on the economic foundation. We see, for example, that the various political forms of the modern European states serve to fortify the rule of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat.

Ibid., pp. 4-5.

"To Hegel . . .," wrote Marx, "the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos (the creator, the maker) of the real world. . . . With me, on the contrary, the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."

Ibid., p. 14, "Karl Marx." Cf. *Capital*, Vol. I, Edition of Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago, Preface to the Second Edition.

. . . according to Marx, dialectics is "the science of the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of human thought." (Ludwig Feuerbach)

This revolutionary side of Hegel's philosophy was adopted and developed by Marx. Dialectical materialism "no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences." (Cf. F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*) Of former philosophy there remains "the science of thought and its laws — formal logic and dialectics." (Cf. *Anti-*

no more this
all knowledge
is the reflection
of nature.

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"Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."

Ibid., p. 78, quoting Marx: "Critique of the Gotha Programme."

. . . democracy itself begins to wither away owing to the simple fact that, freed from capitalist slavery, from the untold horrors, savagery, absurdities and infamies of capitalist exploitation, people will gradually become accustomed to observing the elementary rules of social life that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all copy-book maxims; they will become accustomed to observing them without force, without compulsion, without subordination, without the special apparatus for compulsion which is called the state.

Ibid., p. 81.

"In a higher phase of communist society after the enslaving subordination of individuals under division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not merely a means to live but has become itself the primary necessity of life; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly — only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be fully left behind and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"

Ibid., p. 87, quoting Marx: "Critique of the Gotha Programme."

. . . Kautsky accidentally stumbled upon one true idea (namely, that dictatorship is power unrestricted by any laws) but he failed to give a definition of dictatorship. . . .

V. I. Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," *Selected Works*, Vol. VII, p. 122.

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During the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat there can be no policy of universal freedom in our country, i.e., no freedom of speech, press, etc., for the bourgeoisie. Our domestic policy reduces itself to granting a maximum of freedom to the proletarian strata in town and country, in denying even a minimum of freedom to the remnants of the bourgeois class. This constitutes the crux of our policy, based on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

J. Stalin, *Leninism*, I, New York, 1943, pp. 41-42.

. . . The dictatorship of the proletariat is the weapon of the proletarian revolution, its origin, its most important stronghold which is called into being, first, to crush the resistance of the overthrown exploiters, and to consolidate its achievements; secondly, to lead the proletarian revolution to its completion, to lead the revolution onward to the complete victory of socialism.

. . . the important thing is to retain power, to consolidate it and make it invincible. What is required to attain this end? At least three main tasks confronting the dictatorship of the proletariat "on the morrow" of victory must be fulfilled. They are: a) to break the resistance of the landlords and capitalists overthrown and expropriated by the revolution, and to liquidate every attempt they make to restore the power of capital; b) to organize construction in such a way as will rally all toilers around the proletariat and to carry on this work in such a way as will prepare for the liquidation, the extinction of classes; c) to arm the revolution and to organize the army of the revolution for the struggle against the external enemy and for the struggle against imperialism.

J. Stalin, *Leninism*, I, New York, 1934, pp. 41-42; *Sotchinienia*, Vol. VI, Moscow, 1947, pp. 108 f.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the violent overthrow of the domination of the exploiting classes and establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a general law of the Socialist Revolution. Only the working class, guided by a Marxist-Leninist party, is capable of leading and carrying through to the finish the class struggle against the exploiters. . . . The recognition of the necessity of

ditions for a direct attack on the citadels of capitalism.

Ibid., p. 16; *Sotchinenia*, Vol. VI, p. 74.

II. TACTICS

1) Maturity for Revolution

. . . concerning the prerequisites for the seizure of power by the proletariat. The opportunists assert that the proletariat cannot and ought not to seize power if it does not itself constitute a majority in the country. No proofs are adduced, for this absurd thesis cannot be justified either theoretically or practically. Let us admit this for a moment. Lenin replies to these gentlemen of the Second International. But suppose a historic situation arises (war, agrarian crisis, etc.) in which the proletariat, a minority of the population, is able to rally around itself the vast majority of the working masses, why should it not seize power then? Why should it not profit by the favourable internal and international situation to pierce the front of capitalism and hasten the general climax? . . . why not do it this way: first seize power, create favourable conditions for the development of the proletariat and then advance with seven-league strides to raise the cultural level of the working masses and form numerous cadres of leaders and administrators recruited from among the workers? Has not Russian experience demonstrated that these working class cadres of leaders are growing a hundred times more rapidly and thoroughly with the proletariat in power than under the rule of capital? Is it not obvious, that the experience of the revolutionary mass struggle ruthlessly refutes also this theoretical dogma of the opportunists?

