

Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy

Volume 3

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, 1265-1965

Edited by

John K. Ryan

and

Bernardine M. Bonansea



THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS

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pions of Augustinianism, John Peckham and Matthew of Acquasparta, are significant indications.

If it is correct to recognize the fact that the exaggerations of the Latin Averroists cast many shadows on the moderate Aristotelianism of St. Thomas, one must not underestimate the weight that fidelity to traditional speculative trends by the large majority of the masters had on the Bishop of Paris' decisions. Many reservations need be made, then, to the thesis of those historians who have attempted to present the condemnations of 1277 as a rash act by Stephen Tempier urged on by a small group of masters irritated by the successes of the Thomistic teaching. As certain scholars have recently proved very effectively,² the Bishop of Paris did not act of his own initiative, but at the solicitation of Rome, which was disturbed by the trend that things were taking.

It is possible that the bishop's intervention went further than the papal intentions. Nevertheless it is undeniable that it interpreted a sentiment and expressed a widely spread uneasiness. In fact, are not all experts on medieval studies agreed in admitting that St. Thomas' teaching marks a decisive turning-point in the line of thought followed up to then in the theological schools? Now, history uniformly teaches that novelties at first cause distrust and misunderstanding, which are all the more profound as the innovations seem to be more revolutionary.

In the light of such facts and considerations, the revival of the neo-Platonic theses in opposition to the Aristotelianism of St. Thomas, noticeable between 1270 and 1280 at Paris and Oxford, appears altogether obvious. It appears even more so if one thinks that the revival was placed under the authority of St. Augustine. Equally obvious seems the fact that the most active among the opponents of Thomism should have been direct disciples of St. Bonaventure, that is, the better known Franciscan masters of that time: John Peckham, Matthew of Acquasparta, Gonsalvus of Spain, William de la Mare, Vitalis du Four, and Walter of Bruges. To the last goes the credit of having fathered the battle-cry: "*Plus crendendum est Augustino et Anselmo quam Philosopho.*"

When placed in this milieu, certain stands, recalled by some historians with an air of shock, take on a precise meaning and become understandable. Such are William de la Mare's composition of the

² See, for instance, A. Callebaut, "Jean Pecham et l'Augustinisme," in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XVIII (1925), 441-72.

tried to deviate as little as possible from St. Bonaventure's teachings, and in philosophical doctrine he would likewise have preferred St. Augustine's guidance to that of Aristotle. Instead, Duns Scotus' writings breathe an atmosphere remarkably different from the one that prevails in the works of St. Bonaventure's disciples of the first and second generations.

If it is true that Duns Scotus criticizes many Thomistic theses, it is also true that he shuns any polemical harshness and always motivates his dissent with a critical but calm analysis of the arguments upon which St. Thomas bases his conclusions and, above all, he does so by appealing not to St. Augustine but to Aristotle. Duns Scotus has great respect for the Stagirite, whom he clearly knows in depth. I am not aware that anyone has ever accused Scotus of superficial knowledge of Aristotelian thought. Duns Scotus often disagrees with St. Thomas on the interpretation of this or that Aristotelian principle, and of this or that Aristotelian thesis. However, in every instance it can be shown that it is always possible to find support for his interpretation in the selfsame texts of Aristotle.⁶ P. Raymond has gone so far as to write that "Duns Scotus is as much a disciple of Aristotle as St. Thomas is."⁷ By these words, the Canadian Scotist does not mean that the Subtle Doctor is as convinced and coherent an Aristotelian as St. Thomas; he intends to underline the point that Scotus is neither more nor less familiar with Aristotle's writings than the Angelic Doctor.

A reading of Scotus' works offers clear confirmation of this. Aristotle's authority has always the first place, not only in the strictly philosophical writings (the commentaries on Aristotle's logical works and the "quaestiones" on his *Metaphysics*), but also in the many pages of his theological works where metaphysical, psychological, or cosmological problems are discussed. Aristotle's opinions are quoted and subjected to detailed analysis. In brief, Duns Scotus shows in every way that for him Aristotle is an author

⁶ Cf. on this point the excellent study of T. Barth, "Individualität und Allgemeinheit bei J. Duns Scotus," in *Weisheit und Wissenschaft*, 16 (1953), 122-41; 191-213; 17 (1954), 112-36; 18 (1955), 192-216; 19 (1956), 117-36; 20 (1957), 106-119; 198-220. Besides, as Roger Bacon had already remarked, "Litera sua [i.e., Aristotle's] est ita meretrix (quod solebant sapientes dicere) quod exponit se cuilibet, et in omnem partem vertitur, nec est aliquis qui ea familiari intellectu potest gaudere, sed labitur a quolibet eius intentio, sicut anguilla lubrica non potest teneri manibus attractantis." *Compendium studii philosophiae*, ed. Brewer (London, 1859), p. 468.

⁷ *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, IV.2, col. 1940.

not merely historical, but also more properly philosophical, for we believe that this problem, like the other problems referred to, is still alive and greatly needs to be discussed.² To be sure, it is our conviction that Scotus made a great contribution toward the solution of these problems that has led us to study them in the light of his writings.³

² The growing interest in the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce is one of various factors contributing to a better appreciation of the contemporaneity of some of Scotus' ideas. In this fiftieth anniversary year of Peirce's death (1914-1964) it is surely appropriate to devote some little space, if only in a note, to a consideration of the influence of Scotus' realism on this great American philosopher. Peirce himself was wont to emphasize this: "The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me" (1.6). This and the following references are to *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* [Cambridge, Mass.]. Vols. I-VI were edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss [1931-35]; Vols. VII-VIII by Arthur W. Burks [1958]. Peirce regrets that Kant had not read Scotus (1.19). He waxes eloquent in his praise of scholasticism in general and of Scotus in particular (8.11). He gives a sketch of Scotistic realism as he understands it (8.18). He calls himself "a Scotistic realist" (4.50) and even "a Scotist" *tout court* (*Ibid.*). However, he is far from agreeing with Scotus on all points. In the passage just cited he explains his stand: "In calling himself a Scotist, the writer does not mean that he is going back to the general views of 600 years back; he merely means that the point of metaphysics upon which Scotus chiefly insisted and which has since passed out of mind, is a very important point, inseparably bound up with the *most* important point to be insisted upon today." This point, to be sure, is *realism*. Peirce feels that this is especially important for science. In fact, he tells us that if the logic and metaphysics of Scotus, "not slavishly worshipped, but torn away from its medievalism, be adapted to modern culture, under continual wholesome reminders of nominalistic criticisms, I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science" (1.6); for, as he says, "Realism is implied in modern science" (4.50). Peirce believes, however, that scholastic realism does not go far enough. "Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic. . . ." (8.208), though, no doubt, what Peirce really means is that Scotus is not sufficiently Kantian or Hegelian! In any case, he tells us his own view "amounts to extreme scholastic realism" (*Ibid.*).

Most full-length studies of Peirce deal with Scotus' influence on his realism. The outstanding treatment, however, is found in John F. Boler, *Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism: A Study of Peirce's Relation to John Duns Scotus* (Seattle, 1963). Besides this excellent study one may wish to consult the brief, but densely packed essay of Charles K. McKeon, "Peirce's Scotistic Realism," in *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. by Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 238-50. Allan B. Wolter (see previous note) gave a talk entitled "Some Reflections on Peirce's Scotism" at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting (March 20-21, 1964) of the Metaphysical Society of America, in Washington, D.C. It is to be hoped that this article will eventually be published in book form.

³ We hope sometime in the near future to publish our investigations concerning two other problems of realism with which Scotus dealt. These problems may be approximately expressed in the following two questions: 1) What is the precise objective foundation for our judging that two things are imperfectly

Henry of Ghent and the second by St. Thomas Aquinas, another position is possible, and this is the one that Duns Scotus defends. Intellect and will exist in the soul as two intrinsically distinct principles of operation in such a manner that the soul is neither intellect nor will nor something really distinct from them. Intellect and will are contained in the soul *unitive*, and yet they are formally distinct from it.⁵

To clarify his position Scotus compares the relationship between the soul and its faculties to that existing between being and its transcendental properties. Just as being contains within itself the reasons for its unity, truth, and goodness, and yet each one of these properties retains its specific distinction, so the soul includes within itself intellect and will, and yet these two powers are formally distinct from one another and from the soul itself.⁶ Scotus' formal distinction has no counterpart in Thomistic philosophy, and it would be wrong to judge it from the Thomistic point of view.⁷ If

⁵ *Oxon.*, II, d. 16, q. un., n. 18; XIII, pp. 43b-44a: "[Intellectus et voluntas] non sunt partes essentielles animae, sed sunt unitive contenta in anima quasi passiones eius, propter quas anima est operativa; non quod sint essentia eius formaliter, sed sunt formaliter distinctae, idem tamen identice et unitive."

⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 17; XIII, p. 43b: "Sicut ergo ens continet unitive rationem unius, veri et boni aliorum, sic anima continet potentias istas [intellectum et voluntatem] unitive, quanquam formaliter sint distinctae." The formal distinction between intellect and will is stated in *Ordinatio*, I, d. 3, n. 578; III, p. 342: "Non potest autem idem sub eadem ratione formali esse principium istorum duorum actuum secundorum [intellectionis et volitionis], quia isti actus secundi requirunt oppositam rationem principiandi in suis principiis: ergo oportet habere aliquam distinctionem actuum primorum, et hoc aliquam proportionaliter correspondentem distinctioni actuum secundorum." That the act of understanding and the act of willing are formally distinct is clear from *Oxon.*, III, d. 14, q. 2, n. 6; XIV, p. 500a-500b: "Possunt enim isti actus [intellectionis et volitionis] formaliter distinguui, licet non habeant obiecta formaliter distincta."

⁷ The nature of Scotus' formal distinction is thus explained by Efrem Bettoni: "It is not easy to grasp the meaning and value of the formal distinction met so often in the works of Duns Scotus. Formal distinction stands between real distinction and distinction of pure reason or logical distinction. There is a real distinction between two things, when the one is not contained in the other either as a fruit is contained in the germ, an effect in the cause, or something distinct is contained in something confused: one thing is perfect in itself apart from the other, so that they are two really different things. The logical distinction, on the other hand, is nothing but a distinction of concepts as regards a thing that is really and formally identical. On the contrary, two entities are formally distinct from one another when, although one is not contained in the other in any of the three ways mentioned in connection with the real distinction, i.e., potentially, virtually, or confusedly, they nevertheless lack that ultimate perfection which would make them *really different*. It is only because they are united together that they constitute a real thing. However, they are not parts or constituent principles of the thing, but only different formalities of it." *Duns*

a comparison must be made between the two approaches to the problem under discussion, Scotus seems to be primarily concerned with safeguarding the essential unity of the soul and the intimate relationship between the activities of its powers. Aquinas, on the other hand, is more preoccupied with saving the distinction between God and the human soul, as well as the metaphysical principle that act and potency must be in the same genus.⁸ No matter what approach one may prefer to follow, one thing is certain: Scotus would never admit a real distinction between the soul and its faculties and between the faculties themselves, because his notion of real distinction implies separability of the beings or realities involved. Since intellect and will cannot exist apart from the soul or from one another, not even by the absolute power of God, no Scotistic real distinction is possible between them. That much must be admitted even by the Thomists.

Having clarified Scotus' position on the relationship between the soul and its faculties, we proceed now to his concept of will, which he defines as *appetitus cum ratione liber*,⁹ and more simply as *appetitus rationalis*,¹⁰ or *appetitus intellectivus*.¹¹ Since will is a rational appetite, it includes a double tendency, one passive, consisting in a natural inclination to will and attain the object that constitutes its own perfection, and one active, which is the act of willing as such or free volition.¹² The passive tendency is also called natural will, to distinguish it from free will proper. Natural will, strictly speaking, is no will at all, since of its nature it is a mere inclination or passive capacity to receive its own perfection.¹³ The two tendencies, passive and active, exist as distinct formalities within one and the same power, not otherwise than within one

Scotus: *The Basic Principles of His Philosophy*, trans. and ed. by Bernardine Bonansea, O.F.M. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1961), pp. 78-79.

⁸ For St. Thomas' discussion of this question cf. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 77, a. 1; for Scotus' refutation of Aquinas' arguments see *Oxon.*, II, d. 16, q. un., nn. 5-10; XIII, pp. 25b-28a.

⁹ *Oxon.*, III, d. 17, q. un., n. 2; XIV, p. 653b.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, d. 33, q. un., n. 9; XV, p. 446b.

¹¹ *Rep. Par.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 19; XXIII, p. 127b.

¹² *Collationes*, XVI, nn. 1-2; V, pp. 208b-209a (Vivès ed.).

¹³ *Oxon.*, III, d. 17, q. un., n. 3; XIV, p. 654a: "*Voluntas naturalis non est voluntas, nec velle naturale est velle*"; *ibid.*, n. 5; XIV, p. 655a: "*Voluntas naturalis, ut sic, non est voluntas, neque potentia, sed tantum dicit inclinationem potentiae ad recipiendum perfectionem.*"

and the same intellect there is a natural tendency to know which is formally distinct from the actual act of knowing.¹⁴

The existence of two different tendencies in the will is proved by the conflict that one may experience within himself, as in the case of martyrs who choose to die by a free act of their will despite the natural fear they have for death. The *appetitus naturalis* belongs to the very nature of the will, since a nature, to be such, must tend towards its own perfection, just as a stone tends naturally towards the center of the earth. The perfection towards which the will tends by an intrinsic necessity and to the utmost degree is happiness.¹⁵ It is not happiness in general or universal good, for this can only be known by the intellect, and the *appetitus naturalis* is prior to the act of the intellect, or else it would be a free act. It is therefore happiness in particular represented by individual goods, or such goods as are naturally agreeable to the will.¹⁶ Among these, the infinite good, as man's ultimate end, occupies the first place, since all other goods are related to it.¹⁷

Although will is both a natural appetite and a free power, this latter aspect better characterizes it, for will is essentially free.¹⁸ As

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 655b: "*In una potentia est duplex tendentia, activa et passiva. . . Voluntas naturalis secundum formale, quod importat, non est potentia vel voluntas, sed inclinatio voluntatis et tendentia qua tendit in perfectionem.*" *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 10, n. 2; XXI, p. 318b: "*Sicut se habet appetitus naturalis intellectus ad actum suum, sic appetitus voluntatis ad actum suum; sed appetitus naturalis intellectus non est actus elicited ab eo; ergo sic erit de voluntate.*"

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 3; XXI, pp. 318b-319a: "*De illo appetitu naturali patet quod voluntas necessario et perpetuo et summe appetit beatitudinem, et hoc in particulari. Quod de necessitate, patet, quia natura non potest remanere natura quin inclinatur ad suam perfectionem, quia si tollas illam inclinationem, tollis naturam; sed appetitus naturalis non est nisi inclinatio talis; ergo ut sic necessario appetit beatitudinem, quia illa est maxima perfectio.*"

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 319a: "*Illud appetere non est actus sequens cognitionem, quia tunc esset liber; universale autem non est nisi obiectum intellectus, vel consequens actum intellectus; ergo ille appetitus non erit nisi beatitudinis in particulari.*" *Oxon.*, III, d. 17, q. un., n. 3; XIV, p. 654b: "*Dicitur voluntas naturalis, ut elicited actum conformem inclinationi naturali; quae semper est ad commodum.*"

¹⁷ *Ord.*, I, d. 2, n. 130; II, p. 205: "*Videtur quod . . . inclinatio [voluntatis nostrae] est naturalis ad summe amandum bonum infinitum, nam inde arguitur inclinatio naturalis ad aliquid in voluntate, quia ex se, sine habitu, prompte et delectabiliter vult illud voluntas libera; ita videtur quod experimur actu amandi bonum infinitum, immo non videtur voluntas in alio perfecte quietari.*" *Oxon.*, III, d. 15, q. un., n. 22; XIV, p. 598a: "*Voluntas nihil vult naturaliter primo et propter se nisi finem ultimum, et per consequens omne aliud vult non primo, sed in ordine ad ipsum . . . [Hoc] patet ex rectitudine inclinationis naturalis, quae non est recta si esset maxime et principaliter ad minus bonum et non ad ultimum.*"

¹⁸ *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 16; XIII, p. 210a: "*Ratio autem formalior volun-*

a self-determining power, will has complete control over its acts.¹⁹ Indeed, in St. Augustine's words, which Scotus quotes approvingly, "nothing is so much in our power as the will itself."²⁰ To conceive the will as being forced to act is an evident contradiction.²¹ Freedom of the will includes not only the power to act or not to act in any particular case (freedom of exercise or of contradiction), but also the power to decide between two opposing acts concerning one and the same object, such as to will or not to will (freedom of contrariety), and the power to choose between acts and objects specifically different among themselves (freedom of specification).²² Will can even suspend its own decision concerning a particular act to be done, or change its decision during a course of action and will the opposite of what it had willed previously. This is because of the contingent nature of the relationship that obtains between will, its acts, and its effects. Just as there is no effect that must be necessarily produced by will, so there is no act that will must necessarily perform.²³

Yet the will cannot will and not will something at one and the same time, since this involves a contradiction; nor can it refrain

tatis est magis libera quam ratio appetitus, quare est ratio recipiendi in quantum libera, sicut ratio libertatis est magis ratio constituendi"; *ibid.*, I, d. 17, q. 3, n. 5; X, p. 56b (Vivès ed.): "[Voluntas] est libera per essentiam."

¹⁹ *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 15; XXVI, p. 199a: "Ipsamet [voluntas] est tale activum, quod seipsam determinat in agendo"; *Oxon.*, III, d. 17, q. un., n. 4; XIV, p. 654b: "Omnis voluntas est domina sui actus"; *Rep. Par.*, III, d. 17, q. 2, n. 4; XXIII, p. 376a: "Non potest esse voluntas, nisi sit domina sui actus, et ita est domina voluntas sui actus."

