



Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

10 East 53d Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

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Title **THE END OF PHILOSOPHY**

Author **Martin Heidegger**

Classification

Probable publication date **December 12, 1973**

Probable price **\$4.95**

Illustrations

Approximate length

**A brief description of the book appears in
front of these proofs**

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By Martin Heidegger

Being and Time
Discourse on Thinking
Hegel's Concept of Experience
Identity and Difference
What Is Called Thinking?
On the Way to Language
Poetry, Language, Thought
On Time and Being
The End of Philosophy

(ii)

The End of Philosophy

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Translated by Joan Stambaugh

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Harper & Row, Publishers
New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London

(ii)

The originally planned "destruction" was to be phenomenological in terms of a transcendental hermeneutic. These elements—phenomenology, hermeneutics, and transcendental philosophy—Heidegger linked indissolubly together in *Being and Time*, and it is precisely all three which he wishes to relinquish in his later thinking. Thus the destruction to be carried out can no longer have the character of these three elements, because they themselves constitute the history of ontology and are thus by no means capable of "destroying" or undoing that history. A destruction of the history of ontology must be undertaken in terms of the history of Being³ and must be thought from the Appropriation. It must lay bare the relation of the epochal transformations of Being to the Appropriation. Here, as well as in *Being and Time*, the term "destruction" means the unbuilding (*de-struere*) of the layers covering up the original nature of Being, the layers which metaphysical thinking has constructed.

In his attempt to relinquish the emphasis which metaphysical thinking has placed on causality (Being thought *exclusively* as the *ground* of being), Heidegger, particularly in his later thinking, comes more and more to center on the relation of identity and difference. In this relation it is fundamentally *difference* which receives prime emphasis, since identity is not thought traditionally as a static, abstract equation, but as *belonging-together*, which makes sense only in terms of what *differs*. For Heidegger, to differ is literally to dif-fer, to per-dure, to carry, hold, and bear out the relation of what belongs together.

Heidegger's first formulation of this relation in *Being and Time* is the ontological difference, the difference between Being and beings. This ontological difference, named but not carried out in *Being and Time*, was never thought by meta physics and would have to be experienced in a new way outside of metaphysics. Thus the ontological difference remains for Heidegger something inaccessible in

3. Cf. p. 00.

INTRODUCTION

principle to metaphysics, something to be experienced and transformed in terms of Appropriation.

What does metaphysics, which Heidegger defines as the separation of essence and existence that began with Plato, have to do with the ontological difference of Being and beings? One might say that the tradition, particularly the medieval tradition, would equate these two distinctions. Being (*esse*) is the essence of beings, of what exists (*existentia*), the essence in the sense of the universal One which unifies everything. For Heidegger, the distinction essence-existence actually belongs in the tradition on the side of Being, but the *difference* between Being and beings, although constantly presupposed by all metaphysics, was never thought. Only when metaphysics reaches its completion does the possibility arise of transforming the ontological difference, of thinking it from the unthought presupposition of all metaphysics back to its essential origin in Appropriation.

The greater part of this volume is engaged in working out what happened in the history of Being as metaphysics. With Plato's distinction of essence (whatness) and existence (thatness), the difference between Being and beings is obscured, and Being as such is thought exclusively in terms of its relation to beings as their first cause (*causa prima*, *causa sui*) and thus itself as the highest of those beings (*summum ens*). Thus metaphysics as the history of Being, as the history of the epochal transformations of Being, is precisely the history of the *oblivion* of Being. When the distinction of essence and existence arises, it is essence, whatness, which takes priority. The priority of essence over existence leads to an emphasis on beings. The original meaning of existence as *physis*, originating, arising, presencing, is lost, and existence is thought only in contrast to essence as what "factually" exists. In contrast to what "factually" exists here and now, Being is set up as permanent presence, a presence (nominal) abstracted from presencing (verbal) in terms of time-space.

This volume traces the history of the epochal transformations

of Being right up to Heidegger's own thinking in *Being and Time*, and points beyond that to what he has to say about the Appropriation. As he remarks, the essential nature of Being can be explained in terms of the Appropriation, but the Appropriation can in no way be understood as a form of "Being." The following questions and answers, which circle around the relation of Being, time, and Appropriation, are appended in the hope that they might throw additional light on these problems.⁴

1. Temporality.

QUESTION: What happens to the concept of temporality, so central in *Being and Time*, in your later thinking? Is there a relationship between temporality and Appropriation?

ANSWER: Temporality is "central" in *Being and Time* because the question of Being as such in the sense of presence starts with an analytic of human being which keeps itself ecstatically open to Being.

