

AN HISTORICO-CRITICAL SURVEY

WILL IN WESTERN  
THOUGHT



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connected with a group of very similar words in the north European languages that have the root "wil" or "vil" with the variants "wol" or "vol." Thus the Anglo-Saxon noun is *willa*, the German *Wille*, the Danish *ville*. These forms resemble the Latin infinitive *velle* but are not derived from it. In Russian, the noun is *volya* (воля); in German the verb form is *wollen*; in English we have corresponding forms such as *volition* and *voluntary*. These resemble the Latin noun *voluntas*, from which are derived many of the south European forms: French *volonté*, Italian *volontà*, Spanish *voluntad*, and so on. Classical Greek has *boulesis* (*βουλησις*) which is pronounced *voulesis* in modern Greek, and verb forms in which the root "boul" is obviously related to the Latin "vol." Etymologists trace these forms back to a Sanskrit root "vri" and further to a basic Aryan root "WAR" (WAL) which, they say, meant "to choose, to like, to will."<sup>1</sup> It is fascinating (though not perhaps philosophically valuable) to investigate the variants in such a family of words. Irish Gaelic, for example, has the form "TOIL" in which the initial "T" becomes silent and the word sounds much like the English, will.<sup>2</sup> Arabic has *irāda* for will, a form which may be related to the Sanskrit root.<sup>3</sup> In short, the preceding is sufficient to indicate that most of the languages of Western philosophy, ancient, medieval and modern, have words that are morphologically related to our word, will.

Dictionary definitions of these "vol-wil-vri" words underline their similarity of basic meaning. This may be illustrated by reference to two commonly used English dictionaries. *Webster's Collegiate* defines will, first, in terms of a set of activities: wish, desire, inclination, pleasure, choice, intention. Later, it mentions "the power of choosing . . . and of acting in accordance with choice."<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, a typical small British dictionary opens its entry on will by saying that

237: "Faculté, pouvoir ou liberté de faire quelque chose. Spécialement: on appelle facultés de l'âme, l'intelligence, l'activité (ou comme l'on disait autrefois, la volonté) et enfin la sensibilité."

9. Probably the most complete general survey was published at the end of the nineteenth century: Archibald Alexander, *Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy* (New York: Scribner, 1898), pp. IX-357.

10. Mortimer Adler's *The Idea of Freedom*, 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1958-1961), is an example of a parallel investigation. One can admire the thoroughness with which Adler has directed this joint study; yet the very size of the work makes it difficult to remember what has been treated in its more than 1600 pages.

11. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 399.

12. For a quick sketch of this school: H. W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), pp. 232-237.

13. The point has been studied by Gérard Verbeke, *L'Evolution de la doctrine du Pneuma* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1945), pp. 13-15.

14. Cf. Ewart Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas* (London-New York: Macmillan, 1954), I, 159-162; see also Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship*, trans. Phelan-Eschmann (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), c. X (80), p. 46.

15. See John W. Chapman, *Rousseau—Totalitarian or Liberal?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).

16. Cf. V. J. Bourke, "The Philosophical Antecedents of German National Socialism," *Thought*, XIV, 53 (1939), 225-242.

17. See the comments of Joseph Tussman in his *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 97-98, 111-112.

18. St. Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, 90, 4, c.

19. Cf. T. E. Davitt, *The Nature of Law* (St. Louis: Herder, 1951); F. Oakley, "Medieval Theories of Law: William of Ockham and the Significance of the Voluntarist Tradition," *Natural Law Forum*, 6 (1961), 65-83.

20. Matt. 6:10; Luke 11:2-4 omits this petition in the usual English Catholic versions (*The Holy Bible*, New York: Douay Bible House, 1941, New Testament, p. 72; *The New Testament*, Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1941, p. 191). However, the Greek text in St. Luke's Gospel, ed. John T. White (London: Longmans, Green, 1909), p. 55, does this give full petition: γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου ὡς ἐν

intellect and appetite, and he never says that understanding becomes appetite; rather, he properly says that speculative understanding becomes practical, for the same intellect and potency which directs in the process of consideration afterwards regulates in the process of acting. Now, will (*voluntas*) is not the practical intellect but is ratiocinative appetite; and so, it does not follow from this that reason simply becomes will by extension, or that intellect becomes an affective power.<sup>24</sup>

Thomas Aquinas is doubtless the outstanding representative in Western thought of the view that man's will is a special power of rational appetite. His theory of will is very detailed and cannot be fully analyzed here.<sup>25</sup> Volition is treated by Aquinas in most of his major works: the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Book II, d. 25 (A.D. 1256); the *Questions on Truth*, q. 22 (A.D. 1256-1259); the *Questions on Evil*, q. 6 (A.D. 1270?); the *Summa of Theology*, Part I, q. 82 (A.D. 1265-1269) and Part I-II qq. 6-17 (A.D. 1270). The view of will is basically the same, throughout, though it appears that Aquinas placed a little more stress on the *activity* of the human will, in his later works, though he never denied that it is a partly passive potency.<sup>26</sup> Our expositions of his theory will not attempt to follow the minute changes in his teaching but will deal with volition as described in the mature writings.

First of all, cognition and appetite are understood by Aquinas to be utterly different psychic activities. This distinction is so basic that he almost supposes that his readers will naturally grant it. Knowing is an activity which terminates inside the knower: the cognitive union of knower and thing known results in the knower "becoming" the thing known, not physically but by an intentional identification. On the other hand, appetition means an act of seeking, of tending toward, a thing that is in some sense desired.<sup>27</sup> The

result of knowing is a perfection of the knowing power itself; the result of appetite is the use of some power other than appetite for the attainment (*adeptio*) of the thing that is desired.<sup>28</sup> In relation to the person, cognition is an *ingoing* activity from the thing known; appetite is an *outgoing* activity toward the thing desired.<sup>29</sup>

Three types of appetite are distinguished by St. Thomas, the third being identical with volition. He explains these three levels in the following text:

Since every inclination is the result of a form, natural appetite results from a form existing in nature [he is thinking of an example such as the tending of iron filings toward a magnet], but a sensory appetite or even an intellectual or rational appetite (which is called will) is the result of an apprehended form. Thus that toward which a natural appetite tends is some good thing existing in reality; and that toward which a psychic or volitional appetite tends is an apprehended good.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, there are what might be called physical, sensory and intellectual levels of appetite. The human will is the psychic power enabling a person to tend toward or away from something apprehended intellectually as good or evil.

Sensory and intellectual appetite are not regarded as functions of the same power, nor have they the same objects. Through sense cognition individual things are known as attractive or repellent. Appetitive responses to these sensitively perceived goods or evils are considered passions of the sensory appetites.<sup>31</sup> Such emotional desires and aversions are not attributed to the will. Intellectual cognition has as its objects the universal characteristics of reality. Goods and evils of this universal type are the objects of intellectual appetite, or will. To wish for peace or health would be an act

of willing; to desire a drink of water, when thirsty, would be an act of sensory appetite. Thomas Aquinas would say that one could also will to drink water—but this volition would have some universal “reason why” it is willed, for the sake of good health, say.

The objects of volition are also divided, according to St. Thomas, into ends and means. Ends of volition are intelligible goods that are desired for their own sake. Means are intelligible goods that are desired for the sake of something else, namely an end. The reason why (*propter quod*) an end is willed is its own intrinsic goodness but the reason why a means is willed is something other than the means. A person might will to undergo a painful surgical operation for the sake of regaining good health: the operation is the means and good health is the end. Upon reflection, many ends are recognized as means to a more remote, or intrinsically good, end. Obviously, this theory of will requires that there be an ultimate end, desired for its own sake alone. In several works (notably the Third Book of the *Summa contra Gentiles* and in the first five questions of the *Summa of Theology*, I-II), Aquinas argues that there is one such ultimate end for all men. It is identified as the Perfect Good, or God.<sup>32</sup>

One meaning of nature, according to Aquinas, designates whatever substance a being is.<sup>33</sup> Thus a dog is one kind of substance with its special functions and tendencies, and a man is a different kind of substance. If a man is a rational substance, then his natural inclination will be directed to any and every sort of rationally apprehended good. Since “will” means rational appetite, the generic object of volition is the good in general. For such an object, man has a “natural” desire: this means that man necessarily wills that which is apprehended as good, with no admixture of evil. This natural volition (*voluntas ut natura*) is not free. Here is how St. Thomas

judged good under given circumstances, they may be willed also. Such willing is called deliberate (*voluntas deliberata*) and it is the kind of volition that is free. "Many particular goods are included under the good in general; to these no volition is determined."<sup>36</sup>

Further analysis suggests to Thomas Aquinas the distinction between the exercise of the act of willing and the specification of the will-act (*exercitium actus . . . specificationem actus*).<sup>37</sup> The person may decide to will or not to will (this is a question of exercising the will or not doing so); or having decided to perform a will-act, he may further consider what kind of object he may will. From the point of view of exercising the will, Aquinas thinks that no man is necessitated by any object: it is always possible to refrain from thinking of something and consequently from actually willing. In regard to the specification of the will-act, some purely good objects do determine the will-act (as we have seen above) and other particular goods which are imperfectly good can be either willed or rejected. Freedom of choice lies in the order of specification. St. Thomas summarizes this teaching, as follows:

The ultimate end moves the will necessarily, because it is a perfect good. The same is true of those goods that are directed to this end as means without which the end could not be attained, goods such as to exist and to live, and the like. Other objects, however, without which the end could be attained, are not necessarily willed by the person who wills the end; just as conclusions that are not necessary for the truth of the principles do not have to be accepted by the person who accepts the principles.<sup>38</sup>

From the foregoing, it should be obvious why St. Thomas almost never speaks of free will (*libera voluntas*) and practi-

aroused by an object of appetite.<sup>43</sup> It is further described as an approval or pleasure associated with an object of appetite. On the sensory level, love is attributed to the concupiscible appetite and is said to precede desire. Actually, St. Thomas uses three different terms for love. In the generic sense, love is called *amor* and seems to designate any type of appetitive approval. As a movement of will, love is called *dilectio*. Where the object of love is esteemed for its great value (*inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur*), the word used is *caritas* (endearment).<sup>44</sup> Frequently *caritas* (translated as charity) signifies the love of God for His own sake, or of creatures for God's sake.<sup>45</sup>

Another will-act named by Aquinas is desire (*desiderium*). It is described as an appetite for something that is not yet attained.<sup>46</sup> On the rational level, desire is an inclination of the will toward some good that is to be sought.<sup>47</sup> Such volitional desire is said to flow from love; hence desire may be but another name for intention and love another name for simple willing (*velle*). The terminology fluctuates and is not clear in relation to the will-acts in the foregoing analysis.

