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# Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture

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Translated from the German Manuscript  
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VOLUME III

THE CONFLICT OF CULTURAL IDEALS  
IN THE AGE OF PLATO

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close kinship to the treatise *On hebdomads* and other 'Hippocratic' works, all much later in date; for, like it, they all tend to trace the laws governing phenomena back to similarities in numerical relationships—as was done by Solon's contemporary Anaximander of Miletus in his cosmology, and later by the Ionian Pythagoras and his school.<sup>9</sup> The idea that every age has something 'suitable' to its powers appears in Solon too, and reappears later as the basis of the medical theory of diet.<sup>10</sup> There was another doctrine coined by natural philosophy: that all natural phenomena were a sort of legal compensation paid by things to one another. This often appears in medical writers, who explain physiological and pathological events as compensations or retributions.<sup>11</sup> Closely allied to this is the idea that the normal healthy state of the organism or of all nature is *isomoiria*—equivalence of all its basic elements. This appears, for example, in the treatise *On airs, waters, and places*, written by a medical scientist, and in various other relevant contexts.<sup>11a</sup> It is doubtful whether other fundamental ideas in Greek medicine—for instance that of mixture (κρᾶσις) and that of harmony—were derived from natural philosophy, or were borrowed by natural philosophy from medical thought.

But there is no doubt about the origin of the dominating conception, Nature (φύσις). In discussing the sophists and their educational theory, we referred to the epochal importance of the idea that human *physis* should be the basis of the whole educational process.<sup>12</sup> We found the same idea given historical application in Thucydides; we saw how his historical thinking is founded on the assumption that there is such a thing as 'human nature', always and everywhere the same.<sup>13</sup> In this, as in much else, both the sophists and Thucydides were influenced by contemporary medicine, which had discovered the idea of human nature (φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) and based all its work upon it. But in that point medicine itself depended on the concept of the great *physis*, the Nature of the universe (φύσις τοῦ παντός), which was an idea developed by Ionian philosophy. The introduction to the treatise *On airs, waters, and places* is a splendid expression of the way in which Hippocratean medical thought depends on the philosophical view of nature as a whole. 'Anyone who wishes to study medicine correctly must do as follows. First, he must study the effects of each season of the year—for the seasons

the mass of Hippocratic treatises. Modern critics also have attempted to set aside a certain number of works from the collection, and to ascribe them to Hippocrates himself; but the number has grown smaller and smaller, and varies according to the particular line of medical thought (among the many represented in the corpus) which each scholar holds to be characteristic of Hippocrates himself. And so, after all that industrious and subtle research, it seems that we must resign ourselves and acknowledge our ignorance of the truth.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, there are plenty of these 'Hippocratic' treatises: so that during the search for the true Hippocrates scholars have involuntarily worked out a more detailed picture of medical science in the classical age of Greek thought. Although only its outlines are so far clear, it is an extraordinarily interesting spectacle. It does not simply present one system of doctrine, but shows us the very life of a science, with all its ramifications and conflicts. It has become plain that the corpus as we now have it is not Hippocrates' 'Collected Works' as sold in the bookshops of his day, but a complete collection of the old medical writings found in the archives of the medical school at Cos by Alexandrian scholars of the third century, who had set out to preserve Hippocrates' writings (like those of other classical authors) for posterity. Clearly they had not been revised or purged of heterogeneous matter. Some of them were published as literature, or at least written for publication. Others were copious collections of original notes. Others again were commentaries written, not to be read by the public, but for the information of the author's colleagues. And some of the collection was not written in the Coan school at all—naturally enough, for science would soon have come to a standstill if the scientists had paid no attention to the ideas and discoveries of others. These extraneous works were preserved among the archives of the school, and the master's works were mixed up with his pupils', because the school was an impersonal institution. And, besides, every member of it knew what his colleagues' opinions were. We find the same kind of thing in the collected works of men like Plato and Aristotle who headed great philosophical schools,<sup>16</sup> although to a smaller extent than in the case of Hippocrates.

One of the solemn provisions in the Hippocratic oath, to be

taken by everyone admitted to the school, was that he should keep secret what he learnt. Normally, medical knowledge descended from father to son, as son followed father in the profession. Thus, when a stranger was accepted as a student, he became, as it were, the son of his teacher; and therefore pledged himself to teach his art, without a fee, to his master's children.<sup>17</sup> It was probably quite usual for a pupil (like an apprentice) to inherit his master's practice by marrying his daughter. We are expressly told that Hippocrates' son-in-law Polybus was a doctor. As it happens, he is the only member of the Coan school whom Aristotle quotes by name—citing his detailed description of the venous system, still extant in one of the most famous works in the 'Hippocratic' corpus.<sup>18</sup> That one trait casts a bright light on the whole collection. Although, in Hippocrates' time, the dominance of great individual personalities was beginning to make itself felt in medicine (as it had done at a much earlier stage in poetry and in art, and in philosophy from the very beginning), the corporate solidarity of the medical profession was still so strong that it was rare, in professional practice, for ideas and doctrines to be attributed to their originators. Evidently it was in public lectures that medical researchers first spread their personal views abroad under their own names. Several such lectures still exist in the Hippocratic corpus, but the names of even their authors are lost. Works proceeding from other schools—such as the 'Cnidian doctrines', giving the views held in the older and equally eminent medical institute at Cnidus in Asia Minor—are quoted in a Hippocratic treatise,<sup>19</sup> but until now no scholar has been successful in proving that any extant treatise bears the authentic stamp of any particular school outside Cos. At the end of the fifth century the individual had such wide freedom to express his views that we cannot legitimately use every deviation from Coan theory as evidence for the doctrine of other schools. Still, the research of the past hundred years has proved the existence both of an Asiatic school centring in Cnidus and of a Western Greek school centring in Sicily,<sup>20</sup> although our knowledge of the work done there must remain fragmentary, in default of evidence.

