AN ANALYSIS
OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM
THE NEW CLASS

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industrial revolution or of the struggle of the industrial proletariat for a better life. It was no accident that the frightful poverty and brutalization of the masses which accompanied industrial change had a powerful influence on Marx. His most important work, *Das Kapital*, contains a number of important and stirring pages on this topic. The recurring crises, which were characteristic of the capitalism of the nineteenth century, together with the poverty and the rapid increase of the population, logically led Marx to the belief that revolution was the only solution. Marx did not consider revolution to be inevitable in all countries, particularly not in those where democratic institutions were already a tradition of social life. He cited as examples of such countries, in one of his talks, the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States. However, one can conclude from his ideas, taken as a whole, that the inevitability of revolution was one of his basic beliefs. He believed in revolution and preached it; he was a revolutionary.

Marx's revolutionary ideas, which were conditional and not universally applicable, were changed by Lenin into absolute and universal principles. In *The Infantile Disorder of "Left-Wing" Communism*, perhaps his most dogmatic work, Lenin developed these principles still more, differing with Marx's position that revolution was avoidable in certain countries. He said that Great Britain could no longer be regarded as a country in which revolution was avoidable, because during the First World War she had become a militaristic power, and therefore the British working class had no other choice but revolution. Lenin erred, not only in his failure to understand that "British militarism" was only a temporary, wartime phase of development, but because he failed to foresee the further development of democracy and economic progress in Great Britain or other Western countries. He also did not understand the nature of the English trade-union movement. He placed too much emphasis on his own, or Marxian, deterministic, scientific ideas and paid too little attention to the objective social role and
ment nor did he expect it. History betrayed this great master as it has others who have attempted to interpret its laws.

What has been the nature of the development since Marx?

In the 1870's, the formation of corporations and monopolies had begun in countries where the industrial revolution had already taken place, such as Germany, England, and the United States. This development was in full swing by the beginning of the twentieth century. Scientific analyses were made of it by Hobson, Hilferding, and others. Lenin, in *Imperialism, the Final Stage of Capitalism*, made a political analysis, based mainly on these authors, containing predictions which have proved mostly inaccurate.

Marx's theories about the increasing impoverishment of the working class were not borne out by developments in those countries from which his theories had been derived. However, as Hugh Seton-Watson states in *From Lenin to Malenkov*, they appeared to be reasonably accurate for the most part in the case of the agrarian East European countries. Thus, while in the West his stature was reduced to that of a historian and scholar, Marx became the prophet of a new era in eastern Europe. His teachings had an intoxicating effect, similar to a new religion.

The situation in western Europe that contributed to the theories of Engels and Marx is described by André Maurois in the Yugoslav edition of *The History of England*:

When Engels visited Manchester in 1844, he found 350,000 workers crushed and crowded into damp, dirty, broken-down houses where they breathed an atmosphere resembling a mixture of water and coal. In the mines, he saw half-naked women, who were treated like the lowest of draft animals. Children spent the day in dark tunnels, where they were employed in opening and closing the primitive openings for ventilation, and in other difficult tasks. In the lace industry, exploitation reached such a point that four-year-old children worked for virtually no pay.

Engels lived to see an entirely different picture of Great Britain, but he saw a still more horrible and—what is more important—hopeless poverty in Russia, the Balkans, Asia and Africa.

Technological improvements brought about vast and concrete changes in the West, immense from every point of view. They led to the formation of monopolies, and to the partition of the world into spheres of interest for the developed countries and for the monopolies. They also led to the First World War and the October Revolution.

In the developed countries the rapid rise in production and the acquisition of colonial sources of materials and markets materially changed the position of the working class. The struggle for reform, for better material conditions, together with the adoption of parliamentary forms of government, became more real and valuable than revolutionary ideals. In such places revolution became nonsensical and unrealistic.

The countries which were not yet industrialized, particularly Russia, were in an entirely different situation. They found themselves in a dilemma; they had either to become industrialized, or to discontinue active participation on the stage of history, turning into captives of the developed countries and their monopolies, thus doomed to degeneracy. Local capital and the class and parties representing it were too weak to solve the problems of rapid industrialization. In these countries revolution became an inescapable necessity, a vital need for the nation, and only one class could bring it about—the proletariat, or the revolutionary party representing it.

The reason for this is that there is an immutable law—that each human society and all individuals participating in it strive to increase and perfect production. In doing this they come in conflict with other societies and individuals, so that they compete with each other in order to survive. This increase and expansion of production constantly faces natural and social barriers, such as individual, political, legal, and international
were urgent and specific concrete reasons—international, economic, political—for revolution. The basic reason—the vital need for industrial change—was common to all the countries such as Russia, China, and Yugoslavia, where revolution took place.

It was historically inevitable that most of the European socialist movements after Marx were not only materialistic and Marxist, but to a considerable degree ideologically exclusive. Against them were united all the forces of the old society: church, school, private ownership, government and, more important, the vast power machinery which the European countries had developed since early times in the face of the constant continental wars.

Anyone who wants to change the world fundamentally must first of all interpret it fundamentally and "without error." Every new movement must be ideologically exclusive, especially if revolution is the only way victory can be won. And if this movement is successful, its very success must strengthen its beliefs and ideas. Though successes through "adventurous" parliamentary methods and strikes strengthened the reformist trend in the German and other Social Democratic parties, the Russian workers, who could not improve their position by one kopeck without bloody liquidations, had no choice but to use weapons to escape despair and death by starvation.

The other countries of eastern Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria—do not fall under this rule, at least not the first three countries. They did not experience a revolution, since the Communist system was imposed on them by the power of the Soviet Army. They did not even press for industrial change, at least not by the Communist method, for some of them had already attained it. In these countries, revolution was imposed from the outside and from above, by foreign bayonets and the machinery of force. The Communist movements were weak, except in the most developed of the countries, Czechoslovakia, where the Communist
movement had closely resembled leftist and parliamentary socialist movements up to the time of direct Soviet intervention in the war and the coup d'état of February 1948. Since the Communists in these countries were weak, the substance and form of their Communism had to be identical with that of the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. imposed its system on them, and the domestic Communists adopted it gladly. The weaker Communism was, the more it had to imitate even in form its "big brother"—totalitarian Russian Communism.

Countries such as France and Italy, which had relatively strong Communist movements, had a hard time keeping up with the industrially better-developed countries, and thus ran into social difficulties. Since they had already passed through democratic and industrial revolutions, their Communist movements differed greatly from those in Russia, Yugoslavia, and China. Therefore, in France and Italy revolution did not have a real chance. Since they were living and operating in an environment of political democracy, even the leaders of their Communist parties were not able to free themselves entirely of parliamentary illusions. As far as revolution was concerned, they tended to rely more on the international Communist movement and the aid of the U.S.S.R than on their own revolutionary power. Their followers, considering their leaders to be fighters against poverty and misery, naively believed that the party was fighting for a broader and truer democracy.

Modern Communism began as an idea with the inception of modern industry. It is dying out or being eliminated in those countries where industrial development has achieved its basic aims. It flourishes in those countries where this has not yet happened.

The historical role of Communism in the undeveloped countries has determined the course and the character of the revolution which it has had to bring about.

Character of the Revolution

1.

History shows that in countries where Communist revolutions have taken place other parties too have been dissatisfied with existing conditions. The best example is Russia, where the party which accomplished the Communist revolution was not the only revolutionary party.

However, only the Communist parties were both revolutionary in their opposition to the status quo and staunch and consistent in their support of the industrial transformation. In practice, this meant a radical destruction of established ownership relations. No other party went so far in this respect. None was "industrial" to that degree.

It is less clear why these parties had to be socialist in their program. Under the backward conditions existing in Czarist Russia, capitalist private ownership not only showed itself incapable of rapid industrial transformation, but actually obstructed it. The private property class had developed in a country in which extremely powerful feudal relationships still existed, while monopolies of more developed countries retained their grip on this enormous area abounding in raw materials and markets.

Czarist Russia, according to its history, had to be a latecomer
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with respect to the industrial revolution. It is the only European country which did not pass through the Reformation and the Renaissance. It did not have anything like the medieval European city-states. Backward, semi-feudal, with absolutist monarchy and a bureaucratic centralism, with a rapid increase of the proletariat in several centers, Russia found herself in the whirlpool of modern world capitalism, and in the snare of the financial interests of the gigantic banking centers.

Lenin states in his work *Imperialism, the Final Stage of Capitalism* that three-fourths of the capital of the large banks in Russia was in the hands of foreign capitalists. Trotsky in his history of the Russian revolution emphasizes that foreigners controlled forty per cent of the shares of industrial capital in Russia, and that this percentage was even greater in some leading industries. As for Yugoslavia, foreigners had a decisive influence in the most important branches of Yugoslav economy. These facts alone do not prove anything. But they show that foreign capitalists used their power to check progress in these countries, to develop them exclusively as their own sources of raw materials and cheap labor, with the result that these nations became unprogressive and even began to decline.

The party which had the historic task of carrying out the revolution in these countries had to be anti-capitalistic in its internal policy and anti-imperialistic in its foreign policy.

Internally, domestic capital was weak, and was largely an instrument or affiliate of foreign capital. It was not the capitalist class but another class, the proletariat which was arising from the increasing poverty of the peasantry, that was vitally interested in the industrial revolution. Just as the elimination of outrageous exploitation was a matter of life and death for those who already were proletarians, so was industrialization a matter of survival for those who in their turn were about to become proletarians. The movement which represented both of these had to be anti-capitalistic, that is, socialistic in its ideas, slogans and pledges.

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The revolutionary party could not seriously contemplate execution of an industrial revolution unless it concentrated all domestic resources in its own hands, particularly those of native capitalists against whom the masses were also embittered because of severe exploitation and the use of inhumane methods. The revolutionary party had to take a similar stand against foreign capital.

Other parties were unable to follow a similar program. All of them either aspired to a return to the old system, to preservation of vested, static relationships; or at best, to gradual and peaceful development. Even the parties which were anti-capitalistic, as for example the SRs (Socialist-Revolutionary Party) in Russia, aspired toward returning society to idyllic primitive peasant life. Even the socialist parties such as the Mensheviks in Russia did not go farther than to push for the violent overthrow of the barriers to free capitalist development. They took the point of view that it was necessary to have fully developed capitalism in order to arrive at socialism later. However, the problem here was different; both a return to the old system and unhindered development of capitalism were impossible for these countries. Neither solution was capable, under the given international and internal conditions, of resolving the urgent problem of further development of these countries, i.e., their industrial revolutions.

Only the party which was in favor of the anti-capitalist revolution and rapid industrialization had prospects for success. Obviously that party had to be, in addition, socialist in its convictions. But since it was obliged to operate under prevailing conditions in general, and in the labor or socialist movements, such a party had to depend ideologically on the concept of the inevitability and usefulness of modern industry as well as on the tenet that revolution was unavoidable. This concept already existed, it was necessary only to modify it. The concept was Marxism—its revolutionary aspect. Association with revolutionary Marxism, or with the European socialist move-
ment, was natural for the party then. Later, with the development of the revolution and with the organizational changes in the developed countries, it became just as essential for it to separate itself from the reformism of European socialism.

The inevitability of revolution and of rapid industrialization, which exacted enormous sacrifices and involved ruthless violence, required not only promises but faith in the possibility of the kingdom of heaven on earth. Advancing, as others also do, along the line of least resistance, the supporters of revolution and industrialization often departed from established Marxist and socialist doctrine. However, it was impossible for them to shed the doctrine entirely.

Capitalism and capitalist relationships were the proper and at the given moment the inevitable forms and techniques by which society expressed its needs and aspirations for improving and expanding production. In Great Britain, in the first half of the nineteenth century, capitalism improved and expanded production. And just as the industrialists in Britain had to destroy the peasantry in order to attain a higher degree of production, the industrialists, or the bourgeoisie, in Russia had to become a victim of the industrial revolution. The participants and the forms were different, but the law was the same in both cases.

In both instances socialism was inevitable—as a slogan and pledge, as a faith and a lofty ideal, and, in fact, as a particular form of government and ownership which would facilitate the industrial revolution and make possible improvement and expansion of production.

2.

All the revolutions of the past originated after new economic or social relationships had begun to prevail, and the old politi-
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This leads to an apparent contradiction. If the conditions for a new society were not sufficiently prevalent, then who needed the revolution? Moreover, how was the revolution possible? How could it survive in view of the fact that the new social relationships were not yet in the formative process in the old society?

No revolution or party had ever before set itself to the task of building social relationships or a new society. But this was the primary objective of the Communist revolution.

Communist leaders, though no better acquainted than others with the laws which govern society, discovered that in the country in which their revolution was possible, industrialization was also possible, particularly when it involved a transformation of society in keeping with their ideological hypothesis. Experience—the success of revolution under "unfavorable" conditions—confirmed this for them; the "building of socialism" did likewise. This strengthened their illusion that they knew the laws of social development. In fact, they were in the position of making a blueprint for a new society, and then of starting to build it, making corrections here and leaving out something there, all the while adhering closely to their plans.

Industrialization, as an inevitable, legitimate necessity of society, and the Communist way of accomplishing it, joined forces in the countries of Communist revolutions.

However, neither of these, though they progressed together and on parallel tracks, could achieve success overnight. After the completion of the revolution, someone had to shoulder the responsibility for industrialization. In the West, this role was taken over by the economic forces of capitalism liberated from the despotic political chains, while in the countries of Communist revolutions no similar forces existed and, thus, their function had to be taken over by the revolutionary organs themselves, the new authority, that is, the revolutionary party.

In earlier revolutions, revolutionary force and violence became a hindrance to the economy as soon as the old order was
overthrown. In Communist revolutions, force and violence are a condition for further development and even progress. In the words of earlier revolutionaries, force and violence were only a necessary evil and a means to an end. In the words of Communists, force and violence are elevated to the lofty position of a cult and an ultimate goal. In the past, the classes and forces which made up a new society already existed before the revolution erupted. The Communist revolutions are the first which have had to create a new society and new social forces.

Even as the revolutions in the West had inevitably to end in democracy after all the "aberrations" and "withdrawals," in the East, the revolutions had to end in despotism. The methods of terror and violence in the West became needless and ridiculous, and even a hindrance in accomplishing the revolution for the revolutionaries and revolutionary parties. In the East, the case was the opposite. Not only did despotism continue in the East because the transformation of industry required so much time, but, as we shall see later, it lasted long after industrialization had taken place.

3.

There are other basic differences between Communist revolutions and earlier ones. Earlier revolutions, though they had reached the point of readiness in an economy and a society, were unable to break out without advantageous conditions.

We now know the general conditions necessary for the eruption and success of a revolution. However, every revolution has, in addition to these general conditions, its peculiarities which make its planning and execution possible.

War, or more precisely, national collapse of the state organization, was unnecessary for past revolutions, at least for the larger ones. Until now, however, this has been a basic condition for the victory of Communist revolutions. This is even valid
ship, which emerged from the revolution, signified both the end of the Jacobin revolution and the beginning of the rule of the bourgeoisie. In every case, although one party played a decisive role in the earlier revolutions, the other parties did not surrender their independence. Although suppression and dispersion existed, they could be enforced only for a brief time. The parties could not be destroyed and would always emerge anew. Even the Paris Commune, which the Communists take as the forerunner of their revolution and their state, was a multi-party revolution.

A party may have played the chief, and even an exclusive, role in a particular phase of a revolution. But no previous party was ideologically, or as an organization, centralized to the degree that the Communist Party was. Neither the Puritans in the English revolution nor the Jacobins in the French revolution were bound by the same philosophical and ideological views, although the first belonged to a religious sect. From the organizational point of view the Jacobins were a federation of clubs; the Puritans were not even that. Only contemporary Communist revolutions pushed compulsory parties to the forefront, which were ideologically and organizationally monolithic.

In every case one thing is certain: in all earlier revolutions the necessity for revolutionary methods and parties disappeared with the end of civil war and of foreign intervention, and these methods and parties had to be done away with. After Communist revolutions, the Communists continue with both the methods and the forms of the revolution, and their party soon attains the fullest degree of centralism and ideological exclusiveness.

Lenin expressly emphasized this during the revolution itself in enumerating his conditions for acceptance in the Comintern:*

> In the present epoch of acute civil war, a Communist Party will be able to perform its duty only if it is organized in the

most centralized manner, only if iron discipline bordering on military discipline prevails in it, and if its party center is a powerful and authoritative organ, wielding wide powers and enjoying the universal confidence of the members of the party.

And to this, Stalin appended, in *Foundations of Leninism*:

This is the position in regard to discipline in the party in the period of struggle preceding the achievement of the dictatorship.

The same, but to an even greater degree, must be said about discipline in the party after the dictatorship has been achieved.

The revolutionary atmosphere and vigilance, insistence on ideological unity, political and ideological exclusiveness, political and other centralism do not cease after assuming control. On the contrary, they become even more intensified.

Ruthlessness in methods, exclusiveness in ideas, and monopoly in authority in the earlier revolutions lasted more or less as long as the revolutions themselves. Since revolution in the Communist revolution was only the first act of the despotic and totalitarian authority of a group, it is difficult to forecast the duration of that authority.

In earlier revolutions, including the Reign of Terror in France, superficial attention was paid to the elimination of real oppositionists. No attention was paid to the elimination of those who might become oppositionists. The eradication and persecution of some social or ideological groups in the religious wars of the Middle Ages was the only exception to this. From theory and practice, Communists know that they are in conflict with all other classes and ideologies, and behave accordingly. They are fighting against not only actual but also potential opposition. In the Baltic countries, thousands of people were liquidated overnight on the basis of documents indicating previously held ideological and political views. The massacre of several thousand Polish officers in the Katyn Forest was of similar character. In the case of Communism, long after the revolution is over, terrorist and oppressive methods continue to be used. Sometimes these are perfected and become more extensive than in the revolution, as in the case of the liquidation of the Kulaks. Ideological exclusiveness and intolerance are intensified after the revolution. Even when it is able to reduce physical oppression, the tendency of the ruling party is to strengthen the prescribed ideology—Marxism-Leninism.

Earlier revolutions, particularly the so-called bourgeois ones, attached considerable significance to the establishment of individual freedoms immediately following cessation of the revolutionary terror. Even the revolutionaries considered it important to assure the legal status of the citizenry. Independent administration of justice was an inevitable final result of all these revolutions. The Communist regime in the U.S.S.R. is still remote from independent administration of justice after forty years of tenure. The final results of earlier revolutions were often greater legal security and greater civil rights. This cannot be said of the Communist revolution.

There is another vast difference between the earlier revolutions and contemporary Communist ones. Earlier revolutions, especially the greater ones, were a product of the struggles of the working classes, but their ultimate results fell to another class under whose intellectual and often organizational leadership the revolutions were accomplished. The bourgeoisie, in whose name the revolution was carried out, to a considerable extent harvested the fruits of the struggles of the peasants and sans-culottes. The masses of a nation also participated in a Communist revolution; however, the fruits of revolution do not fall to them, but to the bureaucracy. For the bureaucracy is nothing else but the party which carried out the revolution. In Communist revolutions, the revolutionary movements which carried out the revolutions are not liquidated. Communist revolutions may "eat their own children," but not all of them.
In fact, on completion of a Communist revolution, ruthless and underhanded deals inevitably are made between various groups and factions which disagree about the path of the future. Mutual accusations always revolve around dogmatic proof as to who is "objectively" or "subjectively" a greater counter-revolutionary or agent of internal and foreign "capitalism." Regardless of the manner in which these disagreements are resolved, the group that emerges victorious is the one that is the most consistent and determined supporter of industrialization along Communist principles, i.e., on the basis of total party monopoly, particularly of state organs in control of production. The Communist revolution does not devour those of its children who are needed for its future course—for industrialization. Revolutionaries who accepted the ideas and slogans of the revolution literally, naively believing in their materialization, are usually liquidated. The group which understood that revolution would secure authority, on a social-political-Communist basis, as an instrument of future industrial transformation, emerges victorious.

The Communist revolution is the first in which the revolutionaries and their allies, particularly the authority-wielding group, survived the revolution. Similar groups inevitably failed in earlier ones. The Communist revolution is the first to be carried out to the advantage of the revolutionaries. They, and the bureaucracy which forms around them, harvest its fruits. This creates in them, and in the broader echelons of the party, the illusion that theirs is the first revolution that remained true to the slogans on its banners.

4.

The illusions which the Communist revolution creates about its real aims are more permanent and extensive than those of earlier revolutions because the Communist revolution resolves relationships in a new way and brings about a new form of ownership. Earlier revolutions, too, inevitably resulted in major or minor changes in property relationships. But in those revolutions one form of private ownership superseded the others. In the Communist revolution this is not the case; the change is radical and deep-rooted, and a collective ownership suppresses private ownership.

The Communist revolution, while still in process of development, destroys capitalist, land-holding, private ownership, i.e., that ownership which makes use of foreign labor forces. This immediately creates the belief that the revolutionary promise of a new realm of equality and justice is being fulfilled. The party, or the state authority under its control, simultaneously undertakes extensive measures for industrialization. This also intensifies the belief that the time of freedom from want has finally arrived. Despotism and oppression are there, but they are accepted as temporary manifestations, to last only until the opposition of the expropriated authorities and counter-revolutionaries is stifled, and the industrial transformation is completed.

Several essential changes occur in the very process of industrialization. Industrialization in a backward country, especially if it has no assistance and is hindered from abroad, demands concentration of all material resources. Nationalization of industrial property and the land is the first concentration of property in the hands of the new regime. However, it does not, and can not, stop at this.

The newly originated ownership inevitably comes in conflict with other forms of ownership. The new ownership imposes itself by force on smaller owners who do not employ someone else's manpower, or to whom such manpower is unessential, i.e., on craftsmen, workers, small commercial merchants, and peasants. This expropriation of small property owners is effected even when it is not done for economic motives, i.e., in order to attain a higher degree of productivity.
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In the course of industrialization, the property of those elements who were not opposed to, or even assisted, the revolution is taken over. As a matter of form, the state also becomes the owner of this property. The state administers and manages the property. Private ownership ceases, or decreases to a role of secondary importance, but its complete disappearance is subject to the whim of the new men in authority.

This is experienced by the Communists and by some members of the masses as a complete liquidation of classes and the realization of a classless society. In fact, the old pre-revolutionary classes do disappear with the completion of industrialization and collectivization. There remains the spontaneous and unorganized displeasure of the mass of the people—a displeasure which neither ceases nor abates. Communist delusions and self-deceit about the "remnants" and "influence" of the "class enemy" still persist. But the illusion that the long-dreamed classless society arises by these means is complete, at least for the Communists themselves.

Every revolution, and even every war, creates illusions and is conducted in the name of unrealizable ideals. During the struggle the ideals seem real enough for the combatants; by the end they often cease to exist. Not so in the case of a Communist revolution. Those who carry out the Communist revolution as well as those among the lower echelons persist in their illusions long after the armed struggle. Despite oppression, despotism, unconcealed confiscations, and privileges of the ruling echelons, some of the people—and especially the Communists—retain the illusions contained in their slogans.

Although the Communist revolution may start with the most idealistic concepts, calling for wonderful heroism and gigantic effort, it sows the greatest and the most permanent illusions. Revolutions are inevitable in the lifetime of nations. They may result in despotism, but they also launch nations on paths previously blocked to them.

The Communist revolution cannot attain a single one of the ideals named as its motivating force. However, Communist revolution has brought about a measure of industrial civilization to vast areas of Europe and Asia. In this way, material bases have actually been created for a future freer society. Thus while bringing about the most complete despotism, the Communist revolution has also created the basis for the abolition of despotism. As the nineteenth century introduced modern industry to the West, the twentieth century will introduce modern industry to the East. The shadow of Lenin extends over the vast expanse of Eurasia in one way or another. In despotism form in China, in democratic form in India and Burma, all of the remaining Asiatic and other nations are inevitably entering an industrial revolution. The Russian revolution initiated this process. The process remains the incalculable and historically significant fact of the revolution.

5.

It might appear that Communist revolutions are mostly historical deceptions and chance occurrences. In a sense this is true: no other revolutions have required so many exceptional conditions; no other revolutions promised so much and accomplished so little. Demagoguery and misrepresentation are inevitable among the Communist leaders since they are forced to promise the most ideal society and "abolition of every exploitation."

However, it cannot be said that the Communists deceived the people, that is, that they purposely and consciously did something different from what they had promised. The fact is simply this: they were unable to accomplish that in which they so fanatically believed. They cannot acknowledge this even when forced to execute a policy contrary to everything promised before and during the revolution. From their point of view, such acknowledgment would be an admission that the
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In order to establish the nature of relationships which arise in the course of the Communist revolution and ultimately become established in the process of industrialization and collectivization, it is necessary to peer further into the role and manner of operation of the state under Communism. At present, it will be sufficient to point out that in Communism the state machinery is not the instrument which really determines social and property relationships; it is only the instrument by which these relationships are protected. In truth, everything is accomplished in the name of the state and through its regulations. The Communist Party, including the professional party bureaucracy, stands above the regulations and behind every single one of the state's acts.

It is the bureaucracy which formally uses, administers, and controls both nationalized and socialized property as well as the entire life of society. The role of the bureaucracy in society, i.e., monopolistic administration and control of national income and national goods, consigns it to a special privileged position. Social relations resemble state capitalism. The more so, because the carrying out of industrialization is effected not with the help of capitalists but with the help of the state machine. In fact, this privileged class performs that function, using the state machine as a cover and as an instrument.

Ownership is nothing other than the right of profit and control. If one defines class benefits by this right, the Communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the origin of a new form of ownership or of a new ruling and exploiting class.