What is clear is the fact that Thomas Aquinas has made a very profound study of volition. It is one of the most fully developed analyses that can be found in the history of Western thought. Later Scholasticism lost many of the precisions that are found in St. Thomas' writings and altered his view of will as intellectual appetite. Many so-called "Thomistic" textbooks, in the present century, offer explanations of will that are but travesties of the original. The theory of liberty of indifference does not appear in St. Thomas' works. It is possible that his explanation of the exercise of the will as something wholly undetermined by the object could be developed into an indifference theory. However, the general trend of Aquinas' explanation of volition is hard to ac-

an agent is not free when he is prevented from acting, or primarily moved to act, by virtue of some forces or efficient causes outside the agent; and (2) an agent is not free when he acts in the one way that he is necessitated to act, by his own nature.

We do not find Greek philosophers of the pre-Christian period equating volition with the exercise of freedom. Plato and Aristotle do discuss human freedom but this usually occurs in the context of political or social liberty. At one point in the *Republic*, Plato argues that freedom is a factor in happiness; then he hastens to add that such freedom does not mean the license to do whatever one likes.<sup>3</sup> Platonic freedom is the ability to act in accord with reason and the common good. Likewise, Aristotle never suggests that the genus of willing is freedom; although some translations may suggest that he does.<sup>4</sup> We have already seen that neither Plato nor Aristotle has a special power of will; *boulesis*, as a sort of rational desire, is not associated, in classical Greek philosophy, with any definite theory of freedom.

The situation is somewhat different, when we come to Plotinus. He wrote and taught in the third century of the Christian era. It is possible that his teacher, Ammonius Saccas, knew something of Jewish and Christian teachings; certainly, Plotinus' pupil Porphyry did.<sup>5</sup> As we shall see shortly, the concept of free will is strong in the Bible and in Patristic thought. Plotinus may have been influenced by this tradition. In the opening sections of the Sixth *Ennead* there is a remarkable meditation on the relation of liberty of the person (*to eleutheron*) and willing (*boulesis*).<sup>6</sup> Starting from the Aristotelian notion of the *hekousion* (that which is under our control), Plotinus moves to the idea of "that which depends on us"; then he decides that "what depends on us" must be subservient to our will only.<sup>7</sup> Next he discusses what it means

the free will is free, or it is not a will."<sup>28</sup> Even the human intellect is unable to operate unless it be applied to its work by the free will. Speculative understanding of truth depends on the volitional freedom of man.<sup>29</sup> All human actions are free because they stem from the will.

Olivi's position is an extreme type of psychological voluntarism which reduces the other powers of man to the status of secondary instruments. This view is related to a trend in late thirteenth-century Scholastic thinking which owes its origins, at least in part, to Bishop Etienne Tempier's condemnations (Paris, 1270 and 1277) of passive theories of will.<sup>30</sup> In brief, the Bishop forbade anyone to teach in his diocese that the human will is in any way subject to causal influence from the object of appetite, or from man's knowledge.<sup>31</sup> After this ecclesiastical act, many theologians insisted that the human will is a completely active and self-determining power, and that volitional acts are wholly caused by the will itself.<sup>32</sup> In other words, volition becomes more and more identified with the exercise of personal freedom.

It is in fourteenth-century Scholasticism that we find the most definite identification, by medieval thinkers, of the human will with freedom. Duns Scotus represents a transitional stage in the movement from an appetite theory of human volition to a free, efficient cause theory. Scotus explains that the will is really two "appetites," one is natural and the other is free.<sup>33</sup> As natural, the human will (*voluntas ut natura*) is, like any other nature, inclined to its perfective good. This natural appetite is not an *activity* of volition but is simply an inclination (*inclinatio*) toward what is good for man's intellectual nature. In Scotistic language, this natural appetite is not an elicited act.<sup>34</sup> He compares it to the "natural appetite" which Aristotle says matter has for form: not an activity but a proclivity.<sup>35</sup> Scotus admits that this first appetite

in the human will is in no sense free. As free, the human will is a wholly active power of the soul, capable of acting in accord with reason or in opposition to it. It cannot act without some intellectual knowledge of its object but this cognitive presentation of the object of willing is not a cause of volition; knowledge is merely a condition of volitional activity.<sup>36</sup> In this second sense, of an active, operative power eliciting various actions of volition, the human will is essentially free.<sup>37</sup> As Scotus puts it bluntly: "nothing other than the will is the total cause of volition in the will."<sup>38</sup> Thus the free will is, for Scotus, a *perfect* potency capable of determining itself to act or not to act, and to accept or reject any object presented to it by the understanding.<sup>39</sup>

Scotus introduces the notion of "indifference" (*prima indifferentia*) to explain the initial condition of the will as it is free. The first act of understanding is not free but, once some intellectual object is presented to the will, the will is indifferent (i.e. not in any way determined) toward this object. The will may direct the intellect to consider this object or another, and the will may accept it or reject it (*velle vel nolle*).<sup>40</sup> Provided a man has some knowledge to start with, his will is in first act (as contrasted with second act which is the activity of volition). In first act, the will is free: a) to will or not will; b) in regard to conflicting means; and c) in regard to opposed results of its action.<sup>41</sup>

It is even possible that Scotus is the source, in Scholastic literature, of the much discussed story of the poor animal who is equally attracted by two piles of hay and, not being endowed with liberty of indifference, is unable to decide which way to turn. Under the guise of "Buridan's Ass," this animal has a long history in discussions of free will. Scotus has a bull who sees some grass but, just as he is turning to eat

rectly experiences his ability to will or refuse any suggestion of reasoning.<sup>46</sup>

From the foregoing, one may gather that volitional activity is viewed, in Ockhamism, in the context of efficient causality. The will is said to cause or place an *effectum*: this term "effect" means the product of efficient causation, in fourteenth-century Latin. Indeed, Ockham makes efficient causality the primary type and thus assists in the late medieval trend to abandon formal and final causes.<sup>47</sup> As a result of this, Ockham's notion of will reduces to a pure putting-forth of energy by the soul. Such an explanation approximates the meaning of a "force" in early modern physics. Obviously, it is free of restraint—unless there be a higher, or more powerful, force. In point of fact, there is such a higher (and so, freer) force: this is the Will of God.

Thus far in our examination of the meaning of will in libertarian thought of the middle ages, we have confined the investigation to questions concerning the will of man. Actually much is said about the will of God, in the same literature. When volition is attributed to God, in this period, most thinkers understand the divine will in terms of their theory of human will. If they regard man's will and intellect as two cooperating powers (as Aquinas did), then they try to explain God's activity in terms of a similar duality—always with the reservation that there is no real difference in God of being, powers and activities. If they regard man's will as the soul freely producing any and all psychic activities (as Ockham did), then they see God as an infinite, omnipotent Will.<sup>48</sup>

The notion that will means an essentially free power continues to be dominant in later Scholasticism. In mid-sixteenth century the Council of Trent defined the freedom of the

Such a positive faculty [the power of indifference] I have never denied to be in the will; indeed, in my opinion, it is found not only on all occasions when it determines itself to the kind of actions in which it is not borne by the weight of any reason toward one side more than toward the other; but it is even involved in all the will's other actions, so that it never determines itself without using it to the point that even when a very evident reason inclines us to a thing, though, morally speaking, it be difficult for us to do the contrary, nevertheless, speaking absolutely, we can do it.<sup>56</sup>

Descartes does not think that free will is best exemplified in that trivial situation in which the will is presented with equally appealing objects and finds itself able to select either one. This sort of objective indifference illustrates the lowest type of human freedom. Man's will is at its freest when it faces alternatives that are not indifferently balanced, where one is much better than the other, and the will is still able to opt for either one.<sup>57</sup> Descartes' freedom of will is a continuation of the voluntaristic tradition of St. Bernard, Peter Olivi, Duns Scotus and Ockham.<sup>58</sup>

Oddly, the British philosophers from Locke to Reid, who are such great advocates of political liberty, do not appear to understand will as the exercise of personal freedom. This is not to say that they deny personal freedom to man: this they vigorously support. However, with the gradual disappearance of the faculty theory of will (from Locke onward, in British philosophy), human liberty is dissociated from the field of volition. Locke explains this point of view very clearly:

So far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Wherever any performance or for-

bearance are not equally in a man's power; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary . . . liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty.<sup>59</sup>

Locke is not too far removed from the basic notion of will which we find in Thomas Aquinas. He sees very well that voluntary activity is not co-extensive with free activity.<sup>60</sup>

Nor did Thomas Reid identify will and personal liberty. Like Locke, Reid placed freedom in the human person, as something closely allied to the working of practical reasoning, and he considered volition to be some sort of activity which follows after the exercise of freedom. As we shall see in the next chapter, Reid considers will to be a sort of executive capacity under the direction of a prior power of freedom.