Medical literature was a complete novelty in Greek intellectual history, for this reason: although it was intended to teach,

and to teach directly, it was little if at all addressed to the average man, as philosophy and poetry were. Its appearance is the main example of a historical trend which we shall now come to notice more and more—the tendency of life to become increasingly specialized and of knowledge to split up into sectional professions which could be entered by only a few specially trained men with high intellectual and moral qualifications. It is significant that the medical authors often speak of 'laymen' and 'professionals'—a distinction which was to have a long and important history, but meets us here for the first time. Our word 'layman', originating in the mediaeval church, first meant a person not in holy orders, and thence a person not initiated into professional secrets; but the Greek word *idiotés* carries a social and political connotation. It means a man who pays no attention to the state and the community, but simply attends to his private affairs. In contrast with him, the doctor is a *demiourgos*, a 'public worker'—as indeed every artisan was called who made shoes or utensils for the public. Often laymen are distinguished from the doctor, viewed in this light, by being called 'the people' (*δημόται*). The name *demiourgos* vividly brings together the two sides of the doctor's profession—its social and its technical aspects—while the difficult Ionic word *χειρῶναξ* (which is used as a synonym for it) signifies only the latter aspect.<sup>21</sup> There is no word to distinguish the Greek doctor with his higher skill from what we should consider as an ordinary artisan; and the same holds for the sculptor and the painter. However, there is something in Greek medicine which resembles our use of the word 'layman', with its implication 'uninitiated'. That is the beautiful close<sup>22</sup> of the Hippocratic Law: 'Secret things are revealed only to initiates. It is forbidden to reveal them to profane persons before they are initiated into the mysteries of knowledge.' Here we have mankind divided, as if by a religious rite, into two classes, one of which is severely debarred from an arcane knowledge. This line of thought raises the doctor's importance above that of a mere artisan, both technically and socially; but, more than that, it is an eloquent testimony to the lofty character of the medical calling and its deep consciousness of its duty—written, if not by Hippocrates himself, then certainly by someone who realized what his profession had gained from its increased knowledge of nature. Certainly it shows that

a real difficulty was felt about the position of this new type, the physician, isolated but full of high pretensions, within the framework of society.

But in reality the new science of medicine was not so sharply distinguished from the general intellectual life of Greece. It endeavoured to establish a place for itself there. Although it was founded on a special branch of knowledge which set it apart from the general public, it deliberately tried to impart that knowledge to them and to find ways and means of making them understand it. It created a special type of medical literature addressed to non-medical readers. By good fortune, we still possess some of both types—the treatises written for specialists, and others addressed to the public at large. Most of the works we have belong to the first class and cannot be treated here as fully as they deserve. Our interest is naturally concentrated on the second type, not only because its literary quality is higher, but because it is really a part of what the Greeks called *paideia*.<sup>23</sup> At the time when medical scientists first brought their problems before the public—both in lectures (*ἐπιδείξεις*) like those of the sophists, and in ‘speeches’ written in order to be read (*λόγοι*)—no one actually knew how far an *idiotés* ought to trouble himself about such matters. When the doctors came forward to rival the travelling sophistic lecturers, they were trying to gain public prestige and authority. Their intellectual eminence was great enough not only to awaken passing interest in their subject, but to create something like a medical public. It was made up of ‘medically cultured’ men who had a particular, though not a professional, interest in the problems of medicine, and were distinguished from the general mass who had no opinion on the subject, by being competent to pass judgment upon such problems. Of course the best opportunity for the doctor to introduce medical ideas to the lay public was when he was actually treating his patients. In *The Laws* Plato gives an amusing description of the difference between the slave-doctor and the scientifically trained physician who treats free men. He says it consists in their attitude to their patients. The slave-doctor hurries from bed to bed, giving out prescriptions and orders without discussion (*ἄνευ λόγου*)—i.e. without explaining his treatment, simply working on routine and previous experience. He is an absolute tyrant. If he heard a free doctor talking

that the procedure which he here describes as peculiar to medicine is actually the procedure which he used himself, especially in his later works. It is really astonishing to read the medical texts and discover how much they prefigure the method of 'Socrates' as described by Plato. We have already seen how, under the compulsion of facts, the empirical physicians began to take individual cases of the same character, which they had defined by long study, and 'look on them together' (to use Plato's phrase) as types or forms (εἶδη). When the medical authors are speaking of a number of these types, they call them εἶδη; but when they want simply to bring out the unity underlying a complexity of phenomena, they use the concept of 'one Idea', 'one Form'—i.e. one aspect or appearance (μία ἰδέα). Study of the expressions *eidos* and *idea* and of the way in which Plato uses them (without reference to the medical literature) has led to the same result.<sup>52</sup> These concepts, first used by doctors in studying the body and its functions, were transferred by Plato to the particular subject he was investigating—the realm of ethics—and from there to his entire ontology. Before him, medical science had recognized that the manifold nature and diversity of diseases (πολυτροπιή, πολυσχιδίη) was a great problem, and had endeavoured to establish the exact number of types of each disease<sup>53</sup>—just as Plato does in his dialectical analysis, which he also calls division and breaking down of general concepts into their types.<sup>53a</sup>

