



Introduction
TO
ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS

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PEGIS

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
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INTRODUCTION TO
Saint
Thomas Aquinas

Edited, with an Introduction, by

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the Dominican convent of St. James in Paris, where he commented on the Gospels (1252-1254) and on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (1254-1256), receiving his license to teach from the University of Paris in 1256. During the next three years he inaugurated his career as a professor of theology in Paris, fulfilling in this way the desire, which he was to express at the beginning of the *Contra Gentiles*, of being a teacher of divine wisdom. In 1259 St. Thomas returned to Italy where he taught at the Papal Curia: at Anagni (1259-1261), Orvieto (1261-1265), Rome (1265-1267), Viterbo (1267-1268). St. Thomas' meeting with his fellow Dominican William of Moerbeke at Orvieto led to William's translation of the writings of Aristotle from Greek originals as well as St. Thomas' commentaries on the Philosopher. Returning to Paris in 1268, by way of Bologna and Milan, he entered into the struggles against the Latin Averroists in the Faculty of Arts and against the new attacks by the seculars on the religious orders. Finding himself under attack by the Augustinians, he was finally relieved of his teaching duties in 1272 and commissioned by his Order to establish a new house of studies in Naples. On his way to the Council of Lyons in 1274, to which he had been summoned by Pope Gregory X, he died at the Cistercian monastery of Fossanuova, March 7, 1274. He was canonized by Pope John XXII on July 18, 1323. In 1567 Pope Pius V pronounced him the *Angelic Doctor*. Since 1880, when he was named Patron of Catholic Schools by Pope Leo XIII, St. Thomas has received many official honors from the Church.

St. Thomas' writings belong to many fields of activity and are a faithful mirror of his participation in the religious and intellectual life of his age. His theological writings are a landmark in the history of theology. The Commentary on *The Four Books of Sentences* of Peter Lombard (*Scriptum in IV Libros Sententiarum*) was written in 1254-1256(?). The famous *Summa Contra Gentiles* dates from about 1260. *The Summa Theologica*, left unfinished, is a classic synthesis of Christian thought and represents St. Thomas at his distinctive best. The work belongs to the years 1266-1272. I may add in passing that, though tradition has honored the use of the name *Summa Theologica*, the correct title of the work is either *Summa* or *Summa Theologiae*. In this same group of

writings we must also locate the *Compendium of Theology* (*Compendium Theologiae*, 1273).

Of St. Thomas' commentaries, mention must be made of those on Boethius (*De Trinitate*, *De Hebdomadibus*, 1257-1258), on Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite (*De Divinis Nominibus*, about 1261), as well as on the anonymous and extremely influential *Book of Causes* (*Liber de Causis*, 1268). St. Thomas' commentaries on Aristotle (1261-1272) are a decisive moment in his career. There are commentaries on almost the whole Aristotelian corpus: *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Politics*, *On the Soul*, *Posterior Analytics*, *On Interpretation*, *On the Heavens*, *On Generation and Corruption*. *The Disputed Questions* deals with many topics: *On Truth* (*De Veritate*, 1256-1259), *On the Power of God* (*De Potentia Dei*, 1259-1263), *On Evil* (*De Malo*, 1263-1268), *On Spiritual Creatures* (*De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, 1269), *On the Soul* (*De Anima*, 1269-1270). St. Thomas has also written short treatises or *Opuscula*, of which mention must be made at least of the following: *On Being and Essence* (*De Ente et Essentia*, 1256), *On the Eternity of the World* (*De Aeternitate Mundi*, 1270), *On the Unity of the Intellect* (*De Unitate Intellectus*, 1270), *On Separate Substances* (*De Substantiis Separatis*, 1272).

II

An age which had as many philosophical masters (Greek, Arabian and Jewish) as did the thirteenth century, and in which these masters had very brilliant disciples, cannot be represented by any neat historical formula. On the other hand, those who yield to the impulse to treat the history of mediaeval philosophy with impeccable scholarship joined to philosophical neutrality are being learned spectators whereas the reality which they are investigating, namely, philosophy as it has existed in history, requires that their learning be an instrument of their philosophical understanding of that which in history is itself philosophical. Certainly, a patient reading of the theologians and the philosophers of the thirteenth century suggests that, though they are the heirs and the disciples of many and conflicting philosophical traditions, which crossed and re-crossed one another in the course of a long history, yet they had many problems in common; and

behind the more particular problems, a good many of the thinkers of the thirteenth century saw the emergence, on the boundary between Greek and Christian thought, of issues which were more basic not only because they contained the distinctively Greek contribution to philosophy, but also because they revealed what was permanently philosophical and permanently true in the Greeks. That is why St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, studied the history of philosophy not merely as though it were the record of human opinions, but also and even more as though within this record there was to be found the unfolding of philosophy itself. That is why his diagnosis of the history of philosophy meant to him a philosophical inquiry depending on the intelligibility and truth of philosophical doctrines. The Plato who was a philosopher in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. was a philosopher none the less; and while the historical Plato is inseparably wedded in his individuality to the calamitous age of Athens between the Peloponnesian War and the rise of Philip of Macedon, Platonism remains in any age an understandable philosophical phenomenon, however much it may be true that it belongs to the half century following the death of Socrates. And to St. Thomas, at least, Platonism in the course of history has meant primarily a reasonably coherent philosophical doctrine and method which could grow in the hands of Platonic disciples from Proclus to Avicenna but which retained in its very growth the original inspiration of the doctrine and the method to which Plato gave existence. In any case, we must recognize that a Greek Plato, a Persian Avicenna and a Jewish Maimonides were to St. Thomas Aquinas, as to many others of his age, philosophical contemporaries. We must recognize further that in following the practice of calling Aristotle *The Philosopher*, St. Thomas had no intention of burying philosophy in the fourth century B.C.; on the contrary, what he intended to do was to insist on the fact that, though philosophy can exist at any time only on the condition of being original, yet some philosophical doctrines began by being original with Aristotle.

The most important result of St. Thomas' attitude toward philosophy and its history is what may be called the historically social character of his own philosophical work. He lives and thinks in the company of others. When he reaches a certain philosophical conclusion, he will very often go out

of his way to say that such a conclusion had been reached by one or more of his predecessors; or he might say that he disagreed with Avicenna or Averroes in reaching it; or even that Plato and Aristotle may have formulated the principle that he used, even though they may not have followed through their principle to the end. In short, St. Thomas' use of the history of philosophy, far from being accessory ornamentation, was a necessary part of his own philosophical argument and a sign of his allegiance and discipleship to those who had made that argument possible for him. When he said, therefore, that we study what men have thought in order to discover the truth, he was giving expression, in a remarkably accurate way, to the conviction that philosophy has a history not in the sense that it is ever old but in the sense that those who explore its perpetual newness become an increasing company from generation to generation.

We must be prepared to go very far indeed in the direction of respecting with St. Thomas Aquinas the living character of philosophy before we understand fully the genuinely philosophical character of his conversations with the Greek and Arabian philosophers. Platonism, to repeat, is not for him a convenient abstraction designating a group of thinkers with vague family likenesses; before it is the name of a group, it is the name of a doctrine and of a method. But we must go further than this; for St. Thomas' historical relations to Platonism are very special. There are not many philosophical aberrations that were either inherited or developed by the thinkers of the thirteenth century that St. Thomas does not trace to the Platonic metaphysics, psychology and epistemology. Whether the problem be the nature of God and the divine goodness, the procession of creatures from God, their constitution and unity, their causality and autonomy under the creative causality of God, the unity and economy of man's composite being—the ultimate issue for St. Thomas is Platonism because it is for him the ultimate source to which the many and seemingly varied positions of later thinkers were reducible. Nor are the Platonic errors in these different domains fundamentally many. They are basically one error, running like a guiding thread in all the directions of the Platonic philosophical fabric. They are, in St. Thomas' estimation, errors of *existence*. If St. Thomas disagrees with Plato on the nature of God, creation, the divine transcendent

ence and the divine causality, the constitution of creatures as beings, the economy of their natures, and particularly the economy of man's nature, the reason is one and the only one, even though it has many consequences. Plato, so the reason runs, did not know the nature of being; and in the Platonic unawareness of being *from the point of view of existence* we are invited by St. Thomas Aquinas to locate the many tangled threads of the most serious philosophical issues in the thirteenth century.

It is worthwhile following St. Thomas' conversation with Plato. It will introduce us to the crucial issues of St. Thomas' age. It will enable us to understand that in turning to Aristotle St. Thomas was doing so for motives that were ultimately not to be found in Aristotle himself. Finally, it will enable us to appreciate, however briefly, the distinctive trait of what it is now fashionable to call the existentialism of St. Thomas Aquinas.

III

Of the many issues in the thirteenth century in which St. Thomas was involved and which were eminently issues of existence three are particularly significant, namely, the nature of *being*, the nature of *man* and the nature of *knowledge*. It seemed to St. Thomas Aquinas that on these three issues his ultimate opponent was Plato himself. And though history could offer to him Platonists of many sorts, and even of many degrees, nevertheless, what especially interested him was the fundamental attitude and method of the Platonic philosophy. If Platonism is the name of a school, that is true because it is first and foremost the name of a philosophical doctrine and method. That doctrine concerns the parallelism and similarity of treatment which St. Thomas has observed in the Platonic answer to three specific problems.

There is (A) the Platonic separation of being from becoming, of the intelligible and stable Ideas or Forms from changing and unstable sensible things. There is (B) the problem of the relations between intellectual knowledge and sensation. Intellectual knowledge neither comes from sensible things, nor is it about them; and to say that reminiscence is a necessary moment in the origin of intellectual knowledge is to admit this precise fact, namely, that such knowledge is neither from nor of sensible things. There is (C) the separa-

tion of soul from body, according to which Platonism has the tendency to say that man is a *soul* using a body rather than a *composite* of soul and body. The implication of this tendency is that the whole nature of man is to be found in the soul, and that the body is a sort of residence for man—a residence which is sometimes a workshop, sometimes a prison, sometimes a grave.

The common enemy in the Platonic effort to separate being from becoming, mind from sense and soul from body is matter. Plato has tried to protect the purity of intelligible essences, the universality and immateriality of intellectual knowledge, as well as the rational dignity of the soul, from the stain of matter. True being is the world of intelligible essences, true knowing is intellectual, the true man is the rational soul alone. These are surely cherished Platonic dreams, and St. Thomas Aquinas was both respectful and careful in their presence; and if he finally parted company with Plato, it was precisely at that moment when he was called upon to account for the role and the reality of matter in the universe.

Here, be it observed, St. Thomas differs from Plato by a principle. For since matter is a creature in a world of creatures, it has an intelligible role to play in the structure and organization of the world. Matter is not a barbarian, for in a world of creatures which depend for their whole being upon a creating God, there are no natural barbarians. In any case, Plato's effort to save essences, mind and knowledge from the barbarism of matter was to St. Thomas Aquinas a sign that Plato had not succeeded in looking upon all of reality from a truly unified point of view.

For, why should a philosopher cut off some parts and aspects of reality in order to save them from the rest? Why honor the Ideas with the name being at the price of keeping becoming in the outer darkness of the imitation of being? To this there can be but one answer. Only the philosopher who has not seen being as a whole, who has not seen the order and the unity of being from the point of view of being itself—only such a philosopher can reserve the name *being* for some realities and deny it to others. But what does this mean? It means, among other things, that when Plato separated being from becoming as that which truly *is* from that which *is imitationally*, he was basing his notion of being, not

on existence, but on the private characteristics of a certain sort of being.