²⁰ *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 2; XIII, p. 198a: "Augustinus *primo lib. Retract.* cap. 22 . . . dicit quod nihil est tam in potestate nostra quam ipsa voluntas; igitur ex hoc potest haberi, quod nulla actio in nobis est ita a nobis, sicut volitio voluntatis."

²¹ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 29, q. un., n. 6; XIX, p. 218a: "Contradictio est voluntatem simpliciter cogi ad actum volendi."

²² *Quodl.*, q. 18, n. 9; XXVI, p. 241b: "Voluntas autem sola habet in differentiam ad contradictoria, et talem, quod ipsa est sui determinativa ad alterum eorum"; *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 6; XIII, p. 201a: "In potestate voluntatis nostrae est habere nolle et velle, quae sunt contraria respectu unius obiecti"; *Ord.*, I, d. 1, n. 149 II, p. 100: "In potestate voluntatis est non tantum sic et sic velle, sed etiam velle et non velle, quia libertas eius est ad agendum vel non agendum."

²³ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 10, n. 10; XXI, p. 333b: "A quolibet actu in particulari potest [voluntas] se suspendere hoc vel illo"; *Ord.*, I, d. 39, Appendix A; VI, p. 418: "Voluntati enim ut actus primus, etiam quando producit hoc velle, non repugnat oppositum velle: tum quia causa contingens est, respectu effectus, et ideo non repugnat sibi oppositum in ratione effectus: tum quia ut subiectum est, contingenter se habet ad istum actum ut informat, quia subiecto non repugnat oppositum sui 'accidentis per accidentis'."

entirely from all act of willing, for even such a suspension seems to be possible only in terms of a voluntary act.²⁴ Likewise, it does not seem possible for the will to seek evil as evil or to hate the good as such, since by its very nature the will tends towards the good.²⁵ But the will can seek a certain evil for its own satisfaction, in such a manner that the evil sought becomes for will an apparent good. This is possible because will as a free power can choose any being as the object of its desire and make it an ultimate end, were it not for any other reason than its own pleasure in abusing freedom and performing an evil act.²⁶ Thus a rational creature, with full knowledge of what it is doing, can hate God and find satisfaction in such a hatred, not because God is hateful or because the hatred of God is not something evil, but because of the pleasure that even such a hatred can bring to a rational creature in the form of an apparent good.²⁷ However, a formal hatred of God seems impossible, since it would amount to willing evil as such. Accordingly, even the fallen angels cannot formally hate God. All they can do is to hate the pains and sufferings decreed for them by divine justice.²⁸

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 419: "Voluntas volens a, potest non velle a. Haec . . . [propositio] in sensu compositionis falsa est, ut significetur possibilitas huius compositionis 'voluntas volens a, non vult a'; vera est in sensu divisionis, ut significetur possibilitas ad opposita successive, quia voluntas volens pro a potest non velle pro b"; *Oxon.*, II, d. 7, q. un., n. 24; XII, p. 405b: "Non videtur quod [voluntas] possit se suspendere ab omni actu sine volitione." See also *Ord.*, I, d. 1, n. 150; II, p. 102.

²⁵ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 10, n. 9; XXI, pp. 332b-333a: "A voluntate excluditur actus volitionis respectu miseriae, et actus nolitionis respectu beatitudinis, quia miseria non est nata esse obiectum actus volitionis, nec beatitudo obiectum actus nolitionis, sicut actus videndi disgregando excluditur a visu respectu nigredinis, quia non est nata esse obiectum talis actus; sic in proposito, voluntas non est capax talis actus respectu talis obiecti." The same thought is expressed in *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 5; XXVI, pp. 188b-189a. However, there are passages in Scotus' works which seem to indicate the possibility for the will to seek evil as evil. See, for example, *Ord.*, I, d. 1, n. 151; II, p. 103; *Collationes*, XVII, n. 11; V, pp. 216b-217a; and the specific question, "Utrum voluntas creata possit peccare ex malitia, volendo aliquid non ostensum sibi sub ratione boni veri, id est, boni simpliciter, vel boni apparentis et secundum quid?"; *Oxon.*, II, d. 43, q. 2, n. 1; XIII, pp. 490b-494a.

²⁶ *Ord.*, I, d. 1, nn. 16-17; II, pp. 10-11; *Oxon.*, II, d. 43, q. 2, n. 2; XIII, pp. 493b-494a.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 1; XIII, p. 491ab.

²⁸ *Rep. Par.*, II, d. 43, q. un., n. 5; XXIII, p. 229b: "Non potest Deus odiri ab aliqua voluntate"; *ibid.*: "Quia formaliter [Deus] non potest odiri." See *Oxon.*, II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 13; XII, p. 359b, for Scotus' teaching on the nature of the hatred of God by the fallen angels. The question of the possibility or impossibility of a formal hatred of God is closely related to the question of whether or not the will can seek evil as evil, which Scotus solves in the negative but not without

Scotus is quite consistent in carrying to its logical conclusions his notion of will as an essentially free power. In so doing, he must face St. Thomas' position that will, as an appetitive faculty, cannot be conceived apart from its natural object of desire and final end, which is happiness or the good in general. Will, says Aquinas, tends by its nature towards good in general, so that it is not free not to desire it. This is not something imposed upon it from without, but a necessity of nature proceeding from will itself which has no choice but to seek happiness as its ultimate end.²⁹ Thus for Aquinas no specific distinction obtains between natural appetite and deliberate volition, since the latter is for him merely an application to a particular good of the original movement of will towards good in general.³⁰

Scotus discusses St. Thomas' position very carefully, and with his usual subtlety answers all his arguments, along with the arguments advanced by Henry of Ghent, who follows Aquinas on this score.³¹ Here is the general line of his reasoning. Starting with St. Augustine's saying that nothing is so much in the will's power as the will itself, he argues that this has no meaning except insofar as it refers to the elicited acts of will, or those acts which are performed by will as a free power. Now if the will has the power to tend or not to tend towards happiness through the acts of another faculty, as in the case of all elicited acts, it must also have the power, and even more so, to tend or not to tend towards happiness immediately, i.e., by its very nature. To deny this is to admit the contradiction that, for the attainment of its ends, the will necessarily depends on something over which it has a complete control. But will has the power to tend or not to tend towards happiness or good in general through the acts of intellect, since it can divert intellect from the consideration of that good and thus avoid tending towards something which it does not know. Hence the will has also the power to will or not to will happiness immediately.³² In more

raising some doubts as to the probability of the opposite view. See n. 25 above and the texts therein referred to, especially *Ord.*, I, d. 1, n. 151; II, p. 103.

²⁹ For Aquinas' teaching on this point cf. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 1 and 2; I-II, q. 5, a. 8; q. 10, a. 1 and 2; *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2; *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 5; *De malo*, q. 6.

³⁰ Cf. Robert E. Brennan, O.P., *Thomistic Psychology* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), pp. 232-35.

³¹ Cf. *Ord.*, d. 1, nn. 77-158; II, pp. 59-108; *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 10; XXI, pp. 317-83; *Quodl.*, q. 16; XXVI, pp. 180-201.

³² *Ord.*, I, d. 1, nn. 91-92; II, pp. 66-67.

simple terms, Scotus says that since the will is free in directing the intellect towards its final end, or happiness in general, it is also free in its tendency towards happiness as such.

To support his thesis, Scotus uses another argument. Every agent that is bound by nature to act and is not otherwise impeded, removes necessarily and as best he can every obstacle to his action. Thus a heavy body will of necessity fall downward until it meets a resistance superior to its own weight. If the resistance can be overcome, the heavy body will necessarily overcome it and continue in its descent, since it is of its nature to do so. Likewise, if will is forced by its nature to tend towards its final end and, as we know, is not otherwise impeded to do so, it will also remove by an intrinsic necessity and to the extent of its power all obstacle to its volition. An obstacle to volition is the nonconsideration of the end, for nothing can be willed that is not previously known. Since this obstacle can be easily removed by forcing the intellect's attention to the end, the will will necessarily do this if by its nature it tends towards happiness as its final end.³³ In other words, if will tends of necessity towards happiness as its final end, and it is within its power to apply intellect to the consideration of that end, it will do so at all times and necessarily. But this, as Scotus' reasoning implies, is not the case, since it is against our everyday experience. Hence the will is free in tending towards its final end.

A third argument is that every agent acting by a necessity of nature must act to the full extent of its power, since the intensity of action is no more in its power than action itself. This means that the agent has no choice as to the intensity of his action. Hence if will tends of necessity towards happiness, it will have no choice but to seek it necessarily and to the full extent of its power. This again is contrary to our everyday experience.³⁴

St. Thomas argues that natural necessity of the end is not repugnant to will, since according to Aristotle (*Physics*, II, 9; 200a 21) the end is in practical matters what a principle is in speculative matters. Just as intellect of necessity adheres to first principles, so will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness.³⁵ In

³³ *Ibid.*, n. 93; II, pp. 67-68.

³⁴ *Oxon.*, I, d. 1, q. 4, n. 9; VIII, p. 359a (Vivès ed.). According to the critical edition of the *Opus Oxoniense*, the argument was later dropped by Scotus with the remark: "Conceditur conclusio quando est aequalis apprehensio et nihil retrahens." Cf. *Ord.*, I, d. 1, n. 133; II, pp. 88-89, note.

³⁵ *Sum theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 1 c. Quoted in *Ord.*, I, d. 1, n. 83; II, pp. 62-63.

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answering this argument, Scotus objects to the comparison between the intellect's assent to first principles and the will's assent to the last end. Intellect is a mere natural faculty which cannot but accept the evidence of its object once it is presented to it. Will, on the contrary, is essentially a free power, and as such it always tends freely towards its object, no matter what degree of goodness it may contain. Accordingly, not even the last end or happiness in general can force the will's consent.³⁶

It is further argued by St. Thomas that since the formal object of will is the good, and happiness as such contains only good and no evil, will tends of necessity towards it, just as any other faculty tends of necessity towards its formal object.³⁷ Scotus disagrees once more with this line of reasoning. While accepting the premises that the good is the formal object of will and that this latter has a natural inclination towards it, since it is precisely by attaining the good that will perfects itself, he questions the conclusion that the good or happiness in general has such an appeal to will as to necessarily draw its assent to it. He argues that when our will is confronted with happiness or good in general, we can think of three possibilities: the will can will it (*velle*), reject it (*nolle*), or simply refuse to make any decision (*non velle, non nolle*). While it would be wrong to say that will can reject happiness or good as such and choose misery as its end (see however our previous observation in this regard), it is not at all inconceivable that will, in virtue of its radical freedom, may refuse to act. Not to will to be happy, Scotus acutely remarks, is not the same as to will to be unhappy, just as not to will to be miserable is not equivalent to willing to be happy. Between these two opposing acts of the will—for both to will and not to will are positive acts—there is a middle course which consists in not willing at all. This, Scotus concludes, is what absolutely speaking will can do even when it is confronted with its final end or happiness in general.³⁸

³⁶ *Ord.*, I, d. 1, n. 147; II, pp. 97-98. See also *Oxon.*, II, d. 7, n. 27; XII, pp. 407b-408a; *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 6; XXXVI, p. 189ab.

³⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, *Sum theol.*, I-II, q. 10, arts. 1 and 2.

³⁸ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 10, n. 8; XXI, p. 332b: "Respondeo, non sequitur, non volo beatitudinem; ergo nolo eam, sive non volo esse miserum; ergo de necessitate nolo esse miserum, quia *nolle* est actus positivus nolentis, sicut est *velle*, et ita liberum unum sicut aliud, quia neutrum elicio necessario circa quodcumque obiectum, et ideo possum non elicere *nolle* circa malum, sicut *velle* circa bonum. Tamen sicut circa malum ostensum non possum elicere actum voluntatis nisi *nolle*, sic circa bonum oblatum non possum elicere actum voluntatis nisi *velle*,

To sum up the whole discussion, will is completely free in determining itself as to the attainment of its end, regardless of whether this is happiness in particular or happiness in general.³⁹ The simple apprehension of its formal object cannot be the determining reason for the will's adherence to it, nor does the will act necessarily in its attainment of the object or the continuation of its act of willing it.⁴⁰ To think otherwise is to reject the notion of will as a self-determining power.

Scotus' insistence upon the will's radical freedom in pursuing its objective is no doubt disconcerting to those who are accustomed to think of will and freedom in purely Aristotelian-Thomistic terms. However, if we look at his doctrine from the perspective of the Augustinian-Franciscan school, as must be done in order to understand Scotus' philosophy, we need not be concerned as to the orthodoxy and consistency of his teaching. St. Augustine's conception of will as a fundamentally free power is well known, and the Subtle Doctor never tires of repeating the Augustinian saying that nothing is so much under the will's power as the will itself. Primarily, of course, St. Augustine speaks of freedom of choice, as a type of freedom that belongs to will, but he subordinates it to freedom proper, which consists in the radical dominion that will has over its own acts and belongs, although in different degrees, to God, angels, and man. St. Anselm, following in the steps of his great predecessor, defines freedom as *potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem*,⁴¹ or the power of maintaining righteousness of the will for its sake. The meaning is that the real nature of freedom is to do what is right, and to do it knowingly and with complete control over one's own acts.

The Anselmian definition of freedom is accepted by both St.

et ideo debet sic argui: Non possum velle esse miserum; ergo non possum odire beatitudinem; sed ex hoc non sequitur, ergo necessario volo beatitudinem, quia nullum *velle* necessario elicitur a voluntate."

³⁹ *Ibid.*, n. 5; XXI, p. 331a: "Etsi voluntas libera velit ut in pluribus beatitudinem apprehensam in universali vel particulari, quando intellectus non dubitat in illo particulari esse beatitudinem, non tamen necessario vult nec in universali nec in particulari"; *ibid.*, n. 6; XXI, p. 331b: "Dico ergo quod [voluntas] contingenter vult finem, tam in universali quam in particulari, quamvis ut in pluribus velit utrumque."

⁴⁰ *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 5; XXXVI, p. 188a: "Voluntas viatoris simpliciter contingenter tendit in illud [obiectum in quo est ratio omnis boni] etiam quando est in universali apprehensum, quia illa apprehensio non est ratio determinandi voluntatem ad necessario volendum illud; nec ipsa voluntas necessario se determinat illoposito, sicut nec necessario continuat [velle] illud positum."

⁴¹ St. Anselm, *De libero arbitrio*, c. 3; PL vol. 158, col. 494.

Bonaventure and Duns Scotus who make it their own and develop it further.⁴² The characteristic of this definition consists in stressing the fact that freedom is essentially a power of self-determination in regard to the good known by the intellect. It is a simple perfection of intelligent beings which, in Scotus' words, can obtain even when there is no possibility of choice on the part of the will.⁴³ Actually, freedom of choice is an imperfection of the human will, and God alone, who loves himself by an absolute necessity, is absolutely free.⁴⁴ In this sense Scotus can maintain that the blessed in heaven enjoy a greater degree of freedom than does *homo viator*, or man in his earthly existence, even though the blessed cannot possibly turn away from the supreme good because of a positive decree of the divine will.⁴⁵ Essentially, the will of the blessed re-

⁴² Cf. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, pars 1, dub. 2; Duns Scotus, *Ord.*, I, d. 8, n. 72; IV, pp. 185-86; *Oxon.*, II, d. 7, q. un., n. 25; XII, p. 406b; *ibid.*, n. 26; XII, p. 407a; *ibid.*, d. 44, q. un., n. 2; XIII, pp. 497b-498a.

⁴³ *Oxon.*, II, d. 44, n. 2; XIII, p. 497b: "Libertas absolute est perfectio simpliciter"; *Rep. Par.*, I, d. 10, q. 3, n. 3; XXII, p. 183b: "Necessitas agendi stat cum libertate voluntatis"; *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 9; XXVI, p. 195a: "Possible est aliquod liberum, stante libertate, necessario agere."

⁴⁴ *Ord.*, I, d. 39, Appendix A; VI, p. 417: "Prima libertas [voluntatis ad oppositos actus] habet necessario aliquam imperfectionem annexam, quia potentialitatem passivam voluntatis et mutabilitatem"; *ibid.*, p. 425: "Voluntas divina non est indifferens ad diversos actus volendi et nolendi, quia hoc in voluntate nostra non erat sine imperfectione voluntatis"; *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 8; XXVI, p. 194a: "Voluntas divina necessario vult bonitatem suam, et tamen in volendo eam est libera." To illustrate his point that in God freedom of the will is not incompatible with the absolute necessity of his nature, Scotus uses the example of a man who hurls himself from a high place, and while falling necessarily by the law of gravitation, he continues to will to fall by a free act of his will. *Ibid.*, n. 18; XXVI, p. 201ab. It should be noted, however, that in God the freedom of the will does not extend to the intrinsic constitution of the divine nature, which precedes, as it were, the act of the will. God is not God because he wills to be so, but because of an intrinsic necessity. Scotus makes this point very clear when he speaks of the relationship between intellect and will in God: "Intellectus divinus ex necessitate naturae est speculativus, et non est ad hoc formaliter libertas, licet non sit sine voluntate complacente; Deus enim necessario est sciens, non autem voluntate est sciens proprie, sicut necessitate—non voluntate—est Deus . . . libertas eius non est ad intrinseca (quae quasi praecedunt actum eius)." *Ord.*, I, d. 38, n. 9; VI, p. 306. The divine essence enjoys absolute priority over all relationships in God: "Recte ergo in divinis in comparatione ad essentiam, tanquam ad entitatem, simpliciter primam et absolutam, consideratur omnis ordo cuiuscumque, sive quorumcumque, quae in divinis sunt." *Quodl.*, q. 1, n. 3; XXV, p. 7a. For a more detailed analysis of Scotus' conception of the divine will and its misrepresentation by many theologians, both Protestant and Catholic, the reader is referred to Parthenius Minges, O.F.M., *Der Gottesbegriff des Duns Scotus auf seinen angeblich excessiven Indeterminismus geprüft* (Vienna: Mayr, 1907).