In comparing medical science to philosophy, Plato is thinking principally of its normative character. Therefore he mentions the pilot as another example of the same kind of knowledge, and Aristotle followed him in doing so. But they both borrowed the comparison of doctor and pilot from the essay *On ancient medicine*, where it was first used in this connexion.<sup>53b</sup> But while Plato is concerned mainly with the fact that pilot and doctor both learn to recognize the standard of action, Aristotle uses the suggestive comparison to prove another point. One of the great problems discussed in his *Ethics* is how to apply a standard, which is universal, to the life of an individual and to separate cases, which at first sight seem to be incapable of being settled by general rules. The question is particularly important in the field of education. There Aristotle makes a fundamental

distinction between the education of the individual and the education of the community, and supports it by the example of medicine.<sup>53c</sup> But he also uses medicine to show how the individual man can find the right standard for his own conduct: for medicine shows that correct moral conduct, like healthy physical diet, consists in preserving the mean between excess and deficiency. We can understand this expression better if we recollect that, according to Aristotle, morality is concerned with the regulation of our instincts—desire and aversion. Plato, before him, had used the medical concepts of filling and emptying in discussing the theory of lust, and had concluded that lust was one of the spheres in which there could be 'a More or a Less' needing regulation.<sup>53d</sup> Aristotle says that the standard is the mean—not, however, a rigidly fixed mathematical point between the extremes, not the absolute middle of the scale, but the right mean for the individual concerned. Hence, ethical conduct consists in 'aiming' at the mean between excess and deficiency which is right for us.<sup>53e</sup> In this connexion every word used by Aristotle—*excess*, *deficiency*, *the mean* and *the right proportion*, *aiming*, and *perception* (αἴσθησις)—as well as his denial that an absolute rule exists and his assertion that a standard appropriate to the nature of the individual must be found: all this is borrowed directly from medicine, and his discussion of the matter is actually modelled on the treatise *On ancient medicine*.<sup>54</sup>

We should be convicting ourselves of ignorance of the Greek way of thinking if we tried to qualify that dependence for the sake of guaranteeing to Aristotle what we might make the modern error of calling 'originality'. Such originality is a false criterion and only makes its users misjudge the facts. Plato and Aristotle gain higher authority for their teaching by supporting it on the results gained in a parallel field of thought. In the structure of Greek life every part supports and is supported by the others: stone upholds stone. It is important to realize that this principle in the development of Greek thought, which we have already seen at work in every earlier stage of its growth, is now confirmed in such a decisive point as the central Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine of human areté. And it is not simply a matter of analogy, as it might seem at first glance. The medical doctrine of the correct treatment for the body is, so to speak, raised to a higher power when it is embodied in the Socratic

any other people) revolved around their gymnastics. His dietetic theory could well be described as a recommendation to regulate all that part of the day which is not spent on exercise by accurate medical prescription, and to bring it into complete harmony with one's gymnastic routine.

The aim of all this is to attain the best possible diathesis—the best possible permanent condition for general health and for every kind of physical exertion. Diocles says so several times. But of course he realizes that the world is not run to suit medical theory, and he does not talk as if men simply lived in order to look after their health. The writer of *On diet* also recognizes that a certain social difficulty exists—that some compromise must be found between the doctor's ideals and the actual conditions of the patient's life. He reaches the same conclusion as Diocles. He draws up an ideal régime for the man who has nothing to do but keep fit, and then makes allowances for those who have to work and have little time left for the care of the body.<sup>111</sup> We must not imagine that the Greek doctors wrote only for the rich. Contemporary philosophers did the same thing—they described a *bios* to be lived by the man who was entirely at leisure, and then left individuals to make their own deductions from this ideal.

And yet perhaps the life led by a citizen of a Greek city-state in the fourth century allowed him more time to spend on the culture of his spirit and the care of his body than any other life ever lived by man. The example of the medical system of bodily care shows that, even in its democratic form, the Greek polis was a social aristocracy; and that fact was responsible for the high average level of general culture which it attained. Not one of the main types produced by our own professionalized existence—business man, politician, scholar, labourer, or farmer—would fit into the framework of Greek life. So far as those types had been developed in Greece, they stood out of the pattern even then. Yet it is not hard to understand how the philosophy of Socrates and the dialectic skill of the sophists developed in the gymnastic school. It would be wrong to assume that the *kaloï kagathoi*, the gentlemen, spent all day there, oiling themselves, training, rubbing themselves down, dusting themselves with sand and washing it off again, so earnestly as to turn

lust. The more gently and peaceably reason guides our soul, the more co-operation it needs from within.<sup>76</sup> But the cord of logos is, as we have seen, simply what law commands in the state. God, or someone who knows God, gives logos to the state; and the state raises it to be a law regulating its intercourse with itself and with other states.<sup>77</sup> The soul's obedience to the logos we call self-control. That explains the nature of paideia. Paideia is the control of human life by the cord of logos, moved by a divine hand.<sup>78</sup> But here we observe an essential difference between *The Republic* and *The Laws*. In *The Republic* Plato said the Idea of Good was the model which the philosophical ruler carried in his soul.<sup>79</sup> In *The Laws* he tries to be more concrete. He assumes a type of man who wishes to know exactly *what* he must do, and *why*, and *how*, and who needs laws for every detail of conduct. The question therefore arises how the divine logos is to make its way down to men and become a political institution. Plato seems to think that this happens whenever any kind of public agreement is reached,<sup>80</sup> but he insists that one single man who knows the divine should be the lawgiver for the city. In this he is following the pattern set by the great lawgivers of past history. The Greeks used to call them 'divine men', a title which was soon given to Plato himself. Even in Plato's day, more than one Greek city asked some famous philosopher to give laws to the state. The prototype of this lawgiver who is intermediary between gods and men is Minos, who 'talked with God'. The 'wisdom' of the Greek lawgiver comes closest to revelation.<sup>81</sup>

