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The Political Writings of
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received no honor from the rulers of England and is therefore not included in this distinguished catalogue, he did enjoy during his lifetime the considerable advantages of gentle birth. Notably, he received an excellent education; he was able to associate easily with the greatest and most highly placed personages of his age; and, as the first of his father's four sons, he never faced the necessity of earning a living. In short, Harrington clearly belonged to that aristocracy which he was to describe as possessing "nothing else but their education and their leisure for the public, furnished by their ease and competent riches, and their intrinsic value." It is surely no accident that when he came to write his theory of politics he relied heavily upon the virtues and abilities of this class.

What little information is available to us indicates that Harrington was an exceptionally intelligent child, notable for "his inclination and capacity to learn whatever was proposed to him" and for "a kind of natural gravity" hardly to be expected in one so young. Having spent his early years at his father's home in Lincolnshire, at the age of eighteen he became a Gentleman Commoner in Trinity College, Oxford. There he studied chiefly under the famous apostate Catholic theologian, William Chillingworth, whose most notable book, *The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation* (1637), contained a lively defense of religious toleration, the influence of which may be seen in Harrington's utterances on the same subject. In addition to his general studies, Harrington devoted himself particularly to learning foreign languages, apparently with considerable success, since his writings exhibit a thorough command of Greek, Latin, and Italian, as well as a working knowledge of Hebrew, French, and German. In April of 1630, Harrington's father died and shortly thereafter the young man, who was now financially independent, determined to set out on a tour of the Continent—a form of education which even in the seventeenth century was conceived to be peculiarly appropriate to the sons of aristocratic families.

Although he was only nineteen at the time of his departure, Harrington's activities on the Continent suggest that he was

during this period, and the tremendous expansion of Dutch commerce in both the old world and the new, can hardly have failed to impress the young visitor—as indeed they impressed all his contemporaries. Nor can we suppose that he was unaware of the continuing struggle of the Protestant provinces which sought their independence of both foreign control and the attempted centralization of the House of Orange. When, after traveling through Flanders, Harrington reached France, the contrast must indeed have been striking. Just two years earlier, on November 11, 1630—the famous “Day of the Dupes”—Cardinal Richelieu had finally won his battle with Marie de’ Medici for the support of the young Louis XIII, and by the time of Harrington’s visit the cardinal was well on his way toward the creation of the rigidly centralized “great monarchy” that was to evoke the admiration of all Europe. Harrington, however, was unimpressed. Richelieu, he felt, had no understanding of the true principles of politics and consequently his “fame . . . hath been like the thunder, whereof we hear the noise, but can make no demonstration of the reason.”

Finding little in France to detain him, Harrington traveled next to Italy, stopping first in the Rome of Urban VIII and then in Venice. Of all the places he was to visit, Venice had undoubtedly the greatest influence on the young Englishman’s thought. Despite the fact that the greatness of the republic had declined considerably by the middle of the seventeenth century, Harrington was literally overwhelmed by what he saw there. John Toland, his earliest biographer, tells us that:

He preferred Venice to all other places in Italy, as he did its Government to all those in the whole world, it being in his opinion immutable by any external or internal causes. . . . Here he furnished himself with a collection of all the valuable Books in the Italian language, especially treating of politics, and contracted acquaintance with every one of whom he might receive and benefit by instruction or otherwise.⁴

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xv.

Typically, Harrington’s chief concern was with the government of Venice; whatever the original purpose of his continental tour, its effect had clearly been to stimulate his interest in the world of politics. Thus Toland reports that “he was often heard to say that, before he left England he knew no more of Monarchy, Anarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy, Oligarchy or the like, than as hard words whereof he learned the signification in his Dictionary.”

By the time of his return to England about 1635, Harrington’s sympathies in his country’s mounting constitutional crisis were firmly republican and antimonarchical. In view of this fact it is particularly interesting to note that he soon became an intimate friend of Charles I and accompanied the king to Scotland as a member of the Privy Chamber Extraordinary during the first Bishops’ War (1639). John Aubrey, a contemporary, informs us that “the king loved his company, only he would not endure to hear of a Commonwealth; and Mr. Harrington passionately loved his Majesty.” Perhaps because of the problems raised by this conflict of loyalties—personal devotion to the king versus intellectual commitment to republicanism—Harrington devoted himself during these troubled years chiefly to the affairs of his family, of which he was now the head, and to furthering his own education. “No man,” he wrote in his first book, “can be a Politician, except he be first an Historian or a Traveller.” Having already traveled extensively, he now set out to make himself an historian, assimilating in the process a vast body of political writings, ancient, medieval, and modern.

Almost nothing is known of Harrington’s activities during the period of the first Civil War; the stories of his attempts to win a seat in Parliament have—like so much other alleged biographical information—proved unfounded. In January of 1647, when the Scottish army surrendered the captive Charles I to Parliament, a parliamentary commission was sent to bring the king from Newcastle to Holmby House, in Northampton, and perhaps to reach some sort of political agreement with him. As a supporter of the parliamentary cause, and at the

friends a long time attributed to Melancholy or Discontent.”⁵ At first, he determined to turn his back on the world of politics of which he had such unhappy experience, and toyed briefly with the idea of becoming a poet, going so far as to publish two translations from Virgil’s *Aeneid* and *Eclogues* in presentable (though undistinguished) English verse. It is interesting that even here Harrington was unable entirely to bridle his political imagination and intruded his beloved theory of the balance of property in an extraneous ode, in a footnote, and in various distortions of the texts he translated. Before long, having discovered (or, rather, having been told) that “his Muse was rough,” Harrington abandoned any idea of a purely literary career and, although he remained in retirement, turned to politics once again with the writing of his magnum opus, *The Commonwealth of Oceana*. Later in his life he explained the circumstances that led him to undertake this project:

. . . I wrote under a Usurper, Oliver [Cromwell]. He having started up into the Throne, his Officers (as pretending to be for a Commonwealth) kept a murmuring, at which he told them that he knew not what they meant, nor [did they] themselves; but let any one of them show him what they meant by a Commonwealth (or that there was any such thing) and they should see that he sought not himself: the Lord knew he sought not himself, but to make good the Cause. Upon this some sober men came to me and told me, if any man in England could show what a Commonwealth was, it was my self. Upon this persuasion I wrote. . . .⁶

The writing of the *Oceana* required something more than three years, beginning shortly after the establishment of the Protectorate in 1653 and ending with the publication of the book in the fall of 1656. As we have already seen, many of the ideas presented in the *Oceana*—including its praise of the Venetian constitution, its doctrine of the balance of property, and its general republican bias—had been developed by

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xxxiv.

