


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Friedrich

NIETZSCHE

Beyond Good and Evil

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

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losophers. Let us be more cautious, then; let us be "unphilosophical"; let us say: in every willing there is first of all a multiplicity of feelings: the feeling of a condition to get *away* from, the feeling of a condition to get *to*; then the feeling of this "away" and "to"; furthermore, an accompanying muscular feeling which, from a sort of habit, begins a game of its own as soon as we "will"—even without our moving our "arms and legs." In the first place, then, feeling—many kinds of feeling—is to be recognized as an ingredient in willing. Secondly, there is thinking: in every act of the will there is a thought which gives commands—and we must not imagine that we can separate this thought out of "willing" and still have something like will left! Thirdly, the will is not merely a complex of feeling and thinking but above all it is a passion—the passion of commanding. What is called "freedom of the will" is essentially a passionate superiority toward a someone who must obey. "I am free; 'he' must obey"—the consciousness of this is the very willing; likewise that tension of alertness, that straightforward look which fixes on one thing exclusively, that absolute valuation which means "just now this, and nothing else, is necessary," that inner certainty that there will be obedience—all this and whatever else is part of the condition of one who is in command. A man who *wills* is giving a command to something in himself that obeys, or which he believes will obey. But now let us note the oddest thing about the will, this manifold something for which the people have only one word: because we, in a given case, are simultaneously the commanders and the obeyers and, as obeyers, know the feelings of forcing, crowding, pressing, resisting, and moving which begin immediately after

the act of the will: because, on the other hand, we are in the habit of glossing over this duality with the help of the synthetic concept "I"—for these reasons a whole chain of erroneous conclusions, and consequently false valuations of the will, has weighted down our notion of willing, so much so that the willer believes in good faith that willing *suffices* to produce action. Because in the majority of cases there was a willing only where the effect of the command, the obedience, i. e. the action, was an *expected* one, the *appearance* translated itself into the feeling that there had been a *necessary effect*. In short, the willer believes, with a considerable degree of certainty, that will and action are somehow one. He credits the success, the execution of the willing, to the will itself, therewith luxuriating in an increase of the feeling of power which all success produces. "Freedom of the will" is the word for that manifold pleasurable condition of the willer who is in command and at the same time considers himself as one with the executor of the command—as such enjoying the triumph over the resistance, but possessed of the judgment that it is his will itself that is overcoming the resistance. In this fashion the willer adds the pleasurable feelings of the executing, successful instruments, the subservient "lower wills" or "lower souls" (for our body is nothing but a social structure of many souls) to his pleasurable feeling as Commander. *L'effet c'est moi*—the same thing happens here that happens in any well constructed and happy community: the ruling class identifies itself with the success of the community. In all willing, then, there is commanding and obeying on the basis, as we have seen, of a social structure of many "souls." This is why a philosopher should consider

himself justified in including willing within the general sphere of morality—morality understood as the doctrine of the rank-relations that produce the phenomenon we call “life.”—

20.

The various philosophical concepts do not evolve at random or autonomously but in reference and relationship to one another; although they seem to occur suddenly and arbitrarily in the history of thought, they belong to a system exactly like all the members of the fauna of a continent. This is revealed by the fact that the most diverse philosophers again and again fill in a basic scheme of *possible* philosophies. Invisibly compelled, they revolve again and again in the same orbit. No matter how independent of each other they feel with their critical or systematic will—something or other in them leads them; something or other keeps them running, one after another, in a definite sequence. They share an inborn systematization and relation of concepts. Their thinking is in fact not so much a discovering as a recognizing, remembering, a return and a homecoming to a remote, ancient, commonly stocked household of the soul out of which the concepts grew. Seen in this light, philosophizing is a sort of atavism of the highest order. The odd family resemblance between all Indic, Greek, and German philosophizing is simple enough to explain. For especially where the languages are related it cannot possibly be avoided that, thanks to a common philosophy of grammar (by this I mean thanks to the unconscious domination and leadership of similar grammatical functions), everything lies prepared for a similar development and sequence of the various philosophical systems. For the same

reason, the road seems closed to certain other possibilities of word-interpretation. Philosophers belonging to the Ural-Altaiic linguistic group (containing languages in which the concept of “subject” is least developed) most probably “view the world” quite differently and will be found on paths other than those travelled by speakers of Indo-European or by Moslems. The compulsion exerted by certain grammatical functions is in the end the compulsion of *physiological* value judgments and of the conditions that determine race.—This much by way of rejecting Locke’s superficiality on the subject of the origin of ideas.

21.