Modern German philosophy provides many variations of the identification of will with freedom. Leibniz is the last of the noted German thinkers to retain something of the Thomistic notion of will. In one place he says:

The highest perfection of man consists not merely in that he acts freely but still more in that he acts with reason. Better, these are both the same thing, for the less anyone's use of reason is disturbed by the impulsion of the affections, the freer one is. . . . For freedom is the same as spontaneity with reason, and to will is to be brought to act through a reason perceived by the intellect.<sup>61</sup>

So Leibniz does not say that will is a power freely to will anything, whether it is reasonable or not.

It is with Kant that the first signs of will as freedom are found in German thought. He uses two words for will. The

first (*der Wille*) is almost identical with practical reason; it is to be examined later, in our Chapter Eight. The second Kantian term for will (*die Willkür*) is often translated as "elective will"; it is the power of free choice.<sup>62</sup> In his *Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant states that, "only the elective will can be called free."<sup>63</sup> However, Kant's positive meaning of freedom is identified with the autonomy of the will, with the capacity of the rational will to legislate the directives which form a basis for moral activity.<sup>64</sup> The practical writings of Kant might suggest, then, that he would use freedom as a genus in terms of which he could define will.

Yet, Kant also speaks of a "will" which is not free: this is precisely the case when the elective will is subject to the sway of sensuous impulses or instincts.<sup>65</sup> The fact of the matter is that Kant's notions on freedom admit of a variety of interpretations and it is impossible to establish a univocal meaning for "will" in Kant.<sup>66</sup> The safest conclusion is to say that Kant certainly stimulated some of his followers to move in the direction of an identification of volition and the exercise of freedom.

This is the direction that J. G. Fichte followed. He regarded will as free self-determination.

My will is mine, and it is the only thing that is wholly mine and entirely dependent on myself; and through it I have already become a citizen of the realm of freedom and pure spiritual activity. What determination of my will . . . is best adapted to the order of the spiritual world is proclaimed to me at every moment by my conscience, the bond that constantly unites me to the spiritual world; it depends solely on myself to give my activity the appointed direction.<sup>67</sup>

With Fichte, free activity and volitional activity become co-extensive. "The free being with absolute freedom, proposes to

itself certain ends. It wills because it wills, and the willing of an object is itself the last ground of such willing."<sup>68</sup> Such an identification of will and freedom ultimately makes volition into a blind putting forth of energy: a theory with which our next chapter is to deal.

This same point of view could be illustrated in the writings of many Post-Kantians. It may even be found in Hegel, when he says:

xx The Will is free only when it does not will anything alien, extrinsic, foreign to itself (for as long as it does so, it is dependent), but wills itself alone—wills the Will. This is the absolute Will—the volition to be free.<sup>69</sup>

It is with Schopenhauer that this voluntaristic tendency in German thought reaches a climax and breaks like a bubble. In a great *tour de force*, his *Prize Essay* first shows that free will is utterly impossible, in the phenomenal order.<sup>70</sup> The first four sections of the *Essay* (nine tenths of the whole work) argue that every event requires a cause, that all activities are thus governed by strict necessity, that it is only human ignorance of the total causality behind man's actions which has led theologians and philosophers to postulate freedom of will. In the course of this forceful argument, Schopenhauer displays immense historical erudition, roaming through the writings of the ancient philosophers, Greek and Latin Fathers of the Church, medieval Scholastics, and of course modern religious and philosophic writers. His repeated axiom is: *quidquid fit necessario fit* (everything happens necessarily).<sup>71</sup> He ridicules the whole notion of "liberty of indifference," sarcastically accusing the supporters of this view of basic ignorance.

They declare the freedom of the will to be immediately given in the self-consciousness and therefore so unshakably established that all arguments against it could be nothing but sophisms. This exalted confidence stems only from the fact that the good fellows don't even know what freedom of the will is and means, and in their innocence understand by it no more than the mastery of the will over the parts of the body, which we analyzed in the second section.<sup>72</sup>

If this critique of his predecessors were all that is found in the *Prize Essay*, Schopenhauer would not deserve mention in this chapter. In the final section of the *Essay*, he turns to a resounding defense of the *transcendental* freedom of man. Man is not free in his actions but he is completely free in his esse, in the innermost depths of his being!<sup>73</sup> The unavoidable feeling of moral responsibility is the ground of Schopenhauer's argument for this higher freedom. Personal guilt is attributable to the character of man. And, "character is the empirically recognized, persistent, and unchangeable nature of an individual will."<sup>74</sup> So, in the last analysis, Schopenhauer does belong with those thinkers who identify will and freedom. He does not equate man's activities with freedom; these belong in the phenomenal order. He asks his reader to rise above this area of appearances and thus to see that, "the will is of course free, but only in itself and outside of appearance."<sup>75</sup>

In the course of his criticism, Schopenhauer makes a slighting reference to Maine de Biran as a fanatical supporter of the liberty of indifference approach to will.<sup>76</sup> Actually, this French amateur in philosophy held a theory of will that was not too far removed from Schopenhauer's. Starting from the Cartesian *Cogito*, Maine de Biran stressed the spiritual freedom of the self.

I will, I act (*cogito*), therefore I am (*ergo sum*). I am not in some indeterminate way a thinking being, but very precisely a willing force which passes from the virtual to the actual by its own energy, by determining itself or bringing itself to action.<sup>77</sup>

The human will is the "free force which is the essence of the soul or spirit of man."<sup>78</sup> It is obvious that Schopenhauer might regard de Biran's will as an offense against the principle of causality; yet they are in basic agreement on the metaphysical character of will. We shall see more on this will-metaphysics in Chapter Nine.

The association of will with an inner freedom of the self continues to be a dominant theme in the French *philosophie de l'esprit*. Renouvier, Fouillé, even Bergson, think of volition in terms of free self-determination.<sup>79</sup> As Gabriel Marcel says, "there is a freedom which is not concerned with doing. . . . To want, indeed,—I take this word in the sense of the French *vouloir*—is not to desire."<sup>80</sup> When the French existentialists speak of will, they do not mean anything like rational appetite but rather some sort of free, self-constituting reality.

This way of understanding will, as personal freedom or its exercise, is not typical of American philosophy. Adler professes to find something like this approach in John Dewey and Paul Weiss.<sup>81</sup> It is more obvious in the recent thinking of John Wild which shows the influence of European existentialism.<sup>82</sup>

The meaning of will that we have examined in this chapter reduces will to some sort of freedom. This is positive freedom, a liberty within the person to do or be what he pleases. It is close to the notion of self-determination. Such freedom is but remotely related to the absence of external restraint which is that negative view of liberty which is usually taken by people who discuss political and social freedoms. Perhaps

II, 325: "Certissime enim intra nos experimur quod voluntas nostra retinet se non solum ab indifferentibus, etc."

27. *Ibid.*, II, 329: "Ergo oportet voluntatem, prout est potentia sui ipsius motivam, esse liberam."

28. "O la volontà è libera, o non è volontà." Bettoni, *art. cit.*, p. 45.

29. "Videtur mihi quod intellectus ex eo quod est unius voluntati sortitur tam in modo existendi quam in modo aspiciendi objecta sua quidam sublimitatem et quoddam regimen sine quo non posset, saltem ita alte, veritatem speculari." Olivi, quaest. 57, *id.*, II, 331. Earlier (II, 323), Olivi remarks: "Certum est autem quod intellectus non movetur tunc nec tenetur nisi a voluntate nostra."

30. For the text of Tempier's condemnations of 1277, which touch on certain teachings of Thomas Aquinas, see: *Fontes Vitae S. Thomae Aquinatis*, ed. M. H. Laurent (Saint Maximin: *Revue Thomiste*, 1937), VI, 596-614. In so far as they applied to St. Thomas, these condemnations were revoked in Paris, by Bishop Etienne Bourret, in A.D. 1325. *Ibid.*, VI, 666-667.

31. A. J. Denomy, "The *De Amore* of Andreas Capellanus and the Condemnation of 1277," *Mediaeval Studies*, VIII (1946), 107-123, lists the theses that are concerned with *voluntas*.

32. Walter of Bruges, Gonsalvus Hispanus and William of Ware represent this movement to make will superior to intellect and absolutely free in all its actions. For details, see: A. San Cristobal-Sebastian, *Controversias acerca de la voluntad desde 1270-1300* (Madrid: Editorial y Libreria Co. Cul., 1958).

33. J. Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, IV, d. 49, q. 10, n. 2 (*Opera*, ed. L. Wadding, Paris: Vivès, 1891-1895, t. XXI, 318): "Duplex est appetitus in voluntate, scilicet naturalis et liber." The same point is more fully explained by Scotus in *Reportata Parisiensia*, IV, 49, 9, nn. 3-5 (ed. Wadding, XXIV, 659).

34. *Op. Ox.*, II, 39, 2: "Voluntas naturalis ut necessario tendit in volitum non habet actum elicatum circa illud, sed ipsa est tantum inclinatio quaedam in tali natura ad perfectionem sibi maxime convenientem."

35. The reference to the appetite of matter for form is in the text of *Rep. Paris.*, cited above in note 33.

36. "Sicut voluntas non potest habere actum circa ignotum, ita non potest habere actum circa obiectum sub ratione formali aliqua obiecti quae ratio est penitus ignota." *Op. Ox.*, I, 3, q. 3 (ed. Garcia, Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1912, I, 348). "Unde esto quod phantasiatio vel obiectum apprehensum requiratur ad hoc quod

sit volitio, non tamen requiritur nisi sicut causa sine qua non." *Op. Ox.*, II, 25, 1, 1, n. 19 (ed. Garcia, II, 698).

