






# BEING AND TIME

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

*Translated by*

John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson



SCM PRESS LTD  
BLOOMSBURY STREET LONDON

## CONTENTS

[Page references marked 'H' indicate the pagination of the later German editions, as shown in the outer margins of the text.]

<i>Translators' Preface</i>	13
<i>Author's Preface to the Seventh German Edition</i>	17
<i>Introduction</i>	
Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being	H. 2 21
I. THE NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF BEING	H. 2 21
1. The necessity for explicitly restating the question of Being	H. 2 21
2. The formal structure of the question of Being	H. 5 24
3. The ontological priority of the question of Being	H. 8 28
4. The ontical priority of the question of Being	H. 11 32
II. THE TWOFOLD TASK IN WORKING OUT THE QUESTION OF BEING. METHOD AND DESIGN OF OUR INVESTIGATION	H. 15 36
5. The ontological analytic of Dasein as laying bare the horizon for an Interpretation of the meaning of Being in general	H. 15 36
6. The task of Destroying the history of ontology	H. 19 41
7. The phenomenological method of investigation	H. 17 49
A. <i>The concept of phenomenon</i>	H. 27 51
B. <i>The concept of the logos</i>	H. 32 55
C. <i>The preliminary conception of phenomenology</i>	H. 34 58
8. Design of the treatise	H. 39 63

### *Part One*

The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being

#### *DIVISION ONE: PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DASEIN*

I. EXPOSITION OF THE TASK OF A PREPARATORY ANALYSIS OF DASEIN	H. 41 67
9. The theme of the analytic of Dasein	H. 41 67



10. How the analytic of Dasein is to be distinguished from anthropology, psychology, and biology	H. 45	71
11. The existential analytic and the Interpretation of primitive Dasein. The difficulties of achieving a 'natural conception of the world'	H. 50	76
II. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD IN GENERAL AS THE BASIC STATE OF DASEIN		
12. A preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world, in terms of an orientation towards Being-in as such	H. 52	78
13. A founded mode in which Being-in is exemplified. Knowing the world	H. 59	86
III. THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD		
14. The idea of the worldhood of the world in general	H. 63	91
A. <i>Analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general</i>	H. 66	95
15. The Being of the entities encountered in the environment	H. 66	95
16. How the worldly character of the environment announces itself in entities within-the-world	H. 72	102
17. Reference and signs	H. 76	107
18. Involvement and significance: the worldhood of the world	H. 83	114
B. <i>A contrast between our analysis of worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation of the world</i>	H. 89	122
19. The definition of the 'world' as <i>res extensa</i>	H. 89	123
20. Foundations of the ontological definition of the 'world'	H. 92	125
21. Hermeneutical discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the 'world'	H. 95	128
c. <i>The aroundness of the environment, and Dasein's spatiality</i>	H. 101	134
22. The spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world	H. 102	135
23. The spatiality of Being-in-the-world	H. 104	138
24. Space, and Dasein's spatiality	H. 110	145
IV. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS BEING-WITH AND BEING-ONE'S-SELF. THE 'THEY'		
25. An approach to the existential question of the "who" of Dasein	H. 114	150
26. The Dasein-with of Others, and everyday Being-with	H. 117	153
27. Everyday Being-one's-Self and the "they"	H. 126	163

Contents

V. BEING-IN AS SUCH

28. The task of a thematic analysis of Being-in	H. 130	169
A. <i>The existential Constitution of the "there"</i>	H. 134	172
29. Being-there as state-of-mind	H. 134	172
30. Fear as a mode of state-of-mind	H. 140	179
31. Being-there as understanding	H. 142	182
32. Understanding and interpretation	H. 148	188
33. Assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation	H. 153	195
34. Being-there and discourse. Language	H. 160	203
B. <i>The everyday Being of the "there", and the falling of Dasein</i>	H. 166	210
35. Idle talk	H. 167	211
36. Curiosity	H. 170	214
37. Ambiguity	H. 173	217
38. Falling and thrownness	H. 175	219