As a consequence of the turn, temporality is not given up but becomes the question of time and Being. The "temporality" of the Appropriation which temporalizes is the four-dimensional nearness bringing presencing near. The Appropriation is without destiny (*geschicklos*) because it itself sends presence. It is, however, not timeless in the sense of nearness. It is neither "in time" nor is it the "temporality" of human being, but rather brings each in a different way into its own.

In "Time and Being," however, the relation of the Appropriation and the human being of mortals is consciously excluded.

2. Ontological Difference.

QUESTION: Does the ontological difference disappear in the Ap-

4. These questions were answered by Heidegger in writing in the summer of 1970, after being formulated by the editors. They are here translated with his permission.

between (a) thinking Being without regard to beings (that means not metaphysically as the highest being and the ground of beings, *causa sui*); and (b) "What do you make of the difference if Being as well as beings appear *by virtue of the difference*, each in its own way?" (*Identity and Difference*, pp. 63-64)?

ANSWER: "Being itself" means: The Appropriation can no longer be thought as "Being" in terms of presence.⁷ "Appropriation" no longer names another manner and epoch of "Being." "Being" thought without regard to beings (i.e., always only in terms of, and with respect to, them) means at the same time: no longer thought as "Being" (presence).

If this happens, then the thinking thus transformed thinks the following: the ontological difference disappears in the Appropriation through the step back. It loses its decisiveness for thinking and is thus given up in a certain way in thinking.

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A final question which was supposed to have "answered itself":

Can anything more be said about the relation of (a) the epochal transformations of Being; (b) Appropriation; and (c) Expropriation (*kryptesthai*)?

The epochal
transformations
of Being

Framing
(Janus head)

Appropriation Expropriation

Isn't Appropriation already in itself a double relation: (1) a "separable" relation in that through possibly overcoming Framing by the step back the epochal transformations of Being would be absorbed in Appropriation; and (2) an "inseparable" relation: Appropriation and Expropriation can never be separated from each other, but rather constitute a relation which is what is most original

7. *On the Way to Language*, trans. by Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 129n.

Being, in the sense of the appearance of the division into whatness and thatness.

A support for the differentiating determination of *existentia* is now given by *essentia*. Actuality is distinguished from possibility. One could attempt to grasp the division of Being into whatness and thatness by inquiring into the common element that determines what is divided. What is it that still remains as "—is" if we disregard the what and the that? But if this search for what is most general leads to emptiness, must whatness be grasped as a kind of thatness or, on the contrary, must the latter be grasped as a degeneration of the former? Even if this were successful, the question about the origin of the distinction would still remain. Does it come from Being itself? What "is" Being? How does the coming of the distinction, its origin, result from Being? Or is this distinction merely attributed to Being? If so, by what kind of thinking and by what right? How is Being given to such attribution for such attribution?

If the questions raised are thought through even roughly, the illusion of being a matter of course, in which the distinction of essentia and existentia stands for all metaphysics, disappears. The distinction is groundless if metaphysics simply tries again and again to define the limits of what is divided, and comes up with numbering the manners of possibility and the kinds of actuality which float away into vagueness, together with the difference in which they are already placed.

However, if it is true that metaphysics accounts for its essence through this difference, obscure in origin, of the what and the that, and grounds its essence thereupon, it can never of itself come to a knowledge of this distinction. It would have to be previously and as such approached by Being which has entered this distinction. But Being refuses this approach, and thus alone makes possible the essential beginning of metaphysics—in the manner of the preparation and development of this distinction. The origin of the distinction of *essentia* and *existentia*, for more so the origin of Being thus divided, remains concealed, expressed in the Greek manner: forgotten.

Oblivion of Being means: the self-concealing of the origin of

thought in the Greek manner, also has nothing to do with the so-called energy of later times. At best the opposite is true, but only in a very remote sense. Instead of *energeia*, Aristotle also uses the word *entelecheia* which he himself coined. *Telos* is the end in which the movement of producing and setting up gathers itself. This gathering portrays the presencing of what is completed and ended, that is, of what is fulfilled (the work). *Entelecheia* is having-(itself)-in-the-end, the containing of presencing which leaves all production behind and is thus immediate, pure: being in presence. *Energeia*, *entelecheia* *on* means the same as *en to eidei einai*. What presences in virtue of "being-in-the-work-as-work" has its present in its outward appearance and through its outward appearance. *Energeia* is the *ousia* (presence) of the *tode ti*, of the this and the that in each case.