With this in mind, we can understand what Plato means by the educational influence of the custom of drinking-parties, and why he criticizes Sparta for banning them.<sup>82</sup> His ideal of paideia is ultimately self-control, not control by the authority of others, as in Sparta.<sup>83</sup> As an educator, he wants to find a test for the ability he values so highly, and he finds it in drunkenness. Wine intensifies feelings of pleasure, weakens mental energy, and brings back childish ways.<sup>84</sup> Therefore it tests the power of the unconscious control exercised by shame and modesty. We can teach men to be fearless only by exposing them to danger, and so the soul must be exposed to the temptations of pleasure if it is to harden itself against them.<sup>85</sup> Plato does not elaborate the list of pleasures involved in this test, he merely hints at them;<sup>86</sup>

but he takes the greatest care to emphasize the connexion of paideia and *pais*, 'the child'.<sup>87</sup> In *The Republic* he traced the development of all the forces of paideia up to the topmost branch of education and culture. In *The Laws* he follows it down to its roots, the subjugation of the desires by reason. In early childhood education is almost exclusively concerned with control of pleasure-pain feelings. They are its real material. Considered in this light, paideia becomes pedagogy.<sup>88</sup>

It is needless to say that this interpretation does not exclude the other, loftier conception of paideia. It is a new and promising shoot rising straight from the roots of Plato's philosophy of paideia. Plato now believes more and more that the success of all later education depends on the results of those first attempts to mould the ethos in childhood. That was inevitable; yet had he not taken, as the starting-point of his paideia, Socrates' belief that virtue was knowledge?<sup>89</sup> Plato did not, as we might expect, abandon the belief that virtue is knowledge, but he moved the beginning of education further and further back. It began fairly early in *The Republic*—but there he was simply trying to start training the child's *intellect* young enough.<sup>90</sup> But here he is trying to mould the *desires* as early as possible, so that the child may begin by learning, as if in play, to love right and hate wrong.<sup>91</sup> No one, he thinks, can get the best out of his own logos unless he has been unconsciously prepared by the logos of someone else, teacher or parent. All areté (in so far as it is areté of the ethos, or what we should call moral culture) is based on the harmony of intelligent insight and habit. Paideia is the training of the pleasure-pain feelings, upon which that harmony is based in its turn.<sup>92</sup> Plato has here reached the point at which Aristotle's *Ethics*—also primarily concerned with ethos—starts.<sup>93</sup> Socrates' doctrine that virtue is knowledge developed into the elaborately detailed late Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine of ethos, and that doctrine became the foundation of all modern systems of 'ethics'. The whole development was conditioned by the fact that Socrates was not teaching an abstract theory of moral conduct but seeking a way of paideia. It begins by finding out moral standards, and moves on to an enquiry into the nature of the soul and methods of treating it. Plato at first held that the most important thing was to get more and deeper *knowledge*, in the Socratic belief that it would improve the entire moral cul-

tion in the authority of the Areopagus are connected by Aristotle as the causes of the degeneration of Athenian democracy.<sup>198</sup> That idea too is part of the conservative criticism levelled at Periclean Athens, the imperialistic democracy with the powerful navy. In fact, it goes back beyond Pericles. In Aeschylus' *The Persians* the old conservative members of the council of the Persian empire criticize the policy of the young king Xerxes, and their criticism shows the dislike of noblemen for big fleets and naval hegemony.<sup>199</sup> Aeschylus did not learn about that feeling in Persia, he learnt it in Athens, and he understood it remarkably well. We must not forget that he was himself a country squire from Eleusis. In *The Persians* what really and finally overthrows the barbarians is the land battle of Plataea.<sup>200</sup> Plato goes still further. He says that the sea-battle of Salamis, which was Athens' proudest title to national glory, was not of decisive importance. What saved Hellas from slavery was the destruction of the Persian land-power at Marathon and Plataea.<sup>201</sup> Plato's political views cohere very closely with his ideal of paideia, just as do those of Isocrates with his. At this point in *The Laws* the connexion between politics and paideia becomes especially clear.

Plato understands that we do not simply make laws to suit ourselves. War, economic necessity, epidemics, and misfortunes bring in change and revolution.<sup>202</sup> Tyché dominates human life—political life included. God rules everything; and after him tyché and kairos; and third comes skill or art, techné—still, a very useful thing, like helmsmanship in a storm.<sup>203</sup> If Plato as lawgiver could have one wish to ensure the happiness of the future state, he would choose that it be ruled by a *teachable tyrant*.<sup>204</sup> Tyché must bring him together with the great lawgiver in order to produce the coincidence of mind and power which Plato hoped for in *The Republic*, and which he still thinks the quickest possible method to realize his ideal.<sup>205</sup> From his experience with the Syracusan tyrant, Plato knows that one man of that sort can easily change a whole nation's ethos by bestowing praise and punishment.<sup>206</sup> Only it is rare and difficult to find such a man dominated by a divine passion for justice and self-control.<sup>207</sup> In his old age, Plato thinks that difficulty is more formidable than ever. And yet, as long as it is not surmounted, that way of realizing the ideal state is only 'a myth'.<sup>208</sup> He holds that other types