37. Scotus speaks of *voluntas* as a "potentia libera per essentiam," in the *Ordinatio*, I, 17, pars 1, qq. 1-2 (*Opera*, ed. C. Balic, Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis, 1950 ff., t. V, 169). On the question of Scotus' voluntarism, see: J. Pieper, *Scholasticism*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960), pp. 141-142.

38. "Dico ergo ad quaestionem, quod nihil aliud a voluntate est causa totalis volitionis in voluntate." *Op. Ox.*, II, 25, q. 1, n. 766 (ed. Garcia, II, 701).

39. On this *perfecta potentia contradictionis*, *ibid.*, n. 768d (ed. Garcia, II, 704). Scotus concludes: "Potentia igitur rationalis perfecta, cujusmodi est voluntas, quamvis sit contradictorium, poterit determinare se, objecto praesente, ad unum illorum."

40. "Prima intellectio non est in potestate nostra, sed prima indifferentia, quia potest quis se determinare ad volendum vel non volendum, hoc est a voluntate non ab intellectu, quia intellectus ab objecto naturaliter movetur . . . Sed habita prima intellectione, in potestate ejus est convertere intellectum ad considerandum hoc vel illud, et hoc vel illud velle vel nolle." *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, XXI, n. 14 (ed. Vivès, t. XXVI); cf. *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 1, q. 4, n. 3 (ed. Vivès, VIII, 157).

41. "Voluntas in quantum est actus primus libera est: a) ad oppositos actus; b) libera etiam est mediantibus illis actibus oppositis ad opposita objecta in quae tendit; c) et ulterius ad oppositos effectus quos producit." *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 39, q. 1, a. 3.

42. *Op. Ox.*, II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 690d-e (ed. Garcia, II, 690-691). For a sympathetic exposition of Scotus' theory of free will, see: B. Vogt, "The Metaphysics of Human Liberty in Duns Scotus," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* XVI (1940), 27-37.

43. "Intellectus et voluntas sunt idem realiter in se et cum essentia animae." Guillelmi Ockhami, *Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Subtilissimae Quaestiones*, Lib. II, 2 K (ed. Lyons, 1495).

44. *Quodlibeta Septem*, I, q. 16 (ed. Argentina, 1491); the text is cited in P. Boehner, "Ockham's Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei," *Proc. Amer. Cath. Philos. Assoc.* XVI (1940), 181, footnote 8.

45. "Praeter istos modos adhuc est unus modus, quo potest voluntas creata cessare ab actu causandi, scilicet se sola, quantumcumque nullum praedictorum desit, sed omnia sit posita, et hoc est et non aliud voluntatem contingenter causare." *Super I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1 G.

46. *Quodl.*, I, q. 16; for the text, see Boehner, *art. cit.*, pp. 182-183, footnote 10.

47. On causality in Ockham, see Gilson's analysis of *Quodlibets* II, IV and VI, plus *Super I Sent.* d. 2, in *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 789.

48. A. C. Pegis, "Necessity and Liberty," *Proc. Amer. Cath. Philos. Assoc.* XVI (1940), 1-27, compares Aquinas and Ockham on the matter of divine freedom.

49. Denziger-Bannwart-Umberg, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, Romae, 1937, nn. 814-815.

50. F. Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. XIX, 8, nn. 19-20: "Libertatem voluntatis evidentius et perfectius exerceri in electione mediorum . . . ad intentionem finis fertur voluntas et sola aliqua inclinatione naturali, quamvis libere feratur." See *ibid.*, XIX, 7, n. 8.

51. T. V. Mullaney, *Suarez on Human Freedom* (Baltimore: The Carroll Press, 1950), offers a full study of Suarez' views on will and freedom; for a shorter but accurate treatment, see: T. E. Davitt, *The Nature of Law* (St. Louis: Herder, 1951), pp. 86-94.

52. See the definition of "free will" in B. Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956), p. 49.

53. B. Vogt, *art. cit.*, p. 37.

54. R. Descartes, *Les Passions de l'âme*, I, art. 41 (ed. Adam-Tannery, Paris: Cerf, 1904, t. IX): "La volonté est tellement libre de sa nature, qu'elle ne peut jamais être contrainte."

55. *Meditationes*, IV (ed. G. Lewis, Paris: Vrin, 1946, p. 57): "Sola est voluntas, sive arbitrii libertas, quam tantam in me experior, ut nullius majoris ideam apprehendam. . ."

56. *Lettre à Mersenne*, (ed. Adam-Tannery, III, 379). The text is cited in English, in Adler, *Idea of Freedom*, I, 524, and Adler notes the similarity to the views of Duns Scotus.

57. *Meditationes*, IV (ed. Lewis, pp. 57-58).

58. See the remarks of R. Allers, "Bemerkungen zur Anthropologie und Willenslehre des Descartes," in *Cartesio* (Milano: Società Ed. Vita e Pensiero, 1937), p. 7.

59. J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, XXI, 8.

60. J. Rickaby, *Free Will and Four English Philosophers* (London: Burns and Oates, 1906), pp. 75-111, does not correctly interpret Locke.

61. G. Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers*, "Thoughts on the Principles of Descartes," ed. L. E. Loemker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 639.

62. I. Kant, *Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals*, in T. K.

Abbott, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works*, 6th ed. (London: Longmans, 1948), pp. 265-270.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 282; cf. Adler, *Idea of Freedom*, I, 526-527.

64. *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Abbott, p. 137.

65. *Critique of Pure Reason*, Transcendental Doctrine of Method, chap. 2, sect. 1; the point is well brought out in the translation by J. M. D. Meiklejohn (New York: Willey Book Co., 1900), p. 450.

66. For a quick sketch of the interpretations by Jones, Vaihinger and Herman Cohen, see: J. R. Rosenberg, "Freedom in the Philosophy of Kant," *Philosophical Studies in Honor of Ignatius Smith*, ed. J. K. Ryan (Westminster: Newman, 1952), 257-269.

67. From Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *The Vocation of Man*, edited with an Introduction by Roderick M. Chisholm, copyright © by The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., reprinted by the Liberal Arts Press Division of The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. (New York, 1956), p. 119.

68. Fichte, *Science of Rights*, trans. A. E. Kroeger (London: Trubner and Co., 1889), p. 193.

69. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Willey Book Co., 1900), p. 442.

70. A. Schopenhauer, *Preisschrift über die Freiheit des Willens* (1839); translated by K. Kolenda as *Essay on the Freedom of the Will* (New York: Liberal Arts Press), 1960.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-99.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

77. Maine de Biran, *Nouveaux essais d'anthropologie*, in *Oeuvres*, ed. Tisserand (Paris: Alcan, 1920-1949), t. XIV, pp. 318-367; the quotation is from p. 275.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

79. For a survey of the self-determination theories (most of which are more or less connected with the view of will outlined in this chapter) and for many references to the French school, see Adler, *Idea of Freedom*, I, 400-545.

80. G. Marcel, *The Mystery of Being* (Chicago: Regnery, 1951), p. 110.

81. *Idea of Freedom*, I, 508-511 and 515-517.

82. J. Wild, *Human Freedom and Social Order* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), pp. 170 and 224.

'Heart' in the Bible does not, as in our Western tradition, mean the affections, sensibility as opposed to reason. It is rather man's liberty, the centre in which are taken the fundamental decisions. . . . Thoughts arise in the heart (*alah al leb*) out of an original freedom that engenders them.<sup>1</sup>

Because of this, the Greek *Septuagint* often uses the word, *nous* (intelligence), where the Hebrew would have heart (*leb*).<sup>2</sup> Indeed, the biblical use of heart seems to cover all the higher functions of the human soul.

We find much the same heart-language in the New Testament. There is a passage in St. Paul where nearly all the traditional functions of the "heart" are mentioned. He commences by saying: "Brethren, the will of my heart, indeed, and my prayer to God is for them unto salvation." And later in the same chapter, he adds: "For if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For, with the heart, we believe unto justice."<sup>3</sup> Here we have both will and belief associated with heart. There is no question, then, that the Bible has influenced our use of the term, heart, in this way.

One important school of Greek medicine was that which flourished in Sicily during the third century before Christ. According to Werner Jaeger, a leading doctor in this school was Diokles of Karystos who was contemporary with the establishment of the Stoic school of philosophy and may have influenced it.<sup>4</sup> Now, Diokles taught that man's heart is the organic center of human personality, the principle of motor activity and perception in man. This teaching is connected with the Stoic view that there is a ruling principle (the *hegemonikon* or *pneuma psychikon*) within the human person.<sup>5</sup> As a matter of fact, Aristotle also situated the "spirit"

in the human heart and his view may have influenced these thinkers in the century following him.<sup>6</sup> This theory was quite different from that of the Hippocratic medical school, in which the brain was taken as the central organ of the vital spirit. It is not clear whether the Sicilian doctors or the Athenian philosophers first emphasized the importance of the heart, for there was a fourth-century physician, named Philistion, who visited Athens during the period of Plato and the young Aristotle and who may have given the theory to them.<sup>7</sup> In any case, the medical view that the heart is the key organ of man's higher thought and will processes continued to be influential during the middle ages, through various Arabic and Latin treatises, *On the Motion of the Heart*. The heart was not regarded as a blood pump, of course, but as the center from which emanated various humors, or animal spirits, which affected human personality.