⁴⁵ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 6, n. 4; XXI, pp. 232b-233a.

mains the same as the will of the *homo viator*, for the attainment of the end does not change the nature of the faculty attaining it but only increases the degree of intensity of its acts.⁴⁶ Thus the act by which the blessed love God remains a contingent act and not a necessary one, just as God does not necessarily have to reveal himself to them.⁴⁷ Yet the blessed in heaven feel such an attraction towards God clearly seen in the beatific vision that they love him by what may be called moral necessity or necessity *secundum quid*. This becomes for them like a second nature and is similar to the natural tendency by which stones and metals tend to the center of the earth.⁴⁸

As to the question why stones and metals tend to the earth by an intrinsic necessity and will tends to its end freely, Scotus answers that they are different types of beings and have therefore different natures. Beyond this, he adds, we can say nothing.⁴⁹ Likewise, there is no real answer to the question as to the way in which freedom and necessity can be reconciled for, as Aristotle says, no reason should be asked of those things which admit of no reason, just as a demonstration of a principle is no demonstration. Hence the divine will wills of necessity divine goodness, because it is such a will and such is divine goodness; the divine will wills contingently the goodness of other things, because such is the nature of the divine will and such is the nature of the goodness of other things. All we can say is that the infinite will necessarily loves an infinite object because this is a perfection, but it cannot love neces-

⁴⁶ *Ord.*, I, d. 1, n. 136; II, p. 91: "Voluntas autem habens eandem caritatem quam modo habet [per visionem Dei], prius contingenter eliciebat actum fruendi, ergo modo non necessario elicit actum illum, cum nulla sit facta mutatio ex parte eius"; *ibid.*, n. 138; II, p. 93: "Diversa approximatio passi ad agens non causat necessitatem sed tantum intensiorem actionem."

⁴⁷ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 6, n. 9; XXI, pp. 187b-188a: "Illa necessitas videndi [Deum clare visum] est simpliciter necessitas, sed tantummodo necessitas si obiectum praesens moveat; et istud est sic mere contingens, quia obiectum istud voluntarie et contingenter movet quemcumque intellectum creatum; sed etiam voluntas contingenter fruitur illo viso contingenter." In this sense Scotus can say that absolutely speaking the blessed in heaven, as well as the angels, still retain the capacity to sin. This is merely a physical and remote capacity which they will never use, since they are made impeccable by the preserving action of God, a free gift like beatitude itself. *Ibid.*, n. 15; XXI, pp. 233b-234a. In traditional scholastic terms, Scotus says that the blessed in heaven cannot sin *in sensu composito* but could sin *in sensu diviso*, i.e., if the grace of God would not prevent them—which of course will never be the case. *Ibid.*, n. 11; XXI, p. 229a.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 9; XXI, p. 188ab.

⁴⁹ *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 16; XXVI, p. 199a.

sarily an object that is not infinite because this is an imperfection.⁵⁰

From the foregoing discussion it should be clear that the Scotistic notion of freedom is quite different from the Thomistic concept of it. While both Thomas and Scotus hold that freedom is a simple perfection, at least as far as the power of choosing the good is concerned, Thomas maintains that freedom is essentially freedom of choice or contradiction;⁵¹ Scotus, on the other hand, asserts that choice is not of the essence of freedom but rather a mark of imperfection. Thus, according to Aquinas, when no choice is possible between acting or not acting, acting one way or another, freedom ceases to exist, since for him freedom and necessity are two contradictory terms. On this premise it is of course meaningless to speak of freedom of will as regards happiness or good in general, since everyone wants to be happy. This is even more true in regard to the blessed in heaven who have no choice but to love God. Furthermore, it would be outrageous to attribute such a freedom to God's love of himself, since God's self-love is just as necessary as his own essence.

While Scotus agrees with Thomas on this last score, since he never thinks for a moment of denying the intrinsic necessity of God's self-love, he still maintains that God is absolutely and essentially free even in regard to his operations *ad intra*, for in his understanding of the terms, freedom and necessity are not contradictory of one another. The contradiction obtains rather between a *natural* principle and a *free* principle, since the former is necessarily determined, while the latter is self-determining. This self-determination may be either by an intrinsic necessity or contingently. In the first case we have essential freedom or freedom of dominion; in the second case we have freedom of contingency, inasmuch as there is a possibility of choice between acting or nonacting, acting one way or another. As can be readily seen, this latter coincides with the only type of freedom admitted by the Thomistic school.⁵² To state it in more simple terms, freedom is for Scotus like a genus containing two distinct species, essential freedom and freedom of contingency. For St. Thomas

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, n. 9; XXVI, p. 195b.

⁵¹ St. Thomas, *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 83, a. 4 c: "Voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una"; *ibid.*, a. 3 c: "Proprium liberi arbitrii est electio: ex hoc enim liberi arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere."

⁵² *Oxon.*, III, d. 17, q. un., n. 3; XIV, p. 654ab; *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 43, q. 4, n. 2; XXIV, pp. 520b-521a; *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 15; XXVI, pp. 198b-199ab.

there is no such thing as essential freedom, for freedom does not belong to the essence of will and means simply freedom of choice or of contradiction. It becomes clear then that to judge the Scotistic doctrine on freedom from purely Thomistic premises, as is often done by ill-informed historians and manualists, is just as wrong and unfair as to evaluate St. Thomas' teaching from the exclusive viewpoint of Scotistic principles. The two schoolmen speak different languages and each one must be interpreted according to the principles of his own teaching.

INTELLECT AND WILL

Scotus' teaching on the nature of the will has a definite bearing on the issue of the relationship between intellect and will. When Peter Lombard defined *liberum arbitrium* as a faculty of reason and will,⁵³ his medieval commentators began to speculate on the specific role that reason and will play in man's free act. While they all agree in saying that the term *arbitrium* suggests a judgment of reason and the qualification of *liberum* refers to a decision of the will, they are not of one opinion as to the intrinsic relationship between the two faculties in the performance of a free act. This question concerns the very root or proximate cause of freedom, which for the intellectualists is to be placed in reason, while for the voluntarists it resides in the will. If freedom is essentially freedom of choice and powers are distinguished chiefly by their acts and objects, as the intellectualists maintain, it is only logical to admit that the root of freedom lies in the nature of the objects known and in the activity of the intellect. Thus the objective indifference of the judgment of the mind in regard to particular goods becomes, both in the psychological and the ontological orders, the proximate cause and the root of freedom.⁵⁴ But if freedom is not merely freedom of choice and faculties are distinguished through their specifically different entities, as the voluntarists and Duns Scotus in particular contend, then the root of freedom must be placed in the will. In this latter case the will,

⁵³ *IV Sent.*, l. 2, d. 24, n. 5; PL vol. 192, col. 702: "Liberum . . . arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis."

⁵⁴ St. Thomas expresses this doctrine in *Sum. theol.*, I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad. 2, where he states: "Radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio."

as a self-determining power, remains essentially free even in regard to the last practical judgment of the intellect. The exact nature of the relationship between intellect and will is therefore to be investigated in the light of Duns Scotus' principles. This will give us a further insight into his notion of freedom as a specific characteristic of human acts.

Scotus is well aware of the difficulty inherent to the problem under consideration. As a rational appetite, the will cannot simply follow the dictate of intellect. This would be the destruction of human freedom, since by its nature the intellect is not free. On the other hand, the will must be intellectually aware of its decisions, and this awareness is only possible through an act of the intellect. Knowledge on the intellectual level is in effect an exclusive act of the intellect. To hold, as many scholastic manualists do, that will is a blind faculty and the last practical judgment of the intellect is sufficient to safeguard the rational nature of its decisions as well as its freedom, is no solution to the problem. In such a case, it is the intellect that is responsible for the will's decisions, not the will. Nor is it enough, in order to preserve the freedom of human acts, to say that the will has the power to direct the intellect to the consideration of any particular object, including that of the last practical judgment. Apart from the fact that this seems to involve a vicious circle, inasmuch as intellect determines will, and will in turn determines intellect, we can further ask, How is the will going to direct the intellect except by another practical judgment determining it to do so? This would lead to an infinite regress, and we would never escape some sort of determinism. This is precisely what Scotus wants to avoid. Besides, it must be frankly admitted that the will as a blind faculty is a pure abstraction of our mind; in practice the will never acts blindly. To harmonize the rational nature and essential freedom of the will is the task Scotus imposes upon himself.

For Scotus, it is worth recalling, intellect and will are not really distinct powers, nor are they really distinct from the soul. They are rather virtual parts of the soul from which they are only formally distinct. The essential identity of the soul and its powers helps us to understand why intellect and will are so closely related to one another that they are mutually dependent in their activity.⁵⁵ It also explains why their acts are received

⁵⁵ *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 45, q. 2, n. 9; XXIV, p. 560b: "Fundantur enim

immediately into the essence of the soul, although by nature the act of intellect precedes the act of will.⁵⁶ The entitative order existing between the two higher powers of the soul makes it impossible for will to act without a preceding act of intellect.⁵⁷ Thus the old scholastic maxim, *nihil volitum quin praecognitum*, is fully endorsed by the Subtle Doctor.⁵⁸

Knowledge is not only a necessary requirement for the act of will, but the object known carries a certain weight in the will's decisions by inclining it either towards or against it.⁵⁹ The good, as previously stated, has a natural appeal to the will in proportion to its entity. This is also true of the intelligible, the good of the intellect, which has therefore a natural tendency to draw the will's assent to it, especially when this takes the form of a last practical judgment or the last dictate of practical reason. This, Scotus affirms, the will can abandon but not without difficulty.⁶⁰

Clearly Scotus is neither an irrationalist nor an indeterminist. The charges that in his system the will makes purely arbitrary decisions without any reference to the judgments of intellect are absolutely groundless. His critics fail to consider the many texts in which Scotus shows the will's natural dependence on intellect, and misinterpret his statements on the will as a self-determining power. Self-determination, it is worth emphasizing, is not the same as arbitrary determination, and much less as lack of determination. Self-determination means simply that the will is free in its deci-

[potentiae] in eodem *esse* animae ut partes virtuales, et ideo ad operationem perfectam alicuius potentiae concurrunt coagendo circa idem obiectum, quia quaelibet nata est intendere actum alterius propter concomitantiam earum naturalem."

⁵⁶ *Oxon.*, II, d. 16, q. un., n. 8; XIII, p. 17b: "Immediate intelligere et velle in eodem susceptivo recipiuntur, scilicet in essentia animae"; *ibid.*, d. 25, q. un., n. 19; XIII, p. 212b: "Volitio est effectus posterior intellectione naturaliter."

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*: "Propter illum ordinem necessarium [inter intellectionem et volitionem] non potest causari volitio a voluntate, nisi prius causetur ab intellectu intellectio."

⁵⁸ *Oxon.*, II, d. 1, q. 1, n. 23; XI, p. 44b. See also *ibid.*, d. 42, q. 2, n. 3; XIII, p. 451a: "Omnis volitio requirit necessario intellectionem naturaliter priorem, licet simul duratione."

⁵⁹ *Collationes*, XVI, n. 3; V, p. 209b: "Impressio facta ab obiecto in voluntate est pondus et inclinatio."

⁶⁰ *Oxon.*, II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 8; XII, p. 354a: "Voluntas . . . in quantum est mere appetitus intellectivus, summe inclinaretur actualiter ad optimum intelligibile, sicut est de optimo visibili; tamen in quantum libera est, potest se refraenare in eliciendo actum, ne sequatur istam inclinationem"; *Rep. Par.*, II, d. 39, q. 2, n. 5; XXIII, p. 205a: "Difficile est voluntatem non inclinari ad id quod est dictatum a ratione practica ultimatim, non tamen est impossibile."

sions, since freedom is part of its nature. Far from doing away with knowledge or motivation, it presupposes it.⁶¹ The precise role played by knowledge, and hence intellect, in the act of the will, is what remains to be seen.

Scotus devotes an entire question of his commentary on the *Sentences* to the problem of whether something other than will is the effective cause of volition. There he mentions the opinion of a "modern doctor" (Godfrey of Fontaines) according to whom the effective cause determining the act of the will is the phantasm. The principal reason given is that the mover and the moved must be located in two distinct subjects. Since will is an intellectual appetite, the cause that sets it in motion must be found outside the intellectual soul, and this can only be the object present in the phantasm. Another opinion, which Scotus attributes to an "older doctor" (St. Thomas Aquinas), is that the moving cause of the will is the object known by the intellect, just as in sensation it is the appetible object that moves the sensitive appetite. These two opinions have this in common, that they both hold the will to be moved by an extrinsic agent, although they do not agree on the specific nature of this agent. Scotus rejects both opinions and contends that the object, whether present in the phantasm or in the intellect, cannot be the efficient cause of volition.⁶²

⁶¹ For a defense of Duns Scotus from the charges that have just been mentioned cf. Parthenius Minges, O.F.M., *Ist Duns Scotus Indeterminist?* (Münster in W.: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1905). See also Ephrem Longpré, *La philosophie du B. Duns Scot* (Paris: Société et Librairie St. François d'Assise, 1924), pp. 194-227.

⁶² *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un.; XIII, pp. 196ff: "Utrum aliquid aliud a voluntate causet effective actum volendi in voluntate?" See also *Rep. Par.*, II, d. 25, q. un.; XXIII, pp. 117ff: "Utrum aliud a voluntate causat actum eius effective?" In his *Scholia* preceding Scotus' text of the *Opus Oxoniense*, as well as in the marginal notes, Cavellus identifies the *doctor modernus* with Godfrey of Fontaines, a contemporary of Duns Scotus, and the *doctor antiquior* with Henry of Ghent and refers to some specific questions of their *Quodlibeta*. Parthenius Minges follows Cavellus on this score but gives no references to the *Quodlibeta* or any other work of the two doctors (Cf. *Ioannis Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica*, Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1930, I, 343-44). After careful reading of the pertinent questions referred to by Cavellus, the present writer has been unable to find in the *Quodlibeta* of Godfrey of Fontaines any specific text to the effect that the phantasm as such is the moving cause of the act of the will. Godfrey always speaks of the object as the efficient cause of the act of the will. He writes: "Non videtur ergo esse negandum quin voluntas vere ab obiecto moveatur quantum ad actus volitionis." *Quodlibetum sextum*, q. 7, in *Les philosophes belges*, ed. by M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, 1914), III, 159. Also: "Sed illud magis est ad nostrum propositum, scilicet ad ostendendum quod voluntas non

A natural agent, Scotus argues, cannot by itself be the cause of contrary acts in one and the same subject, for by its nature it is determined to produce one effect only. But our will has the power to produce contrary acts as regards the one and the same object; it can either accept it or reject it. Hence the object, as a natural agent, cannot be the cause of volition.⁶³ The major premise of this argument can be illustrated by the following example hinted at by Scotus and his commentators. If a natural cause could produce two opposite effects, such as heat and cold, it would produce none at all or it would produce both at one and the same time. There is no reason, in fact, why it should produce only one effect and not the other, since it would be equally determined to both of them.

moveat se, sed quod moveatur ab obiecto apprehenso, quia bonum secundum quod apprehensum movet voluntatem vel ad actum volitionis ut hoc dicitur secundum rationem causae efficientis, licet secundum quod est in se ipso moveat in ratione finis." *Ibid.*, p. 164. Again: "Unaquaeque potentia determinatur ad actum suum per se et directe solum ab obiecto, quod scilicet determinat actum cui dat formam et speciem. Et sic universaliter actus intellectus per se determinatur ab obiecto intelligibili et actus appetitus ab obiecto appetibili secundum rationem causae moventis et agentis." *Ibid.*, p. 221. However, Godfrey makes it clear that although the act of the intellect precedes by nature the act of the will, the object moves both intellect and will at one and the same time, since the two faculties are rooted in the same soul. "Est dicendum quod voluntas proprie et per se non movet intellectum nec e converso, sed obiectum quod intellectum movet ad actum intellectionis movet etiam voluntatem ad actum volitionis. Unde, pro tanto intellectus movet voluntatem in quantum voluntas non fit in actu a suo obiecto nisi natura saltem prius intellectus factus sit in actu ab eodem obiecto. Unde unum et idem obiectum secundum rem efficit duplicem actionem ordine naturae, tamen prius unam quam alteram, sed simul tempore in eodem subiecto, id est in anima ratione dictarum eius potentiarum, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis." *Ibid.*, p. 170. Hence Scotus' presentation of Godfrey's view can be said to be substantially correct, since it is only through the phantasm that the object can move intellect and will. For an analysis of Godfrey's teaching on the role that the object plays in the act of the will cf. D. O. Lottin, "Le libre arbitre chez Godefroid de Fontaines," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie*, 40 (1937), 213-41.

As to Henry of Ghent, he denies explicitly that the intellect is the moving cause of the will. The intellect is only a necessary condition for the act of the will. He writes: "Voluntas quantumcumque inclinatur ab intellectu, libere potest huiusmodi inclinationi contraire et non moveri in id ad quod intellectus inclinatur: immo si movetur et fertur in illud volendo, hoc libere facit et sua propria virtute . . . quia voluntas respectu suiipsius habet vim motivam per se, et movet se per se: mota autem a se non ab alio, movet alia a se: intellectum autem praesupponit voluntas sicut causam sine qua non tantummodo" (italics ours). Henricus Gandavensis, *Quodlibeta* (Paris, 1518), quodl. XI, q. 6, fo. 455 BC. The *doctor antiquior* to which Scotus refers is most likely St. Thomas Aquinas, who is known to have held the view that the intellect is the moving cause of the will.

⁶³ *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 6; XIII, p. 201a.

But since contrary effects, such as heat and cold, cannot exist together without contradiction, so a natural agent cannot produce two opposite effects but only that to which it is determined by nature.