Ibid., pp. 22 f.; *Sotchinenia*, Vol. VI, pp. 82-84.

Formerly, it was customary to talk of the existence or absence of objective conditions for the proletarian revolution in individual countries, or, to be more exact, in this or that advanced country. This point of view is now inadequate. Now we must say that objective conditions for the revolution exist throughout the whole system of imperialist world economy, which is an integral unit; the existence within this system of some countries that are not sufficiently developed from the industrial point of view cannot form an insur-

mountable obstacle to the revolution, *if* the system as a whole has become, or more correctly *because* the system as a whole has already become ripe for revolution.

Ibid., p. 32; *Sotchinenia*, Vol. VI, p. 96.

The Leninist theory of the revolution says: No, *not necessarily where industry is most developed*, and so forth; it will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the chain of the imperialist world front at its weakest link. The country which begins the revolution, which makes a breach in the capitalist front, may prove to be less developed in a capitalist sense than others which are more developed but have remained, nevertheless, within the framework of capitalism. . . The chain proved to be weakest in Russia, although that country was less developed in a capitalistic sense than, for example, France, Germany, England or America.

Where in the near future will the chain be broken next? Once more, precisely where is it weakest. It is not impossible that this may be in India, for example. Why? Because there we find a young and militant revolutionary proletariat which has an ally in the shape of the national liberation movement, unquestionably a very powerful and important ally; because in that country the revolution faces a notorious enemy, a foreign imperialism, devoid of all moral authority and deservedly hated by the oppressed and exploited masses of India.

Ibid., pp. 33 f.; *Sotchinenia*, Vol. VI, pp. 97 f.

Marx and Engels said that at the end of the nineteenth century "the French will commence, and the Germans will finish"—the French will commence, because in the course of decades of revolution they acquired that fearless initiative in revolutionary action that made them the vanguard of the socialist revolution.

Today we see a different combination of the forces of international Socialism. We say that it is easier for the movement to start in those countries which are not exploiting countries, which have no opportunities for robbing easily, and are not able to bribe the upper stratum of their workers.

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certain conditions, and when the troops are in a certain condition. The point is, however, that terror is now advocated, not as one of the operations the army in the field must carry out in close connection and in complete harmony with the whole system of fighting, but as an individual attack, completely separated from any army whatever. In view of the absence of a central revolutionary organisation, terror cannot be anything but that.

V. I. Lenin, "Where to Begin?" *Selected Works*, Vol. II, London, 1936, p. 17.

May 17, 1921. Comrade Kursky, with reference to our conversation I enclose the draft of a complementary paragraph of the penal code. . . . * Its fundamental purpose is clear — to make plain to all the principle (politically true and no mere maxim of a narrow jurisprudence) which determines the character and justification of terrorism, its necessity and limits. The legal trial is not intended to replace terrorism; to make such a profession would be deception of others or oneself; but to base terrorism firmly on a fundamental principle and give it a legal form, unambiguous, without dishonesty or embellishment. The law must be couched in the widest possible terms, for only the revolutionary sense of justice and the revolutionary conscience will determine its more or less comprehensive application in practice.

*Propaganda or agitation or participation in forming or co-operating with organisations designed to assist that portion of the industrial bourgeoisie which does not admit the right to existence of an economic system aiming at the destruction of capitalism, and which therefore attempts its forcible overthrow, whether by foreign intervention or blockade or espionage or financing the Press or by similar means, renders the delinquent subject to the supreme penalty. Under extenuating circumstances the capital penalty will be replaced by deprivation of liberty or by exile.

Lenin's letter published in *Bolshevik*, October 31, 1930, as quoted in W. Gurian, *Bolshevism: Theory and Practice*, London, Sheed & Ward, 1933, p. 302.

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sponsible leaders of the Party, by a two-thirds majority, deems it necessary to reduce a member of the C.C. to the status of candidate, or to expel him from the Party, this measure must be put into effect immediately. (March 1921)

V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of the Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B), on Party Unity," *Selected Works*, Vol. IX, London, 1937, p. 134.

