Dean of the College and Philosophy Program Present

Falling Short of Equality

Socrates’ defense of recollection in the Phaedo (72e–77a) turns on the claim that sensible reality falls short of the corresponding form. Socrates illustrates the point with sticks, which he argues “strive” (oregetai) to be like the form of equality but “fall short” (endeesterōs echein, 74d–75a). On the traditional reading, material objects cannot be exactly equal—e.g., no stick is exactly equal to any other. Contemporary scholars tend to reject this reading, arguing instead that sensible items fall short by admitting equality as well as inequality. I show that both readings fail.

To understand the inferiority claim, we must bring in the pedagogical context in which it occurs, rather than treating it in strict metaphysical terms. I argue that the inferiority of sensibles is an evaluative stance that permeates the pedagogical situation on the side of learners and teachers. Since learning aims at the form of each thing, the material examples from which teaching and learning proceed have conditional value relative to the forms they communicate. Equal sticks, for example, enter a mathematical context as symbols of equality, never in themselves, i.e., as the material objects they are. This interpretation explains the striving—and inevitable depreciation—of sensible reality relative to the forms, shedding new light on the overall argument.

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For more information, call 845-758-6822.

Time: 3:30 pm EDT/GMT-4

Location: Olin Humanities, Room 203

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