Most serious writers in the Patristic and medieval periods use the word, heart, to name that part of man in which he loves, believes, decides, regrets and rejoices. The same thinkers recognize that these are, in the main, volitional functions. The notion of "heart" becomes dissociated from the concept of a bodily organ and is spiritualized, or transferred to the psychic order, but there always remains in the background some vestige of the theory that these operations of will are located in the breast, or in the region of the organic heart. The continued use in pictorial art of the heart symbol is but one evidence of this conviction. There would be no advantage in attempting to name or quote all the writers who employ this heart-language. We have no difficulty in finding a few outstanding examples.

What is the best remembered quotation from all the writings of St. Augustine? Doubtless it is his poignant cry, at the beginning of the *Confessions*: "restless is my heart until it

finds rest in Thee." The full Latin text shows how Augustine here connects the heart with functions of willing and loving. What he actually wrote was:

Et tamen laudare te vult homo, aliqua portio creaturae tuae. Tu excitas ut laudare te delectet, quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.<sup>8</sup>

Augustine is praising God and he says that man is stimulated by God, so that a person wills to love God and takes a real joy in praising his Maker. Man has been created with a strong inclination toward God and this heartfelt urge is unsatisfied, until man achieves some sort of loving union with God. Clearly, the human heart is regarded by Augustine as the seat of man's highest aspirations and his most spiritual loves. In a later work, the great treatise *On the Trinity*, Augustine explained that he understood love (*amor seu dilectio*) to be but a strong form of willing (*valentior voluntas*).<sup>9</sup> There is no doubt that St. Augustine closely related the will of man to his heart.

There is a tenth-century Jewish treatise, entitled *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions*.<sup>10</sup> Its writer, Saadia ben Joseph, was born in A.D. 892, at Fajjum, Egypt. He says that the human soul, in union with the body, has three faculties: the power of knowing (*nešamah*), the power of appetite (*nepheš*), and the power of anger (*ruah*).<sup>11</sup> This psychological analysis is thoroughly developed by Saadia. Then he points out that Scripture invariably mentions soul and heart together and adds that the seal of the human soul is in the heart.<sup>12</sup>

A twelfth-century Spanish Jew, Bahya ibn Pakuda, wrote a moral treatise entitled, *Duties of the Heart* (*Hovot Halelevot*), in which the heart is formally taken as the center of

man's love for God. One sentence is perhaps enough to indicate the tenor of the work:

When the believer's heart has been emptied of love of this world and freed from its lusts, as a result of perception and understanding [the love of God is] established in his heart and fixed in his soul.<sup>13</sup>

Some Christian theologians in the twelfth century show a tendency to distinguish two "wills" in man: the affective will (*voluntas affectionis*) which gives rise to man's interior feelings of love and other volitional functions; and the effective will (*voluntas effectiois*) which is directed to exterior, volitionally controlled human actions.<sup>14</sup> The inner volitional feelings are said to be meritorious (in relation to eventual salvation), while the volitional control of bodily actions is called a perfectant of merit.<sup>15</sup> This distinction is not, to my knowledge, associated with references to the heart but it does indicate a growing interest in those aspects of willing that have to do with love and affection.

One key characteristic of Franciscan psychology in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is a certain quality that is called "unction." It means that men like John of La Rochelle, St. Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, Duns Scotus and even William of Ockham put particular stress on the love of God and on the affective dispositions of man. The views of St. Bonaventure may be taken as typical of this school in the thirteenth century. He is contemporary with Thomas Aquinas and read much the same literature that Aquinas knew. However, Bonaventure's psychology is not the same as that which Aquinas developed. The Franciscans are usually closer to the thought of St. Augustine.

For one thing, Bonaventure speaks of intellect and will as

different potencies of the human soul but he does not radically distinguish volition from intellection. As Robert Kilwardby (a Dominican scholar who agreed with many philosophical views of the Franciscan school) was to say in the 1270's, to know and to love are one and the same act of the soul.<sup>16</sup> St. Bonaventure shows this attitude in the way that he treats *synderesis*. Thomas Aquinas considered *synderesis* to be a habit in the practical intellect whereby man knows, from the beginning of his life of moral reasoning, such practical principles as the rule that "good should be done and evil avoided." Now Bonaventure located *synderesis* in the will and treated this habit of first practical principles as an affective tendency toward the good and away from the evil. He called *synderesis* a "weight of the will," inclining man toward the moral good.<sup>17</sup> This tendency to fuse volition, affection and cognition was continued and emphasized by a group of British thinkers at Oxford, in the early fourteenth century. Their writings are only available in manuscript form but they have been very thoroughly studied by the Polish medievalist, Konstantin Michalski.<sup>18</sup> A certain Adam Woodham was the central figure in this movement to attribute a wide variety of cognitive activities, judgment, evaluation, a sort of discursive reasoning, to the human will. Their contemporaries at Paris (men like Gregory of Rimini, John of Ripa and Pierre d'Ailly) strongly opposed this tendency. But eventually some continental thinkers, who are not Franciscans, come to tolerate and even to espouse the notion that the will is able to know things. John of Mirecourt (*monachus albus*) is skeptical of the view but decides that neither side of the argument can be proved. Hugolinus de Malabranca, O.S.A., favors the Oxford theory and teaches that there are two kinds of knowledge through the will: (1) an "experimental" knowledge of the immediately

present object of volition; and (2) an "affective" knowledge of a remembered act of willing.<sup>19</sup>

On another point St. Bonaventure has a very distinctive position on the human will: he thinks that there are two appetites within the will, one is concupiscible and the other is irascible.<sup>20</sup> These are not separate, sensory appetites but divisions of will itself. As a consequence, Bonaventure is able to attribute a wide variety of feelings or affections to the human will.

If we look at the fifteenth-century *Book on the Soul*, in which William of Vaurouillon summarized many of the earlier Franciscan psychological positions, we see these views as characteristic of a continuing school. Moreover, William discusses the problem of the assigning of an organic base for the sensory feelings of desire and anger. He reports that some people have located the concupiscible appetite in the liver (*jecur*) and the irascible in the gall bladder (*cista fellis*), but William gives it as his opinion that both are more truly located in the heart.<sup>21</sup>

As far as the use of the term, heart, is concerned, this continues to be a common feature, particularly in works of piety. Even Thomas Aquinas (who is not much given to romantic metaphors) will occasionally refer volitional activities to the heart. A test case may be made of his treatment of charity, the love of God for His own sake and the love of creatures for the sake of God. In the *Questions on the Virtues in General*, Aquinas carefully explains that there are two major virtues that have the will of man as their subject; these are justice and charity.<sup>22</sup> Earlier, in commenting on the third book of the *Sentences*, he had calmly said, with St. Paul: "Hence, we must say that charity is a theological virtue that is, 'poured forth into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.'"<sup>23</sup>

rupted operation. . . . And thus it is that with these spirits knowing and willing are one; so that a living and effective intellect is even a very spirit, and equally so is a perfectly self-conscious will. But a spiritual being like man, in whom intellect and will are not one, is, as contemplated from this point of view, a spirit divided and distracted.<sup>35</sup>

Schlegel's prescription for the unification and harmonization of discordant will and understanding in men is "a pure, strong, and morally regulated love."<sup>36</sup> A morally perfected character is one in which all divisions and distractions of the four faculties have been surmounted in the inner harmony of love. This is a poetic and high-minded philosophy of self-perfection, in which will is characterized by the central act of love.

A similar, but today more influential, reaction to abstract Hegelianism is found in the writings of the Danish, religious existentialist, Søren Kierkegaard. He opposes rationalism and intellectualism in early nineteenth-century philosophy of religion (which he blames on Hegel) and tries to substitute for this system-building a philosophy of love. The very title of a book published by Kierkegaard, in 1847, tells a story: it is called, *Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing*.<sup>37</sup> He admits that will is a "center from which choice springs,"<sup>38</sup> but insists that choice is not the most distinctive act of willing. The man faced with an intellectual choice between alternatives is ironically dubbed the "double-minded man," the person who is always hesitating and failing to act. "The double-minded man," Kierkegaard maintains, "stands pondering and reflecting. If he is wholly absorbed in his pondering, then he continues to stand—a symbol of double-mindedness."<sup>39</sup> In a sense, Kierkegaard is restating the position of Augustine and Anselm, when he says that man's supreme freedom and greatest

use of his will consists in loving one thing above all else, the Good.<sup>40</sup> This primary object of human willing is, of course, God.