He (Lutovinov) wants real democracy, that all, at least the most important questions should be discussed in all the cells from bottom up, that the whole Party should get going on every question and should take part in the consideration of that question. But, comrades, with such an arrangement our party would be transformed into a discussion club of eternally jabbering and never-deciding people, while our party must, above all, be an acting one, because we are in power. Besides . . . there is no reason to suppose that the enemies who surround us are not engaged in some preparatory work for blockade or intervention. That is the situation. Can we in such circumstances carry all questions of war and peace into the street? Yet, to discuss a question in 20,000 cells means to carry the question out into the street. . . . It must be remembered, that in the conditions of being surrounded by enemies, a sudden stroke on our part, an unexpected maneuver, speed, decide everything. What would have become of us, if, instead of discussing our political campaign for the Lausanne Conference in an intimate circle of trusted persons of the Party, we had carried all that work out into the street, revealed our cards? Enemies would have discounted all the minuses and pluses, undermined our campaign, and we should have departed from Lausanne in shame. What would become of us if we should first bring out into the street the question of war and peace — the most important of all important questions. . . . Why, we should be given a sound thrashing to the count of two. It is clear, comrades, that for organizational as well as political reasons Comrade Lutovinov's democracy is a utopia. It is unfair and unnecessary.

J. Stalin's "Report to the XIIth Congress of the Russian Communist Party(b), April 17-25, 1923," Moscow 1923, pp. 181-182.

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The history of the Party teaches us, first of all, that the victory of the proletarian revolution, the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is impossible without a revolutionary party of the proletariat, a party free from the opportunism, irreconcilable towards compromisers and capitulators, and revolutionary in its attitude towards the bourgeoisie and its state power. The history of the Party teaches us that to leave the proletariat without such a party means to leave it without revolutionary leadership, and to leave it without revolutionary leadership means to ruin the cause of the proletarian revolution.

The history of the Party teaches us that the ordinary Social-Democratic Party of the West-European type, brought up under conditions of civil peace, trailing in the wake of the opportunists, dreaming of "social reforms," and dreading social revolution, cannot be such a party.

History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, New York, 1939, p. 353.

The history of the Party further teaches us that a party of the working class cannot perform the role of leader of its class, cannot perform the role of organizer and leader of the proletarian revolution, unless it has mastered the advanced theory of the working-class movement, the Marxist-Leninist theory.

The power of the Marxist-Leninist theory lies in the fact that it enables the Party to find the right orientation in any situation, to understand the inner connection of current events, to foresee their course and to perceive not only how and in what direction they are developing in the present, but how and in what direction they are bound to develop in the future.

Ibid., p. 355.

Mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory means being able to enrich this theory with the new experience of the revolutionary movement, with new propositions and conclusions, it means being able to *develop it and advance it* without hesitating to replace—in accordance with the substance of the theory—such of its propositions and conclusions as have become antiquated by new ones corre-

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Bochenski, *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus* (Bern, 1950); the last book is summarized by its author in the *Review of Politics*, Vol. 13 (1951). Very helpful for the understanding of the philosophical background of Marx' thought and Hegel's influence on Marx is Th. Steinbuechel's collection of articles, *Sozialismus* (Tübingen, 1950). Steinbuechel emphasizes that Marx took over from Hegel the belief in the necessary and reasonable development of history (p. 42). But for Hegel the logic of the spirit immanent in the world is the moving force, whereas for Marx this role is played by "real", material factors.

⁸ Cf. E. Voegelin, "The Formation of the Marxian Revolutionary Idea," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 12 (1950), 275 f., which gives an excellent analysis—with many quotations—of Marx's atheistic views which have been absorbed by Bolshevism. Lenin's anti-religious views can be studied in his *Selected Works*, Vol. XI.

⁹ Cf. my article on "Totalitarian Religions," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 14 (1952), and J. Monnerot, *Sociologie du Communisme* (Paris, 1949). Monnerot shows how the Communist faith in its scientific basis changes science into a dogmatic system which must be enforced by fanatics. These (secularized) pseudo-scientific dogmas do not request prayer and contemplation but are orders for the transformation of the world. "In the name of the dogmas of secular religions human lives are sacrificed to the knowledge which the holders of the 'Truth' possess, knowledge of the ultimate end of history and of the best ways which lead to it." (p. 302). The background of political religions is discussed in E. Voegelin, *Die politischen Religionen* (Stockholm, 1939) and in his monumental *History of Political Ideas* (to be published by Macmillan).