In fact, the problem of areté and no other was the origin of Plato's plan of making the philosophical knowledge of unity in diversity the main subject in the education of the rulers, and the foundation of the state. From his first work to his last, his thought on that one cardinal point remained unaltered. For example, he constantly gives phronésis, the knowledge of that unity of all good as the highest norm and the supreme ideal, the topmost rank among all the virtues.<sup>370</sup> The members of the night council do not fall behind the guards in *The Republic* in their philosophical culture. They have the power to know the truth, to express it in words, and to accomplish it in action.<sup>371</sup> Again and again in *The Laws* Plato emphasizes the fact that the pattern given by action is the core of all true paideia.<sup>372</sup> The truth which the rulers are to know is the knowledge of values: of the things it is worth while doing.<sup>373</sup> The culmination of this systematic knowledge of values is the knowledge of God: for God, as Plato has taught us, is the measure of all things.<sup>374</sup> In order to apply this measure in practice, to laws and to life, the law-giver and the officials of the government must themselves possess knowledge of God as the highest value and the highest reality. In the state described in *The Laws*, God occupies the place taken in *The Republic* by the supreme paradeigma which the rulers carry in their souls, the Idea of Good.<sup>375</sup> There is no essential difference between the two, only a difference of aspect, and of the stage of knowledge to which, as objects, they correspond.<sup>376</sup>

Plato's *Laws* ends with the thought of God. But, as the tenth book shows, behind that thought there stands an entire system of theology. In a history of Greek paideia, we cannot go into the philosophical structure of that system: it belongs to a history of Greek philosophical theology, and I hope to treat it elsewhere in that connexion. Greek paideia and Greek philosophical theology were the two principal forms in which Greek thought influenced the world in those centuries when Greek art and Greek science lay sleeping. Both were originally united in Homer, as human areté and the ideal of godhead. In Plato the unity reappears on another plane. The synthesis is clearest in his two great educational works, *The Republic* and *The Laws*—clearest and most emphatic. Its boldest statement is the final words of *The Laws*, to which we must add the whole of the

40. Cf. *On ancient medicine* 20. Some writers on the subject are addicted to the false idea that this polemic is directed against Empedocles and his school in particular. Anaxagoras or Diogenes might just as well have been its object. The word φιλοσοφία ('intellectual work', 'study') was not yet clearly defined, and Empedocles' name is used in order to make it clearer: in just the same way Aristotle (*Protr.* frg. 5b Walzer, 52 Rose) explains the concept 'metaphysics', for which there was so far no special word, by naming its best-known representatives. 'That kind of search for truth (ἀληθείας φρόνησις) which was practised by Anaxagoras and Parmenides', he says. It is important to establish this if we are to build up a correct history of the concept 'philosophy': constant attempts are made to date its origin back to the times of Herodotus, Heraclitus, and even Pythagoras. The author of *On ancient medicine* goes on to say 'By this' (i.e., by philosophy à l'Empedocles) 'I mean that type of research (ἵστορίη) which teaches what man is and what are his origins', etc.

41. *On ancient medicine* 20.

42. *Ib.* 20.

43. Hence the title 'Ἐπιδημῖαι—Visits to foreign cities'. It was not only sophists and littérateurs whose careers consisted in visiting foreign cities (ἐπιδημεῖν); cf. Plato, *Prot.* 309d and 315c, *Parm.* 127a, and the autobiographical work by the poet Ion of Chios, which was also called 'Ἐπιδημῖαι. Wandering physicians did the same—cf. *On airs, waters, and places* 1. The authors of the Hippocratic 'Ἐπιδημῖαι are intellectual allies of the man who wrote *On ancient medicine*, although he is probably not identical with any one of them.

44. *Aphorisms* 1.1. Demetrius *On style* 4 quotes this famous sentence as a pattern of the dry, jerky style, whose ethos can be appreciated only because of its content.

45. The occurrences of the concepts *eidōs* (which appears very often in the plural) and *idea* in the Hippocratic writings have been investigated by A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica* 178-267, and others. Cf. more recently G. Else, *The Terminology of the Ideas* (Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 1936).

46. Cf. chap. 12, εἶδεα, and chap. 23 εἶδεα σχημάτων, etc.

47. See the end of chap. 15: heat has not the great force (δύναμις) which is ascribed to it; and the second part of chap. 14: the forces which work in the body, their number, kind, right mixture, and disturbances.

48. Alcmaeon frg. 4 Diels.

49. This is proved by his doctrine that there is an 'infinite number' of forces active in the body. See his polemic in chap. 15 against the contemporary habit of isolating and hypostasizing the qualities heat, cold, dryness, and moisture.

50. Plato, *Gorg.* 464b and following, esp. 465a; 501a f. See *Paideia* II, 131 and 148.

51. Plato, *Phaedr.* 270c-d; W. Capelle lists the earlier literature on this passage in *Hermes* 57, p. 247. I cannot here discuss the last treatment of this problem, L. Edelstein's book cited in note 14 of this chapter, although I do not believe it is always correct.

