Philosophy Program Presents

Reducing Two-Way Powers

Some philosophers argue that if exercising intentional agency is understood in terms of settling truths, then the power required for the exercise of agency is an ontologically irreducible two-way power to either make it true that p or make it true that not-p. In this paper, I motivate rejecting two-way powers by, first, arguing that accepting irreducible two-way powers into one’s metaphysic of agency implies an ontological commitment to substance dualism. I then offer an ontologically less costly alternative to irreducible two-way powers. I argue that an ontologically reductive account of two-way powers should be accepted. The reductive account can provide us with the truth makers for talk about two-way powers.    
 

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For more information, call 845-758-6822, or e-mail [email protected].

Time: 4:45 pm EDT/GMT-4

Location: Olin Humanities, Room 102

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