Harrington considerably earlier than this, but now for the first time he combined them in a coherent theoretical system and put forward this system as an answer to England's political problems.

III

The Commonwealth of Oceana is a long, tedious book, overburdened with trivial details and endless citations of historical and literary authorities. It is divided into four parts: (1) The Preliminaries; (2) The Council of Legislators; (3) The Model of the Commonwealth of Oceana; and (4) The Corollary. While the first of these parts consists of a general exposition of Harrington's theory of politics, the last three are concerned with the creation, the structure, and the operation of the government which Harrington believed should be established in England. If one uses the adjective "utopian" to describe visionary and impractical schemes, Harrington's *Oceana* was most certainly not intended as a utopian book; beneath the most transparent of disguises, its subject matter is clearly the political state of seventeenth-century England, as Harrington indicated in his introductory quotation from Horace: "*mutato nomine, de te Fabula narratur*." Despite his later statements about "the usurper Oliver," Harrington dedicated the *Oceana* to Cromwell and obviously hoped that the Lord Protector would use it as a handbook to guide him in the business of establishing a new government that would succeed where the Stuart monarchy, the short-lived Commonwealth, and the Protectorate had all failed. From the very beginning his hopes were disappointed. Far from seizing upon the *Oceana* as a blueprint, Cromwell first obstructed its publication and then, after his sister had interceded on Harrington's behalf, relented somewhat reluctantly on the understanding that "it was only a kind of Political Romance" quite unrelated to real events. Although Harrington explicitly offered to the Lord Protector the glory of being a new Lycurgus, Cromwell is said to have replied that "The Gentleman had like to trepan him out of

his Power, but that what he got by the Sword he would not quit for a little paper Shot." This sounds very unlike Cromwell, and in all probability it was invented by Harrington or his friends, but in any case the Protector's decidedly cool reception of the book forced its author to revise his tactics; he could no longer rely, as Plato had done, on the appealingly simple device of a single omnipotent and all-wise Legislator.

The next four years Harrington devoted to the achievement of one purpose: the popularization of the ideas and proposals of his *Oceana*. With boundless energy and with considerable imagination, he repeated these ideas and proposals over and over again in books, in pamphlets, in dialogues, in comic essays, in illustrated broadsides, in petitions to Parliament, in collections of simple aphorisms, and, finally, in the meetings of his famous Rota Club. Although, as the years passed, he came increasingly to simplify his message and to strip away such superfluous details as descriptions of the uniforms to be worn by officials in the "equal commonwealth," Harrington made no fundamental change in his system after 1656. Like his equal commonwealth, this system had been created "at once and entire." The only important modifications that he would admit concerned the method of establishing the equal commonwealth, and these were clearly no more than minimal concessions to political reality. Harrington's tactics, and particularly the activities of the Rota Club—at which, Aubrey tells us, discussion was "the most ingeniose, and smart, that I ever heard, or expect to heare, and bandied with great eagerness; the arguments in the Parliament howse were but flatt to it. . . ."—succeeded in winning for the theorist a considerable reputation among his contemporaries, but in their major purpose they failed utterly. Despite the presence in the last Protectorate Parliament of a large number of Harringtonians, and despite Harrington's truly feverish activity in the confused year following Oliver Cromwell's death, none of the proposals of the *Oceana* was adopted during the Interregnum. Finally, in 1660, the restoration of the Stuart mon-

⁷ John Aubrey, *Brief Lives*, ed. Clark (Oxford, 1898), I, 289.

I well remember, he severall times . . . sayd, "Well, the King will come in. Let him come-in, and call a Parliament of the greatest Cavaliers in England, so they be men of estates, and let them but sett seven years, and they will all turn Commonwealth's men." ¹⁰

Small wonder that Charles II, having summoned the so-called "Cavalier Parliament," felt that it would be wise to keep the author of such subversive statements in prison! Despite the lack of evidence against him, Harrington remained in prison for several years, an ordeal that destroyed both his health and reason. Finally, in 1677, he died and was buried in St. Margaret's Church, Westminster, next to the grave of Sir Walter Raleigh. It was typical of his life that an epitaph which had been written for him by his friend, Andrew Marvell, was thought to be politically offensive and was replaced by an innocuous Latin inscription. Actually, Harrington himself had provided a more fitting epitaph, when in 1659 he wrote in his *Art of Lawgiving*: "If this age fails me, the next will do me justice." His own age had most certainly failed him, but future ages were to atone for this, both by vindicating his political predictions and by adopting in large measure his political proposals.

IV

In so far as James Harrington is remembered at all today, he is remembered simply as a political theorist who emphasized the importance of economic conditions and who constructed an elaborate model of a state which he called *The Commonwealth of Oceana*. In a sense it is fitting that this should have been the judgment of posterity. Unquestionably Harrington believed that his most important discovery was the law of the "balance of property," and that his most significant practical contribution consisted in the description of that system of institutions known as the "equal commonwealth." In a broader sense, however, neither Harrington nor

¹⁰ Aubrey, *op. cit.*, I, 291.

the student of his writings can be wholly satisfied with this judgment. In addition to perpetuating the myth that Harrington was a man of one idea, it completely fails to recognize the two most interesting aspects of his political thought: his attempt to formulate a comprehensive and coherent science of politics, and his extraordinary success in understanding the fundamental political problems of his time. Thus, for example, Harrington's famous law of the "balance of property" was not simply the result of a happy guess or an isolated insight, but rather was one part of an extremely complex theoretical system designed to comprehend all of political reality. Similarly, the proposed institutions of the "equal commonwealth" were not dreamed up at random by Harrington's admittedly fertile imagination, but were designed with reference both to the laws of politics, as he understood them, and to the political condition of seventeenth-century Europe. The process of putting the parts of Harrington's theory back into their original places, of reintegrating his system, as it were, does not necessarily lead one to a more favorable estimate of his stature as a political theorist (although it may well serve this purpose), but it does result in a considerably more accurate and complete understanding of both the parts and the whole, and for this reason it is well worth undertaking.