In contemporary existentialism, some thinkers have parted company with Kierkegaard and gone the way of atheism. Perhaps Gabriel Marcel is today the most authentically Christian representative of the school. In his *Mystery of Being*, Marcel frequently criticizes the abstractness of academic philosophy. He argues that the distinction of will from intelligence "is really quite superficial. A will without intelligence would be a mere impulse, and an intelligence which lacked will would be devitalized."<sup>41</sup> Marcel further urges the importance of keeping "affectivity" united with intelligence and will. The mainspring of anti-theism, according to Marcel, "is the will that God should not be."<sup>42</sup> This is why he has no great confidence in "proofs" for the existence of God: they carry no conviction with people who display "a kind of fundamental ill-will which is basically pride."<sup>43</sup> Doubtless Marcel considers that the bent of man's will and love has a great deal to do with what he understands. On this point, as on many others, he has exerted an influence on Jacques Maritain. The theme of connatural knowledge, an understanding rooted in affectivity, has been central in many of Maritain's recent works.<sup>44</sup>

In the United States, during the early eighteenth century, Jonathan Edwards took an intellectualist position on the human will. He is not a philosopher who stresses love and affection. In some ways, Edwards is not far removed from the psychology of Thomas Aquinas. His *Treatise concerning Religious Affections* is more concerned with understanding and intellectually-guided willing than with what we would today recognize as affection or feeling. Yet he does make

- L.B., *Le Problème de l'amour chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1952). (Vs. Rousselot, next item.)
- Rousselot, P., "Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au moyen-âge," *BGPM*, V, 7-102.
- Simonin, H. D., "Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l'amour," *AHMA*, VI (1931), 174-276. (The basic study.)
- Stevens, Gregory, "The Disinterested Love of God according to St. Thomas and Some of his Modern Interpreters," *Thomist*, XVI (1953), 307-333, 497-541.
24. *Troilus and Cressida*, Act II, scene 2, lines 163-173.
25. T. Hobbes, *Elements of Law*, I, 7, 1-2 (ed. F. Tönnies, Cambridge: University Press, 1928, pp. 21-22).
26. J. Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, 21, 73.
27. G. Berkeley, *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Part I, c. 27 (Everyman ed., 1925, p. 126.)
28. D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, II, 3, 1 (ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 399).
29. For many uses of the heart-language, see: *Hume Selections*, ed. C. W. Hendel (New York: Scribner, 1927), pp. 197, 205, 208, 242, 394.
30. *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. 1 (in Hendel's *Selections*, p. 197).
31. A. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will* (New York: Appleton, 1888), p. 303.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 313; for a similar explanation, see Bain's *Mental and Moral Science* (London: Longmans, Green, 1868), p. 2.
33. J. J. Rousseau, *Emile*, trans. Barbara Foxley (New York: Dutton, 1948), p. 252.
34. F. von Schlegel, *Philosophy of Life*, trans. A. J. W. Morrison (London: Bohn, 1847); my quotation is from a selection in Robinson, *Anthology of Modern Philosophy* (New York: Crowell, 1931), p. 511.
35. *Ibid.*, in Robinson, p. 517.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 520.
- X 37. S. Kierkegaard, *Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing*, trans. D. V. Steere (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956).
38. *The Journals of Kierkegaard*, trans. A. Dru (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959), pp. 44-45.
39. *Purity of Heart*, p. 74.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
41. G. Marcel, *The Mystery of Being* (Chicago: Regnery, 1951), p. 178.

DURING THE TWENTY-FIVE CENTURIES that have marked the course of Western philosophy and theology, there have been a number of thinkers who have maintained that will or volition is constitutive of reality. In effect, these people have suggested that to be is to will. Some of them have said that the divine will is the ultimate source of all things and that the universe and mankind share in the volitional character of this supreme will. Others simply take it that some sort of non-divine will constitutes the whole of things. Obviously, these views imply a special metaphysics which might be termed voluntarism. 50645

Plato is not a metaphysical voluntarist but his description of the Ideal Form of the Good, as tending inevitably to share its goodness with other things, may be a remote antecedent of the claim that reality is volitional in character. Dialogues such as the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* suggest that the Good is diffusive of itself and thus constitutive of at least one aspect of the many things of this universe. However, the Idea of the Good is not an agent of the process of world-making; the Good is but an exemplary cause, and not the only one, in this process.

In the third century of the Christian era, Plotinus taught a modified type of Platonism in which he pictured all reality as a series of emanations from an original One. Plotinus' *Enneads*

in its Eighth Chapter, offers some insights on the freedom and will of the One.<sup>1</sup> Plotinus is somewhat dependent on Aristotle's treatment of the *hekousion* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>2</sup> This is what has come to be called the "voluntary" in Latin and English commentaries on Aristotle. Plotinus connects this notion of voluntariness with will, using both Greek words, *thelesis* and *boulesis*.<sup>3</sup> He discusses what it means to be the master (*kyrios*) of one's actions and then applies the theory to the One, in the following text:

In the One, power (*dynamis*) is not open to contraries; it is an irresistible and immovable force, which is the greatest possible. . . . Who could change it, since it is generated from the divine will, and is His will (*boulesin ousan*) itself? . . . Will was, then, in His essence; in fact, it (*boulesis*) is nothing other than His essence. . . . He is entirely will; there is nothing in Him that does not will.<sup>4</sup>

It would seem legitimate to conclude that Plotinus is, here, at least hinting that the fundamental character of reality is some sort of volitional energy or force.

This metaphysics of will continues in the Neo-Platonic school, after Plotinus. Two centuries later, Marius Victorinus is converted to Christianity and he combines Plotinus' teaching with some theological notions (apparently distorted) concerning the second Person of the Trinity. At least one historian of philosophy, Benz, sees Victorinus as a key personality in the growth of a new theory of reality in which will is the central concept.<sup>5</sup> In his *Book on Divine Generation*, Victorinus vaguely suggests that the Word of God is the divine intelligence and will, which has emanated from the eternal will of God.<sup>6</sup>

There is a good deal of Mohammedan and Jewish specula-

tion on the will of God, during the early middle ages. One Mohammedan sect, the *Ashariya* of the tenth century, held that the divine will holds together the discrete elements of space and time. Were this bonding influence of will to be withdrawn, all finite reality would fall into nothingness.<sup>7</sup> The eleventh-century Jewish thinker, Avicbron (Ibn Gabirol), also makes the will of God to be a unifying force throughout the universe. His main work, the *Fountain of Life* (*Mekor Hayim*), became very influential in a twelfth-century Latin translation by Dominic Gundissalinus and deserves special attention here.

Where Plotinus had described the successive emanations, or outpourings, of the many from the One as possibly the results of a supreme Will, Avicbron (writing eight centuries later and with a knowledge of the Jewish tradition) retains the concept of emanation but identifies its source and perhaps its material cause as the Will of God. As the *Fons Vitae* puts it:

To describe will is impossible; but an approximate description may be given, when we say that it is the divine power, making matter and form and binding them together, diffused from the highest to the lowest, like the diffusion of the soul in the body; and it is moving all things and disposing all.<sup>8</sup>

Now this is not a particularly surprising statement for a theist to make but Avicbron has his own peculiar understanding of the Will of God. This divine will is identical with God's essence, *when not acting*, but *when it is acting*, this divine will is considered a sort of first creature, an initial projection of energy and formal reality into creation. And so, as acting, the divine will is something distinct from the essence of God. Avicbron says: "the will which is His [God's] power

very pious teaching but it actually minimizes the power of God by suggesting that the divine act of creation terminated in no real product. The world of creation then becomes a mirage.

Abbé Malebranche, toward the end of the seventeenth century, wrote several books in which he used the language of Cartesianism, and some of Descartes' own views, to show that this universe and mankind are nothing but movements within the divine will. He is also much indebted to St. Augustine but he misinterprets and twists the significance of the thought of the Bishop of Hippo. Malebranche's *Recherche de la Vérité* begins with about eighty pages of texts quoted from Augustine. Augustine had, of course, spoken frequently of man's utter dependence on God but he had never suggested that man and his universe are unreal. Nicholas Malebranche soon makes it clear that he underestimates the reality of this world.

It is necessary [Malebranche writes] to establish clearly . . . and to prove that there is only one true cause, because there is only one true God; that the power of everything proceeds only from the will of God; and all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes.<sup>17</sup>

Now, what this actually means is well brought out in Malebranche's *Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion*. Here he explains: "The act of creation never ceases, the conservation of created things being on the part of God merely a continuous creation, merely an act of volition which persists and operates without ceasing."<sup>18</sup> The mind is much more important to Malebranche than body, yet he insists that even bodies are inoperative without the divine will. "The moving force of a body is [he adds] therefore nothing but the activity of

God's will which conserves it successively in different places."<sup>19</sup> The same is true of the activities of the human mind: these are all but movements of the divine will. "In a word [Malebranche concludes], He has willed—He wills incessantly—that the modifications of the mind and those of the body shall be reciprocal."<sup>20</sup> This is Occasionalism with a vengeance; not only is there no causal interaction between mind and body, there is no real secondary causality among bodily events or among psychic events. Since Malebranche seems to think that reality is active, one may conclude that, for him, the very existence of mind and body is in the divine will. He never quite says this but implies it in passages such as the following:

You find yourself in the world, without any power, immovable as a rock, stupid, so to speak, as a log of wood. . . . What would you do in order merely to move the tip of your finger . . . unless God came to your aid, your efforts would be vain, the desires which you formed impotent. . . . It follows that, notwithstanding the conjunction of soul and body in whatever way it may please you to imagine it, you would be dead and inert if it were not for the fact that God wills to adapt his volitions to yours—His volitions, which are always effective, to your desires, which are always impotent.<sup>21</sup>

A similar view is presented by Arnold Geulincx, a Belgian contemporary of Malebranche. In his *Ethics*, this man compares the parallelism of man's mind and body to the synchronism of two clocks which appear to be interconnected but which correspond in their movements, simply because they are operated by the same clockmaker.<sup>22</sup> This is not, perhaps, a metaphysics of will but it reduces all finite causality to the sole cause that is efficacious, the will of God.

Post-Kantian German philosophy provides us with several examples of people who maintain that reality is basically a self-determining process. What is, is some type of will. F. W. Schelling, in his *System of Transcendental Idealism*, wrote:

How at once the objective world conforms itself to ideas in us, and ideas in us conform themselves to the objective world, it is impossible to conceive, unless there exists, between the two worlds—the ideal and the real—a preëstablished harmony. But this preëstablished harmony itself is not conceivable, unless the activity, whereby the objective world is produced, is originally identical with that which displays itself in volition, and *vice versa*.