It is here that the Platonic *method*, which is for St. Thomas Aquinas the cornerstone of Platonism, makes itself apparent. And it is this method, so widely practiced by his contemporaries, that St. Thomas has singled out with a steady insistence throughout his writings and with remarkable elaborateness in his commentary on the *Liber de Causis*. What is this method? It is the method of modeling the properties of existing beings on the abstractions of the human intellect. In other words, it is the method of thinking that being takes its characteristics *as being* from what it reveals of itself *in the state of being thought*. One need not argue that Plato modeled being on thought, as though he examined thought in order to discover the attributes of being. Nor did St. Thomas Aquinas ever so argue. But one can and must argue that Plato set out to investigate being by using reason and thought alone. Assuredly, Plato did not measure being by thought; but he did, as it is clear from the *Phaedo*, deliberately make the effort to become a pure and solitary reason, free from the body and from sensation, in order to investigate being adequately. Now, in St. Thomas' view, this Platonic method fails by as much as the human reason or human abstract thought is powerless, *by itself*, to apprehend and to know the conditions of actually existing things. For, according to St. Thomas, there are many and profoundly important aspects of existing things that thought alone or the reason alone cannot know; and the most important of these important aspects and conditions is *existence*.

The Ideas are, as St. Thomas repeatedly contends, the center of the Platonic metaphysics. They are true being, they exclude the imperfect conditions of sensible matter, and man must become a pure mind in order to know them. Now it is St. Thomas' conviction that the method which led Plato to posit the Ideas was intended by Plato himself to transcend the imperfections of sensible things; but, according to St. Thomas, that method succeeded in forcing Plato to have a dis-existentialized view of being, of man and of knowledge. Why so? Because the more Plato sought to discover the ultimate conditions of reality by means of a reason which had methodically cut itself off from the body and from all sensible experience, the more he was investing with the name of

being the abstract essences which were the only objects that such a methodically isolated reason could reach; and the more abstract essences became the center of Plato's world, the more Plato found himself incapable of explaining those conditions of actual beings which he could not derive from, or envisage within the economy of, the abstract essences which were the exemplars of his world.

Whether we examine the Platonic conception of the nature and the origin of being or the interior economy of such a being as man, the Platonic commitment to abstract essences as the ultimate models and, in some sense, the sources of the sensible beings around us, can lead to only one result. To be adequately the models and exemplars of reality, the Platonic Ideas would have to be creative divine ideas; and they would have to transcend the world of sensible things as the Creator transcends His creatures. But, in fact, the Ideas, being in St. Thomas' estimation of no more power and transcendence than are human abstractions, are powerless to cause within sensible things the very conditions of matter which they yet represent abstractly. This is the most ultimate conflict in Platonism, the conflict between being and essence. Consider the case of man as an example. How does it happen that man is entirely intelligible as an essence but not entirely intelligible as a being? For the Platonic man is entirely intelligible as a rational animal, but he is not quite so intelligible as soul and body. Why are being and essence thus at odds with one another? Because being and essence are related to matter in radically different ways within Platonism. Corporeal matter disturbs the economy of man's being, but not the economy of his essence. And this must mean that according to Platonism the whole being of man is not included within the ordering of the world by the Platonic Ideas. In other words, it means that matter escapes the causality of the Ideas, and to this extent sensible beings are not entirely intelligible in their origin. Matter enters the economy of the sensible world, not within the providence of God, nor as a co-principle within the economy of composite essences, but radically outside the whole domain and source of intelligibility. Matter is there as an un-reduced stranger within reality, an unintelligible and barbaric alien. It is there to be ordered, but it does not serve essentially the intelligible structure of reality. For Plato, the Ideas are not divine ideas

of individual being whose composite being is entirely intelligible to God. Conceivably, the Ideas might serve as the definitions of the essences of composite beings; but they cannot be the productive causes of the being of composite things.

By as much, therefore, as the Ideas are models of material things whose materiality they are yet powerless to cause, by so much Plato excludes from his explanation of reality the existential conditions of sensible beings. This does not mean merely that Plato was unable to account for the existence of matter, or to include matter within the causality of the intelligible source of all being. The malady is much deeper than this. Plato's flight from matter is bound to be a flight from existence; for a metaphysics which does not deal with being as a whole does not deal with being at all. Plato could not successfully exclude matter and becoming from the domain of being, however much he may have tried; rather, by trying to exclude them, he excluded himself. And this is another way of saying that the Platonic metaphysics of the Ideas is a metaphysics of flight from existence.

But the dilemmas of a metaphysics which turns its back on existence in order to avoid matter can prove embarrassing not only in the problem of the origin of things but also in the problem of their interior constitution and economy. If in the problem of the origin of the world St. Thomas opposed Platonic participation, he also found it necessary to carry this opposition through to its logical results in the further contention that, on Platonic grounds, we are unable to explain the unity of any being as a being and the unity of its nature. Once more, let us take man as an example. It is known how indefatigably St. Thomas Aquinas defended the unity of man's being as well as the unity of the composite economy of his nature. What it is necessary to see in this defense is that the issue between St. Thomas and Plato (an issue deliberately raised by St. Thomas himself) is, once more, a question of existence.

Composite in nature, man yet is for St. Thomas one being. There is a mystery to consider. And the mystery is manifold. For if man, though composed of soul *and* body, is one being, then he has one nature, that is to say, an internal organization and order serving *as a whole* one specific and final purpose. To say, however, that man has a unity of nature is to say that he has an ordered relationship among his various

powers, so that they work and function together for an end which is expressive of the very nature of man. Yet we are not to suppose that this ordered relationship among man's many powers (intellect, will, imagination, memory, sight, hearing, etc.) exists as a meaningless reflection of the unity of man's nature. On the contrary, if man is a composite being, if he is soul *and* body, if, therefore, he has many and varied powers within the unity of his nature, to St. Thomas that means that man is the sort of being that requires the simultaneous and inter-ordinated activity of his several powers to achieve the unitary purpose of his nature. St. Thomas does not think of man as a unity as though his various functions do not interfere with one another; man is rather a unity in the sense that he has to act through several powers *at the same time*, contributing to one another, so that by their togetherness one work, distinctively human, may be the result.

Is man one being? And if so, to what purpose?

To the first of these questions St. Thomas' answer proved very disconcerting to his contemporaries. They all agreed, certainly, that man was *one* being; but sometimes some of them did not mind saying that man was one being because he was the union of two beings. This position, which is not exactly unknown in modern philosophy, struck St. Thomas Aquinas as bad arithmetic and worse philosophy. If man is the *sum* of two actually constituted beings, then he is two beings; in which case there would arise all sorts of embarrassing questions. Why this two-in-one? And how could something that was two beings act as one being—*be* one agent? You could try to relieve the difficulty by saying that man is not a soul and a body, but a soul *with* a body. This would make man a unity by the expedient of saying that man was a soul using and ruling a body. This is the position which St. Thomas attributes to Plato and to St. Augustine.

But it will not work. For man is not a soul, if that means that his whole nature as man is verified in the soul alone, since precisely the notion of a rational animal is not verified in the soul alone. To put man's whole nature in the soul might evade the difficulty of making man two beings; but it poses the other difficulty that the soul alone, though a spiritual substance, is not a complete being. St. Thomas, therefore, offers to his Platonic contemporaries two dilemmas. If,

as everybody admitted, the knowledge of truth was the end and purpose of the soul as a spiritual substance, how could the soul accomplish this purpose by itself? Assuming that this question receives some sort of answer, how did they account for the fact that man, who is for them very little less than the angels, is yet an incarcerated angel? What, after all, is an angel doing with a body?

St. Thomas' conviction is that there are no adequate Platonic answers to these questions. As he sees the problem, any explanation, to be acceptable, must satisfy at least two conditions, both posed by the fact to be explained—man himself. The human soul is in itself a spiritual substance; it does not need the body in order to exist, since precisely it can and does exist through itself. And yet this spiritual substance, which exists *through* itself, does not exist *by* itself; it does not exist as a soul alone. Now how can man be one being? And what is the *why* of such a being?

To the first of these questions St. Thomas answers that man can be one being if the whole composite receives actual existence through one cause or principle. For St. Thomas, at least, being *one* being follows from *being* one being. Such a principle is the soul. Subsistent in itself, it is nevertheless also the principle through which the whole composite exists. The famous Thomistic doctrine of the unicity of the substantial form in man, so resisted by the thinkers of the late thirteenth century, has for its purpose to explain how man is one being in his very existence. To say that man is a composite being can be ambiguous. It should not mean that man is made up of two beings; it must rather mean that, though man is composed of soul and body, the body exists in and through the existence of the soul. That is why we may say that, existentially considered, it is the body that is in the soul, not the soul in the body.

That this is a paradoxical thesis needs scarcely to be denied. But we must add immediately that it is no more paradoxical than the paradox it is trying to explain. What a creature is man! He is spirit and matter together. He is not an imprisoned angel; he is by nature an incarnate spirit. This is the fact to explain—without changing it and without explaining it away. But the more we are true to the fact of man as an incarnate spirit, to the fact of a subsistent and spiritual soul which is yet by nature a part of man, the more we are

driven to ask the *why* of such a being. And we are equally driven to exclude as impossible all explanations of man which render the facts impossible. What is, is possible; and man is. And because man is an observable reality, he poses the problem of the unity of his being and of his nature.

The Thomistic explanation of the unity of man is historically decisive far beyond the confines of the thirteenth century. There are, according to St. Thomas, two things that cannot be said on this point. In the first place, we cannot say that an intellectual substance is joined to a body as a consequence of being an intellectual substance. For the good of such a substance is a spiritual good, the knowledge of truth. It is not, therefore, in the line of the essential purpose of the soul as an intellectual substance that it should be joined to a body. On the other hand, we cannot say that the soul is joined to a body for the good of the body itself, since matter serves form rather than making it its servant. What, then? There is, in St. Thomas' view, only one answer which remains true to the fact without violating any principles. If an intellectual substance is joined to a body neither precisely because it is intellectual nor for the sake of a body, then it must be so joined because it is unequal *by itself* to the task of accomplishing the work proper to an intellectual substance. That is to say, a spiritual substance such as the human soul, which is intellectual in its nature and purpose, and which yet is part of the human composite, must require to be such a part in order to become completely an intellectual substance. We are invited by St. Thomas Aquinas, therefore, to look upon the human composite of soul and body as being the complement of the intellectual nature of the soul. If the knowledge of truth is the aim of a spiritual substance, and if the soul, which is such a substance, is an incarnate spirit, then it is incarnate in order to do the work of a spirit; and, what is no less decisive, it must do a spiritual work as an incarnate spirit.

We are now standing in the presence of a philosophical decision which is unique in history. To say that man must do a spiritual work as an incarnate spirit is to say that *as a knower* man is a composite being. Where the Platonic knower is a pure reason, and the Cartesian knower a pure mind, the Thomistic knower is, *as knower*, the composite of soul and body. Let us say this in another way. Man as a knower must

be partly material in order to be adequately a knower. Of course, such a notion is bound to sound scandalous to modern ears. For we are the heirs of generations of philosophic speculations according to which man is a *thinker* and a *mind*. Now it is a fact that the Thomistic man is a knower rather than a thinker, and he is a composite being rather than a mind. In fact, St. Thomas does not even have in his vocabulary a term corresponding to the term thinker: you cannot translate such a term into Thomistic Latin. If we are to judge matters as St. Thomas has done, we are bound to say that the European man became a thinker after he ruined himself as a knower; and we can now even trace the steps of that ruination—from Augustinian Platonism to the nominalistic isolationism of Ockham to the despairing and desperate methodism of Descartes. For what we call the decline of mediaeval philosophy was really a transition from man as a knower to man as a thinker—from man knowing the world of sensible things to man thinking abstract thoughts in separation from existence. What is thinking but dis-existentialized knowing?