VI. CARE AS THE BEING OF DASEIN

39. The question of the primordial totality of Dasein's structural whole	H. 180	225
40. The basic state-of-mind of anxiety as a distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed	H. 184	228
41. Dasein's Being as care	H. 191	235
42. Confirmation of the existential Interpretation of Dasein as care in terms of Dasein's pre-ontological way of interpreting itself	H. 196	241
43. Dasein, worldhood, and Reality	H. 200	244
(a) Reality as a problem of Being, and whether the 'external world' can be proved	H. 202	246
(b) Reality as an ontological problem	H. 209	252
(c) Reality and care	H. 211	254
44. Dasein, disclosedness, and truth	H. 212	256
(a) The traditional conception of truth, and its ontological foundations	H. 214	257
(b) The primordial phenomenon of truth and the derivative character of the traditional conception of truth	H. 219	262
(c) The kind of Being which truth possesses, and the presupposition of truth	H. 226	269



*DIVISION TWO: DASEIN AND TEMPORALITY*

45. The outcome of the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, and the task of a primordial existential Interpretation of this entity	H. 231	274
I. DASEIN'S POSSIBILITY OF BEING-A-WHOLE, AND BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH	H. 235	279
46. The seeming impossibility of getting Dasein's Being-a-whole into our grasp ontologically and determining its character	H. 235	279
47. The possibility of experiencing the death of Others, and the possibility of getting a whole Dasein into our grasp	H. 237	281
48. That which is still outstanding; the end; totality	H. 241	285
49. How the existential analysis of death is distinguished from other possible Interpretations of this phenomenon	H. 246	290
50. Preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of death	H. 249	293
51. Being-towards-death and the everydayness of Dasein	H. 252	296
52. Everyday Being-towards-the-end, and the full existential conception of death	H. 255	299
53. Existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death	H. 260	304
II. DASEIN'S ATTESTATION OF AN AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, AND RESOLUTENESS	H. 267	312
54. The problem of how an authentic existentiell possibility is attested	H. 267	312
55. The existential-ontological foundations of conscience	H. 270	315
56. The character of conscience as a call	H. 272	317
57. Conscience as the call of care	H. 274	319
58. Understanding the appeal, and guilt	H. 280	325
59. The existential Interpretation of the conscience, and the way conscience is ordinarily interpreted	H. 289	335
60. The existential structure of the authentic potentiality-for-Being which is attested in the conscience	H. 295	341

III. DASEIN'S AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING-A-WHOLE, AND TEMPORALITY AS THE ONTOLOGICAL MEANING OF CARE	H. 301	349
61. A preliminary sketch of the methodological step from the definition of Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole to the laying-bare of temporality as a phenomenon	H. 301	349
62. Anticipatory resoluteness as the way in which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity	H. 305	352
63. The hermeneutical situation at which we have arrived for Interpreting the meaning of the Being of care; and the methodological character of the existential analytic in general	H. 310	358
64. Care and selfhood	H. 316	364
65. Temporality as the ontological meaning of care	H. 323	370
66. Dasein's temporality and the tasks arising therefrom of repeating the existential analysis in a more primordial manner	H. 331	380
IV. TEMPORALITY AND EVERYDAYNESS	H. 334	383
67. The basic content of Dasein's existential constitution, and a preliminary sketch of the temporal Interpretation of it	H. 334	383
68. The temporality of disclosedness in general	H. 335	384
(a) The temporality of understanding	H. 336	385
(b) The temporality of state-of-mind	H. 339	389
(c) The temporality of falling	H. 346	396
(d) The temporality of discourse	H. 349	400
69. The temporality of Being-in-the-world and the problem of the transcendence of the world	H. 350	401
(a) The temporality of circumspective concern	H. 352	403
(b) The temporal meaning of the way in which circumspective concern becomes modified into the theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within-the-world	H. 356	408
(c) The temporal problem of the transcendence of the world	H. 364	415
70. The temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein	H. 367	418
71. The temporal meaning of Dasein's everydayness	H. 370	421