As this presence, *ousia* is called: *to eschaton*, the presence in which presencing contains its utmost and ultimate. This highest manner of presence also grants the first and nearest presence of everything which in each case lingers as this and as that in unconcealment. If *einai* (Being) has thus determined the highest manner of its presencing as *energeia*, then *ousia* thus determined must also of its own show how it can separate into the differentiation of whatness and thatness, and also must thus separate in consequence of the eminent prevailing of Being as *energeia*.

The distinction of a twofold *ousia* (presence) has become necessary. The beginning of the fifth chapter of Aristotle's treatise on the "categories" expresses this distinction.

Ousia de estin he kuriotata te kai protos kas malista legomene, he mete katb'-hypokeimenou tinos legetai mete en hypokeimeno tini estin, boion bo tis anthropos e bo tis hippos.

"What is present in the sense of predominantly presencing (presence) which is thus predicated firstly and for the most part is that which is predicated neither with respect to something already before us, nor (first) occurs in something already before us, for example, the man there, the horse there."¹

1. Cf. Ross translation: "Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite

the *existentia* itself in its nature. Every being is groundlike: groundlike ground: *hypokeimenon*, *subiectum*. Being as reality is a grounding. Grounding must contain the nature of giving Being precedence over nothingness. Being must contain the character of being attracted to itself and capable of itself in its essence. Being is unifying self-effecting in self-containedness. It is the striving after itself which brings itself before itself (represents). As Being, the possibility of something possible is already an "existing," that is, essentially related to *existentia*. The possible being is already—because it only "is" at all what it is to that extent—something attracted, an inclined endeavor and thus a grounding and effecting. Being possible (possibility), which is thought and can only be thought from the essence of Being, summons forth in itself representational striving in such a way that this summons already brings about and accomplishes the *existentia*. "*Itaque dici potest Omne possibile Existiturire.*"²⁷ (The Twenty-four Statements," n. 6.)

at?
here?
as me

The expression *existiturire*, which because of the essentiality of its saying is actually "beautiful" in spite of its seeming misshapeness, is according to the grammatical form a *verbum desiderativum*.

The striving of self-effecting, of the *conatus ad Existentiam* (n. 5), is named there. The existential character of possibility is expressed. Existence itself has such a nature that it summons forth the attraction of itself. Thus possibility does not repulse reality, but contains it, retains it in itself, and so remains precisely in possession of its essence whose fundamental trait is *appetitus*. Hence the first of "The Twenty-four Statements" can begin with the sentence: "*Ratio est in Natura, cur aliquid potius existat quam nihil.*" "A ground is in the nature of beings as beings, a reason why something, that is, preferentially and more attractively, exists rather than nothing." This says: beings in their Being are *exigent* with respect to themselves. "To exist" means in itself: attraction and unifying capability which is an effecting. In that something *is* it is also essentially *potius*.

Being as existence in the sense of representational striving

27. "Thus every possible can be said to strive to exist."

how onesidedly. The system, the *Sustasis*, is the essential structure of the reality of what is real—of course, only when reality has been discovered in its essence as will. This happens when truth has become certainty, evoking from the essence of Being the fundamental characteristic of the universal ensurance of structure in a ground which ensures itself.

Because *veritas* does not yet ground its essence in the *certitudo* of the *cogitare* in the medieval period, Being can never be systematic. What is called a medieval system is always just a *summa* as the presentation of the whole of doctrine. But the idea of a system is still less commensurate with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The systematic essence of subjectivity first brings the trend toward the unconditionality of manipulation and positing. Here the essence of condition appears as a new form of the causality of beingness, so that reality is true reality only when it has determined in advance of everything real all that is in terms of the systematics of the conditioning unconditioned.

LEIBNIZ, "The TWENTY-FOUR STATEMENTS"³¹

1. *Ratio* est in Natura, cur aliquid potius existat quam nihil. Id consequens est magni illius principii, quod nihil fiat sine ratione, quemadmodum etiam cur hoc potius existat quam aliud rationem esse oportet.
2. Ea ratio debet esse in aliquo Ente Reali seu causa. Nihil aliud enim *causa* est, quam realis ratio, neque veritates possibilitatum et *necessitatum* (seu negatarum in opposito possibilitatum) aliquid efficerent nisi possibilitates fundarentur in re actu existente.

31. 1. There is a ground in nature why something exists rather than nothing.

This is a consequence of the great principle that nothing exists without a ground, just as there also must be a ground why this exists rather than something else.

2. This ground ought to be in some real being or cause. For a cause is nothing else than a real ground, and the truths of possibilities and necessities (or negativities in the opposition of possibilities) would not produce anything unless the possibilities were grounded in an actually

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THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

13. Unde jam consequitur materiam non ubique similem esse, sed per formas reddi dissimilarem, alioqui non tantum obtineretur varietatis quantum posset. Ut taceam quod alibi demonstravi, nulla alioqui diversa phaenomena esse extitura.