In a passage that we have already noted, John Adams expressed his opinion that Harrington's doctrine of political balance "is as infallible a maxim in politics as that action and reaction are equal is in mechanics." This parallel between the Harringtonian principle and the Newtonian law of motion is in some respects an extremely suggestive and useful one, and it is most certainly one that would have pleased Harrington immensely. For although he lived a generation before the great physicist and was concerned with phenomena of a completely different order, Harrington was as much a child of the intellectual and scientific revolution of the seventeenth century as was Newton. Indeed, one may conveniently characterize Harrington's career by saying that throughout his life his primary concern was to apply to politics the tech-

niques that had proved so fruitful in the natural sciences, creating (and also popularizing) a *science* of politics. Just as the natural scientist postulated the existence of order in the universe and sought to discover the principles that would explain its operation, so Harrington argued that the task of the student of politics was to reveal the underlying orderliness of political life and to expound the laws that govern it. In fact, Adams' parallel can be made even more exact by noting that the very terminology which Harrington used was, to a considerable extent, drawn from the natural sciences. The notion of equilibrium, of balance, was taken directly from physics; in order to demonstrate the relevance to politics of this notion it was necessary, somehow, to reduce the elements of political life to a form that would admit of quantitative expression and of measurement on a common scale. Thus, Harrington's preoccupation with the amount of property, the number of voters, and the size of assemblies in various commonwealths may be taken as evidence of his determination to "search for measurable elements among . . . phenomena, and then search for relations between these measures of physical quantities" ¹¹—a determination which Alfred North Whitehead has shown to be basic to the development of the natural sciences in the seventeenth century.

If one attempts to carry the parallel between Newton's science and that of Harrington one step further, however, it becomes quite misleading. Despite important similarities of outlook, of terminology, and of method, it is perfectly clear that Harrington did not propose to apply to politics the speculative, deductive method characteristic of the so-called "natural philosophy." On the contrary, he repeatedly criticized Hobbes (whom he considered in other respects "the best writer at this day in the world" ¹²) for attempting to erect an absolute monarchy "by geometry," and he never tired of expressing his belief that the proper model for the new science of politics

¹¹ Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, 1948), p. 46.

¹² Harrington, *Prerogative of Popular Government*, in *Works*, p. 259.

was anatomy, the study of complex living organisms. Harrington wrote, in his *Art of Lawgiving*:¹⁸

There is between the discourses of such as are commonly called Natural Philosophers, and those of Anatomists, a large difference; the former are facile, the latter difficult . . . but the fearful and wonderful making, the admirable structure and great variety of the parts of Man's Body, in which the discourses of Anatomists are altogether conversant, are understood by so few, that I may say they are not understood by any. Certain it is that the delivery of a Model of Government (which either must be of no effect, or embrace all those Muscles, Nerves, Arteries and Bones, which are necessary to any function of a well-ordered Commonwealth) is no less than political anatomy.

Inspired by the signal achievements of William Harvey (1578-1657), the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, Harrington's "political anatomy" represented a deliberate attempt to create a science of politics that would be able to deal effectively with an inherently complex subject matter, that would be generally applicable without being so abstract as to have no relation to the real world of politics. Harrington had little sympathy for the amateurs of his day who were so carried away by the wonders of natural science that they applied its techniques indiscriminately to all fields; of the "virtuosi" who were soon to found the Royal Society, he wryly observed, "they had an excellent faculty of magnifying a Louse, and diminishing a Commonwealth." Magnifying a louse is a perfectly respectable occupation for anyone who is so inclined, but the very act of "diminishing" a commonwealth will inevitably obscure the wealth of detail which is essential to the operation of any government, and will consequently prevent the discovery of meaningful and useful laws of political life. The reader who is put off by the mass of trivia contained in Harrington's discussion of various polities will do well to remember that this passion for detail represents a deliberate attempt on the author's part to avoid oversimplification and excessive abstraction.

¹⁸ Harrington, *The Art of Lawgiving*, in *Works*, p. 429.

called upon to devote half of his *Leviathan* to religious questions), and Harrington, despite his fairly clear personal indifference, was determined that his theory of politics should emerge with the support of Scriptural authority. In a sense, the situation was the same with regard to classical sources. Here was another body of writings capable of eliciting great enthusiasm in an age still dominated by the spirit of the Renaissance; in particular, the connection between republican doctrine and the political practice of ancient Greece and Rome was inescapable.¹⁶ The crucial difference lies in the fact that Harrington himself was among the most ardent admirers of the virtue, the uncorrupted purity of classical political institutions. Thus, while Bossuet's idea of *la politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Écriture sainte* would have seemed to him both overstated and impractical, the not-dissimilar idea of politics drawn from the very institutions of Periclean Athens and republican Rome appealed to him greatly. But even here Harrington was aware of the difficulties involved in taking the position that the problems of the corrupt modern world could be solved by the simple expedient of reproducing these ancient institutions. In the first place, it was quite clear that the governments of Greece and Rome had not been perfect; if they had been, they would never have been destroyed, and thus there would be no need to recreate them. Along the same lines, there was every reason to believe that if they were to be recreated in their original form they would simply suffer the same fate once again. Furthermore, even if one were to assume, as Harrington seems occasionally to have done, that the destruction of these noble polities was due solely to "external causes" rather than to some flaw in their constitutions, it would still be necessary to recognize, perhaps with sorrow, that seventeenth-century England simply was not sufficiently similar to Periclean Athens or republican Rome to make possible such a recreation. What, then, should be the policy of

¹⁶ For an excellent treatment of this subject see Zera Fink, *The Classical Republicans* (Evanston, Ill., 1945).

one who profoundly admired and envied the political success of the ancients?

Harrington's answer was straightforward: such a person should make it his business to discover the fundamental causes of this success. Were the citizens of Athens public-spirited because of the bracing climate of Greece, or because they raised olives? Was the Roman republic virtuous because of its geographical location, or because its citizens wore togas? According to Harrington, these "explanations" cannot be dismissed simply because they seem far-fetched or illogical; because, in other words, we cannot immediately perceive any connection between government and climate, or costume, or diet. They can only be proven or disproven by an empirical, comparative study of political history and contemporary politics. Such a study, if it is managed properly, should enable us to isolate the essential determinants of political life, the fundamental causes of political success and failure, and to discard what Harrington once referred to as "accidents of no precedent to us." While he shared his contemporaries' view of history as, in essence, a decline from the golden age of classical antiquity through the ignorance and obscurantism of the "Gothic" Middle Ages to the anarchy and confusion of the modern age, and shared also their belief that the best hope of the modern world lay in a revival of "ancient prudence," Harrington used these familiar Renaissance arguments to justify something quite new: the creation of a science of politics modeled after the natural sciences. Mere antiquarianism, or a desire slavishly and uncritically to imitate the ancients, can lead to no good. This does not mean that one should ignore the examples of Greece and Rome, the "mines of ancient prudence"; on the contrary, one should study them with great care, remembering all the while, however, that "there is a difference between having the sense of a thing and making a right use of that sense." The latter—making a right use of our knowledge—necessarily involves the application of reason to historical data, the establishment of recurrent pat-

terns, and, finally, the discovery of causal relations. Thus, in Harrington's system, the techniques of political anatomy were in no way inconsistent with a profound regard for the institutions of the Greek *polis* and the Roman republic. On the contrary, it was precisely those techniques which made possible the understanding, and thus the rational emulation, of these institutions.