52. C. Ritter, *Neue Untersuchungen über Platon* (Munich 1910) p. 228 f.

53. See *On diet in acute illness* 3, where the author says that physicians in the Cnidian medical school had emphasized the multiplicity (πολυσχιδία) of diseases and tried to establish the exact number of forms in which each appeared, but had been misled by varieties in their names. He also says that it is necessary to reduce the several forms of a disease to one *eidōs*. The author of *On breaths*, in chap. 2, goes to the extreme: he denies the manifold character (πολυτροπία) of diseases, and asserts that there is only one τρόπος, which, however, is differentiated into many forms of disease according to differences in its τόπος.

53a. There is another problem which interests both Plato and the early physicians. In chap. 15 of *On ancient medicine* the writer says that in reality there is

76. *Laws* 645a4-7.

77. *Laws* 645b. In this passage Plato tells us clearly what he thought the law-giver's function was. God himself is the ultimate lawgiver. The human lawgiver speaks out of his knowledge of God; and his laws derive their authority from God. That was the basis of legislation in the old city-state. Plato now reverts to it; but his idea of God is new, and all his laws are inspired by it.

78. *Laws* 645b8-c3. Plato does not make these deductions from his premise in detail; he only says that the reader can now see clearly what areté and vice are, and what paideia is.

79. *Rep.* 540a9; cf. 484c8.

80. Cf. *Laws* 645b7: *πῶλον δὲ . . . λόγον παραλαβοῦσαν, νόμον θεμένην*. In *Polit.* 293a he had said the agreement of the subject population was not essential for the ideal type of government, which he thinks of as monarchy or aristocracy. But in *The Laws* he assumes their agreement to be necessary, because it is implicit in any governmental system bound by law.

81. Of course an important difference remains: the organ with which he apprehends the divine is just his *reason* (*νοῦς, φρόνησις*): cf. 631c6, 632c, 645a-b. His knowledge of God is not born of ecstasy; and the religious concepts of inspiration and enthusiasm, which Plato uses in other works to describe the spiritual state of the philosopher, are translated by him so as to refer to the intellectual vision which is the final goal of the dialectic journey. But for those who are to accept as laws the knowledge reached by the philosophical ruler, without being philosophers themselves, the philosopher's vision of God is pretty much the same as divine revelation.

82. Plato uses the conclusion he has just reached to discover why the enjoyment of wine at a drinking-party (*μέθη*) should have an educational effect. The passage is *Laws* 645c3-d. With that he reverts to the discussion of a question raised by the Athenian, who had asked what kind of institutions Sparta had to teach self-control (635d), like its well-known ones for education in courage. See 637a f., 638c-e.

83. By asking what institutions Sparta had to teach self-discipline (*Laws* 635e), Plato is alluding to his own un-Spartan conception of paideia, and leading up to the general discussion of the nature of paideia (643a-644b). The single question about the relation between Spartan discipline and the pleasures of drinking now serves to give a concrete psychological illustration of Plato's conception of paideia.

84. *Laws* 645d-e.

85. For drunkenness as a treatment prescribed by the soul-doctor, see *Laws* 646c-d. From 646e to the end of book 2, Plato explains how to educate young men to fear intemperate pleasures (the fear is called *aidós*) by artificially releasing their impulses when drunk.

86. *Laws* 649d.

87. At the beginning of book 2, in 653a f., Plato expressly points this out.

88. Plato shows a certain preference for even the word *παιδαγωγείν* in *The Laws*. Previously he had thought of every effort of mankind to reach areté as paideia; and now he treats *παιδαγωγία* as the root of paideia for adults too. Drunkenness is educational simply *because* it makes an adult into a child (*παῖς*): *Laws* 646a4. For thus it enables the educator to continue all the way from childhood into maturity the basic function of all education, the formation of the proper attitude to emotions and impulses in the soul.

89. See *Paideia* II, 64, 91 f., 124, 160.

90. See *Paideia* II, 313.

91. In *Laws* 653a it is said that the child's first sensation (*πρώτη αἴσθησις*) is pleasure and pain. We must think of it as a piece of good luck if *phronésis* (the Socratic *knowledge of good* which is also *being good*) and true opinion (*ἀληθής*

these preconceptions and treat the subject from a purely artistic standpoint; but the pseudo-Plutarch's essay *On music* is wholly dominated by them. According to its 27th chapter, the historical development of music is a movement from its original paideutic character (παιδευτικός τρόπος) towards theatricality (θεατρική μουσα), in which it at last merges. Plato is several times quoted for evidence. But the author did not take his ideas direct from Plato. If we examine them closely, we shall find that his sketch of the history of music is copied from Aristoxenus, the Peripatetic musicologist. Pseudo-Plutarch quotes his book *On music* (c. 15) and the historical section of his *Harmonica* (c. 16); in the second book of his *On music* Aristoxenus discussed Plato's theory of ethos in music (see c. 17).

179. *Rep.* 424c: τὸ . . . φυλακτῆριον . . . ἐνταῦθά που οἰκοδομητέον τοῖς φύλαξι, ἐν μουσικῇ.

180. *Laws* 700a9-b.

181. *Laws* 700c.

182. *Laws* 700d. On the moral standards implicit in music see 700d4: ἀγνώμονες . . . περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς Μούσης καὶ τὸ νόμιμον. Γνώμη means 'norm' in Theognis 60 100.

183. *Laws* 700e.

184. *Laws* 700e4.

185. *Laws* 701a.

186. *Laws* 701b-c.

187. *Laws* book 1.

188. *Laws* book 3.

189. *Laws* 690a-c.

190. *Laws* 692a.

191. *Laws* 693d-701b.