V. TEMPORALITY AND HISTORICALITY	H. 372	424
72. Existential-ontological exposition of the problem of history	H. 372	424
73. The ordinary understanding of history, and Dasein's historizing	H. 378	429
74. The basic constitution of historicity	H. 382	434
75. Dasein's historicity, and world-history	H. 387	439
76. The existential source of historiology in Dasein's historicity	H. 392	444
77. The connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historicity with the researches of Wilhelm Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck	H. 397	449
VI. TEMPORALITY AND WITHIN-TIME-NESS AS THE SOURCE OF THE ORDINARY CONCEPTION OF TIME	H. 404	456
78. The incompleteness of the foregoing temporal analysis of Dasein	H. 404	456
79. Dasein's temporality, and our concern with time	H. 406	458
80. The time with which we concern ourselves, and within-time-ness	H. 411	464
81. Within-time-ness and the genesis of the ordinary conception of time	H. 420	472
82. A comparison of the existential-ontological connection of temporality, Dasein, and world-time, with Hegel's way of taking the relation between time and spirit	H. 428	480
(a) Hegel's conception of time	H. 428	480
(b) Hegel's Interpretation of the connection between time and spirit	H. 433	484
83. The existential-temporal analytic of Dasein, and the question of fundamental ontology as to the meaning of Being in general	H. 436	486
<i>Author's Notes</i>		489
<i>Glossary of German Terms</i>		503
<i>Index</i>		524



lost in the "they", can dwell in tranquillized familiarity. When in falling we flee *into* the "at-home" of publicness, we flee *in the face of* the "not-at-home"; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein—in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being. This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the "they", though not explicitly. This threat can go together factually with complete assurance and self-sufficiency in one's everyday concern. Anxiety can arise in the most innocuous Situations. Nor does it have any need for darkness, in which it is commonly easier for one to feel uncanny. In the dark there is emphatically 'nothing' to see, though the very world itself is *still* 'there', and 'there' *more obtrusively*.

If we Interpret Dasein's uncanniness from an existential-ontological point of view as a threat which reaches Dasein itself and which comes from Dasein itself, we are not contending that in factual anxiety too it has always been understood in this sense. When Dasein "understands" uncanniness in the everyday manner, it does so by turning away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the "not-at-home" gets 'dimmed down'. Yet the everydayness of this fleeing shows phenomenally that anxiety, as a basic state-of-mind, belongs to Dasein's essential state of Being-in-the-world, which, as one that is existential, is never present-at-hand but *is* itself always in a mode of factual Being-there<sup>1</sup>—that is, in the mode of a state-of-mind. That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar is a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the reverse. *From an existential-ontological point of view, the "not-at-home" must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon.*

And only because anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world, can such Being-in-the-world, as Being which is alongside the 'world' and which is concerned in its state-of-mind, ever be afraid. Fear is anxiety, fallen into the 'world', inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself.

190

After all, the mood of uncanniness remains, factually, something for which we mostly have no existentiell understanding. Moreover, under the ascendancy of falling and publicness, 'real' anxiety is rare. Anxiety is often conditioned by 'physiological' factors. This fact, in its facticity, is a problem *ontologically*, not merely with regard to its ontical causation and course of development. Only because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically.

Even rarer than the existentiell Fact of "real" anxiety are attempts to

<sup>1</sup> Here we follow the earlier editions in reading 'Da-seins'. In the later editions the hyphen appears ambiguously at the end of a line.



that totality of the structural whole which we are seeking. In the unity of those characteristics of Dasein's Being which we have mentioned, this Being becomes something which it is possible for us to grasp as such ontologically. How is this unity itself to be characterized?

Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue. The phrase 'is an issue' has been made plain in the state-of-Being of understanding—of understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This potentiality is that for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is. In each case Dasein has already compared itself, in its Being, with a possibility of itself. Being-free for one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial, elemental concreteness, in anxiety. But ontologically, Being towards one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Dasein is already *ahead* of itself [ihm selbst . . . *vorweg*] in its Being. Dasein is always 'beyond itself' ["über sich hinaus"], not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is *not*, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This structure of Being, which belongs to the essential 'is an issue', we shall denote as Dasein's "*Being-ahead-of-itself*".