Now it is undoubtedly a *productive* activity that displays itself in volition; all free action is productive and productive only with consciousness. If, then, we suppose, since the two activities are only one in principle, that the same activity which is productive *with* consciousness in free action, is productive *without* consciousness in the production of the world, this preëstablished harmony is a reality, and the contradiction is solved.<sup>23</sup>

Notice that we have here a man who still sees the problem in terms of the psycho-physical parallelism of Descartes and Malebranche. But where they rely on God's will to supply the explanation of their apparent interaction, Schelling now gives this role to a sort of cosmic, or universal, will. As Frank Thilly said of Schelling:

The absolute ground, or source, or root, of all things is creative energy, absolute will or ego, the one all-pervading world-spirit, in which everything dwells in potency and from which everything that is actual proceeds.<sup>24</sup>

A theistic divine will has given place to a pantheistic voluntarism.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte developed another kind of voluntarism. Starting within individual consciousness, he pointed out that I am aware of myself as a knower and willer and that I am also aware of what is known and willed. Thus, he distinguishes two phases of consciousness, the ego and the non-ego. Though consciousness is subjective, it appears to contain an objective element. Knowledge is important but willing seems to Fichte to be a more real and active function. As the following selection indicates, he implies that his own will projects the sum total of reality:

The will is the efficient, living principle of the world of reason, as motion is the efficient, living principle of the world of sense. I stand in the center of two entirely opposite worlds: a visible world in which action is the only moving power; and an invisible and absolutely incomprehensible world, in which will is the ruling principle. I am one of the primitive forces of both these worlds. My will embraces both. This will is in itself a constituent element of the supersensual world; for, as I move my will by successive resolutions I move and change something in that world, throughout which my activity thus extends itself giving birth to new and ever enduring results which henceforth possess a real existence and need not be again produced. The will may break forth in a material act; and this act belongs to the world of sense and does there what it can do.<sup>25</sup>

Notice that this will, to which Fichte attributes all the contents of his experience, is his own personal will. Descartes had said, "I think, and so, I am"; now Fichte is saying, "I will, and so, not only I but the whole world exists and moves!" This is the ultimate position in subjective voluntarism. My will is the stuff of the universe. Let us examine one further text, to make certain that we are not overstating the case.

I would exercise my voluntary power freely, for the accomplishment of aims which I shall have freely adopted: and this will, as its ultimate ground can be determined by no higher, shall move and mold, first my own body and through it the surrounding world. My active powers shall be under the control of my will alone, and shall be set in motion by nothing else than by it. Thus it shall be. There shall be a Supreme Good in the spiritual world; I shall have the power to seek this with freedom until I find it, to acknowledge it as such when found, and it shall be my fault if I do not find it. This Supreme Good I shall will to know, merely because I will it; and if I will anything else instead of it, the fault shall be mine. My actions shall be the result of this will; without it I shall not act at all, since there shall be no other power over my actions but this will. Then, my powers determined by and subject to the dominion of my will, will effect the external world.<sup>26</sup>

Obviously, Fichte is quite serious. He really thinks that his own will constitutes the reality of all things. Hocking summed up the position very well, when he said: "Fichte took the essence of mind to be will: will must express itself in action: action means the forming of stuff, or the overcoming of obstacles."<sup>27</sup> What did will actually mean to Fichte? Initially, he seems to have understood the term as Kant did: will is the practical reason, considered as essentially active. As Fichte describes it: "The will is the living principle of reason—is itself reason, when purely and simply apprehended."<sup>28</sup> However, he extends the concept of will, first to designate all that is efficient and productive, and eventually to mean all that is. His system is a metaphysics of will.

The same cannot be said of the absolute idealism of Hegel. He did not think that will was as important and all-prevailing as the Fichtean will. Yet there are passages in the more practi-

dependence. But the subjective will has also a substantial life—a reality—in which it moves in the region of *essential* being, and has the essential itself as the object of its existence. This essential being is the union of the *subjective* with the *rational* Will: it is the moral Whole, the *State*, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the Whole.<sup>80</sup>

It is but a step from these various types of voluntaristic idealism to the world-view of Arthur Schopenhauer. He, also, maintains that the complete reality of the universe, and of man's existence, is basically of the nature of will. This is not the Will of God, nor the will of the individual person, but a primitive and original force which has neither purpose nor goodness in it. As one of Schopenhauer's editors has remarked:

The will of which the world (and most clearly the organic world, and hence, our own individual lives) is the expression is essentially a primordial, ungrounded force, and a blind one. . . . That this will is blind means only that it has no further end than the mere perpetuation of existence—and bare existence, contrasted with existing *for* something, is the essence of meaninglessness.<sup>81</sup>

This comment makes it immediately evident why Schopenhauer is a pessimist. Neither the world, nor man's life, has any ultimate goal or meaning. This is why Schopenhauer's ethics is ambiguous and betrays inner and unresolved tensions. It would seem advisable for man to accept and live in accord with the basic drives of cosmic will: this would be to follow the course of nature, and nature is will. Yet the primordial will is not good; it is evil, and a higher morality

appears to demand that we endeavor to transcend and deny the urgency of the blind force of will. This latter is in no sense the will of a benevolent Deity. Schopenhauer makes this clear in one of his *Essays*:

But if we enter within, and therefore take in addition the *subjective* and the *moral* side, with its preponderance of want, suffering, and misery, of dissension, wickedness, infamy, and absurdity, we soon become aware with horror that we have before us anything but a theophany.<sup>32</sup>

Schopenhauer developed his metaphysics of will in a series of lengthy works. The treatise, *Ueber den Willen in der Natur*, sketches the history of a good many earlier theories of will, in which Spinoza and the German idealists seem to impress Schopenhauer most, and then the work argues that cosmic nature is nothing but the objectification of will activity.<sup>33</sup> His work entitled, *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik*, contains two essays which purport to show how will manifests itself in the psychological and moral life of man.<sup>34</sup> But the most important metaphysical work that he produced was undoubtedly *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*.<sup>35</sup> Here, he endeavors to explain "the meaning for which we seek of that world which is present to us only as our idea (*Vorstellung*)."<sup>36</sup> After criticizing a purely physical explanation of the universe, Schopenhauer goes on:

But all this is not the case; indeed the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge who appears as an individual, and the answer is *will*. This and this alone gives him the key to his own existence, reveals to him the significance, shows him the inner mechanism of his being, of his action, of his movements. The body is given in two entirely different ways to the

subject of knowledge, who becomes an individual only through his identity with it. It is given as an idea in intelligent perception, as an object among objects and subject to the laws of objects. And it is given in quite a different way as that which is immediately known to every one, and is signified by the word *will*. Every true act of his will is also at once and without exception a movement of his body. The act of will and the movement of the body are not two different things objectively known, which the bond of causality unites; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect; they are one and the same, but they are given in entirely different ways,—immediately, and again in perception for the understanding. The action of the body is nothing but the act of the will objectified, i.e., passed into perception. It will appear later that this is true of every movement of the body, not merely those which follow upon motives, but also involuntary movements which follow upon mere stimuli, and indeed, that the whole body is nothing but objectified will, i.e., will become idea.<sup>37</sup>

Very little comment is needed, on this long text. Schopenhauer is telling us that will is everything. If it helps to put the point in Kantian terms, then we might note that Schopenhauer later says that, "the will alone is a thing-in-itself."<sup>38</sup> So, though man and the universe appear to be many things, of variegated characteristics, fundamentally all these are but the appearances of one underlying reality, which is will.

One cannot describe this metaphysical will of Schopenhauer. To attempt description would be to translate will into its phenomenal aspects, into what it imperfectly seems to be rather than what it is. Will is the ineffable principle of reality.

Once one has read Schopenhauer, other and later proponents of metaphysical voluntarism seem rather pale figures.

Eduard von Hartmann further explores the concept of an unconscious will. To him, will as unconscious is "the immanent cause of every movement in animals, which is not produced reflectorially."<sup>39</sup> Conscious willing is the cause of preconceived action and follows upon reflection. "What then in the present work is denoted by the word 'Will' is no other than the same essential principle in both cases."<sup>40</sup> One could find similar tendencies toward psychological voluntarism among many of the German founders of experimental psychology, in the nineteenth century. To the extent that they had a philosophical view of the human psyche, both Fechner and Wundt regarded mental or spiritual activity as a manifestation of will. What they meant by will is not different from what we have seen in Schopenhauer.

The case of Friedrich Nietzsche is different. There is no doubt that will is a most important factor in his thought but there would be some question as to whether he has a metaphysics of will; this is because it is not clear that he had any metaphysics. James Collins remarks that Nietzsche "agrees with Schopenhauer that will constitutes the essential nature of the real, although the will is no longer a noumenal backdrop for Nietzsche, but is only the dynamic aspect of the 'appearances'."<sup>41</sup> Interpretation of Nietzsche is made more difficult by the way in which his sister, Elizabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, interfered with the content of his writings. *The Will to Power*, one of his most widely read books, was not written in that form by Friedrich Nietzsche but was a compilation by his sister of various selections from his other works and notes.<sup>42</sup> However, the notion of the *Wille zur Macht* is present in nearly all his writings and it is a quasi-universal principle of his philosophy. Unlike Schopenhauer, Nietzsche is convinced that the drive of universal will is a movement toward the morally approvable maximization of the human

propositions would be such that to deny them would be to reaffirm them.<sup>51</sup> So, for Royce, willing implies the mental initiative required to alter the facts of experience, over and above the manner in which they are passively received by intellect.<sup>52</sup>

At least four acts of willing are distinguished by Royce: desire, choice, volitional expression, and attention. Desire names the initial feelings that arise in the mind, which feelings may be rational or irrational. All more developed acts of volition begin as desires.<sup>53</sup> Choice is a more rational process, involving "the presence of plans for the satisfaction of desires." In choice, some desires are consciously made to survive and this involves the suppression of other feelings.<sup>54</sup> Volitional expression designates the effectiveness of willing; as Royce puts it: "as doer, as voluntary agent, he [man] is the source of new being; he is an originator."<sup>55</sup> Finally, there is the act of attention, which is central to all volition. One attends, "by dwelling upon one or another various already known and abstractly conceivable possibilities."<sup>56</sup> Attention is the generic act of volition, present to some extent in all other acts of willing.