There is no need to dwell on man as a thinker except perhaps to say that the recent revolts by existential theologians and existential philosophers, not to mention existential historians, is a critical lesson for all to consider. Philosophers have tried to be thinkers; they have tried to give a conceptual and totally abstract reproduction of reality; some of them have even played at being God in order to give, from the point of view of mind, a total and totally abstract presentation of reality. Now, what the contemporary revolt by existentialists will lead to no one will predict. But what it means is clear enough; it means the emptiness of abstract thought closed on abstractions. It is equally clear that, in the violence of their revolt, some existentialists should circle round man's existence very closely, very anxiously and very desperately. And well they should. For an existential revolt against abstractions is historically understandable and philosophically salutary. But a revolt of existence, which turns out to be a revolt against intelligibility in the world, merely ruins the world in order to save existence. The remedy for meaning without a world is not a world without meaning. For, granted that thinking without existence is empty, existence without intelligibility is just as empty.

The Thomistic doctrine of man, in which the knowing subject is a composite being, an incarnate spirit, yields neither to the impulse to conceptualize existence nor to the impulse to stop conceptualization in the presence of existence. Rather, St. Thomas sets himself the problem to explain how it is that we know concrete sensible being. It is not abstractions that we know, though we use abstractions; it is things. What is more, we know things as being, not as essences; we say that things have essences, not that they are essences. How is this knowing of *beings* to be explained? And how is it that we are able to pronounce the *very to be*? Being is not the name of any essence, and in the sense in which we are said to conceive essences we cannot say that we conceive being. We have, to be sure, a concept of being, but it is not the concept of an essence, nor is it abstracted as essential concepts are; for, far from excluding the individuals from which it is abstracted, it includes them, since that to which it refers is individual in every individual being—namely, its act of to be.

The notion of act is fundamental in the metaphysics and epistemology of St. Thomas. For him, the name being takes its origin from the act of to be; it is therefore a name of things from the standpoint of act, not from the standpoint of essence. Essence itself, as St. Thomas understands it, is not a thing or a reality in itself. If you ask: *what* is a thing? to St. Thomas the question means: what sort of being does a thing have? But because a thing is called a being from its act of to be, to ask what a being is is to be concerned with the sortness of its act of to be. To be a man is to be humanly.

How then can *being*—that being which has been such a stranger from the philosophical horizons of Plato and of most modern philosophers—how can being be known? For it cannot be conceived as an essence, since it is not an essence. But, be it observed, the being that is in question here is not some abstraction. It is the being of sensible things; it *is* sensible things. The being that we are called upon to know, and the knowledge of which we are called upon to explain, is concrete sensible being—manifold and multiple, changing and indefinitely varied. Now, how can such being—such beings—be known, given that, because they are beings and not essences, they cannot be completely conceptualized?

To this question, too, St. Thomas thinks that there is but

one answer. The first requisite of knowledge is that the thing known be in the knower. The second requisite is that the thing known, since it is a being and not an essence, be in the knower as a being and not as an essence. The third requisite is that, since the thing to be known is a concrete sensible being, it must be in the knower as a concrete sensible being. Without these requisites, there would not be knowledge as St. Thomas understands it; there would not be a human knowing which is the knowing of sensible beings.

The Thomistic doctrine that man as a knower is a composite being, that *he* knows through the use of his several powers together and inter-ordinated, is the exact complement of knowing understood in the light of the above requisites. Man must as a knower *be* sensible things in order to know them. Man as a knower must be such that he can give existence, within his knowledge, not to abstract essences, but to sensible beings. That is why man as a knower needs a body; for, through the senses of his body he can give sensible existence in the order of knowing to that which is sensible in the order of being. The body as part of the knowing man answers for St. Thomas Aquinas the two questions which knowledge poses for him. In knowing sensible being, how do we know it as sensible, which it is, and as being, which it likewise is? St. Thomas' answer is that sensible being exists in our knowledge as sensible being; its actuality exists in our sensible knowledge as sensible actuality, and not as an abstraction. And it is because we can give sensible actuality, within our knowledge, to what is a sensible actuality in the order of existence that we can say we know sensible beings.

It is important to stress this approach to human knowledge from the point of view of the act of being in sensible things. To know is to be; to know sensible things is, by means of knowing, to be sensible things. To St. Thomas, knowing first presents itself in the mode of act; for it is the mode of act which is the mode of being. If we think of knowledge as intellectual abstraction, we shall never explain why we know being from the point of view of its actuality. If St. Thomas believes that abstraction is not working in a void, and that conceptualization is rooted in the actuality of things, it is because before the work of abstraction and conceptualization by the intellect (or, rather, by man through the intellect) there is the work of giving sensible existence,

within man's knowledge, to the sensible being of things. In other words, being (the being of and in sensible things) first comes to us in the way that it is, as sensible actuality, and human knowing begins by being the exercise by man of the sensible act of being in things.

That is why abstraction as St. Thomas understands it is not a separation from existence; it is the consideration by the intellect of the essential elements within the actuality of things. In other words, given St. Thomas' view of sensible knowledge, we are bound to say that for him abstraction always takes place within the apprehended actuality of things. That is why we can use concepts and form judgments. For a judgment is not built on abstractions; it is in the line of the act of being, not in the line of essence. In going from concepts to judgments we do not miraculously get something from nothing—as though we begin knowledge with conceptualized essences and then by the employment of judgment we begin to speak the language of being. Conceptualized essences, unless they be conceptualized within our apprehension of being, will never enable us to form judgments. For judgments, including attributive judgments, depend for their possibility on our apprehension of being as act, and of essence itself from the viewpoint of act; for it is act which unifies being, and it is within the unity of being that we must seek the unity of essence and therefore the ground of judgment.

IV

There would be many more names and many more struggles within the thirteenth century that we would have to consider in order to give a complete picture of St. Thomas and his age. But perhaps, in a general appreciation of the philosophical spirit of St. Thomas, it is not unjust to concentrate our attention on his relations to Plato. The Thomistic critique of Plato is a permanent and decisive aspect of Thomism, just as it is a permanent and decisive issue in the thirteenth century. Nor is it difficult to see the role assigned to Aristotle by St. Thomas Aquinas. Where the Platonic method in philosophy threatens to leave man in a void of abstractions, the Aristotelian critique of Plato has the basic merit of saving the reality of the world from Platonic abstractionism. But in following the direction of the Aristotelian critique of Plato,

St. Thomas breathed into Aristotle's conception of the world a vision that the Stagirite himself had never known. The world which St. Thomas analyzes by means of the principles of the Aristotelian *Physics* is a world of creatures, something that Aristotle had never known; and while it is true that Averroes and the Averroists used the Aristotelian doctrine of motion against the Christian doctrine of creation, St. Thomas Aquinas preferred to interpret it as failing to reach the idea of creation, rather than as denying it.

It has always been a problem for students of St. Thomas to explain his comparatively milder treatment of Aristotle than of Plato. No doubt, he agreed with Aristotle much more than he ever did with Plato; although it is a fact that he has had occasion to side with Plato against Aristotle. Now one has only to think of all the principles and doctrines which St. Thomas received from Aristotle in order to recognize that the most obvious reason for his mildness toward Aristotle is that, after all, no other attitude is possible in the circumstances. It is quite probable, too, that the intellectual situation in the world around him suggested to St. Thomas the attitude he adopted. For that situation, so rampant with Platonism, some of which even masqueraded under the name of Aristotle, required precisely the sort of use of Aristotle which St. Thomas actually made. An Aristotle, in fact, whose *De Anima*, *Physics* and *Metaphysics* are made to be stout weapons in defense of truth against Plato's isolation of soul from body, his sacrifice of being in the name of its intelligibility, his disparaging attitude toward the world of sense and toward sense knowledge—such an Aristotle was a veritable ally of every Catholic theologian in the thirteenth century.

What is, however, perplexing about such an Aristotle is not the timeliness of his arrival in the Paris of St. Thomas during the middle of the thirteenth century, nor the extent of his services to the cause of philosophy and theology. What is perplexing is, rather, that such an Aristotle existed, to a great extent, only in the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas; and what is no less perplexing is that St. Thomas has criticized Aristotle often enough to leave no doubt on this point. What many still like to call the Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis is the result of more than one benign Thomistic interpretation of the Philosopher. To identify St. Thomas with an Aristotle who is, in many important respects, his own creation, is a compliment

being their critic. For by his own practice we are warranted in saying that St. Thomas' predecessors helped him to reach the truths that he did. Sometimes they helped him by reaching them before him; sometimes they helped by struggling toward them and, by their very failures, revealing to all who could read what would have to be done in order to succeed where they failed. If he was a critic of his predecessors, it was in their name that St. Thomas was their critic. If his doctrines were new, he yet managed to find many beginnings of these doctrines in the past. Nothing is newer in the history of Christian thought than St. Thomas' notion of existence; and, speaking from the historical vantage point of the twentieth century, let us add that nothing has been rarer in the history of philosophy since the thirteenth century than that notion of existence. And yet the same St. Thomas Aquinas, who loved truth much more than he was aware of his own novelty, presents many of his most distinctive notions as having a long birth in the history of Christian thought before him. "According to reason and Aristotle," he has often said. He stood on a giant past; and though he himself was a giant, he always looked upon his intellectual stature with the genuine humility of one who, even in his highest speculative reaches, accepted the fruits of philosophical victory as much in the name of those who went before him as in his own.

Anton C. Pegis

of the intellect, and is thus the first intelligible, as sound is the first audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius defines the divine names according as they imply some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says,¹² from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of the desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation,¹³ said that matter was non-being,¹⁴ goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness as seeking it, for all seek their like, but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that *goodness extends to the non-existent*.¹⁵

Reply Obj. 2. The same solution applies to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them—if, indeed, by the non-existent we understand not unqualifiedly those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. But being implies the relation of a formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.

Reply Obj. 3. Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively—*i.e.*, inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which is removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being. Therefore it is being which is desirable of itself, while non-being is desirable only relatively, viz., inasmuch as one seeks some being of which

¹² *De Div. Nom.*, I, 7 (PG 3, 596). ¹³ Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 9 (192a 2). ¹⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *ibid.* (192a 3). ¹⁵ *De Div. Nom.*, V, 1 (PG 3, 816).

one cannot bear to be deprived; and thus it happens that even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good.

Reply Obj. 4. Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing is desirable except being, and consequently nothing is good except being.

Third Article

WHETHER EVERY BEING IS GOOD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from what has been said. But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 2. Further, no evil is good: *Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil* (Isa. v. 20). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 3. Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher observes that in *mathematics goodness does not exist*.¹⁶ But mathematical are entities, or otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.

On the contrary, Every being that is not God, is God's creature. Now *every creature of God is good* (1 Tim. iv. 4): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.

I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect, since every act is some sort of perfection, and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from what has been said. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.

Reply Obj. 1. Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add

¹⁶ *Metaph.*, II, 2 (996b 1).

anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever its nature. Hence goodness does not limit being.

Reply Obj. 2. No being is said to be evil, considered as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks the being of virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.

Reply Obj. 3. As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,¹⁷ primary matter may be said to be a non-being because of the privation added to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness, viz., by its ordination to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, not to be desirable, but to desire, befits it.

Reply Obj. 4. Mathematical do not subsist as separate beings, for if they subsisted there would be in them some good, viz., their very being; but they have a separate existence only in the reason, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; and it is thus that they are abstracted from an end whose nature it is to act as a moving cause. Nor is it repugnant that in some logical entity we do not find the good, or the character of goodness; for the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding article.

Fourth Article

WHETHER GOODNESS HAS THE ASPECT OF A FINAL CAUSE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says, *Goodness is praised as beauty*.¹⁸ But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.