But this structure pertains to the whole of Dasein's constitution. "Being-ahead-of-itself" does not signify anything like an isolated tendency in a worldless 'subject', but characterizes Being-in-the-world. To Being-in-the-world, however, belongs the fact that it has been delivered over to itself—that it has in each case already been thrown *into a world*. The abandonment of Dasein to itself is shown with primordial concreteness in anxiety. "Being-ahead-of-itself" means, if we grasp it more fully, "*ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world*". As soon as this essentially unitary structure is seen as a phenomenon, what we have set forth earlier in our analysis of worldhood also becomes plain. The upshot of that analysis was that the referential totality of significance (which as such is constitutive for worldhood) has been 'tied up' with a "for-the-sake-of-which". The fact that this referential totality of the manifold relations of the 'in-order-to' has been bound up with that which is an issue for Dasein, does not signify that a 'world' of Objects which is present-at-hand has been welded together with a subject. It is rather the phenomenal expression of the fact that the constitution of Dasein, whose totality is now brought out explicitly as ahead-of-itself-in-Being-already-in . . . , is primordially a whole. To put it otherwise, existing is always factual. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.

Furthermore, Dasein's factual existing is not only generally and without further differentiation a thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world; it is



manifold 'world' of its concern, than the Self which has been individualized down to itself in uncanniness and been thrown into the "nothing"? 'It' calls, even though it gives the concernfully curious ear nothing to hear which might be passed along in further retelling and talked about in public. But what is Dasein even to report from the uncanniness of its thrown Being? *What* else remains for it than its own potentiality-for-Being as revealed in anxiety? How else is "it" to call than by summoning Dasein towards this potentiality-for-Being, which alone is the issue?

The call does not report events; it calls without uttering anything. The call discourses in the uncanny mode of *keeping silent*. And it does this only because, in calling the one to whom the appeal is made, it does not call him into the public idle talk of the "they", but *calls him back* from this *into the reticence of his existent* potentiality-for-Being. When the caller reaches him to whom the appeal is made, it does so with a cold assurance which is uncanny but by no means obvious. Wherein lies the basis for this assurance if not in the fact that when Dasein has been individualized down to itself in its uncanniness, it is for itself something that simply cannot be mistaken for anything else? What is it that so radically deprives Dasein of the possibility of misunderstanding itself by any sort of alibi and failing to recognize itself, if not the forsakenness [Verlassenheit] with which it has been abandoned [Überlassenheit] to itself?

Uncanniness is the basic kind of Being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday way it has been covered up. Out of the depths of this kind of Being, Dasein itself, as conscience, calls. The 'it calls me' ["es ruft mich"] is a distinctive kind of discourse for Dasein. The call whose mood has been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible first and foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost *potentiality-for-Being*. The call of conscience, existentially understood, makes known for the first time what we have hitherto merely contended:<sup>11</sup> that uncanniness pursues Dasein and is a threat to the lostness in which it has forgotten itself.

The proposition that Dasein is at the same time both the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made, has now lost its empty formal character and its obviousness. *Conscience manifests itself as the call of care*: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious<sup>1</sup> about its potentiality-for-Being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (ahead of itself . . .). Dasein is falling into the "they" (in Being-already-alongside the world of its concern), and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience—that is, conscience itself—has its

278

<sup>1</sup> ' . . . sich ängstigend . . . ' The older editions have 'sich ängstend', which has virtually the same meaning, and is more characteristic of Heidegger's style.



which could be either positive or negative as something with which we *can concern ourselves*; for what it has in view is a Being which is ontologically quite different—namely, *existence*. On the other hand, when the call is rightly understood, it gives us that which in the existential sense is the ‘most positive’ of all—namely, the ownmost possibility which Dasein can present to itself, as a calling-back which calls it forth into its factual potentiality-for-being-its-Self at the time. To hear the call authentically, signifies bringing oneself into a factual taking-action. But only by setting forth the existential structure implied in our understanding of the appeal when we *hear it authentically*, shall we obtain a fully adequate Interpretation of what is called in the call.