In reality, the Communists were unable to act differently from any ruling class that preceded them. Believing that they were building a new and ideal society, they built it for themselves in the only way they could. Their revolution and their society do not appear either accidental or unnatural, but appear as a matter of course for a particular country and for prescribed periods of its development. Because of this, no matter how extensive and inhuman Communist tyranny has been,
society, in the course of a certain period—as long as industrialization lasts—has to and is able to endure this tyranny. Furthermore, this tyranny no longer appears as something inevitable, but exclusively as an assurance of the depredations and privileges of a new class.

In contrast to earlier revolutions, the Communist revolution, conducted in the name of doing away with classes, has resulted in the most complete authority of any single new class. Everything else is sham and an illusion.

The New Class

1.

Everything happened differently in the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries from what the leaders—even such prominent ones as Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and Bukharin—anticipated. They expected that the state would rapidly wither away, that democracy would be strengthened. The reverse happened. They expected a rapid improvement in the standard of living—there has been scarcely any change in this respect and, in the subjugated East European countries, the standard has even declined. In every instance, the standard of living has failed to rise in proportion to the rate of industrialization, which was much more rapid. It was believed that the differences between cities and villages, between intellectual and physical labor, would slowly disappear; instead these differences have increased. Communist anticipations in other areas—including their expectations for developments in the non-Communist world—have also failed to materialize.

The greatest illusion was that industrialization and collectivization in the U.S.S.R., and destruction of capitalist ownership, would result in a classless society. In 1936, when the new Constitution was promulgated, Stalin announced that the “exploiting class” had ceased to exist. The capitalist and other
classes of ancient origin had in fact been destroyed, but a new class, previously unknown to history, had been formed.

It is understandable that this class, like those before it, should believe that the establishment of its power would result in happiness and freedom for all men. The only difference between this and other classes was that it treated the delay in the realization of its illusions more crudely. It thus affirmed that its power was more complete than the power of any other class before in history, and its class illusions and prejudices were proportionally greater.

This new class, the bureaucracy, or more accurately the political bureaucracy, has all the characteristics of earlier ones as well as some new characteristics of its own. Its origin had its special characteristics also, even though in essence it was similar to the beginnings of other classes.

Other classes, too, obtained their strength and power by the revolutionary path, destroying the political, social, and other orders they met in their way. However, almost without exception, these classes attained power after new economic patterns had taken shape in the old society. The case was the reverse with new classes in the Communist systems. It did not come to power to complete a new economic order but to establish its own and, in so doing, to establish its power over society.

In earlier epochs the coming to power of some class, some part of a class, or of some party, was the final event resulting from its formation and its development. The reverse was true in the U.S.S.R. There the new class was definitely formed after it attained power. Its consciousness had to develop before its economic and physical powers, because the class had not taken root in the life of the nation. This class viewed its role in relation to the world from an idealistic point of view. Its practical possibilities were not diminished by this. In spite of its illusions, it represented an objective tendency toward industrialization. Its practical bent emanated from this tendency. The promise of an ideal world increased the faith in the ranks of the new class and sowed illusions among the masses. At the same time it inspired gigantic physical undertakings.

Because this new class had not been formed as a part of the economic and social life before it came to power, it could only be created in an organization of a special type, distinguished by a special discipline based on identical philosophic and ideological views of its members. A unity of belief and iron discipline was necessary to overcome its weaknesses.

The roots of the new class were implanted in a special party, of the Bolshevik type. Lenin was right in his view that his party was an exception in the history of human society, although he did not suspect that it would be the beginning of a new class.

To be more precise, the initiators of the new class are not found in the party of the Bolshevik type as a whole but in that stratum of professional revolutionaries who made up its core even before it attained power. It was not by accident that Lenin asserted after the failure of the 1905 revolution that only professional revolutionaries—men whose sole profession was revolutionary work—could build a new party of the Bolshevik type. It was still less accidental that even Stalin, the future creator of a new class, was the most outstanding example of such a professional revolutionary. The new ruling class has been gradually developing from this very narrow stratum of revolutionaries. These revolutionaries composed its core for a long period. Trotsky noted that in pre-revolutionary professional revolutionaries was the origin of the future Stalinist bureaucrat. What he did not detect was the beginning of a new class of owners and exploiters.

This is not to say that the new party and the new class are identical. The party, however, is the core of that class, and its base. It is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to define the limits of the new class and to identify its members. The new class may be said to be made up of those who have special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold.
THE NEW CLASS

Since administration is unavoidable in society, necessary administrative functions may be coexistent with parasitic functions in the same person. Not every member of the party is a member of the new class, any more than every artisan or member of the city party was a bourgeois.

In loose terms, as the new class becomes stronger and attains a more perceptible physiognomy, the role of the party diminishes. The core and the basis of the new class is created in the party and at its top, as well as in the state political organs. The once live, compact party, full of initiative, is disappearing to become transformed into the traditional oligarchy of the new class, irresistibly drawing into its ranks those who aspire to join the new class and repressing those who have any ideals.

The party makes the class, but the class grows as a result and uses the party as a basis. The class grows stronger, while the party grows weaker; this is the inescapable fate of every Communist party in power.

If it were not materially interested in production or if it did not have within itself the potentialities for the creation of a new class, no party could act in so morally and ideologically foolhardy a fashion, let alone stay in power for long. Stalin declared, after the end of the First Five-Year Plan: “If we had not created the apparatus, we would have failed!” He should have substituted “new class” for the word “apparatus,” and everything would have been clearer.

It seems unusual that a political party could be the beginning of a new class. Parties are generally the product of classes and strata which have become intellectually and economically strong. However, if one grasps the actual conditions in prerevolutionary Russia and in other countries in which Communism prevailed over national forces, it will be clear that a party of this type is the product of specific opportunities and that there is nothing unusual or accidental in this being so. Although the roots of Bolshevism reach far back into Russian history, the party is partly the product of the unique pattern of international relationships in which Russia found itself at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Russia was no longer able to live in the modern world as an absolute monarchy, and Russia’s capitalism was too weak and too dependent on the interests of foreign powers to make it possible to have an industrial revolution. This revolution could only be implemented by a new class, or by a change in the social order. As yet, there was no such class.

In history, it is not important who implements a process, it is only important that the process be implemented. Such was the case in Russia and other countries in which Communist revolutions took place. The revolution created forces, leaders, organizations, and ideas which were necessary to it. The new class came into existence for objective reasons, and by the wish, wits, and action of its leaders.

2.

The social origin of the new class lies in the proletariat just as the aristocracy arose in a peasant society, and the bourgeoisie in a commercial and artisans’ society. There are exceptions, depending on national conditions, but the proletariat in economically underdeveloped countries, being backward, constitutes the raw material from which the new class arises.

There are other reasons why the new class always acts as the champion of the working class. The new class is anti-capitalistic and, consequently, logically dependent upon the working strata. The new class is supported by the proletarian struggle and the traditional faith of the proletariat in a socialist, Communist society where there is no brutal exploitation. It is vitally important for the new class to assure a normal flow of production, hence it cannot ever lose its connection with the proletariat. Most important of all, the new class cannot achieve industrialization and consolidate its power without the help of the work-
ing class. On the other hand, the working class sees in expanded industry the salvation from its poverty and despair. Over a long period of time, the interests, ideas, faith, and hope of the new class, and of parts of the working class and of the poor peasants, coincide and unite. Such mergers have occurred in the past among other widely different classes. Did not the bourgeoisie represent the peasantry in the struggle against the feudal lords?

The movement of the new class toward power comes as a result of the efforts of the proletariat and the poor. These are the masses upon which the party or the new class must lean and with which its interests are most closely allied. This is true until the new class finally establishes its power and authority. Over and above this, the new class is interested in the proletariat and the poor only to the extent necessary for developing production and for maintaining in subjugation the most aggressive and rebellious social forces.

The monopoly which the new class establishes in the name of the working class over the whole of society is, primarily, a monopoly over the working class itself. This monopoly is first intellectual, over the so-called avant-garde proletariat, and then over the whole proletariat. This is the biggest deception the class must accomplish, but it shows that the power and interests of the new class lie primarily in industry. Without industry the new class cannot consolidate its position or authority.

Former sons of the working class are the most steadfast members of the new class. It has always been the fate of slaves to provide for their masters the most clever and gifted representatives. In this case a new exploiting and governing class is born from the exploited class.

3.

When Communist systems are being critically analyzed, it is considered that their fundamental distinction lies in the fact that a bureaucracy, organized in a special stratum, rules over the people. This is generally true. However, a more detailed analysis will show that only a special stratum of bureaucrats, those who are not administrative officials, make up the core of the governing bureaucracy, or, in my terminology, of the new class. This is actually a party or political bureaucracy. Other officials are only the apparatus under the control of the new class; the apparatus may be clumsy and slow but, no matter what, it must exist in every socialist society. It is sociologically possible to draw the borderline between the different types of officials, but in practice they are practically indistinguishable. This is true not only because the Communist system by its very nature is bureaucratic, but because Communists handle the various important administrative functions. In addition, the stratum of political bureaucrats cannot enjoy their privileges if they do not give crumbs from their tables to other bureaucratic categories.

It is important to note the fundamental differences between the political bureaucracies mentioned here and those which arise with every centralization in modern economy—especially centralizations that lead to collective forms of ownership such as monopolies, companies, and state ownership. The number of white-collar workers is constantly increasing in capitalistic monopolies, and also in nationalized industries in the West. In *Human Relations in Administration,* R. Dubin says that state functionaries in the economy are being transformed into a special stratum of society.

... Functionaries have the sense of a common destiny for all those who work together. They share the same interests, especially since there is relatively little competition insofar as promotion is in terms of seniority. In-group aggression is thus minimized and this arrangement is therefore conceived

to be positively functional for the bureaucracy. However, the esprit de corps and informal social organization which typically develops in such situations often leads the personnel to defend their entrenched interests rather than to assist their clientele and elected higher officials.

While such functionaries have much in common with Communist bureaucrats, especially as regards “esprit de corps,” they are not identical. Although state and other bureaucrats in non-Communist systems form a special stratum, they do not exercise authority as the Communists do. Bureaucrats in a non-Communist state have political masters, usually elected, or owners over them, while Communists have neither masters nor owners over them. The bureaucrats in a non-Communist state are officials in modern capitalist economy, while the Communists are something different and new: a new class.

As in other owning classes, the proof that it is a special class lies in its ownership and its special relations to other classes. In the same way, the class to which a member belongs is indicated by the material and other privileges which ownership brings to him.

As defined by Roman law, property constitutes the use, enjoyment, and disposition of material goods. The Communist political bureaucracy uses, enjoys, and disposes of nationalized property.

If we assume that membership in this bureaucracy or new owning class is predicated on the use of privileges inherent in ownership—in this instance nationalized material goods—then membership in the new party class, or political bureaucracy, is reflected in a larger income in material goods and privileges than society should normally grant for such functions. In practice, the ownership privilege of the new class manifests itself as an exclusive right, as a party monopoly, for the political bureaucracy to distribute the national income, to set wages, direct economic development, and dispose of nationalized and
changes are taking place in Communist systems, at least not in the eyes of men who think seriously about social progress.

The ownership privileges of the new class and membership in that class are the privileges of administration. This privilege extends from state administration and the administration of economic enterprises to that of sports and humanitarian organizations. Political, party, or so-called “general leadership” is executed by the core. This position of leadership carries privileges with it. In his *Stalin au pouvoir*, published in Paris in 1951, Orlov states that the average pay of a worker in the U.S.S.R. in 1935 was 1,800 rubles annually, while the pay and allowances of the secretary of a rayon committee amounted to 45,000 rubles annually. The situation has changed since then for both workers and party functionaries, but the essence remains the same. Other authors have arrived at the same conclusions. Discrepancies between the pay of workers and party functionaries are extreme; this could not be hidden from persons visiting the U.S.S.R. or other Communist countries in the past few years.

Other systems, too, have their professional politicians. One can think well or ill of them, but they must exist. Society cannot live without a state or a government, and therefore it cannot live without those who fight for it.

However, there are fundamental differences between professional politicians in other systems and in the Communist system. In extreme cases, politicians in other systems use the government to secure privileges for themselves and their co-horts, or to favor the economic interests of one social stratum or another. The situation is different with the Communist system where the power and the government are identical with the use, enjoyment, and disposition of almost all the nation’s goods. He who grabs power grabs privileges and indirectly grabs property. Consequently, in Communism, power or politics as a profession is the ideal of those who have the desire or the prospect of living as parasites at the expense of others.

Membership in the Communist Party before the Revolution meant sacrifice. Being a professional revolutionary was one of the highest honors. Now that the party has consolidated its power, party membership means that one belongs to a privileged class. And at the core of the party are the all-powerful exploiters and masters.

For a long time the Communist revolution and the Communist system have been concealing their real nature. The emergence of the new class has been concealed under socialist phraseology and, more important, under the new collective forms of property ownership. The so-called socialist ownership is a disguise for the real ownership by the political bureaucracy. And in the beginning this bureaucracy was in a hurry to complete industrialization, and hid its class composition under that guise.

The development of modern Communism, and the emergence of the new class, is evident in the character and roles of those who inspired it.

The leaders and their methods, from Marx to Khrushchev, have been varied and changing. It never occurred to Marx to prevent others from voicing their ideas. Lenin tolerated free discussion in his party and did not think that party forums, let alone the party head, should regulate the expression of “proper” or “improper” ideas. Stalin abolished every type of intra-party discussion, and made the expression of ideology solely the right of the central forum—or of himself. Other Communist movements were different. For instance, Marx’s International Workers’ Union (the so-called First International) was not Marxist in ideology, but a union of varied groups which adopted only the resolutions on which its members agreed. Lenin’s party was an *avant-garde* group combining
an internal revolutionary morality and ideological monolithic structure with democracy of a kind. Under Stalin the party became a mass of ideologically disinterested men, who got their ideas from above, but were wholehearted and unanimous in the defense of a system that assured them unquestionable privileges. Marx actually never created a party; Lenin destroyed all parties except his own, including the Socialist Party. Stalin relegated even the Bolshevik Party to second rank, transforming its core into the core of the new class, and transforming the party into a privileged impersonal and colorless group.

Marx created a system of the roles of classes, and of class war in society, even though he did not discover them, and he saw that mankind is mostly made up of members of discernible classes, although he was only restating Terence’s Stoic philosophy: “Humani nihil a me alienum puto.” Lenin viewed men as sharing ideas rather than as being members of discernible classes. Stalin saw in men only obedient subjects or enemies. Marx died a poor emigrant in London, but was valued by learned men and valued in the movement; Lenin died as the leader of one of the greatest revolutions, but died as a dictator about whom a cult had already begun to form; when Stalin died, he had already transformed himself into a god.

These changes in personalities are only the reflection of changes which had already taken place and were the very soul of the Communist movement.

Although he did not realize it, Lenin started the organization of the new class. He established the party along Bolshevik lines and developed the theories of its unique and leading role in the building of a new society. This is but one aspect of his many-sided and gigantic work; it is the aspect which came about from his actions rather than his wishes. It is also the aspect which led the new class to revere him.

The real and direct originator of the new class, however, was Stalin. He was a man of quick reflexes and a tendency to
the new class actually seized the lion’s share of the economic and other progress earned by the sacrifices and efforts of the masses.

The establishment of the new class did not proceed smoothly. It encountered bitter opposition from existing classes and from those revolutionaries who could not reconcile reality with the ideals of their struggle. In the U.S.S.R. the opposition of revolutionaries was most evident in the Trotsky-Stalin conflict. The conflict between Trotsky and Stalin, or between oppositionists in the party and Stalin, as well as the conflict between the regime and the peasantry, became more intense as industrialization advanced and the power and authority of the new class increased.

Trotsky, an excellent speaker, brilliant stylist, and skilled polemicist, a man cultured and of excellent intelligence, was deficient in only one quality: a sense of reality. He wanted to be a revolutionary in a period when life imposed the commonplace. He wished to revive a revolutionary party which was being transformed into something completely different, into a new class unconcerned with great ideals and interested only in the everyday pleasures of life. He expected action from a mass already tired by war, hunger, and death, at a time when the new class already strongly held the reins and had begun to experience the sweetness of privilege. Trotsky’s fireworks lit up the distant heavens; but he could not rekindle fires in weary men. He sharply noted the sorry aspect of the new phenomena but he did not grasp their meaning. In addition, he had never been a Bolshevik. This was his vice and his virtue. Attacking the party bureaucracy in the name of the revolution, he attacked the cult of the party and, although he was not conscious of it, the new class.

Stalin looked neither far ahead nor far behind. He had seated himself at the head of the new power which was being born—the new class, the political bureaucracy, and bureaucracy—and became its leader and organizer. He did not preach
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who, by his versatility and persistence, developed one of the greatest revolutions known to men. It also has no record of a personality like Stalin, who took on the enormous task of strengthening, in terms of power and property, a new class born out of one of the greatest revolutions in one of the largest of the world’s countries.

Behind Lenin, who was all passion and thought, stands the dull, gray figure of Joseph Stalin, the symbol of the difficult, cruel, and unscrupulous ascent of the new class to its final power.

After Lenin and Stalin came what had to come; namely, mediocrity in the form of collective leadership. And also there came the apparently sincere, kind-hearted, non-intellectual “man of the people”—Nikita Khrushchev. The new class no longer needs the revolutionaries or dogmatists it once required; it is satisfied with simple personalities, such as Khrushchev, Malenkov, Bulganin, and Shepilov, whose every word reflects the average man. The new class itself is tired of dogmatic purges and training sessions. It would like to live quietly. It must protect itself even from its own authorized leader now that it has been adequately strengthened. Stalin remained the same as he was when the class was weak, when cruel measures were necessary against even those in its own ranks who threatened to deviate. Today this is all unnecessary. Without relinquishing anything it created under Stalin’s leadership, the new class appears to be renouncing his authority for the past few years. But it is not really renouncing that authority—only Stalin’s methods which, according to Khrushchev, hurt “good Communists.”

Lenin’s revolutionary epoch was replaced by Stalin’s epoch, in which authority and ownership, and industrialization, were strengthened so that the much desired peaceful and good life of the new class could begin. Lenin’s revolutionary Communism was replaced by Stalin’s dogmatic communism, which in turn was replaced by non-dogmatic Communism, a so-called collective leadership or a group of oligarchs.

These are the three phases of development of the new class in the U.S.S.R. or of Russian Communism (or of every other type of Communism in one manner or another).

The fate of Yugoslav Communism was to unify these three phases in the single personality of Tito, along with national and personal characteristics. Tito is a great revolutionary, but without original ideas; he has attained personal power, but without Stalin’s distrustfulness and dogmatism. Like Khrushchev, Tito is a representative of the people, that is, of the middle-party strata. The road which Yugoslav Communism has traveled—attaining a revolution, copying Stalinism, then renouncing Stalinism and seeking its own form—is seen most fully in the personality of Tito. Yugoslav Communism has been more consistent than other parties in preserving the substance of Communism, yet never renouncing any form which could be of value to it.

The three phases in the development of the new class—Lenin, Stalin, and “collective leadership”—are not completely divorced from each other, in substance or in ideas.

Lenin too was a dogmatist, and Stalin too was a revolutionary, just as collective leadership will resort to dogmatism and to revolutionary methods when necessary. What is more, the non-dogmatism of the collective leadership is applied only to itself, to the heads of the new class. On the other hand, the people must be all the more persistently “educated” in the spirit of the dogma, or of Marxism-Leninism. By relaxing its dogmatic severity and exclusiveness, the new class, becoming strengthened economically, has prospects of attaining greater flexibility.

The heroic era of Communism is past. The epoch of its great leaders has ended. The epoch of practical men has set in. The new class has been created. It is at the height of its
power and wealth, but it is without new ideas. It has nothing more to tell the people. The only thing that remains is for it to justify itself.

5.

It would not be important to establish the fact that in contemporary Communism a new owning and exploiting class is involved and not merely a temporary dictatorship and an arbitrary bureaucracy, if some anti-Stalinist Communists including Trotsky as well as some Social Democrats had not depicted the ruling stratum as a passing bureaucratic phenomenon because of which this new ideal, classless society, still in its swaddling clothes, must suffer, just as bourgeois society had had to suffer under Cromwell's and Napoleon's despotism.

But the new class is really a new class, with a special composition and special power. By any scientific definition of a class, even the Marxist definition by which some classes are lower than others according to their specific position in production, we conclude that, in the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries, a new class of owners and exploiters is in existence. The specific characteristic of this new class is its collective ownership. Communist theoreticians affirm, and some even believe, that Communism has arrived at collective ownership...

Collective ownership in various forms has existed in all earlier societies. All ancient Eastern despotisms were based on the pre-eminence of the state's or the king's property. In ancient Egypt after the fifteenth century B.C., arable land passed to private ownership. Before that time only homes and surrounding buildings had been privately owned. State land was handed over for cultivation while state officials administered the land and collected taxes on it. Canals and installations, as well as the most important works, were also state-owned. The state owned everything until it lost its independence in the first century of our era.

This helps to explain the deification of the Pharaohs of Egypt and of the emperors, which one encounters in all the ancient Eastern despotisms. Such ownership also explains the undertaking of gigantic tasks, such as the construction of temples, tombs, and castles of emperors, of canals, roads, and fortifications.

The Roman state treated newly conquered land as state land and owned considerable numbers of slaves. The medieval Church also had collective property.

Capitalism by its very nature was an enemy of collective ownership until the establishment of shareholders' organizations. Capitalism continued to be an enemy of collective ownership, even though it could not do anything against new encroachments by collective ownership and the enlargement of its area of operations.

The Communists did not invent collective ownership as such, but invented its all-encompassing character, more widely extended than in earlier epochs, even more extensive than in Pharaoh's Egypt. That is all that the Communists did.

The ownership of the new class, as well as its character, was formed over a period of time and was subjected to constant change during the process. At first, only a small part of the nation felt the need for all economic powers to be placed in the hands of a political party for the purpose of aiding the industrial transformation. The party, acting as the avant-garde of the proletariat and as the “most enlightened power of socialism,” pressed for this centralization which could be attained only by a change in ownership. The change was made in fact and in form through nationalization first of large enterprises and then of smaller ones. The abolition of private ownership was a prerequisite for industrialization, and for the beginning of the new class. However, without their special role as administrators over society and as distributors of property, the
Communists could not transform themselves into a new class, nor could a new class be formed and permanently established. Gradually material goods were nationalized, but in fact, through its right to use, enjoy, and distribute these goods, they became the property of a discernible stratum of the party and the bureaucracy gathered around it.

In view of the significance of ownership for its power—and also of the fruits of ownership—the party bureaucracy cannot renounce the extension of its ownership even over small-scale production facilities. Because of its totalitarianism and monopolism, the new class finds itself unavoidably at war with everything which it does not administer or handle, and must deliberately aspire to destroy or conquer it.

Stalin said, on the eve of collectivization, that the question of “who will do what to whom” had been raised, even though the Soviet government was not meeting serious opposition from a politically and economically disunited peasantry. The new class felt insecure as long as there were any other owners except itself. It could not risk sabotage in food supplies or in agricultural raw materials. This was the direct reason for the attack on the peasantry. However, there was a second reason, a class reason: the peasants could be dangerous to the new class in an unstable situation. The new class therefore had to subordinate the peasantry to itself economically and administratively; this was done through the kolkhozes and machine-tractor stations, which required an increase proportionate to the size of the new class in the villages themselves. As a result, bureaucracy mushroomed in the villages too.

The fact that the seizure of property from other classes, especially from small owners, led to decreases in production and to chaos in the economy was of no consequence to the new class. Most important for the new class, as for every owner in history, was the attainment and consolidation of ownership. The class profited from the new property it had acquired even though the nation lost thereby. The collectivization of peasant holdings, which was economically unjustified, was unavoidable if the new class was to be securely installed in its power and its ownership.

Reliable statistics are not available, but all evidence confirms that yields per acre in the U.S.S.R. have not been increased over the yields in Tsarist Russia, and that the number of livestock still does not approach the pre-revolutionary figure.

The losses in agricultural yields and in livestock can be calculated, but the losses in manpower, in the millions of peasants who were thrown into labor camps, are incalculable. Collectivization was a frightful and devastating war which resembled an insane undertaking—except for the fact that it was profitable for the new class by assuring its authority.

By various methods, such as nationalization, compulsory cooperation, high taxes, and price inequalities, private ownership was destroyed and transformed into collective ownership. The establishment of the ownership of the new class was evidenced in the changes in the psychology, the way of life, and the material position of its members, depending on the position they held on the hierarchical ladder. Country homes, the best housing, furniture, and similar things were acquired; special quarters and exclusive rest homes were established for the highest bureaucracy, for the elite of the new class. The party secretary and the chief of the secret police in some places not only became the highest authorities but obtained the best housing, automobiles, and similar evidence of privilege. Those beneath them were eligible for comparable privileges, depending upon their position in the hierarchy. The state budgets, “gifts,” and the construction and reconstruction executed for the needs of the state and its representatives became the everlasting and inexhaustible sources of benefits to the political bureaucracy.

Only in cases where the new class was not capable of maintaining the ownership, it resorted to usurpation, or in cases where such ownership was exorbitantly expensive or politically
No class is established by its own action, even though its ascent is organized and accompanied by a conscious struggle. This holds true for the new class in Communism.

The new class, because it had a weak relationship to the economy and social structure, and of necessity had its origin in a single party, was forced to establish the highest possible organizational structure. Finally, it was forced to a deliberate and conscious withdrawal from its earlier tenets. Consequently, the new class is more highly organized and more highly class-conscious than any class in recorded history.