Obj. 2. Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are.¹⁹ But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient

¹⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 9 (192a 2). ¹⁸ *De Div. Nom.*, IV, 7 (PG 3, 701). ¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, IV, 4; 20 (PG 3, 700; 720); cf. also, *op. cit.*, IV, 1 and 4 (PG 3, 693; 697).

Reply Obj. 2. Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.

Reply Obj. 3. He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not because he has a good intellect, but because he has a good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, *we exist because God is good*²³ has reference to the final cause.

Fifth Article

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOODNESS CONSISTS IN
LIMIT, SPECIES AND ORDER?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in limit, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But limit, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: *Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number and weight* (Wis. xi. 21). And to these three can be reduced species, limit and order, as Augustine says: *Measure fixes the limit of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and stability*.²⁴ Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in limit, species and order.

Obj. 2. Further, limit, form, and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in limit, species and order, then every limit must have its own limit, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.

Obj. 3. Further, evil is the privation of limit, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in limit, species and order.

Obj. 4. Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil limit, species and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in limit, species and order.

Obj. 5. Further, limit, species and order are caused by

²³ St. Augustine, *De Doc. Christ.*, I, 32 (PL 34, 32). ²⁴ *De Genesi ad Litt.*, IV, 3 (PL 34, 299).

On the contrary, The Apostle says (*Rom. xii. 2*): *That you may prove what is the will of God.*

I answer that, There is will in God, just as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual being by their form, so the intellect is actually knowing by its intelligible form. Now everything has this disposition towards its natural form, that when it does not have it, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This disposition to good in things without knowledge is called *natural appetite*. Whence also intellectual natures have a like disposition to good as apprehended through an intelligible form, so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it; both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is *will*, just as in every sensible being there is *animal appetite*. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His knowing is His own being, so is His willing.

Reply Obj. 1. Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him And He is the end by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as was shown above:⁵ for the end has the aspect of good.

Reply Obj. 2. Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act to seek what it does not possess, but also to love and delight in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as always possessing the good which is its object; since, as we have already said, it is not in essence distinct from this good.

Reply Obj. 3. A will, of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another: but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone (in the same sense, of course, in which understanding and willing are said to be movements). This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves himself.⁶

⁵ Q. 6, a. 3.

⁶ Cf. *S.T.*, q. 9, a. 1, ad. 1.

I answer that, As was said above, evil indicates the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that every thing would be evil because of not having the good belonging to something else. For instance, a man would be evil because he did not have the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.

Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same—viz., being in potentiality, whether it be being in potentiality absolutely, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form and of the privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in potentiality relatively, and actuality absolutely, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good. Hence, every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so it has goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.

Reply Obj. 2. *Non-being*, understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says, and such a *non-being* is an evil.⁵

Reply Obj. 3. Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not *sight*, but *the animal*. Yet it appears, as Augustine says, that the rule of dialectic here fails, the rule, namely, which says that contraries cannot exist together.⁶ But this is to be taken according to the universal meaning of good and evil, but not in reference to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and like contraries, are considered as contraries only in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genera; whereas good enters into

⁵ *Metaph.*, III, 2 (1004a 15).

⁶ *Enchir.*, XIV (PL 40, 238).

essentially to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause. Thus good is the cause of evil.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says, *The Lord calls an evil will an evil tree, and a good will a good tree.*⁴ Now, a good will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.

Reply Obj. 2. Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil. Thus, the goodness of the fire causes evil to the water, and man, good in his nature, causes a morally evil act. Furthermore, as was explained above, this is by accident.⁵ Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold heats inasmuch as the heat is confined by it.

Reply Obj. 3. Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary beings otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect in it. Hence evil never follows in the effect unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary beings the defect of the action comes from an actually deficient will inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault; but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.

Reply Obj. 4. Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above.

Second Article

WHETHER THE HIGHEST GOOD, GOD, IS THE CAUSE OF EVIL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the highest good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (*Isa. xlv. 5, 7*): *I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil.* It is also said

⁴ *Contra Julian.*, I, 9 (PL 44, 672). ⁵ Q. 19, a. 9.

relation to what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some highest evil.

Obj. 4. Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essentially so. But things which are evil among us are evil, not essentially, but by participation. Therefore it is possible to find some highest essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.

Obj. 5. Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is *per se*. But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some highest evil which is the *per se* cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no *per se* cause, but only an accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the majority of cases, but only in a few.

Obj. 6. Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause, as was said above. But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must posit one first evil as the cause of every evil.

On the contrary, The highest good is the cause of every being, as was shown above.¹³ Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.

I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.

First, because the first principle of good is essentially good, as was shown above.¹⁴ But nothing can be evil in its very essence. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good,¹⁵ and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject.¹⁶

Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as was shown above.¹⁷ But there cannot be a highest evil, for, as was shown above, although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it;¹⁸ and thus, since the good always survives, nothing can be wholly and perfectly evil. Therefore, the Philosopher says that if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself.¹⁹ For if all good were destroyed (which is essential for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good.

¹³ Q. 2, a. 3; q. 6, a. 4.

¹⁴ Q. 2, a. 3.

¹⁵ Q. 6, a. 2.

¹⁶ Q. 6, a. 3 and 4.

¹⁷ Q. 48, a. 4.

¹⁸ Q. 5, a. 3.

¹⁹ *Eth.*, IV, 5 (1126a 12).

Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown above, and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to an essential cause, as appears in *Physics* ii.²⁰

Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the ancients.²¹ For they failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. Hence on that account, if they found a thing injurious to something by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance, if one were to say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of some poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its reference to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its reference to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above.²² So, too, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to a universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary causes; just as above the contrary qualities of the elements there exists the power of the body of the heavens, and above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above.²³

Reply Obj. 1. Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular causes, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was said above.²⁴ Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above,²⁵ it is opposed

²⁰ Aristotle, *Phys.*, II, 6 (198a 8). ²¹ Cf. St. Thomas, *C. G.*, II, 41; St. Augustine, *De Haeres.*, 14; 21; 46 (PL 42, 28; 29; 37). ²² Q. 47, a. 2, ad 1. ²³ Q. 2, a. 3. ²⁴ Q. 48, a. 3. ²⁵ *Ibid.*

to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the highest good, who is pure act.

Reply Obj. 3. Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And just as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to a perfect terminus, while privation and evil are intensified by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse by reason of access to the highest evil, in the same way as a thing is said to be good and better by reason of access to the highest good.

Reply Obj. 4. No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil.

Reply Obj. 5. Evil can have only an accidental cause, as was shown above. Hence reduction to any *per se* cause of evil is impossible. Hence, to say that evil is in the majority of cases is absolutely false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone there can be natural evil, are a very small part of the whole universe. Then again, defects in nature are found in every species only in a small number of cases. In man alone does evil manifest itself in the majority of cases. For the good of man as regards the senses of the body is not the good of man as man, but the good according to the reason. More men, however, follow the sense rather than the reason.

Reply Obj. 6. In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally.

trariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it is a receiving subject according to the manner of its being, and those things which it receives are without contrariety. Thus, the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same science. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible.

Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to being after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know being, except under the conditions of *here* and *now*, whereas the intellect apprehends being absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 1. Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of *Wis. ii.* Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For while the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body, the human soul is produced by God. To signify this, it is written of other animals: *Let the earth bring forth the living soul* (*Gen. i. 24*); while of man it is written (*Gen. ii. 7*) that *He breathed into his face the breath of life*. And so in the last chapter of *Ecclesiastes* (*xii. 7*) it is concluded: *The dust returns into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit returns to God Who gave it*. Again, the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written (*Eccles. iii. 19*): *All things breathe alike*, and (*Wis. ii. 2*), *The breath in our nostrils is smoke*. But the process is not alike in the case of the soul, for man has understanding whereas animals do not. Hence it is false to say: *Man has nothing more than beasts*. Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, but not as to the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. As a thing can be created, not by reason of a passive potentiality, but only by reason of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non-being, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain

Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. It is *thus* that to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above, has an operation extending to universal being.¹⁵ We may therefore see whether an intellect is in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being; and such is the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, in which, originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. Therefore the divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; for then it would needs be an infinite being. Therefore no created intellect, by reason of its very being, is the act of all things intelligible; but it is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act.

Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act. Such is the case with the matter of the heavenly bodies.¹⁶ And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Hence the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intellects and most remote from the perfection of the divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first *like a clean tablet on which nothing is written*, as the Philosopher says.¹⁷ This is made clear from the fact that at first we are only in potentiality towards understanding, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is *in a way to be passive*, taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection is verified of passion in the

¹⁵ Q. 78, a. 1.

¹⁶ Q. 58, a. 1.

¹⁷ *De An.*, III, 4 (430a 1).

first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense, passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.

Reply Obj. 2. *Passive intellect* is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul;¹⁸ which appetite is also called *rational by participation*, because it *obeys the reason*.¹⁹ Others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the *particular reason*.²⁰ And in each case *passive* may be taken in the two first senses, since this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the *possible intellect*,²¹ is not passive except in the third sense; for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 3. The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing; but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being, while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Therefore nothing prevents such a passive power being nobler than such an active one.

Third Article

WHETHER THERE IS AN AGENT INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no agent intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, there is not said to be an *agent sense*, but only a passive one. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that there is an agent intellect, but only a passive one.²²

Obj. 2. Further, if we say that also in the senses there is

¹⁸ Themistius, *In De An.*, III, 5 (II, 186).—Cf. Averroes, *In De An.*, III, 20 (VI, 170v). ¹⁹ Aristotle, *Eth.*, I, 13 (1102b 25). ²⁰ Cf.

Averroes, *In De An.*, III, 20 (VI, 171r). ²¹ *De An.*, III, 4 (429a 22).

²² An argument of William of Auvergne, *De An.*, VII, 4 (II, Suppl., 207).

desires, by natural appetite, that object which is suitable to itself. Above this natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired, not as suitable to this or that power (such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing), but as suitable absolutely to the animal.

Second Article

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE AND INTELLECTUAL APPETITES
ARE DISTINCT POWERS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have seen above.⁸ But it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.

Obj. 2. Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals, and is thereby distinguished from sensitive knowledge, which is of individuals. But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part. For since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things, every act of the appetite seems to be towards individual things. Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the sensitive.

Obj. 3. Further, just as under the apprehensive power the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.

On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes a double appetite, and says that the higher appetite moves the lower.⁹

I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended. Therefore *the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite*

⁸ Q. 77, a. 3. ⁹ *De An.*, III. 9 (432b 5); 10 (433a 23); 11 (434a 17).

obey reason; which is why it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says.¹⁰ Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.

Obj. 2. Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason, according to the Apostle (*Rom. vii. 23*): *I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind*. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.

Obj. 3. Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason, for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupiscible, obey reason.

On the contrary, Damascene says that *the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and anger*.¹¹

I answer that, In two ways do the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will: first, as to the reason, and secondly, as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimated power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimated power, as we have said above, is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some *the particular reason*, because it compares individual intentions.¹² Hence, in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason; and that is why in syllogisms particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that *the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite*, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible, and that this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason, hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself; for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be lessened or increased.

¹⁰ *De Trin.*, XII, 12; 13 (PL 42, 1007; 1009). ¹¹ *De Fide Orth.*, II, 12 (PG 94, 928). ¹² Q. 78, a. 4.

To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites. For instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flies at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites; but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second moves only by virtue of the first; and so the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says, namely, that *the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower*.¹³ In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Sensuality is signified by the serpent in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says: *We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle; for the soul dominates the body by a despotic rule, but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal rule*.¹⁴ For that rule is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the means to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that rule is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic rule, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are at once removed. But the intellect or reason is said to govern the irascible and concupiscible by a politic rule because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the esti-

¹³ *De An.*, III, 11 (434a 12). ¹⁴ *Polit.*, I, 2 (1254b 2).