Our discussion of Harrington's treatment of religious and classical sources reveals a fundamental ambivalence in his thought, characteristic of the age in which he lived. Quite simply, he was unable to decide whether the attractions of innovation and novelty were preferable to the support of tradition and established authority; whether it was better to be the founder of a new science or the "retriever" of ancient wisdom. On the one hand, he used the word "modern" (which was just becoming current in English) in a uniformly derogatory sense; to call an idea or an institution "modern" was automatically to condemn it in Harrington's eyes. On the other hand, he insisted that the principles of politics, although they were "as ancient in Nature as her self,"¹⁷ were nevertheless "as new in Art as my Writing."¹⁸ The fact is that Harrington, like many of his contemporaries, was excited by the intellectual advances made in his lifetime, and particularly by the developing natural sciences which, in Francis Bacon's words, promised to "extend more widely the limits of the power and greatness of man,"¹⁹ but at the same time he lacked the self-confidence that would have permitted him to turn his back on divine revelation and the accumulated wisdom of the ages. One feels that he would have liked to strike out boldly on his own, as William Harvey had done, relying solely on the power of human reason and observation, but that a combination of prudence and humility prevented his doing so. Consequently, in the last analysis, one finds him

¹⁷ Harrington, *Prerogative . . .*, in *Works*, p. 249.

¹⁸ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁹ Quoted in Basil Willey, *The 17th Century Background* (London, 1949), p. 40.

taking an essentially pragmatic position: any argument, any variety of evidence that serves to convince people, is useful, and should be employed. Thus, when Matthew Wren accused Harrington of falsely attributing his own theory of political balance to Aristotle, Harrington replied: "I who must either have the more of Authority, or the less of Competition in the point, shall lose neither way."²⁰ Although he was personally committed to the method which he described as political anatomy, Harrington's chief concern was to communicate to his contemporaries and to posterity certain substantive insights into the nature of political reality. He was so convinced of the urgency of this educational task that he was willing, finally, to subordinate to it all claims of originality.

In order to understand this sense of urgency, it is necessary to turn from Harrington's method to a brief consideration of the content of his theory of politics, and particularly his treatment of the crucial and closely related problems of sovereignty and constitutionalism. By far the most impressive aspect of Harrington's performance as a political theorist was his extraordinary success in viewing the constitutional crisis of mid-seventeenth-century England in its appropriate historical context and, consequently, in recognizing its fundamental nature and its general significance. Almost without exception, his contemporaries saw the English civil wars as essentially a conflict between the forces of "good" and the forces of "evil," assigning virtue and vice to the contestants in accordance with their own political and religious predilections. Unmoved by these partisan polemics, and despite his own clear commitment to the parliamentary cause, Harrington insisted that England's tragic experience was simply one manifestation of a great historical process, a process that transcended national boundaries. Quite simply, this was the collapse of the medieval political order and the emergence of the modern state—the pre-eminent political fact of the seventeenth century. Throughout Europe, the traditional system of government by king and estates had broken down in the face of religious conflict, and

²⁰ Harrington, *Prerogative . . .*, in *Works*, p. 292.

their shepherdess with distended dugs or golden fleeces. The wings of thy night involve thee not in the horror of darkness, but have still some white feather, and thy day is that for which we esteem life the longest." But this ecstasy of Pliny's, as is observed by Bertius,² seems to allude as well to Marpesia [Scotland] and Panopea [Ireland], now provinces of this commonwealth, as to Oceana herself.

To speak of the people in each of these countries, this of Oceana, for so soft a one, is the most martial in the whole world. "Let states that aim at greatness," says Verulamius,³ "take heed how their nobility and gentlemen do multiply too fast, for that makes the common subject grow to be a peasant and base swain driven out of heart, and in effect but a gentleman's laborer. Even as you may see in coppice woods, if you leave the staddles [young trees] too thick you shall never have clean underwood, but shrubs and bushes; so in countries, if the gentlemen be too many, the commons will be base, and you will bring it to that, that not the hundredth pole will be fit for a helmet; especially as to the infantry, which is the nerve of an army, and so there will be great population and little strength. This which I speak of has been nowhere better seen than by comparing of Oceana and France, whereof Oceana though far less in territory and population has been nevertheless an overmatch: in regard the middle people of Oceana make good soldiers, which the peasants in France do not." In which words Verulamius (as Machiavelli has done before him) harps much upon a string which he has not perfectly tuned, and that is the *balance of dominion or property*: as it follows more plainly in his praise of "the profound and admirable device of Panurgus, King of Oceana [Henry VII,

² Probably either Pierre Bertius (1565-1629), a professor of geography at Leyden, or Gaspar Barthius, annotator of an edition of Pliny's letters published at Jena in 1650. The reference, however, cannot be discovered in the works of either.

³ Verulamius was Harrington's name for Francis Bacon (1561-1626), who was Baron Verulam before he became Viscount St. Albans. The quotation is from his *Essay XXIX*, "Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates."