We must first show how the only phenomena with which the ordinary interpretation has any familiarity point back to the primordial meaning of the call of conscience when they are understood in a way that is ontologically appropriate; we must then show that the ordinary interpretation springs from the limitations of the way Dasein interprets itself in falling; and, since falling belongs to care itself, we must also show that this interpretation, *in spite of all its obviousness, is by no means accidental*.

In criticizing the ordinary interpretation of the conscience ontologically, one might be subject to the misunderstanding of supposing that if one demonstrates that the everyday way of experiencing the conscience is not *existentially* primordial, one will have made some judgment as to the *existentiell* ‘moral quality’ of any Dasein which maintains itself in that kind of experience. Just as little as existence is necessarily and directly impaired by an ontologically inadequate way of understanding the conscience, so little does an existentially appropriate Interpretation of the conscience guarantee that one has understood the call in an *existentiell* manner. It is no less possible to be serious when one experiences the conscience in the ordinary way than not to be serious when one’s understanding of it is more primordial. Nevertheless, the Interpretation which is more primordial existentially, also discloses *possibilities* for a more primordial *existentiell* understanding, as long as our ontological conceptualization does not let itself get cut off from our ontical experience.

295

¶ 60. *The Existential Structure of the Authentic Potentiality-for-Being which is Attested in the Conscience*

The existential Interpretation of conscience is to exhibit an attestation of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being—an attestation which is [*seiende*] in Dasein itself. Conscience attests not by making something known in an undifferentiated manner, but by calling forth and summoning us to Being-guilty. That which is so attested becomes ‘grasped’



in the hearing which understands the call undisguisedly in the sense it has itself intended. The understanding of the appeal is a mode of Dasein's *Being*, and only as such does it give us the phenomenal content of what the call of conscience attests. The authentic understanding of the call has been characterized as "wanting to have a conscience". This is a way of letting one's ownmost Self take action in itself of its own accord in its Being-guilty, and represents phenomenally that authentic potentiality-for-Being which Dasein itself attests. The existential structure of this must now be laid bare. Only so can we proceed to the basic constitution of the *authenticity* of Dasein's existence as disclosed in Dasein itself.

Wanting to have a conscience is, as an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, a way in which Dasein has been *disclosed*. This disclosedness is constituted by discourse and state-of-mind, as well as by understanding. To understand in an existentiell manner implies projecting oneself in each case upon one's ownmost factual possibility of having the potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. But the *potentiality-for-Being* is understood only by existing in this possibility.

296 What kind of mood corresponds to such understanding? Understanding the call discloses one's own Dasein in the uncanniness of its individualization. The uncanniness which is revealed in understanding and revealed along with it, becomes genuinely disclosed by the state-of-mind of anxiety which belongs to that understanding. The fact of the *anxiety of conscience*, gives us phenomenal confirmation that in understanding the call Dasein is brought face to face with its own uncanniness. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety.

The third essential item in disclosedness is *discourse*. The call itself is a primordial kind of discourse for Dasein; but there is no corresponding counter-discourse in which, let us say, one talks about what the conscience has said, and pleads one's cause. In hearing the call understandingly, one denies oneself any counter-discourse, not because one has been assailed by some 'obscure power', which suppresses one's hearing, but because this hearing has appropriated the content of the call unconcealedly. In the call one's constant Being-guilty is represented, and in this way the Self is brought back from the loud idle talk which goes with the common sense of the "they". Thus the mode of Articulative discourse which belongs to wanting to have a conscience, is one of *reticence*. Keeping silent has been characterized as an essential possibility of discourse.<sup>ix</sup> Anyone who keeps silent when he wants to give us to understand something, must 'have something to say'. In the appeal Dasein gives itself to understand its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This calling is therefore a keeping-silent. The discourse of the conscience never comes to utterance.