This proposition is true only if it is taken relatively; consciousness and organizational structure being taken in relation to the outside world and to other classes, powers, and social forces. No other class in history has been as cohesive and single-minded in defending itself and in controlling that which it holds—collective and monopolistic ownership and totalitarian authority.

On the other hand, the new class is also the most deluded and least conscious of itself. Every private capitalist or feudal lord was conscious of the fact that he belonged to a special discernible social category. He usually believed that this category was destined to make the human race happy, and that without this category chaos and general ruin would ensue. A Communist member of the new class also believes that, without his party, society would regress and founder. But he is not conscious of the fact that he belongs to a new ownership class, for he does not consider himself an owner and does not take into account the special privileges he enjoys. He thinks that he belongs to a group with prescribed ideas, aims, attitudes, and roles. That is all he sees. He cannot see that at the same time he belongs to a special social category: the *ownership* class.

Collective ownership, which acts to reduce the class, at the
same time makes it unconscious of its class substance, and each one of the collective owners is deluded in that he thinks he uniquely belongs to a movement which would abolish classes in society.

A comparison of other characteristics of the new class with those of other ownership classes reveals many similarities and many differences. The new class is voracious and insatiable, just as the bourgeoisie was. But it does not have the virtues of frugality and economy that the bourgeoisie had. The new class is as exclusive as the aristocracy but without aristocracy’s refinement and proud chivalry.

The new class also has advantages over other classes. Because it is more compact it is better prepared for greater sacrifices and heroic exploits. The individual is completely and totally subordinated to the whole; at least, the prevailing ideal calls for such subordination even when he is out seeking to better himself. The new class is strong enough to carry out material and other ventures that no other class was ever able to do. Since it possesses the nation’s goods, the new class is in a position to devote itself religiously to the aims it has set and to direct all the forces of the people to the furtherance of these aims.

The new ownership is not the same as the political government, but is created and aided by that government. The use, enjoyment, and distribution of property is the privilege of the party and the party’s top men.

Party members feel that authority, that control over property, brings with it the privileges of this world. Consequently, unscrupulous ambition, duplicity, toadyism, and jealousy inevitably must increase. Careerism and an ever expanding bureaucracy are the incurable diseases of Communism. Because the Communists have transformed themselves into owners, and because the road to power and to material privileges is open only through “devotion” to the party—to the class, to “socialism”—unscrupulous ambition must become one of the main ways of life and one of the main methods for the development of Communism.

In non-Communist systems, the phenomena of careerism and unscrupulous ambition are a sign that it is profitable to be a bureaucrat, or that owners have become parasites, so that the administration of property is left in the hands of employees. In Communism, careerism and unscrupulous ambition testify to the fact that there is an irresistible drive toward ownership and the privileges that accompany the administration of material goods and men.

Membership in other ownership classes is not identical with the ownership of particular property. This is still less the case in the Communist system inasmuch as ownership is collective. To be an owner or a joint owner in the Communist system means that one enters the ranks of the ruling political bureaucracy and nothing else.

In the new class, just as in other classes, some individuals constantly fall by the wayside while others go up the ladder. In private-ownership classes an individual left his property to his descendants. In the new class no one inherits anything except the aspiration to raise himself to a higher rung of the ladder. The new class is actually being created from the lowest and broadest strata of the people, and is in constant motion. Although it is sociologically possible to prescribe who belongs to the new class, it is difficult to do so; for the new class melts into and spills over into the people, into other lower classes, and is constantly changing.

The road to the top is theoretically open to all, just as every one of Napoleon’s soldiers carried a marshal’s baton in his knapsack. The only thing that is required to get on the road is sincere and complete loyalty to the party or to the new class. Open at the bottom, the new class becomes increasingly and relentlessly narrower at the top. Not only is the desire necessary for the climb; also necessary is the ability to understand and develop doctrines, firmness in struggles against antagonists, ex-
ceptional dexterity and cleverness in intra-party struggles, and
talent in strengthening the class. Many present themselves, but
few are chosen. Although more open in some respects than
other classes, the new class is also more exclusive than other
classes. Since one of the new class's most important features is
monopoly of authority, this exclusiveness is strengthened by
bureaucratic hierarchical prejudices.

Nowhere, at any time, has the road been as wide open to the
devoted and the loyal as it is in the Communist system. But the
ascent to the heights has never at any time been so difficult or
required so much sacrifice and so many victims. On the one
hand, Communism is open and kind to all; on the other hand,
it is exclusive and intolerant even of its own adherents.

7.

The fact that there is a new ownership class in Communist
countries does not explain everything, but it is the most im-
portant key to understanding the changes which are periodi-
cally taking place in these countries, especially in the U.S.S.R.

It goes without saying that every such change in each separate
Communist country and in the Communist system as a whole
must be examined separately, in order to determine the extent
and significance of the change in the specific circumstances. To
do this, however, the system should be understood as a whole
to the fullest extent possible.

In connection with current changes in the U.S.S.R. it will be
profitable to point out in passing what is occurring in the kolk-
hozes. The establishment of kolkhozes and the Soviet govern-
ment policy toward them illustrates clearly the exploiting
nature of the new class.

Stalin did not and Khrushchev does not consider kolkhozes
as a "logical socialist" form of ownership. In practice this
means that the new class has not succeeded in completely taking
over the management of the villages. Through the kolkhozes
and the use of the compulsory crop-purchase system, the new
class has succeeded in making vassals of the peasants and grab-
bting a lion's share of the peasants' income, but the new class
has not become the only power of the land. Stalin was com-
pletely aware of this. Before his death, in Economic Problems
of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., Stalin foresaw that the kolkhozes
should become state property, which is to say that the bureau-
cracy should become the real owner. Criticizing Stalin for his
excess use of purges, Khrushchev did not however renounce
Stalin's views on property in kolkhozes. The appointment by
the new regime of 30,000 party workers, mostly to be presidents
of kolkhozes, was only one of the measures in line with Stalin's
policy.

Just as under Stalin, the new regime, in executing its so-called
liberalization policy, is extending the "socialist" ownership of
the new class. Decentralization in the economy does not mean
a change in ownership, but only gives greater rights to the
lower strata of the bureaucracy or of the new class. If the so-
called liberalization and decentralization meant anything else,
that would be manifest in the political right of at least part of
the people to exercise some influence in the management of
material goods. At least, the people would have the right to
criticize the arbitrariness of the oligarchy. This would lead to
the creation of a new political movement, even though it were
only a loyal opposition. However, this is not even mentioned,
just as democracy in the party is not mentioned. Liberalization
and decentralization are in force only for Communists; first for
the oligarchy, the leaders of the new class; and second, for those
in the lower echelons. This is the new method, inevitable under
changing conditions, for the further strengthening and consoli-
dation of monopolistic ownership and totalitarian authority of
the new class.

The fact that there is a new owning, monopolistic, and total-
The new class is most sensitive to demands on the part of the people for a special kind of freedom, not for freedom in general or political freedom. It is especially sensitive to demands for freedom of thought and criticism, within the limits of present conditions and within the limits of "socialism"; not for demands for a return to previous social and ownership relations. This sensitivity originates from the class's special position.

The new class instinctively feels that national goods are, in fact, its property, and that even the terms "socialist," "social," and "state" property denote a general legal fiction. The new class also thinks that any breach of its totalitarian authority might imperil its ownership. Consequently, the new class opposes any type of freedom, ostensibly for the purpose of preserving "socialist" ownership. Criticism of the new class's monopolistic administration of property generates the fear of a possible loss of power. The new class is sensitive to these criticisms and demands depending on the extent to which they expose the manner in which it rules and holds power.

This is an important contradiction. Property is legally considered social and national property. But, in actuality, a single group manages it in its own interest. The discrepancy between legal and actual conditions continuously results in obscure and abnormal social and economic relationships. It also means that the words of the leading group do not correspond to its actions; and that all actions result in strengthening its property holdings and its political position.

This contradiction cannot be resolved without jeopardizing the class's position. Other ruling, property-owning classes could not resolve this contradiction either, unless forcefully deprived of monopoly of power and ownership. Wherever there has been a higher degree of freedom for society as a whole, the ruling classes have been forced, in one way or another, to renounce monopoly of ownership. The reverse is true also: wherever monopoly of ownership has been impossible, freedom, to some degree, has become inevitable.
The contradiction between the new class's real ownership position and its legal position can furnish the basic reason for criticism. This contradiction has within it the ability not only to incite others but also to corrode the class's own ranks, since privileges are actually being enjoyed by only a few. This contradiction, when intensified, holds prospects of real changes in the Communist system, whether the ruling class is in favor of the change or not. The fact that this contradiction is so obvious has been the reason for the changes made by the new class, especially in so-called liberalization and decentralization.

Forced to withdraw and surrender to individual strata, the new class aims at concealing this contradiction and strengthening its own position. Since ownership and authority continue intact, all measures taken by the new class—even those democratically inspired—show a tendency toward strengthening the management of the political bureaucracy. The system turns democratic measures into positive methods for consolidating the position of the ruling classes. Slavery in ancient times in the East inevitably permeated all of society's activities and components, including the family. In the same way, the monopolism and totalitarianism of the ruling class in the Communist system are imposed on all the aspects of social life, even though the political heads are not aiming at this.

Yugoslavia's so-called workers' management and autonomy, conceived at the time of the struggle against Soviet imperialism as a far-reaching democratic measure to deprive the party of the monopoly of administration, has been increasingly relegated to one of the areas of party work. Thus, it is hardly possible to change the present system. The aim of creating a new democracy through this type of administration will not be achieved. Besides, freedom cannot be extended to the largest piece of the pie. Workers' management has not brought about a sharing in profits by those who produce, either on a national level or in local enterprises. This type of administration has increasingly turned into a safe type for the regime. Through various taxes
and other means, the regime has appropriated even the share of the profits which the workers believed would be given to them. Only crumbs from the tables and illusions have been left to the workers. Without universal freedom not even workers' management can become free. Clearly, in an unfree society nobody can freely decide anything. The givers have somehow obtained the most value from the gift of freedom they supposedly handed the workers.

This does not mean that the new class cannot make concessions to the people, even though it only considers its own interests. Workers' management, or decentralization, is a concession to the masses. Circumstances may drive the new class, no matter how monopolistic and totalitarian it may be, to retreat before the masses. In 1948, when the conflict took place between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R., the Yugoslav leaders were forced to execute some reforms. Even though it might mean a backward step, they set up reforms as soon as they saw themselves in jeopardy. Something similar is happening today in the eastern European countries.

In defending its authority, the ruling class must execute reforms every time it becomes obvious to the people that the class is treating national property as its own. Such reforms are not proclaimed as being what they really are, but rather as part of the "further development of socialism" and "socialist democracy." The groundwork for reforms is laid when the discrepancy mentioned above becomes public. From the historical point of view the new class is forced to fortify its authority and ownership constantly, even though it is running away from the truth. It must constantly demonstrate how it is successfully creating a society of happy people, all of whom enjoy equal rights and have been freed of every type of exploitation. The new class cannot avoid falling continuously into profound internal contradictions; for in spite of its historical origin it is not able to make its ownership lawful, and it cannot renounce ownership without undermining itself. Consequently, it is forced to try to justify its increasing authority, invoking abstract and unreal purposes.

This is a class whose power over men is the most complete known to history. For this reason it is a class with very limited views, views which are false and unsafe. Closely ingrown, and in complete authority, the new class must unrealistically evaluate its own role and that of the people around it.

Having achieved industrialization, the new class can now do nothing more than strengthen its brute force and pillage the people. It ceases to create. Its spiritual heritage is overtaken by darkness.

While the new class accomplished one of its greatest successes in the revolution, its method of control is one of the most shameful pages in human history. Men will marvel at the grandiose ventures it accomplished, and will be ashamed of the means it used to accomplish them.

When the new class leaves the historical scene—and this must happen—there will be less sorrow over its passing than there was for any other class before it. Smothering everything except what suited its ego, it has condemned itself to failure and shameful ruin.
The Party State

1.

The mechanism of Communist power is perhaps the simplest which can be conceived, although it leads to the most refined tyranny and the most brutal exploitation. The simplicity of this mechanism originates from the fact that one party alone, the Communist Party, is the backbone of the entire political, economic, and ideological activity. The entire public life is at a standstill or moves ahead, falls behind or turns around according to what happens in the party forums.

Under the Communist systems the people realize quickly what they are and what they are not permitted to do. Laws and regulations do not have an essential importance for them. The actual and unwritten rules concerning the relationship between the government and its subjects do. Regardless of laws, everyone knows that the government is in the hands of the party committees and the secret police. Nowhere is “the directing role” of the party prescribed, but its authority is established in all organizations and sectors. No law provides that the secret police has the right to control citizens, but the police is all-powerful. No law prescribes that the judiciary and prosecutors should be controlled by the secret police and the party committee, but they are. Most people know that this is the case. Everyone knows what can and what cannot be done, and what depends on whom. People adjust to the environment and to actual conditions, turning to party forums or to organs under the party’s control in all important matters.

The direction of social organizations and social organs is accomplished simply by this method: the Communists form a unit, which turns to authorized political forums in all matters. This is theoretical; actually it operates in this way: In cases where the social organ or organization is managed by a person who also has power in the party, he will not refer to anyone regarding lesser matters. Communists become familiar with their system and with the relationships created by it; they accustom themselves to distinguish between the important and the unimportant, and refer to party forums only in especially important matters. The unit exists only potentially, important decisions being made by the party; the opinion of those who have elected the government or administration of some organization is totally unimportant.

Communist totalitarianism and the new class took root when the Communist Party was preparing for the revolution; their method of administering and maintaining authority also goes back to that time. The “directing role” in organs of government and social organizations is merely the former Communist unit which has since branched out, developed, and perfected itself. The second “directing role” of the party in the “building of socialism” is nothing but the old theory regarding the avant-garde role of the party with respect to the working class, with the difference that the theory then had a different significance for society than it has now. Before the Communists usurped power, this theory was necessary in order to recruit revolutionaries and revolutionary organs; now it justifies the totalitarian control of the new class. One springs from the other, but one is also different from the other. The revolution and its forms
were unavoidable and were even needed by that part of society which irresistibly aspired to technical and economic progress.

The totalitarian tyranny and control of the new class, which came into being during the revolution, has become the yoke from under which the blood and sweat of all members of society flow. Particular revolutionary forms were transformed into reactionary ones. This was also the case with the Communist units.

There are two essential methods through which Communist control of the social machine is accomplished. The first is the unit, the main method in principle and in theory. The second, actually more practical one, restricts certain government posts to party members. These jobs, which are essential in any government but especially in a Communist one, include assignments with police, especially the secret police; and the diplomatic and officers corps, especially positions in the information and political services. In the judiciary only top positions have until now been in the hands of Communists. The judiciary, subordinated to the party and police establishments, is generally poorly paid, and is unattractive to Communists. However, the tendency now is for judiciary posts to be considered as a privilege open only to party members, and for members of the judiciary to have increasing privileges. Thus, control over the judiciary could be relaxed, if not completely abolished, with the assurance that it will continue to rule according to the intentions of the party or “in the spirit of socialism.”

Only in a Communist state are a number of both specified and unspecified positions reserved for members of the party. The Communist government, although a class structure, is a party government; the Communist army is a party army; and the state is a party state. More precisely, Communists tend to treat the army and the state as their exclusive weapons.

The exclusive, if unwritten, law that only party members can become policemen, officers, diplomats, and hold similar positions, or that only they can exercise actual authority, creates a special privileged group of bureaucrats and simplifies the mechanism of government and administration. In this manner the party unit expanded and more or less took in all these services. As a result, the unit has disappeared while these services have become an essential area for party activity.

There is no fundamental difference in the Communist system between governmental services and party organizations, as in the example of the party and the secret police. The party and the police mingle very closely in their daily functioning; the difference between them is only in the distribution of work.

The entire governmental structure is organized in this manner. Political positions are reserved exclusively for party members. Even in non-political governmental bodies Communists hold the strategic positions or oversee administration. Calling a meeting at the party center or publishing an article is sufficient to cause the entire state and social mechanism to begin functioning. If difficulties occur anywhere, the party and the police very quickly correct the “error.”

2.

The particular character of the Communist Party has already been discussed. There are other special features, too, which help reveal the essence of a Communist state.

The Communist Party does not have its unique character solely because it is revolutionary and centralized and observes military discipline and other definite goals, or has other characteristics. There are other parties with similar features, even though these features may be stronger in the Communist Party.

However, only in the Communist Party is “ideological unity” or an identical concept of the world and of the development of society obligatory for its members. This applies only to persons who function in the higher forums of the party. The others, those in lower positions, are obligated only to give lip service
to identical ideological views, while they execute orders handed down from above. The tendency, however, is to have those in lower positions adjust their ideological level to that of the leaders.

Lenin did not consider that party members were all obliged to hold the same views. However, in practice, he refuted and explained away every view which did not appear “Marxist” or “the party’s”; that is, every view that did not strengthen the party in the manner which he had originally conceived. His settling of accounts with various opposition groups in the party was different from Stalin’s, because Lenin did not kill his subjects, “merely” quelled them. While he was in power both freedom of expression and voting privileges were in effect. Total authority over everything had not yet been established.

Stalin required ideological unity—obligatory philosophic and other views—in addition to political unity as a meeting ground for all party members. This is actually Stalin’s contribution to Lenin’s teaching about the party. Stalin formed the concept of obligatory ideological unity in his early youth: in his time, unanimity became the unwritten requirement of all Communist parties, and it remains so to the present day.

Yugoslav leaders held and still hold the same views. They are still under Soviet “collective leadership” and the forums of other Communist parties. This insistence on the obligatory ideological unity of the party is a sign that no essential changes have occurred, and only confirms the fact that free discussion is not possible, or possible only in a very limited way, under today’s “collective leadership.”

What does obligatory unity in the party mean and where does it lead?

Its political consequences are very serious. The power in every party, especially in the Communist Party, resides in its leaders and higher forums. Ideological unity as an obligation, especially in the centralized and militarily disciplined Communist Party, inevitably brings with it the power of the central body leadership over the thoughts of its members. Although ideological unity was attained in Lenin’s time through discussion held at the top, Stalin himself began to regulate it. Today, post-Stalin “collective leadership” is satisfied to make it impossible for new social ideas to appear. Thus, Marxism has become a theory to be defined exclusively by party leaders. There is no other type of Marxism or Communism today, and the development of another type is hardly possible.

The social consequences of ideological unity have been tragic: Lenin’s dictatorship was strict, but Stalin’s dictatorship became totalitarian. The abolition of all ideological struggle in the party meant the termination of all freedom in society, since only through the party did the various strata find expression. Intolerance of other ideas and insistence on the presumably exclusive scientific nature of Marxism were the beginning of ideological monopoly by party leadership, which later developed into complete monopoly over society.

Party ideological unity makes independent movements impossible within the Communist system and within society itself. Every action depends on the party, which has total control over society; within it there is not the slightest freedom.

Ideological unity did not arise suddenly but, like everything in Communism, developed gradually, reaching its greatest height during the struggle for power between various party factions. It is not at all accidental that, during Stalin’s ascendancy to power in the mid-1920’s, it was openly demanded of Trotsky for the first time that he reject all ideas other than those formulated by the party.

Party ideological unity is the spiritual basis of personal dictatorship. Without it personal dictatorship cannot even be imagined. It begets and strengthens the dictatorship, and vice versa. This is understandable; a monopoly over ideas, or obligatory ideological unity, is only a complement and a theoretical mask for personal dictatorship. Although personal dictatorship and ideological unity were already evident in the
begins of contemporary Communism or Bolshevism, both are firmly establishing themselves with Communism's full power, so that they, as trends and often as prevailing forms, will never again be abandoned until the fall of Communism.

The suppression of ideological differences among the leaders has also abolished fractions and currents, and thus has abolished all democracy in Communist parties. Thus began the period of the Führer-principle in Communism: ideologists are merely people with power in the party regardless of inadequate intellectual ability.

The continuance of ideological unity in the party is an unmistakable sign of the maintenance of a personal dictatorship, or the dictatorship of a small number of oligarchs who temporarily work together or maintain a balance of power, as is the case in the U.S.S.R. today. We find a tendency toward ideological unity in other parties also, especially in socialist parties in their earlier stages. However, this is only a tendency in these parties; in Communist parties it has become obligatory. One is obliged not only to be a Marxist, but to adopt the type of Marxism desired and prescribed by the leadership. Marxism has been transformed from a free revolutionary ideology into a prescribed dogma. As in ancient Eastern despotism, the top authority interprets and prescribes the dogma, while the emperor is the archpriest.

The obligatory ideological unity of the party, which has passed through various phases and forms, has remained the most essential characteristic of Bolshevik or Communist parties.

If these parties had not at the same time been the beginning of new classes, and if they had not had a special historical role to play, obligatory ideological unity could not have existed in them. Except for the Communist bureaucracy, not a single class or party in modern history has attained complete ideological unity. None had, before, the task of transforming all of society, mostly through political and administrative means. For such a task, a complete, fanatical confidence in the righteousness and nobility of their views is necessary. Such a task calls for exceptional brutal measures against other ideologies and social groups. It also calls for ideological monopoly over society and for absolute unity of the ruling class. Communist parties have needed special ideological solidarity for this reason.

Once ideological unity is established, it operates as powerfully as prejudice. Communists are educated in the idea that ideological unity, or the prescription of ideas from above, is the holy of holies, and that factionalism in the party is the greatest of all crimes.

Complete control of society could not be accomplished without coming to terms with other socialist groups. Ideological unity, too, is only possible through a reconciliation within the party's own ranks. Both the one and the other occur approximately simultaneously; in the minds of the adherents of totalitarianism they appear as "objectively" identical, although the first is a reconciliation of the new class with its opponents, and the second is a reconciliation within the ruling class. In fact, Stalin knew that Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and others were not foreign spies and traitors to the "socialist fatherland." However, since their disagreement with him obviously delayed the establishment of totalitarian control, he had to destroy them. His crimes within the party consist of the fact that he transformed "objective unfriendliness"—the ideological and political differences in the party—into the subjective guilt of groups and individuals, attributing to them crimes which they did not commit.

3.

But this is the inescapable road of every Communist system. The method of establishing totalitarian control, or ideological unity, may be less severe than Stalin's, but the essence is always the same. Even where industrialization is not the form or con-
dition for establishing totalitarian control, as in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Communist bureaucracy is inevitably compelled to establish the same forms of authority in underdeveloped countries as those established in the Soviet Union. This does not occur simply because the Soviet Union imposed such forms on these countries as subordinates, but because it is within the very nature of Communist parties themselves and of their ideologies to do so. Party control over society, identification of the government and governmental machinery with the party, and the right to express ideas dependent on the amount of power and the position one holds in the hierarchy; these are the essential and inevitable characteristics of every Communist bureaucracy as soon as it attains power.

The party is the main force of the Communist state and government. It is the motive force of everything. It unites within itself the new class, the government, ownership, and ideas.

For this reason, military dictatorships have not been possible under Communism, although it seems that military conspiracies have occurred in the U.S.S.R. Military dictatorships would not be able to encompass all phases of life, nor even convince the nation temporarily of the need for exceptional efforts and self-sacrifice. Such can be accomplished only by the party, and then only by a party with belief in such vast ideals that its despotism appears to its members and adherents as necessary, as the highest form of state and social organization.

Viewed from the standpoint of freedom, a military dictatorship in a Communist system would denote great progress. It would signify the termination of totalitarian party control, or of a party oligarchy. Theoretically speaking, however, a military dictatorship would be possible only in case of a military defeat or an exceptional political crisis. Even in such a case it would initially be a form of party dictatorship or it would have to conceal itself in the party. But, this would inevitably lead to a change in the entire system.

The totalitarian dictatorship of the Communist Party oli-
olutionary bodies into a form suitable for the totalitarian dictatorship of the new class, or the party.

This was also the case with Lenin's democratic centralism, including both that of the party and of the government. As long as public differences are tolerated in the party, one can still speak of centralism—even though it is not a very democratic form of centralism. When totalitarian authority is created, centralism disappears and the naked despotism of the oligarchy takes over.

We may conclude from this that there is a constant tendency to transform an oligarchic dictatorship into a personal dictatorship. Ideological unity, the inevitable struggle at the top of the party, and the needs of the system as a whole tend toward personal dictatorship. The leader who succeeds in getting to the top, along with his assistants, is the one who succeeds in most logically expressing and protecting the interests of the new class at any given time.

There is a strong trend toward personal dictatorship in other historical situations: for instance, all forces must be subordinated to one idea and one will when industrialization is being pressed or when a nation is at war. But there is a specific and pure Communist reason for personal dictatorship: authority is the basic aim and means of Communism and of every true Communist. The thirst for power is insatiable and irresistible among Communists. Victory in the struggle for power is equal to being raised to a divinity; failure means the deepest mortification and disgrace.

The Communist leaders must also tend to personal extravagance—something which they cannot resist because of human frailty and because of the inherent need of those in power to be recognizable prototypes of brilliance and might.

Careerism, extravagance, and love of power are inevitable, and so is corruption. It is not a matter of the corruption of public servants, for this may occur less frequently than in the state which preceded it. It is a special type of corruption caused
by the fact that the government is in the hands of a single political group and is the source of all privileges. “Care of its men” and their placement in lucrative positions, or the distribution of all kinds of privileges, becomes unavoidable. The fact that the government and the party are identical with the state, and practically with the holding of all property, causes the Communist state to be one which corrupts itself, in that it inevitably creates privileges and parasitic functions.