A second argument against the aforesaid opinions is this. Whenever an act is received only passively, it must be attributed to the agent rather than to the recipient. Hence, if the object is the effective cause of volition, the latter will not be under the will's control, nor will be any other act commanded by the will. Thus all distinction between good and evil acts disappears.⁶⁴

These arguments, it is hardly necessary to remark, rest on the assumption that for the upholders of the two preceding views the object is the total cause of volition, a psychological determinism to which neither Godfrey nor Aquinas would subscribe. Yet it must be admitted that some of their expressions tend to overemphasize the role that the object plays in volition at the expense of the act of the will proper. Thus, to mention only St. Thomas, he states that "the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended."⁶⁵ Moreover, he quotes Aristotle's *De anima* and *Metaphysica* to the effect that "the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a moved mover."⁶⁶ It is statements of this kind that provoked the criticism of the Subtle Doctor, who is more concerned about the consequences they might lead to than the actual intention of their authors.

Answering more directly the reason underlying the view of the "modern doctor," Scotus says that the principle that the mover and the moved must be distinct as to their subjects cannot be applied to spiritual substances. Indeed, he adds, even "another doctor"—he refers here to St. Thomas Aquinas—admits that the will can be moved by the object apprehended by the intellect, despite the fact that both intellect and will are powers of one and the same soul. Moreover—and here Scotus goes beyond St. Thomas—the mover and the moved not only need not be distinct as to their subjects, but one and the same thing can at the same time move and be

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 80, a. 2, Resp.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* Cf. Aristotle's *De anima*, III, 10 (433a 13-26); *Metaph.*, XII, 7 (1072a 26).

moved. It can be in virtual act with regard to a certain perfection and in potency to the formal act of this same perfection.⁶⁷

As to the comparison between the motion of the appetible object in sensation and the motion of the object known by the intellect in volition, which is used by the "older doctor" to support his opinion, Scotus retorts that the analogy, far from supporting that view, is a further proof of his own theory. In fact, the appetible object can move the sensitive appetite precisely because the latter is not free. The intellective appetite, on the contrary, is free, and hence it cannot be moved by the object as by its effective cause. In the words of St. John Damascene, *sensitivus ducitur et non ducit, sed intellectivus ducit et non ducitur.*⁶⁸

Scotus concludes his long discussion, of which only the major points have been highlighted in this study, with the following statement: *Dico ergo ad quaestionem quod nihil aliud a voluntate est causa totalis volitionis in voluntate.*⁶⁹ This passage, which we have quoted in its original Latin text because of its importance, is somewhat ambiguous. It may mean that nothing but the will is the total cause of volition, and it may also mean that nothing that is extraneous to the will is the total cause of volition.⁷⁰ The first interpretation is the most widely accepted and seems to be more in keeping with recent findings, as we shall see presently; however, the second interpretation is not without some textual evidence. Scotus' statement comes as a conclusion to his arguments against those who, in his opinion, contend that will is merely a passive power and must be moved by an extrinsic agent in order to act. In such a case the object present in the phantasm or in the intellect becomes the determining cause—Scotus calls it the total cause—of the act of

⁶⁷ *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., nn. 12-15; XIII, pp. 207b-209b. For a further explanation of Scotus' teaching on this point cf. Roy R. Effler, O.F.M., *John Duns Scotus and the Principle "Omne quod movetur ad alio movetur"* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1962), pp. 52-97.

⁶⁸ *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 21; XIII, p. 220b. St. John Damascene's text is contained substantially but not literally in his *De fide orthodoxa*, Book 2, chaps. 22 and 23.

⁶⁹ *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 22; XIII, p. 221b. See also *Rep. Par.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 20; XXIII, p. 127b: "Dico igitur ad quaestionem, quod nihil creatum aliud a voluntate est causa totalis actus volendi in voluntate."

⁷⁰ The first interpretation has been followed, among others, by Étienne Gilson in his *Jean Duns Scot. Introduction à ses positions fondamentales* (Paris: Vrin, 1952), p. 590, n. 2. Ephrem Longpré follows the second interpretation. Cf. his work, *La philosophie du B. Duns Scot*, p. 221.

the will.⁷¹ This is the view that Scotus wants to condemn. In so doing, he does not necessarily imply that the object has no part in volition. In fact, he adds in the same context, that if one wishes to maintain that the object moves the will effectively but not as a total cause, then he would go along with such a view and even claim Aristotle's authority to its support.⁷² Moreover, Lychetus' commentary on the foregoing texts makes it clear that Scotus' teaching does not rule out the possibility for the object known to be called partial cause of volition, even though the Subtle Doctor does not state this explicitly.⁷³ What Scotus does say, is that the object is either a *causa sine qua non* of the act of the will or a cause that moves the will effectively but only *per accidens*, inasmuch as its presence is a necessary condition for the will to act but has no direct bearing on the will as a free power.⁷⁴

Thus, throughout the entire question it appears that Scotus is chiefly concerned with saving the will from any interference that might jeopardize its freedom. In this sense one may say that the

⁷¹ When arguing against the *doctor modernus*, Scotus prefaces his answer with these words: "Contra primam opinionem arguitur specialiter: Si phantasma est causa totalis et aequivoca intellectionis et volitionis etc." *Rep. Par.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 9; XXIII, p. 121a.

⁷² *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 24; XIII, p. 223a: "Qui diceret quod obiectum movet voluntatem effective, non tamen ut totalis causa, sed ut aliquid ibi faciens, tunc non esset glossanda auctoritas, quod movet, scilicet metaphorice, et tunc auctoritas esset pro me." And even more clearly in *Rep. Par.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 21; XXIII, p. 128b: ". . . sustinendo quod obiectum movet effective voluntatem, non tamen est causa totalis, tunc auctoritas Aristotelis est pro me." See also *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 49, q. 2, n. 14; XXIV, p. 626b, where it is stated that the intellect is a partial cause of volition: "Est igitur [intellectus] causa partialis [volitionis]."

⁷³ *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., Commentarius, n. 20; XIII, p. 225b: "Dico ergo ad quaestionem etc. Hic Doctor vult expresse quod nihil aliud a voluntate sit causa totalis ipsius volitionis, sed non negat expresse quin aliquid aliud possit esse causa partialis, et probat quod voluntas est causa volitionis saltem partialis"; *ibid.*, n. 22, p. 226a: "Ad primum principale etc. Nunc Doctor respondet ad argumentum, primo dicit sustinendo quod obiectum cognitum sit causa partialis volitionis, quod auctoritas Aristotelis sic debet intelligi, quod appetibile extra tantum movet partialiter, id est, est causa partialis volitionis, quod est rationabilius."

⁷⁴ *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 21; XIII, p. 220ab: "Si sustineatur quod obiectum movet potentiam obiective, licet non sit causa totalis, potest tunc sustineri quod . . . intra movet ut efficiens et extra ut finis. Sustinendo tamen quod sit tantum causa sine qua non, et nullo modo movens effective, tunc oportet glossare quod non movet effective per se, sed per accidens." See also *ibid.*, n. 19; XIII, p. 212b; "Unde est quod phantasiatio vel obiectum apprehensum requiritur ad hoc quod sit volitio, non tamen requiritur nisi sicut causa sine qua non."

will is totally responsible for its own acts.⁷⁵ However, since a rational appetite cannot act blindly, the object known plays a definite and necessary role in the act of the will considered in its totality, or in its entire complexity as a rational decision.⁷⁶ In this latter sense the object may be called *causa sine qua non* or *causa per accidens*, and even a partial cause of volition. Followers of the first interpretation of the Latin text above mentioned would disagree with this last connotation.

We have expounded at considerable length the content of distinction 25 of the second book of Scotus' commentary on the *Sentences* because it is there that the Subtle Doctor specifically takes up the question of the relationship between intellect and will in the act of volition. The conclusion reached at the end of the study of all the pertinent texts does not seem to be completely satisfactory and is likely to raise many questions in view of apparently conflicting passages in the *Opus Oxoniense* itself and in other of Scotus' works. Does such a conclusion, unsatisfactory as it may be, represent Scotus' final word on the subject? If one considers that the *Opus Oxoniense* is his definitive work, he may be inclined to believe so. However, this is not the case.

The eminent scholar, Father Charles Balić, has proved that distinction 25 of the second book of the *Ordinatio* does not contain Scotus' teaching at Oxford but rather his lectures at Paris. Distinction 25, along with eleven others in the same book, i.e., d. 12 and dd. 15-24, was introduced later into the *Ordinatio* from the *Additiones magnae* of William of Alnwick, a Scotus disciple, in order to fill the gap left by the master who had omitted it entirely. The *Additiones magnae* are for the most part reports of Scotus' lectures at Paris, although they also contain sections from the *Lectura*

⁷⁵ This seems to be the meaning of Lychetus' pertinent observation: "[Doctor] quaerit istam libertatem voluntatis salvare, quod si obiectum cognitum esset causa partialis illius, non posset ita salvari sua libertas." *Oxon.*, II, d. 25, q. un., Commentarius, n. 18; XIII, p. 221a. This statement should not be construed as meaning that the object known can in no way be called a partial cause of volition taken in its totality, i.e., as an all-embracing rational decision, and not merely in its formal aspect as a free act. Otherwise Lychetus' previous statements quoted above in n. 73 would be meaningless and even contradictory.

⁷⁶ Scotus alludes to the act of the will taken in this sense when, speaking of the will as an indeterminate cause, he writes: "Alia est causa indeterminata, quae est causa completa potens se determinare ad unum istorum, et ita est rationalis complexa, ut voluntas cum intellectu, et hoc necesse est dicere, si aliquid sit contingens" (italics ours). *Rep. Par.*, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 23; XXIII, p. 129b.

Oxoniensis. They are very valuable, not only because of the close relationship between their author and the Subtle Doctor, but also because of the helpful remarks which accompany the text.⁷⁷ Thus, as far as our question is concerned, namely, whether something other than the will is the effective cause of volition, William of Alnwick reports in the *Additiones magnae* first Scotus' teaching from the *Lectura Parisiensis* that the will is the *total cause* of volition and the object known is only a *causa sine qua non*, then he remarks that Scotus refuted this opinion in many ways at Oxford and gives his master's arguments to this effect.⁷⁸

In concluding the arguments and shortly before resuming the report from the *Lectura Parisiensis*, he makes the further observation that Scotus taught differently at Oxford than he had at Paris.⁷⁹ The content of a pertinent question from the *Secundae additiones*, which has been published for the first time by Father Balić and is attributed by him to Duns Scotus, seems to support William of Alnwick's statement. In fact, Scotus takes there the same position

⁷⁷ For a more detailed information on the findings of Father Balić, especially in regard to the topic of our discussion, see the following studies by the eminent scholar: *Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences* (Louvain: Bureaux de la Revue, 1927), pp. 92-134; 264-301; "Circa positiones fundamentales I. Duns Scoti," *Antonianum*, 28 (1953), 286-90; "Tubilaeum Commissionis Scotisticae: Commemorativus sermo P. Caroli Balić," *Acta Ordinis Fratrum Minorum*, 83 (May-June, 1964), 315-23.

⁷⁸ Balić, *Les commentaires*, pp. 276-77: "Notandum quod secundum hanc opinionem, quae ponit voluntatem esse totam causam activam volitionis et obiectum non esse causam eius nec cognitio obiecti, sed quod obiectum requiritur ut causa sine qua non, cognitio vero per amotionem sive solutionem impediti, quia cognitio unius obiecti impedit ne aliud non cognitum possit appeti et ideo voluntas removet impedimentum imperando [intellectui] ad cognoscendum sive considerandum aliud obiectum, hanc—inquam—opinionem [Scotus] multipliciter Oxoniae improbavit . . ." This statement of William of Alnwick has been checked against Balić's more recent presentation of it in *Acta Ordinis Fratrum Minorum*, art. cit., p. 318.

⁷⁹ Balić, *Les commentaires*, p. 282: "Ideo et aliter dixit Oxonie ad quaestionem." Concerning the structure of the question, "Utrum aliquid aliud a voluntate causet effective actum volendi in voluntate," as reported in the *Additiones magnae* of William of Alnwick and published for the first time in *Les commentaires*, pp. 264-301, Father Balić has this to say: "Itaque tres quaestiones de eadem materia a Guilelmo de Alnwick, ex *Lectura Parisiensi* et *Oxoniensi* extractae afferuntur: prima, ut videtur Parisiis habita, quae ponitur pagina 265-276; deinde venit extractum ex *Lectura Oxoniensi* (pp. 277-286); tertia, indicata tamquam alia questio Parisiensis (pp. 286-301). Dubium ponitur utrum quae in secunda quaestione ponuntur de modo concurrenti obiecti et voluntatis (pp. 282-285) sint fideliter ab Alnwick reproducta ex *Lectura Oxoniensi* an modo proprio exposita: nam in commentario inedito in *II Sententiarum*, in quo praelectiones *Oxoniensis* inveniuntur, eadem expressiones non leguntur." *Antonianum*, art. cit., p. 287, n. 2.

in regard to the relationship between intellect and will that William ascribes to him as a lecturer at Oxford.⁸⁰ There is, therefore, good ground for believing that Scotus' approach to the problem under discussion underwent a certain evolution which reached its final stage during his teaching at Oxford but never took concrete shape in the *Ordinatio* because his untimely death prevented him from carrying out his project.⁸¹

Having seen the first phase of Scotus' approach to the problem as represented by the *Lectura Parisiensis*, we shall now investigate his teaching at Oxford by making use of the *Additiones magnae*, the *Secundae additiones*, and some scattered passages from the *Opus Oxoniense* other than those contained in distinction 25 of the second book which, as stated above, does not really belong there. The section of question III of William of Alnwick's *Additiones magnae*, where Scotus' teaching at Oxford is reported, is to some extent the reverse of the preceding section taken from the *Lectura Parisiensis*.⁸² Indeed, in section two Scotus refutes one by one all the arguments favoring the doctrine that the will is the total cause of volition and the object known is only its *causa sine qua non*, a doctrine that he himself had apparently embraced at one time. We shall follow him in his reasoning.

When agent and recipient are in close contact and no obstacle is in their way, action follows necessarily in the case of natural principles, and can follow at all times if the agent is free. Hence if the will were the total active cause of volition, just as it is its total re-

⁸⁰ Cf. P. Ch. Balić, "Une question inédite de J. Duns Scot sur la volonté," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 3 (1931), 191-208.

⁸¹ That Scotus intended to include distinction 25 in his second book of the *Ordinatio* and defend what seems to be his new approach to the problem of the relationship between intellect and will, is evident from his statement in *Opus Oxoniense*, II, d. 7, q. un., n. 15; XII, p. 392a: "Voluntas quidem respectu rectae volitionis est principium activum *partiale*, sicut tactum fuit distinctione 17 primi, et tangetur infra distinctione 25" (italics ours).

⁸² The different teaching in the two sections had already been noticed by a reader of the codex *Veronensis* (210) who inserted the following note on the margin of question 25: "Nota quod ista quaestio, scilicet 'Notandum' etc., non debet esse in isto libro, sed fuit addita a cancellario vel ab aliis; et verum est quod est in alia *Lectura* [i.e., *Oxoniensi*], et fuit extracta; et tenebat oppositum istius quod tenet hic." This reader, observes Father Balić, did not know that both the "Notandum" and the preceding question had been extracted from the *Additiones magnae* of William of Alnwick who had taken the question from the *Reportatio Parisiensis* of the codex Patavinus and inserted it, along with the "Notandum," in the *Additiones magnae* immediately before the report from the *Lectura Oxoniensis*. Cf. Balić, "Tubilaeum Commissionis Scotisticae," *Acta Ordinis Fratrum Minorum*, p. 319.

ceptive cause, one must say that, as long as it is not impeded, it can always act, even if no object is present. This, Scotus asserts, is certainly not the case.⁸³ To the objection that when no object is present the will is by that very fact prevented from acting, so that the object known is a necessary condition for the will's activity rather than its effective cause, Scotus retorts that this line of reasoning is faulty for it rests on a false assumption. In fact, one could equally well say that a wood is the total cause of its own calefaction, and that every natural recipient is the total cause of the act it receives, for in these cases the relationship between agent and recipient is the same as that between the object known and will in the act of volition. But since this is evidently wrong, so it is also wrong to affirm that the object known is merely the *causa sine qua non* of volition.⁸⁴

It is commonly admitted, Scotus argues further, that the four metaphysical causes are sufficient for the production of all effects. If a fifth cause is introduced, such as the *causa sine qua non*, then one must choose between these two alternatives: either the doctrine of the four causes is wrong, or the so-called fifth cause must be reduced to one of the four causes. Since the first alternative is unacceptable, one must say that the *causa sine qua non* is not a cause in its own right but is reducible to one of the four causes. Besides, Scotus adds, nowhere in the world is there such a thing as a *causa sine qua non* which is absolutely necessary for the action of an agent and at the same time has no causal relationship to it.⁸⁵

Again, if the object is merely a *causa sine qua non* of volition, then the act of the will does no more receive its formal specification from the object and all volitions are of the same kind, for they would proceed from one and the same total cause. This no one can accept. Nor can it be rebutted that the will is a universally active cause which of itself is capable of specifically different acts, just as the sun can by its own power produce specifically different effects. To hold this is tantamount to saying that the will has an infinite power. Indeed, since there is no limit to the power of God in producing new species, it takes an infinite power to perform as many acts of volition as new species are, or can be brought, in existence.⁸⁶

In conclusion, since a free agent can only act on something that

⁸³ Balić, *Les commentaires*, p. 277.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 278. See also *Ord.*, d. 3, n. 415; III, p. 252.