We are responsible for the consequences, to ourselves and to other persons, of actions which we perform with attention.<sup>57</sup> Royce's analysis of willing is used in the practical order, both in his ethics and his political philosophy.<sup>58</sup> Obviously, the ethics of loyalty implies the development of reasonable foresight, so that one may choose the action whose consequences, "form the most satisfactory present experience that is possible."<sup>59</sup>

It may be observed, in conclusion, that Royce has a very suggestive and well-developed theory of volition. His views have had a wide influence, not only in the United States and Latin America but also in contemporary France. Men like Gabriel Marcel, Louis Lavelle and Paul Ricoeur are not far

removed from Royce's basic notions of volition.<sup>60</sup> When Marcel writes that, "the will is embodied in acts which themselves form part of what I call reality," and that, "the will appears as a resistance to the seductions to which desire exposes me," he is not only thinking with Royce but using his very terminology.<sup>61</sup>

What we have seen, in this chapter, is the continuity of a tradition which makes reality to be ultimately of the nature of volition. Some thinkers identify this metaphysical will with the divine will; others make it personal volition; still others see it as a universal or cosmic will. Usually, such voluntaristic metaphysics results in an extension of the meaning of will to the point where it becomes as broad as being itself. This is a philosophical meaning that is far removed from the usage of ordinary language.

#### NOTES

1. Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI, 8, 1-21, ed. Bréhier, tome VI, deuxième partie, pp. 132-161.

2. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, III, 1, 1109b28-1111b3.

3. *Enneads*, VI, 8, 1; ed. Bréhier, p. 134, line 31, for *boulesis*, and sect. 13, p. 150, line 27, for *thelesis*.

4. *Ibid.*, sect. 21; ed. Bréhier, p. 160.

5. E. Benz, *Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der abend-ländischen Willensmetaphysik* (Stuttgart, 1932). Benz thinks that Aristotle considered the will to be a special potency of the rational soul (p. 12, note 10) and regards Aristotelian psychology as the beginning of a will metaphysics.

6. M. Victorinus, *Liber de generatione divina*, 23 (PL VIII, 1031-1032); see the analysis in Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, p. 588.

7. Cf. L. Gardet et M.-M. Anawati, *Introduction à la théologie musulmane* (Paris: Vrin, 1948), pp. 52-66, for the views of Al Ash'ari.

Instead of volitional accomplishment being dependent on strength of will, it varies directly with the availability of motives to which the subject continues to attend. Thus Lindworsky is typical of a general tendency in the German psychological writings to shift the focal point of volition from the concept of will-as-force, with varying degrees of intensity, toward an emphasis on attentive awareness of certain ideals or *values* which function in motivating the apparently strong-willed person. As Lindworsky sums up his position:

It is of little or no importance for the execution of a resolution whether or not the resolution has been made very energetically and intensely. On the other hand, it is of the greatest importance that the resolution be in consciousness at the very moment when it is to be carried out; if this is the case, its execution is certain, provided, of course, that it is still a genuine resolution and an actual decision.<sup>29</sup>

There is patent common sense in many of Lindworsky's findings. He has doubtless offered a possible explanation of phenomena of the present day: brain washing, the practical utility of repeated propaganda, and even the effects of reiterated advertising claims.

From the 1930's onward, the United States became the country in which empirical psychologists were most active and influential. However, the interests of recent American psychologists have not been directed to studies of volition. The term "will" is rarely found in the literature of present-day American psychology. During the past fifteen years, for instance, *Psychological Abstracts* reports practically no American studies of will or volition, as such. This is not to say that the subject is entirely ignored; rather, researchers have shifted to a different terminology, decision-making,

motivation, evaluation, and so on. As Norman Munn explains the situation, writing in 1951:

While they have much popular usage, the terms *will* and *will power* are seldom used by psychologists because they really explain nothing. . . . Psychologists have come to regard the varieties of behavior attributed to 'will power' as expressions of the relative strength of motive.<sup>30</sup>

In a more recent textbook by a group of American psychologists, this exclusion of the language of volition is spelled out in greater detail.

Although psychologists must depart somewhat from observation—because observations alone never interpret themselves—they still stay as close to observation as is practicable. In an earlier age, there was a tendency to explain things in terms of concepts called 'essences,' that the thinker devised or found ready-made in his society. Thus a great deal was said about things like 'mind' or 'will' or 'conscience,' all of which were used as explanatory terms. Today we are wary of using these terms, simply because they get a long way from the actual observations themselves. . . . It is difficult, if not impossible, to observe a will or a mind or a conscience. . . . Therefore, according to the law of parsimony, we should drop our 'will chooses' etc. and just say 'I choose.'<sup>31</sup>

One may remark in passing on the naiveté of writers who appear to consider "I" a simpler or more observable item than "will." However, the main point is clear: recent psychological literature offers little help in the understanding of the language of volition, precisely because will is excluded as non-explanatory and non-scientific. Meanwhile, will contin-

ues to be used in popular and scholarly writings, in spite of the ban that experimental psychologists have put upon it.

Ironically, we find a reverse trend in clinical psychology, psychoanalysis and psychiatry. Sigmund Freud had no technical use for the language of willing. His basic terminology of the id, ego and super-ego enabled him to talk about human behavior without mentioning volition.<sup>32</sup> This was precisely one of the criticisms directed against the original Freudianism by some of Freud's disciples. Alfred Adler (at one time, Freud's secretary) broke with the master in 1911 and went on to establish the school of "Individual Psychology."<sup>33</sup> One of Adler's chief complaints against Freud was that the libido (unconscious sexual drives) was made the source of the energy in man's psychic life. Adler came to insist that "will to power" (*Wille zur Macht*), in a modified Nietzschean sense, was much more important than Freud had realized. One of Adler's pupils, Rudolph Allers, developed the theme of two primitive tendencies of human nature, the will to power and the will to community.<sup>34</sup> The first is a tendency toward preservation of the self; the second is directed toward the social good. In this view, will is a primal tendency of man's nature.

Another pupil of Freud, Otto Rank, departed from the original theory and made "will therapy" the basis of his treatment of psychic disorders. Rank claimed that Freud had reduced willing to the activity of the *Id*, while Adler had interpreted will sociologically, as the will to power.<sup>35</sup> What is advisable in the treatment of emotional disorders, Rank insisted, is to encourage him to assert his "positive will."<sup>36</sup> At no point in his book on will therapy does Rank say precisely what this will is. The general impression one gets is that the Rankian concept of will covers the conscious personal ability to make an effort, to wish and to strive for

a faculty of will is well grounded in their scientific observations; other psychologists have been equally sure that there is no experimental evidence of will-functions which cannot be reduced to initial impulses and feelings of a somewhat physiological character. As we have seen, many experimental psychologists now regard will as a non-scientific term. Some continued interest in volition has been noted among applied psychologists, psychoanalysts and psychiatrists. Here, the meaning given to will is personal effort toward self-actualization and integration.

In view of the negative findings in psychology, we may well ask, now, whether the language of volition has any basic significance for those who engage in serious study of human activities. However, I think that there is an established core-meaning for will. This signification is not only that which is loosely described in general dictionaries but also that which is analyzed and expressed under diverse terminologies in several of the main schools of philosophy.

As I see it, this central meaning of human willing may be found in philosophies as diverse as the thought of Thomas Aquinas, Josiah Royce, John Dewey and the Soviet psychologists. Obviously, these thinkers represent radically different types of thought and terminology—yet each school offers something useful to our core-meaning.

Aquinas talks about at least five distinct acts of willing: intention of an end, consent to means, choice of a means (or, of action or non-action), volitional use of other activities, and volitional enjoyment of what has been accomplished through volition. He also discusses but less clearly: the act of wishing an end (*velle*), the act of desiring (*desiderium*), and the act of loving. The relating of these last three to the initial five volitional functions is a difficult problem.

Josiah Royce described four acts of willing: desiring,

As William James put it, in the language of physiology, habit formation is like the wearing of a groove in the channel of ideo-motor discharge: the result is a smoother flow of will energy.<sup>45</sup>

If we overlook the obvious variations of terminology in these analyses, we find something that looks like a common pattern. *Step I* consists of certain unresolved, initial feeling-tendencies or impulses. *Step II* is the initiation of the personal effort to resolve the conflict of these impulses in terms of some reflective objective (which may be called an end, a conscious purpose, or an ideal value). *Step III* is the conscious terminating of the resolving process, in decision or choice. *Step IV* is the controlled execution of the decision, in volitionally directed activity or omission of activity. *Step V* is reflective satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the consequences of such a process.

One could define the central meaning of willing by saying that it is what is involved in the accomplishment of the foregoing five steps in personal effort making. Equivalent definitions could be contrived by using the notions of *personal effort*, *appetition*, *freedom*, or *love* as generic features. The following descriptive definition is what I would propose, at the end of much reading on the subject. *Willing is that psychic activity of man, whereby he tends toward or away from certain objectives reflectively adopted, whereby he sometimes achieves personal freedom of action, whereby he acts with some spontaneity or self-initiative, and whereby he approves or loves what he deems good and disapproves or hates what he deems not good.*

It should be added that such a meaning for volition need not commit the user to any special view of will as a power or faculty. Nor should it be understood as excluding rational motivation. Our core-definition does not tell us all about