A member of the Yugoslav Communist Party very picture-esqueyly described the atmosphere in which a regular Communist lives: “I am really torn into three parts: I see those who have a better automobile than I have, yet it seems to me that they are not more devoted to the party and to socialism than I am; I look down from the heights on those who have no automobile, for they haven’t really earned any. So I’m lucky that I have the one I have.”

Obviously, he was not a true Communist, but was one of those who became a Communist because he was an idealist, and then being disillusioned, tried to be satisfied with what might come to him in a normal bureaucratic career. The true Communist is a mixture of a fanatic and an unrestrained power-holder. Only this type makes a true Communist. The others are idealists or careerists.

Since it is based on administration, the Communist system is unavoidably bureaucratic with a strict hierarchical organization. In the Communist system, exclusive groups are established around political leaders and forums. All policy-making is reduced to wrangling in these exclusive groups, in which familiarity and cliquishness flower. The highest group is generally the most intimate. At intimate suppers, on hunts, in conversations between two or three men, matters of state of the most vital importance are decided. Meetings of party forums, conferences of the government and assemblies, serve no purpose but to make declarations and put in an appearance.

They are only convened to confirm what has previously been cooked up in intimate kitchens.

The Communists have a fetishist relation toward the state or the government, exactly as if it were their own property. The same men, the same groups, which are intimate and familiar inside the party become stiff, formal, and pompous individuals when they act as representatives of the state.

This monarchy is anything but enlightened. The monarch himself, the dictator, does not feel himself to be either a monarch or a dictator. When he was called dictator, Stalin ridiculed the idea. He felt that he was the representative of the collective party will. He was right to a degree—since probably no one else in history ever had as much personal power. He, like every other Communist dictator, was aware that a retreat from the ideological bases of the party, from the monopoly of the new class, from ownership of the nation’s goods, or from the totalitarian power of the oligarchy, would result in his inevitable downfall. Indeed, no such retreat was even considered by Stalin, as he was the foremost representative and creator of the system. However, even he was dependent on the system created under his administration, or on the opinions of the party oligarchy. He could do nothing against them nor could he pass over them.

The fact emerges that in the Communist system no one is independent, neither those at the top nor the leader himself. They are all dependent on one another and must avoid being separated from their surroundings, prevailing ideas, controls, and interests.

Is there, then, any sense in talking about the dictatorship of the proletariat under Communism?

4.

The Communist theory of the state, a theory worked out in detail by Lenin and supplemented by Stalin and others,
favors the totalitarian dictatorship of the party bureaucracy. Two elements are fundamental in the theory: the theory of the state alone and the theory of the withering away of the state. Both of these elements are mutually related and together represent the entire theory. Lenin’s theory of the state is most completely presented in his document *The State and Revolution*, which was written while he was hiding from the Provisional Government on the eve of the October Revolution. Like everything else of Lenin’s, the theory leans toward the revolutionary aspects of Marxist teaching. In his discussion of the state Lenin developed this aspect further and carried it to extremes, utilizing particularly the experience of the Russian revolution of 1905. Considered historically, Lenin’s document was of much greater significance as an ideological weapon of the revolution than it was as a base for development of a new authority built according to its ideas.

Lenin reduced the state to force, or more precisely, to the organ of tyranny which one class employs for the sake of oppressing the other classes. Trying to formulate the nature of the state in the most forceful way, Lenin noted, “The state is a club.”

Lenin perceived other functions of the state too. But in these functions he also uncovered what was for him the most indispensable role of the state—the use of brute force by one class against the others.

Lenin’s theory calling for the destruction of the old state apparatus was, in fact, far from being a scientific one. This document of Lenin’s—extremely significant from the historic point of view—would make valid all that is typical of all Communist theories. In proceeding from immediate needs, the parties create generalities, ostensibly scientific conclusions and theories, and proclaim half-truths as truths. The fact that force and violence are basic characteristics of every state authority, or the fact that individual social and political forces employ the machinery of state, particularly in armed clashes, cannot be denied. However, experience shows that state machinery is necessary to society, or the nation, for still another reason—for the development and unifying of its various functions. Communist theory, as well as that of Lenin, ignores this aspect.

There were, long ago, communities without states and authorities. They were not social communities, but something in transition between the semi-animal and human forms of social life. Even these most primitive communities had some forms of authority. With increasingly complex forms of social life, it would be naïve to try to prove that the need for the state would disappear in the future. Lenin, in support of Marx who agreed with the anarchists about this, contemplated and tried to establish precisely such a stateless society. Without entering into a discussion on the extent to which his premises were justified, we must remember that he contemplated this society as his classless society. According to this theory there will be no classes and no class struggles; there will be no one to oppress and to exploit others; and there will be no need for the state. Until that time, then, the “most democratic” state is the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” for the reason that it “abolishes” classes, and by so doing, ostensibly makes itself gradually unnecessary. Therefore, everything that strengthens that dictatorship, or leads to the “abolishing” of classes, is justified, progressive, and liberal. In those places where they are not in control the Communists are pleaders in behalf of the most democratic measures because this facilitates their struggles; in those places where they manage to get control, they become opponents of every democratic form as allegedly a “bourgeois” form. They currently proclaim the preposterous classification of democracy into “bourgeois” and “socialist,” although the only proper and fair distinction must be drawn solely on the basis of the quantity of freedom, or the universality of freedom.

In the entire Leninist or Communist theory of the state, there are gaps in the scientific as well as the practical points
of view. Experience has demonstrated that the results are completely contrary to those envisaged by Lenin. The classes did not disappear under the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” did not begin to wither away. Actually, the creation of the total authority of the Communists, and the liquidation of the classes of the old society, was meant to look like the liquidation of classes in general. But the growth of state power or, more precisely, of the bureaucracy through which it enforced its tyranny did not stop with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Instead it increased. The theory had to be patched up somehow; Stalin had conceived a still higher “educational” role of the Soviet state before it “withered.” If Communist theory of the state, and especially its practice, is reduced to its very essence, i.e., to force and coercion as the principal or only function of the state, Stalin’s theory might be said to be that the police system has this high or “educational” role to play. Understandably, only a malicious interpretation could lead to such a conclusion. And in this theory of Stalin’s there is one of the Communist half-truths: Stalin did not know how to explain the obvious fact that the power and might of the state machinery continually grew in the already “established socialist society.” So he took one of the functions of the state—the educational function—as the main function. He was not able to use tyranny since there no longer were any opposition classes.

The situation is the same with the Yugoslav leaders’ theories concerning “autonomy.” In the clash with Stalin, they had to “rectify” his “deviations” and do something so that the state would soon begin to “wither away.” It did not matter to Stalin or to them that they were further promoting and strengthening that function of the state—force—which for them was the most important function and one on which they based their theory of the state.

Stalin’s ideas on how the state withers away while growing stronger, i.e., the way that the state’s functions continually expand and draw an ever increasing number of citizens into themselves, is extremely interesting. Perceiving the ever greater and expanding role of the state machine, despite the already “started” transition into a “completely classless” Communist society, Stalin thought that the state would disappear by having all the citizenry rise to the state’s level and take charge of its affairs. Lenin, moreover, talked about the time when “even housewives will administer the government.” Theories resembling that of Stalin circulate in Yugoslavia, as we have seen. Neither these nor Stalin’s are able to bridge the ever increasing chasm between the Communist theories of the state, with the “disappearance” of classes and the “withering away” of the state in their “socialism” on the one hand, and the realities of the totalitarian authority of the party bureaucracy on the other.

5.

The most important problem for Communism, in theory and practice, is the question of the state; the question is a constant source of difficulties since it is such an obvious contradiction inside Communism.

Communist regimes are a form of latent civil war between the government and the people. The state is not merely an instrument of tyranny; society as well as the executive bodies of the state machine is in a continuous and lively opposition to the oligarchy, which aspires to reduce this opposition by naked force. In practice, the Communists are unable to attain the goal of a state existing solely on naked force, nor are they able to subordinate society completely. But they are able to control the organs of force, that is, the police and party, which in turn control the entire state machine and its functions. The opposition of the organs and functions of the state against the “irrationalities” of the party and police, or of individual polit-
tical functionaries, is really the opposition of society carried over into the state machine. It is an expression of dissatisfaction because of the oppression and crippling of society's objective aspirations and needs.

In Communist systems, the state and state functions are not reduced to organs of oppression, nor are they identical with them. As an organization of national and social life, the state is subordinated to these organs of oppression. Communism is unable to solve this incongruity, for the reason that by its own totalitarian despotism it inevitably comes in conflict with dissimilar and opposite tendencies of society, tendencies which are expressed even through the social functions of the state.

Because of this contradiction, and the unavoidable and constant need of the Communists to treat the state predominantly as an instrument of force, the Communist state cannot become a lawful state, or a state in which the judiciary would be independent of the government and in which laws could actually be enforced. The whole Communist system is opposed to such a state. Even if the Communist leaders wished to create a lawful state, they could not do so without imperiling their totalitarian authority.

An independent judiciary and the rule of law would inevitably make it possible for an opposition to appear. For instance, no law in the Communist system opposes the free expression of opinion or the right of organization. Laws in the Communist system guarantee all sorts of rights to citizens, and are based on the principle of an independent judiciary. In practice, there is no such thing.

 Freedoms are formally recognized in Communist regimes, but one decisive condition is a prerequisite for exercising them: freedoms must be utilized only in the interest of the system of "socialism," which the Communist leaders represent, or to buttress their rule. This practice, contrary as it is to legal regulations, inevitably had to result in the use of exceptionally severe and unscrupulous methods by police and party bodies.

Legal forms must be protected on the one hand while the monopoly of authority must be insured at the same time. For the most part, in the Communist system, legislative authority cannot be separated from executive authority. Lenin considered this a perfect solution. Yugoslav leaders also maintain this. In a one-party system, this is one of the sources of despotism and omnipotence in government.

In the same way, it has been impossible in practice to separate police authority from judicial authority. Those who arrest also judge and enforce punishments. The circle is closed: the executive, the legislative, the investigating, the court, and the punishing bodies are one and the same.

Why does the Communist dictatorship have to use laws to the great extent that it does? Why does it have to hide behind legality?

Foreign political propaganda is one of the reasons. Another important one is the fact that the Communist regime must insure and fix the rights of those upon whom it depends—the new class—to maintain itself. Laws are always written from the standpoint of the new class's or party's needs or interests. Officially the laws must be written for all citizens, but citizens enjoy the rights of these laws conditionally, only if they are not "enemies of socialism." Consequently the Communists are constantly concerned that they might be forced to carry out the laws that they have adopted. Therefore, they always leave a loophole or exception which will enable them to evade their laws.

For instance, the Yugoslav legislative authorities stand on the principle that no one can be convicted except for an act which has been exactly formulated by the law. However, most of the political trials are held on the grounds of so-called "hostile propaganda," although this concept is purposely not defined but, instead, left up to the judges or secret police.

For these reasons political trials in Communist regimes are mostly prearranged. The courts have the task of demonstrating
what the power-wielders need to have demonstrated; or have the task of giving a legal cloak to the political judgment on the "hostile activity" of the accused.

In trials conducted by this method the confession of the accused is most important. He himself must acknowledge that he is an enemy. Thus, the thesis is confirmed. Evidence, little as there may be of it, must be replaced by confession of guilt.

The political trials in Yugoslavia are only pocket editions of the Moscow trials. The so-called Moscow trials are the most grotesque and bloody examples of judicial and legal comedies in the Communist system. The majority of other trials are similar insofar as acts and punishments are concerned.

How are political trials handled?

First, upon the suggestion of party functionaries, the party police establish that someone is an "enemy" of existing conditions; that, if nothing else, his views and discussions with close friends represent trouble, at least for the local authorities. The next step is the preparation of the legal removal of the enemy. This is done either through a provocateur, who provokes the victim to make "embarrassing statements," to take part in illegal organizing, or to commit similar acts; or it is done through a "stool pigeon" who simply bears witness against the victim according to the wishes of the police. Most of the illegal organizations in Communist regimes are created by the secret police in order to lure opponents into them and to put these opponents in a position where the police can settle accounts with them. The Communist government does not discourage "objectionable" citizens from committing law violations and crimes; in fact it prods them into such violations and crimes.

Stalin generally operated without the courts, using torture extensively. However, even if torture is not used and the courts are used instead, the essence is the same: Communists settle accounts with their opponents not because they have committed crimes, but because they are opponents. It can be said that most political criminals who are punished are innocent from a legal point of view, even though they are opponents of the regime. From the Communist point of view, these opponents are punished by "due process of law," although there may be no legal basis for their being convicted.

When citizens spontaneously turn against the regime's measures, the Communist authorities handle them without regard to constitutional and legal regulations. Modern history has no record of actions against the opposition of the masses which are as brutal, inhuman, and unlawful as those of Communist regimes. The action taken in Poznan is the best known, but not the most brutal. Occupying and colonial powers seldom take such severe measures, even though they are conquerors and accomplish their actions by the use of extraordinary laws and measures. The Communist power-wielders accomplish them in their very "own" country by trampling on their own laws.

Even in non-political matters, the judiciary and the legislative authorities are not safe from the despots. The totalitarian class and its members cannot help but mix into the affairs of the judiciary and the legislative authorities. This is an everyday occurrence.

An article in the March 23, 1955, issue of the Belgrade newspaper Politika (Politics) offers this suitable illustration of the real role and position of the courts in Yugoslavia (although there has always been a higher degree of legality in Yugoslavia than in other Communist countries):

In a discussion of problems connected with criminals operating in the economy, at a 2-day annual conference, presided over by public prosecutor Brana Jevremovic, the public prosecutors of the republics, of the Vojvodina, and of Belgrade announced that cooperation between the judiciary organs and the autonomous organs in the economy and all political organizations is necessary for complete success in the battle against criminals operating in the economy and all political organizations. . . .

The public prosecutors think that society has not yet reacted
6.

The Communist legal system cannot free itself of formalism, nor abolish the decisive influence of party units and the police in trials, elections, and similar events. The higher up one goes, the more legality becomes a mere ornament, and the greater the role of government in the judiciary, in elections, and the like becomes.

The emptiness and pomposity of Communist elections is generally well known; if I remember correctly, Attlee wittily called them “a race with one horse.” It seems to me that something should be said: Why is it that Communists cannot do without elections, even though they have no effect on political relations; and cannot do without such a costly and empty undertaking as a parliamentary establishment?

Again, propaganda and foreign policy are among the reasons. There is also this: no government, not even a Communist one, can exist without everything being legally constituted. Under contemporary conditions this is done by means of elected representatives. The people must formally confirm everything the Communists do.

Besides this there is a deeper and more important reason for the parliamentary system in Communist states. It is necessary that the top party bureaucracy, or the political core of the new class, approve the measures taken by the government, its supreme body. A Communist government can ignore general public opinion, but every Communist government is bound by the public opinion of the party, and by Communist public opinion. Consequently, even though elections have scarcely any meaning for Communists, the selection of those who will be in the parliament is done very carefully by the top party group. In the selection, account is taken of all circumstances, such as services, role and function in the movement and in society, the professions represented, etc. From the intra-party point of view, elections for leadership are very important: the leaders dis-
tribute those party powers in the parliament which they think are most important. Thus the leadership has the legality it needs to operate in the name of the party, class, and people.

Attempts to allow two or more Communists to contend for the same seat in parliament have had no constructive results. There were several instances where this was attempted in Yugoslavia, but the leadership decided that such attempts were “disrupting.” News has recently been received of a large number of Communist candidates competing for the same positions in the eastern European countries. The intention may be to have two or more candidates for every office, but there is little possibility that this will be done systematically. It would be a step forward, and might even be the beginning of a turning toward democracy by the Communist system. However, it seems to me that there is still a long way to go before such measures will be realized and that development in eastern Europe will first turn in the direction of the Yugoslav system of “workers’ management,” instead of becoming a political democracy with its attendant changes. The despotic core still holds everything in its hands, conscious of the fact that relinquishment of its traditional party unity would prove very dangerous. Every freedom within the party imperils not only the authority of the leaders, but totalitarianism itself.

Communist parliaments are not in a position to make decisions on anything important. Selected in advance as they are, flattered that they have been thus selected, representatives do not have the power or the courage to debate even if they wanted to do so. Besides, since their mandate does not depend on the voters, representatives do not feel that they are answerable to them. Communist parliaments are justifiably called “mausoleums” for the representatives who compose them. Their right and role consist of unanimously approving from time to time that which has already been decided for them from the wings. Another type of parliament is not required for this system of government; indeed, the reproach could be made that any other type would be superfluous and too costly.

7.

Founded by force and violence, in constant conflict with its people, the Communist state, even if there are no external reasons, must be militaristic. The cult of force, especially military force, is nowhere so prevalent as in Communist countries. Militarism is the internal basic need of the new class; it is one of the forces which make possible the new class’s existence, strength, and privileges.

Under constant pressure to be primarily and, when necessary, exclusively an organ of violence, the Communist state has been a bureaucratic state since the beginning. Maintained by the despotism of a handful of power-wielders, the Communist state wields more power than any other state organization does with the aid of diverse laws and regulations. Soon after its establishment, the Communist state becomes replete with so many regulations that even judges and lawyers have difficulty in finding their way through them. Everything has to be accurately regulated and confirmed, even though little profit is derived thereby. For ideological reasons Communist legislators often issue various laws without taking the real situation and practical possibilities into consideration. Immersed in legal and abstract “socialist” formulas, not subject to criticism or opposition, they compress life into paragraphs, which the assemblies mechanically ratify.

The Communist government is non-bureaucratic, however, where a question of the needs of the oligarchy and the working methods of its leaders is involved. Even in exceptional cases state and party heads do not like to fetter themselves with regulations. Policy-making and the right of political determination
are in their hands, and these cannot bear procrastination or too strict formalization. In decisions concerning the economy as a whole and in all other matters except unimportant, representational, and formal questions, the heads function without excessive restrictions. The creators of the most rigid type of bureaucratism and political centralism are not as individuals bureaucrats nor are they bound by legal regulations. For example, Stalin was not a bureaucrat in any respect. Disorder and delay prevail in the offices and establishments of many Communist leaders.

This does not prevent them from temporarily taking a stand "against bureaucratism," that is, against both unscrupulousness and slowness in administration. They are today battling against the Stalinist form of bureaucratic administration. However, they have no intention of eliminating the real, fundamental bureaucratism rampant in the management of the political apparatus inside the economy and state.

In this "battle against bureaucratism," Communist leaders usually refer to Lenin. However, a very careful study of Lenin reveals that he did not foresee that the new system was moving toward political bureaucracy. In the conflict with the bureaucracy inherited partly from the Czar's administration, Lenin attributed most of the difficulties to the fact that "there are no apparatuses composed from a list of Communists or from a list of members of Soviet party schools." The old officials disappeared under Stalin, and Communists from the "list" stepped into their places, and in spite of this, bureaucratism grew. Even in places like Yugoslavia where there was a considerable weakening of bureaucratic administration, its essence, the monopoly of political bureaucracy and the relations resulting from it, was not abolished. Even when it is abolished as an administrative method of management, bureaucratism continues to exist as a political-social relation.

The Communist state, or government, is working toward the complete impersonalization of the individual, the nation, and even of its own representatives. It aspires to turn the entire state into a state of functionaries. It aspires to regulate and control, either directly or indirectly, wages, housing conditions, and even intellectual activities. The Communists do not distinguish people as to whether or not they are functionaries—all persons are considered to be functionaries—but by the amount of pay they receive and the number of privileges they enjoy. By means of collectivization, even the peasant gradually becomes a member of the general bureaucratic society.

However, this is the external view. In the Communist system social groups are sharply divided. In spite of such differences and conflicts, though, the Communist society is as a whole more unified than any other. The weakness of the whole lies in its compulsory attitudes and relationships and the conflicting elements of its composition. However, every part is dependent on every other part, just as in a single, huge mechanism.

In a Communist government, or state, just as in an absolute monarchy, the development of human personality is an abstract ideal. In the period of the absolute monarchy, when mercantilists imposed the state upon the economy, the crown itself—for example, Catherine the Great—thought that the government was obliged to re-educate the people. The Communist leaders operate and think in the same way. However, during the time of the absolute monarchy, the government did this in an attempt to subordinate existing ideas to its own. Today, in the Communist system, the government is simultaneously the owner and the ideologist. This does not mean that the human personality has disappeared or that it has been changed into a dull, impersonal cog which rotates in a large, merciless state mechanism, in accordance with the will of an omnipotent sorcerer. Personality, by its own nature both collective and individual, is indestructible, even under the Communist system. Of course it is stifled under this system more than under other systems, and its individuality has to be manifested in a different way.
Its world is a world of petty daily cares. When these cares and wishes collide with the fortress of the system, which holds a monopoly over the material and intellectual life of the people, even this petty world is not free or secure. In the Communist system, insecurity is the way of life for the individual. The state gives him the opportunity to make a living, but on condition that he submit. The personality is torn between what it desires and what it can actually have. It is free to recognize the interests of the collective and to submit to them, just as in every other system; but also it may rebel against the usurping representatives of the collective. Most of the individuals in the Communist system are not opposed to socialism, but opposed to the way in which it is being achieved—this confirms the fact that the Communists are not developing any sort of true socialism. The individual rebels against those limitations which are in the interest of the oligarchy, not against those which are in the interest of society.

Anyone who does not live under these systems has a hard time grasping how human beings, particularly such proud and brave peoples, could have given up their freedom of thought and work to such an extent. The most accurate, though not the most complete, explanation for this situation is the severity and totality of tyranny. But at the root of this situation, there are deeper reasons.

One reason is historical; the people were forced to undergo the loss of freedom in the irresistible drive toward economic change. Another reason is of an intellectual and moral nature. Since industrialization had become a matter of life or death, socialism, or Communism, as its ideal expression, became the ideal and hope, almost to the point of religious obsession among some of the population at large as well as the Communists. In the minds of those who did not belong to the old social classes, a deliberate and organized revolt against the party, or against the government, would have been tantamount to treason against the homeland and the highest ideals.

The most important reason why there was no organized resistance to Communism lies deep in the all-inclusiveness and totalitarianism of the Communist state. It had penetrated into all the pores of society and of the personality—into the vision of the scientists, the inspiration of poets, and the dreams of lovers. To rise against it meant not only to die the death of a desperate individual, but to be branded and excommunicated from society. There is no air or light under the Communist government's iron fist.

Neither of the two main types of opposition groups—that stemming from the older classes and that stemming from original Communism itself—found ways and means of combating this encroachment on their liberty. The first group was tugging backward, while the second group carried on a pointless and thoughtless revolutionary activity, and engaged in quibbling about dogma with the regime. Conditions were not yet ripe for the finding of new roads.

Meanwhile, the people were instinctively suspicious of the new road and resisted every step and small detail. Today, this resistance is the greatest, the most real threat to Communist regimes. The Communist oligarchs no longer know what the masses think or feel. The regimes feel insecure in a sea of deep and dark discontent.

Though history has no record of any other system so successful in checking its opposition as the Communist dictatorship, none ever has provoked such profound and far-reaching discontent. It seems that the more the conscience is crushed and the less the opportunities for establishing an organization exist, the greater the discontent.

Communist totalitarianism leads to total discontent, in which all differences of opinion are gradually lost, except despair and hatred. Spontaneous resistance—the dissatisfaction of millions with the everyday details of life—is the form of resistance that the Communists have not been able to smother. This was confirmed during the Soviet-German war. When the Germans
first attacked the U.S.S.R., there seemed to be little desire for resistance among the Russians. However, Hitler soon revealed that his intentions were the destruction of the Russian state and the changing of the Slavs and other Soviet peoples into impersonal slaves of the *Herrenvolk*. From the depths of the people there emerged the traditional, unquenchable love for the homeland. During the entire war Stalin did not mention either the Soviet government or its socialism to the people; he mentioned only one thing—the homeland. And it was worth dying for, in spite of Stalin's socialism.

8.

The Communist regimes have succeeded in solving many problems that had baffled the systems they replaced. They are also succeeding in solving the nationality problem as it existed up to the time they came to power. They have not been able to resolve the conflict of national bourgeoisie completely, however. The problem has reappeared in the Communist regimes in a new and more serious form.

National rule is being established in the U.S.S.R. through a highly developed bureaucracy. In Yugoslavia, however, disputes are arising because of friction between national bureaucracies. Neither the first nor the second case concerns national disputes in the old sense. The Communists are not nationalists; for them, the insistence on nationalism is only a form, just like any other form, through which they strengthen their powers. For this purpose they may even act like vehement chauvinists from time to time. Stalin was a Georgian, but in practice and in propaganda, whenever necessary, he was a rabid Great Russian. Among Stalin's errors, even Khrushchev admitted, was the terrible truth of the extermination of entire peoples. Stalin and Company used the national prejudices of the largest nation—the Russian nation—just as if it had been composed of Hottentots. The Communist leaders will always take recourse to anything they find useful, such as the preaching of equality of rights among the national bureaucracies, which is practically the same to them as the demand for equality of rights among nationalities.

National feelings and national interest, however, do not lie at the basis of the conflict between the Communist national bureaucracies. The motive is quite different: it is supremacy in one's own zone, in the sphere which is under one's administration. The struggle over the reputation and powers of one's own republic does not go much further than a desire to strengthen one's own power. The national Communist state units have no significance other than that they are administrative divisions, on the basis of language. The Communist bureaucrats are vehement local patriots on behalf of their own administrative units, even though they have not been trained for the part on either a linguistic or a national basis. In some purely administrative units in Yugoslavia (the regional councils), chauvinism has been greater than in the national republic governments.