1457-1509]," in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard; that is, maintained with such a proportion of land unto them as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty and no servile condition, and to keep the plough in the hand of the owners, and not mere hirelings; and thus indeed (says he) you shall attain unto Virgil's character, which he gives of ancient Italy: *Terra potens armis atque ubere glebae!*⁴

But the tillage bringing up a good soldiery brings up a good commonwealth which [Bacon], in the praise of Panurgus, did not [understand], nor Panurgus in deserving that praise. For where the owner of the plough comes to have the sword, too, he will use it in defense of his own; whence it has happened that the people of Oceana, in proportion to their property, have been always free. And the genius of this nation has ever had some resemblance with that of ancient Italy, which was wholly addicted to commonwealths, and where Rome came to make the greatest account of her rustic tribes and to call her consuls from the plough. For, in the way of parliaments, which was the government of this realm, men of country lives have been still entrusted with the greatest affairs, and the people have constantly had an aversion from the ways of the court; ambition, loving to be gay and to fawn, has been a gallantry looked upon as having something in it of the livery and husbandry or the country way of life, though of a grosser spinning, as the best stuff of a commonwealth according to Aristotle (*Agriculturarum democratica respublica optima*),⁵ such a one being the most obstinate assertress of her liberty and the least subject to innovation or turbulency. Wherefore till the foundations (as will be hereafter shown) were removed, this people was observed to be the least subject to shakings and turbulency of any. Whereas commonwealths upon which the city life has had the stronger influence, as Athens, have seldom or never been quiet, but at best are found to have injured their own business by overdoing it. Whence the urban

⁴ "A land strong in arms and in the richness of the soil." *Aeneid* i. 531.

⁵ See Aristotle *Politics* vi. 4. 1318b, 9. In Jowett's translation, "... the best material of democracy is an agricultural population."

tribes of Rome consisting of the *turba forensis*,⁶ libertines that had received their freedom by manumission, were of no reputation in comparison of the rustics. It is true that with Venice it may seem to be otherwise, in regard the gentlemen (for so are all such called as have right unto that government) are wholly addicted to the city life; but then the *turba forensis*, the secretaries, *cittadini*, with the rest of the populace, are wholly excluded. Otherwise a commonwealth, consisting but of one city, would doubtless be stormy, in regard that ambition would be every man's trade; but where it consists of a country, the plough in the hands of the owner finds him a better calling and produces the most innocent and steady genius of a commonwealth, such as is that of Oceana.

Marpesia, being the northern part of the same island, is the dry nurse of a populous and hardy people, but [a country] where the staddles have been formerly too thick. Whence their courage answered not to their hardness, except in the nobility, who governed that country much after the manner of Poland, save that the king was not elective, till the people received their liberty, the yoke of the nobility being broken by the commonwealth of Oceana, which in grateful return is thereby provided with an inexhaustible magazine of auxiliaries.

Panopea, the soft mother of a slothful and pusillanimous people, is a neighbor island anciently subjected by the arms of Oceana, since almost depopulated for shaking the yoke, and at length replanted with a new race. But (through what virtues of the soil or vices of the air soever it be) they come still to degenerate. Wherefore, seeing it is neither likely to yield men fit for arms nor necessary it should, it had been the interest of Oceana so to have disposed of this province, being both rich in the nature of the soil and full of commodious ports for trade, that it might have been ordered for the best in relation to her purse. Which in my opinion (if it had been thought upon in time) might have been best done by plant-

⁶ The mob of the market place. Cicero *De republica* i. 17.28; Livy ix. 46.14.

ing it with Jews, allowing them their own rites and laws, for that would have brought them suddenly from all parts of the world and in sufficient numbers. And though the Jews be now altogether for merchandise, yet in the land of Canaan (since their exile from whence they have not been landlords) they were altogether for agriculture; and there is no cause why a man should doubt but, having a fruitful country and good ports, too, they would be good at both. Panopea, well-peopled, would be worth a matter of four millions dry rent; that is besides the advantage of the agriculture and trade which, with a nation of that industry, comes at least unto as much more. Wherefore Panopea, being farmed out unto the Jews and their heirs forever, for the pay of a provincial army to protect them during the term of seven years, and for two millions annual revenue from that time forward, besides the customs which would pay the provincial army, would have been a bargain of such advantage both to them and this commonwealth as is not to be found otherwise by either. To receive the Jews after any other manner into a commonwealth were to maim it; for they of all nations never incorporate, but taking up the room of a limb are of no use or office to the body, while they suck the nourishment which would sustain a natural and useful member.

If Panopea had been so disposed of, that knapsack, with the Marpesian auxiliary, had been an inestimable treasure; the situation of these countries being islands (as appears by Venice how advantageous such a one is to the like government) seems to have been designed by God for a commonwealth. And yet that [Venice], through the straitness of the place and the defect of proper arms, can be no more than a commonwealth for preservation; whereas this [Oceana] reduced to the like government is a commonwealth for increase, and upon the mightiest foundation that any has been laid from the beginning of the world unto this day.⁷

⁷ For the distinction between commonwealths for preservation and those for increase, which Harrington took from Machiavelli, see p. 70.

self in the fabric of the commonwealth of Israel and afterward picked out of his footsteps in nature and unanimously followed by the Greeks and Romans; the other beginning with the arms of Caesar which, extinguishing liberty, were the transition of ancient into "modern prudence," introduced by those inundations of Huns, Goths, Vandals, Lombards, Saxons which, breaking the Roman Empire, deformed the whole face of the world with those ill features of government which at this time are become far worse in these western parts, except Venice (which escaping the hands of the barbarians by virtue of her impregnable situation has had her eye fixed upon ancient prudence and is attained to a perfection even beyond her copy).

Relation being had to these two times, government (to define it *de jure* or according to ancient prudence) is an art whereby a civil society of men is instituted and preserved upon the foundation of common right or interest, or (to follow Aristotle and Livy)² it is the empire of laws and not of men.

And government (to define it *de facto* or according to modern prudence) is an art whereby some man, or some few men, subject a city or a nation and rule it according to his or their private interest, which, because the laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a man, or of some few families, may be said to be the empire of men and not of laws.

The former is that kind which Machiavelli (whose books are neglected) is the only politician that has gone about to retrieve, and that Hobbes (who would have his book imposed upon the universities)³ goes about to destroy. For "it is," says Hobbes, "another error of Aristotle's *Politics* that in a well-ordered commonwealth not men should govern, but the laws: what man that has his natural senses, though he can neither write nor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears

² Aristotle *Politics* iii. 16. 1287a and Livy ii. 1.1. The definition of good government as government by laws rather than by men has been a commonplace in Western political thought since the time of Aristotle.

³ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, II, 30; in which Hobbes clearly expresses his willingness to "undertake to teach the Universities."