192. *Laws* 702b-c. Immediately before this passage the Athenian asked why he had chosen the roundabout way to its conclusion through a long historical argument. Its purpose is to prepare for the discussion of the best state. This gives the Cretan Cleinias a chance to mention the colony which is to be established.

193. *Laws* 704b.

194. *Ar. Resp. Ath.* 27.1.

195. The principal document for this is Isocrates' *Areopagiticus*. See the chapter in this book entitled *Authority and Freedom*, p. 113 f.; and my essay quoted there, 'The Date of Isocrates' *Areopagiticus* and the Athenian Opposition.'

196. Isocrates later gives an extensive proof of this point in *Panathenaicus* 131 f., but whereas Plato finds the ideal mixed constitution in Sparta (*Laws* 692a), Isocrates sees it in ancient Athens, which he had already eulogized as a model in the *Areopagiticus*.

197. See p. 114.

198. *Ar. Resp. Ath.* 27.1.

199. See Aesch. *Pers.* 103-113; but the destruction of the fleece is a theme that runs all through the play, and appears wherever the chorus of Persian nobles blames or laments the policy of the young king Xerxes.

200. Aesch. *Pers.* 800 f.

201. *Laws* 707b-c.

202. *Laws* 709a.

203. *Laws* 709b-c.

204. *Laws* 709e6-710b.

205. *Laws* 710c7-d; cf. *Rep.* 473d and *ep.* 7.326a.

206. In *Laws* 711a6 Plato (speaking through the Athenian stranger) expressly claims personal knowledge of a state ruled by a tyrant. On the tyrant's power to change his people's minds, see 711b.

207. *Laws* 711d f.

208. *Laws* 712a.

209. *Laws* 712e10-713a2. See 714b, where Plato recalls the doctrine preached by Thrasymachus in the first book of *The Republic*, that throughout the world law is made for the benefit of the ruling class; and 715a, where he alludes clearly (by quoting Pindar again) to Callicles' speech in defence of the right of the stronger. He admits only one exception to this partiality: the Spartan state, which is a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, with even a touch of tyranny in the institution of the ephorate (712d-e). See the very similar discussion of the mixed Spartan constitution in 691d-692a (note 196).

210. In the state described in *The Laws* no group is to arrogate all power to itself (715b-c) and the rulers in it are to be the servants of the law.

211. *Laws* 715e7.

212. *Laws* 716a5-b.

213. *Laws* 716c and 717a.

214. See *Paideia* II, 285 f., 295 f.

215. In *Timaeus* Plato used the natural science of his age to interpret the orderly structure of the visible world in this sense. So his natural philosophy is the necessary background for his paideia and his political doctrines as they are represented in his two great political works, *The Republic*, and *The Laws*. Strictly speaking, it is a mark of incompleteness to omit *Timaeus* or any of Plato's other books from an account of his paideia. I must emphasize this in order to avoid giving the impression that I think it is possible to make such a cleavage within his work. But this book cannot discuss every aspect of his philosophy and world-view in the same detail; and it must put those works in the foreground which are directly concerned with the problem of paideia.

216. God's way is always *κατὰ φύσιν*, 716a1. See the passages in *The Republic* showing that areté is the condition which is *κατὰ φύσιν*. In Spinoza's phrase *Deus siue Natura* God is made equivalent to nature, and is understood through nature. In Plato, on the other hand, *true* nature is identified with the divine, the good towards which the visible world strives without attaining it.

217. On this see the beginning of book 5, and even more book 10, where Plato's theology is entirely worked out on the basis of this doctrine of the soul and its relation to the body.

218. The very phrasing of the passage (*Laws* 716c) proves that Plato is intentionally recalling Protagoras' famous epigram so as to place his own supreme principle in sharp opposition to all relativism. 'God must really be the measure of all things for us, and not man, as they say.' God is a measure because he is the aim (*τέλος*) which we must try to reach (*στοχάζεσθαι*): cf. 717a. This is reminiscent of *The Republic* and *Gorgias*, where Plato explains that Good, or 'the good in itself', is the object of all effort and all will. Plato could not express the identity of the God of *The Laws* with the 'shape of good in itself' (*ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*) in book 6 of *The Republic* any more clearly than by this reference back to everything he had written about the *σκοπός* in earlier books. We must recall that in Plato the Idea of anything is its highest form of reality: so the Idea of Good is a higher and more powerful degree of good than anything else in the world.

219. *Laws* 897b: *ὁρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα*.

220. This phrase, which beautifully explains the creation as described in *Timaeus*, occurs in *Theaetetus* 176e.

221. In *Laws* 643a7, away back in book 1, during the first discussion of the nature of paideia, Plato said that it must ultimately lead to God. God is its highest, its immovable goal. According to 645a-b the lawgiver is a divine man who

has the true logos within him, and convinces the polis to make it into a law; and law is the cord by which God moves his plaything, man.

222. The aim of Plato's theological discussions in books 10 and 12 of *The Laws* is to prove this.

223. *Tim.* 37a.

224. The phrase 'visible gods' occurs in *Epin.* 984d5; astronomy as a mathematical science comes into *Epin.* 990a f.

225. See p. 216 f.

226. *Laws* 718b-c.

227. Plato wants the written law and the philosophical reasons for it to be set out side by side: he calls this 'double utterance'—see 718b-c, 719e f., 720e6-8.

228. The marriage-law in its simple form is in *Laws* 721a-b3, and in its bipartite form in 721b6-d6 (where *peitho* and *ananké* are combined).

229. *Laws* 721c, cf. *Symp.* 208d-e.

230. *Paideia* I, 40; cf. 9 f.