Among the Communists one can encounter both shortsighted bureaucratic chauvinism and a decline of national consciousness, even in the very same people, depending upon opportunities and requirements.

The languages which the Communists speak are hardly the same as those of their own people. The words are the same, but the expressions, the meaning, the inner sense—all of these are their very own.

While they are autarchical with regard to other systems and localistic within their own system, the Communists can be fervent internationalists when it is to their interest to be so. The various nations, each of which once had its own form and color, its own history and hopes, stand virtually still now, gray and languid, beneath the all-powerful, all-knowing, and essentially non-national oligarchies. The Communists did not
suceed in exciting or awakening the nations; in this sense they also failed to solve nationality questions. Who knows anything nowadays about Ukrainian writers and political figures? What has happened to that nation, which is the same size as France, and was once the most advanced nation in Russia? You would think that only an amorphous and formless mass of people could remain under this impersonal machine of oppression.

However, this is not the case.

Just as personality, various social classes, and ideas still live, so do the nations still live; they function; they struggle against despotism; and they preserve their distinctive features undestroyed. If their consciences and souls are smothered, they are not broken. Though they are under subjugation, they have not yielded. The force activating them today is more than the old or bourgeois nationalism; it is an imperishable desire to be their own masters, and, by their own free development, to attain an increasingly fuller fellowship with the rest of the human race in its eternal existence.

Dogmatism in the Economy

1.

The development of the economy in Communism is not the basis for, but a reflection of, the development of the regime itself from a revolutionary dictatorship to a reactionary despotism. This development, through struggles and disputes, demonstrates how the interference of government in the economy, necessary at first, has gradually turned into a vital, personal interest on the part of the ruling bureaucrats. Initially, the state seizes all means of production in order to control all investments for rapid industrialization. Ultimately, further economic development has come to be guided mainly in the interests of the ruling class.

Other types of owners do not act in an essentially different manner; they are always motivated by some sort of personal interest. However, the thing that distinguishes the new class from other types of owners is that it has in its hands, more or less, all the national resources, and that it is developing its economic power in a deliberate and organized manner. A deliberate system of unification is also used by other classes, such as political and economic organizations. Because there are a number of owners and many forms of property, all in mutual conflict, spontaneity and competition have been preserved in all econ-
ECONOMIES preceding the Communist one, at least under normal or peaceful conditions.

Even the Communist economy has not succeeded in repressing spontaneity, but in contrast to all others, it constantly insists that spontaneity should be achieved.

This practice has its theoretic justification. The Communist leaders really believe that they know economic laws and that they can administer production with scientific accuracy. The truth is that the only thing they know how to do is to seize control of the economy. Their ability to do this, just like their victory in the revolution, has created the illusion in their minds that they succeeded because of their exceptional scientific ability.

Convinced of the accuracy of their theories, they administer the economy largely according to these theories. It is a standard joke that the Communists first equate an economic measure with a Marxist idea and then proceed to carry out the measure. In Yugoslavia, it has been officially declared that planning is conducted according to Marx; but Marx was neither a planner nor a planning expert. In practice, nothing is done according to Marx. However, the claim that planning is conducted according to Marx satisfies people’s consciences and is used to justify tyranny and economic domination for “ideal” aims and according to “scientific” discoveries.

Dogmatism in the economy is an inseparable part of the Communist system. However, the forcing of the economy into dogmatic molds is not the outstanding feature of the Communist economic system. In this economy the leaders are masters in “adapting” theory; they depart from theory when it is to their interest to do so.

In addition to being motivated by the historical need for rapid industrialization, the Communist bureaucracy has been compelled to establish a type of economic system designed to insure the perpetuation of its own power. Allegedly for the sake of a classless society and for the abolition of exploitation, it has created a closed economic system, with forms of property which facilitate the party’s domination and its monopoly. At first, the Communists had to turn to this “collectivistic” form for objective reasons. Now they continue to strengthen this form—without considering whether or not it is in the interest of the national economy and of further industrialization—for their own sake, for an exclusive Communist class aim. They first administered and controlled the entire economy for so-called ideal goals; later they did it for the purpose of maintaining their absolute control and domination. That is the real reason for such far-reaching and inflexible political measures in the Communist economy.

In an interview in 1956, Tito admitted that there are “socialist elements” in Western economies, but that they are not “deliberately” introduced into the economies as such. This expresses the whole Communist idea: only because “socialism” is established “deliberately”—by organized compulsion—in the economics of their countries must the Communists preserve the despotic method of governing and their own monopoly of ownership.

This attribution of great and even decisive significance to “deliberateness” in the development of the economy and society reveals the compulsory and selfish character of Communist economic policy. Otherwise, why would such an insistence on deliberateness be necessary?

The strong opposition of Communists to all forms of ownership except those which they consider to be socialist indicates, above all, their uncontrollable desires to gain and maintain power. They abandoned or altered this radical attitude, however, when it was against their interest to hold to it; thus they treated their own theory badly. In Yugoslavia, for instance, they first created and then dissolved the kolkhozes in the name of “error-free Marxism” and “socialism.” Today they are pursuing a third, and confused, middle-of-the-road line in the same matter. There are similar examples in all Communist coun-
tries. However, the abolition of all forms of private ownership except their own is their unchanging purpose.

Every political system gives expression to economic forces and attempts to administer them. The Communists cannot attain complete control over production, but they have succeeded in controlling it to such an extent that they continuously subordinate it to their ideological and political goals. In this way, Communism differs from every other political system.

2.

The Communists interpret the special role of those who produce in terms of their total ownership and, even more important, often in terms of the overriding role of ideology in the economy.

Immediately after the revolution, freedom of employment was curtailed in the U.S.S.R. But the need of the régime for rapid industrialization did not bring about complete curtailment of such freedom. This took place only after the victory of the industrial revolution and after the new class had been created. In 1940 a law was passed forbidding freedom of employment and punishing people for quitting their jobs. In this period and after World War II, a form of slave labor developed, namely, the labor camps. Moreover, the borderline between work in the labor camps and work in factories was almost completely eliminated.

Labor camps and various kinds of “voluntary” work activities are only the worst and most extreme forms of compulsory labor. This can be of a temporary character in other systems but under Communism compulsory labor has remained a permanent feature. Although compulsory labor did not take the same form in other Communist countries nor develop there to the extent that it has in the U.S.S.R., none of these countries has completely free employment.

Compulsory labor in the Communist system is the result of monopoly of ownership over all, or almost all, national property. The worker finds himself in the position of having not only to sell his labor; he must sell it under conditions which are beyond his control, since he is unable to seek another, better employer. There is only one employer, the state. The worker has no choice but to accept the employer’s terms. The worst and most harmful element in early capitalism from the worker’s standpoint—the labor market—has been replaced by the monopoly over labor of the ownership of the new class. This has not made the worker any freer.

In the Communist system the worker is not like the ancient type of slave, not even when he is in compulsory labor camps: the ancient slave was treated both theoretically and practically as an object. Even the greatest mind of antiquity, Aristotle, believed that people were born either freemen or slaves. Though he believed in humane treatment of slaves and advocated the reform of the slavery system, he still regarded slaves as tools of production. In the modern system of technology, it is not possible to deal this way with a worker, because only a literate and interested worker can do the sort of work required. Compulsory labor in the Communist system is quite different from slavery in antiquity or in later history. It is the result of ownership and political relationships, not, or only to a slight extent, the result of the technological level of production.

Since modern technology requires a worker who can dispose of a considerable amount of freedom, it is in latent conflict with compulsory forms of labor, or with the monopoly of ownership and the political totalitarianism of Communism. Under Communism the worker is technically free, but his possibilities to use his freedom are extremely limited. The formal limitation of freedom is not an inherent characteristic of Communism, but it is a phenomenon which occurs under Communism. It is especially apparent with regard to work and the labor force itself.
are more of a political than an economic problem for the Communists.

While individual strikes are almost impossible, and hopeless as far as potential results are concerned, there are no proper political conditions for general strikes and they can occur only in exceptional situations. Whenever individual strikes have taken place, they have usually changed into general strikes and have taken on a distinctly political character. In addition, Communist regimes constantly divide and disrupt the working class by means of paid functionaries, raised from its ranks, who “educate” it, “uplift it ideologically,” and direct it in its daily life.

Trade union organizations and other professional organizations, because of their purpose and function, can only be the appendages of a single owner and potentate—the political oligarchy. Thus, their “main” purpose is the job of “building socialism” or increasing production. Their other functions are to spread illusions and an acquiescent mood among the workers. These organizations have played only one important role—the lifting of the cultural level of the working classes.

Workers’ organizations under the Communist system are really “company” or “yellow” organizations of a special kind. The expression “of a special kind” is used here because the employer is at the same time the government and the exponent of the predominant ideology. In other systems those two factors are generally separate from each other, so that the workers, even though unable to rely on either one of them, are at least able to take advantage of the differences and conflicts between them.

It is not accidental that the working class is the main concern of the regime; not for idealistic or humanitarian reasons, but simply because this is the class on which production depends and on which the rise and the very existence of the new class depends.

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3.

In spite of the fact that there is no free employment or free workers’ organizations, there is a limit to exploitation, even in the Communist system. The search for this limit would require a deeper and more concrete analysis. We will concern ourselves here only with its most important aspects.

In addition to political limits—fear of dissatisfaction among the workers and other considerations which are subject to change—there are also constant limits to exploitation: the forms and degrees of exploitation which become too costly for the system must sooner or later be discontinued.

Thus, by the decree of April 25, 1956, in the U.S.S.R., the condemnation of workers for tardiness or for quitting their jobs was canceled. Also a great many workers were released from labor camps; these were cases in which it was impossible to distinguish between political prisoners and those whom the regime had thrown into labor camps because it needed a labor force. This decree did not result in a completely freed labor force, for considerable limitations still remained in force, but it did represent the most significant progress made after Stalin’s death.

Compulsory slave labor brought political difficulties to the regime and also became too costly as soon as advanced technology was introduced in the U.S.S.R. A slave laborer, no matter how little you feed him, costs more than he can produce when you count the administrative apparatus needed to assure his coercion. His labor becomes senseless and must be discontinued. Modern production limits exploitation in other ways. Machinery cannot be operated efficiently by exhausted compulsory labor, and adequate health and cultural conditions have become an indispensable prerequisite.

The limits to exploitation in the Communist system are paralleled by limits to the freedoms of the labor force. These
The same is true with regard to agriculture. Under present-day conditions, progressive agriculture also means industrialization. Progressive agriculture does not insure that a Communist regime will be independent of the outside. Internally it makes the regime dependent on the peasant, even though the peasants are members of free cooperatives. Consequently steel has been given priority in the plan, right beside kolkhozes with low production. The planning of political power had to come ahead of economic progress.

Soviet, or Communist, planning is of a special kind. It has not evolved as the result of the technological development of production nor as the result of the "socialist" consciousness of its initiators. Instead it has evolved as the result of a special type of government and ownership. Today, technical and other factors are influencing this type of planning, but these other factors have not ceased to have their effect on the evolution of this type of planning. It is very important to note this, for it is the key to understanding the character of this type of planning, and of the capabilities of a Communist economy.

The results achieved by such an economy and by such planning are varied. The concentration of all means to achieve a specific purpose make it possible for the power-wielders to progress with extraordinary speed in certain branches of the economy. The progress that the U.S.S.R. has achieved in some branches has heretofore never been achieved anywhere in the world. However, when one considers the backward conditions existing in other branches the progress achieved is not justified from the over-all economic point of view.

Of course, once-backward Russia has attained second place in world production as far as its most important branches of the economy are concerned. It has become the mightiest continental power in the world. A strong working class, a wide stratum of technical intelligentsia, and the materials for consumer goods production have been created. The dictatorship has not
been essentially weakened because of this, nor are there any reasons to believe that the standard of living cannot be improved in proportion to the country’s economic capabilities. Ownership and political considerations for which the plan is only an implement have made it impossible to weaken the dictatorship to any extent or to raise the standard of living. The exclusive monopoly of a single group, in the economy as well as in politics, planning that is directed toward increasing its power and its interests in the country and throughout the world, continuously postpones the improvement of the standard of living and harmonious development of the economy. The absence of freedom is undoubtedly the final and most important reason for the postponement. In Communist systems freedom has become the main economic and general problem.

5.

The Communist planned economy conceals within itself an anarchy of a special kind. In spite of the fact that it is planned, the Communist economy is perhaps the most wasteful economy in the history of human society. Such claims may seem strange, especially if one has in mind the relatively rapid development of individual branches of the economy, and of the economy as a whole. However, they have a solid basis.

Wastefulness of fantastic proportions was unavoidable even if this had not been a group which considered everything, including the economy, from its own narrow ownership and ideological point of view. How could a single group of this kind administer a complex modern economy effectively and thriftily—an economy which, in spite of the most complete planning, showed varied and often contradictory internal and external tendencies from day to day? The absence of any type of criticism, even of any type of important suggestion, inevitably leads to waste and stagnation.
There is only partial justification for seeking, in Communist philosophy, the sources of tyranny over the mind, a tyranny which the Communists exercise with clinical refinement when they come to power. Communist materialism is possibly more exclusive than any other contemporary view of the world. It pushes its adherents into the position which makes it impossible for them to hold any other viewpoint. If this view were not connected with specific forms of government and ownership, the monstrous methods of oppression and destruction of the human mind could not be explained by the view itself.

Every ideology, every opinion, tries to represent itself as the only true one and complete one. This is innate in man’s thinking.

It was not the idea itself but the method by which the idea was applied that distinguished Marx and Engels. They denied every scientific and progressive socialist value in the thinking of their contemporaries, usually lumping such ideas into “bourgeois science,” thus banning every serious discussion and study in advance.

The idea that was especially narrow and exclusive with Marx and Engels, the idea from which Communism later could draw substance for its ideological intolerance, was that of the inseparability of the political views of a contemporary scientist, thinker, or artist from his real or scientific value as a thinker or artist. If one was found in the opposite camp politically, his every other objective or other work was opposed or disregarded.

This position of Marx and Engels can be only partially explained as the result of the furious opposition of the owners and power-holders agitated by the “specter of Communism” from the very beginning.

The exclusiveness of Marx and Engels was born and intensified by something else that was at the roots of what they had learned: convinced that they had plumbed the depths of every philosophy, they thought that it was impossible for anyone to attain anything significant without taking their own view of the world as the basis. Out of the scientific atmosphere of the epoch and out of the needs of the socialist movement, Marx and Engels came to think that anything that was not important to them, or to the movement, was not important, even objectively; that is, if it was independent of the movement, it was not important.

Consequently, they proceeded practically unaware of the most important minds of their time, and disdained the views of opponents in their own movement. The writings of Marx and Engels contain no mention of such a well-known philosopher as Schopenhauer or of an aestheticist like Taine. There is no mention of the well-known writers and artists of their period. There is not even any reference to those who were caught up in the ideological and social stream to which Marx and Engels belonged. They settled their accounts with their oppositionists in the socialist movement in a fierce and intolerant manner. This was perhaps not important for the sociology of Proudhon, but it was very important for the development
of socialism and social struggles, especially in France. The same may be said of Bakunin. Slaughtering Proudhon’s ideas, Marx, in his *Misery of Philosophy*, scornfully went beyond his real role. He and Engels did the same with the German socialist, Lassalle, as well as with other oppositionists inside their own movement.

On the other hand, they carefully noted the significant intellectual phenomena of their time. They accepted Darwin. They particularly grasped the currents of the past—ancient and Renaissance—from which European culture had developed. In sociology they borrowed from English political economy (Smith and Ricardo); in philosophy, from classic German philosophy (Kant, Hegel); and in social theory, from French socialism, or from the currents that emerged after the French revolution. These were the great scientific, intellectual, and social currents that created the democratic and progressive climate of Europe and the rest of the world.

There is logic and consistency in the development of Communism. Marx was more of a scientist, more objective than Lenin, who was above all a great revolutionary, formed under the conditions of Czarist absolutism, semi-colonial Russian capitalism, and world conflicts by monopolists for spheres of influence.

Leaning on Marx, Lenin taught that materialism was progressive as a rule throughout history, and that idealism was reactionary. This was not only one-sided and incorrect, but it intensified Marx’s exclusiveness. It also emanated from insufficient knowledge of historical philosophy. In 1909, when Lenin wrote his *Materialism and Empiro-Criticism*, he was not closely acquainted with any great philosopher, classical or modern. Because of the need to overcome oppositionists whose views hindered the development of his party, Lenin rejected everything that was not in accord with Marxist views. To him, anything was erroneous and valueless if it was not in accord with original Marxism. It must be acknowledged that, in this respect,

his works are outstanding examples of logical and persuasive dogmatism.

Believing that materialism had always been the ideology of revolutionary and subversive social movements, he drew the one-sided conclusion that materialism was generally progressive—even in the fields of research and in the development of man’s thought—while idealism was reactionary. Lenin confused form and method with content and with scientific discovery. The fact that anyone was idealistic in his thinking was sufficient for Lenin to disregard his real value and the value of his discoveries. Lenin extended his political intolerance to practically the entire history of human thought.

By 1920, Bertrand Russell, the British philosopher who welcomed the October Revolution, had accurately noted the essence of Leninist, or Communist, dogmatism:*

* From *Bolshevism: Practice and Theory*; New York, Harcourt, Brace & Howe.
ages, I should consider the price too high. It cannot be denied that, over any short period of time, dogmatic belief is a help in fighting.

But this was Lenin’s period.

Stalin went further; he “developed” Lenin, but without having Lenin’s knowledge or depth. Careful research would lead to the conclusion that this man, whom Khrushchev himself today acknowledges to have been the “best Marxist” of his time, had not even read Marx’s *Das Kapital*, the most important work on Marxism. Practical soul that he was, and supported by his extreme dogmatism, it was not even necessary for him to be acquainted with Marx’s economic studies to build his brand of “socialism.” Stalin was not closely acquainted with any philosopher. He behaved toward Hegel as he would toward a “dead dog,” attributing to him the “reaction of Prussian absolutism to the French revolution.”

But Stalin was uncommonly well acquainted with Lenin. He always sought support in him, to a greater extent than Lenin did in Marx. Stalin had considerable knowledge of political history only, especially Russian, and he had an uncommonly good memory.

Stalin really did not need any more than this for his role. Anything that did not coincide with his needs and his views he simply proclaimed as “hostile” and forbade it.

The three men—Marx, Lenin, and Stalin—are contrasts as men and as contrasts in their methods of expression. In addition to being a revolutionary, Marx was a somewhat simple scientist. His style was picturesque, baroque, unrestrained, and witty in an Olympian sort of way. Lenin seemed to be the incarnation of the revolution itself. His style was flamboyant, incisive, and logical. Stalin thought his power lay in the satisfaction of all human desires, and believed his thinking to be the supreme expression of human thought. His style was colorless and monotonous, but its oversimplified logic and dogmatism were convincing to the conformists and to common people.

**TYRANNY OVER THE MIND**

It contained simplicities from the writings of the Church fathers, not so much the result of his religious youth as the result of the fact that his was the way of expression under primitive conditions, and of dogmatized Communists.

Stalin’s followers do not have even his crude internal cohesiveness nor his dogmatic powers and convictions. Average men in everything, they possess an uncommonly strong sense of reality. Unable to generate new systems or new ideas because of their commitment to vital bureaucratic realities, they are able only to stifle or make impossible the creation of anything new.

Thus is the evolution of the dogmatic and exclusive aspect of Communist ideology. The so-called “further development of Marxism” has led to the strengthening of the new class and the sovereignty not only of a single ideology, but the sovereignty of thought of a single man or group of oligarchs. This has resulted in the intellectual decline and impoverishment of the ideology itself. Along with this, intolerance of other ideas, and even of human thought as such, has increased. The ideology’s progress, its elements of truth, have declined in proportion to the increase of physical power of its disciples.

Becoming increasingly one-sided and exclusive, contemporary Communism more and more creates half-truths and tries to justify them. At first sight, it seems as if its views, individually, were true. But it is incurably infected with lies. Its half-truths are exaggerated and debased to the point of perversion; the more rigid and the more inspired it is with lies, the more it strengthens the monopolism of its leaders over society, and thus over Communist theory itself.

**2.**

The proposition that Marxism is a universal method, a proposition upon which Communists are obliged to stand, must in practice lead to tyranny in all areas of intellectual activity.
What can the unfortunate physicists do, if atoms do not behave according to the Hegelian-Marxist struggle or according to the uniformity of opposites and their development into higher forms? What of the astronomers, if the cosmos is apathetic to Communist dialectics? What of the biologists, if plants do not behave according to the Lysenko-Stalinist theory on harmony and cooperation of classes in a “socialist” society? Because it is not possible for these scientists to lie naturally, they must suffer the consequences of their “heresies.” To have their discoveries accepted they must make discoveries “confirming” the formulas of Marxism-Leninism. Scientists are in a constant dilemma as to whether their ideas and discoveries will injure official dogma. They are therefore forced into opportunism and compromises with regard to science.

The same is true of other intellectuals. In many ways contemporary Communism is reminiscent of the exclusiveness of religious sects of the Middle Ages. The observations on Calvinism written by the Serbian poet, Jovan Dučić, in his Tuge i vedrine (Sorrows and Calms), seem to relate to the intellectual atmosphere in a Communist country:

... And this Calvin, jurist and dogmatician, what he did not burn on the funeral pyre, he hardened in the soul of the people of Geneva. He introduced religious tribulation and pious renunciation in these homes which are even today filled with this cold and darkness; planted a hatred of all merriment and rapture, and damned poetry and music by decree. As a politician and tyrant at the head of the republic, he forged, like shackles, his iron laws over life in the state, and even regulated family feelings. Of all the figures which the Reformation fostered, Calvin is probably the most calloused of the revolutionary figures, and his Bible is the most depressing textbook for living. ... Calvin was not a new Christian apostle who wished to restore the faith to its pristine purity, simplicity, and sweetness, as it was when it sprang forth from the parabola of Nazareth. This Calvin was the Aryan ascetic, who, severing himself from the regime, also severed himself from love, the basic principle of his dogma. He created a people, earnest and full of virtue, but also full of hatred of life and full of disbelief in happiness. There is no harsher religion or more fearful prophet. Of the people of Geneva, Calvin made paralytics forever incapable of any joy. There are no people in the world to whom religion has brought as much tribulation and dreariness. Calvin was an eminent religious writer, as important to the purity of the French language as Luther was important to the purity of the German language, the translator of the Bible. But he was also the creator of a theocracy which was no less like a dictatorship than was the Papal monarchy. While announcing that he was freeing man’s spiritual personality, he degraded man’s civil personality to the blackest slavery. He confused the people and failed to brighten life in any way. He changed many things, but completed nothing and contributed nothing. Almost 300 years after Calvin, in Geneva, Stendhal observed how young men and young women carried on conversations only about “the pastor” and his last sermon, and how they knew his sermons by heart.

Contemporary Communism also contains some elements of the dogmatic exclusiveness of the Puritans under Cromwell and of the political intolerance of the Jacobins. But there are essential differences. The Puritans rigidly believed in the Bible and the Communists believe in science. Communist power is more complete than that of the Jacobins. Further, the differences emanate from the capabilities; no religion or dictatorship has been able to aspire to such all-around and all-inclusive power as that of the Communist systems.

The conviction of the Communist leaders that they were on the path leading to the creation of absolute happiness and an ideal society grew in proportion to the growth of their power. It has been said in jest that the Communist leaders created a Communist society—for themselves. In fact, they do identify themselves with society and its aspirations. Absolute despotism equates itself with the belief in absolute human happiness, though it is an all-inclusive and universal tyranny.
leaders that industrialization cannot be accomplished without
the technical intelligentsia, and that this intelligentsia cannot
by itself become dangerous. As in every other field, Communists
have a simplified and generally half-correct theory with relation
to this intelligentsia: some other class always pays the special-
ists, while they serve it. Consequently, why shouldn’t the “pro-
letariat,” or the new class, also do this? Acting on this proposi-
tion, they immediately develop a system of wages.

In spite of their technical progress, it is a fact that no great
modern scientific discovery has been achieved under the Soviet
government. In this respect, the U.S.S.R. is probably behind
Czarist Russia, where there were epochal scientific discoveries
in spite of technical backwardness.

Even though technical reasons make scientific discovery dif-
ficult, the main reasons for this difficulty are social. The new
class is very interested in seeing that its ideological monopolism
is not endangered. Every great scientific discovery is the result
of a changed view of the world in the mind of the discoverer.
A new view does not fit into the form of the already adopted
official philosophy. In the Communist system every scientist
must stop short before this fact or risk being proclaimed a
“heretic” if his theories do not coincide with the confirmed,
prescribed, and desirable dogma.

Work on discoveries is made difficult to an even greater de-
gree by the imposition of the official view that Marxism, or
dialectical materialism, is the most effective method for all
fields of scientific, intellectual, and other activity. There has
not been a single noted scientist in the U.S.S.R. who has not
had political trouble. There have been many reasons for this,
but one is due to opposition to the official line. There have
been fewer occurrences of this kind in Yugoslavia, but con-
versely, there are instances of the favoring of “devoted” but
poor scientists.

Communist systems stimulate technical progress but also
hinder every great research activity where undisturbed func-
tioning of the mind is necessary. This may sound contradictory, but it is so.