Government, according to the ancients and their learned disciple Machiavelli (the only politician of later ages), is of three kinds: the government of one man, or of the better sort, or of the whole people, which by their more learned names are called monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. These they hold, through their proneness to degenerate, to be all evil. For, whereas they that govern should govern according to reason, if they govern according to passion they do that which they should not do. Wherefore, as reason and passion are two things, so government by reason is one thing and the corruption of government by passion is another thing; but not always another government, as a body that is alive is one thing, and a body that is dead is another thing, but not always another creature, though the corruption of one come at length unto the generation of another. The corruption, then, of monarchy is called tyranny; that of aristocracy, oligarchy; and that of democracy, anarchy. But legislators, having found these three governments at the best to be nought, have invented another consisting of a mixture of them all, which only is good. This is the doctrine of the ancients.

But Hobbes is positive that they are all deceived and that there is no other government in nature than one of the three; as also [he is positive] that the flesh of them cannot stink, the names of their corruptions being but the names of men's fancies; which will be understood when we are shown which of them was *Senatus populusque Romanus*.⁸

To go my own way and yet to follow the ancients, the principles of governments are twofold: internal, or the "goods of the mind"; and external, or the "goods of fortune." The goods of the mind are natural or acquired virtues, as wisdom, prudence, and courage, etc. The goods of fortune are riches. There be goods also of the body, as health, beauty, strength; but these are not to be brought to account upon this score, because if a man or an army acquire victory or empire it is more from their discipline, arms, and courage than from their natural health, beauty, or strength, [which is seen in

⁸ "The Senate and people of Rome"; i.e., the Roman Republic.

the fact] that a people conquered may have more of natural strength, beauty, and health, and yet find little remedy. The principles of government, then, are in the goods of the mind or in the goods of fortune. To the goods of the mind [corresponds] authority; to the goods of fortune, power or empire. Wherefore Hobbes, though he be right where he says that "Riches are Power," is mistaken where he says that "Prudence or the reputation of Prudence is power"; for the learning or prudence of a man is no more power than the learning or prudence of a book or author, which is properly authority.⁹ A learned writer may have authority though he have no power, and a foolish magistrate may have power though he have otherwise no esteem or authority. The difference of these two is observed by Livy in *Evander*, of whom says he, *regebat magis Auctoritate quam Imperio* [he ruled rather by authority than power].¹⁰

To begin with riches, in regard that men are hung upon these not of choice as upon the other, but of necessity and by the teeth, for as much as he who wants bread is his servant that will feed him, if a man thus feed a whole people, they are under his empire.

Empire is of two kinds: domestic and national, or foreign and provincial.

Domestic empire is founded upon dominion.

Dominion is property, real or personal; that is to say, in lands or in money and goods.

Lands, or the parts and parcels of a territory, are held by the proprietor or proprietors, lord or lords of it, in some proportion; and such (except it be in a city that has little or no land and whose revenue is in trade) as is the proportion or balance of dominion or property in land, such is the nature of the empire.

If one man be sole landlord of a territory, or overbalance the people, for example, three parts in four, he is *Grand*

⁹ *Leviathan*, I, 10.

¹⁰ Livy i. 7.

been little worse for the other in case she had not divided at all but kept the whole cake to herself, in regard that, being to choose too, she divided accordingly. Wherefore if the senate have any further power than to divide, the commonwealth can never be equal. But in a commonwealth consisting of a single council, there is no other to choose than that which divided. Whence it is that such a council fails not to scramble, that is, to be factious, there being no other dividing of the cake in that case but among themselves.

Nor is there any remedy but to have another council to choose. The wisdom of the few may be the light of mankind, but the interest of the few is not the profit of mankind, nor of a commonwealth. Wherefore, seeing we have granted interest to be reason, they must not choose, lest it put out their light. But as the council dividing consists of the *wisdom* of the commonwealth, so the assembly or council choosing should consist of the *interest* of the commonwealth. As the wisdom of the commonwealth is in the aristocracy, so the interest of the commonwealth is in the whole body of the people. And whereas this, in case the commonwealth consist of a whole nation, is too unwieldy a body to be assembled, this council is to consist of such a representative as may be equal, and so constituted as can never contract any other interest than that of the whole people. The manner whereof being such as is best shown by exemplification, I remit to the model.⁴¹ But in the present case, the six dividing and the fourteen choosing, must of necessity take in the whole interest of the twenty.

Dividing and choosing in the language of a commonwealth is debating and resolving, and whatsoever upon debate of the senate is proposed unto the people and resolved by them is enacted Auctoritate Patrum Et Jussu Populi, by the authority of the fathers and the power of the people, which concurring make a law.

But the law being made, says Hobbes, "is but words and

⁴¹ By the "Model" Harrington means the second part of his *Commonwealth of Oceana*, which describes in detail the system of government which he proposed for England. See pp. 149-165.

in this case that Hobbes affirms the politics to be no ancients than his book *De cive*. Such also as have gotten any fame in the civil government of a commonwealth, or by the leading of her armies, have been gentlemen. For so in all other respects were those plebeian magistrates elected by the people of Rome, being of known descents and of equal virtues, save only that they were excluded from the name by the usurpation of the patricians. Holland, through this defect at home, has borrowed princes for her generals and gentlemen for her commanders, of divers nations. And Switzerland, if she have defect in this kind, rather lends her people to the colors of other princes than makes that noble use of them herself which should assert the liberty of mankind. For where there is not a nobility to bolt out the people, they are slothful, regardless of the world and the public interest of liberty, as even that of Rome had been without her gentry. Wherefore let the people embrace the gentry in peace as the light of their eyes and in war as the trophy of their arms. And if Cornelia disdained to be Queen of Egypt, if a Roman consul looked down from his tribunal upon the greatest king, let the nobility love and cherish the people that afford them a throne so much higher in a commonwealth, and in the acknowledgment of their virtue, than the crowns of monarchs.

But if the equality of a commonwealth consists in the equality first of the Agrarian and next of the rotation, then the inequality of a commonwealth must consist in the absence or inequality of the Agrarian or of the rotation, or of both.