Question LXXXII

THE WILL

(In Five Articles)

WE NEXT consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity? (2) Whether it desires everything of necessity? (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect? (4) Whether the will moves the intellect? (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?

First Article

WHETHER THE WILL DESIRES SOMETHING OF NECESSITY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will desires nothing of necessity. For Augustine says that if anything is necessary, it is not voluntary.¹ But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.

Obj. 2. Further, *the rational powers*, according to the Philosopher, *extend to opposite things*.² But the will is a rational power, because, as he says, *the will is in the reason*.³ Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and hence is determined to nothing of necessity.

Obj. 3. Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated.

On the contrary, Augustine says that *all desire happiness with one will*.⁴ Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity.

I answer that, The word *necessity* is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle:—either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible;—or formal, as when we

¹ *De Civit. Dei*, V, 10 (PL 41, 152). ² *Metaph.*, VIII, 2 (1046b 5). ³ Aristotle, *De An.*, III, 9 (432b 5). ⁴ *De Trin.*, XIII, 4 (PL 42, 1018).

say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is *natural and absolute necessity*. In another way, that a thing must belong to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. The necessity is imposed on something by the end when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called the *necessity of the end*, and sometimes also *utility*. The necessity is imposed by the agent when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called the *necessity of coercion*.

Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call *violent* that which is against the inclination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, just as a thing is called *natural* because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called *voluntary* because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced, or violent, and voluntary.

But the necessity of the end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way; and thus from the will to cross the sea arises in the will the necessity to desire a ship.

In like manner, neither is *natural necessity repugnant to the will*. Indeed, just as the intellect of necessity adheres to first principles, so the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness; for the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters, as is said in *Physics* ii.⁵ For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else pertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.

Reply Obj. 1. The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity *does not take away the liberty of the will*, as he himself says in the same work.⁶

Reply Obj. 2. The will, so far as it desires a thing nat-

⁵ Aristotle, *Phys.*, II, 9 (200a 21). ⁶ *De Civit. Dei*, V, 10 (PL 41, 152).

urally, corresponds rather to the intellect of natural principles than to the reason, which extends to contraries. Hence, in this respect, it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.

Reply Obj. 3. We are masters of our own actions by reasons of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards, not the end, but *the means to the end*, as the Philosopher says.⁷ Consequently, the desire of the ultimate end is not among those actions of which we are masters.

Second Article

WHETHER THE WILL DESIRES OF NECESSITY WHATEVER IT DESIRES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will desires of necessity all that it desires. For Dionysius says that *evil is outside the scope of the will*.⁸ Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.

Obj. 2. Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the movable thing. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity.

Obj. 3. Further, just as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity, for Augustine says that *animals are moved by things seen*.⁹ Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity.

On the contrary, Augustine says that *it is the will by which we sin and live well*.¹⁰ Thus, the will extends to opposites. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires.

I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that, just as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres

⁷ Aristotle, *Eth.*, III, 2 (1111b 27). ⁸ *De Div. Nom.*, IV, 32 (PG 3, 732). ⁹ *De Genesi ad Litt.*, IX, 14 (PL 34, 402). ¹⁰ *Retract.*, I, 9 (PL 32, 596); *De Civit. Dei*, V, 10 (PL 41, 152).

to first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already. Now there are some intelligible things which have no necessary connection with first principles: e.g., contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with first principles, namely, demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware (by demonstration) of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such a connection.

It is the same with the will. For there are certain particular goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy; and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, namely, those by means of which man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude produced by seeing God the necessity of such a connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Reply Obj. 1. The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.

Reply Obj. 2. The mover of necessity causes movement in the movable thing only when the power of the mover exceeds the movable thing in such a way that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will is for the universal and perfect good, it is not subjected to any particular good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.

Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does; but it apprehends simply some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together. Therefore the intellectual appetite—that is, the will

—may be moved by several things, but not of necessity by one thing.

Fourth Article

WHETHER THE WILL MOVES THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and *the agent is nobler than the patient*, as Augustine says,¹¹ and the Philosopher.¹² But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite is a moved mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will.

Obj. 3. Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

On the contrary, Damascene says: *It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we will.*¹³ But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn an art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect.

I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end, as when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the understood good is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says.¹⁴ The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which is related to the universal end moves the

¹¹ *De Genesi ad Litt.*, XII, 16 (PL 34, 467). ¹² *De An.*, III, 5 (430a 18). ¹³ *De Fide Orth.*, II, 26 (PG 94, 960). ¹⁴ Eadmer, *De Similit.* II (PL 159, 605).

powers which refer to particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in political things. For the heavens, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. So, too, a king, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is the good and the end in general, whereas each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as an agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our choice.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a reality and a particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object—that is to say, as appetitive of universal good—and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore, the intellect and will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above, the intellect is absolutely higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect in relation to the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, its act, and its object. Therefore the intellect understands the will, its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will in relation to the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a reality and a special power, then the intellect itself, its act, and its object, which is the true, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the

same way, the good is contained under the true, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and the true under the good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect—namely, God; as Aristotle also says, explaining in this way that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.¹⁵

¹⁵ *Eth. Eudem.*, VII, 14 (1248a 26).

Question LXXXIII

FREE CHOICE

(In Four Articles)

WE NOW inquire concerning free choice. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man has free choice? (2) What is free choice—a power, an act, or a habit? (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive? (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?

First Article

WHETHER MAN HAS FREE CHOICE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man has not free choice. For whoever has free choice does what he wills. But man does not what he wills, for it is written (*Rom. vii. 19*): *For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do.* Therefore man has not free choice.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever has free choice has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power, for it is written (*Rom. ix. 16*): *It is not of him that willeth—namely, to will—nor of him that runneth—namely, to run.* Therefore man has not free choice.

Obj. 3. Further, he is free who is his own master, as the Philosopher says.¹ Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (*Prov. xxi. 1*): *The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it;* and (*Phil. ii. 13*): *It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.* Therefore man has not free choice.

Obj. 4. Further, whoever has free choice is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions, for it is written (*Jer. x. 23*): *The way of a man is not his, neither is it in a man to walk.* Therefore man has not free choice.

Obj. 5. Further, the Philosopher says: *According as each one is, such does the end seem to him.*² But it is not in our power to be such as we are, for this comes to us from nature.

¹ Aristotle, *Metaph.*, I, 2 (982b 26).

² *Eth.*, III, 5 (1114a 32).

Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.

On the contrary, It is written (*Ecclus. xv. 14*): *God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel;* and the Gloss adds: *That is, in the liberty of choice.*³

I answer that, Man has free choice, or otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment, as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment; because it judges, not from deliberation, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment in brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectical syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And in that man is rational, it is necessary that he have free choice.

Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above, the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids.⁴ This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes—namely, *not to desire against reason*, as Augustine says.⁵

Reply Obj. 2. Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free choice, but because free choice is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God.

Reply Obj. 3. Free choice is the cause of its own move-

³ *Glossa interl.* (III, 401v); cf. *Glossa ordin.* (III, 401E). ⁴ Q. 81, a. 3, ad 2. ⁵ *Glossa interl.*, super *Rom.*, VII, 19 (VI, 17r).—Cf. St. Augustine, *Serm. ad Popul.*, serm. CLIV, 3 (PL 38, 834).

ment, because by his free choice man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their actions from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary; but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them, for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

Reply Obj. 4. *Man's way* is said *not to be his* in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.

Reply Obj. 5. Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. This desire is, indeed, a natural desire, and is not subject to free choice, as is clear from what we have said above.⁶ But on the part of the body and its powers, man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said.⁷ Therefore this is in no way prejudicial to free choice.

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free choice.

⁶ Q. 82, a. 1 and 2. ⁷ Q. 81, a. 3.

Second Article

WHETHER FREE CHOICE IS A POWER?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that free choice is not a power. For free choice is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free choice is not a power.

Obj. 2. Further, free choice is defined as *the faculty of the will and reason*.⁸ But faculty denominates the facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free choice is a habit. Moreover Bernard says that free choice is *the soul's habit of disposing of itself*.⁹ Therefore it is not a power.

Obj. 3. Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free choice is forfeited through sin, for Augustine says that *man, by abusing free choice, loses both it and himself*.¹⁰ Therefore free choice is not a power.

On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free choice is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore free choice is a power.

I answer that, Although *free choice*, in its strict sense, denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free choice that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by science and by the intellectual power. Therefore free choice must be either a power,¹¹ or a habit,¹² or a power with a habit.¹³ That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have free choice. But there is no natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free choice, for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits, for instance, to assent to first principles. Now those things to which we are naturally inclined are not sub-

⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, II, xxiv, 3 (I, 421). ⁹ St. Bernard, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, I (PL 182, 1002). ¹⁰ *Enchir.*, XXX (PL 40, 246). ¹¹ St. Albert, *Summa de Creatur.*, II, q. 70, a. 2 (XXXV, 575).

¹² St. Bonaventure, *In II Cent.*, d. xxv, pt. 1, a. 1, q. 4 (II, 601). ¹³ Alex. of Hales, *Summa Theol.*, II, I, no. 390 (II, 486).

ject to free choice, as we have said in the case of the desire of happiness.¹⁴ Therefore it is against the very notion of free choice that it should be a natural habit; and that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions.¹⁵ For by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed; and by science we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary habit ill-disposed. But free choice is indifferent to choosing well or ill, and therefore it is impossible that it be a habit. Therefore it is a power.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free choice denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.

Reply Obj. 2. Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free choice. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying any aptitude by which a man is somehow disposed to an act.¹⁶ This may be both by a power and by a habit, for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill.

Reply Obj. 3. Man is said to have lost free choice by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work.¹⁷

Third Article

WHETHER FREE CHOICE IS AN APPETITIVE POWER?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that free choice is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene says that free

¹⁴ Q. 82, a. 1 and 2. ¹⁵ Aristotle, *Eth.*, II, 5 (1105b 25). ¹⁶ De Grat. et Lib. Arb., I (PL 182, 1002). ¹⁷ S.T., I-II, q. 85; q. 109.

choice straightway accompanies the rational power.¹⁸ But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free choice is a cognitive power.

Obj. 2. Further, free choice is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free choice is a cognitive power.

Obj. 3. Further, the principal function of free choice is election. But election seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another; which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free choice is a cognitive power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says that election is the desire of those things which are in our power.¹⁹ But desire is an act of the appetitive power. Therefore election is also. But free choice is that by which we elect. Therefore free choice is an appetitive power.

I answer that, The proper act of free choice is election, for we say that we have a free choice because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to elect. Therefore we must consider the nature of free choice by considering the nature of election. Now two things concur in election: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another; on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle leaves it in doubt whether election belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that election is either an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite.²⁰ But he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes election as a desire proceeding from counsel.²¹ And the reason of this is because the proper object of election is the means to the end. Now the means, as such, has the nature of that good which is called useful; and since the good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that election is principally an act of an appetitive power. And thus free choice is an appetitive power.

Reply Obj. 1. The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free choice straightway accompanies the rational power.

¹⁸ De Fide Orth., II, 27 (PG 94, 949). ¹⁹ *Eth.*, III, 3 (1113a 11). ²⁰ *Op. cit.*, VI, 2 (1139b 4). ²¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 3 (1113a 11).

Reply Obj. 2. Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptance of the appetite. Hence the Philosopher says that, *having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel.*²² And in this sense election itself is a judgment from which free choice takes its name.