While Communist systems are only relatively opposed to scientific development, they are absolutely opposed to any intellectual progress and discovery. Based on the exclusiveness of a single philosophy, the systems are expressly anti-philosophic. In such systems, there has not been born, nor can there be born, a single thinker, especially a social thinker—as long as one does not so consider the power-wielders themselves, who are generally also the “main philosophers” and masters for “elevating” the human consciousness. In Communism a new thought, or a new philosophy and social theory, must travel by very indirect roads, generally by the way of literature or some branch of art. The new thought must first hide and conceal itself in order to reach the light and begin to live.

Of all the sciences and all thought, social sciences and the consideration of social problems fare the worst; they scarcely manage to exist. When it is a question of society or of a social problem, everything is interpreted according to Marx and Lenin, or everything is monopolized by the leaders.

History, especially of its own—the Communist—period, does not exist. Imposition of silence and falsification are not only permitted but are general phenomena.

The intellectual inheritance of the people is also being confiscated. The monopolists act as if all history has occurred just to let them make their appearance in the world. They measure the past and everything in it by their own likeness and form, and apply a single measure, dividing all men and phenomena into “progressive” and “reactionary” classifications. In this fashion they raise up monuments. They elevate the pygmies and destroy the great, especially the great of their own time.

Their “single scientific” method is most suitable too in that it alone protects and justifies their exclusive dominance over science and society.

Similar things are happening in art. Here favors are extended, in increasing measure, to already established forms and views of average quality. This is understandable: there is no art without ideas, or without some effect on the consciousness. Monopoly over ideas, the formation of the consciousness, are the prerequisites of the rulers. Communists are traditionalists in art, mostly because of the need to maintain their monopoly over the minds of the people but also because of their ignorance and one-sidedness. Some of them tolerate a kind of democratic freedom in modern art; but this is only an acknowledgment that they do not understand modern art, and therefore believe that they should permit it. Lenin felt this way about the futurism of Mayakovsky.

In spite of this, backward peoples in Communist systems experience a cultural renaissance along with the technical one. Culture becomes more accessible to them, even though it comes largely in the form of propaganda. The new class is interested in the spread of culture because industrialization brings the need for higher-quality work and the need for enlarging intellectual opportunities. The network of schools and professional branches of art has spread very rapidly, sometimes even beyond actual needs and capabilities. Progress in art is undeniable.

After a revolution, before the ruling class has established a complete monopoly, significant works of art are generally created. This was true in the U.S.S.R. prior to the 1930's; it is true today in Yugoslavia. It is as if the revolution had awakened dormant talents, even though despotism, which is also born in the revolution, increasingly stifles art.

The two basic methods of stifling the arts are by opposition toward the intellectual-idealistic aspects of it and by opposition to innovations in form.

In Stalin's time things reached the point where all forms
of artistic expression were forbidden except those that Stalin himself liked. Stalin did not have particularly good taste; he was hard of hearing, and liked octosyllabic and Alexandrine verse. Deutscher has stated that Stalin's style became the national style. The adoption of official views on art forms became as obligatory as the adoption of official ideas.

It has not always been like this in Communist systems, nor is it inevitable that it should be so. In 1925, in the U.S.S.R., a resolution was adopted stating that "the party as a whole can in no way tie devotion to a cause in the field of literary form." By this the party did not renounce its so-called "ideological aid," that is, its ideological and political control over artists. This was the maximum democracy attained by Communism in the field of art. Yugoslav leaders are in the same position today. After 1958, when the abandonment of democratic forms in favor of bureaucracy began, the most primitive and reactionary elements were encouraged; a mad hunt for "petit bourgeois" intellectuals was initiated, which openly aimed at controlling art forms. Overnight, the whole intellectual world turned against the regime. Consequently, the regime had to retract, announcing through one of Kardelj's speeches that the party cannot prescribe form itself, but that it would not allow "anti-socialist ideological contraband," that is, views which the regime considered as being "anti-socialist." The Bolshevik parties had taken this stand in 1925. This constituted the "democratic" limits of the Yugoslav regime toward art. However, the internal attitudes of most of the Yugoslav leaders were far from changed by this. They privately consider the entire intellectual and art world as "insecure," "petit bourgeois," or, putting it mildly, "ideologically confused." Cited in Yugoslavia's greatest newspaper (Politika, May 25, 1964) are Tito's "unforgettable" words: "A good textbook is more valuable than any novel." Periodic hysterical onslaughts against "decadence," "destructive ideas," and "hostile views" in art have continued.

Yugoslav culture, unlike Soviet culture, has at least succeeded in concealing, rather than destroying, dissatisfied and turbulent opinions regarding art forms. This has never been possible for Soviet culture. A sword hangs over Yugoslav culture, but the sword has been driven into the heart of Soviet culture.

Relative freedom of form, which the Communists can only periodically suppress, cannot completely free the creative person. Art, even though indirectly, must also express new ideas through form itself. Even in Communist systems where art is allowed the greatest freedom, the contradiction between promised free form and compulsory control of ideas remains unresolved. This contradiction crops out from time to time, sometimes in attacks on "contraband" ideas, sometimes in the work of artists because they are forced to use particular forms. It crops out essentially because of conflict between the uncurbed monopolistic aspirations of the regime and the irresistible creative aspirations of the artists. It is, actually, the same conflict which exists between creativeness in science and Communist dogmatism; it has merely been carried over into the field of art.

Any new thought or idea must first be examined in essence, approved or disapproved, and fitted into a harmless frame. As with other conflicts, the Communist leaders cannot resolve this one. But they can, as we have seen, periodically extricate themselves, usually at the expense of real freedom of artistic creation. In Communist systems, it has not been possible, because of this contradiction, to develop genuine subjects for art or to develop art theory.

A work of art, by its very nature, is usually a criticism of a given situation and of given relations. In Communist systems, therefore, artistic creation based on actual subjects is not possible. Only praise of a given situation or criticism of the system's opponents is permitted. Under these terms art can have no value whatever.

In Yugoslavia officials and some artists complain about the fact
that there are no works of art which can show "our socialist reality." In the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, tons of works of art based on actual subjects are created; but since they do not reflect the truth, they do not have any value and are rapidly rejected by the public, later even coming under official criticism.

The method is varied but the final result is the same.

5.

The theory of so-called "Socialist Realism" reigns in all Communist states.

In Yugoslavia this theory has been crushed and is now held only by the most reactionary dogmatists. In this area, as in others, the regime has been strong enough to forestall the development of disagreeable theories but has been too weak to impose its own views. It can be said that the same goes for the other East European countries.

The theory of "Socialist Realism" is not even a complete system. Gorky was the first to use this term, probably inspired by his realist method. His views were that in rude contemporary "socialist" conditions, art must be inspired with new or socialist ideas and must depict reality as faithfully as possible. Everything else that this theory advocates—typicalness, emphasis on ideology, party solidarity, etc.—has either been taken over from other theories or thrown in because of the political needs of the regime.

Not having been evolved into a complete theory, "Socialist Realism" actually means ideological monopolism by Communists. It calls for efforts to clothe the narrow, backward ideas of the leaders in art forms and for their works to be depicted romantically and panegyrically. This has led to a Pharisaic justification of the regime's control over ideas and to bureaucratic censorship of the needs of art itself.

The forms of this control vary in different Communist countries, from party-bureaucratic censorship to ideological influence.

Yugoslavia, for instance, has never had censorship. Control is exercised indirectly by this method: in publishing enterprises, artist's associations, periodicals, newspapers, and the like, party members submit everything they consider "suspicious" to the proper authorities. Censorship, or really self-censorship, has sprouted from that very atmosphere. Even though party members may push something or other through, the self-censorship which they and other intellectuals must exercise over themselves forces them to dissemble everything and make unworthy insinuations. But this is considered progress, it is "socialist democracy," instead of bureaucratic despotism.

Neither in the U.S.S.R. nor in other Communist countries does the existence of censorship absolve creating artists from self-censorship. Intellectuals are forced into self-censorship by their status and the reality of social relations. Self-censorship is actually the main form of party ideological control in the Communist system. In the Middle Ages men first had to delve into the thought of the Church on their work; in the same manner, in Communist systems, it is necessary first to imagine what kind of performance is expected and, often, to ascertain the taste of the leaders.

Censorship, or self-censorship, represents itself as being "ideological aid." In the same way, everything in Communism is represented as being devoted to the implementation of absolute happiness. Consequently, the expressions "the people," "the working people," and similar ones—in spite of their vagueness—are used frequently in connection with the arts.

Persecutions, prohibitions, the imposition of forms and ideas, humiliations, and insults; the doctrinaire authority of semi-literate bureaucrats over geniuses; all this is done in the name of the people and for the people. Communist "Socialist Realism" is not different even in terminology from Hitler's National Socialism. A Yugoslav author of Hungarian origin,
Ervin Sinko, has made an interesting comparison of the "art" theoreticians in the two dictatorships:

Timofeyev, the Soviet theoretist, wrote in his Theory of Literature: "Literature is an ideology which helps man to get acquainted with life and to realize that he is participating in it."

"Fundamentals of National-Socialist Cultural Policy" states: "An artist cannot be only an artist, he is also always an educator."

Baldur von Schirach, leader of the Hitler Youth, stated: "Every true work of art applies to the entire people."

Zhdanov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., stated: "Everything that is creative is accessible."

In "Fundamentals ..." Wolfgang Schulz stated: "National-Socialist policy, even that part of it which is called cultural policy, is determined by the Führer and those to whom he has delegated authority."

If we wish to know what National-Socialist cultural policy is, we must look to these men, to what they were doing and to the directives they issued in order to educate responsible associates for themselves.

At the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., Yaroslavsky said: "Comrade Stalin inspires artists; he gives them guiding ideas. . . . The resolutions of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the report of A. A. Zhdanov give Soviet writers a completely prepared work program."

Despotisms, even when they are opposing ones, justify themselves in the same way; they cannot even avoid the use of the same words in doing so.

6.

An enemy to thought in the name of science, an enemy to freedom in the name of democracy, the Communist oligarchy cannot but accomplish complete corruption of the mind. Capitalist magnates and feudal lords used to pay artists and scientists as they could and wished, and thus both aided and corrupted them. In Communist systems, corruption is an integral part of state policy.

The Communist system, as a rule, stifles and represses any intellectual activity with which it does not agree; that is, everything that is profound and original. On the other hand, it rewards and encourages, and actually corrupts, all that it thinks will benefit "socialism," that is, the system itself.

Even overlooking such concealed and drastic means of corruptions as "Stalin prizes," the use of personal ties with the powers-that-be, and the capricious demands and purchases of the top bureaucrats—all of which represent extremes of the system—the fact remains that the system itself corrupts intellectuals and, especially, art. Direct rewards from the regime may be abolished, just as censorship may be, but the spirit of corruption and oppression remains.

This spirit is established and stimulated by party-bureaucratic monopolism over materials and mind. The intellectual has nowhere to turn except toward this power, whether for ideas or for profit. Even though this power may not be directly the government's, it extends through all establishments and organizations. In the final analysis it makes the decisions.

It is very important to the artist that restraint and centralism be exercised as little as possible, even though the essence of his social position is not thereby changed. Because of this, it is much easier for him to work and live in Yugoslavia than in the U.S.S.R.

An oppressed human mind is forced to submit to corruption. If one seeks to know why for a quarter of a century there have been scarcely any significant works, especially in literature, in the U.S.S.R., he would find that corruption has played as great or greater a part than oppression in causing this scarcity.

The Communist system persecutes, suspects, and prods into self-criticism its really creative people. It offers its sycophants
of the former regime. This is understandable: the last named are less dangerous since they look to a past which has little likelihood of returning and reconquering.

Whenever Communists come to power, their assault on private ownership creates the illusion that their measures are primarily directed against the ownership classes for the benefit of the working class. Subsequent events prove that their measures were not taken for this purpose but in order to establish their own ownership. This must manifest itself predominantly as ideological rather than class discrimination. If this were not true, if they really strove for actual ownership by the working masses, then class discrimination actually would have prevailed.

The fact that ideological discrimination prevails leads, at first sight, to the conclusion that a new religious sect has risen, a sect which rigidly sticks to its materialistic and atheistic prescriptions and forcibly imposes them on others. Communists do behave like a religious sect even though they are not really one.

This totalitarian ideology is not only the result of certain forms of government and of ownership. For its part, the ideology aided in their creation and supports them in every way. Ideological discrimination is a condition for the continuance of the Communist system.

It would be wrong to think that other forms of discrimination—race, caste, national—are worse than ideological discrimination. They may seem more brutal to all outward appearances, but they are not as refined or complete. They aim at the activities of society, while ideological discrimination aims at society as a whole, and at every individual. Other types of discrimination may crush a human being physically, while ideological discrimination strikes at the very thing in the human being which is perhaps most peculiarly his own. Tyranny over the mind is the most complete and most brutal type of tyranny; every other tyranny begins and ends with it.

On the one hand the ideological discrimination in Commu-
nist systems aims at prohibiting other ideas; on the other, at imposing exclusively its own ideas. These are two most striking forms of unbelievable, total tyranny.

Thought is the most creative force. It uncovers what is new. Men can neither live nor produce if they do not think or contemplate. Even though they may deny it, Communists are forced to accept this fact in practice. Thus they make it impossible for any thought other than their own to prevail.

Man may renounce much. But he must think and he has a deep need to express his thoughts. It is profoundly sickening to be compelled to remain silent when there is need for expression. It is tyranny at its worst to compel men not to think as they do, to compel men to express thoughts that are not their own.

The limitation of freedom of thought is not only an attack on specific political and social rights, but an attack on the human being as such. Man's imperishable aspirations for freedom of thought always emerge in concrete form. If they have not yet become apparent in Communist systems, this does not mean that they do not exist. Today they lie in dark and apathetic resistance, and in the unshapen hopes of the people. It is as if totality of oppression were erasing differences in national strata, uniting all people in the demand for freedom of thought and for freedom in general.

History will pardon Communists for much, establishing that they were forced into many brutal acts because of circumstances and the need to defend their existence. But the stifling of every divergent thought, the exclusive monopoly over thinking for the purpose of defending their personal interests, will nail the Communists to a cross of shame in history.

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The Aim and The Means

1.

All revolutions and all revolutionaries use oppressive and unscrupulous means in abundance.

However, earlier revolutionaries were not as conscious of their methods as the Communists have been. They were unable to adapt and use their methods to the degree that the Communists have done.

"You don't need to pick and choose the means to use against enemies of the movement. . . . You must punish not only the traitors, but also the indifferent; you must punish all who are inactive in the republic, all who do nothing for it."

These words of Saint-Just might have been uttered by some Communist leader of today. But Saint-Just flung them out in the heat of the revolution, to preserve its destiny. The Communists speak these words and act according to them constantly—from the beginning of their revolution until they reach complete power, and even in their decline.

Although Communist methods surpass any of those of other revolutionaries in range, duration, and severity, during a revolution the Communists have not as a rule used all the means that their antagonists used. However, even though the methods of the Communists might have been less bloody, they became
increasingly more inhumane the farther away they got from the revolution.

Like every social and political movement, Communism must use methods primarily suited to the interests and relations of the powers-that-be. Other considerations, including moral ones, are subordinated.

Here, we are interested only in the methods used by contemporary Communism, which may, according to conditions, be mild or severe, human or inhuman, but which are different from those used by other political and social movements and distinguish Communism from other movements, revolutionary or not.

This distinction does not lie in the fact that Communist methods are perhaps the most brutal ones recorded in history. It is true that brutality is their most obvious but not their most intrinsic aspect. A movement which had as its aim the transformation of the economy and of society by means of tyranny had to resort to brutal methods. But all other revolutionary movements had and wanted to use the same methods. Yet, the fact that their tyranny was of shorter duration was the reason that they could not use all these methods. In addition, their oppression could not be as total as that of the Communists, because it came about under circumstances which did not permit it to be as total.

It would be even less justifiable to seek the reasons for Communist methods in the fact that Communists lack ethical or moral principles. Except for the fact that they are Communists, they are men like all others who in relationships among themselves abide by the moral principles customary in human societies. Lack of ethics among them is not the reason for their methods but the result of them. In principles and in words, Communists subscribe to ethical precepts and humane methods. They believe that they are “temporarily” forced to resort to something contrary to their ethical views. Communists too think that it would be much better if they did not have to act contrary to their ethical views. In this they are not much different from participants in other political movements, except that they have divorced themselves from humanity in a more permanent and monstrous form.

Numerous features which distinguish contemporary Communism from other movements in the use of methods can be found. These features are predominantly quantitative or are actuated by varied historical conditions and by the aims of Communists.

However, there is an integral feature of contemporary Communism which distinguishes its methods from those of other political movements. At first sight this feature might seem similar to features of some churches in the past. It stems from the idealistic aims which the Communists will use any means to further. These means have become increasingly reckless as the aims became unrealizable. The use of their methods, even for the attainment of idealistic aims, cannot be justified by any moral principle. Their use brands those who use them as unscrupulous and merciless power-wielders. The former classes, parties, and forms of ownership no longer exist or have been incapacitated, yet methods have not been changed essentially. Indeed, these methods are just now achieving their full measure of inhumanity.

As the new exploiting class climbs to power, it tries to justify its non-idealistic methods by invoking its idealistic aims. The inhumanity of Stalin’s methods reached its greatest height when he built a “socialist society.” Because the new class must show that its interests are exclusively and ideally the aim of society and because it must maintain intellectual and every other type of monopoly, the new class must proclaim that the methods it uses are not important. The end is important, shout its representatives, everything else is trifling. What is important is that we now “have” socialism. So do the Communists justify tyranny, baseness, and crime.

Of course, the end must be assured by special instruments—
by the party. It becomes something dominant and supreme unto itself, like the Church in the Middle Ages. To quote Dietrich von Nieheim, nominal Bishop of Verden, writing in 1411:

“When its existence is threatened, the church is freed of moral edicts. Unity as an aim blesses all means: perfidy, treachery, tyranny, simony, prisons, and death. For every holy order exists because of the aims of society, and personality must be sacrificed to the general good.”

These words, too, sound as if they had been uttered by some contemporary Communist.

There is much of the feudal and fanatic in the dogmatism of contemporary Communism. But neither are we living in the Middle Ages nor is contemporary Communism a church. The emphasis on ideological and other monopolism only seems to make contemporary Communism similar to the medieval Church; the essence of each is different. The Church was only partly owner and governor; in the most extreme cases, it aspired to perpetuate a given social system through absolute control of the mind. The churches persecuted heretics, even for dogmatic reasons which were not always called for by direct practical needs. As the Church represented it, it was attempting to save sinful, heretical souls by destroying their bodies. All earthly means were considered permissible for the purpose of attaining the heavenly kingdom.

But the Communists first of all desire physical or state authority. Intellectual control and persecution exercised for dogmatic reasons are only auxiliary aids for strengthening the power of the state. Unlike the Church, Communism is not the support of the system but its embodiment.

The new class did not arise suddenly, but was developed from a revolutionary to an ownership and reactionary group. Its methods too, even though they seemed the same, changed in essence from revolutionary ones to tyrannical ones, from protective to despotic ones.

Communist methods will in essence be amoral and un-
THE AIM AND THE MEANS

when leaders initiate amoral proceedings and arbitrary turnabouts.

History does not have many movements that, like Communism, began their climb with such high moral principles and with such devoted, enthusiastic, and clever fighters, attached to each other not only by ideas and suffering, but also by selfless love, comradeship, solidarity, and that warm and direct sincerity that can be produced only by battles in which men are doomed either to win or die. Cooperative efforts, thoughts, and desires; even the most intense effort to attain the same method of thinking and feeling, the finding of personal happiness and the building of individuality through complete devotion to the party and workers’ collective; enthusiastic sacrificing for others; care and protection for the young, and tender respect for the old—these are the ideals of true Communists when the movement is in its inception and still truly Communist.

Communist woman too is more than a comrade or co-fighter. It can never be forgotten that she, on entering the movement, decided to sacrifice all—the happiness of both love and of motherhood. Between men and women in the movement, a clean, modest and warm relationship is fostered: a relationship in which comradely care has become sexless passion. Loyalty, mutual aid, frankness about even the most intimate thoughts—these are generally the ideals of true, ideal Communists.

This is true only while the movement is young, before it has tasted the fruits of power.

The road to the attainment of these ideals is very long and difficult. Communists and Communist movements are formed from varied social forces and centers. Internal homogeneity is not attained overnight, but through the fierce battles of varied groups and fractions. If conditions are favorable, the group or fraction which wins the battle is the one which has been most aware of the advance toward Communism and which, when taking over power, is also the most moral. Through moral crises, through political intrigues and insinuations, mu-
cause it is fused into one piece, one soul, and one body. This is the proof that a new, homogeneous movement has emerged, a movement facing a future completely different from the future which the movement foresaw at the beginning.

However, all this slowly fades, disintegrates, and drowns during the course of the climb to complete power and to ownership by the Communists. Only the bare forms and observances which have no real substance remain.

The internal monolithic cohesion which was created in the struggle with the oppositionists and with the half-Communist groups is transformed into a unity of obedient counselors and robot-bureaucrats inside the movement. During the climb to power, intolerance, servility, incomplete thinking, control of personal life—which once was comradely aid but is now a form of oligarchic management—hierarchical rigidity and introversion, the nominal and neglected role of women, opportunism, self-centeredness, and outrage repress the once-existent high principles. The wonderful human characteristics of an isolated movement are slowly transformed into the intolerant and Pharisaical morals of a privileged caste. Thus, politicking and servility replace the former straightforwardness of the revolution. Where the former heroes who were ready to sacrifice everything, including life, for others and for an idea, for the good of the people, have not been killed or pushed aside, they become self-centered cowards without ideas or comrades, willing to renounce everything—honor, name, truth, and morals—in order to keep their place in the ruling class and the hierarchical circle. The world has seen few heroes as ready to sacrifice and suffer as the Communists were on the eve of and during the revolution. It has probably never seen such characterless wretches and stupid defenders of arid formulas as they become after attaining power. Wonderful human features were the condition for creating and attracting power for the movement; exclusive caste spirit and complete lack of ethical principles and virtues have become conditions for the power and main-
criminals and traitors. Long ago they had been educated to believe and had proclaimed that they were connected in every fiber of their being to the party and its ideals. Now, uprooted, they found themselves completely bereft. They either did not know or had forgotten or renounced all of those outside the Communist sect and its narrow ideas. Now it was too late to get acquainted with anything but Communism. They were entirely alone.

Man cannot fight or live outside of society. This is his immutable characteristic, one which Aristotle noted and explained, calling it “political being.”

What else is left to a man from such a sect who finds himself morally crushed and uprooted, exposed to refined and brutal torture, except to aid the class and his “comrades” with his “confessions”? Such confessions, he is convinced, are necessary to the class to resist the “anti-Socialist” opposition and “imperialists.” These confessions are the one “great” and “revolutionary” contribution left that the victim, lost and wrecked, can make.

Every true Communist has been educated and has educated himself and others in the belief that fractions and fractional battles are among the greatest crimes against the party and its aims. It is true that a Communist party which was divided by fractions could neither win in the revolution nor establish its dominance. Unity at any price and without consideration for anything else becomes a mystical obligation behind which the aspirations of the oligarchs for complete power entrench themselves. Even if he has suspected this, or even known it, the demoralized Communist oppositionist has still not freed himself of the mystic idea of unity. Besides, he may think that leaders come and go, and that these too—the evil, the stupid, the egotistical, the inconsequential and the power-loving—will disappear, while the goal will remain. The goal is everything; has it not always been thus in the party?

Trotsky himself, who was the most important of all the oppo-
sitionists, did not go much further in his reasoning. In a moment of self-criticism, he shouted that the party is infallible, for it is the incarnation of historical necessity, of a classless society. In attempting to explain, in his exile, the monstrous amorality of the Moscow trials, he leaned on historical analogies: Rome, before the conquest of Christianity; and the Renaissance, at the beginning of capitalism; in both of which also appeared the inevitable phenomena of perfidious murders, calumnies, lies, and monstrous mass crimes. So it must be during the transition to socialism, he concluded; these were the remnants of the old class society which were still evident in the new. However, he did not succeed in explaining anything through this; he only succeeded in appeasing his conscience, in that he did not “betray” the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” or the Soviets, as the one form of the transition into the new and classless society. If he had gone into the problem more deeply, he would have seen that, in Communism as in the Renaissance and other periods in history, when an ownership class is breaking a trail for itself, moral considerations play a smaller and smaller role as the difficulties of the class increase and as its domination needs to become more complete.

In the same way, those who did not understand what sort of social transformation was actually at stake after the Communists were victorious had to re-evaluate the diverse moral crises among the Communists. The so-called process of de-Stalinization, or the unprincipled, somewhat Stalinist-style, attacks on Stalin by his former courtiers are also re-evaluated as “a moral crisis.”

Moral crises, great or small, are inevitable in every dictatorship, for its followers, accustomed to thinking that uniformity of political thought is the greatest patriotic virtue and the most holy civil obligation, must be disturbed over the inevitable reversals and changes.

But the Communists feel and know that their totalitarian domination does not weaken, but rather gets stronger, in such
the same time expect an echo among the masses—who are immeasurably more deprived of their rights. The French bourgeoisie finally rebelled against its emperor, Napoleon, when his wars and bureaucratic despotism became intolerable. But the French people eventually got some profit from this. Stalin's methods, in which the dogmatic hypothesis of a future society also played an important role, will not return. But this does not mean that the current oligarchs will renounce the use of all his means, even though they cannot use them, or that the U.S.S.R. will soon or overnight become a legal, democratic state.