14. Sequitur etiam eam praevaluisse seriem, per quam plurimum oriretur distinctae cogitabilitatis.

15. Porro distincta cogitabilitas dat ordinem rei et pulchritudinem cogitanti. Est enim *ordo* nihil aliud quam relatio plurium distinctiva. Et confusio est, cum plura quidem adsunt, sed non est ratio quodvis a quovis distinguendi.

16. Hinc tolluntur atomi, et in universum corpora, in quibus nulla est ratio quamvis partem distinguendi a quavis.

X 17. Sequiturque in universum, Mundum esse *kosmon*, plenum ornatus, seu ita factum ut maxime satisfaciatur intelligenti.

18. *Voluptas* enim intelligentis nihil aliud est quam perceptio pulchritudinis, ordinis, perfectionis. Et omnis dolor continet aliquid inordinati sed respective ad percipientem, cum absolute omnia sint ordinata.

13. Whence it follows that matter is not everywhere uniform, but becomes diversified through forms; otherwise, not as much variety as possible would obtain. To pass over in silence what I have demonstrated elsewhere—no diverse phenomena would otherwise appear.

14. It follows also that that series prevailed by which there emerges the greatest possibility of thinking of things as distinct.

[15. Further, the possibility of thinking of things as distinct gives order to the thing and beauty to the thinker. For order is nothing but the distinctive relation between many things, and confusion arises when there are many things, but no ground for distinguishing anything from anything else.

16. Hence atoms are done away with and, in general, bodies in which there is no ground for distinguishing any part from any other.

X 17. And it follows, in general, that the world is a cosmos, fully adorned, that is, so made as to give the most satisfaction to the perceiver.

18. For the pleasure of the perceiver is nothing but the perception of beauty, order, perfection. And every pain contains something of dis-

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tional investigation of means, grounds, hindrances, the miscalculating exchange and plotting of goals, deceptiveness and maneuvers, the inquisitorial, as a consequence of which the will to will is distrustful and devious toward itself, and thinks of nothing else than the guaranteeing of itself as power itself.

The aimlessness, indeed the essential aimlessness of the unconditional will to will, is the completion of the being of will which was incipient in Kant's concept of practical reason as pure will. Pure will wills itself, and as the will is Being. Viewed from the perspective of content, pure will and its law are thus formal. Pure will is the sole content for itself as form.

XXII

In virtue of the fact that the will is sometimes personified in individual "men of will," it looks as if the will to will were the radiation of these persons. The opinion arises that the human will is the origin of the will to will, whereas man is willed by the will to will without experiencing the being of this willing.

In that man is what is thus willed and what is posited in the will to will, "the will" is also of necessity addressed in its being and released as the instance of truth. The question is whether the individuals and communities are in virtue of this will, or whether they still deal and barter with this will or even against it without knowing that they are already outwitted by it. The uniqueness of Being shows itself in the will to will, too, which only admits one direction in which to will. The uniformity of the world of the will to will stems from this, a uniformity which is as far removed from the simplicity of what is original, as deformation of essence from essence, although the former belongs to the latter.

XXIII

Because the will to will absolutely denies every goal and only admits goals as means to outwit itself willfully and to make room

for this game; because, however, the will to will nevertheless may not appear as the anarchy of catastrophes that it really is, if it wants to assert itself in beings; it still must legitimate itself. The will to will invents here the talk about "task." Task is not thought with regard to anything original and its preservation, but rather as the goal which is assigned from the standpoint of "fate," thus justifying the will to will.

XXIV

The struggle between those who are in power and those who want to come to power: On every side there is the struggle for power. Everywhere power itself is what is determinative. Through this struggle for power, the being of power is posited in the being of its unconditional dominance by both sides. At the same time, however, one thing is still covered up here: the fact that this struggle is in the service of power and is willed by it. Power has overpowered these struggles in advance. The will to will alone empowers these struggles. Power, however, overpowers various kinds of humanity in such a way that it expropriates from man the possibility of ever escaping from the oblivion of Being on such paths. This struggle is of necessity planetary and as such undecidable in its being because it has nothing to decide, since it remains excluded from all differentiation, from the difference (of Being from beings), and thus from truth. Through its own force it is driven out into what is without destiny: into the abandonment of Being.

XXV

The pain which must first be experienced and borne out to the end is the insight and the knowledge that lack of need is the highest and most hidden need which first necessitates in virtue of the most distance. Lack of need consists in believing that one has reality and what is real in one's grip and knows what truth is, without needing to know in what truth *presences*.