Reply Obj. 3. This comparison which is implied in the term election belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet inasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison, by choosing one in preference to another.

Fourth Article

WHETHER FREE CHOICE IS A POWER DISTINCT FROM THE WILL?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that free choice is a power distinct from the will.²³ For Damascene says that $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is one thing and $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ another.²⁴ But $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is will, while $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ seems to be free choice, because $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, according to him, is the will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free choice is a power distinct from the will.

Obj. 2. Further, powers are known by their acts. But election, which is the act of free choice, is distinct from the will, because *the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end.*²⁵ Therefore free choice is a power distinct from the will.

Obj. 3. Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But on the part of the intellect there are two powers—agent and possible. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can be only free choice. Therefore free choice is a power distinct from the will.

²² *Ibid.* ²³ Cf. St. Albert, *Summa de Creatur.*, II, q. 70, a. 2 (XXXV, 577). ²⁴ *De Fide Orth.*, XXII (PG 94, 944). ²⁵ Aristotle, *Eth.*, III, 2 (1111b 26).

On the contrary, Damascene says free choice is nothing else than the will.²⁶

I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above.²⁷ Now, as on the part of intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will and free choice, which is nothing else but the power of election. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of *understanding* implies the simple acceptance of something, and hence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to *reason*, properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another, and so, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner, on the part of the appetite, to *will* implies the simple appetite for something, and so the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to *elect* is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else, and so, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired for the end, in the same way as, in knowledge, principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent because of the principles. Therefore it is evident that as *intellect* is to *reason*, so *will* is to the *elective power*, which is free choice. But it has been shown above that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason,²⁸ even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Hence it belongs also to the same power to will and to elect. And on this account will and the free choice are not two powers, but one.

Reply Obj. 1. $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is distinct from $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ because of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.

Reply Obj. 2. Election and will—that is, the act of willing—are different acts, yet they belong to the same power, as do *to understand* and *to reason*, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3. The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an *agent* and a *possible* will.

²⁶ *De Fide Orth.*, XIV (PG 94, 1037). ²⁷ Q. 64, a. 2; q. 80, a. 1. ²⁸ Q. 79, a. 8.

knowledge tends to a definite end. This can be none other than the highest thing knowable, which is God. Therefore the knowledge of God is man's last end.

Now the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is called *happiness* or *beatitude*, for it is this that every intellectual substance desires as its last end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore the last beatitude or happiness of any intellectual substance is to know God.

Hence it is said (*Matt.* v. 8): *Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God*; and (*Jo.* xvii. 3): *This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God*. Aristotle himself agrees with this judgment when he says that man's ultimate happiness is *speculative*, and this with regard to the highest object of speculation.¹²

¹² *Eth.*, X, 7 (1177a 18).

CHAPTER XXVI

DOES HAPPINESS CONSIST IN AN ACT OF THE WILL?

SINCE the intellectual substance attains to God by its operation, not only by an act of understanding but also by an act of the will, through desiring and loving Him, and through delighting in Him, someone might think that man's last end and ultimate happiness consists, not in knowing God, but in loving Him, or in some other act of the will towards Him; [1] especially since the object of the will is the good, which has the nature of an end, whereas the true, which is the object of the intellect, has not the nature of an end except in so far as it also is a good. Therefore, seemingly, man does not attain to his last end by an act of his intellect, but rather by an act of his will.

[2] Further. The ultimate perfection of operation is delight, *which perfects operation as beauty perfects youth*, as the Philosopher says.¹ Hence, if the last end be a perfect operation, it would seem that it must consist in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

[3] Again. Delight apparently is desired for its own sake, so that it is never desired for the sake of something else; for it is silly to ask of anyone why he seeks to be delighted. Now this is a condition of the ultimate end, namely, that it be

¹ *Eth.*, X, 4 (1174b 31).

sought for its own sake. Therefore, seemingly, the last end consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

[4] Moreover. All agree in their desire of the last end, for it is a natural desire. But more people seek delight than knowledge. Therefore delight would seem to be the last end rather than knowledge.

[5] Furthermore. The will is seemingly a higher power than the intellect, for the will moves the intellect to its act; since when a person wills, his intellect considers by an act what he holds by a habit. Therefore, seemingly, the action of the will is more noble than the action of the intellect. Therefore, it would seem that the last end, which is beatitude, consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

But this can be clearly shown to be impossible.

For since happiness is the proper good of the intellectual nature, it must needs become the intellectual nature according to that which is proper thereto. Now appetite is not proper to the intellectual nature, but is in all things, although it is found diversely in diverse things. This diversity, however, arises from the fact that things are diversely related to knowledge. For things wholly devoid of knowledge have only a natural appetite; those that have a sensitive knowledge have also a sensitive appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible appetites are comprised; and those which have intellectual knowledge have also an appetite proportionate to that knowledge, namely, the will. The will, therefore, in so far as it is an appetite, is not proper to the intellectual nature, but only in so far as it is dependent on the intellect. On the other hand, the intellect is in itself proper to the intellectual nature. Therefore, beatitude or happiness consists principally and essentially in an act of the intellect, rather than in an act of the will.

Again. In all powers that are moved by their objects, the object is naturally prior to the acts of those powers, even as the mover is naturally prior to the movable being moved. Now the will is such a power, for the appetible object moves the appetite. Therefore the will's object is naturally prior to its act, and consequently its first object precedes its every act. Therefore an act of the will cannot be the first thing willed. But this is the last end, which is beatitude. Therefore beatitude or happiness cannot be the very act of the will.

Besides. In all those powers which are able to reflect on their acts, their act must first bear on some other object, and afterwards the power is brought to bear on its own act. For if the intellect understands that it understands, we must suppose first that it understands some particular thing, and that afterwards it understands that it understands; for this very act of understanding, which the intellect understands, must have an object. Hence either we must go on forever, or if we come to some first thing understood, this will not be an act of understanding, but some intelligible thing. In the same way, the first thing willed cannot be the very act of willing, but must be some other good. Now the first thing willed by an intellectual nature is beatitude or happiness; because it is for its sake that we will whatever we will. Therefore happiness cannot consist in an act of the will.

Further. The truth of a thing's nature is derived from those things which constitute its substance; for a true man differs from a man in a picture by the things which constitute man's substance. Now false happiness does not differ from true in an act of the will; because, whatever be proposed to the will as the supreme good, whether truly or falsely, it makes no difference to the will in its desiring, loving, or enjoying that good: the difference is on the part of the intellect, as to whether the good proposed as supreme be truly so or not. Therefore beatitude or happiness consists essentially in an act of the intellect rather than of the will.

Again. If an act of the will were happiness itself, this act would be an act either of desire, or love, or delight. But desire cannot possibly be the last end. For desire implies that the will is tending to what it has not yet; and this is contrary to the very notion of the last end.—Nor can love be the last end. For a good is loved not only while it is in our possession, but even when it is not, because it is through love that we seek by desire what we have not; and if the love of a thing we possess is more perfect, this arises from the fact that we possess the good we love. It is one thing, therefore, to possess the good which is our end, and another to love it; for love was imperfect before we possessed the end, and perfect after we obtained possession.—Nor again is delight the last end. For it is possession of the good that causes delight, whether we are conscious of possessing it actually, or call to mind our previous possession, or hope to possess it

in the future. Therefore delight is not the last end.—Therefore no act of the will can be happiness itself essentially.

Furthermore. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable for its own sake. But this is not true. For the desirability of a delight depends on what gives rise to the delight, since that which arises from good and desirable operations is itself good and desirable, but that which arises from evil operations is itself evil and to be avoided. Therefore its goodness and desirability are from something else, and consequently it is not itself the last end or happiness.

Moreover. The right order of things agrees with the order of nature, for in the natural order things are ordered to their end without any error. Now, in the natural order delight is for the sake of operation, and not conversely. For it is to be observed that nature has joined delight with those animal operations which are clearly ordered to necessary ends: for instance, to the use of food that is ordered to the preservation of the individual, and to sexual matters, that are appointed for the preservation of the species; since were there no pleasure, animals would abstain from the use of these necessary things. Therefore delight cannot be the last end.

Again. Delight, seemingly, is nothing else than the quiescence of the will in some becoming good, just as desire is the inclining of the will towards the attaining of some good. Now just as by his will a man is inclined towards an end, and rests in it, so too natural bodies have a natural inclination to their respective ends, and are at rest when they have once attained their end. Now it is absurd to say that the end of the movement of a heavy body is not to be in its proper place, but that it is the quiescence of the inclination towards that place. For if it were nature's chief intent that this inclination should be quiescent, it would not give such an inclination; but it gives the inclination so that the body may tend towards its proper place, and when it has arrived there, as though it were its end, quiescence of the inclination follows. Hence this quiescence is not the end, but accompanies the end. Neither therefore is delight the ultimate end, but accompanies it. Much less therefore is happiness any act of the will.

Besides. If a thing have something extrinsic for its end, the operation whereby it first obtains that thing will be called its last end. Thus, for those whose end is money possession is said to be their end, but not love or desire. Now the last

end of the intellectual substance is God. Hence that operation of man whereby he first obtains God is essentially his happiness or beatitude. And this is understanding, since we cannot will what we do not understand. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is essentially to know God by the intellect; it is not an act of the will.

From what has been said we can now solve the arguments that were objected in the contrary sense. For it does not necessarily follow that happiness is essentially the very act of the will, from the fact that it is the object of the will, through being the highest good, as the *first argument* reasoned. On the contrary, the fact that it is the first object of the will shows that it is not an act of the will, as appears from what we have said.

Nor does it follow that whatever perfects a thing in any way whatever must be the end of that thing, as the *second objection* argued. For a thing perfects another in two ways: first, it perfects a thing that has its species; secondly, it perfects a thing that it may have its species. Thus the perfection of a house, considered as already having its species, is that to which the species "house" is directed, namely to be a dwelling; for one would not build a house but for that purpose, and consequently we must include this in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be perfect. On the other hand, the perfection that conduces to the species of a house is both that which is directed to the completion of the species, for instance, its substantial principles; and also that which conduces to the preservation of the species, for instance, the buttresses which are made to support the building; as well as those things which make the house more fit for use, for instance, the beauty of the house. Accordingly, that which is the perfection of a thing, considered as already having its species, is its end; as the end of a house is to be a dwelling. Likewise, the operation proper to a thing, its use, as it were, is its end. On the other hand, whatever perfects a thing by conducing to its species is not the end of that thing; in fact, the thing itself is its end, for matter and form are for the sake of the species. For although the form is the end of generation, it is not the end of the thing already generated and having its species, but is required in order that the species be complete. Again, whatever preserves the thing in its species, such as health and the nutritive power, al-

though it perfects the animal, is not the animal's end, but vice versa. And again, whatever adapts a thing for the perfection of its proper specific operations, and for the easier attainment of its proper end, is not the end of that thing, but vice versa; for instance, a man's comeliness and bodily strength, and the like, of which the Philosopher says that they *conduce to happiness instrumentally*.²—Now delight is a perfection of operation, not as though operation were directed thereto in respect of its species, for thus it is directed to other ends (thus, eating, in respect of its species, is directed to the preservation of the individual); but it is like a perfection that is conducive to a thing's species, since for the sake of the delight we perform more attentively and becomingly an operation we delight in. Hence the Philosopher says that *delight perfects operation as beauty perfects youth*,³ for beauty is for the sake of the one who has youth and not vice versa.

Nor is the fact that men seek delight not for the sake of something else but for its own sake a sufficient indication that delight is the last end, as the *third objection* argued. Because delight, though it is not the last end, nevertheless accompanies the last end, since delight arises from the attainment of the end.