However, something has changed. The ruling class will no longer be able to justify even to itself that the end justifies the means. The class will still lecture on the final goal—a Communist society—for if it did otherwise it would have to renounce absolute dominance. This will force it to resort to any means. Every time that it does resort to them, it will also have to condemn their use. A stronger power—fear of public opinion in the world, fear that it will bring harm to itself and its absolute domination—will sway the class and hold back its hand. Feeling itself sufficiently strong to destroy the cult of its creator, or the creator of the system—Stalin—it simultaneously gave the death blow to its own ideal basis. Completely dominant, the ruling class has begun to abandon and lose the ideology, the dogma which brought it to power. The class has begun to split up into fractions. At the top everything is peaceful and smooth, but below the top, in the depths, and even in its ranks, new thoughts, new ideas, are bubbling and future storms are brewing.

Because it had to renounce Stalin's methods, the ruling class will not be able to preserve its dogma. The methods were actually only the expression of that dogma, and, indeed, of the practice on which the dogma was based.

It was not good will, still less humanity, which prompted Stalin's associates to perceive the harmfulness of Stalin's meth-
ods. It was urgent necessity that prompted the ruling class to become more "understanding." But, by avoiding the use of very brutal methods, the oligarchs cannot help but plant the seed of doubt about their goals. The end once served as moral cover for the use of any means. Renouncing the use of such means will arouse doubts as to the end itself. As soon as means which would insure an end are shown to be evil, the end will show itself as being unrealizable. For the essential thing in every policy is first of all the means, assuming that all ends appear good. Even "the road to hell is paved with good intentions."

5.

Throughout history there have been no ideal ends which were attained with non-ideal, inhumane means, just as there has been no free society which was built by slaves. Nothing so well reveals the reality and greatness of ends as the methods used to attain them.

If the end must be used to condone the means, then there is something in the end itself, in its reality, which is not worthy. That which really blesses the end, which justifies the efforts and sacrifices for it, is the means: their constant perfection, humaneness, increasing freedom.

Contemporary Communism has not even reached the beginning of such a situation. Instead, it has stopped dead, hesitating over its means, but always assured about its ends.

No regime in history which was democratic—or relatively democratic while it lasted—was predominantly established on the aspiration for ideal ends, but rather on the small everyday means in sight. Along with this, each such regime achieved, more or less spontaneously, great ends. On the other hand, every despotism tried to justify itself by its ideal aims. Not a single one achieved great ends.
The Essence

1.

None of the theories on the essence of contemporary Communism treats the matter exhaustively. Neither does this theory claim to do so. Contemporary Communism is the product of a series of historical, economic, political, ideological, national, and international causes. A categorical theory about its essence cannot be entirely accurate.

The essence of contemporary Communism could not even be perceived until, in the course of its development, it revealed itself to its very entrails. This moment came, and could only come, because Communism entered a particular phase of its development—that of its maturity. It then became possible to reveal the nature of its power, ownership, and ideology. In the time that Communism was developing and was predominantly an ideology, it was almost impossible to see through it completely.

Just as other truths are the work of many authors, countries, and movements, so it is with contemporary Communism. Communism has been revealed gradually, more or less parallel to its development; it cannot be looked upon as final, because it has not completed its development.

Most of the theories regarding Communism, however, have some truth in them. Each of them has usually grasped one aspect of Communism or one aspect of its essence.

There are two basic theses on the essence of contemporary Communism.

The first of them claims that contemporary Communism is a type of new religion. We have already seen that it is neither a religion nor a church, in spite of the fact that it contains elements of both.

The second thesis regards Communism as revolutionary socialism, that is, something which was born of modern industry, or capitalism, and of the proletariat and its needs. We have seen that this thesis also is only partially accurate: contemporary Communism began in well-developed countries as a socialist ideology and a reaction against the suffering of the working masses in the industrial revolution. But after having come into power in underdeveloped areas, it became something entirely different—an exploiting system opposed to most of the interests of the proletariat itself.

The thesis has also been advanced that contemporary Communism is only a contemporary form of despotism, produced by men as soon as they seize power. The nature of the modern economy, which in every case requires centralized administration, has made it possible for this despotism to be absolute. This thesis also has some truth in it: modern Communism is a modern despotism which cannot help but aspire toward totalitarianism. However, all types of modern despotism are not variants of Communism, nor are they totalitarian to the degree that Communism is.

Thus whatever thesis we examine, we find that each thesis explains one aspect of Communism, or a part of the truth, but not the entire truth.

Neither can my theory on the essence of Communism be accepted as complete. This is, anyway, the weakness of every
porary one—with the exception of Communism—has succeeded in incorporating simultaneously all these factors for controlling the people to this degree.

When one examines and weighs these three factors, power is the one which has played and still continues to play the most important role in the development of Communism. One of the other factors may eventually prevail over power, but it is impossible to determine this on the basis of present conditions. I believe that power will remain the basic characteristic of Communism.

Communism first originated as an ideology, which contained in its seed Communism's totalitarian and monopolistic nature. It can certainly be said that ideas no longer play the main, predominant role in Communism's control of the people. Communism as an ideology has mainly run its course. It does not have many new things to reveal to the world. This could not be said for the other two factors, power and ownership.

It can be said: power, either physical, intellectual, or economic, plays a role in every struggle, even in every social human action. There is some truth in this. It can also be said: in every policy, power, or the struggle to acquire and keep it, is the basic problem and aim. There is some truth in this also. But contemporary Communism is not only such a power; it is something more. It is power of a particular type, a power which unites within itself the control of ideas, authority, and ownership, a power which has become an end in itself.

To date, Soviet Communism, the type which has existed the longest and which is the most developed, has passed through three phases. This is also more or less true of other types of Communism which have succeeded in coming to power (with the exception of the Chinese type, which is still predominantly in the second phase).

The three phases are: revolutionary, dogmatic, and non-dogmatic Communism. Roughly speaking, the principal catchwords, aims, and personalities corresponding to these various
phases are: Revolution, or the usurpation of power—Lenin.
“Socialism,” or the building of the system—Stalin. “Legality,”
or stabilization of the system—“collective leadership.”

It is important to note that these phases are not distinctly
separate from one another, that elements of all are found in
each. Dogmatism abounded, and the “building of socialism”
had already begun, in the Leninist period; Stalin did not re¬
nounce revolution, or reject the dogmas, which interfered with
the building of the system. Present-day, non-dogmatic Com­
munism is only non-dogmatic conditionally: it just will not
renounce even the minutest practical advantages for doo-matic
reasons. Precisely because of such advantages, it will at the same
time be in a position to persecute unscrupulously the minutest
doubt concerning the truth or purity of the dogma. Thus,
Communism, proceeding from practical needs and capabilities,
has today even furled the sails of revolution, or of its own
military expansion. But it has not renounced one or the other.

This division into three phases is only accurate if it is taken
roughly and abstractly. Clearly separate phases do not actually
exist, nor do they correspond to specific periods in the various
countries.

The boundaries between the phases, which overlap, and the
forms in which the phases appear are varied in different Com­
munist countries. For example, Yugoslavia has passed through
all three phases in a relatively short time and with the same
personalities at the summit. This is obvious in both precepts
and method of operation.

Power plays a major role in all three of these phases. In the
revolution it was necessary to seize power; in the building of
socialism, it was necessary to create a new system by means of
that power; today power must preserve the system.

During the development, from the first to the third phase,
the quintessence of Communism—power—evolved from being
the means and became an end in itself. Actually power was al­
ways more or less the end, but Communist leaders, thinking that

through power as a means they would attain the ideal goal,
did not believe it to be an end in itself. Precisely because power
served as a means for the Utopian transformation of society,
it could not avoid becoming an end in itself and the most
important aim of Communism. Power was able to appear as
a means in the first and second phases. It can no longer be
concealed that in the third phase power is the actual principal
aim and essence of Communism.

Because of the fact that Communism is being extinguished
as an ideology, it must maintain power as the main means of
controlling the people.

In revolution, as in every type of war, it was natural to con­
centrate primarily on power: the war had to be won. During
the period of industrialization, concentrating on power could
still be considered natural: the construction of industry, or
a “socialist society,” for which so many sacrifices had been made,
was necessary. But as all this is being completed, it becomes
apparent that in Communism power has not only been a means
but that it has also become the main, if not the sole, end.

Today power is both the means and the goal of Communists,
in order that they may maintain their privileges and ownership.
But since these are special forms of power and ownership, it
is only through power itself that ownership can be exercised.
Power is an end in itself and the essence of contemporary
Communism. Other classes may be able to maintain ownership
without a monopoly over power, or power without a monopoly
over ownership. Until now, this has not been possible for the
new class, which was formed through Communism; it is very
improbable that it will be possible in the future.

Throughout all three of these phases, power has concealed
itself as the hidden, invisible, unspoken, natural and principal
end. Its role has been stronger or weaker depending on the
degree of control over the people required at the time. In the
first phase, ideas were the inspiration and the prime mover for
the attainment of power; in the second phase, power operated
as the whip of society and for its own maintainance; today, "collective ownership" is subordinated to the impulses and needs of power.

Power is the alpha and the omega of contemporary Communism, even when Communism strives to prevent this.

Ideas, philosophical principles and moral considerations, the nation and the people, their history, in part even ownership—all can be changed and sacrificed. But not power. Because this would signify Communism's renunciation of itself, of its own essence. Individuals can do this. But the class, the party, the oligarchy cannot. This is the purpose and the meaning of its existence.

Every type of power besides being a means is at the same time and end—at least for those who aspire to it. Power is almost exclusively an end in Communism, because it is both the source and the guarantee of all privileges. By means of and through power the material privileges and ownership of the ruling class over national goods are realized. Power determines the value of ideas, and suppresses or permits their expression.

It is in this way that power in contemporary Communism differs from all other types of power, and that Communism itself differs from every other system.

Communism has to be totalitarian, exclusive, and isolated precisely because power is the most essential component of Communism. If Communism actually could have had other ends, it would have to make it possible for other forces to spring up in opposition and operate independently.

How contemporary Communism will be defined is secondary. Everyone who undertakes the work of explaining Communism finds himself faced with the problem of defining it, even if actual conditions do not compel him to do this—conditions in which Communists glorify their system as "socialism," "classless society," and "the realization of men's eternal dreams," while the opposing element defines Communism as an insensi-

tive tyranny, the chance success of a terroristic group, and the damnation of the human race.

Science must use already established categories in order to make a simple exposition. Is there any category in sociology into which we can cram contemporary Communism if we use a little force?

In common with many authors who started from other positions, I have, in recent years, equated Communism with state capitalism or, more precisely, with total state capitalism.

This interpretation won out among the leaders of Yugoslav Communists during the time of their clash with the government of the U.S.S.R. But just as Communists, according to practical needs, easily change even their "scientific" analysis, Yugoslav party leaders changed this interpretation after the "reconciliation" with the Soviet government, and once more proclaimed the U.S.S.R. a Socialist country. At the same time, they proclaimed the Soviet imperialistic attack on the independence of Yugoslavia—in Tito's words—a "tragic," "incomprehensible" event, evoked by the "arbitrariness of individuals."

Contemporary Communism for the most part does resemble total state capitalism. Its historical origin and the problems which it had to solve—namely, an industrial transformation similar to the one achieved by capitalism but with the aid of the state mechanism—lead to such a conclusion.

If, under Communism, the state were the owner in the name of society and of the nation, then the forms of political power over society would inevitably change according to the varying needs of society and of the nation. The state by its nature is an organ of unity and harmony in society, and not only a force over it. The state could not be both the owner and ruler in itself. In Communism it is reversed: The state is an instrument and always subordinate exclusively to the interests of one and the same exclusive owner, or of one and the same direction in the economy, and in the other areas of social life.

State ownership in the West might be considered more as
munism, which was at one time the task of revolutionaries, eventually transformed itself, as did everything else in Communism, and became the common ground of Communist bureaucracies, fighting one another on nationalistic considerations. Of the former international proletariat, only words and empty dogmas remained. Behind them stood the naked national and international interests, aspirations, and plans of the various Communist oligarchies, comfortably entrenched.

The nature of authority and property, a similar international outlook, and an identical ideology inevitably identify Communist states with one another. Nevertheless, it is wrong to ignore and underestimate the significance of the inevitable differences in degree and manner between Communist states. The degree, manner, and form in which Communism will be realized, or its purpose, is just as much of a given condition for each of them as is the essence of Communism itself. No single form of Communism, no matter how similar it is to other forms, exists in any way other than as national Communism. In order to maintain itself, it must become national.

The form of government and property as well as of ideas differs little or not at all in Communist states. It cannot differ markedly since it has an identical nature—total authority. However, if they wish to win and continue to exist, the Communists must adapt the degree and manner of their authority to national conditions.

The differences between Communist countries will, as a rule, be as great as the extent to which the Communists were independent in coming to power. Concretely speaking, only the Communists of three countries—the Soviet Union, China, and Yugoslavia—individually carried out revolutions or, in their own way and at their own speed, attained power and began "the building of socialism." These three countries remained independent as Communist states even in the period when Yugoslavia was—as China is today—under the most extreme influence of the Soviet Union; that is, in "brotherly love" and in "eternal friendship" with it. In a report at a closed session of the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev revealed that a clash between Stalin and the Chinese government had barely been averted. The case of the clash with Yugoslavia was not an isolated case, but only the most drastic and the first to occur. In the other Communist countries, the Soviet government enforced Communism by "armed missionaries"—its army. The diversity of manner and degree of the development in these countries has still not attained the stage reached in Yugoslavia and China. However, to the extent that ruling bureaucracies gather strength as independent bodies in these countries, and to the extent that they recognize that obedience to and copying of the Soviet Union weaken themselves, they endeavor to "pattern" themselves on Yugoslavia; that is, to develop independently. The Communist East European countries did not become satellites of the U.S.S.R. because they benefited from it, but because they were too weak to prevent it. As soon as they become stronger, or as soon as favorable conditions are created, a yearning for independence and for protection of "their own people" from Soviet hegemony will rise among them.

With the victory of a Communist revolution in a country a new class comes into power and into control. It is unwilling to surrender its own hard-gained privileges, even though it subordinates its interests to a similar class in another country, solely in the cause of ideological solidarity.

Where a Communist revolution has won victory independently, a separate, distinct path of development is inevitable. Friction with other Communist countries, especially with the Soviet Union as the most important and most imperialistic state, follows. The ruling national bureaucracy in the country where the victorious revolution took place has already become independent in the course of the armed struggle and has tasted the blessings of authority and of "nationalization" of property.
Philosophically speaking, it has also grasped and become conscious of its own essence, “its own state,” its authority, on the basis of which it claims equality.

This does not mean that this involves only a clash—when it comes to that—between two bureaucracies. A clash also involves the revolutionary elements of a subordinated country, because they do not usually tolerate domination and they consider that relationships between Communist states must be as ideally perfect as predicted in dogma. The masses of the nation, who spontaneously thirst for independence, cannot remain unperturbed in such a clash. In every case the nation benefits from this: it does not have to pay tribute to a foreign government; and the pressure on the domestic government, which no longer desires, and is not permitted, to copy foreign methods, is also diminished. Such a clash also brings in external forces, other states and movements. However, the nature of the clash and the basic forces in it remain. Neither Soviet nor Yugoslav Communists stopped being what they are—not before, nor during, nor after their mutual bickerings. Indeed, the diverse types of degree and manner with which they insured their monopoly led them mutually to deny the existence of socialism in the opposite camp. After they settled their differences, they again acknowledged the existence of socialism elsewhere, becoming conscious that they must respect mutual differences if they wanted to preserve that which was identical in essence and most important to them.

The subordinate Communist governments in East Europe can, in fact must, declare their independence from the Soviet government. No one can say how far this aspiration for independence will go and what disagreements will result. The result depends on numerous unforeseen internal and external circumstances. However, there is no doubt that a national Communist bureaucracy aspires to more complete authority for itself. This is demonstrated by the anti-Tito processes in Stalin’s time in the East European countries; it is shown also by the current unconcealed emphasis on “one’s own path to socialism,” which has recently come to light sharply in Poland and Hungary. The central Soviet government has found itself in difficulty because of the nationalism existing even in those governments which it installed in the Soviet republics (Ukraine, Caucasus), and still more so with regard to those governments installed in the East European countries. Playing an important role in all of this is the fact that the Soviet Union was unable, and will not be able in the future, to assimilate the economies of the East European countries.

The aspirations toward national independence must of course have greater impetus. These aspirations can be retarded and even made dormant by external pressure or by fear on the part of the Communists of “imperialism” and the “bourgeoisie,” but they cannot be removed. On the contrary, their strength will grow.

It is impossible to foresee all of the forms that relations between Communist states will assume. Even if cooperation between Communist states of different countries should in a short time result in mergers and federations, so can clashes between Communist states result in war. An open, armed clash between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia was averted not because of the “socialism” in one or the other country, but because it was not in Stalin’s interest to risk a clash of unforeseeable proportions. Whatever will happen between Communist states will depend on all those factors which ordinarily affect political events. The interests of the respective Communist bureaucracies, expressed variously as “national” or as “united,” along with the unchecked tendency toward ever increasing independence on a national basis, will, for the time being, play an important role in the relationships among the Communist countries.
2.

The concept of national Communism had no meaning until the end of World War II, when Soviet imperialism was manifested not only with regard to the capitalist but the Communist states as well. This concept developed above all from the Yugoslav-U.S.S.R. clash. The renunciation of Stalin's methods by the "collective leadership" of Khrushchev-Bulganin may perhaps modify relations between the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries, but it cannot resolve them. In the U.S.S.R. operations are not concerned solely with Communism but are simultaneously concerned with the imperialism of the Great Russian-Soviet-state. This imperialism can change in form and method, but it can no more disappear than can the aspirations of Communists of other countries for independence.

A similar development awaits the other Communist states. According to strength and conditions, they too will attempt to become imperialistic in one way or another.

In the development of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. there have been two imperialistic phases. Earlier policy was almost exclusively a matter of expansion by revolutionary propaganda in other countries. At that time there were powerful imperialistic tendencies (as regards the Caucasus) in the policies of its highest leaders. But, in my opinion, there is no satisfactory reason for the revolutionary phase to be categorically considered imperialistic, since at that time it was more defensive than aggressive.

If we do not consider the revolutionary phase as imperialistic, then imperialism began, roughly speaking, with the victory of Stalin, or with the industrialization and establishment of the authority of a new class in the 1930's. This change was clearly shown on the eve of the war when Stalin's government was able to go into action and leave behind pacifist and anti-imperialistic phases. It was even expressed in the change of foreign policy; in place of the jovial and, to a certain extent, principled Litvinov, the unscrupulous and reserved Molotov appeared.

The basic cause of an imperialistic policy is completely hidden in the exploitative and despotic nature of the new class. In order that that class might manifest itself as imperialistic, it was necessary for it to attain a prescribed strength and to appear in appropriate circumstances. It already had this strength when World War II began. The war itself abounded in possibilities for imperialistic combinations. The small Baltic states were not necessary for the security of so large a state as the U.S.S.R., particularly in modern war. These states were non-aggressive and even allies; however, they were an attractive morsel for the insatiable appetite of the Great Russian Communist bureaucracy.

In World War II Communist internationalism, up to that time an integral part of Soviet foreign policy, came into conflict with the interests of the ruling Soviet bureaucracy. With that, the necessity for its organization ceased. The idea of dissolution of the Communist International (Comintern) was conceived, according to Georgi Dimitrov, after the subjugation of the Baltic countries, and in the period of cooperation with Hitler, although it was not effected until the second phase of the war during the period of alliance with the Western states.

The Cominform, consisting of the East European and the French and Italian Communist parties, was created on Stalin's initiative in order to guarantee Soviet domination in the satellite countries and to intensify its influence in western Europe. The Cominform was worse than the former Communist International which, even if it was absolutely dominated by Moscow, at least formally represented all of the parties. The Cominform evolved in the field of real and apparent Soviet influence. The clash with Yugoslavia revealed that it was assigned to subordinate to the Soviet government those Communist states and parties which had begun to weaken because of the internal growth of national Communism. After the death of Stalin the
Cominform was finally dissolved. Even the Soviet government, desiring to avoid major and dangerous quarrels, accepted the so-called separate path to socialism, if not national Communism itself.

These organizational changes had profound economic and political causes. As long as the Communist parties in East Europe were weak and the Soviet Union was not sufficiently strong economically, the Soviet government would have had to resort to administrative methods to subjugate the East European countries, even if there had been no Stalinist arbitrariness and despotism. Soviet imperialism, by political, police and military methods, had to compensate for its own economic and other weaknesses. Imperialism in the military form, which was only an advanced stage of the old Czarist military-feudal imperialism, also corresponded to the internal structure of the Soviet Union in which the police and administrative apparatus, centralized in one personality, played a major role. Stalinism was a mixture of a personal Communist dictatorship and militaristic imperialism.

These forms of imperialism developed: joint stock companies, absorption of the exports of the East European countries by means of political pressure at prices below the world market, artificial formation of a “socialist world market,” control of every political act of subordinate parties and states, transformation of the traditional love of Communists toward the “socialist fatherland” into deification of the Soviet state, Stalin, and Soviet practices.

But what happened?

A change within the ruling class was quietly completed in the Soviet Union itself. Similar changes, in another sense, also occurred in the East European countries; new national bureaucracies long for ever increasing consolidation of power and property relations, but at the same time they fall into difficulties because of the hegemonic pressure of the Soviet government. If earlier they had had to renounce national characteristics in order to come to power, now such action had become a hindrance to their further ascendency to power. In addition, it became impossible for the Soviet government to adhere to the exorbitant and hazardous Stalinist foreign policy of military pressure and isolation and, simultaneously, during the period of the general colonial movements, to hold the European countries in infamous bondage.

The Soviet leaders had to concede, after long vacillation and indecisive argumentation, that the Yugoslav leaders were falsely indicted as Hitlerite and American spies just because they defended the right to consolidate and build a Communist system in their own way. Tito became the most significant personality in contemporary Communism. The principle of national Communism was formally acknowledged. But with that Yugoslavia also ceased to be the exclusive creator of innovations in Communism. The Yugoslav revolution subsided into its groove, and a peaceful and matter-of-fact rule began. With that the love between yesterday’s enemies did not become greater, nor were the disagreements terminated. This was merely the beginning of a new phase.

Now the Soviet Union entered into the predominantly economic and political phase of its imperialistic policy. Or so it appears, judging from current facts.

Today national Communism is a general phenomenon in Communism. To varying degrees all Communist movements—except that of the U.S.S.R. against which it is directed—are gripped by national Communism. In its time, in the period of Stalin’s ascendency, Soviet Communism also was national Communism. At that time Russian Communism abandoned internationalism, except as an instrument of its foreign policy. Today Soviet Communism is compelled, even if indefinitely, to acknowledge a new reality in Communism.

Changing internally, Soviet imperialism was also compelled to alter its views toward the external world. From predominantly administrative controls, it advanced toward gradual
Moscow itself is no longer that which it was. It single-handedly lost the monopoly of the new ideas and the moral right to prescribe the only permissible "line." Renouncing Stalin, it ceased to be the ideological center. In Moscow itself the epoch of great Communist monarchs and of great ideas came to an end, and the reign of mediocre Communist bureaucrats began.

"Collective leadership" did not anticipate that any difficulties and failures were awaiting it in Communism itself—either externally or internally. But what could it do? Stalin's imperialism was exorbitant and overly dangerous, and what was even worse, ineffective. Under him not only the people generally, but even the Communists, grumbled, and they did so at the time of a very strained international situation.

The world center of Communist ideology no longer exists; it is in the process of complete disintegration. The unity of the world Communist movement is incurably injured. There are no visible possibilities whatsoever that it can be restored. However, just as the shift from Stalin to "collective leadership" did not alter the nature of the system itself in the U.S.S.R., so too national Communism has been unable, despite ever increasing possibilities for liberation from Moscow, to alter its internal nature, which consists of total control and monopoly of ideas, and ownership by the party bureaucracy. Indeed, it significantly alleviated the pressure and slowed down the rate of establishment of its monopoly over property, particularly in the rural areas. But national Communism neither desires nor is able to transform itself into something other than Communism, and something always spontaneously draws it toward its source—toward the Soviet Union. It will be unable to separate its fate from that which links it with the remaining Communist countries and movements.

National modifications in Communism jeopardize Soviet imperialism, particularly the imperialism of the Stalin epoch, but not Communism either as a whole or in essence. On the
contrary, where Communism is in control these changes are able to influence its direction and even to strengthen it and make it acceptable externally. National Communism is in harmony with non-dogmatism, that is, with the anti-Stalinist phase in the development of Communism. In fact, it is a basic form of this phase.

3.

National Communism is unable to alter the nature of current international relationships between states or within workers' movements. But its role in these relationships may be of great significance.

Thus, for example, Yugoslav Communism, as a form of national Communism, played an extremely important role in the weakening of Soviet imperialism and in the downgrading of Stalinism inside the Communist movement. The motives for changes which are occurring in the Soviet Union and in the East European countries are to be found, above all, in the countries themselves. They appeared first in Yugoslavia—in the Yugoslav way. And there, too, they were first completed. Thus Yugoslav Communism as national Communism, in the clash with Stalin, actually originated a new, post-Stalin phase in the development of Communism. Yugoslav Communism significantly influenced changes in Communism itself, but did not fundamentally influence either international relationships or non-Communist workers' movements.