⁸⁶ Balić, *Les commentaires*, pp. 279-80.

is previously known, knowledge is not merely an accidental requirement for the act of the will, but it exerts on it a real causality.⁸⁷ Hence volition is *per se* from the will as an active cause and from the object known as its partial cause, in such wise that the total cause of volition includes intellect in its first and second act, will in its first act, and the object.⁸⁸

The same teaching can be gathered from the pertinent question of the *Secundae additiones* which is conducted in a slightly different manner from the preceding one but reflects also Scotus' position at Oxford. The question asks, whether the act of the will is caused in the will by the object moving it or by the will moving itself.⁸⁹ Taking a stand between two extreme positions, one maintaining that the only effective cause of volition is the object (Godfrey of Fontaines), and the other that such an effective cause is the will (Henry of Ghent), Scotus asserts that both object and will concur in the volitional act. Volition is thus from both of them as from its effective cause.⁹⁰

Having made clear his position on the question concerning the effective cause of volition, Scotus pursues his inquiry further and takes up the problem of the specific contribution that each of the partial causes brings to the act of the will considered in its totality. Skillful analyst that he is, he paves the way for his solution by distinguishing three ways in which partial causes may concur in the production of an effect. They may concur on an equal basis and independently of one another, like two men pulling the same

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 281-82: ". . . non agit aliquid libere per se nisi circa per se cognitum, igitur cognoscere non est per accidens requisitum ad velle; habebit ergo aliquam causalitatem per se in eliciendo actum." It is precisely at this place that William of Alnwick makes the remark, "*Ideo et aliter dixit Oxonie ad quaestionem.*"

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 282: ". . . volitio est per se a voluntate, ut a causa activa, et ab obiecto intellecto ut ab alia causa partiali, ita quod totalis causa volitionis includit intellectum in actu primo et secundo, voluntatem in actu primo [other codices read "in actu secundo"] et obiectum."

⁸⁹ Balić, *Une question inédite*, p. 192: "Circa libertatem voluntatis quaero, an actus voluntatis causetur in voluntate ab obiecto movente ipsam vel a voluntate movente seipsam."

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 202: "Respondeo igitur ad quaestionem, quod causa effectiva actus volendi non est tantum obiectum, ut phantasma, quia hoc nullo modo salvat libertatem, prout ponit prima opinio, nec etiam causa effectiva actus volendi est tantum voluntas, quemadmodum ponit secunda extrema, quia tunc non possunt salvari omnes conditiones quae consequuntur actum volendi, ut ostensum est. Ideo teneo viam mediam, quod tam voluntas quam obiectum concurrat ad causandum actum volendi, ita quod *actus volendi est a voluntate et ab obiecto cognito ut a causa effectiva*" (italics ours).

boat. Such causes are only accidentally related to one another and their concurrence can be eliminated by increasing the efficiency of one of them. A very strong man can pull a boat that takes the combined effort of two ordinary men. Partial causes may also concur in such a way that one cause depends on the other for its causation, so that between them there is an essential relationship as between inferior and superior causes. Thus the cue moves the ball only to the extent that it is moved by the hand, since the cue cannot of itself be the cause of motion in another body. There is a third way in which partial causes may concur in the production of an effect, and that is when each cause is a cause in its own right and yet one is the principal agent and the other, although equally necessary and indispensable, is somehow subordinated to it. A typical example is the process of generation, where father and mother concur as partial causes in the production of offspring, each one bringing his own distinct but necessary contribution in such wise that while the father may be called the principal agent, both father and mother preserve their relative independence.⁹¹

Applying these principles to the case under study, Scotus says that in volition collaboration between the object known and the will must be placed in this third type of concurrence. Both object and will are essentially related to one another, inasmuch as neither of them can act without the other, and yet each one is in itself a perfect cause and relatively independent as to the specific nature of its causality. The total causation of the act of the will is thus from the intellect, the object known, and the will as partial causes. But since the act is posited freely, and freedom belongs to will as the power that can act or not act, as well as dispose of the other causes for the production of the effect, will must be called the principal cause (*causa principalior*) of volition.⁹² This teaching is fur-

⁹¹ Balić, *Les commentaires*, p. 282; The same, *Une question inédite*, pp. 202-203; *Ord.*, I, d. 3, n. 496; III, pp. 293-94.

⁹² Balić, *Les commentaires*, pp. 282-83; The same, *Une question inédite*, p. 203: "Voluntas unius causae habet rationem, sc. causae particularis respectu actus volendi, et anima actum cognoscendi obiectum ratione alterius causae partialis, et utrumque est simul causa totalis respectu actus volendi, voluntas tamen est causa principalior et natura cognoscens minus principalis, quia voluntas libere movet"; *ibid.*, p. 204: "Voluntas igitur cum potentia rationali concurrat ut una causa et una sine altera est tantum causa remota, unde potentia rationalis cum voluntate determinante est causa per se actus communiter volendi." Scotus explains the meaning of *causa principalior* in *Ord.*, I, d. 3, n. 560; III, p. 333: "Illa est principalior causa, qua agente, alia causa coagit, et non e converso."

ther confirmed in the *Opus Oxoniense* where intellect is also called, although somewhat hypothetically, the partial cause of volition, while will is said to be its principal agent.⁹³ In other works, such as the *Quodlibetum* and the *Collationes*, Scotus stresses the independent role of will as a free agent without taking any specific stand on the part played by intellect in the volitional act.⁹⁴ He sets however a limit to the power of the will. This consists in its inability to suspend all acts of intellect, for any attempt to do so is only possible in terms of an act of the intellect itself.⁹⁵ The will is likewise unable, Scotus tells us in the *Oxoniense*, to prevent the first thought of the mind or the simple and, as it were, spontaneous apprehension of an object prior to any reflection on it.⁹⁶

In an attempt to assess the results of our inquiry about Scotus' teaching on the relationship between intellect and will in volition, the following points can be established.

First, neither the intellect nor the object known can be the determining factor in the act of volition, which belongs principally to the will as a self-determining power.

Second, the will is totally responsible for the act of volition as

⁹³ Here are some of Scotus' statements concerning the role of the intellect in volition: *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. ex latere, n. 16; XXI, p. 151b: "Respondeo, nec actus intellectus est totalis causa actus voluntatis, sed partialis causa, si est aliqua"; *ibid.*: "Intellectus autem, si est causa volitionis, est causa subserviens voluntati, tanquam habens actionem primam in ordine generationis"; *ibid.*, n. 18; XXI, p. 155a: "Posset dici quod intellectus dependet a volitione, ut a causa partiali, sed superiori; e converso autem voluntas ab intellectione, ut a causa partiali, sed subserviente"; *ibid.*, II, d. 26, q. un., n. 5; XIII, p. 237b: "Intellectio per se si sit causa partialis respectu volitionis, ut dicunt aliqui, etc."

The role of the will as a principal cause of volition is pointed out in the following texts: *Oxon.*, II, d. 7, q. un., n. 6; XII, p. 377a: "Cum voluntas sit causa principalis sui actus, quodcumque ponatur in voluntate respectu actus eius, vel non erit causa actus sic eliciendi, vel si sit causa, est secunda causa respectu voluntatis, et non causa principalis"; *ibid.*, IV, d. 49, q. ex latere, n. 17; XXI, p. 152a: "Ut salvetur libertas in homine, oportet dicere, posita intellectione, [hanc] non habere causam totalem volitionis, sed principaliorum respectu eius esse voluntatem quae sola libera est."

⁹⁴ *Quodl.*, q. 18, n. 9; XXVI, p. 241b; *Collationes*, III; V, pp. 149ff.

⁹⁵ *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 4; XXVI, p. 185a.

⁹⁶ *Ord.*, I, d. 6, q. un., n. 13; IV, p. 93: "In intellectu nostro habente naturaliter primam intellectionem—quae non est in potestate nostra—potest voluntas nostra complacere in illa intellectione iam posita, sed proprie loquendo non elicimus illam actionem volentes sed eam elicitam volumus esse"; *Oxon.*, II, d. 42, q. 4, n. 9; XIII, p. 457a: "Illa simplex intellectio obiecti, ad quam debet intellectus discurrere, non est in potestate voluntatis."

a distinct formality that makes it a free act and proceeds from a principle that is formally distinct from the intellect.⁹⁷

Third, the act of volition, considered not as a distinct formality but rather in its complexity as a rational decision, can only result from the joint cooperation of intellect and will in such wise that the will is its principal cause and the intellect is its secondary but nonetheless important cause, and not merely a necessary condition, as Scotus seems to have taught at one time.⁹⁸

Thus it appears once more that Scotus' voluntarism is a well-balanced doctrine in which intellect and will are each one assigned their specific role in accordance with his own notion of them. Such a voluntarism, while far removed from the extreme voluntaristic trends of some modern and contemporary philosophies, comes close to the intellectualism of St. Thomas, who in his later writings had already moved a step forward towards the position of the Franciscan school by crediting the will with a more active role in volition.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Balić, *Les commentaires*, p. 299: "Nihil aliud a voluntate potest esse totalis causa volitionis in voluntate secundum quod voluntas determinat se libere ad actum volendi causandum." Although this text is taken from a section of the *Additiones magnae* which reports Scotus' teaching at Paris, it contains nevertheless a point of doctrine that is in complete agreement with his notion of the will as an essentially free power formally distinct from the intellect. Cf. *Ord.*, I, d. 3, n. 578; III, pp. 341-42. To the best of our knowledge, Scotus has never rejected such a doctrine.

⁹⁸ Our position differs from that of Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot, op. cit.*, pp. 590-93, inasmuch as he fails to see a change in Scotus' approach to the problem of the relationship between intellect and will, as stated by William of Alnwick and evidenced by the *Additiones magnae* and the *Secundae additiones*; it differs also from the position of Walter Hoeres, who in his recent work, *Der Wille als seine Vollkommenheit nach Duns Scotus* (Munich: Pustet, 1962), does not take into consideration the two sets of the *Additiones* and presents Scotus as inclining towards the view that the act of the intellect is only a *causa sine qua non* of the act of the will: "Daher neigt Scotus der Auffassung zu, dass der Erkenntnisakt nichts anderes als *causa sine qua non* für den Vollzug des Willensaktes sei." *Ibid.*, p. 208. However, we wholeheartedly agree with Gilson's observation that in the study under discussion we must distinguish between two problems, one concerning the act of the will as such, and the other concerning the act of the will in its totality, i.e., as including the act of choice. *Op. cit.*, p. 590. The only difficulty is to know in each case which text refers to the act of the will taken in the first sense and which refers to the act of the will taken in the second sense.

⁹⁹ St. Thomas' change of approach to the problem of will and freedom is described by Odon Lottin, O.S.B., in his work, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles* (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César—Gembloux: Duculot, 1942), I, 226-43; 252-62. The same author summarizes the results of his findings in *Principes de morale* (Louvain: Éditions de l'Abbaye du Mont César, 1946), II, 16-19. He concludes: "On le voit, sans renier la thèse du *De veritate*, q. 24, l'exposé du *De malo*, q. 6, souligne beaucoup plus l'aspect actif de la volonté;

The main difference that distinguishes Scotus' system from that of St. Thomas consists in his emphasis on will as a self-determining power and the preeminence he assigns to it in regard to the intellect. This last point is the subject matter of the following section.

PRIMACY OF THE WILL

If Scotus' attitude towards the problem of the intellect and will relationship has gradually shifted in the direction of a better understanding of the intellect's role in volition, there is one point of doctrine in which his teaching has remained unchanged, and that is the superiority of the will over the intellect. This doctrine, which takes its concrete form in the affirmation that love is above knowledge and has many practical applications in the theological and ascetical fields, is so characteristic of the Scotistic school that it has come to be known as one of its principal features. This is not to say that the doctrine originates with Scotus, for in the words of his Irish commentator, Anthony Hickey, "it is the opinion most commonly held before and after St. Thomas."¹⁰⁰ However, Scotus gave it a great impetus and helped to establish it on more solid grounds. It is mainly because of its intrinsic value and natural appeal that the doctrine has won the admiration and often the outright acceptance of thinkers even outside the Scotistic school who have seen in it an important achievement of philosophical speculation and theological insight. The doctrine will be considered briefly along the general lines of Scotus' treatment.

Scotus discusses the question whether intellect or will is the nobler faculty in a theological context, inasmuch as the question follows immediately the treatment of the related issue whether beatitude consists essentially in the act of the intellect or in the act of the will.¹⁰¹ He examines first the arguments of the opposite view

la raison n'exerce plus qu'une causalité formelle, laquelle se réduira bientôt, dans la Ia-IIae, qq. 9-10, à une simple présentation de l'objet par la raison. Par ces nouvelles formules, saint Thomas se rapprochait sensiblement des énoncés franciscains et séparait ostensiblement sa position de la position déterministe des averroïstes des environs de 1270." *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁰⁰ Commentary on *Oxon.*, I, d. 49, q. ex latere; XXI, p. 125b: "Haec [Scoti] est sententia communissima antiquorum ante et post D. Thomam."

¹⁰¹ The discussion on the essence of beatitude is found in q. 4 of dist. 49 of the fourth book on the *Sentences*; the related issue, "Utra potentia sit nobilior, intellectus an voluntas," is a *quaestio ex latere*, *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, nn. 10-21; XXI, pp. 123-64.

represented by St. Thomas and his followers, next answers them one by one, and then presents his own viewpoint, which usually takes the form of a counter-argument.¹⁰²

A first argument used by Aquinas to prove the superiority of the intellect over the will is derived from the nature of their objects. The true is closer to intellect, and therefore more perfect, than is the good to will, for intellect understands inasmuch as it becomes the object known, whereas will tends to the object as it is in itself. Scotus answers that one could just as well argue that will is higher than intellect because its object is the good in itself, whereas truth is only a good by participation. Similarly, universal good is higher than a particular good, such as the true, the good of the intellect. However, he observes, this kind of reasoning is based on the false premise that the true and the good are really distinct from one another, which is not the case; consequently, they cannot serve as a criterion for judging about the lesser or greater degree of perfection of their respective faculties. Furthermore, if it is questionable whether the good as such can be called the object of will, it is certainly wrong to call the true the object of intellect. The truth of the matter is that the object of both intellect and will is being under the aspect of truth and goodness.¹⁰³

A second argument aiming to prove the primacy of intellect over will is based on the habits predisposing the two faculties to act, for an act is as good and noble as the habit from which it proceeds. Now a habit of the intellect is nobler than any habit of the will, for according to Aristotle wisdom is the noblest of all habits. Thus intellect is superior to will. Here the Subtle Doctor engages on a long discussion the substance of which is an attempt to prove that love, a habit of the will, is the greatest of all habits, not wisdom, a habit of the intellect. He quotes to this effect both St. Paul and St. Augustine. Since the discussion is mostly theological in character, it suffices to have mentioned it.¹⁰⁴

The third proof is strictly philosophical and argues from the nature of the acts of the two faculties. An efficient equivocal cause, so reason the intellectualists, is more perfect than its effects. But intellect is the efficient cause of the acts of will, for nothing can be willed that is not previously known. Hence the intellect is more

¹⁰² For St. Thomas' view cf. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 3; *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 11.

¹⁰³ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. ex lat., nn. 10-12; XXI, pp. 123-24.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, nn. 13-15, pp. 140-41.

perfect than the will. Scotus grants the major of the syllogism but uses it to his own advantage and arrives at a conclusion that is directly opposite to that of his opponents. If it is true, he writes, that the will depends on the intellect for the knowledge of its object, it is equally true, and perhaps even more so, that the will can command the intellect by directing its attention to one particular object rather than to another. Hence the will can rightly be called the efficient equivocal cause of the acts of the intellect. Yet, Scotus continues, the truth is that neither the intellect is the total cause of volition, nor the will is the total cause of intellection, since each faculty is primarily responsible for its own acts and exerts only a partial influence on the acts of the other faculty. The argument from the nature of an equivocal cause is therefore out of the question, since it applies only to a total cause. If an argument is to be built on a partial cause, it can only be in favor of the will, for it is the will that commands the intellect, not vice versa. The intellect is at most a subservient cause in that it presents to the will the object on which the latter will act.¹⁰⁵

Granting that the will can command the intellect, the intellectualists rebut, it is nevertheless an incontestable fact that the intellect has an activity of its own, independently of the will. The same cannot be said of the will, which depends necessarily on the intellect for its volitive act. Since dependence is a mark of imperfection, it remains true that the intellect is more perfect than, and therefore superior to, the will. To this Scotus replies that dependence is not always a sign of imperfection. As Aristotle says, a being that is generated can be more perfect than the beings which are the cause of its generation. Similarly, the end depends on the means and form on matter, and yet the end is more perfect than the means and form is superior to matter. The dependence of will on intellect is analogous to this kind of dependence: volition depends on knowledge but only as end depends on the means and form on matter. Intellect, on the other hand, depends on will as on a partial but superior cause of its acts.¹⁰⁶

The dialectical contest goes on. This time the intellectualists come back with a new kind of weapon, an argument that is based on a pure hypothesis but serves nevertheless to point out, so they say, the superiority of knowledge over volition. If it were at all

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 16, p. 151.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 18, p. 155.

San Scotus, will becomes love - volo ut sis;
Hic as confirmation & negation; Nihil de se proprio
puti volo ut sis.

possible, they argue, to isolate intellection from volition, intellection would still be a perfect act of an intellectual nature, but not volition, which is merely an inclination comparable to the law of gravitation in a heavy body. Thus intellection is of a higher order than volition. Scotus' answer is as follows: that must be held as more perfect the opposite of which is a greater evil. But to hate God—in the hypothesis that hatred can exist without knowledge—is a much greater evil than not to know him, even if this means a positive act of ignorance. Love is therefore superior to knowledge.

The same principle holds true in regard to contradictory acts of the two powers in question. Thus, when one is conscious of his obligation to love God, not to love him is sinful, but merely not to think of him is not sinful. Again, to think of something evil is not necessarily a sin; but to think approvingly of something evil is a sin. Finally, and this is Scotus' direct answer to the argument of his opponents, even if love alone remained, this would not be merely like the natural inclination of a heavy body towards its gravitational center. It would still be an act of an intellectual nature, for that is precisely what distinguishes will as a free power from the tendencies of a physical body and other inferior beings. The fact that love in its concrete reality is always accompanied by an act of the intellect does not mean that love derives its activity from the intellect, since love has a formality of its own. It simply means that love acts in conjunction with the intellect.¹⁰⁷ More specifically, the human will is by definition a rational appetite, and to make it dependent on the intellect for its element of rationality is to downgrade it and falsify its true nature. Scotus' concern with the will's essential characteristic of rationality is in accordance with his notion of freedom as a perfection that goes hand in hand with rationality. To deprive the will of its rationality is to jeopardize the freedom of its acts.