Israel and Lacedaemon, which commonwealths (as the people of [the latter], in [the history of] Josephus,⁵³ claim [to be] kindred of [the former]) have great resemblance, were each of them equal in their Agrarian and unequal in their rotation, especially Israel, where the *Sanhedrin* or senate first elected by the people, as appears by the words of Moses, took upon them [selves] thenceforth, without any precept of God, to substitute their successors by ordination; which having been there of civil use, as excommunication, community of

⁵³ Josephus *Antiquitatum Judaicarum* xii. 4.10.

sist, as has been shown by reason and all experience, of the three general orders; that is to say, *of the senate debating and proposing, of the people resolving, and of the magistracy executing*. Wherefore I can never wonder enough at Hobbes, who, without any reason or example, will have it that a commonwealth consists of a single person or of a single assembly, nor sufficiently pity that "a thousand gentlemen, whose minds otherwise would have wavered, he has framed (as is affirmed by himself) unto a conscientious obedience (for so he is pleased to call it) of such a government." ⁶⁴

But to finish this part of the discourse, which I intend for as complete an epitome of ancient prudence and, in that, of the whole art of the politics as I am able to frame in so short a time:

The first two orders, that is to say, the senate and the people, are *legislative*, whereunto answers that part of this science which by politicians is entitled *De legibus* or of laws. And the third order is *executive*, to which answers that part of the same science which is styled *De judiciis*, or of the frame and course of courts or judicatories. A word to each of these will be necessary.

And first for laws: they are either ecclesiastical or civil, such as concern religion or government. (Somebody blushes, but I will do no harm.)

Ecclesiastical laws or such as concern religion, according to the universal course of ancient prudence, are in the power of the magistrate; but according to the common practice of modern prudence, since the papacy, torn out of his hands.

But as a government pretending to liberty and suppressing the liberty of conscience, which (because religion not according to a man's conscience can as to him be none at all) is the main [form of liberty], must be a contradiction, so a man that, pleading for the liberty of private conscience, refuses liberty to the national conscience must be absurd.

⁶⁴ "[My doctrine] hath framed the minds of a thousand gentlemen to a conscientious obedience to the present government which otherwise would have wavered in that point." Hobbes, *Works*, VII, 335f.

Now a commonwealth is nothing else but the national conscience. And if the conviction of a man's private conscience produce his private religion, the conviction of the national conscience must produce a national religion. Whether this be well reasoned, as also whether these two may stand together, will best be shown by the examples of the ancient commonwealths taken in their order.

In that of Israel, the government of the national religion appertained not to the priests and Levites otherwise than as [they happened] to [be members of] the *Sanhedrin* or senate, to which they had no right at all but by election. It is in this capacity, therefore, that the people are commanded under pain of death, "to hearken unto them, and to do according to the sentence of the law which they should teach."⁵⁵ But in Israel the law ecclesiastical and civil was the same; therefore the *Sanhedrin* having the power of one had the power of both. But as the national religion appertained to the jurisdiction of the *Sanhedrin*, so the liberty of conscience appertained from the same date and by the same right to the prophets and their disciples; as where it is said, "I will raise up a prophet—and whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in my Name, I will require it of him."⁵⁶ Which words relate to prophetic right, which was above all the orders of this commonwealth; whence Elijah not only refused to obey the king, but destroyed his messengers with fire.⁵⁷ And whereas it was not lawful by the national religion to sacrifice in any other place than the Temple, a prophet was his own temple and might sacrifice where he would, as Elijah did in Mount Carmel.⁵⁸ By this right John the Baptist and our Saviour, to whom it more particularly related, had their disciples and taught the people; whence is derived our present right of *gathered congregations*. Wherefore the Christian religion grew up according to the orders

⁵⁵ Deut. 17:9ff.

⁵⁶ Deut. 18:18ff.

⁵⁷ II Kings, 1:9ff.

⁵⁸ I Kings, 18:19ff.

this empire, being neither hawk nor buzzard, made flight accordingly, and having the avarice of the soldiery on this hand to satisfy upon the people, and the senate and the people on the other to be defended from the soldiery, the prince being perpetually tossed seldom died any other death than by one horn of this dilemma, as is noted more at large by Machiavelli.⁷¹ But the pretorian bands, those bestial executioners of their captain's tyranny upon others and of their own upon him, having continued from the time of Augustus, were by Constantine the Great (incensed against them for taking part with his adversary, Maxentius) removed from their strong garrison which they held in Rome, and distributed into divers provinces. The *benefices* of the soldiers that were hitherto held for life and upon duty, were by this prince made hereditary so that the whole foundation whereupon this empire was first built, being now removed, shows plainly that the emperors must long before this have found out some other way of support, and this was by stipendiating the Goths, a people that, deriving their roots from the Northern parts of Germany or out of Sweden, had (through their victories obtained against Domitian) long since spread their branches to so near neighborhood with the Roman territories that they began to overshadow them. For the emperors, making use of them in their arms (as the French do at this day of the Swiss), gave them that, under the notion of stipend, which they received as tribute, coming (if there were any default in the payment) so often to distrain for it that in the time of Honorius they sacked Rome and possessed themselves of Italy. And such was the transition of ancient into modern prudence, or that breach which, being followed in every part of the Roman Empire with inundations of Vandals, Huns, Lombards, Franks, Saxons, overwhelmed ancient languages, learning, prudence, manners, cities; changing the names of rivers, countries, seas, mountains, and men; Camillus, Caesar, and Pompey being come to Edmund, Richard, and Geoffrey.

To open the groundwork or balance of these new politi-

⁷¹ *The Prince*, Chap. XIX, 8.

cians, *feudum*, says Calvin the lawyer,⁷² is a Gothic word of divers significations, for it is taken either for war or for a "possession of conquered lands distributed by the victor unto such of his captains and soldiers as had merited in his wars, upon condition to acknowledge him to be their perpetual lord and themselves to be his subjects."

Of these there were three kinds or orders. The first, of nobility, distinguished by the titles of dukes, marquesses, earls, and these being gratified with cities, castles, and villages of the conquered Italians, their feuds participated of royal dignity and were called "Regalia," by which they had right to coin money, create magistrates, take toll, customs, confiscations, and the like.

Feuds of the second order were such as with the consent of the king were bestowed by these feudatory princes upon men of inferior quality called their barons, on condition that next unto the king they should defend the dignities and fortunes of their lords in arms.