The *causa sui* is the best self-contradiction hitherto thought up; it is a sort of logical rape and perversion. But man’s extravagant pride has managed to tie itself up deeply and dreadfully with just this nonsense. The demand for “freedom of the will,” in that metaphysical superlative sense in which it still rules the minds of the half-learned, the demand to assume the total and final responsibility for one’s own actions, thereby relieving God, world, ancestors, accident, and society; this demand is nothing less than to be the *causa sui* oneself, to pull oneself by one’s own bootstraps into existence out of the bog of non-existence—a feat dreamed up with a recklessness exceeding that of Baron Munchhausen! But supposing someone recognizes the peasant-like simplicity of our famous “freedom of the will” and deletes it from his thinking. I would now beg him to carry his “enlightenment” one step farther and to delete also contrary of that “free will” monstrosity. I mean the “non-free will,” which amounts to a

misuse of cause and effect. One should not mistakenly *objectivize* "cause" and "effect" in the manner of the natural scientists (and whoever else nowadays naturalizes in his thinking), in accordance with the ruling mechanistic oafishness that pushes the cause until it becomes "effective." One should make use of "cause" and "effect" only as pure *concepts*, i. e. as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and mutual understanding, *not* for explanation. In "being-as-such" there are no "causal connections" or "necessities" or "psychological lack of freedom"; effect there does *not* follow upon a cause; there *is* no "law" which rules phenomena. It is *we*, we alone, who have dreamed up the causes, the one-thing-after-anothers, the one-thing-reciprocating-anothers, the relativity, the constraint, the numbers, the laws, the freedom, the "reason why," the purpose. And when we mix up this world of symbols with the world of things as though the symbols existed "in themselves," then we are merely doing once more what we have always done: we are creating myths. The "non-free will" is a piece of mythology; in real life there is only *strong* will and *weak* will. It is almost always a symptom of what the man lacks when a thinker feels something of constraint, necessity, having-to-obey, pressure, and lack of freedom in all his "causal connections" and "psychological necessities." It is revealing to feel these things: the personality betrays itself. On the whole, if I have observed correctly, there are two diametrically opposed factions which have picked the "non-freedom" of the will for their problem—but both sides reveal a profoundly *personal* bias. The ones want to avoid giving up at any cost their "responsibility," their faith in *themselves*, their personal

right to *their* merit. (These are the vain races!) The others, conversely, do not want to be responsible for anything; they do not want to be guilty of anything; they demand, from an inner self-contempt, to *get rid of the burden* of themselves in some direction or other. When this latter type writes books, nowadays, they usually interest themselves in criminals: a sort of socialistic compassion is their favorite disguise. And they are right: the fatalism of the weak of will is astonishingly beautified by its claim to be "*la religion de la souffrance humaine*." Herein lies its type of "good taste."

22.

One will forgive, I hope, an old philologist who cannot desist from the malice of pointing his finger at poor interpretation. But really, that "conformity of nature unto law" of which you physicists talk so proudly as if . . . , that lawfulness is the result only of your *explication de texte*, of your bad philology! It is not a fact, not a "text" at all, but only a naive, humanitarian arrangement and misinterpretation that you use for truckling to the democratic instincts of the modern soul. "Everywhere equality before the law—and nature is no better off than we are"—surely a fine *arrière-pensée* in which are disguised first, a vulgar hostility to everything privileged and autocratic, and second, a very subtle atheism. "*Ni dieu, ni maitre*"—you, too, want that, and therefore "Long live natural law"! Am I right? But, as I have said, this is *explication*, not *text*, and someone might come along who, with opposite intention and interpretive skill, might read out of the same nature and the same phenomena quite another thing: a tyrannical, inconsiderate, relentless enforcement of claims

est." (In order to be a good philosopher it is necessary to be dry, clear, without illusion. A banker who has made a fortune has one aspect of character needed to make discoveries in philosophy: that is to say, he sees clearly into that which is.)

40.

Everything deep loves masks; the deepest things have a veritable hatred of image and likeness. Might not *contrariety* be the only proper disguise to clothe the modesty of a god? A question worth asking. It would be surprising if some mystic hadn't at some time ventured upon it. There are events of such delicate nature that one would do well to bury them in gruffness and make them unrecognizable. There are deeds of love and extravagant magnanimity after which nothing is more advisable than to take a stick and beat up the eye-witness of them, to cloud his memory. There are people who know how to cloud and abuse their own memories in order to get revenge on their sole accomplice: modesty is inventive. The things of which one is most ashamed are by no means the worst things; not only cunning is found beneath a mask; there is much goodness in guile. I could imagine that a man who had something precious and vulnerable to hide might roll through life rough and round like an old green heavily hooped wine cask: the subtlety of his modesty would demand it. The destinies and delicate decisions of a man who is deeply ashamed happen to him on paths that few ever reach and of whose existence his nearest and dearest must know nothing. The danger to his life is hidden from their eyes, as is his life-security when he regains it. Such a concealed one, who instinctively uses speech for silence and withholding, and whose