¹⁰ This description of a basic Marxian-Bolshevik belief is not refuted by attempts to give to the superstructures of the economic foundation an increased importance and relative independence, such as Stalin, following many previous interpretations of Marxism, does in his letters on errors in linguistics, *Bolshevik* (Nos. 12 and 14, June and July 1950). There, the role of the Soviet state, of the "revolution from above," is mentioned. J. Ellis and R. W. Davies, "Soviet linguistics," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. II (1951), 163, emphasize correctly the Marxist character of Stalin's statements. Cf. also the article of G. Gleserman in *Bolshevik*, Sept. 6, 1950.

¹¹ Cf. G. Briefs, *The Proletariat* (New York, 1937).

¹² This distinction between Socialism (which is also called the first phase of Communism) and Communism goes back to K. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," *Selected Works*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 563 f.

¹³ Cf. Stalin's statement on the 18th congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party (CPSU), March 1939; reproduced in English and commented upon by M. T. Florinsky, *Towards an Understanding of USSR* (revised edition, New York, 1951), pp. 17-20; discussed also by A. Vyshinsky in *Sovetskoe Socialisticheskoe Gosudarstvo* (Moscow, 1948), pp. 93 f.

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¹⁴ Stalin, in his report on the Work of the Central Committee to the 18th congress of the CPSU, quoted from Lenin: "We do not regard Marxist theory as something complete and inviolable; on the contrary we are convinced that it has only laid the cornerstone of the science which socialists must further advance in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life. We think that an independent elaboration of the Marxist theory is especially essential for Russian socialists, for this theory provides only general guiding principles which in particular are applied in England differently from France, in France differently from Germany, and in Germany differently from Russia."

¹⁵ Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. V, preface of 1920, pp. 11 ff.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

S. e. = ston ¹⁷ Lenin defined dictatorship as "power unrestricted by any laws." ("The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky", *Selected Works*, Vol. VII, p. 122).

¹⁸ Cf. my article on Lenin's methods of seizing Power in 1917 in W. Conze, ed., Rothfels-Festschrift: *Deutschland und Europa* (Dusseldorf, 1951). For Lenin's three articles against constitutional illusions of August 1917, cf. his works, *Sotchinienia*, (3rd ed. Moscow 1926,) Vol. XXI, pp. 48 f.

¹⁹ Karl Marx, "Communist Manifesto," *Selected Works*, Vol. I (New York, International Publishers), pp. 218 f.

²⁰ Cf. E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, I (New York, 1951), ch. 2, pp. 26 f. (particularly p. 29 and p. 36); and F. Dan, *op. cit.*, ch. 9, pp. 266 f. (particularly pp. 274-275).

²¹ Speech at the grave of Karl Marx, March 17, 1883. "Just as Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in human history." Quoted in Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 1-6.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 255.

²³ *Selected Works*, Vol. VII (London, 1937): "Left Wing childishness and petty bourgeois mentality" (1918), p. 356. "Left Communists are obliged to take refuge behind high sounding and empty phrases. . . . The flaunting of high-sounding phrases is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intelligentsia."

²⁴ The claim that Marxism is no dogma (rather it is always ready to learn from experience) as well as bitter criticism of such so-called "Marxists" as Kautsky, who knew only the letter of Marx, can be found in many writings of Lenin before and after his seizure of power. Stalin likes to repeat them. Therefore, it is surprising that B. Meissner in his excellent

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⁵⁶ For the text of the decree in English translation, cf. J. H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera, *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1950) pp. 19 f.

⁵⁷ John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Forgotten Peace—Brest-Litovsk* (New York, 1938).

⁵⁸ Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. VII, pp. 305 f., description of his difficulties in the party in his speech of March 8, 1918. Cf. also my article on "Soviet Foreign Policy" *Yearbook of World Affairs*, Vol. I (London, 1947). Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, Vol. I (New York, 1930) pp. 13 ff.

⁵⁹ Lenin, *Selected Works* VII, "'Left-Wing' childishness and Petty Bourgeois Mentality", p. 351 f. Lenin writes that one does not have to accept battle against the giants of imperialism; "wait until the conflicts between the imperialists weaken them still more" (p. 353).

⁶⁰ The admirer of Lenin, E. H. Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 156, states: "Lenin accepted the terror in principle," though he tried to minimize as "boutade" Lenin's statement: "If (a man) is against (the revolution) we'll stand him up against the wall."