The intellectualists resort to a final attack which takes the form of a twofold objection. The intellect, they assert, is superior to the will because its act is not vitiated, as it were, by the object as the act of the will is. Thus one can know evil without any loss of moral integrity, but he cannot desire evil, for any such desire is wrong. Moreover, it is a mark of imperfection to have to tend towards something that is outside of oneself. But such is the nature of will in regard to its object. Intellect, on the contrary, draws things to-

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 17, pp. 152-55.

wards itself, so that, in the words of Aristotle, truth and falsity are in the soul, good and evil are in the things outside (*Met.*, VI, 4; 1027b 25-29). To the first objection Scotus answers that the better and the more perfect a thing is the worse is its corruption. But such is the will for, as the objectors are ready to concede, the very act of willing evil is wrong, while there is nothing reproachable in the mere knowledge of evil.

As to the second objection, the argument on which it rests can also be retorted against its proponents. By their own admission, when the will is directed towards a good that is superior to itself, its act is nobler than the act of the intellect. Now since the will can perform acts which are more perfect than the corresponding acts of the intellect, and since on the other hand it is permissible to judge of the nature of a specific category of acts from any individual act of that category, the will must be considered as a higher faculty than the intellect. Furthermore, an act is all the more perfect insofar as it leads to a real union of the faculty with its object. But this can only be an act of the will, for it is through it that the will attains the object as it is in itself; in intellection, on the contrary, there is only a union between intellect and the object as it is in the soul, not as it is in itself. Hence again the superiority of will over intellect is manifest.

As to Aristotle's text that truth and falsity are in the soul, whereas good and evil are in the things outside, the following observation is in order. While it is true that intuitive knowledge and the ensuing love tend to the object as it is in itself, abstractive knowledge and the love thereby generated tend to the object as it is in the mind alone. In this respect no difference is seen between intellect and will, for both powers can direct their acts to the object as it is in itself or as it is found in the intellect. However, Aristotle speaks solely of abstractive knowledge and of the act by which the will desires something to be attained in the future. Since this object is not present to the will as yet, the will cannot tend towards it as it is in itself but only as it is understood by the intellect.¹⁰⁸ Briefly, Aristotle's text does not affect the principle that a greater union exists between the will and its object in concrete reality than between the intellect and its object since this is solely obtained by the process of abstraction, the only kind of object that in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy is possible to the intellect in this life. Thus one

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, nn. 19-20, pp. 162-63.

of the most common arguments used by the intellectualists to support their theory of the primacy of intellect turns out, in Scotistic dialectic, to prove the opposite view, namely, the superiority of will over intellect.

The Scotistic doctrine of the primacy of will has a direct bearing on the question concerning the essence of beatitude, a much debated issue among scholastics. All scholastics agree in saying that man's supreme beatitude consists in the attainment of his final end and infinite good, God. Likewise, they all agree with very few exceptions that God can only be attained—whether naturally or supernaturally is not our concern here—by man's highest powers of intellect and will, and that the operation of both faculties is needed for his complete happiness. This is what scholastic terminology calls "extensive beatitude." The controversy arises as to whether the act of one of the two faculties could so attain the supreme good as to constitute man's formal and essential happiness, or what scholastics call "intensive beatitude." Otherwise stated, the question comes down to this: Do knowledge and love play an equal role in beatitude or does one excel the other? If one excels the other, which of the two is predominant, knowledge or love?

St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, Richard of Mediavilla, and Francis Suarez, to mention only a few leading figures, maintain that the operation of both intellect and will is required for man's essential beatitude, so that knowledge and love contribute to it on an equal basis. On the other hand, St. Thomas and Scotus hold that beatitude consists essentially in the act of one faculty alone, which for Aquinas is the intellect, for Scotus the will. Since the arguments used to support these two latter theories, the only ones which interest us in this study, are chiefly those used by their proponents to uphold their stands on the question of which of the two faculties enjoys a primacy over the other, it can be said that, successfully or not, Scotus has already made his case quite clear in the preceding dispute. However, because certain additional arguments have been advanced which concern directly the essence of beatitude, it is necessary to state Scotus' position on the subject and see how he justifies his view that beatitude consists essentially in love.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Scotus discusses the problem in *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 4; XXI, pp. 93-100; *ibid.*, q. 5, pp. 170-77; *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 49, q. 2; XXIV, pp. 620-31; *ibid.*, q. 3, pp. 631-35; *ibid.*, q. 4, pp. 635-40. See also pertinent material in *Ord.*, I, d. 1, nn. 1-158; II, pp. 1-108; *Rep. Par.*, I, d. 1, qq. 1-3; XXII, pp. 54-61, as well as in qq. 1-3 of d. 49 of the fourth book of the *Sentences* in the *Opus Oxoniense* and the corresponding q. 1 in the *Reportata Parisiensia*.

Beatitude, writes Scotus, is man's supreme perfection which he achieves by attaining the final end to which he has been destined.¹¹⁰ It consists, properly speaking, in the operation of his most perfect faculty, for only such a faculty can attain the ultimate end in the most perfect way.¹¹¹ This faculty cannot be the intellect, for man's final end is also his supreme good, and the good is the object of will, not of intellect. Moreover, the natural order existing between the act of intellect and the act of will clearly indicates the superiority of the latter. One does not will in order to know; he knows in order to will.¹¹² It is true that will cannot attain its object without first knowing it, so that the act of intellect precedes the act of will, but this is merely a priority of nature, not one of perfection. Formal and essential beatitude is the attainment of the end by a priority of perfection, which consists in the full and perfect attainment of the object as it is in itself and not merely as it is in the mind.¹¹³

Scotus has yet to meet the main objection to his position, which even today is the one most widely used by his opponents. The objection, as formulated by St. Thomas, runs somewhat like this. Beatitude is the attainment of the ultimate end. This cannot be done by an act of will as such, for will can only tend towards an end by desiring it, or enjoy the end once this has been attained. In neither case can it be said that will attains the end properly speaking, for desire is of something that is absent, and joy comes after the end has already been achieved. Hence the ultimate end can be attained solely by an act whereby the end is actually present to man, and that is the act of the intellect.¹¹⁴

Scotus takes notice of the objection and, as usual, has his answer ready for it. He concedes that the attainment of an end cannot be merely by an act of desire; understandably enough, the very notion of desire excludes the actual possession of the object so desired. He

¹¹⁰ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 4, n. 9; XXI, p. 100b: "Beatitudo est assecutio [finis] prima primitate perfectionis"; *ibid.*, q. 6, n. 24; XXI, p. 269a: "Accipimus beatitudinem pro summa perfectione beatificabilis naturae, ipsam summe suo obiecto perfectissimo coniungente."

¹¹¹ *Rep. Par.*, IV, d. 49, q. 1 n. 2; XXIV, p. 614b; "Cum beatitudo sit finis et finis potentis operari est operatio sua, igitur beatitudo consistit in operatione"; *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 3, n. 7; XXI, p. 81ab: "Planum est quod non consistit beatitudo nisi in unica operatione, quia non nisi unica potentia in natura perfectissime attingit obiectum."

¹¹² *Ibid.*, q. 4, n. 4; XXI, p. 97b.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, n. 5; XXI, p. 98a, n. 9; XXI, p. 100b. See also *ibid.*, nn. 108 and 110.

¹¹⁴ *Sum. theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 4 c.

concedes further that joy, or the complacency consequent upon the attainment of the end, is not what constitutes the essence of beatitude as such; rather, it presupposes it. Besides, joy is a passion, whereas beatitude is a most perfect act and operation. Having granted this much, he strongly objects to having the acts of will reduced to desire and joy. What of the act whereby the will does actually attain the object and does not merely desire or enjoy it? Before the will can draw any satisfaction from the possession of an object, it must first attain it, and that attainment is precisely what constitutes the essence of beatitude in the strict sense of the term. Beatitude is therefore the act by which the will comes in contact with the object presented to it by the intellect and loves it, thus fully satisfying its natural desire for it. To ignore such an act, Scotus affirms in rather strong terms, is completely to disregard the principles of logic and reason. Indeed, if will can act in regard to an object that is absent and only imperfectly known to intellect, it must also be able, and much more so, to act in regard to an object that is perfectly present to it because it actually sees it through the intellect. Thus, in Scotus' reasoning, the principal argument of his opponents is faulty because it fails to consider one of the most important acts of the will.¹¹⁵

It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the nature of this act which Scotus calls *fruitio* and distinguishes from the ensuing *delectatio*. It will suffice to point out that fruition, in which the essence of beatitude consists, is the perfect love of God for God's sake (*amor amicitiae*), and is thus distinct from the love of God for one's own sake (*amor concupiscentiae*). The latter, although not evil in itself, is nevertheless less perfect than the former and must be moderated.¹¹⁶

If we compare Scotus' teaching on the essence of beatitude with the teaching of other scholastics, we may say that he holds a somewhat middle position between those who, like St. Albert the Great and St. Bonaventure, place essential beatitude in intellect and will,

¹¹⁵ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 4, nn. 5-9, XXI, pp. 98-100. The following passage is particularly important: "Si enim accipitur quietatio pro consequente operationem perfectam, concedo quod illam quietationem praecedit perfecta consecutio finis; si autem accipitur quietatio pro actu quietativo in fine, dico quod actus amandi, qui naturaliter praecedit delectationem, quietat illo modo, quia potentia operativa non quietatur in obiecto, nisi per operationem perfectam, per quam attingit obiectum." *Ibid.*, p. 99b.

¹¹⁶ For a complete discussion of Scotus' notion of *fruitio* cf. *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 5; XXI, pp. 170-77; *Rep. Par.*, d. 49, q. 4; XXIV, pp. 635-40.

THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF DUNS SCOTUS' PHILOSOPHY

by

BÉRAUD DE SAINT-MAURICE

The actuality of Duns Scotus' philosophy is based on no scanty evidence. That psychological approach of existential import, leading to the supreme importance of love which characterizes Duns Scotus' philosophy, suffices to accredit it to present-day thought. This may seem very strange to some readers. How can a philosophy of the Middle Ages, which has been in discredit since the eighteenth century because misinterpreted and degraded by determined opponents, be of any actual importance? "There is perhaps no figure in the history of Western thought, except possibly Ockham, whose views are so consistently misrepresented as those of Duns Scotus," writes George Lindbeck.¹ Furthermore, Duns Scotus belongs to the apex of the Middle Ages; he shows himself strong in scholastic methods, uses scholastic vocabulary, and takes up the immediate concerns of his time. Notwithstanding this, Duns Scotus' philosophy, because it contains answers to certain problems of the present generation, can dispel like a rising sun the mists that shroud so many contemporary philosophies, and also give support to various valid doctrines that they advance.

Scotus' *Weltanschauung* has a broad and daring outlook on the progressive knowledge of truth. He rejects any kind of dogmatism in philosophy, and for that matter in theology also, except accepted doctrine. His turn of mind and the critical eye with which he probes the subjects he treats, his scientific approach to his topics, and his wish to get to the bottom of things, unsatisfied with mere logic but in search of objective truth only, can be epitomized in his own dictum: "In processu generationis humanae, semper crevit notitia veritatis."²

¹ George Lindbeck, "A Great Scotist Study," *The Review of Metaphysics* (March, 1954), 423.

² *Op. Oxon.*, IV d. 1 q. 3 n. 8; XVI 186.

Scotus' theses on the divisibility of matter *in potentia et in fieri*, the forms of corporeity, the active part of woman in conception, scientific induction, and self motion,³ to mention but these few, are accepted by contemporary science. As an American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, has written: "The logic and metaphysics of Duns Scotus adapted to modern culture would go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science."⁴ Moreover, his teaching that primary matter is *per se* in act and craving for all forms, implies a principle of evolution susceptible of arousing the interest of modern evolutionists. Again, in accord with contemporary thought, Duns Scotus rejects interference by philosophy with physical science. In his judgment the physical sciences have their own laws and standards, with which philosophy must not interfere except when called to do so in order to explain the higher reasons or ultimate causality of certain phenomena or of certain experiments. "Principia omnium aliarum scientiarum posunt concipi, et termini illorum, ante principia metaphysicae."⁵

This attitude proves wise, and in contrast to it we need only recall the severe criticisms made by physical scientists of certain other systems of philosophy. Thus Sir Edmund Whittaker, professor of mathematics at Edinburgh University, writes:

In criticizing the metaphysician's line of argument, the man of science points out in the first place that most of the speculative philosophical systems of the past—notably Thomism, Kantianism and Hegelianism—when applied to natural philosophy, lead to conclusions that are demonstrably false. As a matter of history, each of these systems did much harm in obstructing the progress of true knowledge. The Thomists rejected every doctrine characteristic of modern science—the earth's rotation, the Newtonian dynamics and the atomic theory—while the Kantians succeeded in vetoing non-Euclidian geometry for nearly half a century and the Hegelians long prevented the acceptance of Ohm's law. Hegel himself gave a proof that the number of planets could not exceed seven in his *Dissertatio*

References to Duns Scotus' works are from the Vivès edition (Paris, 1891-1895), except those from the first book of the *Ordinatio*, which are taken from the Balić edition (Rome, 1950-).

³ Cf. Roy R. Effler, *John Duns Scotus and the Principle "omne quod movetur ab alio movetur"* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1962).

⁴ Charles K. McKeon, "Peirce's Scotistic Realism," *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. by Philip P. Weiner and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 238.

⁵ *Ord.*, I d. 3 p. 1 q. 1-2 n. 77; III 53.

philosophica de orbitis planetarum, which by an uncommon piece of bad luck, was published almost simultaneously with the astronomer Piazzi's discovery of an eighth planet. It is not to be wondered at that even the mild-mannered James Clerk Maxwell once referred in public to 'the den of the metaphysician, abhorred by every man of science.' Professor Born takes much the same attitude: 'Metaphysical systematization,' he says, 'means formulization and petrification.'⁶

We need not comment upon this statement; it is evident that a wrong has been done to philosophy through such incursions into scientific areas, and it is also evident how wise Duns Scotus was to avoid this. As a great Scotist authority, the late Philotheus Boehner, has written: "Scotus is one of the giants on whose shoulders we stand like dwarfs; like the other giants of the past, Scotus helps us not only to see what he saw, but he lets us stand on his shoulders to obtain a still broader and clearer vision."⁷

Significant of a Duns Scotus revival is the new critical edition of Duns Scotus' *Ordinatio*, which, as Fernand Guimet points out, "testifies to a renewed interest in the Subtle Doctor's thought."⁸ Professor Gilson praises it and states that with it "a new era has begun for the study of Duns Scotus."⁹ Needless to say, this achievement had been well prepared by such pioneers as de Basly, Minges, Bertoni, Seiller, Müller, and Boehner. After 1927, the Commission for the critical edition of Scotus' works was headed by Ephrem Longpré, until Carlo Balić, President of the Pontifical International Marian Academy in Rome, and his collaborators took charge. Besides this great enterprise, Allan B. Wolter, of the School of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America, has edited a volume of Duns Scotus' metaphysics, containing the Latin text and a facing English translation with notes and references. To these may be added noteworthy works on Scotus by such distinguished authors as Gilson, Bettoni, Barth, Oromí, Alluntis, Copleston, Bonansea, Shircel, Grajewski, de Gandillac, Vignaux, Stella, and Merton, and in 1963 Luchiesio Giasson's Louvain doctoral dissertation, *Genre*,

⁶ Quoted by Allan B. Wolter in *Select Problems in the Philosophy of Nature* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1952), pp. 83-84.

⁷ Béraud de Saint-Maurice, *John Duns Scotus, a Teacher for our Times*, translated by Columban Duffy (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1955), pp. vi-vii.

⁸ Fernand Guimet, "Actualité de Duns Scot," *Recherches de Philosophie*, Vol. II: *Aspects de la dialectique* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1956), p. 315.

⁹ *Bulletin thomiste*, VII (1947-1953), 115.

espèce et différence spécifique dans la philosophie de Jean Duns Scot.

Yet no matter how indicative of actual value this renewed interest in the Subtle Doctor's works may be, it is not to be interpreted as an antiquarian concern for a specimen of medieval thought. This renewed interest has a much deeper meaning. As a matter of fact, it tells of the appreciation that various philosophers today seem to have of Duns Scotus' ability to help solve contemporary problems.

The Psychological Approach

From the Renaissance to the atomic age, philosophers have focused their interest on man. Noematics has thus become highly accredited in today's philosophical fields. A brief survey of Scotus' psychological approach will show how he answers this present need for knowledge of the concrete existential in man. Duns Scotus weighs to the full the serious positive consequences intuitive intellectual knowledge would bring to a Christian philosophy of love. He senses that without it we are doomed to the blind alley that is skepticism: "Cognitio quae dicitur intuitiva potest esse intellectiva, alioquin intellectus non esset certus de aliqua existentia alicujus objecti."¹⁰ Kantianism, which rejects intellectual intuition and thereby sweeps away all transcendental truths, because of our spatio-temporal condition, finds a most serious opponent in Duns Scotus.

Scotus also senses that love is of singular objects, not of the universal. Moreover, since there can be no love for that which is unknown, the singular object of love must be and is intelligible, despite the denials of Aristotle and his school. "Impossible est abstrahere universalia a singulari non cognito singulari, aliter enim abstraheret ignorando a quo abstraheret; igitur."¹¹ Scotus, therefore, reasons as follows: God is the singular par excellence; finite beings are finite singulars; hence the singular is intelligible and highly so. Our senses perceive the material singular; but our intellect, which is far superior to the senses, evidently has a broader capacity for knowledge; therefore it can and does know not only the material but also the immaterial singular. "Dicendum ergo, quod singulare est a nobis intelligibile secundum se, quia intelligibilitas

¹⁰ *Op. Oxon.*, IV d. 45 q. 2 n. 12; XX 305.