The lowest order of feuds were such as being conferred by those of the second order upon private men, whether noble or not noble, obliged them in the like duty unto their superiors, these were called "vavasors." And this is the Gothic balance by which all the kingdoms this day in Christendom were at first erected. For which cause, if I had time, I should open in this place the Empire of Germany and the kingdoms of France, Spain, and Poland. But so much as has been said being sufficient for the discovery of the principles of *modern prudence in general*, I shall divide the remainder of my discourse, which is more particular, into three parts:

The first, showing the constitution of the late monarchy of Oceana;

The second, the dissolution of the same;

⁷² This is not John Calvin the theologian, but rather Jean Calvinus, a professor at Heidelberg and author of the *Lexicon juridicum* (Frankfort, 1600); the passage cited by Harrington appears on p. 368 of the 1645 Geneva ed.

years without any dangerous tumult or corruption." ¹⁰⁹ My Lord General (as it is said of Themistocles, that he could not sleep for the glory obtained by Miltiades at the battle of Marathon) took so new and deep impression at these words of the much greater glory of Lycurgus, that being on this side assaulted with the emulation of his illustrious object, on the other with the misery of the nation, which seemed (as it were ruined by his victory) to cast herself at his feet, he was almost wholly deprived of his natural rest until the debate he had within himself came to a firm resolution that the greatest advantages of a commonwealth are, first, that the legislator should be one man, and secondly, that the government should be made altogether or at once. For the first it is certain, says Machiavelli, ¹¹⁰ that a commonwealth is seldom or never well turned or constituted except it have been the work of one man. For which cause a wise legislator and one whose mind is firmly set not upon private but the public interest, not upon his posterity but upon his country, may justly endeavor to get the sovereign power into his own hands. Nor shall any man that is master of reason blame such extraordinary means as in that case shall be necessary, the end proving no other than the constitution of a well-ordered commonwealth. The reason of this is demonstrable: for the ordinary means not failing, the commonwealth has no need of a legislator, but the ordinary means failing, there is no recourse to be had but to such as are extraordinary. And, whereas a book or a building has not been known to attain to perfection if it have not had a sole author or architect, a commonwealth, as to the fabric of it, is of the like nature. And thus it may be made at once, in which there be great advantages. For a commonwealth made at once takes her security at the same time she lends her money, trusts not herself to the faith of men, but launches immediately forth into the *empire of laws*, and being set straight, brings the manners of her citizens unto her rule. Whence followed that uprightness which was in Sparta. But

¹⁰⁹ *Discourses*, I, 2.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 9.

manners that are rooted in men bow the tenderness of a commonwealth coming up by twigs unto their bent; whence followed the obliquity that was in Rome and those perpetual repairs by the consuls' axes and tribunes' hammers, which could never finish that commonwealth but in destruction.

My Lord General being clear in these points and the necessity of some other course than would be thought upon by the Parliament, appointed a rendezvous of the army, where he spoke his sense agreeable to these Preliminaries with such success to the soldiery that the Parliament was soon after deposed, and himself (in the great Hall of the Pantheon or Palace of Justice, situated in Emporium, the capital city) created, by the universal suffrage of the army, Lord Archon, or sole legislator of Oceana; upon which theater you have, to conclude this piece, a person introduced whose fame shall never draw his curtain. ¹¹¹

The Lord Archon being created, fifty select persons to assist him (by laboring in the mines of ancient prudence and bringing her hidden treasures unto new light) were added, with the style also of Legislators and sat as a Council whereof he was the sole Director and President.

THE COUNCIL OF LEGISLATORS

Of this piece, being the greater half of the whole work, I shall be able at this time to give no further account than very briefly to show at what it aims.

My Lord Archon in opening the Council of Legislators made it appear how unsafe a thing it is to follow fancy in the fabric of a commonwealth, and how necessary that the archives of ancient prudence should be ransacked before any counselor should presume to offer any other matter in order to the work at hand, or towards the consideration to be had by the Council upon a Model of Government. Wherefore he caused an urn

¹¹¹ Pantheon is Westminster Hall; Emporium is London.

6. Where there is but one Elder of the Horse in a parish, let him be annually eligible, without interval; where there are more Elders of the Horse, let no Deputy of the parish be re-eligible but after the interval of one year.

7. Where there be four Elders of the Horse, or more, in one and the same parish, let not under two, nor above half of them, be elected at one and the same election or time.

8. Let the Deputies thus elected at the parishes assemble annually at the capital of their shire, and let them then and there elect out of their own number two Elders of the Horse to be Knights or Senators, three Elders of the Horse and four Elders of the Foot to be the Assembly of the People, for the term of three years, enjoining an equal vacation or interval before they can be re-elected in either of these capacities.

9. Let there be elected at the same time in each shire, the first year only, two other Knights and seven other Deputies for the term of one year, and two other Knights and seven other Deputies for the term of two years, which in all constitutes the Senate of three hundred Knights and the popular Assembly of one thousand and fifty Deputies, each being upon a triennial rotation or annual change in the one-third part.

10. Let the Senate have the whole Authority or right of debating and proposing to the people; let the popular Assembly have the whole Power of Result; and let what shall be proposed by the Senate, and resolved by the popular Assembly, be the law of Oceana.

The Conclusion

Two Assemblies thus constituted must necessarily amount to the understanding and the will, to the wisdom and the interest of the whole nation; and a commonwealth where the wisdom of the nation proposes, and the interest of the people resolves, can never fail in whatever shall be further necessary for the right constituting of itself.

THE MODEL AT LARGE OF A FREE STATE OR EQUAL COMMONWEALTH

PROPOSED IN FOUR PARTS: FIRST, THE CIVIL; SECONDLY, THE RELIGIOUS; THIRDLY, THE MILITARY; FOURTHLY, THE PROVINCIAL.

I. For the Civil Part, it is proposed:

1. That the whole native or proper territory of Oceana (respect had to the tax roll, to the number of people, and to the extent of territory) be cast with as much exactness as can be convenient into fifty precincts, shires, or tribes.

2. That all citizens, that is, freemen, or such as are not servants, be distributed into Horse and Foot, that such of them as have one hundred pounds a year in lands, goods, or money, or above that proportion, be accounted of the Horse; and all such as have under that proportion, be accounted of the Foot.

3. That all Elders or freemen, being thirty years of age or upwards, be capable of civil administration; and that the Youth, or such freemen as are between eighteen years of age and thirty, be not capable of civil administration, but of military only, in such manner as shall follow in the military part of this Model.

4. That the Elders resident in each Parish annually assemble in the same, as for example, upon Monday next ensuing the last of December; that they then and there elect out of their own number every fifth man, or one man out of every five, to be for the term of the year ensuing a Deputy of that Parish; and that the first and second so elected be Overseers, or presidents for the regulating of all parochial congregations, whether of the Elders or of the Youth, during the term for which they were elected.

5. That so many Parishes lying nearest together, whose Deputies shall amount to one hundred, or thereabouts, be cast into one precinct called the Hundred; and that in each precinct called the Hundred, there be a town, village, or place appointed to be the capital of the same.



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