Nor do more people seek the pleasure that comes from knowledge than knowledge itself. But more there are who seek sensible delights than intellectual knowledge and the delight consequent thereto; because those things that are outside us are better known to the majority, in that human knowledge takes its beginning from sensible objects.

The suggestion put forward by the *fifth argument*, that the will is a higher power than the intellect, as being the latter's motive power, is clearly untrue. Because the intellect moves the will first and *per se*, for the will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good; whereas the will moves the intellect accidentally as it were, in so far, namely, as the act of understanding is itself apprehended as a good, and on that account is desired by the will, with the result that the intellect understands actually. Even in this, the intellect precedes the will, for the will would never desire understanding, did not the intellect first apprehend its

² *Eth.*, I, 8 (1099b 2); 9 (1099b 28). ³ *Op. cit.*, X, 4 (1174b 31).

understanding as a good.—And again, the will moves the intellect to actual operation in the same way as an agent is said to move; whereas the intellect moves the will in the same way as the end moves, for the good understood is the end of the will. Now the agent in moving presupposes the end, for the agent does not move except for the sake of the end. It is therefore clear that the intellect is higher than the will absolutely, while the will is higher than the intellect accidentally and in a restricted sense.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THAT MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN CONTEMPLATING GOD

ACCORDINGLY, if man's ultimate happiness does not consist in external things, which are called goods of fortune; nor in goods of the body; nor in goods of the soul, as regards the sensitive part; nor as regards the intellectual part, in terms of the life of moral virtue; nor in terms of the intellectual virtues which are concerned with action, namely, art and prudence:—it remains for us to conclude that man's ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of truth.

For this operation alone is proper to man, and it is in it that none of the other animals communicates.

Again. This is not directed to anything further as to its end, since the contemplation of the truth is sought for its own sake.

Again. By this operation man is united to beings above him, by becoming like them; because of all human actions this alone is both in God and in the separate substances. Also, by this operation man comes into contact with those higher beings, through knowing them in any way whatever.

Besides, man is more self-sufficing for this operation, seeing that he stands in little need of the help of external things in order to perform it.

Further. All other human operations seem to be ordered to this as to their end. For perfect contemplation requires that the body should be disencumbered, and to this effect are directed all the products of art that are necessary for life. Moreover, it requires freedom from the disturbance caused

by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and of prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which the whole governance of the civil life is directed. So that, if we consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations appear to serve those who contemplate the truth.

Now, it is not possible that man's ultimate happiness consist in contemplation based on the understanding of first principles; for this is most imperfect, as being most universal, containing potentially the knowledge of things. Moreover, it is the beginning and not the end of human inquiry, and comes to us from nature, and not through the pursuit of the truth. Nor does it consist in contemplation based on the sciences that have the lowest things for their object, since happiness must consist in an operation of the intellect in relation to the most noble intelligible objects. It follows then that man's ultimate happiness consists in wisdom, based on the consideration of divine things.

It is therefore evident also by way of induction that man's ultimate happiness consists solely in the contemplation of God, which conclusion was proved above by arguments.¹

¹ Ch. 25.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD WHICH IS POSSESSED GENERALLY
BY THE MAJORITY

IT REMAINS for us to inquire in what kind of knowledge of God the ultimate happiness of an intellectual substance consists. For there is a certain general and confused knowledge of God, which is in almost all men, whether from the fact that, as some think, the existence of God, like other principles of demonstration, is self-evident, as we have stated in the First Book,¹ or, as seems nearer to the truth, because by his natural reason man is able at once to arrive at some knowledge of God. For seeing that natural things run their course according to a fixed order, and since there cannot be order without a cause of order, men, for the most part, perceive that there is one who orders the things that we see.

¹ C. G., I, 10.

HUMAN ACTS

THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART

Question VI

ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY

(In Eight Articles)

SINCE therefore happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must as a consequence consider human acts in order to know by what acts we may obtain happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with what is singular, consequently, all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in the particular. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider, first, what is universal; and, secondly, what pertains to the particular.¹

In treating of what is universal in human acts, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their principles.² Now of human acts some are proper to man, while others are common to man and animals. And since happiness is man's proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called passions of the soul.³ The first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts?⁴

¹ S. T., II-II.

² Q. 49.

³ Q. 22.

⁴ Q. 18.

which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says.²⁵ Therefore the movement of the will can be compelled.

On the contrary, Augustine says that what is done voluntarily is not done of necessity.²⁶ Now whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity, and consequently what is done by the will cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act.

I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, to will; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power: e.g., to walk and to speak, which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the power of locomotion.

As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will. The reason for this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from an interior knowing principle, just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently, it is contrary to the nature of the will's own act that it should be subject to compulsion or violence; just as it is also contrary to the nature of the natural inclination or the movement of a stone to be moved upwards. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is impossible. In like manner, a man may be dragged by force, but it is contrary to the very notion of violence that he be thus dragged of his own will.

Reply Obj. 1. God, Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to *Prov. xxi. 1: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it.* But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not always a violent movement when a passive subject is moved by its active principle, but only then when this is done against the interior inclination of the

²⁵ *De Fide Orth.*, IV, 20 (PG 94, 1196). ²⁶ *De Civit. Dei*, V, 10 (PL 41, 152).

passive subject. Otherwise, every alteration and generation of simple bodies would be unnatural and violent; whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In like manner, when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.

Reply Obj. 3. That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, is nevertheless apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit.

Fifth Article

WHETHER VIOLENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in terms of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as was shown above. Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene²⁷ and the Philosopher²⁸ say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.

Obj. 3. Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will, for instance, when a man with a heavy body goes upwards, or when a man contorts his members in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher²⁹ and Damascene³⁰ say that things done under compulsion are involuntary.

I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle, whereas the violent is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things devoid of knowledge

²⁷ *De Fide Orth.*, II, 24 (PG 94, 953). ²⁸ *Eth.*, III, 1 (1111a 20). ²⁹ *Ibid.* (1109b 35). ³⁰ *De Fide Orth.*, II, 24 (PG 94, 953).

concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.

I answer that, Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but, on the contrary, makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be voluntary from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.

Reply Obj. 1. Fear has reference to evil, but concupiscence has reference to good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness.

Reply Obj. 2. He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from concupiscence, *e.g.*, an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; rather his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence is in no way involuntary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.

Reply Obj. 3. If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet, properly speaking, it would not make the act involuntary, because in beings bereft of reason there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the power of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example, *not to act* or *not to will*, and in like manner *not to consider*; for the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on.³⁹

³⁹ Q. 10. a. 3; q. 77, a. 7.

Question VIII

ON THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS

(In Three Articles)

WE MUST now consider the different acts of the will, and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will.¹

Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end. We must therefore consider (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means.² And since it seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end: viz., *volition*, *enjoyment* and *intention*, we must consider (1) volition; (2) enjoyment;³ (3) intention.⁴—Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By what is the will moved?⁵ (3) How is it moved?⁶

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will is of good only? (2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means? (3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means by the same movement?

Second Article

WHETHER VOLITION IS OF THE END ONLY, OR ALSO OF THE MEANS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says that *volition is of the end, while choice is of the means.*⁷

Obj. 2. Further, *For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul.*⁸ Now the end and the means are in different genera of good, because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus *quality*, or *action*, or *passion*; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to an end, is in the genus

¹Q. 17. ²Q. 13. ³Q. 11. ⁴Q. 12. ⁵Q. 9. ⁶Q. 10.

⁷*Op. cit.*, III, 2 (1111b 26). ⁸*Op. cit.*, VI, 1 (1139a 8).

*relation.*⁹ Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.

Obj. 3. Further, habits are proportioned to powers, since they are their perfections. But in those habits which are called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art. Thus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the art of the helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end, it is not of the means.

On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle ground and arrives at the terminus. But the means are a kind of middle ground through which one arrives at the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means.

I answer that, The term *voluntas* [*will*] sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act [*volition*]. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in which the nature of its object may be found in any way whatever. Thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored. Now the nature of good, which is the object of the power of will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.

If, however, we speak of will in so far as it is properly the name of an act, then, strictly speaking, it is of the end only. For every act denominated from a power designates the simple act of that power. Thus, *to understand* designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end. Therefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Therefore the will is directed to them only in so far as it is directed to the end; so that what it wills in them, is the end. So, too, to understand is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e., first principles; but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. Now in

⁹ *Op. cit.*, I, 6 (1096a 26).

morals the end is what principles are in speculative matters.¹⁰

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking of the will as signifying the simple act of the will, not as signifying the power of the will.¹¹

Reply Obj. 2. There are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are mutually independent. For instance, sound and color are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and the right-eous are not mutually independent, but are as that which is of itself and that which is in relation to another. Now such objects are always referred to the same power. For instance, the power of sight perceives both color and the light by which color is seen.

Reply Obj. 3. Not everything that diversifies habits diversifies the powers, since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the end as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and the means that belong properly to that art.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, VII, 8 (1151a 16). ¹¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 2 (1111b 26).

ON THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL

(In Six Articles)

WE MUST NOW consider what moves the will, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect? (2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite? (3) Whether the will moves itself? (4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle? (5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body? (6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?

First Article

WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on *Ps. cxviii. 20* (*My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications*): *The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all; we know what is good, but deeds delight us not.*¹ But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect; for the movement of the movable results from the motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

Obj. 2. Further, the intellect, in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will as the imagination in representing the appetible object to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, in presenting the appetible object, does not move the sensitive appetite; indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all.² Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.

Obj. 3. Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect, for we exercise the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says that *the appetible is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved.*³

¹ *Enarr. in Psalm., super CXVIII, 20, serm. VIII (PL 37, 1552).*

² Aristotle, *De An., III, 3* (427b 23). ³ *Op. cit., III, 6* (433b 10; b 16).

I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things. For that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is found to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus, the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not; and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects: viz., as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting; while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.

The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above,⁴ the principle of this motion lies in the end. Hence it is that the art, which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding.⁵ Now the good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the ends and the perfections of every other power are included under the object of the will as particular goods; and the art or power, to which the universal end belongs, always moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good—i.e., the order of the whole army—by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.

On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal being and truth, which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.

⁴ Q. 1, a. 2. ⁵ Aristotle, *Phys., II, 2* (194b 5).

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness does not move the sensitive appetite, so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect.⁶

Reply Obj. 3. The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act, since even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; for the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect.

Second Article

WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SENSITIVE APPETITE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite. For *to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive*, as Augustine says.⁷ But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite, just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore, the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

Obj. 2. Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore, it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the universal apprehension of the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, as is proved in *Physics* viii., the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion.⁸ But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

On the contrary, It is written (*Jas. i. 14*): *Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and*

⁶ Aristotle, *De An.*, III, 9 (432b 26); 10 (433a 17). ⁷ *De Genesi* ad I.itt., XII, 16 (PL 34, 467). ⁸ Aristotle, *Phys.*, VIII, 5 (257b 23).

allured. But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will.

I answer that, As we have stated above, that which is apprehended under the nature of what is good and befitting moves the will as an object. Now that a thing appear to be good and fitting happens from two causes, namely, from the condition either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation, and hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Therefore as the Philosopher says: *According as a man is, such does the end seem to him.*⁹

Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Therefore, according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected; and thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. It is in this way that the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing hinders that which is better absolutely and in itself from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly, the will is absolutely more excellent than the sensitive appetite; but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.

Reply Obj. 2. Men's acts and choices are concerned with singulars. Therefore, from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says,¹⁰ the reason, in which resides the will, moves the irascible and concupiscible powers by its command, not, indeed, by a despotic rule, as a slave is moved by his master, but by a royal and political rule, as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both the irascible

⁹ *Eth.*, III, 5 (1114a 32). ¹⁰ *Polit.*, I, 2 (1254b 5).

and concupiscible parts can move counter to the will, and, accordingly, nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.