¹¹ *De Anima*, q. 22 n. 3; III 629.

sequitur entitatem; secundo dico quod singulare est a nobis intelligibile pro statu isto."¹²

The question now arises: How is this done? It is done, says Duns Scotus, on the level of simple apprehension, where we have intuitive intellectual and abstractive knowledge,¹³ which latter, it must be remembered, is not equivalent to Thomistic abstraction. It never strips the singular object of its individual notes in order to seize the universal quiddity, which alone, according to Thomists, is intelligible. Abstractive knowledge for Scotus—still on the level of simple apprehension—is indifferent to existence or nonexistence, to the presence or absence of the singular object; it merely prescind from these existential aspects and therefore never despoils the singular of its wealth. It acts something like an X-ray penetrating the flesh to reveal the bone structure alone. Charles Sanders Peirce's mode of abstraction is not unlike that of Scotus, and Peirce defines it as "the act of supposing some one element of a percept upon which the thought dwells *without paying any regard to other elements*."¹⁴

Whether it is knowledge of the singular material or of the singular immaterial, intuitive intellectual knowledge is a direct, immediate, simple awareness of things, events, or states of mind; it is an apperception or contact, and therefore requires no species, of a real singular as existing and as present *hic et nunc*. "Potest aliqua esse cognitio objecti secundum quod existens et secundum quod praesens in aliqua existentia actuali . . . eo modo quo dicimur intueri rem, sicut est in se."¹⁵

Because of this basic cognition we are able to form existential judgments such as, "I am awake," "I see Michael," "I am thinking," and so forth. But of course, *pro statu isto*, I cannot know Michael's singularity as such, *sub ratione propria singularis*, because its numerical unity is a uniqueness that shields the singular from all others and even from itself.

I know intuitively, when I directly apprehend the boy Michael seated at this desk in front of me. This means that I apperceive

¹² *Ibid.*, nn. 4-5, III 629-630.

¹³ Cf. Sebastian J. Day, *Intuitive Cognition, a Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1947).

¹⁴ Thomas A. Goudge, "Peirce's Theory of Abstraction," *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. by Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young, p. 122.

¹⁵ *Op. Oxon.*, II d. 3 q. 9 n. 6; XII 212.

mental water extinguish real fire; no mental knife, however sharp it may be, will ever cut real wood; on the contrary, in the case of 'real' objects, consequences always follow."¹⁸ For that matter, Duns Scotus himself might have added: Mental persons can neither love nor be loved.

The only possible concession to be made to mentalist idealists is that kind of experience pertaining to romanticism, according to which, for instance, to a poet in a dejected state of mind a flowing river appears to be a melancholy emblem of the futility and uselessness of life and things, suggestive of the Coheleth's complaint: "I have seen all things that are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and vexation of spirit."¹⁹ On the contrary, to a carefree picnicker the same river looks bright, buoyant, and the very image of youth. Yet the river objectively remains the same in both cases as it really flows along, unconscious of the different mental effects it produces in different minds.

Among the conclusions drawn by Duns Scotus, there is one which reveals a psychological insight very much in keeping with his philosophy of love. He writes: "Incognita non possumus diligere, sed per prius diligimus singulare quam universale."²⁰ This is profoundly true; for although I may love truth, justice, fair play, and the like, it is because they are indirectly at least connected with a person or persons. They are embodied in so and so. Furthermore, as we have written elsewhere, "The singular is empowered to become 'presence' as well as objectivation; in balance, therefore, with the 'thou' and the 'he.' On the contrary, the universal expresses nothing else than the *quod quid est*, or that which is common in things. . . . Now to consequences: for if it is true that I pledge myself only in regard to a person, it is equally true that this concept, 'man,' will not pledge me to 'Michael.' It merely furnishes casual registration references, allowing me to classify this object in the category of reasonable animals. Some amount of intellectual curiosity may accompany this act, but hardly any real existential concern for the same."²¹

¹⁸ William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York: Longmans Green, 1912), pp. 127-128. Cf. Gérard Deledalle, *Historie de la philosophie américaine*, ch. VIII (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954).

¹⁹ *Ecclesiastes*, I, 14.

²⁰ *De Anima*, q. 22 n. 5; III 630.

²¹ Béraud de Saint-Maurice, "Existential import in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus," *Franciscan Studies*, IX (September, 1949), p. 296.

Bergson's theory of intuition adds to Scotus' scientific description something of St. Bonaventure's *penetrans acumen* of love, since to it are attached some elements of penetrating sympathy, allowing coincidence with the inexpressible singularity of the known object. Duns Scotus, however, treats intuition as the basic process of knowledge in order that love may not be frustrated in attaining its object, the individual singular concretely existing.

Intuitive knowledge can also be with regard to the past, provided the object or the event has been previously known intuitively. For example, I recall to mind Michael sitting at this desk sometime ago, or one of my past emotions of love, fear, or joy in such and such circumstances. This is to revive the intuitive knowledge of that person, event, or emotions as it was when actual and present. The English past progressive tense in grammar is suggestive of this: if I say, for instance, "I was watching TV at 10 o'clock last evening," I mean much more than just mentioning this fact in the preterit: I watched. I actually recall it as it was happening then.

Duns Scotus also refers to an intuitive knowledge of the future, which, Wolter says, is "a simple awareness of a situation that will occur in the future, i.e., an awareness of this situation, not abstractly as indifferent to existence or nonexistence, or as something merely possible, but together with the notes of (future) existence."²² Scotus calls it *opinio de futuro*, which Wolter equates to a sort of natural precognition or a premonition.²³

By the sure criterion of perfect intuitive cognition we may evaluate our dreams and know with evident certitude that we are awake when we really are awake. Our intellect passes an infallible judgment on the phantasy, and we know that our dreams in sleep were produced without the control of our judgment and will. Bergson has the strange notion that to be awake and to will are one and the same thing: "Veiller et vouloir sont une seule et même chose."²⁴ For him the dream represents the entire mental life minus the effort of concentration: "Le rêve est la vie mentale tout entière, moins l'effort de concentration."²⁵ We still perceive, we still remember, we keep on reasoning, all these can abound in the dreamer's

²² Letter to the author, April 26, 1961.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Henri Bergson, *Mécanisme du rêve* (Conférence à l'Institut Général Psychologique, 26 mars 1901), quoted in André Cresson, *Bergson* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), p. 155.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

without which no real certitude whatsoever is possible for man: "Intellectus potest percipere actum meum intuitive . . . quodam sensu, id est perceptione interiori experimur."³⁰ Otherwise, he adds, we should never be certain of the existence of anything: "Alioquin intellectus non esset certus de aliqua existentia alicujus objecti."³¹ Not only am I conscious of my intellectual acts, when, on the level of simple apprehension, I am aware that I am thinking; but by a reflexive and therefore immaterial act of double consciousness I am aware that I am conscious of being aware. I am also immediately and directly aware of the acts of my emotions and of my free will. I not only feel and know these, but I am equally conscious of being aware of my feeling them and of my freely willing or not willing them. This "internal experience" according to Duns Scotus, as Longpré says, "is a witness in favor of the existence of human liberty."³² "Experitur enim qui vult se posse non velle sive nolle, juxta quod de libertate voluntatis alibi diffusius habetur."³³ We may add that it is a witness of love also, since it is indissolubly one with it.

Duns Scotus' introspection, let us note, is not an emptying of all real objects with a view to obtain knowledge through knowledge in the manner of a conclusion arrived at through reasoning, as the Cartesian "cogito" is, but a first intuition evidence.³⁴ Precisely because it is such, insurance against idealism of the mentalist type is thereby implicitly given. We are generally inclined to think that Descartes was an innovator when he asserted his "Cogito ergo sum." The fact is that this foremost problem of philosophy goes back to Socrates and after him to St. Augustine's "Si fallor, sum." However, since the Cartesian *cogito* reaches directly nothing but the mind, we cannot be surprised at the mentalist turn to be found in Descartes' works. For instance: . . . "Je dois être persuadé que ma pensée existe, à cause qu'il peut se faire que je pense toucher la terre encore qu'il n'y ait peut-être aucune terre au monde, et qu'il n'est pas possible que moi, c'est-à-dire mon âme ne soit rien pendant qu'elle a cette pensée: nous pouvons conclure de même de toutes les autres choses qui nous viennent en la pensée, à savoir que nous qui les

³⁰ *Op. Oxon.*, IV d. 43 q. 2 n. 10-11; XX 40.

³¹ *Op. Oxon.*, IV d. 45 q. 2 n. 12; XX 305.

³² Longpré "The Psychology of Duns Scotus and its Modernity," p. 27.

³³ *Metaph.*, IX q. 15 n. 5; VII 609.

³⁴ Séraphin Belmont, "Essai sur la théorie de la connaissance d'après Jean Duns Scot," *La France Franciscaine*, XVII (avril-septembre, 1935), p. 208.

pensons, existons, encore qu'elles soient peut-être fausses ou qu'elles n'aient aucune existence."³⁵

On the other hand, the solidity of Duns Scotus' first intuitive evidence is an existential act of self-investment making me conscious of the threefold process of my immaterial, reflexive soul. The "I" apperceives its act toward the "me" in "myself"; the "me" is real intrinsic object and objective reality of the "I," terminating in this reflexive act in which the "I" and the "me" identify. Hence, "I," "me," "myself" are the three introspective terms expressing the acts of a substance—subject, object to itself, the *ego*, by which I am *imago Dei*, as St. Bonaventure would say. This apperception mirrors the sparks of my intelligence and will, making me discover that since I know and will myself, I am love. Since love is of a person to a person, I am. It is impossible to escape this fundamental immaterial substratum of mine from which the "I," "me," "myself" operate, as idealists are prone to do. As Wolter pertinently remarks: "The *ego* of my experience is one numerically. It is always this 'I' which I call myself. Thus from the purely empirical or phenomenological analysis my *ego* or self appears as a principle of constancy and continuity, a numerically identical factor that endures from one experience to another. Objects and acts undergo change or flux, but my self, my *ego* remains."³⁶

Duns Scotus does not imply that by introspection man can know the soul's nature or essence. The reason for such impossibility *pro statu isto* is the soul's ineffable uniqueness. Scotus therefore would not subscribe to Husserl's *Wesensschau* theory. In fact, he categorically denies such an apperception for the spatio-temporal: "Non cognoscitur anima a nobis nec natura nostra pro statu isto nisi sub ratione aliqua generali a sensibilibus abstrahibili."³⁷ Yet, because the soul's faculties are really identical with the soul and distinct from it by formal distinction *a parte rei* only, its acts being known *in actu secundo*, somehow the soul itself is known through its faculties *in actu primo*, since these acts spring from these faculties really identical to the soul. Curiously enough, Avicenna, having approached this problem when anticipating the Cartesian postulate to be, had come to the same conclusion as Duns Scotus was to up-

³⁵ Descartes, *Les Principes de la Philosophie*, 1ère partie, n. 10.

³⁶ Allan B. Wolter, *Select Problems in the Philosophy of Nature*, p. 130.

³⁷ *Ord.*, Prol. p. 1 q. unica n. 28; I 17.

plicity and with certitude the value of the first principle of contradiction. Ingenious as is this criterion, it is nevertheless illicit since it proceeds from mere sense data, leaping on to the level of the conceptual order, and offering therefore no guarantee to the evidence of reality, since it lacks the existential experiential grounding of introspection which alone can give evidence of the real against mentalist ideologies. Consequently, as Vier says, "if you reject introspective evidence, you must logically reject all self-evident propositions."⁴¹ Why is this so? It is because, as we have pointed out in a previous work, "I cannot have certainty unless there is a nexus between the extrinsic world and my intrinsic self. Hence to deny or to ignore the certitude of introspection is to postulate universal doubt."⁴² What evidence can the words just mentioned bring to the skeptic, since according to this Aristotelian conceptual theory he cannot directly apprehend his own acts of knowing and willing nor things extrinsic to himself?

Duns Scotus passes a peremptory judgment on one who refuses to acknowledge the evidence of self-apperception: "Et ideo si quis istos [actus cognitionis non sensitivae] neget, dicendum est eum non esse hominem, quia non habet illam visionem interiorem quam alii experiuntur se habere."⁴³ Whoever denies this evidence experienced by all men is not worthy to be called a man. At best he is a "protervus," as Scotus would say. To rest on solid, basic evidence, which alone can yield certitude and insure the findings of metaphysics, one must go back to Duns Scotus whose merit it is to have been the first scholastic to propound the doctrine of existential introspection.

Eminent contemporary philosophers have praised Duns Scotus for this phenomenological survey, and have said that in it lies the initial movement of modern and contemporary psychology. "In der Seelenauffassung des Duns Skotus liegt, wie schon Siebeck betont hat . . . der erste Beginn zur Psychologie der Renaissance und der ganzen Neuzeit."⁴⁴ The value and scope of this initial psychological approach cannot be overestimated; without it the entire order of

⁴¹ Peter C. Vier, *Evidence and its Function According to John Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1951), p. 132.

⁴² Béraud de Saint-Maurice, "Existential Import in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus," *Franciscan Studies*, IX (September, 1949), pp. 297, 299.

⁴³ *Op. Oxon.*, IV d. 43 q. 2 n. 11; XX 40.

⁴⁴ Quoted in Longpré, "The Psychology of Duns Scotus and its Modernity," *The Franciscan Educational Conference*, XIII (1931), 21, n. 15.

things and the whole universe vanish away as a mere figment of the mind. What then becomes of love?

The Making of the Person

Since love is from person to person, Duns Scotus is very intent on giving us the right notions of the person's constituents. The initial philosophical step to real individuation of the concrete being is real identity of essence and existence: "Numquam esse essentiae separatur realiter ab esse existentiae."⁴⁵ Minges does not exaggerate in saying that this Scotistic thesis is "maximi momenti," because it is basic concreteness.

There is much discussion nowadays of opposing existentialism to essentialism within neo-scholastic spheres. In the Middle Ages this question does not appear. What does appear is Platonism to some degree together with opposition to it. Duns Scotus takes a decided position against Platonism; for him the existing individual alone is in full measure real: "Individuum est verissime ens et unum."⁴⁶ It is indeed the only perfect existing being: "Nonnisi individuum seu singulare ens verum, ens verissimum, maxime ens est."⁴⁷

On the other hand, essence, in so far as it does not identify with the existing individual, is merely an "ens cognitum" having a diminished existence, "in cognitione" only, "ut cognitum," in contrast to real individual being which exists absolutely. "Objectum in cognitione habet esse diminutum, substantia autem ut in se habet esse simpliciter et perfectum."⁴⁸

Duns Scotus could not show more plainly his dissent from Platonism on this important question: "Ipse [Plato] enim posuit ideas quidditates rerum per se quidem existentes, secundum Aristotelem, et male; secundum Augustinum in mente divina, et bene."⁴⁹ He is deeply conscious that not only the concreteness of his philosophy but also his whole Trinitarian theology and his Christology are at stake here. By sweeping away Platonic essences, Duns Scotus achieves the first step towards individuation. No essence of man preexists the existence of man, nor is essence really distinct from

⁴⁵ Cf. *Op. Oxon.*, II d. 1 q. 2 n. 7; XI 63.

⁴⁶ *Metaph.*, VII q. 13 n. 17; VII 417.

⁴⁷ Parthenius Minges, *Joannis Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica*, Vol. I (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1930), p. 15.

⁴⁸ *Op. Oxon.*, IV d. 13 q. 1 n. 39; XVII 693.

⁴⁹ *Op. Oxon.*, I, d. 35 q. unica n. 12; X 554.

existence *in concreto*. The individual is as truly distinguished by its existence as by its essence, since existence is identified with essence.

As a consequence, the problem that divides existentialists from essentialists is no problem at all for Scotus. He would not agree with the essentialists, who claim that essence enjoys priority over existence; he would not agree with the existentialists, who assert that existence enjoys priority over essence. Not unlike the judge in La Fontaine's "L'Huître et les plaideurs," he hands a shell to each and swallows the oyster whole.

In the wake of this, what are we to think of the existential value assigned to the *jugement d'existence, ad mentem Scoti*? Can we truly say that it concerns the real because to judge is to assert and to assert is to posit an existence? Scotus would answer no, since judgment belongs to the conceptual order only, which lies on the level of an abstraction not previously guaranteed by the basis provided by intellectual intuitive knowledge. Consequently, this so-called *jugement d'existence* is not existential but merely conceptual.

There is not the least doubt that the existentialists have understood the value of concrete existence in life. Furthermore, since this philosophical trend came about as a nauseous disgust over speculative reason, due to Hegelian absolute rationalism, it showed stern interest in existence, choosing it in preference to its concept, and expressed by the proverb: A live dog is worth more than a dead lion. Unfortunately, the existentialists, though in terms of phenomenology, have sacrificed some amount of concreteness to the arbitrary, in making a deliberate dichotomy between thinking and existing. They speculate abstractly upon both, using philosophy against philosophy, as Aristotle would say. They forget that total man cannot and does not exist without due respect to the fruits of his mind. Anguish and free choice cannot be prescinded from thinking and reasoning in real concrete life. Joy and ecstatic happiness cannot be overlooked as experiential existing to the sole benefit of nausea and the rest. To think, to reason, to will, to choose, to suffer distress, and to love are ways by which man exists, so that one cannot be arbitrarily considered at the expense of the others.

Unlike Kant's categories, which are mere laws of the mind and therefore considered nonexistent by Scotists as well as by existentialists, Kierkegaard's categories are concrete and individual. One of them, the category *unique*, according to which every individual is precisely himself and no one else and no other, brings us to Duns

Scotus' second and third steps towards the making of the person: the common nature and haecceity. The *natura communis* has often been interpreted as an instance of exaggerated realism by philosophers who accuse Scotus of having sacrificed to Platonism on this point. If we correctly understand Scotus, the reproach is undeserved. In reference to the individual the common nature is that which is singular in each individual of a similar group, each singular thing having its own common nature which is singularized by the individual difference. Scotus explains: "Si loquamur realiter, humanitas quae est in Socrate, non est humanitas quae est in Platone, et est realis differentia ex differentiis individualibus unitive contentis, inseparabilibus hinc inde";⁵⁰ "talis existentia est magis singularis quam universalis, quia non est universalis nisi in singulari."⁵¹ The fact that the common human nature found in Socrates is not the common human nature found in Plato proves it to be singularized; at the same time, owing to its less than numerical unity, it can be made an intentional universal concept, because of its similarity; there are as it were many individual similar patterns. Therefore, Socrates is this man (common nature singularized, expressed by "this"), and he is also a man (common nature universalized, expressed by "a"), since Socrates being this man is also a man. Were this common nature denied its minor unity, which exists prior to the intellective act, it would be impossible for us to explain why we cannot derive a specific concept from Socrates and a stone as well as from Socrates and Plato. All science thereby would vanish into nothingness. Hence we can rightly credit great actual value to this thesis advanced by Duns Scotus.