231. *Laws* 721c.

232. *Laws* 721d. This means that he can never exercise the authority which, according to Plato's third axiom (690a7), the older man possesses over the younger.

233. *Laws* 723c-d.

234. *Laws* 722d.

235. *Laws* 722e5.

236. *Laws* 724a. The theory of the soul, which is the real core of Socrates' teaching, follows at the beginning of book 5. The last sentence of book 4 emphasizes once again the connexion between the prefaces and paideia. Actually, laws in the ordinary traditional form are not enough to teach the citizens how to achieve the areté of the perfect citizen (*τέλεος πολίτης*), which is called the aim of all paideia in 643e. In short, it is the Socratic spirit which must be added to legislation, and must penetrate every detail of the city's laws.

237. After the general prefaces to all legislation (734e) must come the actual laws. Plato distinguishes two *εἶδη πολιτείας* (735a): the creation of the state's offices, and the establishment of laws by which the officials must administer the state. The former does not occur till the beginning of book 6, after a detailed discussion of the distribution of land (735b). If there are marks of incompleteness anywhere in the book, it is in this important passage. Of course, there could be no better place to discuss the distribution of land (a problem which frequently exercised the minds of fourth-century social reformers) than just before describing the administration of the state. Still, we do not feel as we read that Plato intended to put it here when he wrote the words in 735a5-6 which announce the transition to the creation of public offices. Ivo Bruns, *Platos Gesetze* 189 f., holds 734e6-735a4 to be a stray fragment of Plato's first draft.

238. *Laws* 734e6-735a4.

239. *Laws* 965b. On the other hand, what Plato says in 670e about a 'more accurate paideia' (*ἀκριβεστέρα παιδεία*) than that meant for the ordinary public (*πλήθος*) has obviously no connexion with the higher education of the rulers, which he is talking of here. In the second book, the phrase does not yet possess the clear meaning which allows Plato to contrast the *ἀκριβεστέρα παιδεία* in book 12 with the *σικκὰ παιδεία* of book 5.735a.

240. It is scarcely probable that Plato ever intended to give elementary and higher education the same space in *The Laws*. If worked out in detail, the paideia of the rulers would not have been essentially different from the education of the philosophical rulers in *The Republic*.

241. The very existence of a home and a family in the state of *The Laws* is an approximation to actual conditions. The foundation for this social order is laid in

366. The 'unity of the virtues' (963a-964c) is the old problem of Socrates, which we know from Plato's earliest dialogues. See Robin's *Platon* (Paris 1935) 272. This 'total areté' is identical with the apprehension of Good in itself. See note 367.

367. *Laws* 962d. In that passage and in 963b<sub>4</sub> Plato calls the unity of virtues simply the One (τὸ ἓν).

368. So Jackson, Lutoslawski, and others.

369. *Laws* 965c: τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν βλέπειν. Dialectic is meant there by the phrase 'more accurate method'.

370. *Laws* 963c5-e; and see 631c5.

371. *Laws* 966a-b.

372. *Laws* 966b.

373. *Laws* 966b<sub>4</sub>: περὶ πάντων τῶν σπουδαίων. This reminds us of the description Plato gave of his new 'political art' in *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*: 'knowledge of the highest human things'. That and nothing else is the subject of the rulers' education in *The Laws*.

374. *Laws* 966c, cf. 716c.

375. *Rep.* 484c-d. See 505a: 'the supreme study' (μέγιστον μάθημα).

376. The God who is the 'measure of all things' (see p. 241) is identical with the One (τὸ ἓν) which in 962d and 963b<sub>4</sub> Plato states to be the subject of the rulers' dialectical knowledge. So they are philosophers like the rulers of the Republic; and the climax of their learning is the same—it is theology. The One in *The Laws* is the same as the Idea of Good in *The Republic*.

377. Max Scheler, *Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung* (Bonn 1925) 32-39.

378. *Laws* 966d.

379. These important facts are set down and appraised in my *Aristotle* 161.

380. *Laws* 967d. 'It is impossible for any mortal man to become firmly religious without the knowledge of God which flows from these two sources' (see note 378). The end of *The Laws* fulfils the promise of the beginning: in 643a this paideia was described in anticipation as the way to God.

## 11. DEMOSTHENES: THE DEATH-STRUGGLE AND TRANSFIGURATION OF THE CITY-STATE

1. Georges Clémenceau, *Démosthène* (Paris 1926). On the rise and fall of Demosthenes' reputation, and the different estimates of his character in different countries, see Charles Darwin Adams, *Demosthenes and His Influence* (London 1927, in the series 'Our Debt to Greece and Rome'). Adams shows very well how the democrats of the eighteenth century admired him, and how he is despised by modern German historians.

2. Engelbert Drerup, *Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik* (Paderborn 1916).

3. It actually started with the brilliant book of Droysen's youth, his *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen* (1st edn., 1833); but the great work on the subject is his *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (1st edn., 1836). The most scholarly defender of the old orthodox view of Demosthenes was Arnold Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* (3 vols., Leipzig 1856).

4. This, roughly, was the view of such modern German historians of classical civilization as Beloch and Meyer. Wilcken and Berve are much more moderate in their opinions.

5. Engelbert Drerup, *Demosthenes im Urteil des Altertums* (Würzburg 1923).

6. The modern school of British historians was partly influenced by Droysen and Beloch; but recently there have been some who objected to their condemnation of Demosthenes: for instance, Dr. Pickard-Cambridge. See also the excellent French

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