Third Article

WHETHER THE WILL MOVES ITSELF?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act, whereas what is moved is in potentiality; for *movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, in so far as it is in potentiality*.¹¹ Now the same is not in potentiality and in act in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.

Obj. 2. Further, the movable is moved when the mover is present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be moved, which is clearly false.

Obj. 3. Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as was stated above. If, therefore, the will moves itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.

On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.

I answer that, As was stated above, it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object. Now, as we have stated above, the end is in the order of appetibles what a principle is in the order of intelligibles.¹² But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of a principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act as to its knowledge of conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not in the same respect that the will moves itself and is moved, and so neither is it in act and in potentiality in the same respect. But in so far as it actually

¹¹ Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 1 (201a 10).

¹² Q. 8, a. 1.

other time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, which previously it did not will. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as was stated above, in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel. For when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician; and this he wills. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Therefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the *Eudemian Ethics*.¹⁵

Reply Obj. 1. It is of the nature of the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent; but it is not necessary that this inward principle be a first principle unmoved by another. Therefore, though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless, its first principle is from the outside. Thus, too, the first principle of natural movement, namely, that which moves nature, is from the outside.

Reply Obj. 2. For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add, *without the concurrence of him that suffers violence*. This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle; for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will; which in the present case is impossible, since then the will would will and not will the same thing.

Reply Obj. 3. The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say, as a proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Therefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.

¹⁵ *Eth. Eudem.*, VII, 14 (1248a 14).

*an image existing in the memory to the gaze of the soul thinking within itself.*³ Therefore intention is an act of the will.

I answer that, Intention, as the very term denotes, signifies, to tend to something. Now both the action of the mover and the movement of the thing moved tend to something. But that the movement of the thing moved tends to anything is due to the action of the mover. Consequently, intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end; and so we say that an architect, or anyone who is in authority, moves others by his command to that which he intends. Now it is the will that moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as was shown above.⁴ Therefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will.

Reply Obj. 1. The eye designates intention figuratively, not because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the latter moves. So, too, we see ahead with the eye whither we should tend with our bodies.

Reply Obj. 2. Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends. Therefore works are called darkness because a man knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds in the same reference.

Reply Obj. 3. The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of reason. Consequently, this term *intention* indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act by which the reason orders something to the end.

Reply Obj. 4. Intention is an act of the will in relation to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely, and thus we have *volition*, by which we will absolutely to have health and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end as its place of rest, and thus *enjoyment* regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus *intention* regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we will to have it, but that we will to reach it by means of something else.

³ *De Trin.*, XI, 4; 8; 9 (PL 42, 990; 994; 996). ⁴ Q. 9, a. 1.

Question XIII

ON CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELATION TO THE MEANS TO THE END

(In Six Articles)

WE MUST now consider the acts of the will which are related to the means to the end. There are three of them: *to choose*, *to consent* and *to use*. Now choice is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice; secondly, counsel;¹ thirdly, consent;² fourthly, use.³

Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry: (1) Of what power is it the act, whether of the will or of the reason? (2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals? (3) Whether choice is only of the means to the end, or sometimes also of the end? (4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves? (5) Whether choice is only of possible things? (6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?

First Article

WHETHER CHOICE IS AN ACT OF THE WILL OR OF THE REASON?

Objection 1. It would seem that choice is an act, not of the will, but of the reason. For choice expresses a certain comparison, whereby one thing is preferred to another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act of reason.

Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to the same power to form a syllogism and to draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the reason that forms syllogisms. Since, therefore, choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters, as is stated in *Ethics* vii.,⁴ it seems that it is an act of reason.

Obj. 3. Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the cognitive power. Now there is an *ignorance attending choice*, as is stated in *Ethics* iii.⁵ Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to the will but to the reason.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says that choice is the

¹ Q. 14. ² Q. 15. ³ Q. 16. ⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Eth.* III, 3 (1113a 4; a 11). ⁵ *Op. cit.*, III, 1 (1110b 31).

*desire of things which are in our power.*⁶ But desire is an act of will. Therefore choice is too.

I answer that, The term *choice* expresses something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something belonging to the will; for the Philosopher says that choice is either *intellect influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect.*⁷ Now whenever two things concur to make one, one of them is as a form in relation to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa says that choice is *neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body, and that it is neither only the body, nor only the soul, but both, so is it with choice.*⁸

Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit receives its form or species from a higher power or habit, according as the inferior is ordered by the superior. For if a man were to perform an act of fortitude for the love of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally, an act of charity. Now it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the will and directs its act, namely, in so far as the will tends to its object according to the order of reason; for the apprehensive power presents to the appetite its object. Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such matters, the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Therefore, choice is substantially, not an act of the reason, but of the will; for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. Consequently, it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.

Reply Obj. 1. Choice implies a previous comparison, but not that it consists in the comparison itself.

Reply Obj. 2. It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called *a decision or judgment*, to be followed by *choice*. And for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to that which results from it.

Reply Obj. 3. In speaking of *ignorance attending choice*,

⁶ *Op. cit.*, III, 3 (1113a 9). ⁷ *Op. cit.*, VI, 2 (1139b 4). ⁸ *Cl. Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.*, XXXIII (PG 40, 733).

we do not mean that choice itself is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be chosen.

Third Article

WHETHER CHOICE IS ONLY OF THE MEANS TO THE END OR SOMETIMES ALSO OF THE END?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that choice is not only of the means to the end. For the Philosopher says that *virtue makes us choose rightly; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power, to direct rightly those things which are to be done for its sake.*⁹ But that for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore choice is of the end.

Obj. 2. Further, choice signifies preference of one thing to another. But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says that *volition is of the end, but choice of the means.*¹⁰

I answer that, As we have already stated, choice follows the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher says.¹¹ Therefore the end, as such, is not a matter of choice.

But just as in speculative matters nothing hinders the principle of one demonstration or of one science from being the conclusion of another demonstration or science (although the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science), so, too, that which is the end in one operation may be ordained to something as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus in the work of a physician health is the end, and so it is not a matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. But the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, and, consequently, with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the Apostle

⁹ *Eth.*, VI, 12 (1144a 20). ¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, III, 2 (1111b 26). ¹¹ *Phys.*, II, 9 (200a 20).

says (2 Cor. xii. 10): *For when I am weak, then am I powerful*. But the last end is in no way a matter of choice.

Reply Obj. 1. The proper ends of the virtues are ordained to happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.

Reply Obj. 2. As was stated above, there is but one last end.¹² Accordingly, wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.

Fourth Article

WHETHER CHOICE IS OF THOSE THINGS ONLY THAT ARE
DONE BY US?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that choice is not only in respect of human acts. For choice is of the means. Now, not only acts, but also the organs, are means.¹³ Therefore choice is not concerned only with human acts.

Obj. 2. Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice has a place even in contemplation, in so far, namely, as one opinion is preferred to another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.

Obj. 3. Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says that *no man chooses save what he thinks he can do himself*.¹⁴

I answer that, Just as intention regards the end, so choice regards the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And when the end is a thing, some human action must intervene, and this either in so far as man produces the thing which is the end, as the physician produces health (and so the production of health is said to be the end of the physician), or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or enjoys the thing which is the end: *e.g.*, for the miser, money or the possession of money is the end. The same is to be said of the

¹² Q. 1, a. 5. ¹³ Aristotle, *Phys.*, II, 3 (195a 1). ¹⁴ *Eth.*, III, 2 (1111b 25).

I answer that, As was stated above, our choice is always concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us is possible to us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things.

Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that we may gain the end through it, or that it conduces to an end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end. A sign of this is that when men, in taking counsel together, come to something that is impossible to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the business.

Again, this is evident if we examine the preceding process of the reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the end as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle. Therefore an end cannot be possible unless the means be possible. Now no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently, no one would tend to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible. Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice.

Reply Obj. 1. The will stands between the intellect and the external action; for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something as a universal good; but the term or perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the action by which a man tends to the attainment of a thing, for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently, the perfection of the act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Therefore, perfect willing is only in respect of what is possible and good for him that wills. But imperfect willing is in respect of the impossible; and by some it is called *velleity*, because, namely, one would will [*vellet*] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of the will already fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good, so choice is sometimes made of something

Obj. 2. Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its potentiality is deprived of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as is stated in *Metaph.* ix.⁵ Therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is good. Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.

Obj. 3. Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as Dionysius declares.⁶ But every action has some effect which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action is good.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (*Jo.* iii. 20): *Every one that doth evil, hateth the light*. Therefore some actions of man are evil.

I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things, because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being, for good and being are convertible, as was stated in the First Part.⁷ But God alone has the whole fullness of His Being in a manner which is one and simple, whereas every other thing has its proper fullness of being in a certain multiplicity. Therefore it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fullness of being due to them. Thus the fullness of human being requires a composite of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement; and so if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fullness of his being. Hence, as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness, while so far as something is lacking in the fullness of its being, so far does this fall short of goodness, and is said to be evil. Thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives, and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be either evil or good. But since this same fullness of being is of the very notion of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fullness of being, it is not said to be good absolutely, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being;

⁵ Aristotle, *Metaph.*, VIII, 9 (1051a 4; a 29). ⁶ *De Div. Nom.*, IV, 20; 32 (PG 3, 717; 732). ⁷ *S. T.*, I, q. 5, a. 1 and 3; q. 17, a. 4, ad 2.

or evil from its end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly false.

Obj. 2. Further, the goodness of an action is something in the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not said to be good or evil according to its end.

Obj. 3. Further, a good action may happen to be ordered to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an evil action may happen to be ordered to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action is not good or evil from its end.

On the contrary, Boethius says that *if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is evil.*¹⁶

I answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being. But in some things the being does not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on something else, and hence concerning them we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from the end. But human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, in addition to that goodness which is in them absolutely.

Accordingly, a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that goodness which, as an action, it derives from its genus; since, as much as it has of action and being, so much has it of goodness, as was stated above. Secondly, it has goodness according to its species, which is derived from its befitting object. Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances,—its accidents, as it were. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.

Reply Obj. 1. The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the end is an extrinsic cause, never-

¹⁶ *De Differ. Top.*, II (PL 64, 1189).

intellectual virtue, as is stated in *Ethics* vi.¹⁷ Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue.

On the contrary, It is stated in *Ethics* i. that *there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual, some, moral.*¹⁸

I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts, and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason in some way, but diversely. For some obey reason instantaneously and without any contradiction whatever. Such are the members of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says that *the soul rules the body with a despotic rule*,¹⁹ i.e., as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly, some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for a man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that virtue existed only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said *every virtue is a kind of prudence*, as is stated in *Ethics* vi.²⁰ Hence he maintained that as long as a man was in possession of knowledge, he could not sin, and that every one who sinned did so through ignorance.²¹

Now this is based on a false supposition. For the appetitive part obeys the reason, not instantaneously, but with a certain power of opposition; and so the Philosopher says that *reason commands the appetitive part by a political rule*,²² whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on *Ps.* cxviii. that *sometimes the intellect marks the way, while desire lags, or follows not at all*,²³ so much so, that sometimes the habits or passions of the appetitive part cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, VI, 13 (1144b 21). ¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, I, 13 (1103a 3).
¹⁹ *Polit.*, I, 2 (1254b 4). ²⁰ Aristotle, *Eth.*, VI, 13 (1144b 19). ²¹ Cf. *op. cit.*, VII, 2 (1145b 23).—Cf. also Plato, *Protag.* (pp. 352B; 355A; 357B). ²² *Polit.*, I, 5 (1254b 4).

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