As to the indifference of the common nature, it must be attributed to the paradox of the one and the multiple proper to finite beings. According to this, the nature, because it is in Socrates as well as in Plato, proves to be multiple and yet it is one as to its similarity in both. This common nature is *real* since we find it singularized in individuals, and universal when objectivized; thus it is indifferent, because effectible and objectivable. But let us remember that such indifference is arrived at through Scotistic abstract knowledge, which, as has been said, causes no detraction whatsoever from the abundant wealth of the existing singular, but

⁵⁰ *Metaph.*, VII q. 13 n. 21; VII 421.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, n. 23; VII 424.

merely attains the object without considering it as present and existing.

This doctrine of the *natura communis* and its *unitas minor quam numeralis* reveals a deep and mysterious truth. It tells of the radical contingency of the universe. The common nature is our "faillie de néant" that discloses us as finite, not infinite, beings. God alone, Scotus tells us, is his own singular nature: "Natura communis non est per se ipsam haec seu individualis. Solummodo in Deo est Natura seu deitas per se haec."⁵²

Can Scotus' doctrine of the common nature be compared to Charles Sanders Peirce's categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness? It is notable that Peirce was influenced by Duns Scotus to some extent on this matter, and there is no doubt as to his great admiration for the Subtle Doctor, whom he calls "a vast logical genius" and states that he himself is a "Scotistic realist." If correct, Peirce's firstness, secondness, and thirdness would correspond to Scotus' three universals: Firstness, to the physical universal *in re*; Secondness, to the metaphysical universal *in mente*; and Thirdness, to absolute nature considered in its indifference to universality or to singularity. Still we are not sure that Peirce's thirdness can be said to be equivalent to Scotus' indifference of the common nature. It appears to us rather as a form of exaggerated realism. In Peirce's own words, "I am myself a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe."⁵³

The third step towards making the person is haecceity: the principle of individuation which Scotus defines as the *ultima realitas entis*. This principle contracts the common nature to individual numerical unity as *thisness*. The contraction proceeds to this matter, form, composite which make the individual.

Principium individuationis verum est haecceitas, id est quaedam differentia vel proprietas, quae huic rei non alii rei, non nisi Socrati non Platoni, competit vel competere potest. Socratas est principium quare Socrates est individuum. Ulterior ratio non est quaerenda quia haec differentia vel proprietas est ultima realitas entis.⁵⁴

⁵² *Op. Oxon.*, II d. 3 q. 1 n. 9; XII 55. As stated by Mingès, *op. cit.*, I, p. 69.

⁵³ Charles K. McKeon, "Peirce's Scotistic Realism," *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce*, edited by Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young, p. 238.

⁵⁴ P. Mingès, *Joannis Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica*, Vol. I, p. 65.

The common nature is inseparable from haecceity which contracts it; both are modes of one and the same individual. Neither indeterminate matter nor accident, such as quantity or quality, can serve as the principle of individuation, because nothing indeterminate, such as matter, nor an accident, such as quantity or quality, can be the principle of substantial determination. Scotus' haecceity principle, it is clear, is *toto coelo* different from Peirce's principle. The former is substantial, the latter, although nominally Scotistic, is relational and therefore accidental, thereby destroying Scotus' careful avoidance of individuation *per accidens*. Scotus' principle of individuation shows itself to be a dignifying of the singular individual, and especially of man. It testifies that matter, the lowest element of the composite, is not and cannot be the cause of real things, especially of man. It testifies that individuals are not an Averroistic series made like paper dolls out of one and the same stuff, but are each a unique *thisness* standing apart and high in perfection.

The fourth and final step leads from the individual to the person. Metaphysically speaking, the person adds absolutely nothing to the individual man, except the fact of being *sui juris*, the self-possessor of self in one's ultimate solitude. "Ad personitatem requiritur ultima solitudo sive negatio dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis ad personam alterius naturae."⁵⁵ Psychologically speaking, the individual man is called a personality; metaphysically speaking, a person. We may compare the individual as such to a photographic negative and the person as such to the positive picture. The same elements appear in both film and picture, and so also the same elements belong to the individual and to the person. But the negative film is susceptible of a further touch, just as the individual is open to an hypostasis, whereas the positive picture cannot be further altered, and the person is not open to anything more since it is sealed within its ultimate solitude.

The Supreme Importance of Love

Duns Scotus' philosophy is a philosophy of love. Because of this, it answers a craving of the present generation which is so greatly concerned with love in liberty of action. For Duns Scotus, Gemelli writes, "all that is real is love: will-power, action, science, grace, beatific vision and even thought itself, in as much as it is dependent

⁵⁵ *Op. Oxon.*, III d. 1 q. 1 n. 17; XIV 45.

upon the will";⁵⁶ and Longpré points out that "a great and powerful synthesis completely ruled by the idea of love shows up in bold relief in the theological and philosophical work of the Blessed Duns Scotus."⁵⁷

Love might even be said to characterize our atomic age, were it not for the fact that often its true meaning has, partly through Freudian influences, been degraded into mere sex. Since love has in a large measure been overrun by sexual passion, there has been widespread theory and practice blurring its very notion and leaving "no room for Agape which lives not by making claims but by giving."⁵⁸ Again, it would seem impossible to have a philosophy of love when rationalism and atheism prevail. When man has repeated Prometheus' theft of the divine fire and determined to become god himself, atheistic philosophy yields a solipsism contrary to the communion of love. At the same time, there has been a great practical reawakening to real love, with its scorn for sham and its yearning for true otherness. Moreover, scientific progress has expanded our horizons beyond our own petty interests. Communications having increased to dimensions and frequency heretofore unimagined, societies have been drawn closer together in every sphere of life. Most striking still is the religious ecumenism that aims at union in the one fold prayed for and prophesied by Christ. Teilhard de Chardin has foretold this planetisation as "the sublime call of that which goes by the name of love."⁵⁹

Duns Scotus' main concern is focused on the nature and the primacy of love. He proves love to be essentially free to say yes or no to anything, thus disengaging it from natural appetite and the passions, and thus also disengaging it from the determination of the intellect. Kierkegaard's theory of choice, which asserts that liberty is the deepest characteristic of human beings, savors of Duns Scotus' own appreciation and doctrine on this matter. Whereas natural appetite is *per se* necessitated by its object, since it is a natural inclination towards one's own good and perfection and hence a capacity to receive, love, on the contrary, is a will free to give. "Voluntas est libera per essentiam; est appetitus cum ratione

⁵⁶ Agostino Gemelli, *Le message de saint François au monde moderne*, traduit de l'italien par Ph. Mazoyer (Paris: Lethielleux, 1948), p. 58.

⁵⁷ Ephrem Longpré, *La Philosophie du Bienheureux Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: Société et librairie S. François d'Assise, 1924), p. 160.

⁵⁸ *Time*, January 24th, 1964, p. 59.

⁵⁹ Claude Cuénot, *Teilhard de Chardin* (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1963), p. 48.

liber, propter amatum." For this reason, since it is better to give than to receive, its *ratio formalis* is far nobler than that of natural appetite; it is free otherness. "Ratio autem formalior voluntatis est magis libertas quam ratio appetitus."⁶⁰

The immense service Duns Scotus' philosophy renders by shedding light on real and false, on perfect and imperfect love, cannot be overestimated. It offers the best solution to such human problems as domestic, racial, and religious. For were love rightly understood, the married couple could choose to undergo the transformation that leads to oblation love; the racial strifes resolve in brotherhood; and the different creeds unite in deeds of charity.

Love, according to Scotus, can be more or less perfect. Imperfect love is primarily self-seeking: "Amor concupiscentiae vel commodi, utilis." It is imperfect because it seeks the beloved in view of some advantage or pleasure: "Qui est propter aliud ut est bonum mihi."⁶¹ Who does not see that imperfect love is impeded in its freedom by these selfish motives? If carried to an extreme it turns up a sterile narcissism.

Real love is unselfish, for it is heterocentric: *Propter amatum ut est in se bonum*. Being free, it is generous, and it is generous because it is perfect; that is to say, the more perfect the person and his love, the more liberal will he prove to be because love is essentially, formally, and effectively communicative. Hence, since God is infinite and absolute perfection, he is also absolute liberality, both intrinsically and extrinsically.

Duns Scotus states his own canon of liberality-love in glowing words: Every agent acts according to his degree of perfection; an absolutely perfect agent overflows with absolutely perfect liberality. On the contrary, one who acts for self-interest does not love with liberality but out of a certain amount of egotism. Man proves himself to be liberal when he does not expect a reward and gives all that he has *propter amatum*.

Liberality is, of course, found in nature—the sun, for instance, is prodigal of its light and warmth to plants, animals, and men. But its liberality is neither conscious nor free; it is blindly necessitated as all of nature is. When St. Francis of Assisi sang his Cantic of the Sun, he directed his praise not to the sun as such, but to God, its maker, through the sun, his creature.

⁶⁰ *Op. Oxon.*, II d. 25 q. unica n. 16; XIII 210.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, d. 21 q. 2 n. 2; XIII 139.

toiled until 1938 investigating and photographing the codices of Scotus, as well as restoring the text of the *Metaphysica*.

The Scotist Commission, heir to all this busy activity, separated the genuine works of Scotus from the spurious, adding to the edited works those yet unedited, and considered once more the criteria used for restoring a genuine text by the editors of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and those of the critical edition of the Vulgate and other works of Christian antiquity. Thus the Commission determined its own method as regards principles for arriving at a true text or drawing up a critical apparatus and indicating the sources and various traditions.

Since Duns Scotus is the Subtle Doctor not merely for theologians and philosophers but also for editors, it was necessary to find and to adjust to this edition an almost unique method of procedure. Thus, for example, a prolonged study of not one but more than three hundred codices and over thirty editions of the *Ordinatio* showed that neither the rule of the "majority" or antiquity of codices, nor the rule of the soundness of a text, nor the famous rule, "The shorter reading the more likely," could be employed to find the true text of Scotus. Since Scotus did not finish his works, particularly the central and basic work, the *Ordinatio*, which was completed by his disciples, each following his own way, it is no wonder that there are great discrepancies in his writings and that questions were asked shortly after his death as to which of the greatly varying codices contained Scotus' own reading. Moreover, since we possess no autograph copy, no apograph or exact copy of an autograph manuscript, it was necessary after much thought, discussion and labor to work out some reliable principle on the basis of which we could decide on the genuine text. We have been successful in our endeavor, because a few years after Scotus' death his *Ordinatio* was widely disseminated and disagreement arose among his disciples and adversaries as to which had been the true reading of the great teacher. Thus a commission was set up, which declared that a certain copy of the *Ordinatio*, already in circulation, was the actual writing of Scotus.⁵ This medieval edition, the only one of its kind, is in codex 137 in the municipal library of Assisi (codex A),⁶ and in it we find carefully indicated which texts are not in Scotus' own

⁵ Cf. C. Balić, "Die kritische Textausgabe der Werke des Johannes Duns Scotus," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 43 (1961), 303-317.

⁶ Cf. *Disquisitio historico-critica*, 12*-23*; 259*-70*.

II. IMPORTANCE, NECESSITY, AND UTILITY OF THE CRITICAL EDITION

If we bear in mind that the later editions of Scotus' main work, the *Ordinatio* or *Opus Oxoniense*, differ among themselves to such an extent that in one edition there are whole passages missing from another, that in one edition one-hundred pages are called "an addition," while another mentions no such "addition," and that Cavellus, in the edition appropriated by Wadding, admits he has omitted unintelligible additions which contain unsound teaching¹³ or make no sense, we see immediately the importance, necessity, and utility of the edition now being prepared by the Scotistic Commission.

Certainly, to expect the Vatican edition of Scotus to transform Scotism into Thomism is just as vain as to pretend that the Leonine edition of St. Thomas transformed Thomism into Scotism. Once this is admitted, it is still true, as Gilson has pointed out, that "l'image future de Duns Scot, sera, de toute manière, infiniment plus sûre, car il ne faut pas oublier que, nous apportant pour la première fois un texte critiquement contrôlé, tout ce que l'édition nouvelle conserve de l'ancienne est, en fait, nouveau. . ."¹⁴ Indeed, all the old elements in the *Ordinatio* which criticism upholds as genuine may be thought of as something new, for in addition to many other reasons, now for the first time the text is critically confirmed. To study fruitfully and in a fitting manner the works of so great a teacher, one must be morally certain that he possesses an authentic text. However, in the course of centuries, and particularly in the last decades, so many doubts and suspicions about Scotus' text have accumulated that most scholars have given up all hopes of discovering what he himself wrote. This situation has in turn led to the perpetuation of old errors and false opinions about the Subtle Doctor. Even Scotus' faithful disciples, using Vivès' printing of the only complete edition, viz., Wadding's of 1639, encountered so many "additions" that they were forced several times to admit frankly, "Note that this passage is found in an addition. Perhaps it is not genuine."¹⁵

¹³ "Delevimus . . . additiones multas, quarum nonnullae videbantur inintelligibiles, aliae malam doctrinam continebant." Cf. *I. Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, Vivès edition, VIII, 4; Balić, "Die kritische Textausgabe," p. 313.

¹⁴ E. Gilson, "Duns Scot à la lumière des recherches historico-critiques," in *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Rome, 1951), p. 516.

¹⁵ P. Minges, *Ioannis Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica*, I (Quaracchi, 1930), 564, n. 6.

In our edition, the texts which in Wadding are called "additions" and are printed in italics, are divided into *three classes*, so that the authentic additions by Scotus, his erasures, and the passages interpolated by his disciples are shown separately, each under its own heading. Furthermore, many "added texts" in Wadding's edition are not in fact additions, while many others, printed without any note, should be placed among the texts added by either Scotus or his disciples. In the apparatus of sources are indicated authors to whom Scotus paid constant attention, such contemporaries as Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Giles of Rome, but there is hardly mention of Thomas Aquinas. This shows how wrong are those who until now have continued to regard Aquinas as Scotus' rival, as though the Subtle Doctor had wished to overthrow every single opinion advanced by St. Thomas.

Again, since Scotus does not follow the classical form of setting down the question, it is often difficult, because of the many opposing viewpoints, to know whether Scotus or his opponent is speaking. This difficulty is increased by the fact that Scotus often refers back to what he had already said in relation to the question at issue. Hence in the critical edition the reader is led, as it were, by the hand (in apparatus T.) to find the places to which Scotus refers, parallel passages, and other useful references.

Nor should we fail to mention that in the ample apparatus of variant readings one can perceive that the love Scotus' disciples felt for their master led them to change the text by omissions, additions, and alterations in the belief that had Scotus given his work the final touches he would himself have made those corrections.

Lastly, since great interest is shown today in the development of an author's teaching, it is worth noting that whereas the text of the *Ordinatio* or *Opus Oxoniense* was always thought to be the beginning of Scotistic teaching, it is now proved in the Vatican edition that it represents the terminus and fruit of the various lectures Scotus held at Cambridge, Oxford, and Paris. Many of these "lecture notes," hitherto unknown or thought spurious, allow us to plot the formative progress and working out of Scotus' teaching, and to determine by direct dialogue with him what was really his position.

We shall now cite a few examples to show that by publishing for the first time many texts written by Scotus "outside the works," the critical edition can lead to a more accurate understanding of

four literary forms in which the *Ordinatio* gives Scotus' doctrine of the constitution of the divine persons, as well as various inedited *Reportationes*, we arrive at the following conclusion.

It is certain from the *Lectura Oxoniensis*, of which the first part appears in vol. 16 of the Vatican edition and the second is in press, that as a young man Scotus taught that the opinion according to which the divine persons are constituted by absolute properties is compatible with faith, the Church's doctrine, and sound reason. So he declared it more probable than the commonly accepted opinion. Yet later he inclined more and more towards the commonly accepted opinion, so that when he commented on Bk. 3 of the *Sentences* he thought that the opinion *de relativis*, earlier considered the less likely because of the greater difficulty to find supporting arguments for it, was more probable, though the other was not absolutely groundless or against faith.²⁸

More specifically, Duns Scotus never denied that the divine persons are constituted by something relative, but he tried from the start to find whether it was enough to say that the persons are constituted and distinguished only by relationships (i.e., the Father by fatherhood, the Son by sonhood, and the Holy Spirit by passive expiration), and whether the relative principle is the prime constituent properly and strictly so-called.

We could go on and offer many other examples of the practical value of Scotus' critical edition, but this would be beyond the limits of this paper. If a new image of Scotus emerges from the critical edition of his genuine works such as the *Ordinatio*, what shall we say of those works—they are fully half of Wadding's edition—which will no longer be counted among Scotus' writings, because they are proved to be spurious? It suffices to recall the *De rerum principio*, wrongly attributed to Scotus, where on account of the sentence, "I am returning to the position of Avicbron" (qq. 7-8), many authors have concluded that Scotus really wished to return to Avicbron and embrace all his errors. For, as St. Thomas had seen, Avicbron has the seeds of monism, pantheism, a false idea of the material universe, of the hylomorphic composition of simple substances, etc. Hence Gilson could rightly say:

"On ne dira jamais assez quel ravage a causé la fausse attribution du 'De rerum principio' à Duns Scotus . . . Ravages his-

²⁸ Cf. "Adnotationes ad distinctiones vigesiman sextam et trigesiman nonam," in *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, VI (Vatican City, 1963), 1*-26*.