⁶¹ Oliver H. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917* (Cambridge, 1950). For an analysis of Lenin's theses on the Constituent Assembly, cf. E. H. Carr, *op. cit.*, pp. 113 ff.

⁶² Lenin, *Sotchinienia* Vol. XXI (3rd ed., Moscow, 1928), p. 194.

⁶³ M. Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917* (London, 1948).

⁶⁴ Lenin, *Sotchinienia* Vol. XXII (3rd ed., Moscow, 1929), pp. 168 f.

⁶⁵ W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921* (New York, 1937); G. Stewart, *The White Armies* (New York, 1933).

⁶⁶ F. Borkenau, *World Communism* (New York, 1939).

⁶⁷ E. H. Carr, *German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939* (Baltimore, 1951).

⁶⁸ E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution I*, pp. 309 ff.

⁶⁹ Lenin, *Sotchinienia* Vol. XXVI (3rd ed., Moscow, 1930), p. 588.

⁷⁰ Stalin, *Ob opposizii* (Moscow, 1928), p. 226.

⁷¹ That has been recognized by Stalin himself in his warning against dizziness from success. *Sotchinienia*, Vol. XII (Moscow, 1949), p. 191 f.

⁷² N. Jasny states: "At gun point, with sacrifices of millions of lives and by sending other millions in concentration camps, almost 100 million peasants and their families were herded into the Kholkhos", *Soviet Studies*, Vol. III, No. 2 (Oxford, October 1951), 161.

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⁷³ Cf. D. Dallin and B. Nikolaevsky, *Forced Labor in the Soviet Union* (New Haven, 1947). Of the many books of former inmates of Soviet camps most revealing is the introductory survey of M. Rozanov's *Zavoevatel'no bielych piaten* (Posev, Limburg, 1951), V-XXXVI.

⁷⁴ B. I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, 1951).

⁷⁵ With some exaggeration K. Mehnert claims that, with the condemnation of Pokrovsky—after his death (1932)—and the publication of Stalin's and Molotov's decree on teaching history of May 16, 1934, a new period in Bolshevik ideology started. (Cf. his interesting study *Weltrevolution durch Weltgeschichte*, Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Europa Akademie, Heft 9, Kitzingen, 1951). About the persecution of the Pokrovsky School, cf. A. Ouralov, *Staline au Pouvoir* (Paris, 1951) pp. 114-135. Cf. also S. Yakobson, "Postwar Historical Research in the Soviet Union" in Philip E. Mosely, ed., "The Soviet Union Since World War II" (*The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, Philadelphia, 1949); G. Kagan "La crise de la science historique russe," *Revue Historique*, 1940; G. von Rauch, "Die sowjetische Geschichtsforschung heute," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, XI (1951), Heft 4.

⁷⁶ F. L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad* (New York, 1946) gives (on pp. 261 ff.) a long though incomplete list of the prominent victims of the purge. "The number of little people who were purged cannot be estimated" (p. 262). On the one hand, F. L. Schuman believes that "the portrait of conspiracy spread on the Soviet court record" is "closer to reality than any alternative explanation" (264); on the other hand, he states: "The Soviet authorities preferred to see a thousand innocents liquidated rather than see a traitor escape." (268) Lists of those who had to be arrested were drawn up according to "objective criteria": membership in non-Communist parties—even before the rise of the Soviet regime, e.g., the security organs received orders to arrest certain percentages of the population. Another feature was the ultimate purge in their turn of the purgers of the first stages. Almost all Caucasian colleagues of Beria, who headed the NKVD in the Caucasus until he became Ezhov's successor, disappeared. Cf. the many books describing the great purge: particularly revealing are A. Ouralov, *op. cit.*, and A. Weissberg, *The Accused* (New York, 1951). Weissberg was a foreign Communist who lived in the USSR as a leading expert in physics.—Three members of Stalin's Politburo disappeared during the purge [G. K. Schueller, *The Politburo* (Stanford, 1951).]

⁷⁷ Cf. M. Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941*, Vol. I (New York, 1949).

⁷⁸ M. Beloff, *op. cit.*, Vol. II (New York, 1950); E. H. Carr, *German Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939* (Baltimore, 1951). Source books are *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941* (Department of

Sel. Works
IX, p. 131 ff.