The expectation that Yugoslav Communism would be able to evolve toward democratic socialism or that it would be able to serve as a bridge between Social Democracy and Communism has proved baseless. The Yugoslav leaders themselves were in conflict over this question. During the time of Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia they demonstrated a fervent desire for a rapprochement with the Social Democrats. However, in 1956, during the period of peace with Moscow, Tito announced that both the Cominform and the Socialist International were unnecessary, despite the fact that the Socialist International unselfishly defended Yugoslavia while the Cominform laboriously attacked Yugoslavia. Preoccupied with a policy of so-called active coexistence, which for the most part corresponds to their interests of the moment, the Yugoslav leaders declared that both organizations—the Cominform and the Socialist International—were "immoderate" solely because they were allegedly the product of two blocs.

The Yugoslav leaders confused their desires with reality and confused their momentary interests with profoundly historic and socialistic differences.

At any rate, the Cominform was the product of Stalinist efforts for the creation of an Eastern military bloc. It is impossible to deny the fact that the Socialist International is linked with the Western bloc, or with the Atlantic Pact, since it operates within the framework of the West European countries. But it would exist even without that bloc. It is, above all, an organization of Socialists of the developed European countries in which political democracy and similar relationships exist.

Military alliances and blocs are temporary manifestations, but the Western Socialism and Eastern Communism reflect much more enduring and basic tendencies.

Contrasts between Communism and a Social Democracy are not the result of different principles only—these least of all—but of the opposing directions of economic and intellectual forces. The clash between Martov and Lenin at the Second Congress of Russian Social Democrats in London in 1903 concerning the question of party membership, and concerning the question of lesser or greater centralism and discipline in the party—which Deutscher correctly calls the beginning of the greatest schism in history—was of far greater significance than even its initiators were able to anticipate. With that began not only the formation of two movements but of two social systems.

The schism between Communists and Social Democrats is
impossible to bridge until the very natures of these movements, or the conditions themselves which resulted in differences between them, are changed. In the course of a half century, despite periodic and separate rapprochements, the differences have on the whole increased, and their natures have become still more individualized. Today Social Democracy and Communism are not only two movements but two worlds.

National Communism, separating itself from Moscow, has been unable to bridge this chasm although it can circumvent it. This was demonstrated by the cooperation of the Yugoslav Communists with the Social Democrats, which was more seeming than actual and more courteous than sincere, and which was without tangible important results for either side.

For completely different reasons, unity has not even been realized between Western and Asian Social Democrats. The differences between them were not as great in essence, or in principle, as they were in practice. For national reasons of their own, Asian Socialists had to remain separated from Western Socialists. Even when they are opponents of colonialism, Western Socialists—though they play no leading role—are representatives of countries which, solely because they are more developed, exploit the undeveloped countries. The contrast between Asian and Western Social Democrats is a manifestation of contrasts between underdeveloped and developed countries. The proximity in essence—as far as can be deduced today—is obvious and inevitable.

4.

National Communism similar to that in Yugoslavia could be of immense international significance in Communist parties of non-Communist states. It could be of even greater significance there than in Communist parties which are actually in power. This is relevant above all to the Communist parties in France and Italy, which encompass a significant majority of the working class and which are, along with several parties in Asia, the only ones of major significance in the non-Communist world.

Until now, the manifestations of national Communism in these parties have been without major significance and impetus. However, they have been inevitable. They could, in the final analysis, lead to profound and essential changes in these parties.

These parties have to contend with the Social Democrats—who are able to channel the dissatisfied masses toward themselves by means of their own socialist slogans and activity. This is not the only reason for the eventual deviation of these parties from Moscow. Lesser reasons may be seen in the periodic and unanticipated reversals of Moscow and of the other ruling Communist parties. Such reversals lead these and other non-ruling Communist parties into a "crisis of conscience"—to spit on what until yesterday they extolled, then suddenly to change their line. Neither oppositionist propaganda nor administrative pressure will play a fundamental role in the transformation of these parties.

The basic causes for deviation of these parties from Moscow may be found in the nature of the social system of the countries in which they operate. If it becomes evident—and it appears likely—that the working class of these countries is able through parliamentary forms to arrive at some improvement in its position, and also to change the social system itself, the working class will abandon the Communists regardless of its revolutionary and other traditions. Only small groups of Communist dogmatists can look dispassionately at the disassociation of the workers; serious political leaders in a given nation will endeavor to avoid it even at the cost of weakening ties with Moscow.

Parliamentary elections which give a huge number of votes
Togliatti is confused, and the robust Thorez is wavering. External and internal party life is beginning to bypass them.

Emphasizing that today a parliament can serve as a "form of transition to socialism," Khrushchev intended at the Twentieth Congress to facilitate manipulation of the Communist parties in "capitalist countries," and to stimulate the cooperation of Communists and Social Democrats and the formation of "People's Fronts." Something like this appeared realistic to him, according to his words, because of the changes which had resulted in the strengthening of Communism and because of peace in the world. With that he tacitly acknowledged to everyone the obvious impossibility of Communist revolutions in the developed countries, as well as the impossibility of further expansion of Communism under current conditions without the danger of a new world war. The policy of the Soviet state has been reduced to a status quo, while Communism has descended to gradual acquisition of new positions in a new way.

A crisis has actually begun in the Communist parties of the non-Communist states. If they change over to national Communism, they risk forsaking their very nature; and if they do not change over, they face a loss of followers. Their leaders, those who represent the spirit of Communism in these parties, will be forced into the most cunning manipulations and unscrupulous measures if they are to extricate themselves from this contradiction. It is improbable that they will be able to check disorientation and disintegration. They have reached a state of conflict with the real tendencies of development in the world and in their countries that obviously lead toward new relationships.

National Communism outside of the Communist states inevitably leads toward renunciation of Communism itself, or toward the disintegration of the Communist parties. Its possibilities are greater today in the non-Communist states, but obviously, only along the lines of separation from Communism.
its emergence. Therefore, national Communism in these parties will emerge victorious only with difficulty and slowly, in successive outbursts.

In the Communist parties that are not in power it is evident that national Communism—despite its intent to stimulate Communism and strengthen its nature—is simultaneously the heresy that nibbles at Communism as such. National Communism per se is contradictory. Its nature is the same as that of Soviet Communism, but it aspires to detach itself into something of its own, nationally. In reality, national Communism is Communism in decline.
did not earlier have a tendency toward unity, in a different way. The tendency toward binding the world together by means of the world market was already dominant in the mid-nineteenth century. It, too, was an epoch of capitalist economies and national wars. World unity of one kind was being achieved then, through national economies and national wars.

The further unification of the world was effected by the shattering of pre-capitalist forms of production in the underdeveloped regions and their division among the developed countries and their monopolies. This was the period of monopolistic capitalism, colonial conquests, and wars in which internal connections and interests of the monopolies often played a role more decisive than national defense itself. The tendencies at that time toward world unity were achieved mainly through conflicts and associations of monopolistic capital. This was a higher level of unity than unity of the market. Capital poured out of national sources, penetrated, took hold, and dominated the entire world.

The present tendencies toward unity are apparent in other areas. They may be found in a very high level of production, in contemporary science, and in scientific and other thought. Further advancement of unity is no longer possible on exclusively national foundations or through the division of the world into individual, monopolistic spheres of influence.

The trends toward this new unity—unity of production—are being built on the foundations already attained in earlier stages—that is, on the unity of the market and the unity of capital. They conflict, however, with already strained and inadequate national, governmental, and, above all, social relations. While the former unities were achieved by means of national struggles or through conflicts and wars over spheres of interest, contemporary unity is being formed, and can only be formed, by the destruction of the social relationships of previous periods.

No one can say conclusively in what manner the coordina-
The earlier unities were never attained as something final; this unity too is being established only as a tendency, as something toward which production, at least that of the most developed countries, aspires.

3.

The ending of the Second World War had already confirmed the tendency to division of systems on a world scale. All the countries which fell under Soviet influence, even parts of countries (Germany, Korea), achieved more or less the same system. It was the same on the Western side.

The Soviet leaders were fully aware of this process. I remember that at an intimate party in 1945 Stalin said: “In modern war, the victor will impose his system, which was not the case in past wars.” He said this before the war was over, at a time when love, hope, and trust were at their peak among the Allies. In February 1948 he said to us, the Yugoslavs, and to the Bulgarians: “They, the Western powers, will make a country of their own out of West Germany and we will make one of our own out of East Germany—this is inevitable.”

Today it is fashionable, and to some extent justifiable, to evaluate Soviet policy as it was before and after Stalin’s death. However, Stalin did not invent the systems, nor do those who succeeded him believe in them less than he did. What has changed since his death is the method by which Soviet leaders handle relations between systems, not the systems themselves. Did not Khrushchev, at the Twentieth Party Congress, mention his “world of socialism,” his “world socialist system,” as something separate and special? In practice this means nothing more than insistence upon a division into systems, into the further exclusiveness of Communism’s own system and hegemonistic control.

Because the conflict between the West and East is essentially
a conflict of systems, it must take on the appearance of an ideological struggle. Ideological war does not wane, even when temporary compromises are effected, and it drugs into unconsciousness the minds in the opposing camps. The more the conflict in the material, economic, political, and other spheres sharpens, the more it seems as if pure ideas themselves were in conflict.

In addition to the exponents of Communism and capitalism there is a third type of country, that which has wrested itself from colonial dependence (India, Indonesia, Burma, the Arab countries, etc.). These countries are straining to construct independent economies in order to tear themselves loose from economic dependence. In them overlap several epochs and a number of systems, and particularly the two contemporary systems.

These emerging nations are, principally for their own national reasons, the most sincere supporters of the slogans of national sovereignty, peace, mutual understanding, and similar ideas. However, they cannot eliminate the conflict between the two systems. They can only alleviate it. In addition they are the very fields of battle between the two systems. Their role can be a significant and noble one but, for the present, not a decisive one.

It is important to observe that both systems claim that the unification of the world will be modeled on one or the other. Both take the stand, then, that there is a need for world unity. However, these stands are diametrically opposed. The modern world's tendency toward unity is being demonstrated and realized through a struggle between opposing forces, a struggle of unheard-of severity in times of peace.

The ideological and political expressions of this struggle are, as we know, Western democracy and Eastern Communism.

Since the unorganized tendencies toward unification are bursting forth more strongly in the West, because of political democracy and a higher technical and cultural level, the West also appears as the champion of political and intellectual freedom.

One or another characteristic system of ownership in these countries may check or stimulate this tendency, depending upon circumstances. However, the aspiration toward unity is widespread. A definite obstacle to this unification is the monopolies. They want unity, in their own interests, but they want to accomplish it by an already obsolete method—in the form of spheres of influence. However, their opponents—for example, the English Labourites—are also adherents of unity, but in a different way. The tendency toward unity is also strong in Great Britain, which has carried out nationalization. Moreover, the United States is carrying out nationalization as well, on an even vaster scale, not by changing the form of ownership, but by putting a considerable portion of the national income into the hands of the government. If the United States should achieve a completely nationalized economy, tendencies toward the unification of the contemporary world would receive still greater impetus.

4.

The law of society and man is to expand and perfect production. This law evidences itself in the contemporary level of science, technology, thought, etc., as a tendency toward the unification of world production. This is a tendency which, as a rule, is so much more irresistible if it involves people on a higher cultural and material level.

Western tendencies toward world unification are the expression of economic, technical, and other needs and, behind these, of political ownership and other forces. The picture in the Soviet camp is different. Even if there had not been other reasons, the Communist East, because it was more backward, would have been compelled to isolate itself economically and
ideologically and to compensate for its economic and other weaknesses by political measures.

It may sound strange, but this is true: Communism's so-called socialist ownership is the main obstacle to world unification. The collective and total dominance of the new class creates an isolated political and economic system which impedes the unification of the world. This system can and does change, but very slowly, and almost not at all in regard to mixing and interweaving with other systems in the direction of consolidation. Its changes are made solely for the purpose of increasing its own strength. Leading to one type of ownership, government, and ideas, this system inevitably isolates itself. It inevitably moves toward exclusiveness.

A united world which even the Soviet leaders desire can only be imagined by them as more or less identical with their own and as being theirs. The peaceful coexistence of systems of which they speak does not mean to them the interweaving of various systems, but the static continuation of one system alongside another, until the point when the other system—the capitalist system—is either defeated or corrodes from within.

The existence of the conflict between the two systems does not mean that national and colonial conflicts have ceased. On the contrary, it is through clashes of a national and colonial nature that the basic conflict of systems is revealed. The struggle over the Suez Canal could hardly be kept from turning into strife between the two systems, instead of remaining what it was: a dispute between Egyptian nationalism and world trade which, by a coincidence, happened to be represented by the old colonial powers of Britain and France.

Extreme strain in all aspects of international life has been the inevitable result of such relations. Cold war has become the normal peacetime state of the modern world. Its forms have changed and are changing; it becomes milder or more severe, but it is no longer possible to eliminate it under given conditions. It is necessary first to eliminate something much deeper, something which is in the nature of the contemporary world, of contemporary systems, and especially of Communism.

The cold war, today the cause of increasing tension, was itself the product of other, deeper, and earlier conflicting factors.

The world in which we live is a world of uncertainty. It is a world of stupefying and unfathomable horizons which science is revealing to humanity; it is also a world of terrible fear of cosmic catastrophe, threatened by modern means of war.

This world will be changed, in one way or another. It cannot remain as it is, divided and with an irresistible aspiration toward unity. World relationships which finally emerge from this entanglement will be neither ideal nor without friction. However, they will be better than the present-day ones.

The present conflict of systems, however, does not indicate that humanity is going in the direction of a single system. This type of conflict demonstrates only that the further unification of the world or, more accurately expressed, the unification of world production, will be achieved through the conflict between systems.

The tendency toward unity of world production cannot lead everywhere to the same type of production, that is, to the same forms of ownership, government, etc. This unity of production expresses the aspiration toward elimination of inherited and artificial obstacles to the flourishing and greater efficiency of modern production. It means a fuller adjustment of production to local, natural, national, and other conditions. The tendency toward this unification really leads to a greater coordination and use of the world production potential.

It is fortunate that a single system does not prevail in the world. On the contrary, the unfortunate thing is that there are too few different systems. Most of all, what is really bad is the exclusive and isolated nature of systems, of whatever kind they may be.

Increasingly greater differences between social units, state and political systems, in addition to increasingly greater effi-
economic and social progress of the countries concerned. It is possible to have, in harmony with progressive economic and democratic aspirations in the world, more bread and liberty for people generally, a more just distribution of goods, and a normal tempo of economic development. The condition for this is the changing of existing property and political relationships, particularly those in Communism since they are, because of the monopoly of the ruling class, the most serious—although not the only—obstacle to national and world progress.

5.

The tendency toward unification, for other reasons, has also influenced changes in property relationships.

The increased, and even decisive, role of government organs in the economy, and to a large extent in ownership as well, is also an expression of the tendency toward world unification. Certainly it is manifested in different ways in various systems and countries, and even as an obstacle in those places where—as in the Communist countries—formal state ownership itself conceals the monopoly and the total domination of a new class.

In Great Britain private or, more accurately expressed, monopolist ownership has already legally lost its sanctity and purity through Labourite nationalization. Over twenty per cent of British productive power has been nationalized. In the Scandinavian countries, in addition to state ownership, a cooperative type of collective ownership is developing.

The increasing role of government in the economy is especially characteristic of the countries which until recently were colonies and semi-dependent countries, without regard to whether they have a socialist government (Burma), a parliamentary democracy (India), or a military dictatorship (Egypt).
The government makes most of the investments; it controls exports, seizes a large portion of the export funds, etc. The government appears everywhere as an initiator of economic change, and nationalization is a more frequently occurring form of ownership.

The situation is no different in the United States, the country where capitalism is most highly developed. Not only can everybody see the increasing role of the government in the economy from the great crisis (1929) to the present time, but few people deny the inevitability of this role.

James Blaine Walker emphasizes, in *The Epic of American Industry*: “The growing intimacy between government and the economic life has been one of the striking characteristics of the twentieth century.”

Walker cites that in 1938 about 20 per cent of the national income was socialized, while in 1940 this percentage went up to at least 25 per cent. Systematic government planning of the national economy began with Roosevelt. At the same time, the number of government workers and government functions, particularly those of the federal government, is growing.

Johnson and Kross, in *The Origins and Development of the American Economy*, come to the same conclusions. They affirm that administration has been separated from ownership and that the role of the government as a creditor has grown considerably. “One of the chief characteristics of the 20th century,” they say, “is the constant augmentation of the government’s, especially the federal government’s, influence over economic affairs.”

In his work *The American Way*, Shepard B. Clough cites figures that illustrate these statements. The expenditures and public debts of the federal government, according to him, look like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditures of the Federal Government (in millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Public Debts (Federal) (in thousands of dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>309.6</td>
<td>2,436,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>8,998.1</td>
<td>42,967,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>40,166.8</td>
<td>256,798,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this work Clough speaks of the “managerial revolution,” which he understands to be the rise of professional administrators, without whom owners can no longer operate. Their number, role, and solidarity are continually growing in the United States, and men of great business genius, like John D. Rockefeller, John Wanamaker, Charles Schwab and others, do not emerge any longer in the United States.

Fainsod and Gordon, in *Government and the American Economy*, remark that the government has already played a role in the economy and that various social groups have tried to make use of this role in economic life. However, there are now essential differences in this. The regulative role of government, they write, has appeared not only in the sphere of labor but in production—in branches of the economy as important to the nation as transportation, natural gas, coal, and petroleum. “Novel and far-reaching changes were also evident in the form of an expansion of public enterprise and increased concern with the conservation of natural and human resources. Public enterprise became particularly important in the banking and credit field, in electricity, and in the provision of low-cost housing.” They comment that the government has begun to play a far more important role than it played half a century ago, even ten years ago. “The result of these developments has been to produce a ‘mixed economy,’ an economy in which public enterprise, partially government-controlled private en-

† New York, Prentice-Hall, 1953.
‡ New York, T. Y. Crowell, 1953.
Enterprises, and relatively uncontrolled private enterprise all exist side by side."

These and other authors cite various aspects of this process and the growth of the needs of society for social welfare, education, and similar benefits, which are being provided by government agencies, as well as the continual increase—both relative and absolute—in the number of persons employed by the government.

It is understandable that this process received immense impetus and intensity during the Second World War because of military needs. However, after the war the process did not subside but continued at a faster tempo than during the prewar period. It was not just the fact that the Democratic Party was in power. Even the Republican government of Eisenhower, which was elected to power in 1952 on the slogan of a return to private initiative, could not change anything essentially. The same thing happened with the Conservative government in Great Britain; it did not succeed in bringing about de-nationalization except in the steel industry. Its role in the economy, by comparison with that of the Labour government, has not essentially decreased, although it has not increased either.

The interference of the government in the economy is obviously the result of objective tendencies which had already penetrated the people's consciousness a long time ago. All serious economists, beginning with Keynes, have advocated the intervention of the state in the economy. Now this is more or less an actuality throughout the world. State intervention and state ownership are today an essential and in some places a determining factor in the economy.

One could almost conclude from this that there is no distinction or source of conflict in the fact that in the Eastern system the state plays the major role, while in the Western system private ownership, or ownership by monopolies and companies, plays a major role. Such a conclusion seems all the more war-
of the world—specifically the U.S.S.R.—was escaping from their domain. The Communist bureaucracy had just recently become the ruling class.

Ownership relationships have always been vital to the U.S.S.R. in its dealings with other countries. Wherever possible its peculiar type of ownership and political relationship was imposed by force. No matter how much it developed its business connections with the rest of the world, it could not go beyond the mere exchange of goods, which had been developed during the period of national states. This was also true of Yugoslavia in the period of its break with Moscow. Yugoslavia could not develop any kind of significant economic cooperation except for the exchange of goods, although she had and continues to have hopes of achieving this. Her economy has remained isolated too.

There are other elements which complicate this picture and these relationships. If the strengthening of Western tendencies toward world unity of production might not mean aid to underdeveloped countries, in practice it would lead to the ascendency of one nation—the United States—or, at best, a group of nations.

By the very element of exchange, the economy and the national life of the underdeveloped countries are exploited and forced to be subordinated to the developed countries. This means that the underdeveloped countries can only defend themselves by political means, and by shutting themselves in if they wish to survive. This is one way. The other way is to receive aid from the outside, from the developed countries. There is no third way. Up to now there has been barely the beginning along the second way—aid in insignificant amounts.

Today the difference between the American and the Indonesian worker is greater than that between the American worker and the wealthy American stockholder. In 1949 every inhabitant of the United States earned an average of at least $1,440.00; the Indonesian worker earned 1/53rd as much, only $27.00, according to United Nations data. And there is general agreement that the material and other differences between developed and undeveloped countries do not diminish; on the contrary, they increase.

The inequality between the Western developed countries and the underdeveloped countries reveals itself as being mainly economic. Traditional political domination by governors and local lords is already on its way out. Now, as a rule, the economy of an underdeveloped but politically independent, national government is subordinate to some other country.

Today no single people can willingly accept such subordinate relationships, just as no single people can willingly renounce the advantages made possible by greater productivity.

To ask American or West European workers—not to mention owners—willingly to renounce the benefits offered them by a high level of technology and more productive work is as unthinkable as it would be to persuade a poor Asiatic that he should be happy that he receives so little for his work.

Mutual aid between governments and the gradual elimination of economic and other inequalities between peoples must be born of need in order to become the child of good will.

In the main, economic aid has thus far been extended only in those cases where underdeveloped countries, with low purchasing power and low production, have become a burden to the developed countries. The current conflict between the two systems is the main obstacle to the extension of real economic aid. This is not only because huge sums are being spent for military and similar needs; contemporary relationships also hinder the flourishing of production, and its tendency toward unification, thus blocking aid to underdeveloped countries and the progress of the developed countries themselves.

Material and other differences between the developed and the underdeveloped countries have also been registered in their internal life. It would be completely inaccurate to interpret democracy in the West only as an expression of solidarity of rich nations in looting the poor ones; the Western countries
were democratic long before the time of colonial extra-profits, though on a lower level than that of today. The only connection between present-day democracy in the Western countries and that of the period when Marx and Lenin were alive lies in the fact of continuous development between the two periods. The similarity between past and present democracy is not greater than that between liberal or monopolistic capitalism and modern statism.

In his work, *In Place of Fear*, the British socialist Aneurin Bevan observed:

> It is necessary to distinguish between the intention of Liberalism and its achievements. Its intention was to win power for the new forms of property thrown up by the Industrial Revolution. Its achievement was to win political power for the people irrespective of property.*
> The function of parliamentary democracy, under universal franchise, historically considered, is to expose wealth-privilege to the attack of the people. It is a sword pointed at the heart of property-power. The arena where the issues are joined is Parliament.†

Bevan’s observation applies to Great Britain. It could be expanded to apply to other Western countries, but only to the Western ones.

In the West, economic means which operate toward world unification have become dominant. In the East, on the Communist side, political means for such unification have always been predominant. The U.S.S.R. is capable of “uniting” only that which it conquers. From this point of view not even the new regime could change anything essentially. According to its ideas, oppressed peoples are only those on whom some other government, not the Soviet one, is inflicting its rule. The Soviet government subordinates its aid to others, even in the case of loans, to its political requirements.

The Soviet economy has not yet reached the point which would drive it to world unification of production. Its contradictions and difficulties stem mainly from internal sources. The system itself can still survive despite its isolation from the outside world. This is enormously expensive, but it is achieved by the widespread use of force. But this situation cannot last long; the limit must be reached. And this will be the beginning of the end of unlimited domination by the political bureaucracy, or by the new class.

Contemporary Communism could help achieve the goal of world unification most of all by political means—by internal democratization and by becoming more accessible to the outside world. However, it is still remote from this. Is it actually capable of such a thing?

What kind of picture does Communism have of itself and of the outside world?

Once, during the period of monopolies, the Marxism which Lenin modified conceived the internal and external relationships into which Czarist Russia and similar countries had fallen with a degree of accuracy. With this picture to spur it on, the movement headed by Lenin fought and won. In Stalin’s time this same ideology, again modified, was realistic to the extent that it defined, almost accurately, the position and role of the new state in international relations. The Soviet state, or the new class, was in a good position externally and internally, subordinating to itself all that it could acquire.

Now the Soviet leaders have a hard time orienting themselves. They are no longer capable of seeing contemporary reality. The world which they see is not the one that really exists. It is either the one that used to exist or the one that they would wish to have exist.

Holding on to obsolete dogmas, the Communist leaders thought that all the rest of the world would stagnate and de-

† From page 6, ibid.
view of the world, they believe that the present conflicts would have been avoided if such relationships had not been predominant in the West.

That is where the difficulty lies.

Even if relationships in the West were the way the Communists would like them to be—the conflict would still continue. Perhaps the conflict would be even more severe in this case. For not only forms of ownership would differ; it would be a matter of different, opposing aspirations, behind which stand modern technology and the vital interests of whole nations, in which various groups, parties, and classes endeavor to have the same problem solved according to their needs.

When the Soviet leaders rate the modern Western countries as blind instruments of the monopolies, they are just as wrong as they are in interpreting their own system as a classless society where ownership is in the hands of society. Certainly the monopolies play an important role in the politics of the Western countries, but in no case is the role as great or the same as before the First World War, nor even as before the Second World War. There is, in the background, something new and more essential; an irresistible aspiration toward the unification of the world. This is now expressed more strongly through statism and nationalization—or through the role of the government in the economy—than it is through the influence and action of the monopolies.

To the extent that one class, party, or leader stifles criticism completely, or holds absolute power, it or he inevitably falls into an unrealistic, egotistical, and pretentious judgment of reality.

This is happening today to the Communist leaders. They do not control their deeds, but are forced into them by reality. There are advantages in this; they are now more practical men than they used to be. However, there are also disadvantages, because these leaders basically lack realistic, or even approximately realistic, views. They spend more time defending