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¹²² As A. Weissberg, *op. cit.*, relying upon his own experience, observes: those arrested during the purge were accused of being enemies of the Soviet regime when they refused to confess the crimes ascribed to them by the MVD—their refusal proved that they rejected cooperation with the regime and actually accused it of lying.

¹²³ Cf. F. Borkenau, *op. cit.* The leadership of the Third International was afraid that moderate socialist opportunists, “social-patriots” who had sold out to imperialists during World War I, would join the Communist movement; the 21 points containing the conditions under which socialist groups would be accepted by the Third International, were directed against them.

¹²⁴ The best surveys of the Civil War between the Red Army and its White opponents are given by W. H. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, and G. Stewart, *op. cit.*

¹²⁵ K. London, *The Seven Soviet Arts* (London, n.d.) notes in his preface, dated 1936-37, that he is an objective liberal observer and states: “In the Soviet Union . . . culture and its reconstruction within a new society, forms one of the most essential interests both of government and people” (p. 5).

¹²⁶ K. London, *op. cit.*, regrets that Lenin had no understanding of modern art, but he judged it “with infinitely greater generosity. . . . With the stabilization of Stalin’s power the activities of leftist artists were eliminated” (p. 76).

¹²⁷ It would be fascinating to write a history of the Bolshevik party and the Soviet regime as a history of the defections which accompany them from their beginnings. Here it is only possible to hint at a general classification of these defections. First, there are those old Socialists and Bolsheviks who were not willing to accept the doctrinal authority of Lenin (e.g. Bogdanov). Some of them returned to the fold, e.g. Lunatscharski, or tried to minimize their disagreements with Lenin, e.g. Trotsky after 1917; later he accused Stalin of having betrayed Lenin and true Bolshevism. Secondly, there are those who are disappointed with the policies of the regime; afraid of being purged, they refuse to return to the U.S.S.R.—such officials as Agabekov (former Tcheka-leader) and such Soviet diplomats as Bessedovsky and Dmitrievsky. Many of them became nationalist opponents of the anti-Russian Soviet regime—e.g. General Vlasov, who, after having become a German prisoner, tried to organize during World War II, a national Russian army. Third, there are disappointed intellectuals, artists, social reformers and socialists. Typical of the rejection, of the original strange belief that the Soviet regime is realizing humanitarian needs, is the attitude of André Gide. This realization of radical misunderstanding of the Soviet regime may result in the sharpest criticism of a gullible western world and of all “liberals” and “progressives” who are unable to oppose the U.S.S.R. energetically and to fight the Communist

Chief merit: Spells out what others hardly summed.

1. Political religion

5/1/44 2. Unbroken line Lenin - Stalin

3. Radicality of Leninism or revolutionary society.

4. Anti-Stalinism 1946 (without complete neg.)

a) 1): religion called what usually is called state - p. 5

The paradox in actual: after Lenin had called rel. an

"ideology", the relig. people agree to call an ideology a

"religion". Reason is Socialology: p. 14 - simplicity of Lambert.

Questions: difference between religion - faith - ideology. The whole thing rests on ultimate view of the divine. See Summary. Speaks only of doctrine. - transcribed.

a) 2) Stalin's reformulation of state - ideology - 8 - curiously interpreted - wrongly argued contribution.

Underlying alternative between "Stalin's line" and "unbroken line of Leninism - Stalinism"

(p. 17)

Anti

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Botkinov: stayed thru

Russian: intelligentsia / 25 pp. 101

Intelligentsia = educated classes (Director as Lenin's

Specific: all of Lenin -- either of "relig." or "relig." means (26)

37: Rel. betw. prof. relig. & intellect -

Thing - Practice -

38: overthrown possibly because nobody defends!

37: The non-Botkinov style of the Soviet and Lenin -

The dual character of Lenin's policy: 44 (can be explained in fact, not in form, follows. disappears under Stalin. This main argument of unbroken line. -

Shortcomings: too much emphasis on "ideas", too little on facts. F. i. Krasinski just meant - 44

2) Certain imperfections in places not spelled out, such as intelligentsia.

Summa: p. 164 - m. 69.

p. 86: end

m. 122 (84-174)

89

98

Contradiction betw. reality of thing? Identified with between utopian aim and practical means. 83. Very doubtful. In reality: "Utopian" aim result if man no "socialist" that is necessary: 1) conclusion 2) Rel. political ideal space.